Putin'sHybridWars HonorsThesis Haynie (FinalPrint)

PUTIN’S HYBRID WARS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RUSSIAN
INCURSIONS INTO GEORGIA, UKRAINE, BULGARIA, AND SYRIA
A thesis submitted to the

Kent State University Honors College
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for University Honors
by
Joshua Haynie
May, 2020
Thesis written by
Joshua Haynie
Approved by
_____________________________________________________________________,
Advisor
_______________________________________, Chair, Department of Political Science
Accepted by
___________________________________________________, Dean, Honors College
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTON.............................................................................................................1
1. Research Design...................................................................................................4
II. LITERATURE REVIEW................................................................................................6
1. Hybrid Warfare....................................................................................................6
2. Hybrid Warfare and Russian Thinking..............................................................15
3. Gerasimov and Non-Linear Warfare.................................................................16
4. Political Warfare and the Kremlin’s Playbook..................................................21
5. Russian Foreign Policy......................................................................................23
III. GEORGIA....................................................................................................................31
1. Historical Background.......................................................................................31
2. Events Leading to Incursion..............................................................................36
3. Hybrid Tactics Observed...................................................................................39
A. Political Warfare...................................................................................39
B. Conventional.........................................................................................42
C. Irregular.................................................................................................45
D. Information Warfare.............................................................................46
4. Conclusion.........................................................................................................48
IV. UKRAINE...................................................................................................................50
2. Event’s Leading to Incursions...........................................................................54
3. Political Warfare................................................................................................56
4. The Annexation of Crimea.................................................................................58
A. Conventional.........................................................................................58
B. Information Warfare..............................................................................65
C. Criminality............................................................................................69
5. War in Donbass..................................................................................................71
iii
A. Political Warfare...................................................................................71
B. Irregular.................................................................................................75
C. Transitory Period...................................................................................77
D. Conventional.........................................................................................79
E. Information Warfare..............................................................................81
6. Conclusion.........................................................................................................85
V. BULGARIA..................................................................................................................87
2. Hybrid Tactics Observed...................................................................................90
A. Economic Warfare................................................................................90
B. Information Warfare..............................................................................93
3. Conclusion.........................................................................................................95
VI. SYRIA........................................................................................................................97
2. Events Leading to Incursion............................................................................101
3. Hybrid Tactics Observed.................................................................................104
A. Political Warfare.................................................................................104
B. Conventional.......................................................................................105
C. Irregular...............................................................................................108
D. Information Warfare...........................................................................110
4. Conclusion.......................................................................................................113
VII. COMPARISON ANALYSIS...................................................................................115
VIII. CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................122
BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................129
iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
First and foremost, I would like to acknowledge my thesis advisor, Dr. Gabriella
Paar-Jakli. Dr. Paar-Jakli has not only supported me throughout this entire project but
has been a valuable source of mentorship throughout my collegiate career. I would also
like to extend my thanks to Dr. Julie Mazzei, Dr. Mary-Ann Heiss, and Dr. Don-John
Dugas for agreeing to participate on my Oral Defense Committee. I would also like to
extend my thanks to my parents, Michael and Natalie Haynie, for their support over the
last three years at Kent State University.
v
1
I. Introduction
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a unipolar world
dominated by the United States of America, most people expected the Russian Federation
to embark on a path towards democracy and economic freedom that would promote
stability in the international system. The result of nearly 25 years of modernization has
produced the opposite outcome; a newly emergent Russian state that seeks to
aggressively assert itself at both the regional and international levels. This assertion can
be seen manifested in Russia’s incursions into Georgia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Syria.
These incursions are defined not only by their military elements, but also by the political,
economic, and technological intrusions that accompany Russia’s use of force. The result
is a form of hybrid warfare, termed by some to be “New Generation Warfare” that blends
soft and hard power together by combining political, economic, technological, cyber, and
military elements in a comprehensive framework for conducting war.1
Russia’s “New Generation Warfare” has been a source of controversy and debate
between scholars, pundits, policymakers, and even the military strategists seeking to must
counter it. This debate originated when an article published in 2013, under the name of
1
Stefan Hadjitodorov and Martin Sokolov, "Blending New-generation Warfare and Soft Power: Hybrid
Dimensions of Russia-Bulgaria Relations," Connections: The Quarterly Journal 17, no. 1 (2018): 7.
2
the Chief of Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov, seemingly foreshadowed Russia’s
strategy in both Syria and Ukraine. Western commentators and scholars viewed the
article as outlining the current Russian military doctrine and strategies, labeling the views
authored by Gerasimov as the “Gerasimov Doctrine.” However, the existence of the
Gerasimov doctrine, and the organized hybrid warfare it describes, has been critiqued by
various scholars. The original proponent of the notion of a Gerasimov doctrine, Mark
Galeotti, has even rejected its existence.2 Although much of this discussion has centered
around what exactly Russia’s form of hybrid warfare is and whether it is a an entirely
unique phenomenon, little debate has occurred surrounding the choices made by Russian
leadership in conducting warfare characterized by its hybrid aspects and tactics. This
thesis seeks to help fill the intellectual void by exploring what conduct is characterized as
hybrid warfare.
This thesis examines how the Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin employed
“New Generation Warfare" to achieve its geopolitical interests and by what mechanisms
or strategies “New Generation Warfare” uses to achieve these goals. Four cases have
been selected to explicate this phenomenon—Georgia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Syria—
because all share a set of common factors. First, each nation-state formerly belonged to
Russia’s sphere of influence, whether a part of the Russian Empire, the U.S.S.R., or as an
ally. Both Georgia and Ukraine were absorbed by the Russian Empire in the eighteenth
century, as well as forcibly absorbed into the Soviet Union in the course of the Russian
2
Mark Galeotti, “I'm Sorry for Creating the 'Gerasimov Doctrine,’” Foreign Policy, March 5, 2018, 2,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/05/im-sorry-for-creating-the-gerasimov-doctrine/.
3
Civil War. Bulgaria aligned itself with Soviet Union during the Cold War, becoming
highly dependent on Soviet patronage throughout this period. Syria, like Bulgaria, was a
Soviet ally against the Western powers during the Cold War and continues to maintain
significant political, military, and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union’s
successor. The second common factor is that each nation-state has been subject to
various Russian intrusions, both military and otherwise. Both Georgia and Ukraine saw
military conflicts arise with Russia in 2008 and 2014, respectively, while Bulgaria is
currently undergoing the process of state capture through political and economic activity
related to Russian interests. State capture, as defined by Vesna Pesic, involves the act of
“...any group or strata, external to the state, that seizes decisive influence over a state
institutions and policies for its own interests and against the public good.”3 Syria is the
site of a Russian intervention to bolster its ally, President of Syria Bashar al-Assad and
his government forces. The last common factor is that the Russia incurred into each
states’ incursion during the tenure of Vladimir Putin, while he served in the capacity of
either President of Russia or Prime Minister of Russia.
The purpose of this study is to examine Russian hybrid warfare in an effort to
determine the patterns, characteristics, and traits that define this seemingly new style of
conflict. Additionally, this study examines Russia’s conduct through a realist paradigm
and contemporary Russian assumptions on international relations in order to
3
Vesna Pesic, “State Capture and Widespread Corruption in Serbia,” CEPS Working Document No. 262,
Center for European Policy Studies, March 2007, 5,
http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.kent.edu/login.aspx?direct
=true&AuthType=ip&db=edsupe&AN=edsupe.11664&site=eds-live&scope=site.
4
contextualize hybrid warfare in the greater scope of Russian foreign policy. Realism will
be used as a paradigm to examine Russian hybrid warfare for its state-centric approach
that posits that a state will use every available means to it in order to protect its own
security. Given the scope of means employed in the course of hybrid warfare and
organization required to enact these tactics, the state ought to be assumed to be the central
actor within the international system or a case, who is continuing politics by any and all
means available to it. In achieving this purpose, Russian incursions into Georgia,
Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Syria will be compared and contrasted against one another.
Additionally, this thesis will also examine Russian foreign policy trends and theory, as
well as explore its basis in political realism.
1. Research Design
The method employed in this thesis will be the comparative case study of four
specific countries, with attention being focused on their contemporary relations and or
conflicts with the Russian Federation: Georgia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Syria.
Comparative case studies are in-depth examinations of two or more cases that share a
common focus and involve the synthesis and analysis of similitude, variance, and patterns
between them.4 American behavioral scientist Alexander L. George defines a case as an
“instance of a class of events,” referring to any event of scientific interest.5 This method
4
Delwyn Goodwrick, Comparative Case Studies (Florence: UNICEF Office of Research, 2014): 1.
5
Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences,
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007): 18.
5
requires the specific features of each case to be described at the beginning of the study to
establish an analytic framework to be used in the cross-case comparison, highlighting
similarities and differences between cases and their respective causes. Furthermore, with
the focus on cases and their context, the method allows for one to accrue general
knowledge regarding said context’s influence on the phenomena.
Comparison has long been employed in the discipline of Political Science and is a
fundamental to any analysis in the field.6 Scholar David Collier, in his article “The
Comparative Method,” identifies the comparative method as playing a central role in
forming concepts derived from a focus upon suggestive similarities and differences.7 A
comparative case study of these countries draws attention to the similarities and
differences between a limited number of occurrences or incidents, in this case, being the
presence of a hybridized conflict by Russia in each respective nation-state.
In order to determine what tactics are employed as well as what patterns emerge
in the occurrence of hybrid warfare, the hybrid tactics employed in each case will be
identified and explored in detail. The source material for these cases will mainly draw
upon a variety of secondary sources, consisting of books, articles, and periodicals, in
order to detail the examples of hybrid warfare. Following the identification of hybrid
tactics in each case, the cases will be compared and contrasted in an effort to identify the
patterns associated with hybrid warfare.
6
David Collier, “The Comparative Method,” in Political Science: The State of the Discipline II, ed. Ada
W. Finifter (Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1993): 105.
7
Collier, “The Comparative Method.”
6
II. Literature Review
1. Hybrid Warfare
Before one can examine potential examples of Russian incursions that have been
characterized as hybrid warfare, one must first understand the meaning and scope of the
term. In academic and military communities, a universally accepted definition for this
concept has yet to emerge. As a result, hybrid warfare has been used interchangeably
with a variety of different terms in an effort to better characterize the actions that are
typical of the phenomena.
Hybrid warfare’s origins can be traced to an article by Lieutenant General James
N. Mattis and Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hoffman in 2005. Rejecting the technologically
centered visions of the Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA), which considered the
character and conduct of warfare to be fundamentally transformed by the innovative
application of technology, Mattis and Hoffman posited that future conflicts would be
characterized by hybrid warfare, an extension of General Charles Krulak’s “Three Block
War.”8 The concept of the “Three Block War” is based in the notion that, in an urban
operating environment, a modern military force, like the United States Armed Forces,
will be required to simultaneously conduct combat, humanitarian, and peacekeeping
8
James Mattis and Frank Hoffman, “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” Proceedings Magazine,
November 2005, 2.
7
operations in the span of three blocks or more.9 When conducting the plethora of
operations, the United States faces four threats or challengers: the traditional, the
irregular, the catastrophic, and the disruptive.10 Because the United States enjoys
superiority in the gross majority of conventional conflicts, adversaries will increasingly
seek to undermine such conventional superiority by seeking to employ unconventional
tactics. Such unconventional tactics could include irregular methods, including terrorism,
insurgency, unrestricted warfare, guerrilla war, or coercion by narco-criminals, being
used to achieve small successes that are subsequently magnified through both media and
information warfare in an effort to offset a conventional superiority.11 Mattis and
Hoffman predict that actors, both state and non-state, will examine the four threats to the
United States “...and select a combination of techniques or tactics appealing to them...” to
yield a combination of novel approaches to war.12 This synthesis of different modes and
means of war, write Mattis and Hoffman, is hybrid warfare.13 Mattis and Hoffman
further emphasize the role of psychological and information warfare in hybrid warfare,
wherein both the United States and its adversaries compete in broadcasting or
communicating each belligerent’s respective “message.”14 Consequently, the authors
introduce the information domain as the fourth block of a “Three Block War,” and urge
the U.S. military to prepare for combating enemies in hybrid wars.
9
Walter Dorn and Michael Varey, "Fatally Flawed: The Rise and Demise of the ‘Three-Block War’
Concept in Canada," International Journal 63, no. 4 (2008): 968,
http://www.jstor.org.proxy.library.kent.edu/stable/40204431.
10
James Mattis and Frank Hoffman, “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” 1.
11
Mattis and Hoffman, “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars.”
12
13
14
Mattis and Hoffman, “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” 2.
8
The National Defense Strategy (NDS) was critical in forming Mattis and
Hoffman’s concept of hybrid warfare, identifying the four threats or challenges that lay
hybrid warfare’s foundation. In 2005, the United States’ Department of Defense
published the NDS, which recognized that the United States’ military’s predominance in
traditional forms of warfare leads to potential adversaries adopting asymmetrical and
unconventional capabilities to challenge the United States.15 As the document posits, the
result is “...an array of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive capabilities and
methods threaten[ing] U.S. interests.”16 The document defines these challenges as
follows:
Traditional challenges are posed by states employing recognized military capabilities and forces
in well-understood forms of military competition and conflict.
Irregular challenges come from those employing “unconventional” methods to counter the
traditional advantages of stronger opponents.
Catastrophic challenges involve the acquisition, possession, and use of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) or methods producing WMD-like effects.
Disruptive challenges may come from adversaries who develop and use breakthrough technologies
to negate current U.S. advantages in key operational domains.17
Each category overlaps with another, and actors able to efficiently harness and utilize
threats from each category pose the greatest threat to U.S.’s interests. Successfully
melding these categories creates an asymmetrical threat that effectively nullifies the
U.S.’s superiority in traditional forms of warfare. Although this framework realizes the
diversification of threats in which a modern military must respond to beyond
conventional ones, its focus on categorizing modern threats fails to capture the blurring of
war and peace that so often characterizes hybrid warfare.
15
Donald Rumsfeld, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.:
Department of Defense, 2005), 2.
16
Rumsfeld, The National Defense Strategy, 2.
17
Rumsfeld, The National Defense Strategy.
9
Hybrid warfare, as conceptualized by Mattis and Hoffman, draws parallels to the
concept of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW). Fourth Generation Warfare’s proponents,
including William S. Lind and a cohort of military officers, argue that warfare has been
evolving in generational shifts since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. First-generation
warfare refers to ancient battles fought by uniformed combatants using massed
manpower and employing line and column tactics. Second-generation warfare saw mass
firepower replace massed manpower, fire and movement evolving from the line and
column, and an increasing emphasis on indirect artillery’s ability to wear down an enemy
through attrition. Second-generation tactics were summed up by French Marshal Henri
Petain, who stated “The artillery conquers, the infantry occupies.” Third-generation
warfare is based neither on firepower nor attrition, but maneuverability. Epitomized by
the German blitzkrieg, third-generation attackers “...relied on infiltration and collapse the
enemy’s combat forces rather than seeking to close with and destroy them.”18 Defense
was primarily conducted in depth and invited penetration, with the intended goal of
overstretching an enemy and encircling them with counterattacks.19
According to 4GW proponents, third-generation warfare marked the end of linear
warfare.20 Whereas linear conflicts are defined by “...a sequential progression of a
planned strategy by opposing sides...nonlinear conflict is the simultaneous deployment of
18
William S. Lind et al., “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette
(October 1989): 8, https://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/lind/the-changing-face-of-war-into-the-fourth-
generation.html.
19
Lind et al., “The Changing Face of War,” 10.
20
William S. Lind, “Understanding Fourth Generation War,” August 6, 2009, Antiwar.com, 11,
https://original.antiwar.com/lind/2004/01/15/understanding-fourth-generation-war/.
10
multiple, complementary military and non-military warfare tactics.”21 War is no longer a
shoving contest with each side vying for control of or advancing over a font line. With
this shift in the nature of war followed an evolution in the culture of military institutions.
Rejecting strict obedience to orders and imposed discipline as the foundational methods
to achieve an objective, third-generation warfare saw the decentralization of war and a
greater emphasis being placed on individual initiative in achieving orders.22 Orders
themselves merely stated what needed to be achieved, leaving the method and means of
achievement to individual combat units and leaders. While characteristics like
decentralization, initiative, and non-linearity carry over into the next generation of
warfare, fourth-generation warfare is defined by the blurring between peace and war, as
well as that of combatants and civilians.23 Central to this new generation of warfare is
the weakening of the state as a governing mechanism, which results in the rise of non-
state actors willing and able to challenge the state’s legitimacy and monopoly on the
ability to conduct war.24 Non-state actors, in addition to the adapting state, employ a
range of conventional and unconventional methods, including terrorism and information
warfare, in an effort to undermine the state via the weakening of its political will and
stimulating internal societal breakdown.25 According to Lind and his cohort, this
generational warfare marks the return to the type of conflict present prior to the formation
21
Joshua Ball, “What Is Hybrid Warfare?” June 10, 2019, Global Security Review, 4,
https://globalsecurityreview.com/hybrid-and-non-linear-warfare-systematically-erases-the-divide-between-
war-peace/.
22
Lind, “Understanding Fourth Generation War,” 11.
23
Lind, “Understanding Fourth Generation War,” 13.
24
Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War (Arlington: Potomac Institute for
Policy Studies, 2007), 18.
25
Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War.
11
of the nation-state as a structure. However, the 4GW proponents are often criticized for
ignoring the long history of irregular warfare and its presence throughout military history
and in each of the generational shifts.
Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, two senior colonels from China’s People’s
Liberation Army, assert that military history is useless for understanding modern warfare.
The authors acknowledge that, in the wake of the Gulf War and the technology-centric
military orthodoxy it spawned, war was no longer conceptualized around the usage of an
armed regular force, utilizing speed and technology, to coerce an enemy to submit to their
will. Rather, the new principles of war are that of “...using all means, including armed
force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to
compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.”26 Qiao and Wang recognize that, given the
variety of methods to coerce an opponent, the distinction between combatant and
noncombatant becomes less clear as the entire society, and the interest-blocs that
constitute it, are mobilized. As a result, the possible battlefields for conflicts becomes
infinite, with “...financial warfare, trade warfare, cultural warfare, information warfare,
and legal warfare”... all becoming viable stratagems to pursue interests.27 This approach
is epitomized by Liang’s quote in the editor’s note, where he declares, “The first rule of
unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden.”28 In the paradigm
offered by unconventional warfare is no longer an activity monopolized by the military
26
Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing
House, 1999), 7.
27
David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “A New Generation of Unrestricted Warfare,” April 23, 2016, War on
the Rocks, 3, https://warontherocks.com/2016/04/a-new-generation-of-unrestricted-warfare/.
28
Liang and Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, 2.
12
sphere. Rather, strategists must synthesize all resources available to a nation-state and
employ them as a means to wage war. In essence, Liang and Xiangsui assert that military
thinking should occur beyond the limits of traditional military thinking that recognizes
the hard power of militaries as the only conduit of war.
The academic and military communities have yet to agree on a precise definition
of hybrid warfare, with “hybrid warfare,” “fourth-generation warfare,” “unrestricted
warfare,” and a variety of other different terms used interchangeably in an effort to
characterize the same phenomena. This phenomena which typifies hybrid warfare and its
related terminology is described by Frank G. Hoffman as the blending of “...the lethality
of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare.”29
According Hoffman, whose usage first popularized the term, hybrid warfare
“...incorporate[s] a range of different modes of warfare including conventional
capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate
violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.”30 Able to be waged by both states and a
plethora of non-state actors, these activities are orchestrated and coordinated within the
same battlespace to achieve “...synergistic effects in the physical and psychological
dimensions of the conflict.”31
At the strategic level, regular and irregular forces have been components of
conflicts historically. However, these forces traditionally operated in both different
theaters and in different formations. In hybrid warfare, regular and irregular elements
29
Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War, 57.
30
31
13
blur into a single force operating in the same battlespace.32 While integrated with a
conventional force, the irregular elements becomes decisive in the success of an
operation, rather than “...just protract[ing] the conflict, provoke[ing] overreactions or
extend[ing] the costs of security for the defender.”33 Instead of facilitating the
progression of confrontations with an enemy force with the intention of initiating a
climactic and decisive battle, hybrid warfare seeks to achieve success by employing
irregular tactics alongside the most efficient means available to achieve political goals,
including terrorism. Criminal activity, rather than technology advancement, is used to
sustain a hybrid force, alongside initiating general disorder and disruption in an opposing
state.34 The combination and hybridization of methods are designed to either gradually
wear down an opponent’s conventional opposition to achieve political goals, or the
capitulation of the state and its infrastructure.
While Hoffman’s definition provides the most comprehensive overview of hybrid
warfare, it is not the only one in use. Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor define
hybrid warfare as “...conflict involving a combination of conventional military forces and
irregulars (guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists), which could include both state and non-
state actors, aimed at achieving a common political purpose.”35 The authors view hybrid
warfare as the extension of historical compound wars, with the combination of regular
and irregular troops on the same battlefield being characteristic of a plethora of wars
32
33
34
35
Peter R. Mansoor and Williamson Murray, Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the
