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A world inquiring about the origins of SARS-CoV-2 has been met with
repeated antipathy and lack of cooperation on the part of the Chinese
Communist Party. Consequently, any speculation that the CCP concealed
the presence of SARS-CoV-2 prior to December 2019 must be researched
through an examination of corroborating yet circumstantial evidence.
Inference which may be ascertained only through prosecution along a
series of must-answer critical questions.
The Chinese Communist Party owes the entire world restitution for its
negligent handling and release of a virus which they fully understood
could be deployed as a weapon of war. A virus which has destroyed
human rights, worldwide economies, and furthermore resulted in over 5
million deaths globally to date.
Note: Genetic analyses of both Covid-19 and its Omicron variant are contained in
Questions #7 a. and b.
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settlement to discontinue a case brought by Iran in 1989 against the U.S. in the
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International Court of Justice (The Hague).
The mistaken disposition of an IFF (Identify friend or foe) aircraft transponder signal
as ‘foe (hostile)’ – is not materially different from the inept execution of bio safety
level (BSL) lab procedures – both involve a hazardous ‘lab’ environment entrusted
to professionals supposedly trained in their craft and its safekeeping protocols.
Negligence here, imparts liability.
This responsibility mandate is the impetus behind obfuscation efforts on the part of
Chinese officials regarding the origins of Covid-19 – efforts to block a reasonable process
of discovery, which are profiled in this article. The People’s Republic of China and its
Chinese Communist Party (hereinafter ‘the CCP’, ‘China’s CCP’, or ‘The Party’) owe the
world restitution along the same legal lines as those which presided in the Iran Flight 655
case. Theirs was a case of malicious negligence in the handling of a Chinese-made virus
which could be mistakenly released as a defacto weapon of war, no different than a missile
inadvertently deployed from an anti-air warfare, or even strategic nuclear system. A duty
which was entrusted to them by the international community for handling and safekeeping
of such a potential weapon. A duty they were negligent and cavalier in executing, causing
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the ‘shoot-down’ death of myriad innocents outside their nation.
How do we infer that the Chinese Communist Party both reacted to and concealed the
existence of SARS-CoV-2 as far back as March 2018? There is a critical path of query and
dependency necessary and sufficient in prosecuting this problem from a deductive
perspective. The questions which compose this pathway are exhibited in detail within this
article. To summarize in advance, the critical arguments within this article involve nine key
avenues of consilient inference:
1. The mismatch in timing of Chinese SARS-CoV-2 B.1 and B.1.617.2 variant global
rates of spread
2. The conclusive evidence of both risk and culpability that SARS-CoV-2 was released
(not zoonotic) from a Chinese BSL gain-of-function lab (during a U.S. ‘pause’ in
such research)
3. The elevated rates of unidentified ‘flu’ in longitude E65-180 nations during 2018/19,
matching geographic pathogenic history
4. The observed natural progression of a 47 to 1 Covid prior immunity signal, in
longitude E65-180 and across 173 nations (which presided up until Delta variant
natural-immunity breakthrough infections)
5. The genetics and mutation history of SARS-CoV-2 itself, which strongly suggest an
inception case date in early 2018 – from a mouse environment, not wild animal
6. The 2021 appearance of a pre-October-2019 genetic Jan-2018-LCA highly
divergent variant of SARS-CoV-2 (Omicron) in highly immune African populations
under low mutagenic pressure
7. The CCP’s social response to an unknown, which resulted in 45-year
unprecedented CO2 ppm reductions during 2018/19
8. The CCP’s reactive social disruption patterns exhibited during 2019
9. The CCP’s Nelsonian knowledge of SARS-CoV-2 exhibited in December 2019,
along with its concerted efforts to conceal critical information, databases, 8 index-
genomes, 174 index and inception case patient samples/profiles, and pertinent lab
production logs.
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What follows within this article therefore, and through confirmation of some of its central
tenets on the part of U.S. Intelligence services (see Question #17 near end of article), does
not constitute a conspiracy theory. Its construct follows:
Unfortunately for the CCP, the virus consequently broke through to a more virulent
(full strength SEB peptide) and deadly form (first Wuhan or ‘wild’ variant) during a
mid-2019 tail outbreak in Hubei province. By October of 2019, following significant
unrest in a suffering Wuhan city, and under the impending realization that they
could no longer conceal an outbreak of such virility, the CCP formulated an
elaborate obfuscation campaign and coronavirus mitigation charade. A scheme
crafted to both minimize China’s culpability before the international community and
furthermore tender the appearance that the resulting catastrophic harm to the rest
of the world had resulted from merely a freak occurrence of natural virus evolution.
That plan launched on 31 December 2019, when the PRC informed the World
Health Organization of a novel pneumonia of unknown etiology which had been
detected at the Huanan wet-food wholesale market in Wuhan City, Hubei Province.
What the astute ethical skeptic may notice is that this hypothesis bears critical elegance. In
other words, its construct both addresses every ‘must answer’ or critical path question we
just outlined with regard to Covid-19, and achieves this without having to resort to
assembling highly convoluted and risky stacks of conjecture in order to do so. The
prosecution of this series of 17 critical path questions is outlaid with in this article. One
should note however, that the following is not a ‘study’; rather it is an argument and petition
for plurality under Ockham’s Razor.
Notes: Click on images to enlarge them inside a separate tab. Reference sources are indicated inside each
graphic or in its preamble text/footnote. Also please note that ‘SARS-CoV-2’ or ‘Covid-19’, as used in a context
prior to November 2019, can also comprise a precursor or less virulent/communicable early form of the virus
(which is also now extinct and unmeasurable, save for 174 early-patient profiles which China’s CCP refuses to
disclose). Where a reference Exhibit or Question is not specifically indicated, each paragraph principally
discusses the image or chart immediately following it.
1. Did China’s CCP misrepresent Covid’s speed and means of spread/transmission in Jan
2020? Answer: Yes.
China deceptively communicated that Covid-19 had gone from a first infection on
December 27th 2019, to the entire world, inside of three months. In fact, Covid actually
spreads geographically slow, by season (see Exhibit 2.2 below), from an impetus which
involves primarily fecal aerosols active in specific Hope-Simpson seasonal conditions.
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While it is reasonable that traditional oral fomites are also a principal form of Covid
transmission, the big picture does not support the contention that this mode of transmission
is its primary one.
Having done work in materials research, I note that often what is observed in the
microscopic expresses in the macroscopic. When I observe Covid outbreak inceptions,
routes of progression, speed, and patterns in other species – I see fecal aerosol
transmission as explaining the big picture very elegantly. Influenza-styled fomites do not
travel long distances in the air nor spread through locked-down compartmented offices and
apartment buildings, however fecal aerosols can. For instance, one can observe the
Midwest deer population Covid-19 infection arrival curve relative to Class B Biosolid
spraying in the Midwest for 2020 in Exhibit 1.1 below, extracted and modified from the
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footnoted Kuchipudi, et al study.
Deer hunters did not give Covid-19 to their already-dead prey, nor for that matter 33 – 40%
of deer (only in the Midwest and not the Southeast or Southwest) by means of direct-
contact fomites or ‘tossed apples’. In fact, why would deer bear an equivalent balance of all
human Covid variants, if their population outbreak came from single point exposures? This
is an ignorant and Pollyanna supposition. As well, this contention has been exploited by
China to spread the notion that Covid-19 appeared in the U.S. before it did in China, and
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smacks of absolute desperation.
Exhibit 1.1 – Increase in Covid among deer immediately follows Class B Biosolid
application
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Exhibit 1.2 – Nov 17 2020 Top 500 hot growth Covid counties all just happen to be Class B
Biosolid spraying counties
Principal spread was by means of household toilet aerosols and plumbing, as well as
spraying of Class B Biosolids bearing human sewage sludge onto (primarily corn) fields in
the Fall, and the fecal-protein particulate convective uplift potential of CAPE(S) or
Convective Available Potential Energy (from Surface). CAPE(S) defines the energetic
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capability of the atmosphere to loft and carry aerosols (<5 μm) or drive aerosolization of
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open wastewater (as shown in the left hand panel of Exhibit 1.3 below). These three
factors became the origin of most Covid outbreaks, with household transmission being the
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principal sustaining factor thereafter (and not public gatherings). These outbreaks then
followed a Hope-Simpson seasonal-latitude progression and did not principally spread
through breathing fomites as does the flu – as China had claimed early on to the
international community.
Exhibit 1.3 – CAPE energy for particulate convection matches Covid outbreak 11 days later
2. How long does the most communicable Covid variant (B.1.617.2 Delta) take to progress
globally? Answer: 10 months. And to herd resistance? Answer: 24 – 32 months.
The seasonal
spread from the
chart peak on the
left in Exhibit 2.1
below, to the peak
depicted in the chart
on the right, will
actually span a period of around 5 months – half of its global progression reach timeframe.
Covid’s natural spread does not come in the form of rocketing across the globe in just over
two months as it turns out, contrary to what we believed (were told by China’s CCP) in
March 2020. Remember that the first priority of China’s CCP was to confuse the
international community as to Covid’s characteristics and measures – so that their
culpability in its release could not be directly observed nor inferred.
