BP 22

1. (ATE WENDY) G.R. No. 163494 August 3, 2016

JESUSA T. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

FACTS:

Tan supplied and delivered to the petitioner rolls of textile materials worth ₱27,090,641.25. For
every delivery made by Tan, the petitioner issued post-dated checks made payable to "Cash". When
presented for payment, however, some of the checks issued by the petitioner to Tan were
dishonored by the drawee-bank for being "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds" or "Account Closed".
The replacement checks later issued by the petitioner were still dishonored upon presentment for
payment. The fourth batch of twenty-three (23) replacement checks issued by the petitioner to Tan
became the subject of his complaint. All checks were dated March 30, 1987 and drawn against
Family Bank & Trust Co. (FBTC), but were issued for different amounts totaling ₱6,226,390.29.

The 23 checks were still later dishonored by the drawee-bank FBTC for the reason "Account
Closed". Tan informed the petitioner of the checks' dishonor through a demand letter,8 but the
amounts thereof remained unsatisfied. Hence, the filing of the complaint against petitioner for
violation of BP 22. She was found guilty by the RTC as affirmed by the CA. Jesusa asks the Court
to take into consideration the fact that she was acquitted by the CA in another set of B.P. Blg. 22
cases on the ground that she has overpaid Tan and prays for the remand of the case to the RTC.
She likewise claimed that she was not properly notified of the proceedings before the RTC and,
second, her alleged non-receipt of a notice of dishonor from Tan.

ISSUE:
Whether Jesusa should be acquitted of the crime B.P 22

RULING:
Yes. Jesusa’s acquittal is proper.

"To be liable for violation of B.P. [Blg.] 22, the following essential elements must be present: (1) the
making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of
the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment."

Although a notice of dishonor is not an indispensable requirement in a prosecution for violation of

B.P. Blg. 22 as it is not an element of the offense, evidence that a notice of dishonor has been sent
to and received by the accused is actually sought as a means to prove the second element. The
presumption that the issuer had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is brought into existence only
after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor and that within five days from
receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangement for its payment.
The presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in Section 2 of B.P 22 cannot arise, if such
notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if there is no proof
as to when such notice was received by the drawer, since there would simply be no way of
reckoning the crucial 5-day period. The absence of said notice therefore deprives an accused of an
opportunity to preclude criminal prosecution. In other words, procedural due process demands that a
notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. In the case at bar, appellant has a right to
demand and the basic postulate of fairness requires - that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to
and received by her to afford her the opportunity to aver prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22.

In this case, the prosecution merely presented a copy of the demand letter, together with the registry
receipt and the return card, allegedly sent to petitioner. However, there was no attempt to
authenticate or identify the signature on the registry return card. Receipts for registered letters and
return receipts do not by themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as
proof of receipt of the letter, claimed to be a notice of dishonor. To be sure, the presentation of the
registry card with an unauthenticated signature, does not meet the required proof beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner revived such notice. It is not enough for the prosecution to prove
that a notice of dishonor was sent to the drawee of the check. The prosecution must also prove
actual receipt of said notice, because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from
receipt of such notice of dishonor by the drawee of the check. The burden of proving notice rests
upon the party asserting its existence.

The failure of the prosecution to prove the receipt by the petitioner of the requisite written notice of
dishonor and that she was given at least five banking days within which to settle her account
constitutes sufficient ground for her acquittal.
 2. (SHEENA) G.R. No. 196289 August 15, 2016

ELIZABETH ALBURO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Petitioner and her husband bought a house and lot from petitioner's sister-in-law,
Elsa Alburo-Walter. They made a partial payment and the remaining balance has been paid
through four (4) postdated checks (subject checks) issued by petitioner. The checks eventually
bounced, thus, four (4) separate Informations for violation of B.P. 22 were filed against
petitioner. The MTCC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged. The RTC affirmed the decision. The CA dismissed the appeal on the ground of
procedural defects.

ISSUE: Whether the prosecution was able to prove the existence of the elements of the
crime charged

RULING: No.

For violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the prosecution must prove the following essential
elements, namely:

(1) The making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there were no
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment; and

(3) The dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
the dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered
the drawee bank to stop payment.

