Why Arabs Lose Wars?

NORVELL B. DE ATKINE
Arabic-speaking armies have been generally ineffective in the
modern era. Egyptian regular forces did poorly against Yemeni
irregulars in the 1960s.1

Syrians could only impose their will in Lebanon during the mid-
1970s by the use of overwhelming weaponry and numbers.2

Iraqis showed ineptness against an Iranian military ripped apart

by revolutionary turmoil in the 1980s and could not win a three-
decades-long war against the Kurds.3

The Arab military performance on both sides of the 1990 Kuwait

war was mediocre.4 And the Arabs have done poorly in nearly
all the military confrontations with Israel. Why this unimpressive
record? There are many factors—economic, ideological,
technical—but perhaps the most important has to do with culture
and certain societal attributes which inhibit Arabs from producing
an effective military force.

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1
 ‫ﳌﺎذا ﻳﺨﴪ اﻟﻌﺮب اﻟﺤﺮوب؟‬
‫‪2‬‬

‫ﻧﻮرﻓ�ﻞ دي ي ن‬
‫أﺗﻜن‬
‫ن‬
‫�ﺸكﻞ ﻋﺎم‪ ،‬ﻟﻢ ﺗﻈﻬﺮ ﺟﻴﻮش اﻟبﻼد اﻟﻨﺎﻃﻘﺔ بﺎﻟﻠﻐﺔ اﻟﻌ���ﺔ ﻛﻔﺎءة ي� اﻟﻌ� اﻟﺤﺪ�ﺚ‪ .‬ﻓﻠﻢ‬
‫ن ن‬ ‫ي ن‬
‫اﻟ�ﻤﻨﻴن ي�‬
‫ي‬ ‫اﻟﻨﻈﺎﻣﻴن‬ ‫ﻏ�‬
‫ﺗﺆدي اﻟﻘﻮات اﻟﻨﻈﺎﻣ�ﺔ اﻟﻤ��ﺔ �ﺸكﻞ ﺟ�ﺪ أﻣﺎم اﻟﺠﻨﻮد ي‬
‫�‬
‫اﻟﻌ��ﻦ‪(1).‬‬ ‫ﺳتﻴن�ﺎت اﻟﻘﺮن‬

‫ن‬
‫وﻟﻢ ﻳﺘﻤﻜﻦ اﻟﺴﻮر�ﻮن ﻣﻦ ﻓﺮض ﺳ�ﻄﺮﺗﻬﻢ ي� ﻟﺒﻨﺎن ﺧﻼل ﻣﻨﺘﺼﻒ اﻟﺴبﻌﻴن�ﺎت ﺳﻮى‬
‫بﺎﺳﺘﺨﺪام اﻷﺳﻠﺤﺔ واﻷﻋﺪاد اﻟﺴﺎﺣﻘﺔ‪(2).‬‬

‫ن‬ ‫ن‬
‫اي اﻟﺬي كﺎﻧﺖ ﺗﻤﺰﻗﻪ اﻻﺿﻄﺮابﺎت اﻟﺜﻮر�ﺔ ي�‬
‫واﻓﺘﻘﺪ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﻴﻮن اﻟ�ﻔﺎءة ﺿﺪ اﻟﺠ�ﺶ اﻹﻳﺮ ي‬
‫�‬
‫اﻟي اﺳﺘﻤﺮت ﻟﺜﻼﺛﺔ ﻋﻘﻮد ﺿﺪ‬
‫اﻟﺜﻤﺎﻧيﻨ�ﺎت‪ ،‬كﻤﺎ ﻟﻢ ﻳﺘﻤﻜﻨﻮا ﻣﻦ ﻛﺴﺐ اﻟﺤﺮب ي‬
‫اﻷ�ﺮاد‪(3).‬‬