The reader should keep this principle in mind to the end of the article: The relatively
advanced early knowledge regarding SARS-CoV-2 on the part of the CCP, their
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adept grasp of exactly what was needed in order to confuse origin issues,
knowledge of fecal aerosol mitigation protocols, and awareness that they were in
Covid’s third and final year for their nation – is collectively called Nelsonian
Knowledge. It betrays a deep experiential knowledge of Covid-19 and its particulars
on the part of China’s CCP – a knowledge they should not have possessed, if
indeed this was a ‘novel pneumonia’.
Exhibit 2.1 – Regional peak to peak migration is slower than China instructed
One must remember two principles in this deliberation of how fast Covid, and in particular
the Delta variant, spread globally. First, Covid vaccines do not stop the transmission of the
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virus, rather only serve to mitigate its severity in vaccinated individuals. In fact, the
opening of society based upon higher levels of vaccination, only served to speed the
transmission of the Delta variant, not slow it. Second, the Delta variant still infected those
with natural prior immunity from previous Covid B.1 and B.1.1.7 infection. So the notion
that, for these reasons, the Delta variant spread more slowly across the globe is incorrect.
Therefore, the fastest actual global spread we witnessed for a Covid variant, was indeed
10 months in duration, as indicated in Exhibit 2.2 below.
Exhibit 2.2 below was developed from GISAID: CovidCG Global Lineages Variant Tracker
– New Lineage Percentages by Week. Period of escalation for B.1.617.2 was 56 weeks.
We assume 41 weeks for conservancy. Raw data snapshot can be viewed by clicking here.
Exhibit 2.2
Moreover, take note that each main wave of SARS-CoV-2 inside a previously naive nation,
generates a serum IgG antibody prevalence of around 12 – 18%. Observe the net effect of
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six months (Apr – Sep 2020) of Covid-19 in the United States in Exhibit 2.3 below. This
was repeated in European and South American nations as well. The fact that Covid
spreads slowly, not fast, mandates that 5 to 7 waves of Hope-Simpson outbreak are
necessary to bring a population into any semblance of herd immunity.
Exhibit 2.3
The period in which this takes place is around 24 – 32 months, with some straggling
communities (such as Wuhan in China) filling in at the tail, before the virus has run its full
course. China bore this understanding as Nelsonian knowledge and exploited that
awareness to tender the appearance of cultural superiority. They ‘quashed Covid’, when in
reality they had merely surfed the final (albeit more deadly Alpha variant) Wuhan wave (in
green in Exhibit 2.4 below). They were still vulnerable to the Delta variant in late 2021,
however more in the form of an endemic arrival profile and not a naive outbreak.
Therefore, theories which assume (and fail to inform of this assumption) that 66+
contiguous nations (led by China statistically, see ‘Zone I’ in Exhibit 4.5 below) used an
unacknowledged implicit magic to avoid a full 28 month course of Covid-19, are not
credible.
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“We cannot rule out the possibility that the local population’s fear in the early days
of COVID-19 determined both the strictness of state-imposed lockdowns and
subsequent COVID-19 death rates, with no direct causal link between state actions
and subsequent observed deaths.
~ Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy; Report on State Restrictions
versus Covid Death Rates
Sweden, one of the few nations which refused to heed the lockdown-fable boasts on the
part of the long E65 – 180 nations, has fared better than or equal to, most of its peer
nations in terms of Covid cases (Exhibit 3.1 left panel below) and fatality rate (Exhibit 3.1
right panel below). Lockdowns in those peer nations bore no appreciable impact benefit as
compared to Sweden. (Note: Sweden’s ‘peer nations’ in terms of pandemic are not small
compartmented communities, peninsulas, nor islands, such as exist in Norway, Denmark,
Finland, Ireland, Iceland, etc.) (Charts below are from 91-DIVOC and Our World in Data).
Sweden Charts – Cases per Day and Case Fatality Rate (log)
Exhibit 3.1
Neither a 70% vaccination rate, nor extensive lockdowns have proven effective in quelling
Australia’s severe SARS-CoV-2 Delta variant outbreak. The Gompertz progression
proceeded unabated through a normal profile as shown on the left in Exhibit 3.2 below.
States such as Australia and New Zealand paid an albeit later in the game, but still heavy
price for misunderstanding what exactly worked and did not work against Covid-19 (Left
panel in Exhibit 3.2 is from WorldoMeters, Right panel is from Our World in Data) Suddenly,
with the onset of the Delta variant, the boasting about superior national lockdown policy
and execution has ended.
In the right-side panel in Exhibit 3.2 below one may observe as clean a peer-cohort
comparison as can be derived globally regarding lockdowns (there are at least 15 more
comparatives just like this). Estonia’s case curve behaved (non-coincidentally) in arrival
distribution exactly as did the case curve of its lockdown neighbor, Latvia. Lockdowns work
on fomite-transmitted heavier-than-air direct contact pathogens. Lockdowns are not
effective in the face of fecal-aerosol (<5 μm) transmitted viruses – and unless the pathogen
involves a large outbreak of fomite-transmitted Ebola, they constitute a human rights crime
of the highest order.
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Exhibit 3.2
Finally, just as in the case of Australia, as soon as these nations in the long E65 – 180
geographic block were hit with the Delta variant of SARS-CoV-2, the variant with the most
genetic divergence from B.1 – they suddenly found lockdowns to be useless as well. The
case is clear. Prior immunity benefited these 66 nations, called ‘Zone I’ nations later on in
Exhibit 4.5, but only lasted for a couple years up until the Delta variant (B.1.617.2)
breakthrough against a waning IgG antibody base.
This should not have been a surprise, because all four existing endemic human
coronaviruses (HCoV’s 229E, NL63, OC43, and HKU1) have been mutating and
breakthrough-reinfecting the population with new mutations every 3 to 6 years, for
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literally most of the last century.
In Exhibit 3.3 below, one can observe the net effect of the combination of waning IgG
antibodies and the breakthrough of a new SARS-CoV-2 variant on the Asian population
which had once had 92% lower rates of cases and deaths (see Exhibit 4.2). We observe
the coincidence with rates of vaccination without remark.
Exhibit 3.3
4. Did Covid spread in Feb/Mar 2020 as if it was a pathogen novel to the entire globe?
Answer: No.
By August 2020 it had become clear that the contiguous group of nations in the East Asia-
Pacific region between longitudes E65 and E180 all bore a prior immunity to Covid-19. This
was falsely passed off as the result of superior knowledge, governing, mitigation practices,
and racial stereotypes on the part of those nations. In fact, as it turned out, those nations
had been exposed to a precursor SARS-CoV-2 or SARS-CoV-2 itself, long before the
theater of coercion which encompassed 2020.
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Specifically, nations in this geographic cluster bore a null relationship between size of
population and number of Covid cases or deaths (beige dots and Pearson line in Exhibit
4.1 below). Since Covid spreads in the household and inside venues which cannot be
sanitized completely, only prior immunity can create a lack of association between these
two variables to this comprehensive degree. It is clear that SARS-CoV-2 behaved as if
already endemic inside this geographic block of nations.
Exhibit 4.1
As one can see in Exhibit 4.2 below (extracted from WorldoMeters), by mid October 2020
most of the group of longitude E65 – 180 nations had experienced only 8% the rate of the
world’s average national total cases and deaths from Covid-19. This trend was later broken
by Covid-19 Delta variant natural immunity breakthrough illnesses which skyrocketed in
that same longitude region in mid 2021 (as we saw in Exhibit 3.3 above).
Having one lockdown nation exceed another lockdown nation’s NPI performance by
1250% (1.00 – .08 or 92 percentage points) is one thing – which itself pushes
credibility. However, having 20+ contiguous nations (40+ if you count Equatorial
African nations) collectively exceed the entire world by 1250% is a claim that a
reasonable ethical mind cannot let stand unchallenged. No hypothesis which
accepts this as part of its structure has been vetted properly in its duty to reduce,
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address, and inform.
This differential shown in Exhibit 4.2 below was produced by nascent prior immunity (i.e.
not extant Human CoVs), and any hypothesis to the contrary must assemble grand stacks
of convoluted and improbable happenstance in order to explain this. Nascent (SARS-
CoV-2 or precursor) immunity is elegant and is also the null hypothesis in this case.
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Exhibit 4.2 – Nineteen Asia/Pacific Rim nation cases and deaths versus remainder of globe
This block of nations (shaded blue in Exhibit 4.3 below), between longitude E65 ad E180
bore the highest level of immunity to Covid, followed by central African nations with high
concentrations of Chinese workers/projects, and exposure along equatorial trade winds
along CAPES (see Question #1 above) concentrations.
Moreover, these exact same nations have a solid history of being the first nations which
gain exposure/immunity to Asian novel pathogens in the past. Thus there exists a long
precedent of history as to this pattern of pathogen progression globally. Below in Exhibit
4.4 we observe that the 1957 H2N2 flu took the same exact pathway of spread which
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SARS-CoV-2 has under this article’s line of conjecture.