Ancient World to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 2.
14
throughout history. Lawrence Freedman, in his article “Ukraine and the Art of Limited
War,” defines hybrid warfare as “...as an approach that draws upon a number of types of
force from across the full spectrum, including terrorism, insurgency and regular combat,
along with the extensive use of information operations.”36 In essence, hybrid warfare is
used to describe the apparent melding of conventional and irregular warfare, which is
accompanied by any means at the state’s disposal to accomplish a political objective.
Hybrid warfare is often employed as a catch-all term that seeks to describe a
variety of contemporary states’ activities. In surveying a variety of definitions that
attempt to describe contemporary warfare, including hybrid warfare, it becomes evident
that there exists little difference between each term in principle. Each is attempting to
describe the same phenomena. As a result, several have criticized the term’s utility in
acting as a paradigm by which to examine actors’ actions. As Matthew Rojansky and
Michael Kofman noted, “Hybrid’ simply denotes a combination of previously defined
types of warfare, whether conventional, irregular, political, or information.”37 In simply
indicating the combination of previously defined forms of warfare, the term neither
establishes a new analytic framework, nor provides any precision as to what the
characteristics and goals of such operations are. While hybrid warfare may describe
tactics employed on the battlefield, it does little to explain the overarching strategy
behind such tactic’s employment. In essence, critics of hybrid warfare view hybrid
36
Lawrence Freedman, “Ukraine and the Art of Limited War,” Survival 56, no. 6 (November 2, 2014): 8,
doi:10.1080/00396338.2014.985432.
37
Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky, “A Closer look at Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare,’” April 2015, The
Wilson Center Kennan Cable No. 7, 2, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents
/publication/7-KENNAN CABLE-ROJANSKY KOFMAN.pdf.
15
warfare as a vague catch-all term for an actor’s actions that contributes little analytically
in attempting to construct policy decisions, influences, and factors.
The criticism of hybrid warfare and its scope should not be ignored. Despite the
subtle differences that exist amongst the several definitions of hybrid warfare and
competing terminology, each seeks to describe Russia’s broad range of subversive
activities and instruments employed in an effort to further its national interest. These
activities include the deployment of military force and resources of a nonmilitary
character in the pursuit of political goals. Therefore, hybrid warfare should be
recognized as a shorthand term for Russian activities, rather than providing a coherent
doctrine from which to examine past and future Russian activities.
2. Hybrid Warfare and Russian Thinking
The concept of hybrid warfare is a Western one. Though the term is often
associated with Russian activities in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria, the term is seldom used
in Russian literature to describe Russian activities in the international arena. Russian
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, speaking at the Valdai Discussion Club in November
2014, made the following statement regarding hybrid warfare:
It is an interesting term, but I would apply it above all to the United States and its war strategy – it
is truly a hybrid war aimed not so much at defeating the enemy militarily as at changing the
regimes in the states that pursue a policy Washington does not like. It is using financial and
economic pressure, information attacks, using others on the perimeter of a corresponding state as
proxies and of course information and ideological pressure through externally financed non-
governmental organizations. Is it not a hybrid process and not what we call war?38
38
Sergey Lavrov, “Remarks by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the XXII Assembly of the Council on
Foreign and Defence Policy,” November 22, 2014, Valdai Club, 13,
16
To Lavrov, and other Russian elites, policymakers, and military strategists, hybrid
warfare is a Western concept that ought to be applied to Western actions. Hybrid
warfare, to these individuals, describes a Western effort to destabilize Russia and
undermine its interests abroad. So-called “colored revolutions,” fifth-column regime
changes, subversive use of social media and NGOs, and economic expansions all
encompass the perceived threat to Russian sovereignty.
3. Gerasimov and Non-Linear Warfare
The term most often used in Russian literature to describe its perceived practice of
hybrid warfare is non-linear warfare. Non-linear warfare’s usage was popularized by
Vladislav Surkov. A key political advisor to Vladimir Putin and the supposed architect
of Russian’s annexation of Crimea, Surkov published a science fiction short-story under
the penname Natan Dubovitsky in 2014 and in it described his conception of the future of
war.39 Set during the “fifth world war,” the story follows a child orphaned in the course
of the conflict. Beginning with hints of perpetual mobilization, which mirrors the
Kremlin’s narrative of perpetual war, Surkov introduces the fifth world war as being a
war unlike ordinary conflicts, which he terms a non-linear war. Non-linear wars are
described as being unlike the primitive and conventional conflicts of the nineteenth and
hhttp://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/remarks_by_foreign_minister_sergey_lavrov_at_the_xxii_assembly_of
_the_council_on_foreign_and_defence/.
39
Peter Pomerantsev, “Non-Linear War,” March 28, 2014, LRB Blog, London Review of Books, 1,
https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2014/march/non-linear-war.
17
twentieth century, which were defined by two sides, whether countries, groups of allies,
or coalitions, competing with one another. Non-linear war is viewed as being all against
all, and recognized that war, in the traditional sense, was a part of process, though not the
most important part of the process, that comprises of non-linear conflicts.40 In Surkov’s
fictional world, the warring parties are not clear, and warfare becomes secondary to other
more efficient modes of conflict. While an act of fiction, Surkov’s short story provides
insight into the strategic thinking guiding contemporary actions of the Russian state.
Specifically, that a paradigm is employed which recognizes that war is evolving away
from a state of conflict, characterized by the presence of two defined parties in opposition
to one another, to that of non-linear warfare.
In February 2013, General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the
Russian Federation Armed Forces, published an article titled “The Value of Science Is in
the Foresight” in the Russian newspaper Military-Industrial Courier, introducing
Western audiences to Russian conceptions of twenty-first century warfare. In the article,
Gerasimov writes that “In the twenty-first century we have seen a tendency toward
blurring the lines between the states of war and peace. Wars are no longer declared and,
having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template.”41 Rather than relying on
traditional military means to wage a conflict, modern warfare sees the broad application
of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures,
40
Pomerantsev, “Non-Linear War,” 5.
41
Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight,” Military Review 96, no. 1 (January 2016):
23, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=f5h&AN=112783591&site
=eds-live&scope=site.
18
supplemented by the use of force, to achieve political and strategic goals. The militaristic
characteristics of war take on a concealed character, including the waging of an
informational conflict and the deployment of special operations forces. The use of
military elements openly occurs under the guise of peacekeeping or managing crises,
only to guarantee success of a conflict when it is in its final stages. Under these new
rules of war, “...a thriving state can, in a matter of months and even days, be transformed
into an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention, and sink
into a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe, and civil war.”42 Traditional military
means achieving geopolitical aims are recognized by Gerasimov as being inefficient to
the greater, and often more effective, nonmilitary means.
In the West, Gerasimov’s article went unnoticed until it seemingly prophesized
Russia’s incursions into Crimea and Ukraine. In light of these conflicts, and the Russian
intervention into the Syrian Civil War, Gerasimov’s article has often been interpreted as a
proposal of a new form of Russian warfare, referred to as hybrid warfare, that blends
conventional military elements with unconventional, nonmilitary assets. However, rather
than presenting a comprehensive doctrine, Gerasimov’s article merely explains his view
of the current environment that Russian military forces must operate in and how the
nature of warfare is likely to evolve in the future.43
Gerasimov’s views, and the greater Russian consensus on warfare and regime
change, were shaped by Western interventions into nations such as Yugoslavia, Iran, and
42
Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight,” 24.
43
Charles Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,” Military Review 96, no. 1 (January 2016): 30,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329933852_Getting_Gerasimov_Right.
19
Iraq. In his article “Getting Gerasimov Right,” Charles Bartles explains that, “In the
Russian view, the patterns of U.S. forced regime change has been as follows: a military
operation; finding an appropriate pretext such as to prevent genocide or seize weapons of
mass destruction; and finally, launching a military operation to cause regime change.”44
However, this blueprint for regime change is considered by many in Russia to have been
replaced by a new pattern of U.S.-forced regime change after observing the Arab Spring
and “color revolutions.” This pattern, coined the use of smart power by Joseph Nye, is
the skillful combination of both hard and soft power into an integrated strategy that relies
of non-military means to achieve strategic objectives that are underscored by the support
of military assets to supplement their usage.45 The U.S.’s supposed mastery of smart
power, where the creation of a U.S.-dominated liberal international order backed by its
military power solidified American control, placed the U.S. into a hegemonic role in the
international system without relying on the excessive and unsustainable deployment of
resources to achieve its own strategic objectives. As a result, American influence has
expanded, and their actions legitimized through the proper use of smart power.
Rather than relying on an overt military invasion, the first offenses come from the
creation and maintaining of political opposition through state propaganda, social media,
the internet, and nongovernmental organizations in an instance of smart power. Through
the creation of political dissent and internal political strife causes the legitimate state to
experience difficulties maintaining order. As a nation-state continues to be destabilized,
44
Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,” 32.
45
Richard Lee Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure
America (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2007), 7.
20
opposition movements can be further strengthened with the addition of the covert
deployment of special operations elements, conventional military forces, and private
military contractors, who are introduced to battle a government to continue the
destabilization of a region. As the legitimate state is forced to employ more drastic and
aggressive measures to maintain control of a region, the U.S. is provided the pretext for
the imposition of economic, political, and military sanctions, culminating in the
deployment of military forces under the guise of peacekeepers to return the destabilized
region to normalcy and, if desired, install a new regime friendly to the U.S’s interests.
Gerasimov’s description of the new forms and methods of achieving political and
strategic goals, as practiced by the United States and the West, reveals a fundamental
change in the understanding of how foreign-induced regime change occurs. Whereas
regime change had previously been defined by the large-scale military invasions, regime
change today arises from indirect and asymmetrical methods of coercion. As Michael
Koffman points out in his article, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts,” the
United States has pioneered an indirect approach to warfare that not only employs
subversion, propaganda, social media, and sanctions to wage war, but also featured
“...humanitarian interventions, the use of Western special forces, funding for democracy
movements, and the deployment of mercenaries and proxies[...].”46 Gerasimov
recognizes that the Russian state no longer faces a threat emanating solely from the
West’s ability to wage a conventional conflict, but from the aforementioned asymmetrical
46
Michael Kofman, "Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts," March 11, 2016, War on the Rocks, 7,
https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/.
21
elements that define modern conflict. As a result, Gerasimov posits that Russian military
doctrine must focus on fostering its capabilities to counter asymmetrical and indirect
threats. Given the diverse array of tools available to the West while engaged in modern
conflict, the means required to counter these tools will be equally diverse and of a similar
nature, resulting in the prominence “...of undeclared conventional forces, peacekeepers,
special operators, Cossacks, private military companies, foreign legionnaires, biker
gangs, Russian-sponsored NGOs, and cyber/propaganda warriors.”47
4. Political Warfare and the Kremlin’s Playbook
The insights presented by Gerasimov are neither original nor new. American
diplomat and historian George F. Kennan, in the early days of the Cold War, provided a
similar evaluation and observations regarding the current operational environment and
nature of war. In a 1948 memo to the National Security Council, Kennan argues for the
inauguration of what he terms political warfare, which he defines as “...the employment
of all means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objective... Such
operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political
alliances, economic measures, and ‘white’ propaganda to such covert operations as
clandestine support of ‘friendly’ foreign elements, ‘black’ psychological warfare and
even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.”48 Kennan, recognizing
47
Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,” 33.
48
George F. Kennan, 'The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare' [Redacted Version],” April 30,
1948, Wilson Center, 1, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114320.
22
that the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States was neither a state of
outright war nor that of absolute peace, argued that the U.S. ought to work to counter the
style of warfare already mastered by the Soviets through their mix of Soviet ideology
with Clausewitz’s classic realism.
Political warfare, however, continues to be a tactic available to the Russian state
to accomplish political objective. In a report titled The Kremlin Playbook, the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) documented contemporary Russian political
warfare in Central and Eastern Europe. Termed the “Unvirtuous Cycle” by CSIS,
Russian political warfare was characterized by the creation of channels of influence
within Eastern European nations in an effort to undermine Russia’s geopolitical
opponents in Europe, specifically the European Union and NATO. This process begins
with the political and or economic penetration of a state, from which an opaque network
of patronage evolves and expands to accrue influence and control over critical
institutions, bodies, and the economy.49 The successful incursion into these sectors
allows for Russia to shape national policy and decisions, resulting in the “…erosion of
governance standards and the credibility of democracy as a model of governance, which
in some instances leads to ‘state capture.”50 The entirety of this process is fueled by
corruption, which allows for the exploitation of a state’s resources and the blurring of
lines between public- and private-sector interests. In gaining and exerting influence over
businesses, individuals, or institutions, Russia is able to effectively control the actions of
49
Heather Conley, The Kremlin Playbook, (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2016), 1,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/kremlin-playbook.
50
Conley, The Kremlin Playbook.
23
a state by successfully dominating the domestic environment. This antagonistic influence
is most prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe, whose weaker democratic traditions and
institutions make these states more vulnerable to Russian influence.
5. Russian Foreign Policy
In his book, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics, Jeffery
Mankoff describes how one of the central dilemmas facing modern Russia is the
“...tension between a tradition of relying on the ability to project power abroad as a
means of asserting influence and a desire to harness the forces of globalization and
integration to create a more competitive, respected state.”51 Traditionally, Russia was a
Great Power—one of the handful of fully sovereign states whose interactions within the
international system defined the nature of international politics. However, the nature of
international politics changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the two
superpowers in constant competition with one another in a bipolar world. The result was
a new world order that rejected concepts like balance of power and spheres of influence.
Long the foundation of Russia’s geopolitical thinking, the rejection of a world based
around great powers forced the nation-state to transpose itself into a system grounded in
globalization and international structures of law and government.
51
Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics (Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2012): 11.
24
Mankoff further posits that Russian foreign policy has long been shaped by
Russia’s historical experience, culture, and geography.52 Constantly surrounded by
enemies and lacking defensible borders, consolidation at home and expansion abroad
were fundamental to securing itself against Tatars, Turks, Poles, Germans, or any other
foreign aggressor.53 Russia established buffer zones between itself and rivals, creating
spheres of influence to shield itself from foreign aggression. For example, Ukraine was
utilized as a borderland against the Turks and Tatars for centuries, while Poland served in
the same capacity against the Germans from the nineteenth century until the end of World
War II. The Soviet Union’s Eastern European satellite states, after falling under the Iron
Curtain during the Cold War, protected the Soviet Union from any possible Western
aggression until its collapse in 1991. The principle of establishing buffer zones to secure
the Russian nation-state instilled a need for expansion into the Russian psyche. The
American Minister to Imperial Russia in 1852, Neill S. Brown, noted in a dispatch that
“A strange superstition prevails among Russians, that they are predestined to conquer the
world, and the prayers of the priests in the church are mingled with requests to hasten and
consummate this ‘divine mission.’54 The expansionist imperative, and the intrinsic fear
of the outside world that is ingrained in it, have been characteristic of the Russian
mindset since the formation of the Russian state, and with each setback, Russia, again,
reemerges to carry out its “divine mission.”55 British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, in
52
Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 12.
53
Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy.
54
Douglas Boyd, The Kremlin Conspiracy (Hersham: Ian Allan, 2010), 23.
55
Boyd, The Kremlin Conspiracy.
25
his analysis of Russian actions in the nineteenth century and before, stated that “The
policy and the practice of the Russian government has always been to push forward its
encroachments as fast and far as the apathy or want of other governments would allow it
to go, but always to stop and retire when it met with decided resistance and then to wait
for the next favorable opportunity.”56
The collapse of the Soviet Union in December of 1991 temporarily paused
Russia’s traditional foreign policy. The Russian Federation was a shadow of both the
historical Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Its frontier shrunk to its seventeenth-
century borders, while Soviet’s massive army collapsed with its armaments and
manpower divided between various successor states.57 As a result, Russia was stripped
of its great power status with the collapse of its empire and loss of puppet states. No
longer feared by its neighbors and the larger international community, Russian
geopolitical interests were increasingly ignored. The transformation of Russia’s
international status was accompanied by domestic turmoil as well. The collapse of the
authoritarian Soviet system caused the erosion of law and order within the country.
While crime surged throughout the country, a civil war broke out in Chechnya, further
destabilizing the Russian state.
During this time, President Boris Yeltsin and his foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev
pursued a Western-oriented foreign policy that attempted to integrate the fledgling
56
Boyd, The Kremlin Conspiracy, 33.
57
26
Russian state into the established liberal international order.58 Although the country’s
leadership abandoned its Great Power status and the power it commanded internationally,
Kozyrev was able to assert its interests in post-Soviet areas through the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) and other international institutions without undermining its
relationships with the United states and its allies. In effect, Russia was able to balance its
own immediate and limited interests with the expectations of the Western-dominated
international system that was antagonistic to Russia’s traditional interests of expansion
and security.
The post-war phase of international relations initiated by Boris Yeltsin and Andrei
Kozyrez ended with the NATO-led military action in Kosovo in 1999. Alexei G.
Arbatov, a Russian political scientist, argues that the U.S.-led campaign undermined the
post-Cold War security infrastructure that was “...based on an enhanced role for the
United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe
(OSCE)” within the international system.59 This international system “...assumed strict
conformity with the UN Charter, compliance with international law, respect for existing
agreements between Russia and the West, and a partnership between Russia and
NATO.”60 The bombing campaign against Serbia had occurred without UN and OSCE
approval and saw the employment of military force to resolve ethnic conflicts and
problems in an effort to achieve the alliance’s interests. Arbatov argues that this
58
Allen C. Lynch, "The Realism of Russia's Foreign Policy," Europe-Asia Studies 53, no. 1 (2001): 7,
www.jstor.org/stable/826237.
59
Aleksej Georgievič Arbatov, The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from
Kosovo and Chechnya (Garmisch-Partenkirchen: George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, 2000), 1.
60
Arbatov, The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine.
27
perceived violation of international norms and the emerging security structure caused
Russia to reshape its foreign policy to mimic Western actions in Yugoslavia:
The main lesson learned is that the goal justifies the means. The use of force is the most efficient
problem solver, if applied decisively and massively. Negotiations are of dubious value and are to
be used as a cover for military action. Legality of state actions, observation of laws and legal
procedures, and humanitarian suffering are of secondary significance relative to achieving the
goal. Limiting one’s own troop casualties is worth imposing massive devastation and collateral
fatalities on civilian populations. Foreign public opinion and the position of Western governments
are to be discounted if Russian interests are at stake. A concentrated and controlled mass media
campaign is the key to success.61
Yugoslavia forced Russia to reexamine its approach to relations with the West. Rather
than striving for a genuine security and military partnership, certain Russian elites began
to recognize NATO as the country’s primary defense concern.
These lessons most underpinned the foreign policy legacy left by Evgenii
Primakov on modern Russia. Serving as both the Russian Foreign Minister from 1996 to
1998 and Prime Minister of Russia from 1998 to 1999, Primakov posited that, rather than
accepting a unipolar world organized by a singular global power, Russian foreign policy
ought to strive for the achievement of a multipolar world organized into several concerts
of great powers, including Russia, China, India, and the U.S., who manage their
respective spheres of influence.62 Instead of confronting the United States directly,
Moscow should seek to counterbalance U.S. unilateral power with assistance from a
concert of other great powers. Primakov envisioned Russian relations with the United
States as a zero-sum game, with each great power attempting to establish its own sphere
61
Arbatov, The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine, 21.
62
Eugene Rumer, “The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine in Action,” June 2019, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 4, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/06/05/primakov-not-gerasimov-doctrine-in-
action-pub-79254.
28
of influence at the expense of other competing powers.63 As such, Russia is required to
insist on its primacy in the post-Soviet space, with efforts to integrate such regions into
Russia’s sphere of influence becoming a focal point in the nation’s foreign policy.
Furthermore, Russia must not only actively oppose the expansion of NATO, which
continues to expand up to Russia’s sphere of influence, but also persistently “...weaken
transatlantic institutions and the U.S.-led international order...” in an effort to transform
it.64 Primakov’s ascension to the post of Foreign Minister was reflective of an emerging
consensus concerning the Russian state’s identity and role within the new global system.
This identity was rooted in the notion that the state ought to occupy a leading role in
economic and political life in Russia, and that the national interest of the Russian state
ought to be measured in accordance to the well-being of the state rather than that of the
people living under its rule.65 Power, thus, becomes the metric from which to judge the
health of a state. Maximizing the power of the Russian state while minimizing the power
of competing states in the international system became the central premise of Russian
foreign policy under Primakov.
Although Russia’s current political and economic elites lack the nuance of
Primakov, who was able to strike a balance between international and national interests,
many subscribe to Primakov’s vision of a multipolar world that recognizes Russia as a
great power. Given the Russian Federation’s weak formal institutions and fluctuating
63
Ariel Cohen, The ‘Primakov Doctrine’: Russia’s Zero-Sum Game With the United States (Washington,
D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1997), 3, https://www.heritage.org/report/the-primakov-doctrine-russias-zero-
sum-game-the-united-states.
64
Rumer, “The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine in Action,” 4.
65
29
political system, these elites are increasingly able to influence the foreign policy of the
Russian state.66 The presidencies of Yeltsin, Medvedev, and Putin failed to
institutionalize any formal methods of regular foreign policy creation, resulting in a
highly centralized governing apparatuses only accessible to a small number of elites
directly connected to Russia’s ruling regime. With these elites seeking the reassertion of
old foreign policy patterns, despite lacking a unified ideology and seeking to pursue
different national interests, they coalesced around Russian President Vladimir Putin who
led the Russian state on a more confrontational path. Emboldened by the rapid growth of
Russia’s economy, the Russian state helmed by Putin was able to assert its interests more
forcefully on the international level.
Putin embodied the collective view and preferences favored of Russia’s elite,
despite the appearance that he exerted complete and total control over the state’s foreign
policy.67 However, the Putin regime strengthened the siloviki, who were former members
of the Soviet KGB or a member of the various internal security forces descended from
the KGB. Under Putin, who himself was a member of the KGB, the siloviki were not
only appointed to various administrative positions within the Russian government, but
were given control over lucrative economic sectors, like in the energy and media sectors.
The KGB had been considered to be a kind of intellectual elite, and that status was
inherited by the various internal security organizations that succeeded it.68 The elites
originating from the security forces not only shared the great power aspirations of their
66
67
68
30
peers, but also emphasized the danger and threat that the expansion of NATO posed to
Russian national interests. As a result, the siloviki’s influence throughout the state and
economy increased significantly, challenging the pragmatic and non-ideological approach
of the foreign policy of Russia under Vladimir Putin.