‫ن ن‬ ‫ً‬
‫اﻟﺠﺎﻧﺒن ي� ﺣﺮب اﻟ���ﺖ ﻋﺎم ‪(4).1990‬‬ ‫ي‬ ‫اﻟﻌﺮى ﻣﺘﻮﺳﻄ ﺎ ﻋ� كﻼ‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫وﺟﺎء اﻷداء اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي‬
‫�‬
‫اﻟﻌﺮي ي� أﻏﻠﺐ اﻟﻤﻮاﺟﻬﺎت اﻟﻌﺴﻜ��ﺔ ﻣﻊ إ�اﺋ�ﻞ‪ِ .‬ﻟ َﻤ ﺎ هﺬا‬
‫�ي‬ ‫ﻓﻀﻼ ﻋﻦ ﺿﻌﻒ اﻷداء‬
‫اﻟﺘﺎر�ـ ــﺦ اﻟﻤﺘﻮاﺿﻊ؟ هﻨﺎك اﻟﻌﺪ�ﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻮاﻣﻞ اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎد�ﺔ واﻟﻔﻜ��ﺔ واﻟﺘﻘﻨ�ﺔ‪ ،‬وﻟ�ﻦ ﻟﻌﻞ‬
‫�‬
‫اﻟي ﺗﻤﻨﻊ‬
‫و� ي‬ ‫� اﻟﺴﻤﺎت اﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓ�ﺔ واﻟﺴﻤﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ بﻌﻮاﻣﻞ ﻣﺠﺘﻤﻌ�ﺔ ﻣﻌﻴﻨﺔ‪ ،‬ي‬ ‫اﻷهﻢ ي‬
‫اﻟﻌﺮب ﻣﻦ إﻓﺮاز ﻗﻮة ﻋﺴﻜ��ﺔ ﻗ��ﺔ‪.‬‬

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It is a truism of military life that an army fights as it trains, and so

I draw on my many years of firsthand observation of Arabs in
training to draw conclusions about the ways in which they go into
combat.

The following impressions derive from personal experience with

Arab military establishments in the capacity of U.S. military
attaché and security assistance officer, observer officer with the
British-officer Trucial Oman Scouts (the security force in the
emirates prior to the establishment of the United Arab Emirates),
as well as some thirty year's study of the Middle East.

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‫‪4‬‬
‫�‬
‫ﺧ� يي‬
‫ﻣﻦ بﺪﻳﻬ�ﺎت اﻟﺤ�ﺎة اﻟﻌﺴﻜ��ﺔ أن اﻟﺠﻴﻮش ﺗﺤﺎرب ﻣﺜﻠﻤﺎ ﺗﺪر�ﺖ‪ ،‬ﻟﺬا ﻓﺴﺄﺳﺘﺨﺪم �‬
‫ن‬ ‫ن� اﻟﺴﻨﻮات اﻟﻌﺪ�ﺪة �‬
‫اﻟي ﻗﻀيﺘﻬﺎ ي� ﻣﺮاﻗبﺔ ﺗﺪر�بﺎت اﻟﻌﺮب ﻋﻦ ﻛﺜﺐ ﻻﺳﺘﺨﻼص‬‫ي‬ ‫ي‬
‫ن‬
‫اﺳتﻨﺘﺎﺟﺎت ﺣﻮل ﻃﺮﻗﻬﻢ ي� اﻟﻘﺘﺎل‪.‬‬

‫اﻻﻧﻄبﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﺘﺎﻟ�ﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻤﺪة ﻣﻦ ﺗﺠ��ﺔ ﺷﺨﺼ�ﺔ ﻣﻊ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﻌﺴﻜ��ﺔ اﻟﻌ���ﺔ‬

‫ﻋﻤ� كﻤﻠﺤﻖ ﻋﺴﻜﺮي ﻟﻠﻮﻻ�ﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪة وﺿﺎبﻂ ﻟﻠﻤﺴﺎﻋﺪات اﻷﻣﻨ�ﺔ‪ ،‬وﺿﺎبﻂ‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ﺧﻼل‬
‫)و� ﻗﻮات‬ ‫�‬
‫اﻟي كﺎن �ﻘﻮدهﺎ ﺿبﺎط ﺑ��ﻄﺎﻧﻴﻮن‬
‫ي‬ ‫ﻣﺮاﻗﺐ ن ﻣﻊ ﻗﻮة ﻛﺸﺎﻓﺔ ﺳﺎﺣﻞ ﻋﻤﺎن ي‬
‫اﻷﻣﻦ ي� اﻹﻣﺎرات ﻗبﻞ ﻗ�ﺎم دوﻟﺔ اﻹﻣﺎرات اﻟﻌ���ﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪة( ‪ ،‬وﻛﺬﻟﻚ دراﺳﺔ ﻋﻦ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﺔ‬
‫ي ن‬
‫ﺛﻼﺛن ﺳﻨﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫اﻟ�ق اﻷوﺳﻂ اﻣﺘﺪت ﻟﻨﺤﻮ‬ ‫�‬

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False Starts
Including culture in strategic assessments has a poor legacy, for
it has often been spun from an ugly brew of ignorance, wishful
thinking, and mythology. Thus, the U.S. army in the 1930s
evaluated the Japanese national character as lacking originality
and drew the unwarranted conclusion that the country would be
permanently disadvantaged in technology.5

Hitler dismissed the United States as a mongrel society 6 and

consequently underestimated the impact of America's entry into
the war. As these examples suggest, when culture is considered
in calculating the relative strengths and weaknesses of opposing
forces, it tends to lead to wild distortions, especially when it is a
matter of understanding why states unprepared for war enter into
combat flushed with confidence.