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Exhibit 4.4
To sum up Exhibits 4.1 through 4.4 into two charts, below one can observe (Exhibit 4.5 –
deaths per million in population) both the geographic migration of the SARS-CoV-2 virus
from the longitude East 65 – 180 nations (on the right in green), across the years and globe
through to the 35 holdout or virus-naive nations (on the left in blue). There are three zones
of mathematics embedded into the curve in the chart plot itself (beige line). An inelastic
(Zone I – immune) set of 66 nations, a linear (Zone II – transitional immunity group) set of
107 nations, finally followed by our exponential (Zone III – naive) set of 35 nations (Chart is
developed from WorldoMeters Covid-19 case, death, and population data by nation).
This is important. The set of groupings and their associated mathematics outlined in Exhibit
4.5 below deductively falsify the notion that the below immunity (remember the context is
immunity here, not infection) profile spread across the globe in 2 to 3 months in early 2020.
There is absolutely no viable possibility that such a spread could have produced this, a.
contiguous, b. mathematically segmented, c. 47 to 1 ratio signal, and d. conforming-to-
typical-viral-history sequence of immunity arrival across 173 of 208 nations in that short
amount of time. Zero.
It has become clear that a weaker form of SARS-CoV-2 was the only vehicle which could
deliver a 47 to 1 immunity ratio, of the mathematical symmetry shown in Exhibit 4.5 below.
A proline-weakening of the staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB) peptide (causes Covid-19
illness) in the older Omicron variant (see Question #7b. below) may offer a key to this older
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version of SARS-CoV-2.
The outbreak waves in Exhibit 2.4 reiterated below, are necessary to produce the
immunity profile shown in Exhibit 4.5 further below. This is a ‘must address’
question and any hypothesis which does not have a straightforward answer for this
is a false hypothesis.
Exhibit 2.4 – Necessary Covid outbreak arrivals to achieve asymmetric integrity in immunity
globally
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If the Zone I profile in Exhibit 4.5 below had been the result of lockdowns, there would have
still been an observable relationship between population size and number of deaths, by
nation. There was no such relationship in Zone I. As well, in order to address the effect
which different rates of obesity and aging by nation (East vs. West) might imbue into this
curve, one can find a version of this chart overlain with percent population which is obese
and percent population over age 65, by clicking here. In the end, these flat-concave
contributors did not provide the essence of the convexity observable in Exhibit 4.5 below.
Only a highly communicable biological (SARS-CoV-2) virus could cause this
comprehensive 47 to 1 immunity differential between Zones III and I. This is prohibitive as
evidence.
5. Were the nations hardest and least hit by Covid concentrated into longitudinal groups by
human travel and climate pathways? Answer: Yes.
Not only were the nations which exhibited prior immunity to SARS-CoV-2 all grouped
together inside traditional pathways of historic virus spread, as well, these nations (outside
of China) happened to reside along equatorial trade wind latitudes transferring virus
material westward towards central Africa and the remainder of Pacific Oceania.
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Exhibit 5.1
Just as did the 1957 H2N2 influenza, SARS-CoV-2 transferred along CAPE pathways of
viral conveyance globally. Geographic proximity, regional worker migration corridors, and
CAPES-energized air movements, in that order, appeared to be the primary factors which
related to prior immunity against SARS-CoV-2. Below in Exhibits 5.2 and 5.3, one can
observe that SARS-CoV-2 communicated not only along CAPES and worker-migration
pathways, but along the exact same geographics as the 1957 H2N2 influenza did as well
(see Exhibit 4.4 above). Exhibit 5.2 is provided courtesy of Twitter’s @StatSleuth.
See link: AP: Scientists mystified, wary, as Africa avoids Covid disaster
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Exhibit 5.3
6. Were there indicators that an unknown pathogen struck areas least hit by Covid, in the
years prior to Covid-19 – and further then finally struck Western nations 10 to 18 months
later? Answer: Yes.
It became clear in my investigation, that the Pacific Rim and Oceania nations (Exhibit 6.1
below) purportedly bore the sole ‘success’ in lockdowns globally. However, eventually
lockdowns were disproved as an effective means of mitigating SARS-CoV-2. So how do we
resolve this conundrum? The next candidate for such mitigation was prior immunity to
SARS-CoV-2 in particular. But this required that Covid, or a precursor thereof, circulate in
the 12 to 21 months immediately prior (based on IgG antibody dilution curves which left the
same region vulnerable to the Delta variant in 2021) to the 2020 pandemic. Was there
evidence that such a pathogen indeed circulated in these regions and in this timeframe?
Yes, good evidence in fact. Exhibits 6.1 and 6.2 show clearly that a sudden rise in illness
and death preceded Covid in these prior immunity nations during the 2018 and 2019
timeframe.
Exhibit 6.1 – 2018 and 2019 excess death in longitude East 65 through 180 nations versus
globe
Remember that very few cases of influenza are actually derived from a genetically tested
phenotype. Most cases are diagnosed abductively (are simply declared to be flu, because
that is what is going around and that is what sentinel stations have apportion-sampled). In
the years immediately prior to 2020, the Pacific Rim and Oceania nations which showed
prior immunity, just happened to also experience much higher rates of influenza and death
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Exhibit 6.2
However, in the U.S. one can observe in Exhibit 6.3 immediately below, developed from
National Center for Health Statistics data, a sudden uptrend in Alzheimer’s and Dementia
deaths beginning in the early summer of 2018. Given the very close association (#1 rank,
#2 is metabolic disorder – with many medical professionals regarding A&D to simply be
late-stage diabetes/metabolic disorder) between this particular comorbidity and SARS-
CoV-2, this change in a long-established growth rate of 1.35% is alarming. Something
caused this, aside from the normal demographic trends which drive the former 1.35%
annual increase. That something was introduced (on this chart) in May of 2018, and
escalated strongly in 2019, causing an exception in terms of excess deaths in the 65+ and
85+ age cohorts in the U.S., as we observe in Exhibits 6.4 and 6.5 later below. The
unknown malady then dovetailed nicely into Covid-related Alzheimer and Dementia deaths
in 2020. This steady scale-up from 2019 and into 2020 was not a coincidence.
I do not hold therefore, that the July 2019 Virginia Department of Health elder care center
respiratory illness outbreak deaths or other U.S. respiratory illness outbreaks in 2019 (cited
in Exhibits 13.9 through 13.11 below) were a mere coincidence. Nor have they ‘been
debunked’ as a form of Covid precursor – because we no longer have access to the
measures necessary to debunk them. I bristle at drawing inference from such a position of
politically-motivated ignorance.
Exhibit 6.3
Across the nations in the eight panel charts below (Exhibit 6.4), one may observe the
progression of excess deaths in the 65-year old and older cohort for the years 2015 – 2021
YTD. In each nation, an off-season (this is important) departure from historic growth (or
decline as demographics dictate) begins in early to mid 2018 – with an excess death rate
for this Covid-vulnerable age cohort persisting right into the December 2019 inception case
period for Covid-19. The data is obtained from the University of Berkeley, Max Planck
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Institute – Human Mortality Database.
One may observe a very strong off-season excess death signal in mid-2019 for South
Korea and Taiwan (as we see also in Exhibit 6.5 below), both nations which had
‘successful’ lockdowns until the Delta variant arrived in 2021. One may observe for
Australia and New Zealand as well, that both nations did not suffer from Covid-19 in 2020 –
instead they suffered excess deaths in 2018, 2019, and 2021 (Delta variant). What was the
factor which caused these excess deaths worldwide during the very pre-Covid timeframe
upon which this article focuses? We contend that the SARS-CoV-2 genetics dictate that
this was a milder form of precursor virus.
In particular, one should note that the off-season excess death in the United States panel
on the lowest left of Exhibit 6.4 is solely driven by the high Covid-comorbidity relationship
cited in Exhibit 6.3 above. This is the most Covid-vulnerable population therein, and also
happens to match the timeframe where something was killing the 65+ age group to excess
in all these nations. We do not believe that this is a coincidence.
Exhibit 6.4 – Excess death in 2018 and 2019 across eight sentinel nations
The excess death in the 85+ age cohort for 2018/19 shown in Exhibit 6.5 below, dovetailed
nicely into Covid excess deaths in Italy, Spain, and later on in the U.S. beginning in early-
mid 2019. Of key interest to note in Exhibit 6.5, is that both Italy and Spain’s 2019 average
excess death for this age cohort constituted a double-digit increase over previous years.
2019 rates of excess death equaled around a third or more of the magnitude of each
nation’s 2020 Covid-19-year for the same 85+ cohort statistic. Not a trivial observation by
any means. Curiously, Italy and Spain were also the first European nations to be hit hard
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This is neither a coincidence nor the result of statistical drift. An exception caused this to
occur, just as happened in Taiwan in 2019 and South Korea in 2018 and 2019. Our
contention is that this East-to-West progression demonstrates the natural and well-
documented actual spread rate of Covid identified in Exhibit’s 2.2 and 4.5 above. As we will
see in Exhibit 8.1 later below, we have established that China’s variant of Covid-19 spread
too fast to be credible. The challenge therefore that, ‘Why didn’t Covid spread to the entire
world in 2019?’ becomes moot. It did spread. Just not at the Chinese-advertised rate,
during a time when the virus was less virulent, and during a heavy flu period wherein we
were simply not aware of its presence.