31
III. Georgia
On August 7th, 2008, tens of thousands of Russian soldiers marched into Georgia.
The culmination of a period of declining relations between the two states, the Russo-
Georgian War lasted five days before a negotiated ceasefire brokered by the European
Union went into effect. This chapter examines the variety of elements and means
employed by the Russian state leading up to and during the Russo-Georgian War against
its southern neighbor. This study will first be conducted by describing the historical and
political background of Georgia and its relations with Russia, as well as describing the
timeline leading up to the outbreak of the conflict. Second, the study will seek to identify
and describe the elements and means employed by the Russian state against Georgia.
1. Historical and Political Background
Georgia, roughly covering a territory of 69,700 square kilometers and having a
population of approximately 4 million people, has long been the battlefield for warring
empires. Located in a strategic transit corridor between the East and the West in the
Caucuses and separating the Caspian and Black Seas, Georgians were destined to be
beholden to the historical powers which strove to control the region. Whether it be
Alexander the Great’s Seleucids, the Persian Empires, the Byzantines, Muslim Arabs and
Turkic Ottomans from the south, or ever-expanding Russian Empire to the north, Georgia
32
has been coveted and conquered by outsiders for millennia.69 Eventually absorbed by the
Russian Empire in the nineteenth century, it would remain part of the Russian sphere
until 1917, when Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia formed the short-lived Transcaucus
Democratic Republic in an effort to stymie an Ottoman invasion into the Caucuses.
Sponsored by the Kaiser in Germany, Georgia declared independence from the union,
forming its own republic helmed by the Menshevik government of Noe Jordania.70
Georgia’s existence as the Democratic Republic of Georgia was short-lived.
Bolshevik forces from the Soviet Union swiftly suppressed the republic, forcing its
Menshevik government into exile, purging whatever supporters who remained, and
forcibly annexed the state.71 As a Soviet Republic, Georgia contained three autonomous
territories: Adjara, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Adjara was an autonomy “...designed to
accommodate ethnic Georgian Muslims, who were not a nationality at all, but a religion-
based community” within Georgia.72 Abkhazia and South Ossetia, however, were home
to ethnically distinct minorities that enjoyed “...some manner of the Soviet-style official
self-determining status... of the USSR...” which granted them autonomy from the
Georgian government.73 Given South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s close relationships with
the Soviet state and the autonomy it brought, both regions feared that the collapse of the
69
Thomas Goltz, “The Paradox of Living in Paradise: Georgia's Descent into Chaos,” in The Guns of
August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia, ed. Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr (Armonk: M.E.
Sharpe, 2009), 11.
70
Goltz, “The Paradox of Living in Paradise,” 11.
71
72
73
33
Soviet Union would result in the revocation of their special status and autonomy by the
Georgian government.74
On April 9th, 1991, Georgia declared its independence from the collapsing Soviet
Union. Georgian nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia rose to power, rallying support under
the vision of a “Georgia for the Georgians.”75 Gamsakhurdia’s policies stripped
Georgia’s minorities of their autonomous status and attempted to subjugate the
previously autonomous polities to the nationalist Georgian government. Gamsakhurdia’s
nationalists fostered ethnic discord through the establishment of Georgian as the official
language and the banning of the Ossetian “Popular Front” organization.76 The South
Ossetians and Abkhazians, who previously sought to remain a part of the Soviet Union
and not the newly established Georgian state, resisted nationalist attempts in an effort to
circumvent Georgian rule. This conflict would eventually culminate in the deployment
of armed Georgian militias into South Ossetia and its capital of Tskhinvali, setting off the
South Ossetia War. The number of deaths in the ensuing violence is contested, with
estimates ranging from only scores to over one thousand dead. While the South Ossetia
War was being raged, a different conflict was brewing in Georgia’s capital, Tbilisi. The
nationalist Gamsakhurdia became increasingly viewed as a fascist, despot, and “nuts” in
the words of U.S. President George W. Bush.77 An armed opposition, led by former
Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze, demanded Gamsakhurdia’s
74
Goltz, “The Paradox of Living in Paradise.”
75
Goltz, “The Paradox of Living in Paradise.”
76
77
34
resignation on December 22nd, forcing Gamsakhurdia into exile. This coup d’état
sparked off the Georgian Civil War, which involved Gamsakhurdia loyalists combatting
Shevardnadze’s newly established government. Concurrent to these skirmishes, South
Ossetian and Abkhazian separatist, backed by Russian authorities, broke away from the
Georgian government in a bid to maintain their autonomy from the politically unstable
Georgian state. After three years of sporadic violence, Russia, Georgia, and South
Ossetia signed a ceasefire agreement to freeze the interethnic conflict, a status to be
maintained by the presence of a Russian peacekeeping force in South Ossetia.
This peacekeeping agreement brought a decade of relative peace to Georgia, in
addition to the quasi-domination of the Georgian state by Russia. During this decade,
Shevardnadze, who ascended to the presidency during the civil war, transformed the
nation-state into one of the largest beneficiaries of per capita aid from the United States.
Shevardnadze, cognizant of the influence Russia exerted over Georgia, attempted to
break free of its northern neighbor’s sphere. Shevardnadze surrounded himself with pro-
Western advisors, who helped facilitate the creation of pro-Western political structures
parallel to the established Russian political and security apparatuses. For example, in
1999, Shevardnadze’s government enacted a bilateral military agreement with the United
States.78 A $64 million project, the Georgia Train and Equip Program also saw the
deployment of 100-150 American advisors to Georgia. The program resulted in an
American military presence directly on Russia’s border, fostering tensions between
78
Thornike Gordadze, “Georgian-Russian Relations in the 1990s,” in The Guns of August 2008: Russia's
War in Georgia, ed. Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2009), 43.
35
Georgia and Russia. This program was part of a greater reorientation away from Russia
by Georgia and towards the West. In 1999, the Shevardnadze government announced
that it would close all Russian military bases located within Georgia’s territory. As part
of this process, Georgia left the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty and began
to prepare itself for rapprochement with NATO.
By 2003, Shevardnadze’s government had readily embraced a pro-Western
political orientation without alienating either the Soviet elites still residing in Georgia or
the Russian government. In the course of a balancing Western and Russian interests,
Shevardnadze’s government created a limited system of authoritarianism.79 Facilitated
through informal mechanisms of corruption, Shevardnadze was able to act as a critical
arbitrator between competing Russian and Western interests, allowing him to accumulate
power for both him and his party, the Citizen’s Union of Georgia (CUG). Within
Georgia’s political system, opponents of the CUG were allowed to create their own
political parties, each with their own platforms and agendas. Eventually, these opposition
parties, which were often both liberal and pro-Western, came to accrue more power than
Shevardnadze’s CUG. In a desperate attempt to maintain power, the November 2nd, 2003
elections were rigged, with large numbers of voters were turned away from the polls,
ballot boxes were stuffed, and several precinct and district election commissions blatantly
falsified results.80
79
Niklas Nilsson, “Georgia’s Rose Revolution: The Break with the Past,” in The Guns of August 2008:
Russia's War in Georgia, ed. Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2009), 85.
80
Nilsson, “Georgia’s Rose Revolution,” 87.
36
As the scale of Shevardnadze and the CUG’s election fraud became known,
rallies were fostered in downtown Tbilisi in an effort to coerce Shevardnadze’s
government to acknowledge the real election results. Eventually, these rallies grew in
both size and scope, spreading throughout the country. When the Central Election
Commission announced that Shevardnadze’s coalition had won the elections on
November 20th, opposition protesters were infuriated. On November 23rd, as
Shevardnadze was delivering an opening speech to the newly convened parliament,
opposition protesters stormed parliament with roses in their hands.81 These protests,
known as the Rose Revolution, forced Shevardnadze to resign on January 4th, 2004.
Mikheil Saakashvili, the leader of Georgia’s reformists, was subsequently elected
Georgia’s president as a result of the Rose Revolution.
2. Events Leading to Incursion
Saakashvili and his government put Georgia on a path to conflict with Russia.
Reform-oriented, Saakashvili’s government focused on economic liberalization, anti-
corruption, and institution building.82 Another key priority of Saakashvili was the
reestablishment of Georgia’s sovereignty over both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, whose
autonomous status was backed by the Russian state. Furthermore, Saakashvili sought
membership in both NATO and the European Union, marketing the Rose Revolution as a
81
82
37
complete break from its historical, cultural, and strategic ties to Russia. In essence,
Georgia’s new government framed the nation-state’s future in the context of European
security, in an effort to fully break away from Russia’s sphere of influence through the
establishment of a strong Georgian state. Georgia’s western course was incompatible
with the Russian government’s interests in the region, where it sought to exercise
exclusive influence.83 Consequently, the Russian government began to coerce Georgia
into moderating its territorial objectives. However, these efforts were largely
unsuccessful, and Georgia maintained its objective of reintegrating South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. Shortly after the election of Saakashvili, Russian authorities enacted an
energy blockade against Georgia, which would be expanded in March to include wine
imports. On October 10th, 2006, the Russian Federation suspended “...postal, automobile,
aviation, marine and railway connections with Georgia.”84 Deportations of Georgians
from Russia followed, and the harassment of Georgians and Georgian businesses was
encouraged within Russia. Russian authorities, furthermore, strengthened their control
over both Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
By 2008, tensions between Russia and Georgia had reached a tipping point. On
April 16th, 2008, President Vladimir Putin signed a presidential decree directing Russian
state agencies to establish official ties with the breakaway republics of South Ossetia and
83
Brian J. Ellison, “Russian Grand Strategy in the South Ossetia War,” Demokratizatsiya 19, no. 4 (Fall
2011): 347, http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.kent.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType
=ip&db=edb&AN=79656447&site=eds-live&scope=site.
84
Thea Morrison, “A Chronology of Russian Embargoes on Georgia,” Georgia Today, June 24, 2019, 10,
http://georgiatoday.ge/news/16199/A-Chronology-of-Russian-Embargoes-on-Georgia.
38
Abkhazia.85 This diplomatic act was viewed in Tbilisi as a step towards the recognition
of the regions, or even as the first steps towards direct annexation. Tensions escalated
between the two neighbors on April 20th, when a Georgian drone was shot down by a
Russian Mig-29 fighter place over Abkhazia.86 Shortly afterwards, the Russian
government, claiming that Georgian forces were being deployed in mass on Abkhazia’s
border, began to increase the number of peacekeepers and military equipment deployed
to the region. On July 15th, Russian forces took part in the Kavkaz-2008 military
exercises on the Russian-Georgian border. The exercises involved over 8,000 Russian
soldiers, who remained in the area even after the conclusion of the exercises. Concurrent
to these exercises, reporters from Moscow-based media outlets were flown into
Tskhinvali, South Ossetia’s capital, while hundreds of South Ossetians, primarily women
and children, were evacuated out of the breakaway region’s capital.87
On August 7th, 2008, Georgian forces shelled Tskhinvali in a miscalculated
attempt to protect its territory. In response, Russia launched an invasion of Georgia
involving the 58th Army and its 80,000 servicemen.88 Outnumbered and unprepared for
an invasion of that scale, the Georgian army was defeated by the Russian military, which
successfully occupied half of the country in five days. A ceasefire, brokered by the
85
Johanna Popjanevski, “From Sukhumi to Tskhinvali: The Path to War in Georgia,” in The Guns of
August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia, ed. Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr (Armonk: M.E.
Sharpe, 2009), 145.
86
Popjanevski, “From Sukhumi to Tskhinvali,” 145.
87
Popjanevski, “From Sukhumi to Tskhinvali,” 149.
88
Pavel Felgenhauer, “After August 7: The Escalation of the Russia-Georgia War,” in The Guns of August
2008: Russia's War in Georgia, ed. Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2009),
163.
39
European Union, brought the conflict to a conclusion, but heavily favored Russia’s
interests and destroyed Georgia’s aspirations towards joining NATO or the EU.
3. Hybrid Tactics Observed
A. Political Warfare
Russia’s incursion into Georgia began with a series of diplomatic and economic
actions, the most prominent being the Russian government’s passport offensive. In
December 2000, the Russian government enacted visa requirements targeting Georgians
working in Russia, specifically those who sent remittances home to their relatives.89 In
theory, Russian authorities believed that they could force Georgia into bankruptcy and
Shevardnadze’s government to collapse. However, the entirety of this strategy was based
on the incorrect assumption that millions of Georgians lived in Russia, when in reality
only half a million Georgians resided in the country. Furthermore, authorities
underestimated the willingness of corrupt local officials to make deals enabling
Georgians to stay in Russia.90 As a result, the visa law had only a moderate effect on
Georgia, though it did challenge Georgia’s territorial integrity. Visas were not required
to move in or out of Georgia’s secessionist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
treating them independent of the territory supposedly governing them.
89
Marcel H. Van Herpen, Putin’s War: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism (Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2014), 644, https://www.willzuzak.ca/cl/putin/Herpen2014PutinsWars.pdf.
90
Gordadze, “Georgian-Russian Relations in the 1990s,” 45.
40
In December 2002, this diplomatic pressure became even more antagonistic when
Russian authorities began the wholesale distribution Russian passports to the inhabitants
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. By providing Russian passports to individuals in these
breakaway republics, Russian authorities created Russian citizens where none had
previously existed before.91 In bestowing citizenship in mass to a population recognized
as living in Georgian territory, Russia could intervene in Georgia under the auspices of
defending its newly minted citizens. While the proliferation and distribution of Russian
passports was the most obvious component of Russia’s “passport offensive,” it was not
the sole component. Abkhazia had also begun to issue its own passports to those living
within its borders, allowing for upwards of 80% of the population to have both
Abkhazian and Russian citizenship.92 Russia’s passport offensive left Russian authorities
with the option of either annexing breakaway republics or preserving their independence
from Georgia.
In addition to the Russian government’s passport campaign, Russian authorities
began an anti-Georgian campaign within their nation-state. Government officials,
including President Putin, likened Georgia’s government and policies to that of the KGB
during the reign of Joseph Stalin.93 With support from Russian government officials,
Georgian businesses within Russia were raided and illegal immigrants expelled. Moscow
91
Van Herpen, Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism, 645.
92
Emil Aslan Souleimanov, Eduard Abrahamyan, and Huseyn Aliyev, “Unrecognized States as a Means of
Coercive Diplomacy? Assessing the Role of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Russia’s Foreign Policy in the
South Caucasus,” Journal of Southeast European & Black Sea Studies 18, no. 1 (March 2018): 81,
doi:10.1080/14683857.2017.1390830.
93
41
police went to local schools and demanded lists of students with Georgian names, while
also sponsoring raids against Georgian migrants and traders.94
Russia’s policy on visas and passports was part of a greater and more cohesive
political and economic campaign designed to keep Georgia within Russia’s sphere of
influence. Economically, the Russian Federation launched a series of trade wars with
Georgia that eventually culminated in the Russian government embargoing all Georgian
goods in 2005, with special emphasis placed on Georgia’s agricultural sector.95 At the
time, Georgia’s agricultural sector was highly dependent on the Russian market and was
significantly impaired by the sanctions as a result.96 On January 22nd, 2006, Russian
economic coercion expanded to the energy sector.97 When the main gas pipeline into
Georgia from Russia exploded, the entirety of Georgia was left without power for days.
As a result, Georgia was forced to diversify its energy sector to meet its energy needs,
eliminating Russia’s political leverage in the strategic economic area. In March 2006,
Russia expanded its embargo to include wine imports from Georgia, resulting in the loss
of $153 million.98 Later that year, Russia would suspend all air, rail, and road traffic
between the two countries, further placing a strain on the Georgian economy.
94
95
Lesia Dorosh, Olha Ivasechko, and Jaryna Turchyn, “Comparative Analysis of the Hybrid Tactics
Application by the Russian Federation in Conflicts with Georgia and Ukraine,” Central European Journal
of International & Security Studies 13, no. 2 (July 2019): 63,
http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.kent.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=tsh&AN=13
8302975&site=eds-live&scope=site.
96
Morrison, “A Chronology of Russian Embargoes on Georgia,” 5.
97
Morrison, “A Chronology of Russian Embargoes on Georgia.”
98
Morrison, “A Chronology of Russian Embargoes on Georgia,” 9.
42
B. Conventional
The most obvious component of Russia’s incursion into Georgia was its
conventional invasion. Russia’s full-scale invasion sought to decimate and destroy the
Georgian state, a goal that required the mobilization of tens of thousands of Russian
servicemen from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. By August 2008, from 25,000 to
30,000 ground troops were deployed to Georgia, supported by over 1,200 pieces of armor
and artillery. Accompanying Russia’s ground forces in the invasion were 200 aircraft
and 40 helicopters.99 Though not deployed directly to the conflict in Georgia, the crews
of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Air Force, and logistics personnel brought the total force
involved in Georgian operations to 40,000. This force was deployed in overwhelming
numbers against Georgian forces, which numbered only 17,000 and lacked experienced
officers. Leaving little to chance, Russia’s conventional forces overwhelmed Georgian
troops through sheer volume, a strategy reminiscent of that employed in Chechnya.100
After Georgian forces shelled Tskhinvali and began moving further into South Ossetia,
Russian armed forces, supported by airstrikes and elements of the Black Sea Fleet,
counterattacked. Penetrating deep into Georgia, Russian forces were able to drive
towards Georgia’s capital of Tbilisi. At the same time, another front was opened in
99
Felgenhauer, “After August 7: The Escalation of the Russia-Georgia War,” 175.
100
Lionel Beehner, Analyzing the Russian Way of War: Evidence from the 2008 Conflict with Georgia
(West Point: Modern War Institute, 2018), 50, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct
=true&AuthType=ip&db=cat02286a& AN=kent.b5819525&site=eds-live&scope=site.
43
eastern Georgia when Russian and Abkhaz forces launched a joint-offensive.101 Unable
to properly respond to the Russian-Abkhazian incursion and withstand a two-front war,
Georgian forces were forced to surrender after five days of fighting.
The majority of Russian troops were moved into Georgia’s separatist regions
under the cover of military exercises, specifically the Kavkaz-2008 exercises that
occurred in the vicinity of South Ossetia.102 According to Georgia’s Ambassador to the
UN Alexander Lomaia, several thousand Russian troops were moved into South Ossetia
via the Roki tunnel.103 Russian authorities, in an effort to conceal the scale of the troop
movement into the area, purposefully underestimated the number of troops involved in
the exercises, causing Georgian officials to believe they could defend against any Russian
incursions related to the Kavkaz-2008 exercises. In Abkhazia, the movement of Russian
troops was concealed under the guise of peacekeeping operations. Army, airborne, and
naval forces moved into Abkhazia under the guise of supporting the already present
3,000-strong Russian peacekeeping operation.104 Part of the forces sent to support the
peacekeeping mission were 400 railroad soldiers, who, since May, repaired critical
railway infrastructure that would be required to mobilize the Russian military. In totality,
the Russian troop movements into both South Ossetia and Abkhazia were obfuscated in a
deliberate effort to conceal Russian intentions in the region.
101
Heidi Tagliavini, International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report. Volume I
(Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2009), 10,
https://web.archive.org/web/2009100703013/http:/www.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_I.pdf. PDF.
102
Vicken Cheterian, “The August 2008 War in Georgia: From Ethnic Conflict to Border Wars,” Central
Asian Survey 28, no. 2 (June 2009): 163, doi:10.1080/02634930903056768.
103
104
44
The heavy reliance on Russian conventional forces during the operation revealed
a number of significant flaws in the Russian military. First and foremost, the Russian
military was largely a paper-tiger. According to Russia’s First Deputy Defense Minister
and Chief of General Staff General Nikolai Makarov, only 20% of the army was combat
ready while the majority of the Russian armed forces’ divisions were comprised solely of
officers without any men to lead.105 Many of these officers, furthermore, could not be
expected to effectively lead soldiers in combat because they lacked experience. The
Russian forces, additionally, were issued with largely outdated equipment. Russian tanks
and armored personal carriers often broke down, slowing the Russian advance. Russian
aircraft, lacking modern equipment, were unable to conduct precise airstrikes or operate
in bad weather, significantly hampering their utility. As the conflict in Georgia
progressed, it became obvious that the two most serious deficiencies of Russia’s
conventional force were its communication and command systems.106 Commanders of
ground forces often were forced to rely on the use of cellular phones, which in turn relied
on Georgian telephone providers to function, to communicate with not only the elements
under their command but with one another as well. Many of the inexperienced
commanders and soldiers of the Russian military often found themselves confused in the
warzone and commonly refused to obey orders from their superiors. In totality, Russia’s
conventional elements faced a plethora of deficiencies and mishaps, hampering their
effectiveness and quality in the campaign.
105
106
Felgenhauer, “After August 7: The Escalation of the Russia-Georgia War.”
45
C. Irregular
Supporting Russian conventional forces were a variety of irregular forces. The
most common of these irregular elements were the military and paramilitary forces
mustered by both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Abkhazia raised a regular army, led and
equipped by Russian officers and the Russian government respectively, of 10,000
soldiers and several hundred pieces of armor and artillery.107 Both Abkhazia and South
Ossetia also fielded militias, which comprised an additional 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers.
Also supplementing the large-scale deployment of separatist forces and militias were
Cossack volunteers and experienced Chechens, many of whom served in the Russia’s
Vostok Battalion—a special forces unit organized by GRU, the Russian foreign military
intelligence agency. In the Georgian Civil War and related South Ossetian-Georgian
conflict, these irregular forces were the primary opponents of Georgian forces. In the
Russia-Georgia War, irregular forces acted as both a vanguard and auxiliary to the main
conventional Russian force.108 At the beginning of the conflict, irregular militias would
be used to engage and draw out Georgian forces and then shift the responsibility of
combat to Russian regular troops. Subsequently, irregular forces would support Russian
forces in their future offenses, performing rear-guard duties and combatting Georgian
forces whenever necessary. These irregular forces, furthermore, played a critical role in
107
108
46
escalating the violence that occurred prior to official hostilities breaking out between
Russia and Georgia.
D. Information Warfare
Though not critical to Russia’s success in the war, the Russian government waged
a robust and comprehensive information war before, during, and after the actual invasion
of Georgia. Rather than attempting to destabilize the Georgian and government, this
campaign sought to legitimize Russia’s own aggressive actions.109 Reflective of this
goal, Russia’s information campaign centered around three major themes: that Georgian
President Saakashvili and the Georgian state “...was the aggressor, that Moscow had... no
choice but to intervene in the defense of its citizens and their human rights... and... that
the United States and NATO has no basis for criticizing Russian actions because of
NATO’s earlier actions in Kosovo...”110 Russia’s creation of a competing narrative was
created and fostered through the plethora of resources available to the Russian state,
including state-controlled media, general state apparatuses, and the presence of Moscow-
based journalists on the ground. Days before the Georgian forces marched into South
Ossetia, forty-eight Russian journalists were based in Tbilisi to report on the conflict.111
Moscow’s state-controlled media was similarly prepared to report on the outbreak of
109
Dorosh, Ivasechko, and Turchyn, “Comparative Analysis of the Hybrid Tactics Application by the
Russian Federation in Conflicts with Georgia and Ukraine,” 65.
110
Paul A. Goble, “Defining Victory and Defeat: The Information War Between Russian and Georgia,” in
The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia, ed. Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr (Armonk:
M.E. Sharpe, 2009), 183.
111
Goble, “Defining Victory and Defeat,” 186.
47
armed violence in Georgia, having elaborate graphs prepared and strict talking points
concerning the war. These talking points not only accused President Saakashvili of
aggression, but the Georgian state of both genocide and ethnic cleansing. Though
unintended, Russian broadcasts presented such a distorted view of reality that many
domestic viewers turned to Western news sources in an effort to obtain a more accurate
version of events.
Moscow’s information war in Georgia was waged with the intention of creating
both misinformation and disinformation. Though misinformation, being the spread of
knowingly false reports, was quickly identified and challenged, disinformation posed a
different and more unique challenge. Disinformation occurs when carefully selected
truths are mixed with falsehoods in order to create a plausible truth or reality, or one that
is impossible to check or empirically reject. As a result, it becomes especially
problematic once it becomes disseminated by a reliable media outlet, as the
disinformation begins to gain credibility as it is used by these media outlets in good
faith.112 The creation and proliferation of disinformation led the establishment of
Moscow’s competing narrative that held Georgia as the aggressor. This narrative,
because of its dissemination by reliable media sources, came to dominate several
European countries, like Germany, whose policies reflected Georgia’s perceived
malevolence.
The Russian state also employed a primitive cyber campaign in an effort to
cripple the Georgian institutions. Organized via state-backed or state-employed
112
Goble, “Defining Victory and Defeat,” 190.
48
organizations, hackers engineered denial of service (DOS) attacks on Georgian
government sites.113 These attacks, which began in July 2008, overloaded and effectively
shut down Georgian websites by overloading their servers. One such site of DOS attacks
was the website of the Georgian president, which was rendered inoperable for over 24
hours. After the invasion, Georgian websites came to be replaced with Russian
propaganda, which included images of Saakashvili alongside the images of 20th century
dictators. The likening of Saakashvili to the fascist and totalitarian leaders of the 20th
century was a common motif in Russian propaganda at the time. In addition to the DOS
attacks, internet traffic from Georgia was redirected to Russian firms, from whence future
attacks would originate and be controlled. Additionally, Russian websites, like
stopgeorgia.ru, made the software to launch a DOS attack on Georgia available on a
public domain. In crippling Georgia’s internet infrastructure, the cyber-attacks isolated
not only individual Georgians from their state but the Georgian state from the greater
international community.114
4. Conclusion
When the Georgian state pursued policies that looked likely to fulfill its
aspirations to join NATO and the European Union, it placed itself on a collision course
113
Michael Koffman, “Russian Performance in the Russo-Georgian War Revisited,” September 3, 2018,
War on the Rocks, 29, https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/russian-performance-in-the-russo-georgian-war-
revisited/.
114
Dorosh, Ivasechko, and Turchyn, “Comparative Analysis of the Hybrid Tactics Application by the
Russian Federation in Conflicts with Georgia and Ukraine,” 63.
49
with the Russian Federation’s desire to secure its sphere of influence in the Caucasus.
Concerned with the expansion of NATO to its borders and the Georgian government’s
adoption of a pro-Western political orientation, Russia sought to employ a variety of
tactics leading up to and during the Russo-Georgian War. Rather than employing these
tactics simultaneously in the manner prescribed by the proponents of hybrid warfare, the
Russian state engaged in a series of escalations that would eventually culminate in a
conventional war. Russia first used political and economic means to coerce the Georgian
state to enact pro-Russian policies. When these means failed to terminate Georgia’s
westward motion, the Russian government laid the groundwork for a conventional
military invasion. When this invasion was launched, Russian forces relied on both its
superior firepower and sheer numbers to overwhelm Georgian defenses and occupy half
the country in five days. Supplementing Russian regular forces were irregular elements
comprised of separatist militias, Cossacks, and Chechens, who acted as auxiliaries to the
regular Russian forces. During the war, the Russian government’s use of both political
and conventional warfare, informational strategies were employed simultaneously to
forward its own narrative.

