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Sudan’s Democratic
Transition Needs a
Jumpstart
Yasir Zaidan | Tuesday, July 13, 2021

Sudanese Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok didn’t mince words about

Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok during a news
his country’s future during a press conference last month, putting his conference at the Grand Palais Ephemere in Paris, May 17,
2021 (pool photo by Sarah Meyssonnier via AP Images).
concerns about the growing tensions between the civilian and military
sides of the fragile transitional government in existential terms. “The
big question today is will Sudan exist or not exist,” he said. The week before, Hamdok delivered a rare televised
address in which he warned the country could fall into civil war between multiple armed groups and different factions
of the Sudanese military. 

The alarming remarks come at a pivotal time for Sudan, which next month will mark the second anniversary of its
interim constitution. Signed in August 2019, months after the popular uprising that resulted in Bashir’s ouster, the
constitutional declaration created a transitional government that was to share power between military and civilian
leaders for 3 years and 3 months, after which national elections were to be held. However, that clock was reset to
zero in a peace agreement the transitional government signed (https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/b168-rebels-come-
khartoum-how-implement-sudans-new-peace-agreement) last year with armed rebel groups, meaning elections are now scheduled
for early 2024.

More than two years after the revolution, Sudan’s democratic future does not look promising. A fraught relationship
between Sudan’s generals and civilian leaders like Hamdok has made intra-government coordination difficult at a
time when leaders need to address a persistent economic crisis, integrate armed rebel groups into the national army
and resolve thorny diplomatic spats with neighboring countries. To tackle all of these issues simultaneously, Hamdok
has proposed a comprehensive new initiative (https://allafrica.com/stories/202106240147.html) that aims to bolster the
government’s unity and deepen democratic reforms. But success is far from guaranteed.

Notably, Hamdok’s remarks last month were the first time in two years that he spoke critically of the state of civil-
military relations in Sudan. Since the beginning of the democratic transition, he had maintained an optimistic
narrative on this issue, praising the uniqueness of what he called the “Sudanese model” of civil-military partnership.
Even as many analysts, including myself (https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28860/covid-19-threatens-to-derail-an-unsteady-
democratic-transition-in-sudan), warned of a widening split between civilian institutions and the military, the prime minister
mostly remained passive, at least publicly. 
That hopeful mentality has now gone out the window, as Hamdok is reportedly worried not only about civil-military
tensions, but also a split between the army and a powerful, separate branch of the military known as the Rapid
Support Forces, or RSF. Indeed, the first element in his new initiative calls for a process of security sector reform that
would integrate the RSF into a unified military. But Sudanese generals have resisted this idea, and in any case, the
interim constitution stipulates that security sector reform falls under the purview of the military. Therefore, any efforts
by civilian leaders to lead such a process would almost certainly be denounced as unconstitutional by the army,
exacerbating intragovernmental tensions. 

The situation is complicating Sudan’s efforts to deal with multiple security threats. The eastern region around the Red
Sea coast has seen an increase in violent attacks by anti-government forces; four people were killed in a bomb
attack in the city of Port Sudan over the weekend. At the same time, tensions continue to simmer over a border
dispute with Ethiopia (https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29458/ethiopia-sudan-border-skirmishes-spark-fears-of-a-wider-war). And
Khartoum has yet to reach an agreement with Addis Ababa on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project on the
Nile River, which Sudan says will endanger its water supplies. Ethiopia is currently moving ahead with its plans for a
second filling of the dam’s reservoir, and with the summer flood season approaching, the two governments will need
to coordinate closely to avoid endangering downstream communities.

If there is one bright spot for the transitional government when it comes to security matters, it is the generally
successful peace negotiations with armed rebel groups. The government has made peace with all but one group and
continues to engage with the remaining holdout, the Sudan’s People Liberation Movement-North, led by Abdelaziz al-
Hilu.  

However, many aspects of Sudan’s democratic transition remain woefully behind schedule. For example, the interim
constitution stated (https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Sudan_2019.pdf?lang=en) that a transitional Legislative Council
should be created within 90 days of the charter’s signing, but plans for doing so have been repeatedly delayed.
Hamdok’s new initiative called for all parties to recommit to creating this body, and he may actually get his wish:
Sudanese leaders finally announced last week (https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-s-transitional-legislative-council-to-
convene-in-august) that the Legislative Council would hold its first session on Aug. 17.

Nonetheless, the long institutional vacuum is affecting Sudan’s governance. One of the two women in the 11-
member Sovereignty Council that heads the transitional government, Aisha Musa, resigned in May,
(https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/woman-sudans-ruling-council-quits-saying-civilians-are-being-ignored-2021-05-22/) citing the council’s lack of
coordination between its civilian and military members. Her seat remains vacant because, according to the
constitutional declaration, Musa’s replacement must be nominated by the Legislative Council.