Exhibit 6.5
Meanwhile, Australia and other Pacific Rim and Oceania nations struggled with a severe
‘not subtyped’ flu during the 2018/19 season. This ‘flu’ then conferred the observed Covid
prior immunity upon the long E65 – 180 group of nations. Below are three charts showing
annual rates of influenza for the Philippines (Exhibit 6.6), Japan (Exhibit 6.7), and Australia
(Exhibit 6.8).
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Exhibit 6.6
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Exhibit 6.8
Note that Australia’s flu peak, the superimposed red arrival curve in Exhibit 6.9 below,
coincides nicely with both Japan’s rate of excess death as well as China’s sigma reductions
in carbon dioxide emissions for that timeframe. SARS-CoV-2 might or might not have hit
the region in 2017, however it is clear that China knew about its presence by Covid’s peak
in early 2018. While the CCP responded too late in 2018 to have an impact on the
pathogen, by 2019 they knew exactly what they were facing and how they wanted to go
about mitigating it (although in the end what turned out to be feckless measures) – but of
course the CCP failed to inform the world community because it was ‘none of their
business’. As always, this was a Chinese internal-state matter.
The Party Rule #2: Matters of The Party are matters of The Party only.
Exhibit 6.9
Not only was there an exceptionally large ‘flu’ rate in China in 2018/19, prior to SARS-
CoV-2, but as well there was a curious pause in the 2018 flu altogether (see Exhibit 6.10
below), right as carbon emissions in China plummeted to their lowest levels. Levels which
were the result of an unknown-in-cause social clampdown. Curiously this constituted a flu-
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disappearing-act which was also observed later in western nations during their peak period
of SARS-CoV-2.
Exhibit 6.10
The genetic
divergence
dates based
upon
mutation
frequency,
between
SARS-CoV-2
and its
originating bat
sarbecovirus
subgenus Nucleotide Identity Comparative – EcoHealth Alliance (modified)
were
estimated as 1948, 1969, and 1982, (55 average years of evolution) indicating that if
SARS-CoV-2 was of indeed zoonotic as opposed to lab origin, then the SARS-CoV-2
15
lineage had to have been circulating unnoticed for decades prior to 2019. While it is not
impossible that SARS-CoV-2 could have evaded detection all this time, by either bat colony
survey or human illness sentinel work, this represents a non-trivial measure of genetic
distance. One composed of around a 4% nucleotide jump from BANAL-52 (as shown in the
Nucleotide Identity Comparative chart to the right), along with an impossible poly-basic
16
furin cleavage segment insertion (center panel of the chart). Of particular note, is the fact
that human-adaptation features of the virus bear a strikingly large genetic distance from
this comparative group, which whole-genome comparatives tend to misleadingly obscure.
This requires any hypothesis that features zoonotic origin as its foundation, to craft
complex explanations as to how the modifications in Exhibits 7.1 through 7.5 just suddenly
occurred recently, absent of a human host. Conversely, under the assumption that the virus
had been circulating/mutating for decades, then one need explain how decades of
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sampling bat viruses failed to ever find a wild SARS-CoV-2’s species and furthermore
demonstrate that it absolutely never jumped to humans prior to October 2019. Both of
these demands upon hypothesis are a pretty tall order, even a bit of a Catch-22. There are
therefore, no parsimonious zoonotic origin hypotheses.
In particular, the virus bears a genetic exception in the form of a furin specific cleavage site
which cannot realistically exist in a zoonotic virus of this phenotype, and had to be created
in a lab and gain-of-function setting. The genetic jump from BAT-CoV-HKU5 to SARS-
CoV-2, combined with the inception-only human specific mutations (Exhibit 7.2) and furin
cleavage insert (Exhibit 7.1), render a zoonotic origin essentially only a desperate political
notion masquerading as science. The sole reason it perpetuates as an idea is that experts
fear being categorized in the ‘disinformation’ group by various social conformance patrols
(see the DNI Report Conclusions 1 – 7 in Question #17 at the end of this article).
Exhibit 7.1
As well, despite circulating in myriad number of human hosts for almost two years now,
most of SARS-CoV-2’s human-adaptation variations occurred in the ‘early phase’ of (read
as ‘in a lab’ or the ‘two years prior to’) the pandemic.
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Exhibit 7.2
However the oldest variant of SARS-CoV-2, the Omicron variant (which we will examine
below in Question #7 b.), presented significant aspects of its progenitor genome (the
forerunner which conferred immunity to much of the globe in 2018 and 2019), which
indicated that it was originally serial passed inside a lab mouse environment. This makes
17
the January 2018 lab leak a very likely hypothesis. Exhibit 7.3 below is extracted from the
study providing this insight.
Exhibit 7.3 – Progenitor of Omicron bore mutational signatures of being serial passed in a
mouse
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Precursor genetics of the virus identified by China in December of 2019, indicate one or
two years of mutation prior to the index case genomics of the B.1 variant.
One must bear in mind that the red line in the chart below is not a ‘mutation
emergence curve’ but rather a discovery curve. Treating it as the former is an act of
propaganda, not science. Neither can one fit a regression line to this entire genomic
progression (see an example of such ineptness here), as such a line is not
mathematically valid, spans differing nonlinear dynamics, and involves Gaussian
blindness.
Please take note that as much as one third of all Covid variations to the end date on this
chart occurred in that first month of the virus’ ‘existence’. The reality is that this portion of
the mutation base probably occurred over the 20 months prior to December 2020, and not
inside the two months shown in the chart below.
Before we move on make a mental note to carry forward as you read, that now we have
been huckstered with the notion of global spread, as well as a principal portion of Covid’s
history of mutation, as having both occurred in just two months.
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Exhibit 7.5
Similarly, when linear extrapolations are compared between variants of Covid from outside
China, Wuhan, and China areas outside of Wuhan, a progressive story can be witnessed in
the mutation base. The areas in China outside of Wuhan featured the oldest variants of
Covid, with a suggested index case in mid-late 2018. Thereafter, the strains of the virus in
Wuhan coincide with exactly the dates in which Wuhan residents were protesting about a
June 2019 unidentified deadly respiratory illness in the city’s population (see Exhibits 11.1
and 11.2 below). In turn, these timeline milestones also happen to coincide exactly with
China’s anomalous (45-year exception) reductions in CO2 ppm output (Exhibit 11.4).
Exhibit 7.6
Additionally, a December 2021 study showed that both Europe’s and the variant Omicron’s
mutational history pre-dated the mutational history of the original Wuhan strain (A.x and
18
B.x). Four mutations in the DG614G group all existed in Omicron, but not in the original
Asian strains from December 2019. This is prohibitive as an argument, both in terms of the
time it would take for these four mutations to occur (see below), and the precedent it
served in replacing the alleles of the original A.x and B.x variants out of Asia.
European strains would have no time to evolve [four DG614G mutations] mutations,
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had they come directly from the early Asian DG0000 strain. It would thus appear
that SARS-CoV-2 had been in Europe [before the Wuhan A or B strains] long
enough to evolve DG614G in separation from the viral evolution in Asia.
Ruan, Wen, et al., The twin-beginnings of COVID-19 in Asia and Europe (Dec
2021)
Please note that this mutation group existed in Omicron but not in Wuhan. With that in
mind, we now proceed to examine the curiosities entailed by the Omicron variant itself.
7b. Omicron Variant – genetics are older than and lineage does not connect back to Dec
2019 ‘wild’ type
Under this paradigm, if Omicron turns out to be highly transmissible but mild in
terms of symptomatic severity – then it has a great likelihood of being the direct
descendant of the pre-Wuhan 2018/19, 173 nation (Zone I and II in Exhibit 4.5
above) immunity-conferring strain of Covid conjectured within this article.
Exhibit 7.7 – Nextclade: clade assignment, mutation calling and quality control for viral
22
genomes (21K Omicron – Sequence QLD-2568 – 2 Dec 2021
As well, Omicron carries 3 amino acid insertion mutations (ins214EPE) which do not exist
in any extant clade of SARS-CoV-2, but does exist in other human alpha and beta
23
coronaviruses. If this insertion occurred as the result of ‘template switching’ in a human
coronavirus co-infected individual, then the other alleles in Omicron should have matched
the lineage of one of our known clades. It didn’t. Thus, we face a confounded problem in
trying to stuff Omicron artificially into a recent (<2 year) timeline of origin. In the timeline
24
developed from GISAID data in the left hand panel of Exhibit 7.7 for instance, the
exceptional red clade-line, which suggests a narrative-comforming lineage for Omicron, is
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“We probably missed many generations of recombinations” that occurred over time
and that led to the emergence of Omicron, Soundararajan added.