50
IV. Ukraine
Following the Euromaidan protests and the resignation of Ukraine’s president in
2014, Russian soldiers lacking insignias seized strategic positions within Crimea. Shortly
after the territory was annexed, pro-Russian demonstrations escalated into an armed and
protracted conflict, eventually culminating in a Russian intervention. This chapter will
examine the variety of elements and means employed by the Russian state leading up to
and during both the annexation of Crimea and the War in Donbass. This study will first
be conducted by elaborating on the historical and political background of Ukraine and its
relations with Russia, as well as describing the timeline leading up to the outbreak of the
conflict. Second, the study will seek to identify and describe the elements and means
employed by the Russian state against Ukraine. The elements present in the annexation
of Crimea and the War in Donbass will be identified in their own distinct and separate
sections.
1. Historical Background
Since achieving independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine has been a
nation torn between East and West. The Eastern European country is home to 45 million
people who, since the twelfth century, have been dominated and controlled by external
51
powers, including the Golden Horde, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the
Crimean Khanate. Since 1654, when the Cossack Hetman Bohdan Khmelnitsky swore
allegiance to the Russian Czar in his uprising against the Polish Crown, Ukraine has been
dominated by the Russian state. This dynamic created and perpetuated a unique
relationship between the two nations. Both Russian and Ukraine “...share language;
Russian media are popular in Ukraine; there are family ties; many Ukrainians work in
Russia; and Russians have billions of dollars invested in Ukraine.”115 Ukraine was the
birthplace of the region’s Orthodox religion, and the nation played an integral role in the
Russian Empire. Arguably, Ukraine was also the most important republic within the
USSR after Russia. Alongside Russia, Ukraine was one of the founding states of the
Soviet Union, “...where Ukrainian men were pivotal in the Soviet defeat of the German
army in World War II.”116 With the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 and Ukraine’s
subsequent independence, this special relationship, though at times strained, continued.
With its newfound independence, the Ukrainian government under Leonid
Kravchuk initially attempted to pursue a pro-Western foreign policy, stressed its place
within the European, rather than Eurasian community, and began reinstituting symbols
associated with the post-World War One Ukrainian public.117 Although the government
attempted to establish a new Ukraine free from Russian influence, it inherited from the
115
Krishnadev Calamur, “Why Ukraine Is Such A Big Deal For Russia,” February 21, 2014, NPR, 3,
https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/02/21/280684831/why-ukraine-is-such-a-big-deal-for-russia.
116
Calamur, “Why Ukraine Is Such A Big Deal For Russia,” 5.
117
Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s.v. “Independent Ukraine,” by Lubomyr A. Hajda et al, last modified
March 5, 2020, 3, https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/Independent-Ukraine.
52
Soviet Union a “... a legacy of state control and endemic corruption...,” which stalled
many of the state’s attempts at democratization and Westernization.118
Poor relations with Russia, coupled with rampant corruption and economic
difficulties, led to Leonid Kuchma winning the 1994 presidential election, replacing
Leonid Kravchuk. The results of the 1994 election revealed a deep political and cultural
divide within Ukraine. Kuchma had won most of the Russophone regions of Eastern
Ukraine, which was mostly Russian speaking and of the Orthodox religion. In contrast,
Kravchuk had done particularly well in Western Ukraine, whose population spoke
primarily Ukrainian, was increasingly nationalistic and distrustful of Russia, and whose
Church acknowledged the supremacy of the Roman Catholic Pope.119
Kuchma pursued a policy wherein Ukraine “...sought membership in NATO and
the European Union while also pursuing closer relations with Russia,” which was a
delicate balancing act with domestic and international consequences.120 As his
presidency continued, Kuchma’s relationship would grow increasingly strained with the
West as his administration became mired in corruption scandals.121 Although he put
Ukraine on the paths for EU and NATO membership, his low popularity abroad forced
118
“The World Factbook: Ukraine,” February 1, 2018, Central Intelligence Agency, 1,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html.
119
William Schneider, “Ukraine's 'Orange Revolution,’” The Atlantic, December 14, 2004, 1,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/12/ukraines-orange-revolution/305157/.
120
121
Oleksandr Sushko, “The International Implications of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution,” PONARS Policy
Memo No. 356, November 2004, 4, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-
pdf/pm_0356.pdf.
53
Kuchma to turn to Russia for political and economic support, culminating in the
formation of a joint economic space known as the Single Economic Space in 2003.122
In 2004, Ukraine’s trajectory changed significantly with the Orange Revolution.
In the 2004 presidential elections, Kuchma’s chosen successor and Russian President
Vladimir Putin’s preferred candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, defeated opposition leader
Viktor Yushchenko, who ran on an anticorruption, anti-cronyism, and pro-Western
platform, in a run-off election. Much like the 1994 elections, the candidate’s supporters
were divided into two camps: the nationalistic, Ukrainian-speaking western half of the
nation-state voted for Yushchenko, who favored stronger ties to the West and Europe;
and the Russophilic eastern half of Ukraine supported Yanukovych, the pro-Moscow
candidate.123 However, in the run-off election, observers detected massive discrepancies.
According to the National Democratic Institute, observers reported nearly 1 million extra
votes being cast in Yanukovych’s favor.124 As a result, Yushchenko’s supporters began
mass protests, adopting the color orange as a symbol against Yanukovych. After two
months of protests, the Ukrainian Supreme Court order a new election, bringing the pro-
West Yuschenko to power in Ukraine.
122
Sushko, “The International Implications of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution,” 4.
123
Schneider, “Ukraine's 'Orange Revolution,’” 5.
124
Schneider, “Ukraine's 'Orange Revolution,’” 6.
54
2. Events Leading to Incursions
In 2010, Viktor Yanukovych was elected president. The pro-Moscow candidate,
who was ousted in the Orange Revolution, ascended to the presidency after President
Viktor Yushchenko’s governing coalition collapsed, due in part because of the dissent of
his Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko. Under Yanukovych, Ukraine began to reorient
itself towards Moscow. In exchange for a reduction in the price of imported Russian
natural gas, “...Ukraine agreed to extend Russia’s lease of the port at Sevastopol.”125
Relations with Russia were further improved when Ukraine announced that it would
officially no longer pursue NATO membership.126 At the same time, the rule of law
deteriorated within the country. Yanukovych’s political enemies, like former Prime
Minister Tymoshenko and her interior minister, Yuri Lutsenko, were imprisoned as a
result of politically motivated trials.127 Because of policies pursued by Yanukovych,
Ukraine’s pro-European trajectory was placed in danger.
By 2012, the European Union and Ukraine had negotiated a treaty to lower trade
barriers, launch reforms to meet EU standards, and begin the mechanisms that could lead
to Ukraine achieving membership with the EU. Known as the European Union
Association Agreement, the treaty was incredibly popular with students throughout the
125
126
127
Associated Press in Strausburg, “Yulia Tymoshenko Imprisonment 'Politically Motivated,” The
Guardian, April 30, 2013, 1, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/30/yulia-tymoshenko-jailing-
politically-motivated.
55
country, who viewed their future as being tied to European integration and the
elimination of corruption.128 While under pressure from Russia, Yanukovych suspended
negotiations regarding the association agreement on November 21st, 2013. In place of
this agreement, Yanukovych accepted a Russian multibillion-dollar economic bailout
package, signaling closer ties to Russia and the end of Ukraine’s pro-European trajectory.
The effects of Yanukovych’s policy reversal were immediate. The day that
Yanukovych announced the cessation of talks, several hundred activists gathered in
Kiev’s main square the Maiden square, to protest. On November 30th, after days of
continuous protest, riot police, known as the Berkut, violently cracked down on the
protestors who were camped out on the square.129 The images of police brutality against
the peaceful demonstrators shocked and angered the nation. The following day, “...the
protest had swelled to hundreds of thousands as people poured in from across the
country...” to demand the resignation of Yanukovych, sparking the Euromaidan
Revolution.130 As months dragged on, and as violence developed into battles leaving
scores killed, Yanukovych was forced to flee Kiev and a pro-Western government was
formed. 131 A few days later, Russian troops began to surround Ukrainian bases in
Crimea, beginning a new phase of the crisis.
128
“Ukraine's Euromaiden Revolution,” June 2017, Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, 2,
https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Ukraine_Euromaidan_CCP_ii.pdf.
129
“Ukraine's Euromaiden Revolution,” 6.
130
131
56
3. Political Warfare
In the wake of the Orange Revolution and Yanukovych’s initial defeat, the
Russian government under Vladimir Putin, began to influence and mobilize its
nonmilitary means in order to guarantee Ukraine’s pro-Russian trajectory. These means
included the use of economic and political assets in an effort to solidify and guarantee
Ukraine’s position within Russia’s sphere. Through the use of Gazprom, Russia’s state-
owned global energy company, the Russian government was able to strike Ukraine at its
will without the use of physical force. In both 2006 and 2009, Russia cut off gas supplies
to Ukraine, leading to the eventual collapse of the Yuschenko government. Additionally,
Gazprom’s provision of gas supplies became an important bargaining chip between
Ukraine and Russia. When Yanukovych’s government in 2010 began pursuing pro-
Russian policies, Ukraine “...a 30% discount on gas prices and a reduction of the amount
of gas that Ukraine was obligated to purchase.”132 The Russian state also emphasized the
economic benefits that a positive relationship with Russia offered. When relations
deteriorated under pro-Western regimes in Kiev, Putin’s government instructed Russian
customs officials to intensify inspections of Ukrainian goods into the country, resulting in
the flow of Ukrainian goods into Russia being effectively stopped without the use of
embargoes or tariffs.
132
Jeffrey V. Dickey et al., “Russian Political Warfare: Origin, Evolution, and Application” (Master’s
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 214.
57
Since the turn of the century, the Russian government’s political influence over
Ukraine was solidified through the funding of pro-Russian political parties and leaders,
the enhancement of the abilities of NGOs, and the strengthening of the Russian Orthodox
Church.133 Russian President Vladimir Putin gambled on the support of Yanukovych and
his Party of Regions to facilitate pro-Russian policies in Ukraine. In return for Russian
political support and $600 to $900 million in funding it brought, Yanukovych’s
government pursued policies beneficial to the Russian state, including the adoption of
Russian as the official language of Ukraine, the allowance of dual citizenship, and the
abandonment of Ukrainian rapprochement towards NATO.134 Non-governmental
organizations promoted anti-Western and anti-democratic sentiment through the creation
of political structures parallel to Western ones. Also, the Russian Orthodox Church
promoted pro-Russian parties and Yanukovych specifically. The church publicly
endorsed Yanukovych, politicizing their sermons to support his pro-Russian policies and
using its finances to fund his campaign.135
133
Todd C. Helmus et al., Russian Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern
Europe (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 8, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports
/RR2237.html.
134
Helmus et al., Russian Social Media Influence, 215.
135
Helmus et al., Russian Social Media Influence, 211.
58
4. The Annexation of Crimea
A. Conventional
Russian conventional capabilities, with a huge boost in funding following the
Georgian War, played an important role in Russia’s incursion into Crimea, and Ukraine
in general. Between 2010 and 2014, Russian defense spending rose significantly.
According to a report in Jane’s Defence Weekly, Russia’s military expenditure increased
92.3% during the aforementioned period. In nominal terms, Russian defense spending
had reached $69.3 billion, a 18.4% increase from its defense expenditure of 58.2 billion
the previous year.136 This increase in defense spending allowed for the Russian military
to be modernized and brought up to par with its Western counterparts. Professional,
well-trained contract soldiers began to exceed the number of conscripts, allowing Russia
to conduct small to medium- scale military operations by employing these professional
troops. Not only did Russia produce qualitatively improved personal, but the Russian
government also created a new command and control system, modernized
communication equipment, improved situational awareness, made mobility the focal
point of its operations, and introduced precision weaponry to all branches of its armed
forces.137 The increase in funding, coupled with the modernization of its military,
136
Craig Caffrey, “Russian Commits to 18% Budget Rise,” March 24, 2014, Jane’s 360, 1,
https://www.janes.com/article/35911/russian-commits-to-18-budget-rise.
137
Anton Lavrov, Russian Military Reforms from Georgia to Syria (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic
and International Studies, 2018), 14, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/181106_RussiaSyria_WEB_v2.pdf?sM_hVtQ0qs4_TTU9rSTS_sDJJvcB.IPg.
59
allowed for Russia to challenge the West and its periphery that encroached upon its
perceived sphere of influence.
This newly modernized and efficient Russian military played a critical role in
Russian operations in Crimea, threatening Ukraine and the West with a massed
conventional attack, as well as its contract troops and special forces leading operations on
the peninsula. Primarily a means to flex its military abilities to the West, snap exercises
occurred along the border of Ukraine. Since he returned to the presidency in 2012,
Vladimir Putin had ordered several of such exercises to occur.138 However, these
inspections were also used to disguise troop movements as well as to create a distraction
near Ukrainian borders. In a RAND Corporation report titled Lessons from Russia’s
Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, it was noted that on February 26th, 2014,
“Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a snap inspection involving 150,000 troops
from parts of the Central and Western District,” shifting Russian military forces
throughout the county and moving special forces closer to Ukraine.139 On March 13th,
another snap exercise was ordered, resulting on nearly 8,500 pieces of artillery and 1,500
paratroopers being deployed to the border.140 These snap exercises were supplemented
by large-scale operations involving navy, air, and ground troops throughout the entirety
138
Steve Gutterman, “Putin Puts Troops in Western Russia on Alert in Drill,” Reuters, February 26, 2014,
3, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-military/putin-puts-troops-in-western-russia-on-
alert-in-drill-idUSBREA1P0RW20140226.
139
Michael Kofman et al, Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (Santa
Monica: RAND Corporation, 2017), 8, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1498.html.
140
Kathy Lally and Carol Morello, “Russian Troops Gathering at Ukraine Border for Exercises as Standoff
Continues,” The Washington Post, March 13, 2014, 8, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russian-
troops-gathering-at-ukraine-border-for-exercises-as-standoff-continues/2014/03/13/39f42508-aaa1-11e3-
adbc-888c8010c799_story.html.
60
of Russia during the crises. Given the massive troop movements that directed Russian
forces to the border of Ukraine, these exercises raised the threat of the Russian
government escalating the conflict via a conventional military invasion, as well as
allowing for the sustained build-up of combat-ready troops in close proximity to the
Ukrainian border while obfuscating their movements in general.
These conventional forces, who enjoyed a significant boost in funding and whose
movement into the region was obscured by large Russian military drills, were the primary
actors in the annexation of Crimea. Russian KSO special forces, whose limited numbers
were supplemented by elements from the Spetsnaz-GRU and marines from the 810th
Independent Naval Battalion based at the Black Sea Fleet base near Sevastopol, were the
primary drivers of Russian actions within Crimea. According to the report Lessons from
Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, “...several units from the 810th
Independent Naval Infantry Brigade arrived in armored personal carriers in
[Sevastopol]...” after the city council appointed a Russian citizen as mayor.141 The
conventional characteristics of Russian operations was exemplified again on February
27th, when a group of “...50 special-forces operators from the KSO unit pretending to be
a local ‘self-defense militia’ seized the Crimean Parliament and raised a Russian flag
over the building.”142 These forces, though limited in number, quickly diffused
throughout Crimea, quickly seizing critical infrastructure and key roads in the peninsula.
141
Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations, 52.
142
61
These professional Russian soldiers subsequently erected checkpoints and roadblocks in
their newly conquered territory, cementing their control over the territory.143
The Russian forces engaged in operations in Crimea lacked the heavy firepower
required to engage in a prolonged conflict. As a result, Russian military elements
“...leverag[ed] mobility, speed of action, surprise, and capability...” to “...quickly seize
control of the peninsula.”144 Equipped with high-maneuverable light utility vehicles and
armored personal carriers, Russian forces used their mobility to surrounded and blockade
a number of Ukrainian military facilities while facing little resistance from their
garrisons.145 Following the successful proliferation of Russian professional troops
through the peninsula, a conventional troop buildup of regular Russian forces occurred.
Beginning on March 6th, the Russian government ferried units of “...motor rifle brigades,
towed artillery, a variety of air-defense units, and antiship missile batteries...” across the
Kerch straight into eastern Crimea to supplement the Russian forces already conducting
operations there.146 At this point in Russian operations, the peninsula was largely under
the control of Russian military elements.
With Ukrainian military bases on the peninsula encircled and besieged by Russian
forces, Ukraine’s military presence in Crimea was effectively neutralized. With
Ukraine’s response to Russian actions unlikely to originate from troops on the peninsula,
the recently arrived Russian regulars prepared for a Ukrainian counterattack to arrive
143
John Simpson, “Russia's Crimea Plan Detailed, Secret and Successful,” BBC, March 19, 2014, 3
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26644082.
144
Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations, xi.
145
146
62
from mainland Ukraine. Simultaneous to these defensive preparations, Ukraine’s navy
stationed on Crimea came under attack by conventional Russian naval elements. A third
of Ukraine’s warships were effectively blockaded in their in their port when “Russian
forces... blocked their only exit point to the Black Sea by sinking two ageing vessels
there...” while Russian missile cruisers patrolled the waters near the fleet.147 At the time,
neither Ukrainian troops stationed on bases in Crimea nor the fleets docked there
responded to Russian aggression with force. Without any immediate response by the
Ukrainian military to the aforementioned international transgressions, Russian
conventional power proved crucial to the annexation of Crimea.
While the Russian forces deployed to Crimea were of a conventional nature, these
elements employed a variety of unconventional tactics in order to establish authority over
the peninsula. The most obvious manifestation of these irregular tactics was the sudden
appearance of “little green men” or “polite people” in Crimea. Termed “little green men”
or “polite people” by the media, these masked Russian soldiers wore green army
uniforms lacking national or unit patches and were equipped with modern Russian
weaponry.148 In interactions with the local population, Russian troops behaved in a
professional manner and claimed to be local “self-defense” militias unaffiliated with the
Russian state or other external strata. These “little green men,” who hid their faces and
147
Andrew Osborn, “Ukraine Facing Loss of Its Navy as Russian Forces in Crimea Dig In,” Reuters,
March 8, 2014, 2, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-naval-fleet/ukraine-facing-loss-of-its-
navy-as-russian-forces-in-crimea-dig-in-idUSBREA270M920140308.
148
Oleg Manko and Yurii Mikhieiev, “Defining the Concept of ‘Hybrid Warfare’ Based on Analysis of
Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine,” Information & Security: An International Journal 41 (August 2018):
15, doi:10.11610/isij.4107.
63
lacked any official national affiliation, were employed in an attempt to obfuscate their
relation to the Russian state and the nature of their actions.149
Another example of Russian conventional forces employing unconventional
tactics can be found in their reliance on psychological warfare. Because of the limited
deployment of Russian troops in the peninsula, the Russian state sought to cultivate
defections from the Ukrainian Armed Forces in an attempt to supplement its limited
invasion with indigenous manpower.150 Russian troops, consequently, limited their use
of force in Crimea and instead “...applied psychological pressure, propaganda tactics, and
promises...” of power, wealth, and promotion in an effort to coerce Ukrainian
commanders and their units to defect.151 These tactics were especially effective on
Ukrainian security forces, such as the Berkut, who defected due to “combination of
propaganda, pressure and financial incentives.”152 Additionally, several high profile
Ukrainian military commanders defected as well, such as the commander of the
Ukraine’s navy, Denis Berezovsky.153 Though some defections accompanied these
military commanders, the overall number of defections amongst Ukrainian service
members failed to provide a major and stable source of manpower for conventional
operations in the manner originally envisioned by Russian military planners.154
149
Manko and Mikhieiev, “Defining the Concept of ‘Hybrid Warfare,’” 16.
150
151
152
Johann Schmid, “Hybrid Warfare on the Ukrainian Battlefield: Developing Theory Based on Empirical
Evidence,” Journal on Baltic Security 5, no. 1 (2019): 9, doi:10.2478/jobs-2019-0001.
153
154
64
As it became apparent that Ukrainian forces stationed in Crimea would not
respond to Russian operations with force, local pro-Russian militias were organized to
supplement Russian troops either by Russian intelligence services or pro-Russian
elements within Crimea.155 Although these auxiliaries varied in background, equipment,
and organization, they always functioned to police the local populace. These irregulars
included pro-Russian local militias, the Night Wolves motorcycle club, former members
of the Berkut, Cossack paramilitaries, and the Chetnik Guards.156 Unlike the supposed
“self-defense” militias wearing modern Russian military uniforms and carrying advanced
weaponry, these pro-Russian militias comprised of “...men often dressed in civilian
clothes — though they are increasingly in surplus military camouflage — distinguished
by black and orange ribbons or red armbands.”157 Driven by “... an affinity for Russia
and a general disdain for Kiev’s revolutionary movement and its right-wing factions...,”
these militias embraced the role of local citizens guards who performed police functions
for Russian forces.158
155
“Little Green Men”: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014 (Fort
Bragg: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2015), 58,
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=cat02286a&AN=kent.b5683867&si
te=eds-live&scope=site.
156
“Little Green Men,” 44.
157
“'We Don't Want War Here': Pro-Russia Militias Patrol Crimea,” NBC News, March 5, 2014, 2,
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis/we-dont-want-war-here-pro-russia-militias-patrol-
crimea-n45246.
158
“’We Don’t Want War Here’: Pro-Russian Militias Patrol Crimea,” 6.
65
B. Information Warfare
Prior to, during, and following Russian military operations in Crimea was an
information campaign designed to generate domestic support and local acquiescence,
while simultaneously creating plausible deniability at the international stage. Whereas
“The Russian media always maintained some coverage on events in Crimea for its own
domestic public...,” their coverage of the peninsula intensified as violence grew between
Maidan protestors and pro-government forces in Kiev.159 Already the subject of an
intense manipulation and disinformation campaign by the Russian state, the Euromaidan
movement energized the Russian media, which began to push an anti-EU and anti-
Western narrative to its domestic audience.160 Following the ouster of President
Yanukovych, “...Russian media outlets and government officials began to disseminate the
narrative that Yanukovych was forced out of power by Ukrainian fascists supported by
the West.”161 In addition to attempting to discredit the new Ukrainian government, this
narrative sought to emphasize the danger that ethnic Russians in Ukraine faced and
displayed broad support for the return of Crimea back to Russia.162 This narrative was
often forwarded by Russian political figures and elites, who called for a Russian
intervention to protect said nationals in Crimea.163 In fostering the narrative that the new
159
160
Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations.
161
Fighting in the “Grey Zone”: Lessons from Russian Influence Operations in Ukraine, 1st sess, 2017
(115th Cong.), statement of Dr. Michael Carpenter, Senior Director, Biden Center for Diplomacy and
Global Engagement, 4. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Carpenter_03-29-17.pdf.
162
Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations, xii.
163
66
Maiden government is fascist and seeks to marginalize Ukraine’s Russian minority, the
Russian media and governing elites successfully justified their incursion into Crimea to
the domestic Russian populace.
Crimea had long been a Russian media and cultural space, due in a large part to
Ukraine’s shared history with Russia and Crimea’s Russian ethnic majority. Russian
television channels provide “...the main source of information for two-thirds of local
residents.”164 When Russian forces stopped Crimea’s nine Ukrainian television channels
from broadcasting on March 9th, those on the peninsula only had access to Russian
televised media.165 For nearly two-thirds of the population, Russian television channels
are the main source of information. At the time of its annexation, Crimea had 555
Russian-language schools compared to just six Ukrainian-language ones.166 When
Russian forces turned off the nine available Ukrainian television channels on March 9th,
only access to Russian channels remained. As a result, the disinformation campaign and
narrative creation occurring in Russia was occurring in Crimea simultaneously to an
ethnic Russian population already oriented and supportive of Moscow. Without access to
any other forms of non-Russian traditional media, the population of Crimea was
constantly fed propaganda discrediting the new government in Kiev while Moscow was
increasingly portrayed as messianic.
164
Wojciech Konończuk, “Russia's Real Aims in Crimea,” March 13, 2014, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 27, https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/03/13/russia-s-real-aims-in-crimea-pub-
54914.
165
Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, 13.
166
Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations.
67
Complementing traditional media was both a grassroots movement and an online
presence. Grassroots movements first emerged in Crimea to protest the actions of the
Maiden movement in Kiev, such as the Stop Maiden movement in Simferopol that
“...relied on visual outdoor ads...” to convey its anti-Maiden message.167 A majority of
these anti-Maiden campaigns “...originated from the Russian-speaking population of
Crimea, although some alleged the Russian government... ” provided assistance to these
pro-Russian movements in organizing protests in Crimea.168 These groups, through their
use of advertising and petitioning, reinforced the Russian media narrative that the Maiden
movement was fascist and posed a threat to Ukraine’s Russian minority.169 Online,
Kremlin-paid, pro-Russian agitators would spread disinformation on blogs, websites, or
social media in a manner in which traditional media would conduct their disinformation
campaign. These agitators claimed that Crimea always belonged to Russia, that Russian
speakers need to be protected from Kiev’s fascists, and, after the annexation, that Crimea
was never annexed but rightfully unified with Russia.170
One of the cornerstones of Russia’s information operations was the creation of
plausible deniability. Throughout operations in Crimea, Russian troops maintained the
bare minimum of deniability. At the operational level, the “little green men,” who were
central to Crimean operations, removed their insignias and other identifying symbols
167
Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations, 15.
168
Allison Quinn, “Why Moscow’s Anti-Maidan Protesters Are Putting on an Elaborate Pretence,” The