The temptation is to impute cultural attributes to the enemy

state that negate its superior numbers or weaponry. Or the
opposite: to view the potential enemy through the prism of one's
own cultural norms.

American strategists assumed that the pain threshold of the

North Vietnamese approximated their own and that the air
bombardment of the North would bring it to its knees.7 Three
days of aerial attacks were thought to be all the Serbs could
withstand; in fact, seventy-eight days were needed.

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‫‪6‬‬

‫بﺪا�ﺔ كﺎذبﺔ‪.‬‬

‫�‬
‫اﻻﺳ�اﺗ�ﺠ�ﺔ ﺗﺎر�ـ ــﺦ ﺟ�ﺪ‪ ،‬ﻓﻬﻮ ً‬ ‫ن‬
‫ﻏﺎﻟب ﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻳنﺒﻊ ﻣﻦ‬ ‫ﻟ�ﺲ ﻻﺳﺘﺨﺪام اﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﺔ ي� اﻟﺘﻘﻴ�ﻤﺎت‬
‫اﻷﻣ� ي�‬ ‫ﻣﺨﺰون ﻣﻦ اﻟﺠﻬﻞ‪ ،‬واﻟﺘﻔﻜ� اﻟﺮﻏﺒﻮي‪ ،‬واﻷﺳﺎﻃ�‪ .‬ﻟﺬا‪ ،‬ﻓﻘﺪ ّ‬
‫ﻗ� ﻢ اﻟﺠ�ﺶ‬
‫ي‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ي‬
‫ن‬
‫ﻣ�ر‬
‫اﻟﺸﺨﺼ�ﺔ اﻟ�ﺎبﺎﻧ�ﺔ ي� اﻟﺜﻼﺛيﻨ�ﺎت ﺑﻮﺻﻔﻬﺎ ﺗﻔﺘﻘﺮ إ� اﻻﺑﺘكﺎر‪ ،‬ﻟ�ﺼﻞ إ� اﺳتﻨﺘﺎج ﻻ �‬
‫ﻟﻪ أن اﻟبﻼد ﺳﺘﻜﻮن داﺋﻤﺎ ﻣﺘﺄﺧﺮة ﺗﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﺟ�ﺎ‪(5).‬‬

‫ﺑﺘﺄﺛ�‬
‫ي‬ ‫و�ﺎﻟﺘﺎ� اﺳﺘﺨﻒ‬ ‫ي ن‬
‫هﺠن )‪(6‬‬ ‫ورﻓﺾ هﺘﻠﺮ اﻟﻮﻻ�ﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪة بﺎﻋﺘبﺎرهﺎ ﻣﺠﺘﻤﻊ‬
‫ن‬ ‫ي‬
‫�ﺸ� ﺗﻠﻚ اﻷﻣﺜﻠﺔ‪ ،‬ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ �ﺴﺘﺨﺪم اﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﺔ ي� ﺣﺴﺎب ﻧﻘﺎط‬ ‫أﻣ�كﺎ اﻟﺤﺮب‪ .‬كﻤﺎ ي‬
‫دﺧﻮل ي‬
‫اﻟﻘﻮة واﻟﻀﻌﻒ اﻟنﺴب�ﺔ ﻟﻠﻘﻮات اﻟﻤﻘﺎبﻠﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻧﻬﺎ ﺗﻤ�ﻞ إ� أن ﺗﺆدي إ� �ﺸﻮهﺎت بﺎﻟﻐﺔ‪،‬‬
‫ئ‬
‫ﺗﻤﺘ� بﺎﻟﺜﻘﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫��ح ﻟﻤﺎذا ﺗﺪﺧﻞ دول إ� اﻟﻘﺘﺎل دون اﺳﺘﻌﺪاد ﺑيﻨﻤﺎ‬ ‫ً‬
‫وﺧﺼﻮﺻ ﺎ ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ �‬

‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬

‫ﺗﻨ� ﺗﻔﻮﻗﻬﺎ ي� اﻷﻋﺪاد أو‬
‫اﻟﺘﻔﻜ� ي� اﻟﺴﻤﺎت ن اﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓ�ﺔ ﻟﻠﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﻌﺪو كﺄﻧﻬﺎ ي‬
‫ي‬ ‫اﻹﻏﺮاء هﻮ‬
‫اﻟﻤﻌﺎﻳ� اﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓ�ﺔ اﻟﺨﺎﺻﺔ‬
‫ي‬ ‫ﻜ� ي� ﻋﺪو ﻣﺤﺘﻤﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﻣﻨﻈﻮر‬ ‫اﻷﺳﻠﺤﺔ‪ .‬أو اﻟﻌﻜﺲ‪ :‬اﻟﺘﻔ ي‬
‫بﺎﻟﺪوﻟﺔ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ‪.‬‬