This confounding, along with the evidence presented below, indicates that Omicron’s
genetic particulars constitute not merely mutations, but more importantly alleles which pre-
date, not post-date, our best index case of SARS-CoV-2 in Oct/Dec 2019 (according to
Chinese and other narratives). In other words the genetic last common ancestor (LCA, aka
‘MRCA’) which birthed Omicron existed well prior to the Wuhan wild and B.1 variants of Oct
– Dec 2019. Again, this is not inductive evidence (as has been used to assemble the
Wuhan/China/WHO wet market chronology), but is rather much stronger deductive
inference. The entailed calculations and logic are outlined below and in Exhibit 7.9.
-4
Multiple studies have estimated that SARS-CoV-2 mutations occur at the rate of 1 x 10
25 -3
(measured by survival in population) to 1.1 x 10 raw mutations per nucleotide per
26
year. These extremes are shown in Exhibit 7.8 below. This equates to .0001 to .0011
mutations per nucleotide per year, with an average of .0006. Since the sustaining of a
mutated clade-member or especially novel variant occurs at a slower rate than the raw rate
27
of mutation, we err conservatively towards the survival rate, or .00036 (.0006 x .6 or 3.6 x
-4
10 ) mutations per nucleotide per year, based upon the arrival rate of new sustainable
mutations in the circulating population.
Exhibit 7.8
There are 29,811 single strand RNA nucleotides in SARS-CoV-2. Given its 93 differential
mutations from a ~March 2020 Alpha Clade 20B variant, which can be seen in Exhibit 7.7,
this would at first glance indicate around 8.7 years of genetic distance wound up inside
Omicron’s divergence from other existing variants. However we must adjust the calculation
in that only 66 of the 93 total mutations constitute the most typical RNA virus mutation,
28
called a ‘substitution’. Therefore,
Substitution Clock – .00036 x 29811 = 10.7 mutations per year 66/10.7 = 6.1 years
of mutation
However, genetic distance by typical RNA virus mutation is not the end-all of this
29
derivation. Not all nucleotides mutate at the same rate. As we just mentioned, most
mutations arrive in the form of synonymous high frequency events called substitutions –
mutations that separate Covid in-clade variants in linear sequence from their initial index
sequence (see horizontal lines in the left panel of Exhibit 7.9 below). The mutations in
Omicron do not follow this pattern, and in fact constitute an exception within the entire
diagram. Instead, Omicron mutations comprise about 32% of what are called
30
‘insertion/deletion’ mutations (INDELs). INDELs do not arrive at the same rate as higher
frequency substitutions, but rather constitute less common absences or novel-presences of
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an entire nucleotide. Insertions and deletions constitute a change in the logical structure of
the RNA sentence and not a mere synonymous replacement of a word, if you will. Thus
they produce failures (extinction) more often than successes, and as such constitute a
much bigger challenge in terms of genetic language. They can also often result in different
mutational clock measures as compared to those based upon substitutions alone. In fact,
RNA virus INDELs are 4x less frequent in their occurrence than are substitutions (actually
deletions are 8x less frequent, and the majority of INDELs for Omicron are deletions –
31
however, we still use 4x here for conservancy). If we approach our genetic clock with this
second method of measuring genetic distance, we get the following result – which
importantly, substantiates and exceeds fairly well our substitution-nucleotide method of
measuring genetic distance conducted above.
INDEL Clock – (.00036 / 4) x 29811 = 2.68 INDEL mutations per year 30/2.68 =
11.2 years of mutation
32
We therefore through triple-conservancy in this method, can reasonably cite that 6.1
years (the smaller of the two above substitution and INDEL based estimates) would be the
minimum time duration required to enact all 66 Omicron substitution mutations as observed
in sample sequence QLD-2568 of 2 Dec 2021. We must leave the alarming INDEL
mutation rate in Wittgenstein silence because sadly we cannot connect it back to any kind
of usable reference. Finally, before we move on from this set of calculations, we should
employ this same method to take quick note of the evolutionary time which would be
required for SARS-CoV-2 to have evolved naturally from its nearest relative among beta
coronaviruses, BANAL52. This will act as a double-check of the validity of our estimates
above as well (consilience). We divide by two here because two virus evolutionary
pathways are involved in this analytical context. Reader please note that this is a
-4
benchmark comparison for establishing credibility of our assumed 3.6 x 10 survival
mutation rate only. It does not mandate that SARS-CoV-2 necessarily evolved naturally
from BANAL52. The conjectured Jan 2018 lab accident could have released either a
natural or edited SARS-CoV-2 under our hypothesis.
This matches exactly (consilience again) the 55 years divergence cited at the beginning of
-3
Question #7a above (1966 average through to 2021). It also means that 1 x 10 mutations
per nucleotide per year estimates for rates of mutation are far too high and theoretical, to
be used as basis for estimating the appearance of sustained Covid-19 variants like
-3
Omicron (the context we need for this deliberation). This 10 order of magnitude was also
the mutation rate for SARS-CoV-1 after all, which mutated so fast that it exterminated all of
33
its genetic lineages before it could spread past one season (see Exhibit 15.1). The Furin
-3
Cleavage Site mutates at a rate ten times faster (3.6 x 10 ) than does the overall Covid
34
genome. So a too-fast Covid mutation rate, will only result in destruction of the virus’ very
ability to infect human hosts to begin with.
Our assumed rate of mutation provides for the appearance of a new sustained SARS-
CoV-2 variant every year, per clade. We have 23 clades as of December 2021 (see Exhibit
7.9), and only 13 named variants to date – so even this conservative rate indexes high
against the Covid-19 mutational reality (left hand side of mutation rate spectrum in Exhibit
-4
7.8 above). Therefore, as a mutation rate, 3.6 x 10 not only matches historical indexing
against FCS mutations, but moreover provides a falsification-based sound match from
every angle of outside-comparative or deliberation within this analysis. Nonetheless, I fully
-3
anticipate that the raw (theoretical) 1.1 x 10 or higher mutation rate will be exploited by
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those desperate to enforce the Dec 2019 narrative. Hold them accountable by showing that
not only does Omicron not have an existing precedent from which it could recently have
mutated (see Exhibits 7.6 and 7.9), but their preferred mutation rate would serve to
extinguish SARS-CoV-2 within a season as well – both by SARS-CoV-1 precedent, and by
mathematical modeling. Such a raw theoretical and excessive assumption is an orphan
assumption and artifice, which in no way matches our observed Covid clade-to-variant
reality.
Now lets carry this three-way validated, 6.1 years of genetic distance forward as we
consider it in relation to the nearest relative to the Omicron variant. Omicron carries a
mutation called N501Y, which affords the virus a greater ability to bind to human cells. This
mutation was also present in the Alpha variant and was linked to its higher contagiousness
as compared to the wild variant. But N501Y did not exist in Delta, nor the wild variant, so
those constitute a separate evolutionary pathway – this is very important. Therefore
Omicron must share an LCA not with the wild/Wuhan variant, but rather the very first Covid
35
Alpha 20B Clade of 3 February 2020. Remember, that the 66-mutation line drawn in the
GISAID chart on the left in Exhibit 7.9 is an assumption, not a derivation (and a wholly
different assumption from the one in the Exhibit 7.7 left hand chart we showed earlier in
this Omicron subject segment). These connectors therefore, are basically viral fiction.
Exhibit 7.9
Now, if we add this 6.1 years of mutation clock time to evolve an Omicron variant directly
from Alpha 20B (Sep 2021, or even 3 Feb 2020) as the Nextstrain/GSAID chart on the left
in Exhibit 7.9 suggests, we get Oct 2027 (or Mar 2026) as a timeframe for Omicron’s
arrival. This obviously did not happen – so Omicron did not originate from Alpha 20B itself,
nor the wild variant, nor Delta, but rather a prior LCA with Alpha 20B. Therefore, conversely
we must parse these same 6.1 years from the arrival date of Omicron (Nov 2021) through
to the detection date of Alpha 20B (3 Feb 2020) in order to find the actual date of the LCA
with Omicron and Alpha.
By the 2 variable/2 sentence reduction shown on the right hand side of Exhibit 7.9
we are able to solve for an estimated emergence date for this last common
ancestor of January 2018. Exactly the date we have estimated for the lab leak in
China.
To frame this in a simpler perspective – the average maximum clade divergence from
Clade 19A (26 Dec 2019), wild variant, on the GSAID chart is 46 nucleotides (1 sigma =
36
6.2). The below mathematical approach is not entirely valid because successive
mutations are merely synonymous substitutions, and do not usually include anywhere near
Omicron’s 29% portion of INDELs. Nonetheless, let’s benchmark Omicron against the other
clades on Exhibit 7.10 below.
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Benchmarking off this relative measure serves to place the latest Omicron variant
(93 mutations on 2 Dec 2021) as originating from an LCA at 93/46 x 23 months =
47 months – or Jan 2018 in origin. A clean match.