Guardian, February 26, 2015, 2, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/26/russia-anti-maidan-
protest-moscow.
169
170
Soňa Rusnáková, “Russian New Art of Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine,” Slovak Journal of Political
Sciences 17, no. 3-4 (October 1, 2017): 360, https://doi.org/10.1515/sjps-2017-0014.
68
from their uniforms and were ordered not to tell anyone their place of origin.171 These
Russian troops claimed to be local “self-defense” militias, denying any connection to the
Russian government. Russian government officials and elites, including Putin himself,
denied the presence of Russian troops in Crimea as well. In a March 4th press
conference, Putin not only publicly stated that there were no Russian troops present in
Crimea, in spite of the mounting evidence of their deployment, but also declared that
Russia had no plans to annex Crimea despite the ongoing events.172 Furthermore, Putin
claimed that the snap military inspections, which masked troops movements and
threatened both Ukraine and the West with an invasion, were not spurious but planned
long beforehand.173 In creating plausible deniability, Russia obfuscates its involvement
in the region. The resulting confusion in the international community commits them to
inaction, allowing Russia to consolidate its gains and normalize the annexation of
Crimea.
Though not playing a decisive role in Crimea, Russia employed cyber
technologies in its operations on the peninsula. In an effort to pressure besieged
Ukrainian troops, “...landline communications between the Ukrainian mainland and bases
on Crimea” were severed and Russian forces employed ship-based cell phone jammers in
order to mitigate contact with mainland Ukraine.174 Additionally, several instances of
physical Russian attacks on cyber infrastructure were observed. For example,
171
Pierre Vaux, James Miller, and Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, “Provocations, Proxies and Plausible
Deniability,” The Interpreter, June 16, 2014, 5, http://www.interpretermag.com/provocations-proxies-and-
plausible-deniability/.
172
173
174
69
Urktelecom, the Ukrainian National Telecommunications Operator, experienced one of
its office branches seized by armed men who proceeded to kinetically damage
telecommunications cables present at the office.175 Also, Ukrainian government officials
experienced cyber-attacks on their mobile communications originating from Crimea.176
Further cyber-attacks were launched on both governmental, departmental, bank servers,
and military communications, disrupting the efficiency of the Ukrainian state.177
Although cyber-attacks did not play a pivotal role in Crimea, it is likely that the
deployment of cyber techniques in Crimea accompanied more large-scale cyber
operations occurring in Eastern Ukraine at the same time.
C. Criminality
After the initial covert and conventional phases of Crimean operations, the
Russian government mobilized criminal networks and its contacts as instruments of state
policy. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Crimea and its cities were a center of
criminal activity, acting as “...havens for smuggling, black marketeering, and a lucrative
array of embezzlement schemes centering on the region's health spas and holiday
resorts.”178 These Crimean criminal networks and their operations depended on their
175
Rusnáková, “Russian New Art of Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine,” 361.
176
Rusnáková, “Russian New Art of Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine.”
177
Manko and Mikhieiev, “Defining the Concept of ‘Hybrid Warfare’ Based on Analysis of Russia’s
Aggression Against Ukraine,” 17.
178
Mark Galeotti, “Crime And Crimea: Criminals As Allies And Agents,” RadioFreeEurope /
RadioLiberty, April 23, 2019, 9, https://www.rferl.org/a/crimea-crime-criminals-as-agents-
allies/26671923.html.
70
relations with Russian criminal networks, for “...dirty money was typically laundered
through Russian banks and became all but untraceable for the Ukrainian police.”179 As
protests against Yanukovych grew and his power subsequently waned, the Russian
government reached out to potential clients among its contacts within Crimean criminal
networks to mobilize their resources in support of its annexation of Crimea. As a result
of this mobilization, Crimean criminal networks become instruments of Russian
policy.180 The Kremlin’s appointed acting Prime Minister of Crimea, Sergei Aksyonov,
was repeatedly connected to a cigarette-smuggling gang called “Salem” during the
1990s.181 Crimean parliament speaker, Vladimir Konstantinov, was persistently linked to
organized crime groups and has been accused of fraud on numerous occasions.182 In
addition to positions of leadership being filled by members of criminal networks, a
portion of the Crimean “self-defense” forces were alleged to be manned by criminal
gangs. According to an official of a local prosecutor, foot soldiers from rival criminal
gangs joined together to strategic locations and erect checkpoints around the peninsula at
Moscow’s behest.183 Though crime and corruption have always been common to
Ukraine and Crimea, the criminal networks that perpetuated them were easily exploited
by the Russian government to become instruments of state policy.
179
Galeotti, “Crime And Crimea,” 6.
180
181
182
Galeotti, “Crimea and Crimea,” 21.
183
Galeotti, “Crimea and Crimea,” 23.
71
5. War in Donbass
Concurrent to Russia’s military operations in Crimea were a series of protests in
the Donbass region. When Ukraine began to crack down on these Donbass protestors in
mid-April of 2014, Russia began to take a more active role in the brewing civil conflict,
though still far from the direct, covert, and visible role it had in Crimea. Russia only
intervened in the conflict in Donbass using conventional means at the end of May, when
it became apparent that the pro-Russian separatist forces there were on the verge of
collapse. This approach was successful in destabilizing the country and preventing the
Ukrainian government from asserting control over the wayward region. The War in
Donbass occurred in several distinct phases, each one of which involved a greater level of
involvement by Russia in its efforts to achieve political goals and deserves to be
examined in detail.
Immediately after the Maidan protests forced Yanukovych to flee Ukraine,
counter-protests began against the new pro-Western government in Kiev. On February
23rd, this new government “...voted to repeal the official status of the Russian language,”
provoking fear and anger in the pro-Russian eastern half of the nation.184 Coupled with
Russia’s operations in Crimea, this measure “...encouraged the mobilization of both
184
72
leftist and right-wing organizations in Eastern Ukraine” in opposition to Ukraine’s new
Western orientation and its immediate policy decisions.185 Initially, the protests gripping
Eastern Ukraine were both “...spontaneous and initiated by local populations.”186
Reflecting existing political divisions, a majority of these protesters were supporters of
the ousted President Yanukovych and his political party, the Party of Regions, resulting
in their collective dismay at his removal. With his ouster, many individuals felt anxiety
that their political interests, which tended to be Russian-aligned, would no longer be
pursued by the western-centric government in Kiev.
This collective anxiety culminated in a series of demonstrations throughout
Eastern Ukraine by unarmed pro-Russian protesters against the new government.187 In
the city of Donetsk, one such protest escalated when a group of 100 protestors
“...[overran] a government building and proclaimed they have taken over the regional
administration.”188 In Luhansk and Odessa, similar incidents occurred. A group of 400
protestors stormed the local administration building in Luhansk and hoisted a Russian
flag atop the building.189 In Odessa, a group of 4,000 protestors skirmished with
Ukrainian nationalists, necessitating a police intervention to prevent an escalation
between the two groups.190 As several commentators have recognized, the presence of
“...Russian military support for the installment of a Russian mayor in Sevastopol may
185
186
187
188
Oksana Grytsenko, “Pro-Russia Groups Take over Government Buildings across Ukraine,” The
Guardian, March 3, 2014, 1, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/03/pro-russia-groups-
government-buildings-ukraine.
189
Grytsenko, “Pro-Russia Groups Take over,” 5.
190
Grytsenko, “Pro-Russia Groups Take over,” 6.
73
have convinced these protestors they could have counted on Moscow’s backing,”
resulting in their emboldened actions during this period.191 The calls for referendums that
became common in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Odessa were attempts to pressure
the government, in order to force the Ukrainian government to offer the concession of
greater autonomy. The rise of the Maiden movement at the expense of the Yanukovych
regime fueled feelings of disenfranchisement and resent amongst eastern Ukrainians, who
increasingly viewed some level of autonomy or separation from Kiev as necessary.
Although the Russian government cannot claim responsibility for organizing the
initial protests and displays of disdain for the new Western orientation, the Kremlin did
assist in perpetuating them by further mobilizing the region’s anti-Western sentiments to
its political advantage.192 In order perpetuate the protests in Eastern Ukraine and take
advantage of the regions’ current circumstances, “Russia, together with vested Ukrainian
oligarchs in the eastern regions, leveraged their influence to mobilize protests and
advance those on the fringe of Ukraine’s politics.”193 Under Yanukovych and his
predecessors, Ukrainian oligarchs informally exerted significant influence and control
over regional politics within Ukraine. As a result of this influence, Ukrainian oligarchs
had the ability to curb the threat of separatism as it emerged from Eastern Ukraine.
However, certain Ukrainian oligarchs, like Rinat Akhemtov and Oleksandr Yefremov,
used the threat of separatism as a card in negotiations with Kiev’s new government to
191
192
Schmid, “Hybrid Warfare on the Ukrainian Battlefield,” 10.
193
Kofman, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts,” 15.
74
preserve their own influence and authority, as well as playing into Russian interests in the
event that Russia conducted operations similar to Crimea in the Donbass region.194
Much like local protestors, these oligarchs advocated for Kiev to delegate more
authority to the regional governments, as well as giving these regional administrations
greater control over finances in order to accrue more personal power.195 As a result, the
agitations in Eastern Ukraine were tolerated by pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarchs, given
the existing political divisions within the country. The Russian government sought to
take advantage of these divisions by encouraging “...Russian citizens... to cross the border
and participate...” in the unfolding events by traveling to Eastern Ukraine and protesting
against the Maiden government.196 The Ukrainian government, in turn, accused the
Russian government of paying individuals cross the border and to partake in the
agitations.197 As the threat of separatism continued to be fostered, Moscow sought to
force Ukraine to federalize, which would effectively divide the country regionally and
prevent Ukraine from moving in a western direction. This scheme would allow for
power to be concentrated in the hands of regional governments and pro-Russian oligarchs
with vested interests in maintaining the status quo.198
194
Roman Olearchyk, “Ukraine's Oligarchs Accused of Double Dealing over Separatism,” Financial
Times, April 15, 2014, 10, https://www.ft.com/content/76d548cc-c4a9-11e3-b2fb-00144feabdc0.
195
Olearchyk, “Ukraine's Oligarchs Accused of Double Dealing over Separatism,” 5.
196
197
Andrew Roth, “From Russia, 'Tourists' Stir the Protests,” The New York Times, March 4, 2014, 3,
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/world/europe/russias-hand-can-be-seen-in-the-protests.html.
198
75
B. Irregular
The political warfare that characterized Russian activities in Eastern Ukraine
transitioned into an insurgency when Ukraine arrested the separatist leaders who
previously declared themselves governors and mayors of people’s republics and
forcefully retook areas under the control of separatist demonstrators. Leading the
aforementioned demonstrations were a variety of self-proclaimed “people’s mayors” and
“people’s governors.” While these individuals were undoubtably pro-Russian and anti-
Maiden, they were “...local and regional outsiders, adherents of extreme movements that
exist on the margins of the political landscape.”199 The majority of these separatist
leaders consisted of largely unknown individuals on the frisks of the separatist
movement, or in essence, nobodies. Denis Pushilin sold shares in a pyramid scheme
before becoming the leader of the Donetsk People’s Republics, while Vyacheslav
Ponomariov operated a soap factory prior to embracing the role of “people’s mayor” of
Slovyansk.200 At best, the original leaders of the separatist movement, men like Pushilin
and Ponomariov, were “...local criminals, small businessmen, and ideological extremists
colored by Russian nationalism...” who were universally poorly suited for the
stewardship of the separatist movement in Ukraine.201
199
200
Griff Witte, “Pro-Russian Separatists in Eastern Ukraine Were 'Nobodies' - until Now,” The Washington
Post, April 30, 2014, 17, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/pro-russian-separatists-in-eastern-
ukraine-were-nobodies--until-now/2014/04/30/c504e687-cc7a-40c3-a8bb-7c1b9cf718ac_story.html.
201
76
With the commencement of a crackdown by regional administrations against the
pro-Russian movements in Eastern Ukraine, the “people’s mayors” and “people’s
governors” were arrested and replaced. Their successors were better suited to leadership
of the fledgling separatist movement as they were highly connected to Ukraine’s
powerful oligarchs and their patronage systems that exerted influence in Ukraine. When
Yanukovych was forced out of office, the disgraced president and many of his associates
fled to Russia, providing Moscow the opportunity to “...tap their patronage connections
and business networks.”202 With the establishment of ties between Moscow and
Yanukovych’s existing patronage networks, the Russian state was able to facilitate the
replacement of ousted “people’s mayors” and “people’s governors” with “...individuals
with ties to Russian security services, military experience, and associations with business
interests in Russia.”203 These new leaders of the separatist movement were no longer
political outsiders but experienced militants with ties to Yanukovych, his patronage
networks and Moscow, who effectively acted in accordance to Russian interests as
Yanukovych’s government had while in power.
The ascension of these individuals into roles of authority resulted in the
establishment of an insurgency in Eastern Ukraine. This armed insurgency began and
spread from April 6th to 23rd, when pro-Russian separatists “...employed groups of armed
men to capture and hold the administration buildings...” previously lost to Ukrainian
forces.204 Though it is unknown if the militias’ operations were coordinated with Russian
202
203
204
77
authorities, the militias were able to capture several regional administration buildings in
Eastern Ukraine. By mid-May, however, Russia employed its intelligence services to
being coordinating the actions between the variety of actors and in the region.205 Russia,
in addition to assisting with the coordination of separatist militias, supported local forces
with detachments of “...paramilitaries, local recruits, and a unit of mercenaries, along
with a good deal of defectors from Ukraine’s own security services.”206 At the time, the
local forces of the separatist movement were predominately comprised of militias raised
by local elites who strove to assure their own autonomy and interests. Though driven by
the self-interested elite, the irregular warfare of this stage was also a product of Russian
intelligence colluding with vested local interests and the Russian government supplying
conventional equipment to Eastern Ukrainian militias.
C. Transitory Period
By the end of May, the irregular warfare had largely been abandoned by the
Russian state. In late April, the Ukrainian military, having reorganized and reintroduced
mass conscription for men, mounted a serious campaign to isolate separatist strongholds
in Eastern Ukraine. On May 2nd, Ukrainian government forces launched a successful
offensive against separatist forces, seizing several cities and isolating Luhansk and
205
Rfe/rl, “Authorities Clear Occupied Kharkiv Building,” RadioFreeEurope / RadioLiberty, April 8, 2014,
11, https://www.rferl.org/a/kharkiv-operation-ukraine-terrorism-separatist-arrests/25324984.html.
206
78
Donetsk from one another successfully.207 With it becoming clear to Russian authorities
that the irregular forces deployed and supported by the Russian government were unable
to resist the offensive by Ukrainian volunteers and a rejuvenated armed forces, Russia
abandoned its dependence on irregular elements.208 In its place, Russia began a new
phase of its intervention into Eastern Ukraine, characterized by the “...introduction
of high-end conventional capabilities, and the intermixing of Russian units along with
individual Russian soldiers among the separatist force.”209 As part of this new phase of
operations, “mechanized equipment, armor, and advanced munitions...” began to be
provided to Ukrainian separatists in mass by the Russian state. 210 The sophistication of
certain weapon platforms, like that T-72B3 tanks and a variety of anti-air defenses,
resulted in their operation by Russian units, which were attached to and deployed
alongside irregular elements in a cohesive manner.211 Russian ground forces, as well,
were deployed in a similar manner, intermingling with separatist militias to bolster their
combat effectiveness.
The transition from irregular to conventional is most evident with the First Battle
for the Donetsk Airport. During the battle, a large group of Russian “volunteers” arrived
to reinforce the separatist militias in their siege of the airport, which recently fell to
Ukrainian paratroopers as part of the Ukrainian’s renewed offensive.212 These Russian
207
Roland Oliphant, “Ukrainian Troops Advance as pro-Russians Fight Back,” The Telegraph, May 4,
2014, 3, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10807529/Ukrainian-troops-
advance-as-pro-Russians-fight-back.html.
208
209
Kofman, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts.”
210
Kofman, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts.”
211
212
79
forces, who were deployed to support the separatist militias, were killed in a friendly fire
incident by a separatist battalion, who mistook their Russian reinforcements as Ukrainian
ones.213 The incident demonstrated the lack of efficient systems of communications that
were inherent to the loosely-coordinated separatist militias who lacked a unified
command structure, as well as the lack of coherent control that the Russian state had over
the militias that Russian military elements were to support. While Russian elements
increasingly intertwined and deployed alongside separatist forces, they failed to
effectively coordinate in a successful manner due to the flawed structure unifying
irregular elements, resulting in a largely ineffective response to the Ukrainian
government’s successes.
D. Conventional
This transitional period would last only three months. The limited introduction of
conventional elements alongside approach taken by Russia had failed to stem the
Ukrainian offensive, with the situation in Eastern Ukraine becoming critical for
separatists as the Ukrainian military came closer to reasserting control the region.214
Despite the limited presence of Russian units and military systems, the Ukrainian army
leveraged its numbers of manpower, artillery, and air power to launch a series of siege
213
214
Woo Pyung Kyun, “The Russian Hybrid War in the Ukraine Crisis: Some Characteristics and
Implications,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 27, no. 3 (2015): 392, http://search.ebscohost.com
.proxy.library.kent.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=edskis&AN=kis3349183&site=edslive
&scope=site.
80
campaigns, successfully encircling and destroying separatist strongpoints throughout
Eastern Ukraine. Though seeking to avoid a traditional conflict, a conventional invasion
of Russian forces occurred in August 2014 to prevent the separatists from collapsing in
the wake of continually successful Ukrainian offensive.215 An estimated 4,000 regular
Russian soldiers began to cross into separatist controlled areas with limited political and
territorial objectives.216 At the Battle of Ilovaisk, Russian troops, backed by modern
tanks and artillery, seized the central railyard at Ilovaisk in order to preserve the Russian
logistical network that provided separatists forces with Russian aid, encircling and
destroying a contingent of the Ukrainian military in the process. 217 Further offensives
followed the Battle of Ilovaisk, with Russian conventional forces supported by separatist
militias retaking territory that was previously lost in the Ukrainian offensive.
Russia’s conventional invasion resulted in the signing of the Minsk I ceasefire in
early September, though sporadic shelling and combat continued.218 The lull in the
fighting gave both Russian and Ukrainian forces time to rearm, train, and consolidate
their gains. The ceasefire also provided the Russian military the opportunity to more
rigorously equip and train the irregular elements that comprised of the separatist militias,
with the intent of creating a more conventional and capable fighting force in the
region.219 On January 13th, 2015, pro-Russian forces launched a second offensive against
215
Koffman, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts,” 23.
216
Lucian Kim, “The Battle of Ilovaisk: Details of a Massacre Inside Rebel-Held Eastern Ukraine,”
Newsweek, March 4, 2016, 41, https://www.newsweek.com/2014/11/14/battle-ilovaisk-details-massacre-
inside-rebel-held-eastern-ukraine-282003.html.
217
Kim, “The Battle of Ilovaisk,” 38.
218
Kristian Åtland, “Destined for Deadlock? Russia, Ukraine, and the Unfulfilled Minsk Agreements,”
Post-Soviet Affairs 36, no. 2 (2020): 130, doi:10.1080/1060586X.2020.1720443.
219
81
entrenched Ukrainian forces. At Debaltseve, much like Ilovaisk, Ukrainian forces were
encircled and defeated by pro-Russian armored columns and motorized troops. Ukraine,
again, was forced to sign another ceasefire agreement, Minsk II, which resulted in terms
highly favorable to Moscow’s interests. Minsk II obliged Ukraine to “...grant the
separatist regions special status, amend its constitution for greater decentralization, and
reintegrate them,” effectively denying Ukraine a path to both NATO and the EU.220
While Ukraine has slowly adopted some of the measures specified by the Minsk II
agreements, fighting in Ukraine has not ceased. Since the beginning of the conflict, over
20 ceasefires have been signed, with each one being equally unsuccessful and used to the
advantage of both Ukraine and Russia to rearm and consolidate their respective forces.
As of October of 2019, the conflict had reached a stalemate, with Russian-backed
separatist forces and the Ukrainian military continuing to combat one another.
E. Information Warfare
Similar to Crimea, the Russian state waged an information campaign,
accompanied by several cyberattacks, designed to generate domestic support and local
acquiescence during Russia’s operations in Eastern Ukraine, while creating plausible
deniability at the international stage. Like in Crimea, technology played a distinct, but
not critical, role in Russia’s operations in Eastern Crimea. Denial of service attacks, or
DDoS attacks, were, and continue to be, common in Ukraine. Prior to the ouster of
220
82
Yanukovych, DDoS attacks occurred on Euromaidan websites and domains, crippling
their organizational abilities during the opening stage of the Euromaidan revolution. As
recent as February of 2019, Russia was accused of launching cyberattacks in an effort to
disrupt Ukraine’s presidential elections.221
In addition to cyber-attacks, social media became the medium not only by which
the Russian state conveyed its propaganda but created and fostered a narrative which
competed with the predominant Western one. The most popular social media platforms
in Ukraine are VKontakte and Odnoklassniki, both of which are hosted on Russian
servers.222 Prior to the conflict in Ukraine, “...as many as 67 percent of Ukrainian social
media users had active VKontakte accounts, 54 percent had Odnoklassniki accounts, and
43 percent Facebook accounts.”223 Given that these platforms were hosted on Russian
domains, Russian authorities had the ability to censor pro-Maiden pages and reveal the
personal information of those who had interacted with the pages.224 Furthermore, social
media platforms were used as “...a tool for soliciting contributions and recruiting...” for
separatists in eastern Ukraine.225 As well, such platforms were deployed to capture and
distribute the activities of Russian separatists, popularizing the violence of pro-Russian
militias while also capturing “...the activities of the separatists [and] the Russian
equipment being provided to them.”226
221
Sean Lyngaas, “Ukraine's President Accuses Russia of Launching Cyberattack against Election
Commission,” CyberScoop, February 26, 2019, 1, https://www.cyberscoop.com/ukraines-president-
accuses-russia-launching-cyberattack-election-commission/.
222
223
224
225
226
83
One important element of Russia’s information warfare was the use and
popularization of the term Novorossiya.227 Novorossiya was a term which previously
referred to a stretch of the Russian Empire that occupied what is today Southern and
Eastern Ukraine and is predominately Russian speaking.228 Though is contemporary
usage was previously limited to those on the fringes of Russian politics, Putin and the
Russian government adopted the term as their own as leverage in the greater conflict,
referring to the breakaway republics of Luhansk and Donetsk as Novorossiya. In the
West, its usage “...implied that the Russia intended to dismember Ukraine in pursuit of a
larger irredentist cause” if it left Russia’s sphere of influence.229 Furthermore, the term
Novorossiya carried with it historical connotations that appealed to nationalists who
longed for reunification of ethnic Russians separated by the collapse of the Soviet Union.
In addition to its historical overtones, the term provided some legitimacy and justification
to both the separatists’ claims and the Russian intervention. The concept of Novorossiya
provided a just cause from which separatist leaders and Russian “volunteers” could be
unified behind. In May 2014, the Luhansk and Donetsk republics joined together to form
the Confederation of Novorossiya.230 Though the term soon fell out of favor of Russian
authorities, the concept of Novorossiya still played an important role in unifying the
loosely affiliated separatist militias behind the common ideology.
227
Ioana-Nelia Bercean, “Ukraine: Russia’s New Art of War,” Online Journal Modelling the New Europe,
no. 21 (December 2016): 162,http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.kent.edu/login.aspx?direct=true
&AuthType=ip&db=poh&AN=121421008&site=eds-live&scope=site.
228
229
230
84
Like in Crimea, one of the cornerstones of Russia’s information operations was
the creation of plausible deniability. Given that Russia deployed its forces in Eastern
Ukraine with only limited political and territorial objective, Russia was able to avoid an
overt and undeniable invasion. However, as Russia’s presence continued to grow in
Eastern Ukraine, it became nearly impossible to hide the scale of their involvement in the
conflict. Despite overwhelming evidence put forward by NATO and Ukrainian
authorities, the Russian government continued to quickly explain away or dismiss reports
of Russian elements in Ukraine.231 Even when Russia’s conventional forces were
deployed in mass to counter Ukraine’s successful offensive, Russian military and
political leadership continued to deny their involvement.232 Much like in Crimea, the
denial of operations contributes to a purposefully created atmosphere of confusion and
disinformation.233 In creating this atmosphere, Russia obfuscates its involvement in the
region. The resulting confusion in the international community commits them to
inaction, allowing Russia to consolidate separatist gains in the Eastern Ukraine, as well as
to continue to deploy it forces in a limited manner without repercussion for is actions.
231
Roger N. McDermott, Brothers Disunited: Russia’s Use of Military Power in Ukraine (Fort
Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2016), 26.
232
Bercean, “Ukraine: Russia’s New Art of War,” 162.
233
McDermott, Brothers Disunited, 28.
85
6. Conclusion
Following the Euromaidan Revolution and the ouster of Ukraine’s pro-Russian
President Viktor Yanukovych, the pro-Western government based in Kiev challenged the
Kremlin’s influence and supremacy over the state. Threatened by the possibility of
NATO expanding to Russian borders, the Russian government took advantage of the
political instability and general weakness of the Ukrainian state to seize the strategic
Crimean Peninsula. As pro-Russian separatist movements emerged in Eastern Ukraine
and developed into armed insurgencies, the Russian government began to support these
movements in order to further destabilize the region. Both the annexation of Crimea and
War in Donbass were typified by Russia’s exploitation of the circumstances, providing
the Kremlin with the opportunity to further destabilize the Ukrainian state. In doing so,
Russia effectively prevented Ukraine from leaving its sphere of influence.
Like in Georgia, Russia’s use of hybrid tactics in Ukraine was not simultaneous
and synchronized with one another. Rather, Russia employed a series of escalating
phases each of which was characterized by the reliance on a different tactic. In the
Donbass region, Russia’s escalating phases began as political warfare, transitioning to
irregular warfare, and finally culminating in a conventional military invasion. While
each phase of Russia’s incursion introduced new components to the intervention, an
overarching disinformation campaign was observed in each phase. In the case of Crimea,
however, Russia’s annexation of Crimea was a conventional military operation by
Russian regulars who employed unconventional tactics. After the conventional