‫اﻗ��ﺖ وأن‬‫اﻟﺸﻤﺎﻟﻴن �‬
‫ي ن‬ ‫ي ن‬
‫اﻟﻔﻴتﻨﺎﻣﻴن‬ ‫ي ن‬
‫اﻷﻣ��ﻜﻴن أن ﻋﺘبﺔ أﻟﻢ‬ ‫ي ن‬
‫اﺗ�ﺠﻴن‬ ‫�‬
‫اﻻﺳ�‬ ‫اﻓ�ض‬‫�‬
‫ُ َ‬ ‫�‬
‫اﻟﻘﺼﻒ اﻟﺠﻮي ي� اﻟﺸﻤﺎل ﺳ�ﺪﻓﻌﻬﻢ إ� اﻟﺮﻛ�ع‪ (7).‬وكﺎن � ْﻌ ﺘ ﻘﺪ أن ﺛﻼﺛﺔ أ�ﺎم ﻣﻦ‬
‫ن‬
‫اﻟﻬﺠﻤﺎت اﻟﺠ��ﺔ هﻮ كﻞ ﻣﺎ �ﺴﺘﻄﻴﻊ اﻟ�ب اﺣﺘﻤﺎﻟﻪ‪ ،‬وﻟ�ﻨﻬﻢ ي� اﻟﻮاﻗﻊ اﺣﺘﺎﺟﻮا ‪78‬‬
‫ً‬
‫ﻳﻮﻣ ﺎ‪.‬‬

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It is particularly dangerous to make facile assumptions about

abilities in warfare based on past performance, for societies
evolve and so does the military subculture with it.

The dismal French performance in the 1870 Franco-Prussian

war led the German high command to an overly optimistic
assessment prior to World War I.8

The tenacity and courage of French soldiers in World War I led

everyone from Winston Churchill to the German high command
vastly to overestimate the French army's fighting abilities.9
Israeli generals underestimated the Egyptian army of 1973
based on Egypt's hapless performance in the 1967 war.10

Culture is difficult to pin down. It is not synonymous with an

individual's race nor ethnic identity. The history of warfare makes
a mockery of attempts to assign rigid cultural attributes to
individuals—as the military histories of the Ottoman and Roman
empires illustrate.

In both cases it was training, discipline, esprit, and élan which

made the difference, not the individual soldiers' origin.11 The
highly disciplined, effective Roman legions, for example, were
recruited from throughout the Roman empire, and the elite
Ottoman Janissaries (slave soldiers) were Christians forcibly
recruited as boys from the Balkans.

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‫‪8‬‬
‫ن‬ ‫ذا ﻓﻤﻦ اﻟﺨﻄﻮرة اﻻرﺗكﺎن إ� �‬
‫اﻓ�اﺿﺎت ﺳﻬﻠﺔ ﺣﻮل ﻗﺪرات اﻟﻘﺘﺎل ﻋ� أﺳﺎس اﻷداء ي�‬
‫ن‬
‫اﻟﻤﺎ� ‪ ،‬ﻷن اﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻌﺎت ﺗﺘﻄﻮر وﻛﺬﻟﻚ اﻟﺤﺎل بﺎﻟنﺴبﺔ ﻟﻠﺜﻘﺎﻓﺔ اﻟﻔﺮﻋ�ﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜ��ﺔ‪.‬‬
‫ي‬

‫ئ ن‬
‫اﻟ�وﺳ�ﺔ ﻋﺎم ‪ 1870‬اﻟﻘ�ﺎدة اﻟﻌﻠ�ﺎ‬‫اﻟﺴئ ي� اﻟﺤﺮب اﻟﻔﺮ�ﺴ�ﺔ �‬ ‫ي‬ ‫اﻟﻔﺮ��‬
‫ي‬ ‫ﻗﺎد اﻷداء‬
‫ن‬
‫اﻷﻟﻤﺎﻧ�ﺔ إ� ﺗﻘﻴ�ﻢ ﻣﻔﺮط ي� اﻟﺘﻔﺎؤل ﻗبﻞ اﻟﺤﺮب اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻤ�ﺔ اﻷو�‪(8).‬‬

‫اﻟﻔﺮ�ﺴﻴن ن� اﻟﺤﺮب اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻤ�ﺔ اﻷو� بﺎﻟﺠﻤﻴﻊ ً‬