Exhibit 7.10 – Omicron mutation timeline and lack of extant variant basis
If evolutionary pressure during the last year had served to accelerate this variant into being
(or even cause its 12-mutation spread observed over a mere 8 days), then it should have
borne the nucleotide base of any variant on the above chart (Exhibit 7.10) which has
existed since Clade 19A. As one can observe in Exhibits 7.6 and 7.9 above, Omicron did
not bear such a genetic legacy from any existing clade – merely the ‘N501Y association’
with Alpha. However, this mere single nucleotide linkage with Alpha is not enough solid
evidence, so we undertook a more sophisticated approach to viral adjacency next.
If we take the frequency of differential mutations shared between these four variant
benchmarks, and assign a value of 1 to each, then divide that value by the entropy for that
nucleotide (therefore lower entropy sites carry more contrast weight), then we end up with
a value for each of the variety of relative strengths in mutation relationships between the
four variants (see ‘Relationship’ chart in the top center of Exhibit 7.11 below). The
worksheet which outlines this analysis can be accessed by clicking here. The source for
38
the nucleotide data was Covid CG – Covid Genetics: Lineage Reports by Nucleotide. The
39
source for the entropy measures was Nextstrain.
If those weighted contrast strengths are then summed as a total for 144 nucleotide sites,
and shown as vectors on a spanning tree diagram (see upper right of Exhibit 7.11), they
40
can be optimized into a single configuration of nodes (optimized spanning tree). As you
can see, these relationship connectors span in direct proportion to the amount of time
required for evolution to drive the introduction of each variant. Accordingly, a set of annual
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rings are placed, centered on Delta, indicating the relative amount of time in genetic
distance each variant is from the introduction of the first sample sequence of Delta. Exhibit
7.11 is based upon the most important factor, differential mutations (not shared between
two variants). However, we ran another version of this same chart based upon affinity
mutations (shared) and got the exact same outcome, January 2018. That chart can be
seen by clicking here.
If we then remove redundant but weaker relationship vectors we end up with a relationship
spine, as shown on the lower center of Exhibit 7.11. As you can see from both elements
inside Exhibit 7.11, the entropy weight averaged genetic distance (by differential mutations
or contrast) places Omicron at a distance from Delta, of sufficient magnitude that Omicron
cannot mathematically be a contemporary of the B.1-Alpha-Delta triad below. The only
direction one can apply the time of genetic distance required is into the past. Thereby
arriving at January 2018, quod erat demonstrandum. The exact same result which the
affinity analysis produces.
This effort produces a diagram which allows us to observe that Omicron not only is
nowhere near related to Alpha and Delta, but is offset from Delta by 2.8 years of evolution.
The important thing to understand here is that the only way one can assemble this
optimized spanning tree is by assuming the ancestor of Omicron to have existed
prior to the B.1 Wuhan strain – separated by an amount of time around quadruple
that between Wuhan and either Alpha or Delta.
Exhibit 7.11
The dynamics of virus outbreaks are not well understood. Viruses have been observed to
flourish, go dormant, and then re-emerge with relatively little genetic clock progression
41
between the two outbreaks despite being separated in time by 5 years or more. Thus,
objection to this theory based upon the idea that Omicron was ‘too human adapted and
similar to the human adaptations of Alpha/Delta variants to be this old’, does not hold
scientific water. Again, a highly ‘if’-dependent effort to stuff 10 pounds of evolution into a 2
pound bag of recency.
42
Update: the following study came two weeks after this article was published.
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[Extensive analysis] reveals that Omicron variant formed a new emergent group
that was not originating [from] other variants. It’s possible [therefore], that Omicron
has been around for much longer than [originally] predicted…
8. Do the progression timelines of the wild (B.1) and Delta (B.1.617.2) variants of SARS-
Cov-2 agree in their implications? Answer: No.
China’s CCP lied about the speed at which SARS-CoV-2 B.1 spread globally. This variant
of the virus not only did not spread globally in a mere two to three months, but moreover
when indexed against the well-measured rate of spread for the Delta variant, indicates a
probable index case and inception in China of around mid-to-late 2018, or into 2019 at the
latest (if we pretend that the Delta variant is not really more transmissible). The relative
transmission rate for Delta is sourced from 26 Aug 2021 CDC advisory on Delta variant.
Some sources contend that Delta’s transmission rate, relative to the wild virus, is even
43
higher than 2.5 : 1. However for conservancy, we use the CDC comparative in Exhibit 8.1
below, which is damning enough as it is.
Exhibit 8.1
9. Did the CCP bear the capacity and opportunity to release, and imminent risk of releasing
Covid in 2018/19? Answer: Yes.
Before they were aware that their emails would become critical evidence, members of
Anthony Fauci’s team expressed the opinion that SARS-CoV-2 genetics were inconsistent
with a virus of zoonotic origin. They believed that it was the product of a gain-of-function
lab – but both a lab and a genomic signature about which they had no specific knowledge.
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Exhibit 9.1
Note the dates of these alerts issued by U.S. Embassy officials (Exhibits 9.2 and 9.3),
th
January 19 2018. Our estimated release date of SARS-CoV-2 was around March 2018,
two months after this warning was issued: “but [the Wuhan BSL-4 lab’s] current productivity
is limited by a shortage of the highly trained technicians and investigators required to safely
operate a BSL-4 laboratory and a lack of clarity in related Chinese government policies and
guidelines.”
Exhibit 9.2
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Exhibit 9.3
Finally, based upon the commissioning and operating schedule of China’s 5 top BSL-level
operations, there existed ample opportunity for this novel pathogen, featuring a genetically
manipulated furin cleavage site, to have escaped from poorly security-administered labs in
both 2018 and 2019 (or even 2017 during the U.S. ‘pause’ in gain-of-function research).
10. Did other nations besides China bear this capacity, opportunity, and imminent risk of
Covid release? Answer: No.
The Obama Administration had placed a pause on the very gain-of-function research which
would have been required to produce SARS-CoV-2, from 17 October 2014 until 19
December 2017 (timeframe is referenced from Exhibit 10.2 below). Given that the United
States and China were the only principal nations involved in this research, this leaves
China as the only researching body which could have conducted the gain-of-function
development necessary for am early 2018 release of the SARS-CoV2 virus.
In fact, in 2016/17 and during the ‘pause’ in gain-of-function research in the U.S., the
National Institutes of Health funded and conducted this very gain-of-function research on
bat coronaviruses – in and only in – China (see Exhibits 10.2 and 10.3).
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Exhibit 10.1
Exhibit 10.2
Exhibit 10.3
11. Were there indicators of potential virus social impact and disruption in China during the
‘unknown pathogen years’ experienced by its contiguous nations? Answer: Yes.
As one may observe in the four-panel chart shown in Exhibit 11.1 below, the critical China
keyword searches (per Google Trends) associated with the pandemic, other than
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‘coronavirus’, ‘SARS’, Covid-19, etc. do not concentrate in January and February of 2020.
Keyword popularity for ‘cold (illness)’, ‘medicine’, ‘lung-cough’, and ‘hospital’ all concentrate
during the March 2018 – August 2019 period – right in the same timeframe when influenza
took a ‘zero-case pause’ in China and mysteriously did a Covid-style disappearing act (see
Exhibit 6.10 above). The search hit arrival chart for the term ‘hospital’ on the bottom right is
particularly intriguing in that the March 2018 period dwarfs the January 2020 Covid-19
panic period in Wuhan. Very curious. In fact, this keyword group’s search intensity rivals
the volume for the same word searches for the Jan-Feb 2020 period, when one would
expect such keywords to register with high hits.
Exhibit 11.1
Now focusing back upon Wuhan in particular: “…in late June and early July of 2019 the
residents of Wuhan began to fill the streets, angry that officials responsible for the health
and prosperity of the city’s 11 million people had betrayed them. They were sick, and
feared getting sicker. The elderly gasped for breath. There was fear that the ill had suffered
permanent damage to their immune and nervous systems.“
Exhibit 11.2
China proper experienced an alarmingly robust 2019 flu season as well. Remember that
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the vast (99%+) majority of these flu cases were apportionment-only (not novel virus
detection) ‘guesses’ as to the actual virus involved. China had an information ban in place
sometime before 3 January 2020, which forbade release of any genetic sequences or case
44
studies without permission of The Party. Below in Exhibit 11.3, we see exactly why they
did this.
Exhibit 11.3
In addition, notice that as soon as China ceased its lockdown of just Hubei province on 8
April 2020, the world immediately experienced a 45-year record in CO2 ppm spring
increase (grey ‘2020’ line on the left hand side of Exhibit 11.4 below). Because 47% of the
West was locked-down at this time, this demonstrated clearly that it is China, and not
Western nations, which impart the most significant impact in terms of CO2 production
globally. Sorry Greta.
Finally, the reader should note that I am not talking about China enacting a comprehensive
lockdown of its entire nation and economy in this context – rather just small regions where
a Covid outbreak was known to exist (potentially or even likely known on the part of very
few persons). The actions could be excused through a cover-story regarding influenza
quarantines (2018/19 flu season was 6x heavier as we observed in Exhibit 11.3), African
Swine Fever and H5N1 bird flu mitigation efforts, 2019 flood alerts, or a variety of other
exculpatory rationale.