86
operation, criminal networks and irregular elements were mobilized in order to normalize
and solidify Russian influence over the peninsula, with a sophisticated information
campaign being waged to justify Russia’s actions for its domestic population and
obfuscating its actions at the international level.

87
V. Bulgaria
Following the worldwide recession of 2008 and 2009, Bulgaria became the
poorest country in the European Union. In desperate need for foreign investment,
Bulgaria welcomed Russian investment with open arms in an effort to stimulate its
economy. With Russian investment came Russian influence, eventually culminating in
Bulgaria experiencing a level of state capture.234 This chapter will examine the variety of
elements and means employed by the Russian state during and after Bulgaria’s financial
crises. This chapter will first describe the historical and political background of Bulgaria
and its relations with Russia, as well as recount the events leading up to Russia’s
incursion of the state. Second, this chapter will seek to identify and describe the elements
and means employed by the Russian state against Bulgaria.
Bulgaria is a Slavic, Orthodox nation which has traditionally had strong
historical, cultural, and economic ties with Russia. The two nations share a common
heritage, both using the Cyrillic alphabet and practicing Eastern Orthodox religion, in
addition to sharing the title of tsar to describe the respective nation’s emperor. The
234
Conley, The Kremlin Playbook, 44.
88
creation of formal ties between Bulgaria and Russia can be traced back to the nineteenth
century, when the Russian Empire aided the Slavic, Orthodox nations of the Balkans
against the Ottoman Empire. Bulgarian support for the Russian Empire during the
Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 would lead to the creation of a de-facto Bulgarian
sovereignty, from which the foundations of the modern Bulgarian state would be
expanded upon.235 Although an independent Bulgarian state would distance itself from
the Russian Empire after the rule of several Germanophile governments during the
twentieth century, its alignment with the Axis powers during the Second World War
would result in the toppling of the pro-German government and the instillation of a
Soviet-aligned regime.236
During the Cold War, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union enjoyed the strengthening of
relations with one another. Bulgaria, as a communist state ideologically aligned with the
Soviet Union, had an economic system which was both centralized and planned in a
similar vein to the Soviet model. However, the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 90’s
resulted in the nation undertaking “…significant structural economic reforms…” to create
a “…more liberal, market driven economy.”237 These reforms included the privatization
of state-owned enterprises, the liberalization of trade, and the strengthening of the tax
system. While these policies would initially result in the nation-state facing some
economic hardships, this liberalization process “…later helped to attract investment, spur
235
Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s.v “Bulgaria,” by Francis William Carter and Loring Danforth. Last
modified February 24, 2020, 10, http://www.britannica.com/place/Bulgaria/The-national-revival.
236
Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s.v “Bulgaria,” by Francis William Carter and Loring Danforth. Last
modified February 24, 2020, 21, http://www.britannica.com/place/Bulgaria/The-national-revival.
237
“The World Factbook: Bulgaria,” February 1, 2018, Central Intelligence Agency, February 1, 2018, 6,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bu.html.
89
growth, and make gradual improvements to living conditions.”238 These successful
economic policies would lead to high GDP growth during the 2000’s, with the GDP
increasing an average of 6% every year.239 This economic achievement allowed Bulgaria
to join the European Union in 2007, although several policy issues have resulted in
Bulgaria not being able to join the Eurozone.
Underlying Bulgaria’s open economy and strong market growth, the Bulgarian
economy has faced a variety of problems which became most obvious in the aftermath of
the worldwide recession of 2008 and 2009. The recession marked a reversal of
Bulgaria’s liberalization process and slowed the state’s economic growth. As a result,
Bulgaria became the poorest nation in the European Union, with the average wage being
$3.80 an hour and average monthly salaries totaling only $390.240 The country’s GDP
sits at $151.5 billion, which is only 47% of the EU average.241 To reach the EU average,
the World Bank reports that Bulgaria would need to average a 4% GDP growth for the
next 25 years. As it stands, Bulgaria currently only has a GDP growth of 3.6%, which is
the result of domestic consumption and the absorption of EU funds which drive the
Bulgarian economy. For Russia, the economic stagnation and related recession provided
the opportunity for Russian economic and political incursion.
238
“The World Factbook: Bulgaria,” 7.
239
“The World Factbook: Bulgaria.”
240
“Bulgaria's Economy: In a Rough Region,” The Economist, July 7, 2012, 4,
https://www.economist.com/europe/2012/07/07/in-a-rough-region.
241
Nicholas Tenzer, “How Long Can Bulgaria Keep Facing Both East and West?” EUobserver, August 15,
2018, 8, https://www.euobserver.com/opinion/142574.
90
A. Economic Warfare
Russian influence in Bulgaria takes the form of the domination and abuse of the
state’s strategic sectors conducted via strategic investments. These strategic investments
can be measured through the Russia’s economic footprint, which indicates the totality of
Russian-owned or controlled business in the overall economy.242 Russia’s economic
footprint in Bulgaria is the largest in Europe, contributing 27% of the state’s GDP and
controls the entire Bulgarian energy sector.243 While this economic footprint has
declined in recent years due to oil prices, EU sanctions on Russia, and Russian
countersanctions, Russia still dominates and is the sole provider of most of Bulgaria’s
energy. Russia’s state-owned Gazprom is the sole natural gas provider in Bulgaria,
providing 97% of Bulgaria’s gas needs and owns 50% of the country’s retail gas
distribution company, Overgaz.244 As a result of Bulgaria being dependent on Russian
oil and gas, a powerful political and business lobby exists within Bulgaria that advocates
for energy projects that disproportionately favor Russia.
Furthermore, Bulgaria is entirely dependent upon Russia for the production of
nuclear energy. Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear company, and its subsidiaries,
have a monopoly on nuclear energy, responsible for both supplying fuel for Bulgaria’s
242
Conley, The Kremlin Playbook, XVIII.
243
244
91
reactors and disposing of the waste produced by them. Bulgaria is fully dependent on
Russia for nuclear fuel, which Rosatom provides and also ships spent fuel back to Russia
for processing. The Russian-owned nuclear company, thus, produces 34% of the
country’s electricity and 30 percent of the total final energy consumption.245 Lukoil,
Russia’s privately-owned oil major, fully controls Bulgaria’s sole oil refinery and 5% of
the wholesale fuel market within the country. Additionally, Lukoil is the largest
company in the state, making $3.3 billion in revenue and, as a result, is the largest
taxpayer in the nation, indirectly controlling one-quarter of all budget revenue.246 In
addition to Russia’s described domination of the Bulgarian energy sector, Russian foreign
direct investment, or FDI, is concentrated in other key sectors other than energy.
Increasing fourfold since 2004, Russian FDI is focused in strategic sectors such as
finance, telecommunications, real estate, and the media.247 Due to this investment and
domination of Bulgaria’s energy sector, Russia has accrued a considerable amount of
influence over the Bulgarian economy.
To maintain this economic dominance, Russian networks collude with
government officials and oligarchs who change the course of governance to meet Russian
interests. Operating via an opaque network of relationships, this influence is manifested
through:
…the management of state-owned companies, the large energy infrastructure projects, the
distribution of public procurement contracts, the approval process of mergers and acquisitions, the
circumvention of EU law through legal changes, and the exploitation of corporate governance
loopholes to block policy initiatives against Russian corporate and strategic interests.248
245
246
247
248
92
By gaining considerable influence over Bulgaria’s economy, Russia is able to use this
dominant position to strengthen its relationships and cultivate new ones with corrupt
businessmen and local oligarchs. These businessmen and oligarchs, accordingly, “…are
linked to prominent politicians over whom they exert considerable control.”249 These
politicians create deals with pro-Russian businessman and oligarchs which benefit both
them and the politicians by increasing their power in the corrupt networks. From this
relationship, Russia is able to then influence both Bulgarian norms of governance and
even the government in order to align Bulgarian interests with Russian ones.
One of the largest problems fueling Bulgaria’s incursion is the systemic
corruption rampant throughout the country. According to Transparency International,
Bulgaria is one of the most corrupt nations in Europe.250 Corrupt practices are deeply
ingrained within Bulgarian culture, with “…more than one in five Bulgarian adults report
having taken part in a corrupt transaction.”251 Its judiciary is far from independent and,
as a result, rarely prosecutes individuals and officials who are involved in these illegal
practices. Bulgaria’s rampant graft and failing judiciary are stalling the nation’s
economic progress and scaring off foreign investors, who view Bulgarian society as
being defined by a sense of pervasive lawlessness and impunity.252 As a result, the
Bulgarian economy is defined by its low productivity and an urgent need for greater
249
250
Silvia Amaro, “Amid Brexit and Rising Populism - There's a European Country That's Still Desperate to
Join the Euro,” CNBC, April 23, 2018, 20, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/23/bulgaria-the-european-
country-still-hoping-to-join-the-euro.html.
251
Tenzer, “How Long Can Bulgaria Keep Facing Both East and West?,” 12.
252
Tenzer, “How Long Can Bulgaria Keep Facing Both East and West?,” 18.
93
foreign investment in an effort to spur economic growth. Russia has been increasingly
able to meet this demand by investing heavily in into the nation, which Bulgaria has
accepted willingly as a means to stimulate its struggling economy.
Similar phenomenon is observed in Bulgaria’s defense sector. While Bulgaria
committed to modernizing its military prior to becoming a NATO member in 2004, very
few improvements have been made and very few new capabilities have been procured for
its armed forces.253 Bulgaria still primarily relies on Soviet era equipment and weapons,
with attempts at procuring modern Western equipment often being stalled. For example,
Bulgaria’s air force has long attempted to acquire new fighter jets, specifically American-
made F-16 fighters or Swedish Grippens. However, procedures that would facilitate the
acquisition of these planes fell apart, largely as a result of the suspicion that lobbyists had
promoted an offer that was not in Bulgaria’s interests.254 As a result, Bulgaria’s
government agreed to return its Soviet-era MiG-29 to Russia for repairs. This cost of
repairs, coupled with transportation, is considered by experts to be approximate to the
costs of procuring planes.
B. Information Warfare
Pro-Russian media outlets in Bulgaria have played a critical role in facilitating the
proliferation of Russian economic and political influence. These media outlets would
253
Hadjitodorov and Sokolov, "Blending New-generation Warfare and Soft Power,” 34.
254
94
advocate for Russian economic projects, claiming that Russian investments in the country
would result in the creation of jobs in Bulgaria. When projects failed, the pro-Russian
media outlets would subsequently blame the European Union. The pro-Russian media
also was instrumental in dismantling any agreements attempting to modernize Bulgaria’s
media. For example, these outlets successfully convinced some segments of Bulgaria’s
population that the procurement of new aircraft would be a mistake. These outlets were a
traditional source of influence over a domestic population whose effectiveness was
enhanced by misinformation and disinformation.255
This information campaign is not limited to economic measures, and the
information distributed was successful in raising domestic political opposition to the EU
and NATO. Pro-Russian political parties, like the nationalist party of Ataka, promoted a
variety of Euro-skeptic and anti-NATO policies beneficial to the Russian state.
Additionally, the Bulgarian National Union “Shipka” epitomizes the ability of Russia’s
information campaign to mobilize a population. The supposedly self-organized group,
formed in the wake the migration crisis, seeks to protect the country’s southern border by
combing through Bulgaria and apprehending any immigrants they encounter. “Shipka,”
furthermore, considers NATO and the EU to be occupiers, and promoted an opportunity
for individuals to train abroad, likely in Russia.256 Though the groups source of funding
remains unclear, the pseudo-paramilitary organization is “...at the very least, a by-product
of Russian propaganda and disinformation” that seeks to act
255
256
95
upon the information spread by pro-Russian media.257
In Bulgaria, cyber-attacks were also observed in the course of Russia’s state
capture of Bulgaria. In 2015, Russian hackers launched a series of attacks against the
Presidency, the Central Election Committee, the Council of Ministers, and other
government institutions on the day of national referendum and local elections.258 The
Bulgarian government at the time was both overtly pro-EU and pro-NATO and a vocal
critic of the Russian state. The Kremlin, in turn, mounted a campaign to weaken the anti-
Russian government of Bulgaria by interfering in its elections and distributing
disinformation in an effort to influence the results of the elections.
3. Conclusion
Russia’s incursion into Bulgaria did not include any hybrid tactics other than
political and economic elements. When the Bulgarian economy collapsed in 2008, its
economy was desperate for foreign investment of any kind. The Russian state viewed
Bulgaria’s need as an opportunity to expand its influence into a territory which was
historically viewed as being part of its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. With the
successful proliferation of Russian companies and securing of strategic economic sectors,
the Russian state was able to reassert its influence over the Bulgarian state without
resorting to conventional or irregular methods. Furthermore, Bulgaria’s membership in
257
Hadjitodorov and Sokolov, "Blending New-generation Warfare and Soft Power.”
258
96
both NATO and the Europe Union limited Russia’s option to engage in more overt and
direct forms of coercion, given the collective defense of NATO such tactics would likely
incur.
Because of the success achieved with political and economic warfare, as well as
the risks posed any possible aggression against a NATO member, Russia’s incursion was
not characterized by its usage of conventional or irregular elements. Rather, Russia’s
incursion was defined by political and economic warfare that was supplemented by a
robust disinformation campaign. Because of the Bulgaria’s economic struggles, Russia
has been able to invest heavily into the nation. In willingly accepting this investment as
the means to stimulate its struggling economy, Bulgaria has made itself vulnerable to
heavy domestic and economic influence. To maintain this economic dominance, Russian
networks collude with government officials and oligarchs who change the course of
governance to meet Russian interests. As a result, Russia has successfully captured the
Bulgarian state without the employment of conventional or irregular elements.