There is no dispute that the first and the third elements are present in this case. It was proven
that petitioner issued the subject Landbank checks in favor of Aurelio Tapang as payment for
the balance of the purchase of the house and lot owned by Elsa Alburo-Walter and when
presented for payment, the same checks were dishonored for the reason of being drawn against
insufficient funds.

The remaining issue is whether or not the second element is present. To establish the existence
of the second element, the State should present the giving of a written notice of the dishonor to
the drawer, maker or issuer of the dishonored check.

To hold a person liable under B.P. Blg. 22, the prosecution must not only establish that a check
was issued and that the same was subsequently dishonored, it must further be shown that
accused knew at the time of the issuance of the check that he did not have sufficient funds
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment.
Inasmuch as this element involves a state of mind of the person making, drawing or issuing the
check which is difficult to prove, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 creates a prima facie presumption of
such knowledge.

For this presumption to arise, the prosecution must prove the following: (a) the check is
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check; (b) the drawer or maker of the
check receives notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee; and (c) the drawer or
maker of the check fails to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or make
arrangements for payment in full within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such
check has not been paid by the drawee. In other words, the presumption is brought into
existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor and that
within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make
arrangements for its payment. The presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in this
section cannot arise, if such notice of nonpayment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker
or drawer, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer, since there
would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period.

In this case, the findings of the MTCC, as affirmed by the RTC, failed to mention that
petitioner received any notice of dishonor, and simply stated that a representative of
Landbank testified that notices of dishonor were issued. It is necessary in cases for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, that the prosecution prove that the issuer had received a notice of
dishonor. A perusal of the records of the case, likewise shows the absence of any indication
that petitioner received the notices of dishonor allegedly sent by Landbank. The absence
of proof that petitioner received any notice informing her of the fact that her checks were
dishonored and giving her five banking days within which to make arrangements for payment of
the said checks prevents the application of the disputable presumption that she had knowledge
of the insufficiency of her funds at the time she issued the checks. Absent such presumption,
the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove that petitioner had knowledge of the insufficiency of
her funds when she issued the said checks, otherwise, she cannot be held liable under the law.

Thus, there being no clear showing that petitioner actually knew of the dishonor of her checks,
this Court cannot with moral certainty convict her of violation of B.P. 22. The failure of the
prosecution to prove that petitioner was given the requisite notice of dishonor is a clear ground
for her acquittal.
RA 7832
3. (SHEENA) G.R. No. 195145 February 10, 2016

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES SULPICIO and PATRICIA

RAMOS, Respondents.

FACTS: MERALCO entered into a contract of service with the respondents agreeing to
supply the latter with electric power in their residence. To measure their electric consumption,
MERALCO installed an electric meter outside the front wall of the property occupied by
Patricia’s brother, Isidoro, and his wife Nieves located beside the respondents’ house. An
inspector of MERALCO inspected the respondents’ electrical facilities and found an outside
connection, an illegal one, attached to their electric meter, and traced the same to the residence
of Nieves. Due to the discovery of the illegal connection, the service inspector disconnected the
respondents’ electric services on the same day. The inspection and disconnection were done
without the knowledge of the respondents as they were not at home and their house was closed
at the time. They denied that they had been using an illegal electrical connection and they
requested MERALCO to immediately reconnect their electric services. Subsequently,
respondents filed a complaint for breach of contract with preliminary mandatory injunction and
damages against MERALCO.

The RTC ordered MERALCO to reconnect the respondents’ electric service. The CA RTC’s
order of reconnection and award for payment of damages, on the ground that MERALCO failed
to comply not only with its own contract of service, but also with the requirements under
Sections 4 and 6 of Republic Act No. 7832 when it resorted to the immediate disconnection of
the respondents’ electric service without due notice.

ISSUE: Whether MERALCO had the right to immediately disconnect the electric service
of the respondents upon discovery of an outside connection attached to their electric meter

RULING: No.

The distribution of electricity is a basic necessity that is imbued with public interest.
Nevertheless, the State also recognizes that electricity is the property of the service provider.
R.A. 7832 was enacted by Congress to afford electric service providers multiple remedies to
protect themselves from electricity pilferage. These remedies include the immediate
disconnection of the electric service of an erring customer, criminal prosecution, and the
imposition of surcharges. However, the service provider must avail of any or all of these
remedies within legal bounds, in strict compliance with the requirements and/or conditions set
forth by law.