When China locked-down only Hubei province on 23 January 2020 for example (4% of
population) – this drove the largest CO2 reduction on the entire chart depicted below. Thus
China did not have to undertake drastic nationwide measures in order to effect these
smaller-variance 2018 (tomato) and 2019 (red) charted CO2 ppm trend lines. Regardless,
China’s CCP contention that they did not know about Covid-19 until late December 2019 is
belied by the chart below. So we know they were lying – now we are only negotiating how
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much.
The red trend line ppm suppression impetus in July 2019 (or 2018 for that matter) did not
just coincidentally give way to a convenient, exactly-timed, and same-magnitude Covid
lockdown suppression tend line in December 2019. Such a suggestion broaches
incredulity. No, this entire ppm suppression all stemmed from one single factor. This is also
the parsimonious explanation for what we observe in Exhibit 11.4 below.
Exhibit 11.4
Meanwhile Japan, as we noted earlier in Exhibit 6.9, struggled with the same set of ‘severe
flu season’ issues in terms of excess deaths, curiously evolving at the same time as
Australia’s record illness peak, and commensurate with China’s CO2 production shutdowns
(‘sigmas’ extracted from Exhibit 11.4).
Many observers as well noted increased traffic patterns at Chinese hospitals in mid 2019,
accompanied by decreased mobility measures on the part of Chinese cell phone users. Of
course, we now know that the pandemic did not begin in China ‘in August’ as the article
below cites – however, that was the peak of actual virus circulation and lockdown activity
on the part of the CCP (see Exhibit 11.2). So this makes sense relative to our argument.
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Exhibit 11.5
12. Was this social response/carbon reduction reaction due to African Swine Fever or
Trump Trade Tariffs? Answer: No.
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The 2018 African Swine Fever resulted in a single-year hit to China’s GDP of 0.78%.
Despite this large of a hit to GDP, when we contrast the CO2 reduction sigmas seen in
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Exhibit 11.4 and 11.5 above with the progression of African Swine Fever, we are able to
falsify the notion that ASF served to produce the 45-year exception reductions in carbon
emissions on the part of China.
As well, Trump Administration tariffs approached nowhere near a 0.78% impact upon
Chinese GDP. In fact 2019 was a record year for China in terms of global containerized
shipping, with the greatest fluctuation in export volume being attributable to China’s annual
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celebration of the Lunar New Year. A normal condition which has existed for all 45 years
analyzed in Exhibit 11.4 above. In fact, the Brookings Institute, in their Election Policy 2020
Report, identified that China-US supply chain entities simply paid the additional tariffs and
went on about conducting business order cycles as usual – resulting in a rise in costs to
American consumers and not an appreciable drop in traded unit volumes nor harm to
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China’s economy.
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Exhibit 12.1
As a note before we move on, if anything, it is more likely that the African Swine Fever,
various chicken pathogens, and human ‘influenza’ to which the CCP responded during this
timeframe, also served as a diversion away from their activity in attempting to mitigate and
understand a nascent viral (later named SARS-CoV-2) challenge.
13. Did the world exhibit blood antibody serum, CLI outbreak, or Covid-19 mRNA profiles
which matched an exposure to Covid-19 prior to Oct 2019? Answer: Yes.
Sewage sampling and blood testing for serum antibodies even in Western nations such as
Italy, France, and Barcelona, Spain, consistently showed mRNA or antibodies to Covid-19
which were generated as far back as January 2019. Given that it takes 10 months (Exhibit
2.2) for Covid to spread across the globe, this places a likely inception (true index case) in
China, around March – June 2018.
To corroborate the Barcelona March 2019 mRNA detection (Exhibit 13.3) we note high
excess death observations in Spain (Exhibits 6.4 and 6.5) – which place Covid in China
around the Feb – May 2019 inception period. Both Barcelona, Spain as well as Lombardy,
Italy are heavy Chinese citizen travel destinations. Accordingly, the Spain 4%, 11%, and
18% excess death data matches the 8%, 12%, and 26% excess death rates we observed
in the over 85 cohort in Italy for 2018, 2019, and 2020 respectively (Exhibit 6.5). Something
less virulent, but nonetheless still deadly swept through these first European regions to be
hit with Covid up to a year before their supposed March 2020 outbreaks. These
benchmarks corroborate the genetic analyses in Exhibits 7.4 and 7.5 well.
The U.S. blood donation antibody tests in particular demonstrated IgG antibodies in the
population which were generated as far back as March 2019 in the United States alone
(see Exhibit 13.2 below). In the chart immediately below (Exhibit 13.1), one can find all the
studies cited inside this Question summarized onto one graphic. Each cited study then
follows inside a set of actual study first page or critical images shown as Exhibits 13.2
through 13.12.
The chart below (Exhibit 13.1) falsifies the notion that SARS-CoV-2 appeared in China in
December, or even October, 2019. It was present (in likely a less virulent or even precursor
form) much earlier than those dates allow. Desperate attempts at debunking these
detection points are underway, as they serve to falsify China’s CCP fairy tale – be cautious
of such plausible deniability debunking efforts, and furthermore watch for the exercise of
‘outference’ (a method of pseudo-skepticism) as defined in Question #17 at the end of this
article.
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Exhibit 13.1
Exhibit 13.2
Please note that this study did not find just one detect, but two and from the same
sample on the RdRp gene, primers IP2 and IP4 at 39 C(t). This was very unlikely to
be a false positive given that there were two hits not just one, and furthermore
RdRp primers are selected specifically to avoid cross-reactivity with the six other
human-circulation coronavirus members (229E, OC43, SARS-CoV, NL63, HKU1,
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and MERS-CoV). While it is possible the detection was the result of contamination
or sample mix-up, given the array of samples conducted with no contamination/mix-
up false positives, this was also very unlikely. These plausible deniability spins
constitute nothing more than simply a version of nulla infantis or ‘nuh-uh’ argument.
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Therefore, one cannot just declare either of these as the conclusion nor even likely
or implied conclusion. However, in a subsequent release the authors chose to leave
the observation mute, because it was being exploited by China’s CCP as evidence
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that SARS-CoV-2 did not originate in China. The detection was not refuted,
recanted, nor retracted – rather just left as an isolated observation. Fact-checkers
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agree with this neutral assessment. No effort has been made to confirm these
results – so we have a case again, of Nelsonian inference being exploited to
increase ignorance and imply ‘finished science’. Theories which get stronger as
ignorance increases, are not theories at all. Do not trust people who make
debunking claims based upon this common circumstance in scientific study.
Exhibit 13.3
Exhibit 13.4
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Exhibit 13.5
Lung Cancer Blood Serum Antibodies in Pre-pandemic IgG Antibody Italy study – February
2019
Exhibit 13.6
India demonstrated a serum antibody rate of 60% in June 2021, despite only documenting
Covid in a mere 2.1% of the population up to that time. Comparatively, it took the United
States a full 18 months of exposure, just to get to a 38% seroprevalence. By deduction,
India would have to have been exposed to a precursor of Covid, or Covid itself, a full 18
months prior to January 2020 – July 2018.
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Exhibit 13.7
Exhibit 13.8
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Exhibit 13.9
Exhibit 13.10
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Exhibit 13.11
Exhibit 13.12
14. Did China’s CCP attempt to conceal its gain-of-function activities, early case data, and
genome libraries from the 2014 – 2019 period? Answer: Yes.
China’s CCP requested that 200 coronavirus samples submitted to the U.S. National
Institutes of Health (NIH) be deleted in June of 2019. As it turned out, these sequences
suggested that the virus was circulating in Wuhan earlier than previously thought, and
could perhaps point toward answers on the origins of Sars-CoV-2 – answers that could not
only help end this pandemic but prevent the next one. China’s CCP regarded its Party
interests as being more important than global health however.
The Party Rule #3: There are no interests more important than the interests of The
Party.
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Exhibit 14.1
As well, China refused to submit samples from the first 174 cases of SARS-CoV-2 which it
detected. These inception cases are critical in determining how diverse Covid mutation had
been by the index case detection date. This would allow investigators to both affix an
estimated actual inception date to the virus in China, and as well establish a likelihood of its
inception being confined only to Wuhan. Thus, we must presume that by withholding these
samples, China’s CCP is concealing data which could serve to falsify their narrative. This
forces the earlier (before Oct 2019) outbreak hypothesis (the one favored by the House
Minority Intelligence Committee, see Question #17) into becoming the null hypothesis. One
must prove that Covid-19 miracle-mutated and appeared in Oct/Dec 2019, not simply
assume it and then look for the evidence later.
Exhibit 14.2
15. Did China’s CCP appear to fudge its case and fatality measures regarding Covid,
thereby obfuscating data indicating a much longer period of Covid exposure nationally?
Answer: Yes.