More than two years after the revolution that ousted Omar
al-Bashir, Sudan’s democratic future does not look
promising.

The situation is equally grim when it comes to the judiciary. On May 17, the Sovereignty Council announced
(https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-africa-sudan-business-f62de1434d152d3751244e0fe1e8bc07) the resignation of Attorney General Taj
al-Ser Ali al-Hebr and removed Neamat Abdullah Mohamed Kheir from her position as Sudan’s chief justice, without
providing any reasons for the changes. Kheir, a veteran jurist, had become the first woman to head the judiciary in
October 2019. Hebr told Voice of America (https://www.voanews.com/africa/south-sudan-focus/sudans-ruling-council-removes-first-female-
chief-justice-accepts-attorney) that he resigned because he did not have enough political space to work independently. 

According to the interim constitution, replacements for Kheir and Hebr should be named by the Supreme Judicial
Council and the Supreme Council of the Public Prosecution, respectively, but the transitional government has not
followed through on creating those key bodies. The Sovereignty Council, which is headed by Gen. Abdel Fattah al-
Burhan, has expressed its intent to unilaterally fill the vacancies under the terms of the constitution. It is also worth
noting that Sudan remains without a Constitutional Court since April 2019, as members of this body, too, are
supposed to be appointed by the Supreme Judicial Council.

Hamdok’s new initiative comes amid deteriorating popular support for the transitional government, largely due to a
package of severe economic belt-tightening measures that it imposed recently with the backing of the International
Monetary Fund, such as the removal of fuel subsidies (https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/sudan-fully-scraps-fuel-subsidies/2268651). Days
after Hamdok’s press conference, hundreds of protesters gathered (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/30/sudan-protesters-
demand-govt-step-down-over-imf-backed-reforms?

utm_source=dailybrief&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=DailyBrief2021Jul1&utm_term=DailyNewsBrief) in Khartoum to commemorate the

massive pro-democracy demonstrations of June 30, 2019, which were brutally suppressed by the Transitional
Military Council that then controlled the country. It was ironic that at the gathering held to commemorate the second
anniversary of that occasion, some protesters demanded Hamdok’s resignation. 

The removal of the fuel subsidies was part of a series of painful reforms that the IMF required so that Sudan could
qualify for debt relief. Other conditions included a sharp devaluation of its currency, which the government
implemented in February (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-economy/sudan-devalues-currency-to-meet-key-condition-for-debt-relief-
idUSKBN2AL06P), and removal from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, which former President Donald Trump’s
administration fulfilled in December (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/sudan-remove-state-terror-list/2020/12/14/7f119482-3d10-
11eb-aad9-8959227280c4_story.html). All of those difficult steps paid off days after Hamdok’s press conference, when the
World Bank and IMF announced they would reduce Sudan’s debt by more than $50 billion
(https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2021/06/29/pr21199-sudan-to-receive-debt-relief-under-the-hipc-initiative)—representing over 90 percent
of Sudan’s total external debt—over three years.

The prime minister’s new initiative appears to have international support. U.S. Secretary of State Antony
Blinken discussed the matter (https://twitter.com/SecBlinken/status/1409142392326963203?s=20) with Hamdok in a phone
conversation a few days after his press conference, and reiterated support for Sudan’s “civilian-led government.”
However, Hamdok will ultimately need a grand political bargain with domestic stakeholders if his initiative is to
succeed. 

While Hamdok has called for political constituencies outside the Forces for Freedom and Change—the umbrella
group that spearhead the 2019 revolution—to participate in a national dialogue, he should go further to ensure that
these stakeholders are represented in the Legislative Council. Bringing in the moderate Islamist factions that
supported the revolution, as well as the Democratic Unionist Party, the second-largest party in Sudan’s parliament at
the time of the 1986 coup that brought Bashir to power, would ensure that the incoming legislative body is inclusive.
Broadening the transitional government’s base of support would also help solidify backing for civilian oversight of the
military. This is particularly vital in light of Sudan’s long history of military coups, which always required tacit or active
civilian support. 
The security reform process also requires that transitional institutions be up and running. Effective security
institutions ultimately require a functioning judiciary and court system to protect law and order while safeguarding civil
and political liberties. But instead of prioritizing those issues, the government detained several journalists
(https://twitter.com/Sudan_Asrf/status/1410259940678148103?s=20) who were covering the June 30 protests—a step back to
Sudan’s oppressive past.

Hamdok’s proposed new initiative is coming late in the transition, though it is a step in the right direction. After many
similar proposals in the past two years, however, the patience of the Sudanese people is fading. Hamdok will be
under immense pressure to get it right this time.

Yasir Zaidan is a lecturer of international affairs at the National University of Sudan and a doctoral student at the University of
Washington’s Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies. Follow him on Twitter @YasirZaidan91 (https://twitter.com/YasirZaidan91).

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