Section 4(a) of R.A. 7832 provides that the discovery of an outside connection attached on the
electric meter shall constitute as prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity by the person
who benefits from the illegal use if the discovery is personally witnessed and attested to by
an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board
(ERB). With the presence of such prima facie evidence, the electric service provider is within its
rights to immediately disconnect the electric service of the consumer after due notice.

Additionally, Section 6 of R.A. 7832 affords a private electric utility the right and authority to
immediately disconnect the electric service of a consumer who has been caught in flagrante
delicto doing any of the acts covered by Section 4(a). However, the law clearly states that the
disconnection may only be done after serving a written notice or warning to the
consumer.

To reiterate, R.A. 7832 has two requisites for an electric service provider to be authorized to
disconnect its customer’s electric service on the basis of alleged electricity pilferage: first, an
officer of the law or an authorized ERB representative must be present during the inspection of
the electric facilities; and second, even if there is prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity
and the customer is caught in flagrante delicto committing the acts under Section 4(a), the
customer must still be given due notice prior to the disconnection.

After a thorough examination of the records of the case, we find no proof that MERALCO
complied with these two requirements under R.A. 7832. MERALCO never even alleged in its
submissions that an ERB representative or an officer of the law was present during the
inspection of the respondents’ electric meter. Also, it did not claim that the respondents were
ever notified beforehand of the impending disconnection of their electric service.

In view of MERALCO’s failure to comply with the strict requirements under Sections 4 and 6 of
R. A. No. 7832, we hold that MERALCO had no authority to immediately disconnect the
respondents’ electric service. As a result, the immediate disconnection of the respondents’
electric service is presumed to be in bad faith.
RA 10654
4. (ATE WENDY) G.R. No. 118816 July 10, 1998

SANTIAGO ARGONCILLO, RICHARDO BALBONA and POLICARPIO UMITEN, petitioners

vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

FACTS:

Due to reports of rampant illegal fishing at Barangay Basiao, Ivisan, Capiz, the DENR as well as the
Barangay Captain of said place assisted by the local policemen created a team to conduct
surveillance within the Ivisan Bay. Around 6:30 of the same evening while standing by with their
engines off, in a place facing Barangay Culasi, the team heard an explosion. Sensing it was caused
by dynamite, they proceeded to the area around five hundred meters (500 m.) away from them. After
ten minutes of navigation, the team arrived at the scene in question which was near an islet and saw
six persons including the accused-appellant. These six persons tried to escape but they were
advised not to do so and the team introduced themselves as law enforcers. The team found out that
the fishes they caught were deep sea fish of four kinds. Upon inspection, the team failed to find any
explosive (dynamite) either on the seashore or on the banca. No paraphernalia used in dynamite
fishing were found. The team recognized the six persons as the herein accused by their faces.

The team apprehended the six accused and brought them to the fish cage of the barangay captain
located within the same barangay. While on their way, Joey de la Cruz externally examined the fish
samples. Upon another examination, it was also found out that the fishes were caught with the use of
explosives because blood was oozing from their operculums and their eyes were protruding.

The RTC found Argoncillo, Balbona and Umiten guilty of "illegal fishing with the use of an
explosive. It was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether the absence of the explosives and related paraphernalia in possession of the
accused should warrant their acquittal

RULING:

No. First, it is quite probable that petitioners dumped these materials into the sea while the raiding
party was approaching. Moreover, Section 33, Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1058, provides:

Sec. 33. Illegal fishing; . . . — It shall be unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather, or cause to
be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of
explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs
(l), 7 (m) 8 and (d), 9 respectively, of Sec. 3 hereof.

The last paragraph of Section 33, creates a presumption that illegal fishing has been committed
when fish caught or killed with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or by
electricity are found in a fishing boat. In this case, it cannot be denied that the fishes found in
petitioners' banca were caught or killed by the use of explosives.