97
VI. Syria
In 2011, major unrest and discontent with the Syrian government escalated into an
armed conflict, pitting the Syrian government led by Bashar al-Assad against a coalition
of diverse rebel groups. When the Syrian government appeared to be on the verge of
collapse as the result of sustained offensives by both its domestic opposition and the
Islamic State, the al-Assad government sought assistance from Russia to prop up their
crumbling regime. As a result, Russia began launching airstrikes against anti-Assad
forces and ISIS in 2015, marking the beginning of their intervention into the civil war.
This chapter will examine the variety of elements and means employed by the Russian
state leading up to and during its intervention into the Syrian Civil War. This study will
first be conducted by describing the historical and political background of Syria and its
relations with Russia, as well as describing the timeline leading up to the outbreak of the
Syrian Civil War. Second, the study will seek to identify and describe the tactics
employed by the Russian state in Syria in the pursuit of its strategic objectives in the
region.
98
The current relationship between the Russian Federation and Syria can be traced
to early 1946, a few weeks before Syria ousted the French and declared independence.
On February 1st, 1946, the Soviet Union and Syria “...signed a secret treaty in which the
Soviets promised to support Syria internationally and help..” the fledgling state build “...a
national army.”259 As part of this relationship, the promotion of economic and cultural
relations was prioritized between the two parties, with the explicit goal of cultivating a
strategic and ideological partner in the Middle East. In 1954, the Soviets sold the Syrian
government 44 German Mark IV tanks at extremely favorable prices in an effort to
bolster its military capabilities in the face of increasingly antagonistic neighbors,
specifically Turkey and Iraq.260 This exchange was described as “...the most significant
step in the development of relations between the two countries,” which took a distinctly
economic character prior to 1956.261 Despite the military characteristics of the 1954
transaction, the economic relationship continued to occupy a central role in the greater
relations between the Syrian state and the Soviet bloc. The Soviets agreed to fund the
construction of the Euphrates Dam and several other projects worth an estimated $90
million in October 1957.262 In 1964, the Soviets pledged an additional $40 million more
259
Rami Ginat, "The Soviet Union and the Syrian Ba'th Regime: From Hesitation to
Rapprochement," Middle Eastern Studies 36, no. 2 (2000): 156, www.jstor.org/stable/4284075.
260
Ginat, "The Soviet Union and the Syrian Ba'th Regime,” 156.
261
Ginat, "The Soviet Union and the Syrian Ba'th Regime.”
262
Ginat, "The Soviet Union and the Syrian Ba'th Regime.”
99
in aid for infrastructure projects. As a result of Syrian and Soviet economic relations
improving, Soviet exports to Syria increased significantly between 1956 and 1961.
In March 1963, the Ba’athist party, which adhered to an ideology grounded in
both radical Arab nationalism and Arab socialism, seized control of the Syrian state in a
coup. However, this regime would quickly be ousted, with new form of Ba’ath
leadership taking power following a coup on February 23rd, 1966.263 Unlike its more
ideologically rigid predecessor, the new Ba’ath leadership fostered “...an oligarchic
regime led by an elite of Alawi origin...,” a minority ethnicity in Syria that enjoyed the
support of the Syrian armed forces. The initial relations between the Soviet Union and
the Ba’ath regime were marked by mutual distrust and suspicion, due to uncertainty
regarding the political orientation of the new Syrian regime. As the socialist orientation
of the new Ba’athist leadership became obvious, ties between Moscow and Damascus
strengthened, presenting the Soviet Union with a foothold into the Middle East.264 By the
early 1970’s, Syria became central to not only Soviet interests in the Middle East, but
critical to its projection of power within the region.
In 1970, a third coup occurred in Syria called the Corrective Movement, bringing
General Hafez al-Assad and his followers to power within the Ba’ath party and Syrian
government. With the Assad regime came the strengthening of relations between the two
states, with the Soviets helping “...to develop Syria’s national industries, including oil,
263
264
100
agriculture, and transportation sectors.”265 In addition, “Soviet scientists, engineers, and
military instructors were dispatched to Syria along with weapons and equipment...” to
modernize the Syrian state’s economy and infrastructure.266 By 1985, the Soviets
delivered almost $17 billion worth of weapons to Syria, accompanied by 3,000 military
advisors and 2,000 personal comprising independent Soviet units within the Middle
Eastern country.267 As a result of the significant economic and military aid provided to
Syria, the Soviets received Syrian support in the international forum on a majority of
issues, though enjoyed only limited influence on the Assad regime regarding domestic
policy. During this period, a series of agreements and treaties established specific
strategic ties between the Soviet Union and Syria. In 1971, Hafez Assad allowed
Moscow to open a naval base in Tartus, establishing a permanent military foothold in the
Middle East.268 In 1980, the two nation-states signed a treaty of friendship and
cooperation, which formalized relations between the USSR and Syria. Despite the
fostering of positive relations, by the mid-1980’s, relations between Russian and Syria
cooled over both the Palestinian cause and the Iran-Iraq war.269 By the end of the decade,
however, relations between the two normalized, and Moscow continued to provide
economic and military aid to the Assad regime.
265
Ann M. Simmons, “Russia Has Been Assad's Greatest Ally - as It Was to His Father before Him,” Los
Angeles Times, April 7, 2017, 13, https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-syria-russia-20170406-
story.html.
266
Simmons, “Russia Has Been Assad's Greatest Ally,” 11.
267
Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East (Washington: U.S., 1986), 13.
268
Simmons, “Russia Has Been Assad's Greatest Ally,” 15
269
Roy Allison, “Russia and Syria: Explaining Alignment with a Regime in Crisis,” International
Affairs 89, no. 4 (2013): 802. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12046.
101
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the concurrent First Gulf War,
Syria sought to align itself with the United States against Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.
Russia, the Soviet Union’s predecessor led by Boris Yeltsin, also sought to improve
relations with its historical opponent. Though both attempted to improve relations with
the United States by the end of the 1990’s, Moscow and Damascus inadvertently
strengthened their relations with one another more so than Washington.270 This
relationship was reinforced in 2005, when Russian President Vladimir Putin “...agreed to
cancel almost 73% of Syria’s Soviet-era debt to Russia.”271 When Russia invaded
Georgia in 2008, it was of little surprise that Syria fully-backed Russian actions in the
post-Soviet republic. Since then, Syria and the Assad regime have benefitted from both
the military and economic support continually provided by the Russian government.
2. Events Leading to Incursion
Since President Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father, Hafez, in 2000, many
Syrians complained about the rampant unemployment and corruption that accompanied
his despotic regime. In March 2011, while the Arab Spring gripped most of the Middle
East, pro-democracy protests broke out in the city of Deraa after a group of teens and
children were arrested for writing political graffiti.272 When Assad’s government
270
Allison, “Russia and Syria,” 16
271
Allison, “Russia and Syria.”
272
“Why Is There a War in Syria?” BBC News, February 25, 2019, 3, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-35806229.
102
employed deadly force in an effort to quell the demonstrations, protests demanding the
resignation of Assad erupted throughout the country. As the protests spread and the
ensuing crackdowns escalated, opposition supporters took up arms and began forcing
security forces out of towns and villages. Assad, in response, vowed to crush the
fighters. As violence between rebels and security forces intensified, the country
descended into civil war.
The civil war first broke out when a variety of poorly organized opposition groups
formed rebel brigades, many of which were created at the behest of foreign patrons, and
seized key cities in Northern Syria, including Aleppo.273 Additionally, seven military
officials defected from the Syrian government on July 29th and formed the Free Syrian
Army (FSA) as the main opposition group for Syrian military defectors. The FSA, by
November, was able to launch attacks on government forces in Damascus and Aleppo,
providing some order and structure to the loosely organized rebel groups opposing the
Assad regime. As the Assad regime continued to lose ground to the FSA and other
opposition forces into 2013, both Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard
Corps were deployed to Syria in an effort to prop up the Assad government.274
In 2014, the Syrian Civil War underwent a dramatic evolution caused by the
introduction of the Islamic State (ISIS) and other hardline Islamist groups into the
conflict. Groups like ISIS and the al-Nusra Front found support among local populations
sympathetic to their cause and introduced legions of foreign fighters to the Syrian Civil
273
Mona Yacoubian, “Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising Against Assad,” July 3, 2019, United States
Institute of Peace, 3, https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/07/syria-timeline-uprising-against-assad.
274
Yacoubian, “Syria Timeline.”
103
War, who opposed both government forces and moderate rebels.275 The introduction of
ISIS and Islamist elements to the conflict provided a third front for the Assad regime to
combat. As opposition forces in the north and ISIS in the east launched offensives
against the Syrian government, the Syrian government and supporting militias were
pushed back to regime strongholds. No longer capable of launching offensives outside of
its most valuable territories, the Assad regime appeared to be losing its civil war.276
Complicating the civil war even further was the introduction of a U.S.-led coalition into
the conflict, which directly intervened in an effort to destroy the Islamic State.
At the request of the Assad government for assistance, the Russian state
intervened militarily in the conflict on September 30th, 2015. Though the Russian and
Syrian governments claimed that this intervention was limited to strikes towards Islamist
targets, Russian forces primarily launched strikes against opposition forces.277 With the
deployment of some of Russia’s most advanced and sophisticated weapons, the Assad
regime was able to retake major swaths of areas throughout Syria. By the end of 2016,
pro-Assad forces retook Aleppo, and by 2017 had retaken much of the Syrian
countryside. By 2018, the Russian-backed forces seized Daraa, the birthplace of the civil
war, reestablishing governmental control over the majority of the country.
275
Yacoubian, “Syria Timeline,” 4.
276
Charles Lister, “Why Assad Is Losing,” July 28, 2016, Brookings Institution, 5,
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/why-assad-is-losing/.
277
Patrick J. McDonnel, W. J. Hannigen, and Nabih Bulos, “Russia Launches Airstrikes in Syria amid U.S.
Concern about Targets,” Los Angeles Times, September 30, 2015, 3,
https://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-kremlin-oks-troops-20150930-story.html.
104
At the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, Russia quickly established itself to be the
main international patron of the Assad Regime. The Russian government not only
supplied Syrian forces with arms and ammunition but deployed Russian personnel to man
Soviet and Russian-made missile defenses and military instructors to help modernize
Syria’s armed forces.278 In addition to supporting Syria militarily, Russia used its
diplomatic capabilities in an effort to raise international support for, or tolerance of, the
Assad regime. The Russian government attempted to mobilize the international
community to establish a coalition against the expanding Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIS).279 This coalition would effectively back the Assad regime, who was
perceived as a lesser evil than ISIS. At the same time, diplomatic appeals would be made
to non-jihadist rebel forces in an effort to force them into negotiations with the Assad
regime. The creation of a coalition with Western powers would not only legitimize the
Assad regime internationally but would also help to break Russia’s international isolation
brought upon by its aggressions in Ukraine. Although Russia would successfully break
its international isolation to an extent, it failed to establish a broad international coalition
to support Assad, forcing the abandonment of the political means in the conflict.
278
Emil Aslan Souleimanov, “Russia's Syria War: A Strategic Trap?” Middle East Policy Council 25, no. 2
(2018): 3, https://mepc.org/journal/russias-syria-war-strategic-trap.
279
Souleimanov, “Russia's Syria War,” 6.
105
B. Conventional
When it became clear that a political solution with the West was unattainable and
that the Assad regime was on the verge of collapse, Russia’s strategy in Syria shifted
significantly. In response to the failures of political means, Russia’s engagement and
intervention into the Syrian Civil War became conventional in nature.280 The
intervention comprised of the large-scale deployment of regular military elements into
Syria primarily comprised of air assets. These air assets included “...3 to 4 Su-27
fighters, 12 Su-24 strike fighters, 12 Su-10 close support fighters, and Pchela-1T
UAVs.”281 In addition to the deployment of air assets, the Russian military transferred an
undisclosed amount of new artillery weapons, “...six or more T-90 main battle tanks, 35
or more new BTR-82A/B wheeled armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) with 30mm cannon
turrets, [and] an undisclosed amount of Humvee equivalents to Syria.”282 200 marines
were deployed to Latakia, and with them came housing for an additional 3,500
personnel.283 These forces were concentrated at Russia’s port facilities in Tartus and at
an expanding air base in Latakia, the Assad family’s ancestral homeland, from where
Russian forces had the capability to launch strike and close support aircraft against any
mix of rebel or Islamist forces.284 This transfer of arms to Syria and military support
280
Michael Kofman, “A Tale of Two Campaigns: U.S. And Russian Military Operations in Syria,”
Pathways to Peace and Security 52, no. 1 (2017): 166, doi:10.20542/2307-1494-2017-1-163-170.
281
Anthony H. Cordesman, “Russia in Syria: Hybrid Political Warfare,” September 23, 2015, Center for
Strategic & International Studies, 1, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-syria-hybrid-political-warfare.
282
Cordesman, “Russia in Syria: Hybrid Political Warfare,” 6
283
Cordesman, “Russia in Syria: Hybrid Political Warfare.”
284
Brian Glyn Williams and Robert Souza, “Operation ‘Retribution’: Putin’s Military Campaign in Syria,
2015-16,” Middle East Policy 23, no. 4 (Winter 2016): 44, doi:10.1111/mepo.12232.
106
provided to the Assad regime is in line with Russian foreign policy and strategic thinking
since the 1970’s, which recognized Syria as being a key ally in the Middle East.
Russia’s conventional air campaign was the most visible aspect of Russia’s
intervention in Syria, where Russia’s forces launched ground attack and support missions
in conjunction with Assad’s forces. Moscow’s bombing campaign was both relentless
and indiscriminate, paving the way for Assad regime forces to counterattack and retake
rebel-held territory. During its intervention, Russia launched nearly one air strike every
20 minutes that targeted ISIS militants, opposition forces, or civilians in rebel-held
territory.285 According to the Russian defense ministry, between February 10th to the
16th, Russian airplanes performed 444 combat sorties and engaged in 1,593 “terrorist”
objects through Syria.286 Not only were the number of airstrikes performed by Russian
forces double that of their U.S.-led counterparts, but Russian strikes inflicted greater
damage to its targets as well. This effectiveness can be attributed to the Russian forces
use of cluster bombs. Rather than relying on precise airstrikes, Russian planes would
carpet bomb a target area with unguided cluster bombs, which scattered explosives in an
area the size of a football field or larger. The result was the indiscriminate killing of
militants, rebels, and civilians in a target area. Despite the indiscriminate bombing of
population areas, the airstrikes effectively supported regime forces, who steadily pushed
285
Vladimir Karnazov, “The Russian Air Campaign over Syria,” Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter 41, no. 10
(December 2015): 22,http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.kent.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType
=ip&db=tsh&AN=111720488&site=eds-live&scope=site.
286
Karnazov, “The Russian Air Campaign over Syria,” 23.
107
back ISIS and rebel fighters that were unable to contest the Russian-back aerial
supremacy throughout the country.
In addition to the deployment of conventional air forces, the Russian government
also established a ground presence in Syria through the limited posting of ground forces
in Syria. The most visible of these deployments was that of Russian naval infantry,
specifically the 61st and 810th Naval Infantry Brigades, and a variety of special forces.
Prior to the official start of Russia’s intervention, 700 to 800 Russian marines were
deployed to Syria’s western countryside, with the majority being stationed in Latakia and
the remaining troops moved to Homs and Tartous in preparation for Russia’s
intervention.287 As the Syrian Army began offensives into rebel and militant held
territory, these contract troops participated in operations in Aleppo, Palmyra, the Idlib
Province, and Homs. Russia’s Naval Infantry Brigades are not only some of the best
trained units in the Russian military, but also have combat experience in the Second
Chechen War, Russo-Georgian War, and Ukraine, resulting in crucial operations being
entrusted to these combat-tested units. While a plethora of Russian infantry brigades
have been identified as being present in Syria, these groups were regulated to rear-guard
actions given their relative inexperience in combat. Additionally, Russian special forces
units have also supplemented Syrian forces, though their presence is less overt than army
and naval brigades. KSO elements, redeployed from Ukraine, assisted in coordinating
287
Leith Aboufadel, “Russian Marines Position Themselves in Eastern Latakia,” Al-Masdar News,
September 8, 2015, 5, http://www.almasdarnews.com/article/russian-marines-position-themselves-in-
eastern-lataki.
108
airstrikes against opposition and Islamist targets, in addition to protecting sensitive
Russian equipment, personal, and information.288
C. Irregular
Russia’s deployment of conventional air assets and limited ground forces
occurred in an effort to support both the regular Syrian army and various irregular pro-
government militias. In addition to the irregular forces serving under the Assad-regime,
private military contractors comprised of the irregular elements of Russia’s strategy in
Syria. Russian mercenaries played a critical role in combat operations in Syria, both
seeking out and engaging in combat simultaneous to conventional air support. In this
capacity, the traditional role of irregular and regular forces is switched, as irregular
mercenaries are used to directly engage in combat while the majority of Russian regular
forces are predominately used in an auxiliary role.289
The most visible of the private military companies (PMC) in Syria is the Wagner
Group. Owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a Russian oligarch in Putin’s inner circle, and led
by Lt. Col. Dmitry Utkin, a former commander of a Spetsnaz-GRU unit, the Wagner
Group was deployed to Syria in an effort to provide Russian forces with a pool of
288
Bret Perry, “How NATO Can Disrupt Russia's New Way of War,” Defense One, March 3, 2016, 9,
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/03/nato-russia-sof-ew-hybrid-war/126401/.
289
Sabra Ayres, “Russia's Shadowy World of Military Contractors: Independent Mercenaries, or Working
for the Kremlin?” Los Angeles Times, February 18, 2018, 18, https://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-
russia-mercenaries-20180218-story.html.
109
manpower whose casualties could not be linked to an official military institution.290 In
Syria, the more experienced and skilled Wagner PMCs are responsible for training
specialized units of the Syrian military and pro-Assad militias, while the rest of the
contractors are deployed on the front lines against ISIS and rebel forces. With regard to
organization, the Wagner Group is organized in a manner similar to regular Russian
forces. Groups of contractors are organized into battalion tactical groups, with
contractors divided into officers and regulars.291 The various tactical groups present in an
area of operations are be coordinated by military intelligence officers, who helped to arm,
transport, and field contractors in combat operations. As a result, the Wagner Group has
evolved into a form of public-private institution that Moscow is able to employ in order
to achieve political and strategic objectives while creating plausible deniability in the
process of their achievement of objectives.
Though the most visible, the Wagner Group is not the only private military
corporation active in Syria. Despite Russian law proscribing the formation and existence
of private military corporations, the Kremlin employs PMCs without officially
acknowledging their existence. Before the Wagner Group dominated the battlefield in
Syria, the Slavonic Corps was hired to fight against Syrian rebels between Homs and
Deir Ez Zor.292 However, a contingent of 267 contractors were defeated by ISIS militants
and forced to retreat. Because of their poor performance, in addition to the proof of their
290
Mike Giglio, “How A Group Of Russian Guns For Hire Are Operating In The Shadows,” BuzzFeed
News, April 19, 2019, 16, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/mikegiglio/inside-wagner-mercenaries-
russia-ukraine-syria-prighozhin.
291
Giglio, “How A Group Of Russian Guns,” 42.
292
James Miller, “The Insane Story of Russian Mercenaries Fighting for the Syrian Regime,” HuffPost,
January 25, 2014, 2, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-insane-story-of-russi_b_4317729.
110
illicit activity being recovered and disseminated by ISIS, the Russian government denied
any knowledge of their presence in Syria and arrested the Slavonic Corps’ members
responsible for the operation. After the Wagner Group brazenly attacked a U.S. outpost
and hundreds of contractors were estimated to be killed or wounded, the organization
similarly fell out of favor with Moscow.293 As a result, the Wagner Group was replaced
with contractors from other PMC groups, like Shield, Patriot, and Vega. Given the
Russian state’s informal relations with contractor groups, these private military
companies are able to be substituted as politically necessary to protect the Kremlin’s
image domestically and internationally.
D. Information Warfare
During the Russian intervention in the Syrian Civil War, the Russian state was
engaged in extremely aggressive information operations designed to proliferate
disinformation and create a narrative to compete with the dominant Western one.
Russian official discourse, in the course of the intervention, “...has sought to combat the
loose coalition of Syrian opposition groups” that strive to topple the Assad regime.294 In
accordance with this goal, Russian discourse has created a dichotomy among opposition
forces. Groups either adhere to Russian-backed ceasefires and partake in a Russian
293
Neil Hauer, “The Rise and Fall of a Russian Mercenary Army,” Foreign Policy, October 6, 2019, 3,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/06/rise-fall-russian-private-army-wagner-syrian-civil-war/.
294
Julien Nicetti, Dazed and Confused: Russian “Information Warfare” and the Middle East – The Syria
Lessons (Barcelona: EuroMeSCo, 2019), 5, https://www.euromesco.net/wp-
content/uploads/2019/02/Brief93_Dazed-and-oncufsed.-Russian-information-warfare.pdf.
111
sponsored reconciliation processes or violate the ceasefire and be labeled terrorists
regardless of the group’s political standing.295 In labeling all opposition forces terrorists,
the Kremlin is able to justify their use of force against the opposition forces and
characterize their activities as being counter-terrorist in nature.296 This discourse,
reinforced via official channels, state-run media, and social media, both discredited
moderate Syrian opposition forces and reduced “...the complexities of the conflict to a
binary choice between the Assad regime...” or the establishment of an extreme Islamist
state.297 As a result, Russia portrayed its intervention against Syrian rebels as a
counterterrorism campaign designed to dislodged the Islamic State from the Middle East,
despite the gross majority of its strikes occurring against moderate forces.
Another component of the Kremlin’s narrative creation was the assigning of
blame for the conflict on the West. In the Kremlin’s narrative, Islamism is a product of
Western countries, whose origins can be traced to the United States’ support of the
mujahedeen in Afghanistan in the 1980’s.298 The invasion of Iraq, according to Kremlin
propogandists, only exasperated the issue, setting the foundation for the rise of the
Islamic State. Not only are the actions of the United States allegedly responsible for the
rise of Islamism extremists, Moscow asserts that the West purposefully created the
Islamic State and is cooperating with them in order to further their own malevolent
interests. Because Westerners are blamed for the outbreak of violence in the region,
295
Nicetti, Dazed and Confused.
296
Spyridon Plakoudas, “Putin, Assad, and Geopolitics,” MERIA Journal 19, no. 3 (Fall 2015): 36,
http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.kent.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=jss&AN=11
297
Plakoudas, “Putin, Assad, and Geopolitics.”
298
Plakoudas, “Putin, Assad, and Geopolitics,” 6.
112
Russia is able to deflect Western criticism and accusations of war crimes. For example,
on August 21st, 2013, a chemical attack in Ghouta killed over 1,400 civilians.299 By the
end of the day, Russian officials dismissed Western accusations as being Saudi
propaganda, eventually positing that the entire attack was fabricated by the West, an
assertion reinforced through Russian state-media.300 In a similar manner, humanitarian
organizations were dehumanized and condemned by the Kremlin in an effort to mitigate
the fallout from the proliferation of the organization’s accrued information. This
phenomenon can be observed with regard to the White Helmets, a group of Syrian
volunteer rescue workers operating in opposition-held areas The victim of “...a massive,
systematic and coordinated information campaign manipulation campaign,” the
organization was accused of being a terrorist organization responsible for several false
flag attacks.301 These specific attacks on the White Helmets, like Russia’s greater
disinformation campaign, is directed at discrediting critics of Russia’s intervention into
the region.
In addition to the creation of a competing narrative dependent on the proliferation
of disinformation, Russian authorities created a structure of plausible deniability through
their use of PMCs in Syria. Because PMCs are private organizations and not an official
state institution, the actions of PMCs are able to remain a secret.302 Also, the role that the
Russian government has in planning or approving the actions of a PMC remains
299
Nicetti, Dazed and Confused, 6.
300
301
302
Andrew Linder, “Russian Private Military Companies in Syria and Beyond,” New Perspectives in
Foreign Policy, no. 16 (2018): 18, https://www.csis.org/npfp/russian-private-military-companies-syria-and-
beyond.
113
unknown to the domestic or international community. Furthermore, the Russian
government enjoys the ability to reject blame and claim that there exist no official ties
between the PMCs and themselves because of the nature of privately-owned military
forces. The presence of private military companies, therefore, obfuscates the extent of
Russia’s involvement in the Syrian conflict.
4. Conclusion
The Syrian Civil War provided Russia with the opportunity to engage and refine
its conventional and irregular military forces, as well as to hone its political and
information tactics. Since its rise to power, the al-Assad regime has long been Russia’s
regional ally in the Middle East. Both governments long enjoyed strong military and
economic ties with one another, which continued to be maintained after the collapse of
the Soviet Union. Russia’s partnership with Syria provided the Russian state with the
ability to project its power outside of post-Soviet regions and, specifically, in the Middle
East. When Russia’s influence in Syria was threatened by the possible collapse of the
Russian-allied Assad regime brought upon by the outbreak of a civil war in Syria, the
Russian state felt compelled to support its longtime ally and secure its interests in the
prolonging of the Assad regime’s survival. Russia initially launched a political campaign
to support the Assad regime internationally, as well as supporting its war efforts through
arms sales. As rebel and Islamist forces gained ground against the Assad regime, Russia
was forced to intervene to prevent the collapse of the regime. In the course of this
114
intervention, Russia deployed conventional air power and the irregular forces of PMCs
simultaneously in order to support Syrian forces. As a result of Russia’s intervention, the
Assad regime has managed to recapture vast swathes of territory lost to rebels and
extremists, cementing the regime’s prolonged rule over Syria.