Given that we know that lockdowns were not effective in quelling SARS-CoV-2 (Questions
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#1 through #6), we can infer that China’s report of cases (cited in green in Exhibit 15.1
below), were both mitigated by prior immunity, and as well were fabricated even given this
reality. The sole purpose of this under-reporting was to ensure that the Chinese Communist
Party did not appear weak before the international community. Targeted lockdowns had
failed in China for 2 years, however now that the nation was seeing herd resistance at play,
the CCP decided to exploit this natural phenomenon to make itself appear superior to the
world. We observe here that the CCP’s intransigence with regard to its transparency is not
merely motivated by a desire to not be mocked; but moreover, a desire to appear racially
superior to their lesser-human planetary co-inhabitants. A formula we observed plied in the
years immediately prior to World War II. A sentinel warning about what may also lie ahead
for the world.
The Party Rule #4: Every decision on the part of The Party is both brilliant and
correct.
Exhibit 15.1
Furthermore, in a display of how fudged the Chinese numbers were, the reduced case
reporting shown in Exhibit 15.1 above served to artificially decrease the denominator in
China’s advertised case fatality ratios (CFR’s) shown in Exhibit 15.2 below. As a result,
China’s CCP gave the world a false depiction of Covid’s fatality rate at 4.15% (see the
green trend y-axis intercept in Exhibit 15.2), sending most nations into overreaction. Not
only was Covid ‘not like the flu’, apparently it was like Ebola. Accordingly, instead of
preparing medical resources and treatment capabilities, panicked nations elected to pursue
harmful lockdowns, feckless ‘zero-Covid’ impossibilities, and a slew of rushed vaccines.
Flawed national policies were hastily enacted under this erroneous level of coerced panic
and malicious actors exploited this in order to alter election laws towards The Party’s favor.
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Many people died from the ensuing shortfall in understanding, that Covid-19 did require
treatment which was critical in avoiding death from secondary effects (warfarin,
budesonide, doxycyline, apixaban, prednisone, etc.), as well as successful therapies for
Covid-19 itself (ivermectin, monoclonal antibodies, hydroxycytidine, zinc, quercitin, vitamin
D, etc.).
The Party Rule #5: Every action on the part of The Party is virtuous.
Exhibit 15.2
16. Did China’s CCP sabotage efforts to investigate SARS-CoV-2 and impose an
obfuscating veil of intimidation around its origins and timing? Answer: Yes.
China falsely portrayed willingness to continue further investigation into the origins of
SARS-CoV-2. But the reality was that this was under the condition that ‘lab leak’ was not
one of the options under consideration to investigate. China delayed and terminated critical
investigations, secured veto rights over critical participants, and clumsily tried to affix blame
for SARS-CoV-2 upon other nations – especially the United States.
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Exhibit 16.1
Exhibit 16.2
“It is beyond doubt that the CCP actively engaged in a cover-up designed to
obfuscate data, hide relevant public health information, and suppress doctors and
journalists who attempted to warn the world. They deliberately, and repeatedly,
disregarded their obligations under the 2005 IHR. …As more countries have begun
to question the CCP’s official accounting of the early stages of the pandemic and
call for an international investigation, the PRC has used economic manipulation and
trade coercion to demand silence.”
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~ House Foreign Affairs Committee Minority Staff Report, 21 Sep 2021
China’s shutdown of travel within Wuhan, but abject allowance for travel from there to other
nations, implies culpability on its part. It was only after US President Donald Trump
th
petitioned directly to him on March 27 2020, that Chinese President Xi Jinping finally
agreed to curb international flights from Wuhan and China. Three months too late, and
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after a massive propaganda campaign on China’s part to dissuade nations from adopting
travel clampdowns, only then did China finally call an end to this method of polluting the
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Covid-origins pool.
The notion that SARS-CoV-2 originated from a gigantic genetic/furin cleavage zoonotic
jump event in a seafood wet market in December 2019, and then underwent 18 months of
variant mutations and spread to 95% of global nations in the next 70 days, and that the
Chinese just withhold critical information because that is just what Chinese do, it’s their
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17. Did various nation’s/intelligence agencies agree with the above assessment on the part
of The Ethical Skeptic? Answer: Yes (mostly), and No.
Of course we reviewed the assessment by the House Foreign Affairs Committee Minority
Staff Report of 21 Sep 2021 in Question #16 above. They cite an obvious campaign of
coverup and intimidation on the part of the CCP. However, let’s continue on with reports
from the intelligence community itself. Two reports in particular came out in August and
October of 2021. Their conclusions are outlined below.
The virus …was likely collected in the identified cave in Yunnan Province, PRC,
sometime between 2012 and 2015. Its release was due to poor lab safety
standards and practices, exacerbated by dangerous gain-of-function research being
conducted at inadequate biosafety levels…”
Exhibit 17.1
However the Office of the Director of National Intelligence shied away from taking the
recommendation of the House Committee in its unclassified Update Assessment of
October 2021. Its constituents officially ‘remained divided’ (politics?) on the issue of lab
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versus zoonotic origin, and did not hold enough real information to conjecture further.
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shenanigans at play.
Neutral. Disagrees with our assessment at face value, but is a rhetorical argument
and implies nothing of a critical path nature. Merely symbolic.
3. “Finally, the IC assesses China’s officials did not have foreknowledge of the virus
before the initial outbreak of COVID-19 emerged.”
Disagrees with our conclusion, but bases this inference on a lack of, rather than a
presence of information. A lack of information specifically engineered by China’s
CCP.
4. “After examining all available intelligence reporting and other information, though,
the IC remains divided on the most likely origin of COVID-19. All agencies assess
that two hypotheses are plausible: natural exposure to an infected animal and a
laboratory-associated incident.”
Agrees with our assessment but offers no evidence nor critical argument.
6. “The IC—and the global scientific community—lacks clinical samples or a complete
understanding of epidemiological data from the earliest COVID-19 cases. If we
obtain information on the earliest cases that identified a location of interest or
occupational exposure, it may alter our evaluation of hypotheses.”
One cannot contend a conclusion nor a confidence level on that conclusion, and
thereafter cite that they are not getting the data they need in order to make a
conclusion in the first place. Such cultivated ignorance and the theories which result
from its outference, merely serve as political-fear narratives protecting their issuers
from The Party’s compliance patrols.
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The mistakes outlined above, along with the conjecture as to who bears responsibility for
them, therefore do not constitute a conspiracy theory. They were enacted on the part of a
Chinese Communist Party which wholly underestimated the level of program rigor and
operational discipline required to manage and control a potential bio-weapon. They further
then mistakenly launched this weapon upon a planet-load of innocent civilians. Finally, like
any mafia they followed up their crime with an utter disregard for ethics, humanity, and any
semblance of accountability.
The Party Rule #7: In the end, only The Party is of any importance.
If China’s CCP is willing to conduct this level of surreptitious harm to the rest of the world
over a matter of a virus escape, then what will The Party be willing to do to the rest of the
world when they are really upset? The Chinese Communist Party owes the international
community recompense for the massive levels of death, economic disruption, and suffering
of our loved ones.
Share this:
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17. December 14th, 2021; Evidence for a mouse origin of the SARS-CoV-2 Omicron
variant; Changshuo Wei, Ke-Jia Shan, Weiguang Wang, Shuya Zhang, Qing Huan,,
and Wenfeng Qian; State Key Laboratory of Plant Genomics, Institute of Genetics
and Developmental Biology, Innovation Academy for Seed Design, Chinese
Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China8; University of Chinese Academy of
Sciences, Beijing 100049, China
18. Yongsen Ruan, Haijun Wen, Mei Hou, Ziwen He, Xuemei Lu, Yongbiao Xue,
Xionglei He, Ya-Ping Zhang, Chung-I Wu, The twin-beginnings of COVID-19 in Asia
and Europe – One prevails quickly, National Science Review, 2021;, nwab223,
https://doi.org/10.1093/nsr/nwab223
19. Ivan Aksamentov, Cornelius Roemer, Emma B Hodcroft, & Richard A Neher.
(2021). Nextclade: clade assignment, mutation calling and quality control for viral
genomes. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5607694
20. Nextstrain: Genomic epidemiology of novel coronavirus – Global subsampling;
https://nextstrain.org/ncov/gisaid/global?l=scatter
21. Alaa Abdel Latif, Julia L. Mullen, Manar Alkuzweny, Ginger Tsueng, Marco Cano,
Emily Haag, Jerry Zhou, Mark Zeller, Emory Hufbauer, Nate Matteson, Chunlei Wu,
Kristian G. Andersen, Andrew I. Su, Karthik Gangavarapu, Laura D. Hughes, and
the Center for Viral Systems Biology. outbreak.info, (available at
https://outbreak.info/compare-lineages?pango=Omicron). Accessed 6 December
2021.
22. Ivan Aksamentov, Cornelius Roemer, Emma B Hodcroft, & Richard A Neher.
(2021). Nextclade: clade assignment, mutation calling and quality control for viral
genomes. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5607694
23. Venkatakrishnan, AJ, et al. “Omicron Variant of Sars-cov-2 Harbors a Unique
Insertion Mutation of Putative Viral or Human Genomic Origin.” OSF Preprints,
Web. 3 Dec 2021
24. Nextstrain: Genomic epidemiology of novel coronavirus – Global subsampling;
https://nextstrain.org/ncov/gisaid/global?l=scatter
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