There was testimony that the fish samples manifested signs that said fish were caught or killed by the
use of explosives. With the external and internal examination by Joey de la Cruz and Rolando
Amoroso showing that these fishes were caught with the use of explosive, bare denial of above
three (3) accused that they caught them by means of a fishing net they locally call "patoloy" is
insufficient to disprove such finding. It is simply a superiority of weight of object evidence over
testimonies of the accused. The presumption that the crime of illegal fishing was committed has,
therefore, been clearly established. Such presumption, however, is merely prima facie, and may be
rebutted by the accused.

Moreover, the fishes caught by petitioners were not actually "deep sea fishes" in the sense that they
came from the deep portions of the sea as distinguished from shallow waters or waters near or along
the shores. Too, the law punishing illegal fishing does not require the use of motorized banca or boat
for the crime to be committed so their defense that they merely used a boat which would make it
difficult for them to escape from the law enforcers riding motorized boats does not automatically
exonerate them.

Having failed to discharge themselves of the burden of disproving that they have committed illegal
fishing, the Court is left with no alternative but to affirm petitioners' conviction.
PD 705

5. (JILL) G.R. No. 193313 March 16, 2016

ERNIE IDANAN, NANLY DEL BARRIO AND MARLON PLOPENIO, Petitioners, v.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioners Idanan, Del Barrio and Plopenio, together with Vargas and Tulod were charged with
illegal possession of lumber under Sec. 68 of (PD) No. 705, as amended. They were in control
of (29) pieces of narra lumber loaded in a truck without the necessary permit required by the
DENR to the damage and prejudice of the Republic in the amount of Php275,844.80.

The police officers who apprehended petitioners testified that the PNP headquarters in
Panganiban, Catanduanes received information that a group of illegal loggers will be
transporting narra flitches. While patrolling Kilometer 12, they spotted an idling Isuzu Elf truck
loaded with lumber. They found out that Idanan was the driver while Del Barrio and Plopenio
were the passengers. Vargas and Tulod were seen hauling lumber to be loaded into the truck.
Petitioners were not able to produce any document authorizing them to transport lumber so they
were placed under arrest.

The defense denied the charge. Idanan, Del Barrio and Plopemo testified that while traversing
Kilometer 12, they were flagged down by policemen. One of the policemen drove the truck for
about 100meters while petitioners trailed the truck by foot. They then saw the policemen load
narra flitches into the truck. Not one of them questioned the police out of fear. To petitioners'
surprise, they were then arrested and ordered to follow the policemen to the police station.

RTC found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of lumber. CA
rendered its decision affirming petitioner's conviction.

Relying on an illegal possession of firearm case where the Court held that to support a
conviction, there must be possession coupled with intent to possess, petitioners assert that their
intent to possess the subject narra lumber must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68 of
PD No. 705

HELD: YES

Section 68 of PD 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines
penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber or
other forest products from any forest land without any authority; (2) the cutting, gathering,
collecting, or removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land
without any authority; and (3) the possession of timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.
Petitioners were charged under the third category, i.e., of possessing and in control of 29
pieces of narra lumber without the legal requirements as required under existing forest laws and
regulations.

Illegal possession of timber is an offense covered by special law and is malum prohibitum. Thus,
criminal intent is not an essential element of the offense. However, the prosecution must prove
intent to possess or animus possidendi.

Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive
possession. Actual possession exists when the object of the crime is in the immediate physical
control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the object of the
crime is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
dominion and control over the place where it is found.

Thus, conviction need not be predicated upon exclusive possession, and a showing of
non-exclusive possession would not exonerate the accused. Such fact of possession may be
proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inference drawn therefrom.

Idanan, Del Barrio, and Plopenio were, at the very least, in constructive possession of the
timber without the requisite legal documents. Petitioners were found in the truck loaded with 29
pieces of narra lumber. Idanan admitted to driving the truck while Del Barrio and Plopenio
accompanied Idanan. They claimed to have traveled for almost three hours just to retrieve the
cellular phone of Idanan's father from a certain Jojo Cabrera (Cabrera) in Barangay Poblacion,
Panganiban, Catanduanes. When pressed by the prosecutor if they managed to get the
cellphone, they replied that they failed to locate Cabrera. The three accused did not protest
despite seeing that the policemen allegedly load lumber into the truck. Neither did they complain
when they were subsequently arrested. Idanan was the driver. It is presumed that he exercised
full control of the vehicle that he is driving and that he knew what its load was. Having offered no
plausible excuse, petitioners failed to prove to our satisfaction that they did not have the animus
possidendi of the narra lumber.

Mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents, even
absent malice or criminal intent, is illegal. It would make no difference at all whether the
ownership of the lumber pertains to only one accused. The possession of lumber was made
without any license or permit issued by any competent authority.
 6. (JEZ) G.R. No. 205015 November 19, 2014

MA. MIMIE CRESCENCIO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

​FACTS:

Abaniel, the Chief of the Forest Protection Unit of DENR received information that there was a
stockpile of lumber or forest products in the vicinity of the house of Crescencio. Abaniel,
together with Forest Rangers Butal, Bastasa and Ramos went to the house and saw forest
products lying under the house and at the shoreline about two meters away from the house. As
the DENR personnel tried to investigate from the neighborhood, Crescencio admitted its
ownership. Thereafter, the DENR personnel entered the premises of the house without a search
warrant. Upon inspection, 24 pieces of magsihagon lumber were discovered and when the
DENR personnel asked for documents to support Crescencio’s claim of ownership, the latter
showed them OR No. 35053 issued by Pengavitor Enterprises where she allegedly bought the
said lumber. However, they found out that the dimensions and the species of the lumber did not
match with the items mentioned in the receipt.

Since Crescencio could not present any other receipt, Abaniel ordered the confiscation of the
lumber, asked for police assistance, and told Crescencio that they were going to transport the
confiscated lumber to the DENR office for safekeeping. Seizure Receipt and a Statement
Showing the Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber Being Confiscated which showed the value
of the lumber were issued to Crescencio. Forest Rangers Butal and Ramos corroborated
Abaniel’s testimony.

SPO1 Garcia testified that upon the request of Abaniel for police assistance, he and PO3
Antonio Crescencio went to the house where they saw some lumber which was later loaded on
a cargo truck.

The lone witness of the defense, Lolita Crescencio, admitted that the seized lumber was owned
by Mimie Crescencio but claimed that the latter bought it from Pengavitor Enterprises and from
Java Marketing. However, the defense had only the OR No. 35053 issued by Pengavitor
Enterprises.

Crescencio was charged with violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No.
277. RTC rendered judgment convicting him of the offense charged and also ordered the
confiscation of the seized lumber. The RTC imposed an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor as maximum.

Crescencio filed an appeal and a motion for reconsideration to the CA but it was dismissed
outright.

ISSUE/S:
 1. Whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt Crescencio’s
culpability and whether the DENR personnel had authority to arrest Crescencio
without warrant.

2. Whether the penalty imposed by the RTC was proper.

HELD:

1. YES.

Section 80 of the Forestry Code authorizes the forestry officer or employee of the DENR or any
personnel of the Philippine National Police to arrest, even without a warrant, any person who
has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined by the Forestry
Code and to seize and confiscate the tools and equipment used in committing the offense or the
forest products gathered or taken by the offender. Clearly, in the course of such lawful intrusion,
the DENR personnel had inadvertently come across the lumber which evidently incriminated the
petitioner.
The fact of possession by Crescencio of the 24 pieces of magsihagon lumber, as well as her
subsequent failure to produce the legal documents constitute criminal liability for violation of the
Forestry Code. Under Section 68 of the Forestry Code, there are two distinct and separate
offenses punished, namely: (1) cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land without any authority; and (2) possession of timber or other forest products without the
legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.
In the present case, the magsihagon lumber was admittedly owned by Crescencio but
unfortunately no permit evidencing authority to possess was presented. Thus, the Information
correctly charged the petitioner with the second offense which is consummated by the mere
possession of forest products without the proper documents.

2. No.

This Court notes that the estimated value of the confiscated pieces of lumber, as appearing in
the Statement Showing the Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber Being Confiscated is
₱9,040.00 which is alleged in the Information. However, except for the testimonies of Abaniel
and Butal, the prosecution did not present any proof as to the value of the lumber.

The Court had ruled that in order to prove the amount of the property taken for fixing the penalty
imposable against the accused under Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the
prosecution must present more than a mere uncorroborated "estimate" of such fact. In the
absence of independent and reliable corroboration of such an estimate, courts may either apply
the minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on the
attendant circumstances of the case.