115
VII. Comparison Analysis
To reiterate, hybrid warfare is employed as a catch all term that seeks to describe
and characterize a plethora of contemporary state activates in the international arena.
Furthermore, hybrid warfare is used to describe the apparent melding of conventional and
irregular warfare, which is accompanied by any means at the state’s disposal to
accomplish a political objective, termed hybrid tactics or elements. Specifically, this
terminology is increasingly employed to characterize the efforts utilized by Vladimir
Putin’s Russian Federation on the regional and international levels to coerce states to
pursue pro-Russian policies.
In Georgia, Russia first used political and economic means to coerce the Georgian
state to enact pro-Russian policies. When political and economic means failed to
terminate Georgia’s westward trajectory, the Russian government laid the groundwork
for a conventional military invasion. When this invasion was launched, Russian forces
relied on both overwhelming firepower and sheer numbers to overwhelm Georgian
defenses and occupy half the country in five days. Supplementing Russian regular forces
were irregular elements comprised of separatist militias, Cossacks, and Chechens, who
acted as auxiliaries to the regular Russian forces. During the Russian governments use of
both political and conventional warfare, informational strategies were employed
simultaneously to forward its own narrative.

116
In Ukraine, two different incursions occurred; one in Crimea and one in Donbass.
Crimea was conventional military operation by Russian regulars who employed
unconventional tactics. After the conventional operation, criminal networks and irregular
elements were mobilized in order to normalize and solidify Russian influence over the
peninsula, with a sophisticated information campaign being waged to justify Russia’s
actions for its domestic population and obfuscating its actions at the international level.
In Donbass, Russia’s actions took the form of a series of escalating phases, transitioning
from political warfare, to hybrid warfare, and finally culminating in a conventional
military invasion. While each phase of Russia’s incursion introduced new components to
the intervention, an overarching disinformation campaign was observed in all of the
phases.
In Bulgaria, Russia’s incursion was characterized not by its usage of conventional
or irregular elements, but by political and economic warfare that was supplemented by a
robust disinformation campaign. Because of the Bulgaria’s economic struggles, Russia
was able to invest heavily into the state’s economic sectors. In willingly accepting this
investment as a means to stimulate its struggling economy, Bulgaria has made itself
vulnerable to heavy domestic and economic influence. To maintain this economic
dominance, Russian networks collude with government officials and oligarchs who
change the course of governance to meet Russian interests. As a result, Russia has
successfully captured the Bulgarian state without the employment of conventional or
irregular elements.
117
In Syria, the Russian and Syrian governments enjoyed strong military and
economic ties with one another, which continued to be maintained after the collapse of
the Soviet Union. Russia’s influence in Syria was threatened only when the country
collapsed into a civil war between the Russian-allied Assad regime and opposition forces.
Russia initially launched a political campaign to support the Assad regime
internationally, as well as supporting its war efforts through arms sales. As rebel and
Islamist forces gained ground against the Assad regime, Russia was forced to intervene to
prevent the collapse of the regime. In the course of this intervention, Russia deployed
conventional air power and the irregular forces of PMCs simultaneously in order to
support Syrian forces. As a result of Russia’s intervention, the Assad regime managed to
recapture vast swathes of territory lost to rebels and extremists, cementing the regimes
prolonged rule over Syria.
In examining these cases, several observable patterns emerge. First, Russian
incursions tend to occur during times of political instability, especially with regard to the
escalation of the scale of the incursion. This instability weakens both the strength of state
institutions and social cohesion among a population. In weakening state institutions and
a society’s social cohesion, Russian assets are allowed to be introduced into a state.
Additionally, these incursions occur in countries that already have segments of
their population sympathetic to the Russian state. Many of the targets of Russian tactics
either had sizable Russian minority, like in Ukraine, or had historical or cultural ties to
the Russian state stemming from either the Russia Empire or the Soviet Union, like
Bulgaria, Georgia, and Syria. It was not required for the Russian state to build support
118
among the populations of target states as said states already have a sizeable and
sympathetic portion of their population which provides justification for Russian
incursions.
Throughout every case, Russia used both political means and information
elements in an effort to coerce targeted states. In cases where irregular, conventional,
and other means were introduced as part of the Russian incursion, some level of political
and information campaigns continued to be employed. Political means, however, were
relied upon far less once conventional and irregular forces were introduced as part of an
incursion, while information means became geared towards concealing the scale of
Russian activities and creating a narrative that justified Russian actions.
Additionally, these information campaigns did not target the domestic population
of states victim to Russian incursions once the intervention employed the use of force.
Rather, these information campaigns targeted Russia’s domestic population and the larger
international community. In each case, the central aim of the information campaign was
to create a narrative that competed with either the dominant Western one or the targeted
state’s narrative. For Russia’s domestic population, the narrative helped to justify their
government’s adventurism in—even invasions of—other nations. For the international
community, this narrative created confusion and obfuscated Russia’s actions within a
target state, hampering the international community’s ability to present a unified
response.
With regard to Russia’s conventional assets, the Russian state typically relied on
contract troops and special forces to achieve political objectives via military means. In
119
Donbass, Crimea, and Syria, the Kremlin relied on contract naval infantry and special
forces to achieve political objectives. Unlike Georgia, where the Soviet-esque tactic of
overwhelming an opponent with numbers and firepower was used, these limited
deployments relied on the efficiency and effectiveness of small numbers of elite forces in
achieving specific objectives. In Bulgaria, Russian military forces were never deployed,
likely due of the success of low-risk political and economic maneuverings as well as
high-risk posed by deploying military forces against a NATO member state.
Furthermore, the deployment of conventional military assets is the last expedient
to be used in the achievement of the Russian state’s political and strategic objectives.
The use of conventional forces would only arise once nonmilitary means and irregular
elements failed to achieve the desired political objectives. Rather than being deployed in
a simultaneous, cohesive, and organized manner alongside other elements present from
the outset of a Russian incursion, conventional elements were deployed as a last resort.
The use of direct force was used to achieve objectives only when political, economic,
information, and irregular assets failed to achieve a desired goal. Additionally,
conventional forces were employed only when the risk of repercussions was low.
Irregular forces were often relied on prior to and during the deployment of
conventional forces. Typically, irregular elements comprised of separatist militias or
PMCs, who functioned as either the primary, regular force in the absence of conventional
military assets or auxiliaries supporting Russian professional troops. Though they might
be deployed to the same areas of operation at the same time, irregular forces and Russian
conventional military assets would never act in a symbiotic manner. Conventional forces
120
would be employed as the primary combatants, while the irregular elements, offered by
militias and mercenaries, would act as auxiliaries and support the conventional, regular
force. While this dynamic and roles that regular and irregular elements occupied would
be flipped in Syria, the supposed melding of regular and irregular forces characteristic of
hybrid tactics was not observed. There still existed a distinct separation between regular
Russian forces and irregular PMCs.
The effects of cyber elements were largely negligible. Though employed on
several occasions, Russia’s cyber capabilities never seriously threatened a targeted state’s
infrastructure or its ability to perform functions of governance. Rather, cyber tactics
resulted in the targeted harassment of websites, creating little more than a nuisance for
these targeted nation-states. Normally, physical actions would be required to disrupt or
disable critical state infrastructure.
From these patterns, a cohesive model of incursion emerges, based upon a series
of escalating phases that increase in openly antagonistic means to accomplish political
objectives in accordance to the risk posed by each corresponding action. The first phase
is one characterized by tactics common to political warfare. This initial level of incursion
employs political and economic means to coerce a state to pursue policies in accordance
to the interests of Russia. If these measures are successful in compelling a targeted state
to adopt the desired policies, then the subsequent political and governance structures
created are fostered in order to maintain influence over the targeted state. The failure to
achieve the desired goals results in the escalation of means employed to achieve the
desired political outcome. Specifically, irregular forces are employed in an effort to

121
coerce a state. These irregular forces typically include domestic separatist groups,
transnational non-organizations, like Cossack militias or the Night Wolves, and PMCs
whose relationship cannot be directly tied to the Russian government. Following this
phase, the limited deployment of regular Russian military forces in conjunction and
alongside irregular elements presents a kind of phase which, though resembling hybrid
warfare, lacks the melding and interconnectedness typical of conventional and
unconventional elements in hybrid warfare. Finally, this transition prompts the escalation
of the incursion into one of conventional military means. This conventional military
intervention is carried out by professional contract troops and special forces, who are
deployed in a limited manner to achieve the specific political and strategic objectives.
Throughout each level, and the escalating means utilized in each phase, a robust
information campaign is waged. This information campaign, beginning at the same time
as Russia’s initial incursion into a state, is designed to create a narrative that competes
with the dominant Western one whilst simultaneously creating disinformation in an effort
to blur the true role of Russia in the domestic activities of a targeted nation-state. In
essence, hybrid warfare does not appear to be the blurring of regular, irregular, military,
and nonmilitary means, but instead a series of escalating phases employing new and more
coercive means, supplemented by information tactics, to achieve specific political and
strategic objectives.
122
VIII. Conclusion
The thesis has argued that Russian activities in the international arena termed
hybrid warfare are characterized by distinct phases denoted by the state’s reliance on or
the addition of a distinct mean of political achievement which, over time, expand in scope
to incorporate new elements or means that the Russian state then relies on to accomplish
its goals. Every additional element signals the beginning of a new, riskier phase in the
achievement of strategic objectives. This observed process of escalation in accordance
with risk is not a static phenomenon that is rigid in its application, but fluid and ever-
changing in accordance to the circumstances of an intervention. This characterization
challenges the common notion that Russia has adopted a coherent strategy of achieving
its objectives through the simultaneous deployment of conventional and irregular
elements, accompanied by that of political and information means, in a novel manner. In
fact, the approach of escalatory phases employed by the Russian state is more
sophisticated than what most attribute to hybrid warfare; while a strategy does exist, it
follows a tailored pattern of action rather than a one-size fits all approach.
In all but one of the cases of the Russian state’s intrusions, this pattern of
escalation in accordance to risk was observed. In Georgia, Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, and
Syria, the Russian state initially employed political and economic means to coerce a
target into pursuing policies in accordance to the interests of Russia. Upon the failure of
123
the political and economic measures to achieve the Russian state’s desired goals results,
irregular forces would be employed in an effort to further coerce a state. As irregular
forces would typically maintain a relationship that could not be directly tied to the
Russian government, risk for the act would be mitigated. Following this phase, a level of
hybridization would occur between regular Russian military forces in conjunction and
alongside irregular elements. Finally, the failure of hybrid tactics and means would
prompt the escalation of the incursion into one of conventional military means. Though
carrying the most risk, the use of traditional military means was relied upon extensively
to achieve Russian goals and objectives in all four cases.
This pattern of escalation is not static, but changes based upon the circumstances
in which Russian finds itself in a particular moment. In the case of Bulgaria, Russian
incursions never escalated past the initial phase characterized by political and economic
coercion, largely because of the success arising from the deployment of these elements.
Given that Bulgaria had effectively undergone the process of state capture by Russian
economic and political incursions, further interventions were largely unnecessary.
Additionally, given the fact that Bulgaria is a NATO member and any invasion would be
responded with a collective NATO response, invading the country using conventional
means would have posed too great a risk to Russian security. Similarly, Georgia did not
strictly adhere to the pattern of escalations, bypassing a phase characterized by hybrid
tactics and instead opting to employ conventional military means in response to a
Georgian military excursion into Tskhinvali. Hybrid warfare, as used to describe Russian
activities, does not prescribe a necessary pattern that must be adhered to by strategists nor
124
policymakers. The use of these elements, though always escalating in phases in
accordance with their overtness and risk, is not determined nor guaranteed. Their use and
reliance are dependent on the circumstances of the incursion, providing a flexible
approach to foreign policy for the Russian state.
Furthermore, an examination of the cases demonstrates that the occurrence of
hybrid warfare is used to achieve the historical foreign policy objectives of the Russian
state. Much like its predecessors, contemporary Russian foreign policy continues to be
driven by its historical xenophobia. For modern Russia, the continued expansion of
NATO poses an existential threat to the Russian nation, as NATO is recognized as the
country’s primary defense concern by the collective decision-making elites within the
nation-state. Like with the Tatars, Turks, Poles, Germans, or any other foreign aggressor,
the Russian state sought to establish and foster spheres of influences to act as a buffer
between itself and its rival NATO. Hybrid warfare, and the series of escalations present
within it, acts as the means through which to undermine NATO expansion, expand
Russia’s defensive buffer, and to create areas that represent its own interests and to
guarantee its security. This escalation of tactics and elements becomes the preferred
method of expansion through which the Russian state is able to reassert its influence in its
traditional spheres of influence, but not the mechanism to create new ones into Europe or
in the Americas.
The conclusions presented are the result of the examination of several cases of
Russian incursion. These intrusions were compared with focus being placed on the
means employed and the observable patterns that emerged. Recognizing that Russia has
125
sought to reassert its interests in post-Soviet states and former areas of influence, I
selected several countries that either belonged to the former or latter to be examined.
Drawing off the works of Frank Hoffman concerning hybrid warfare, I sought to identify
and examine both the irregular and regular elements of Russian incursions, in addition to
identifying instances of political warfare and information warfare as well. I sought to
place the use of these identified elements in an incursion into historical and political
context, providing a general history of the case country’s relations with Russia and the
events that precipitated the Russian intervention. The data used in the course of these
case studies originated from a variety of sources, primarily emanating from both
respected news sources and academic journals. Finally, I compared the observable
characteristics of each case to investigate the patterns inherent to Russia’s use of hybrid
warfare as a policy tool.
From the qualitative comparison of the cases performed, it becomes evident that
Russia has not adopted a coherent strategy of achieving its objectives through the
simultaneous deployment of conventional and irregular elements, accompanied by that of
political and information means, in a novel manner. Rather, the comparison
demonstrates that Russian activities are characterized by distinct phases denoted by the
state’s reliance on, or the addition of a distinct mean of political achievement. Over time,
these phases expand in scope to include new elements, or means, that the Russian state
then relies on to accomplish its goals. Moreover, the paradigm provided by realism
cannot fully explain the phenomena observed. While Russian activities in the
international arena are grounded in realism, they have the tendency to reflect
126
constructivist theories. The Russian state’s focus on constructing a competing narrative
and the fostering of plausible deniability through Russia’s information campaigns draws
parallels to constructionist thought. As such, realism itself cannot explain the Russian
state’s strategy. In turn, it becomes necessary to draw on realist, liberal, and
constructivist theory to form a nuanced and accurate view on the collection of Russian
actions that encompass their practice of hybrid warfare.
These findings are susceptible to criticism. Given that the cases of Donbass,
Bulgaria, and Syria are on-going situations, it is possible that the evidence accrued from
the case-studies is prone to change as time goes on. The relative recency of the cases of
Georgia and Crimea are susceptible to the same problem. Furthermore, the recency of
the cases limits the amount of data available for examination, possibly resulting in an
incomplete image of the scope of Russian activities related to hybrid warfare. Given that
this thesis seeks to understand phenomena in the midst of its occurrence, the facts,
observations, and analyses arising is subject to change as more events transpire and
further information is accrued. Additionally, it would be difficult to reproduce these
conclusions through quantitative analysis or study. Whether it be Hoffman’s works,
Gerasimov’s article, or this thesis itself, the phenomena of hybrid warfare as a concept is
the product of qualitative observations of recent conflicts, primarily arising from the
examination of Hezbollah’s actions in their 2006 war with Israel. Because of the nature
of the concept, any quantitative research is would be difficult to enact on the topic,
resulting in the certainty that arises from quantitative data being inaccessible.
127
Future research will be required in order to better understand the patterns of
escalation employed by Russia to achieve its political and strategic goals. The research
conducted suggests that hybrid warfare is not as much the melding of a variety of
different elements and means simultaneously, but rather a distinct series of phases relying
on, and dependent upon, specific means to achieve said goals. It would be important to
determine whether this series of escalatory phases can be observed in other examples of
hybrid warfare. Because of many Russian strategists and scholars adhering to the belief
that the concept of hybrid warfare is product of the American military, it would beneficial
to examine and compare both countries’ patterns and tactics in interventions to conclude
if the Russian patterns of escalations are influenced by American stratagems.
Furthermore, it would be equally critical to determine whether this phenomenon
constitutes a unique mechanism by which to achieve a nation-state’s objectives or
whether it is merely a continuation of normal interactions between states whose interests
are at odds with one another.
Additionally, because the scope of the research was limited to cases that had
previously been a part of the Russia’s sphere of influence in the past, future research
ought to examine the applicability of Russian tactics of zones of operation outside its
historical reaches. Similarly, this thesis raises questions about the susceptibility of
NATO members to the most overt of Russian escalations and tactics, necessitating future
research into the possibility of such an occurrence. As scholars and policymakers better
understand the patterns and characteristics of Russia’s covert and overt coercive means
128
against international targets, the manner in which to effectively respond and rebut
Russian advances will become clearer to the international community.
In January 2014, the Russian state, led by Vladimir Putin, shocked the world
when its “little green men” seized the Crimean Peninsula from its neighbor Ukraine,
setting into action a chain of events that would embroil Russia’s neighbor into a civil war.
Ukraine was only one victim of an increasingly confident Russian foreign policy that
emerged in the wake of Putin’s ascension to Russia’s leadership. Georgia, Bulgaria, and
Syria all experienced Russian incursions, ranging from economic and political intrusions
to overt military interventions. With the Russian state outmaneuvering international
opponents, it is successfully reestablishing its historical dominance over its spheres of
influence. Without a more refined or nuanced understanding of these political and
military maneuverings, it will be difficult for the international community to respond the
Russian government’s international aggression.

129
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PUTIN’S HYBRID WARS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RUSSIAN

INCURSIONS INTO GEORGIA, UKRAINE, BULGARIA, AND SYRIA

A thesis submitted to the

_______________________________________, Chair, Department of Political Science

___________________________________________________, Dean, Honors College

last three years at Kent State University.

military elements in a comprehensive framework for conducting war.1

authored by Gerasimov as the “Gerasimov Doctrine.” However, the existence of the

been selected to explicate this phenomenon—Georgia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Syria—

either President of Russia or Prime Minister of Russia.

The purpose of this study is to examine Russian hybrid warfare in an effort to

and contemporary Russian assumptions on international relations in order to

well as explore its basis in political realism.

between them.4 American behavioral scientist Alexander L. George defines a case as an

establish an analytic framework to be used in the cross-case comparison, highlighting

knowledge regarding said context’s influence on the phenomena.

Comparative Method,” identifies the comparative method as playing a central role in

presence of a hybridized conflict by Russia in each respective nation-state.

upon a variety of secondary sources, consisting of books, articles, and periodicals, in

patterns associated with hybrid warfare.

II. Literature Review

typical of the phenomena.

Hybrid warfare’s origins can be traced to an article by Lieutenant General James

character and conduct of warfare to be fundamentally transformed by the innovative

characterized by hybrid warfare, an extension of General Charles Krulak’s “Three Block

will be required to simultaneously conduct combat, humanitarian, and peacekeeping

superiority in the gross majority of conventional conflicts, adversaries will increasingly

seek to undermine such conventional superiority by seeking to employ unconventional

insurgency, unrestricted warfare, guerrilla war, or coercion by narco-criminals, being

information warfare in an effort to offset a conventional superiority.11 Mattis and

United States “...and select a combination of techniques or tactics appealing to them...” to

communicating each belligerent’s respective “message.”14 Consequently, the authors

the U.S. military to prepare for combating enemies in hybrid wars.

hybrid warfare’s foundation. In 2005, the United States’ Department of Defense

traditional forms of warfare leads to potential adversaries adopting asymmetrical and

methods threaten[ing] U.S. interests.”16 The document defines these challenges as

diversification of threats in which a modern military must respond to beyond

war and peace that so often characterizes hybrid warfare.

Hybrid warfare, as conceptualized by Mattis and Hoffman, draws parallels to the

concept of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW). Fourth Generation Warfare’s proponents,

evolving in generational shifts since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. First-generation

warfare refers to ancient battles fought by uniformed combatants using massed

through attrition. Second-generation tactics were summed up by French Marshal Henri

warfare is based neither on firepower nor attrition, but maneuverability. Epitomized by

overstretching an enemy and encircling them with counterattacks.19

According to 4GW proponents, third-generation warfare marked the end of linear

warfare.20 Whereas linear conflicts are defined by “...a sequential progression of a

planned strategy by opposing sides...nonlinear conflict is the simultaneous deployment of

multiple, complementary military and non-military warfare tactics.”21 War is no longer a

to achieve an objective, third-generation warfare saw the decentralization of war and a

greater emphasis being placed on individual initiative in achieving orders.22 Orders

achievement to individual combat units and leaders. While characteristics like

range of conventional and unconventional methods, including terrorism and information

and in each of the generational shifts.

variety of methods to coerce an opponent, the distinction between combatant and

offered by unconventional warfare is no longer an activity monopolized by the military

the hard power of militaries as the only conduit of war.

of hybrid warfare, with “hybrid warfare,” “fourth-generation warfare,” “unrestricted

warfare,” and a variety of other different terms used interchangeably in an effort to

related terminology is described by Frank G. Hoffman as the blending of “...the lethality

“...incorporate[s] a range of different modes of warfare including conventional

capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate

same battlespace to achieve “...synergistic effects in the physical and psychological