IOS 529- Final Exam

The ideal response to a question is between 2-2.5 pages with single space. Do not avoid of using
footnotes and short quotations from the course materials in your responses.

Q1: What does the term ‘Muslim World’ mean? Was it simply a unity of Muslims against with
an anti-imperialist agenda? How can we relate its emergence to the development of the
‘progressive thought’ in the West? Was it a response to the Western secular orientalist discourses
assuming backwardness for Islam? What was the position of the Ottoman Empire and the Caliph
in such discourses? How Abdulhamid II wanted to benefit from Pan-Islamist movement?

Even though ‘Muslim World’ (as well as Islamic World) may designate actually several
realities at a time, according to Cemil Aydın this term is coined in the second half of the 19 th
century in a political context in which a great part of Muslims were living under Colonial
empires, mainly British, French and Dutch, as colonized indigenous people. It is very difficult to
locate where and when this usage first came out and through which type of medium. Again
according to Aydın, at least between 1880 and 1930 many periodicals were published bearing the
title of ‘Muslim World’ in major European languages as well as in Ottoman Turkish, Arabic
Malay and even Japanese (Aydın 2016: 78). In other words, the term was used both by the
Western powers and Muslim ‘intellectuals’. Of course for both sides the term had different
connotations. As for Muslims, it can be interpreted as a considerably ‘updated version’ of the
idea of ummet (Aydın 2016: 3) reinforced so to create a sort of defense mechanism against ever-
growing Colonial powers who, for instance, by 1884 had established new norms of international
public law to invade in ‘civil’ manner the ‘Rest of the World’, during the so-called ‘Scramble for
Africa’ frenzy (Minawi 2016: 46-49). So for the European powers, Muslim populations were just
another culture, geographical entity, in sum a world, to colonize, tame and dominate. In this
context, this later reification, i. e. the ‘Muslim World’, became a suitable term which was
instrumental for different actors and publics who had different agendas. For a colonial official
like Cecil Wood it was a much more political and military matter (Minawi 2016: 32-34; 58-60),
for Orientalists as well as anthropologists like E. E. Evans-Pritchard it was moreover a scientific
object (Minawi 2016: 53-54). On the other hand for Rashid Rida or Ismail Gaspıralı the meaning
entailed by this term, although with several intersecting lines did not have the same connotations,
just as it did not between them or Abdulhamid II (Aydın 2016: 66).
Seen from this light, the term ‘Muslim World’ does not seem to be ‘a simply a unity of
Muslims against with an anti-imperialist agenda’. Of course, in the last century and a half, as
Cemil Aydın illustrates in his book, several political actors starting from Abdulhamid II (1876-
1908), early pan-Islamic congress makers from India, Egypt or from other colonized and semi-
colonized societies to Ayatollah Humayni or Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi claimed to be the speaker for
this ‘Muslim World’. It was thus a highly political concept. But, again with the development of
communications and infrastructural systems, the mobility and interaction between different
Muslim societies – who before the 1850’s had very rare occasions to make encounters besides
the Pilgrimage – considerably developed. Consequentially, even if this term was at first an
abstract reification gradually came to bear concrete meanings for educated and less educated or
politicized and less politicized Muslims.
In this sense, one may say that this term was initially a substantivist reaction to an
essentialist conceptualization. So, it would be too easy to say that this was a ‘response to the
Western secular orientalist discourses assuming backwardness for Islam’. In a sense, it is a
response to discursive and effective discrimination and domination. But one has to keep in mind
several aspects so as not to fall to another essentialist trap. As Aydın demonstrates by several
examples, there was not a compact and unique Islamic culture. There were numerous Muslim
societies, having different evolution patterns and historicity. So these reactions or responses
changed inevitably according to time and place. As indicated above, different Muslim political
actors made different uses of these reactionary feelings. For instance, even just for one actor,
though a prominent one, Abdulhamid II the idea of ‘Muslim World’ evolved according to
political, economic and cultural circumstances. When a Muslim population under his rule
revolted – as it was the case for Albanians living under his great-father’s rule in 1830 (Anscombe
2010: 173-178) – these Muslims became automatically Infidels, according to one of his very
active officer, Azmzade (Minawi 2016: 64). He did not hesitate to forbid Rida’s and Gaspirali’s
congress in Cairo fearing British reaction (Aydın 2016: 67). He nevertheless financed, as much
as possible, the former’s highly influential periodical al-Manar (Aydın 2016: 67) when it was in
line with his subtle foreign policy. In effect, often, Abdulhamid’s sympathy with British Queen’s
policies was approved by several writers of al-Manar as well as Indian Muslims (Aydın 2016:
85-93) which does not seem to be a curious coincidence.
In a similar manner, Abdulhamid’s policy toward Sanusi policies followed these lines.
The Ottoman sultan and caliph had vital interests in Libya’s hinterland and the Sanusi
confraternity appeared as the suitable actor to implement Ottoman control in these lands. Even if
he established many schools and supported charitable foundations in the region so as to create a
bond between diverse desert communities and his state, these bonds were only viable through
these intermediary actors who were his proxies to whom he moreover had sympathy. Still, he
had to follow a careful policy in the region. When he was asked for military aid against French
colony armies he often did this very reluctantly, after a mini-crisis with the III rd Republic in 1882
(Minawi 2016: 43). He did not hesitate to decline the Acehnese sultans ask for military help
fearing the reaction of the Dutch (Aydın 2016: 58).
In sum, Minawi’s argument seems to be convincing: ‘The Ottoman Empire, because it
seemed to straddle the line between civilized and uncivilized according to these definitions, was
often slotted as “semicivilized.” For it not to be considered fully civilized meant not only that
international law would not apply but that its very right to guaranteed sovereignty over its
territories could be questioned. With that in mind, we must understand that the Ottoman Empire
was not simply fighting for extra territory; it was fighting to maintain legal standing in the so-
called family of nations’(Minawi 2016: 64). The sultan and caliph of the Ottoman Empire, by
vocation, was sympathetic to the idea of Muslim World. Still, he had to prove his Empire’s place
in the international ground and especially, keep in as much as possible his own territories under
great menace. To do so, he as well his ministers and officials on the ground had to follow subtle
policies. ‘Muslim World’ as a conception and discourse was a convenient and convincing
instrument.
Q4:
a. What were the CUP’s policy against the Arab opposition before the First World War and
how did it change after the outbreak of the War? What did Cemal Pasha aim in Syria with
his draconian policies? Can we relate it to the pre-war Unionist attitudes toward the
Arabists?
b. How was the Ottoman Arab attitude toward the declaration of war against the Entente
and proclamation of Jihad? Did they support the Ottoman military operations? Did the
‘Ottoman Arab’s support the Arab Revolt?
c. How did the Ottoman rule in the Arab territories come to an end? Did the Arabs play a
part in this?