‫بﺪء ا ﻣﻦ‬ ‫ي ن‬ ‫وأدت ﻣﺜﺎﺑﺮة وﺷﺠﺎﻋﺔ اﻟﺠﻨﻮد‬
‫ن‬ ‫ي‬
‫ﻛﺒ� ي� ﺗﻘﺪﻳﺮ ﻗﺪرات‬ ‫و�ﺴﺘﻮن �‬
‫��ﺷﻞ إ� اﻟﻘ�ﺎدة اﻟﻌﻠ�ﺎ اﻷﻟﻤﺎﻧ�ﺔ إ� اﻟﻤبﺎﻟﻐﺔ �ﺸكﻞ ي‬
‫اﻟﺠ�اﻻت اﻹ�اﺋ�ﻠﻴﻮن بﺎﻟﺠ�ﺶ اﻟﻤ�ي ﻋﺎم‬‫ن‬ ‫اﻟﻔﺮ�� اﻟﻘﺘﺎﻟ�ﺔ‪ (9).‬كﻤﺎ اﺳﺘﺨﻒ‬ ‫اﻟﺠ�ﺶ‬
‫�‬ ‫ي‬
‫‪ 1973‬ﻋ� أﺳﺎس أداء ﻣ� اﻟبﺎ�ﺲ ي� ﺣﺮب‪(10). 1967‬‬

‫ً‬
‫ﻓ� ﻟ�ﺴﺖ ﻣﺮادﻓ ﺎ ﻟﺴﻼﻟﺔ اﻟﻔﺮد أو ه��ﺘﻪ اﻟﻌﺮﻗ�ﺔ‪� .‬ﺴﺨﺮ‬‫اﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﺔ �ﺼﻌﺐ ﺣ�هﺎ‪ .‬ي‬
‫ي ن‬
‫ﺗﻌﻴن ﺳﻤﺎت ﺛﻘﺎﻓ�ﺔ ﺟﺎﻣﺪة ﻟﻸﻓﺮاد‪ ،‬كﻤﺎ ﻳﻮﺿﺢ اﻟﺘﺎر�ـ ــﺦ‬ ‫ﺗﺎر�ـ ــﺦ اﻟﺤﺮوب ﻣﻦ ﻣﺤﺎوﻻت‬
‫اﻹﻣ�اﻃﻮر�ﺔ اﻟﺮوﻣﺎﻧ�ﺔ‪.‬‬
‫�‬ ‫اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي ﻟﻠﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﻌﺜﻤﺎﻧ�ﺔ أو‬

‫ي ن‬ ‫ن‬
‫اﻟﺠﻤﺎ� واﻟﻬﻤﺔ هﻢ اﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﺻﻨﻌﻮا‬
‫ي‬ ‫اﻟﺤﺎﻟﺘن كﺎن اﻟﺘﺪر�ﺐ واﻻﻧﻀبﺎط وروح اﻟﻌﻤﻞ‬ ‫ي� كﻠﺘﺎ‬
‫اﻟﻔﺎرق‪ ،‬وﻟ�ﺴﺖ ﺳﻤﺎت كﻞ ﺟﻨﺪي ﻋ� ﺣﺪة‪ (11).‬ﻋ� ﺳب�ﻞ اﻟﻤﺜﺎل‪ ،‬ﺟﺤﺎﻓﻞ اﻟﺠﻨﻮد‬
‫ي ن‬
‫اﻟﺮوﻣﺎﻧﻴن اﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﻳتﺴﻤﻮن بﺎﻟ�ﻔﺎءة و�ﺪرﺟﺔ ﻋﺎﻟ�ﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻻﻧﻀبﺎط‪ ،‬ﺗﻢ ﺗﺠﻨ�ﺪهﻢ ﻣﻦ‬
‫ين‬
‫اﻟﻤﻤ�ة )ﺟﻨﻮد ﻋﺒ�ﺪ(‬ ‫اﻹﻣ�اﻃﻮر�ﺔ اﻟﺮوﻣﺎﻧ�ﺔ‪ ،‬وﻓﺮﻗﺔ اﻹﻧﻜﺸﺎر�ﺔ اﻟﻌﺜﻤﺎﻧ�ﺔ‬
‫�‬ ‫ﺟﻤﻴﻊ أﻧﺤﺎء‬
‫ﻣﺴ�ﺤﻴن ﺗﻢ ﺗﺠﻨ�ﺪهﻢ ً‬
‫ﻗ�ا وهﻢ ﻓﺘ�ﺎن ﻣﻦ اﻟبﻠﻘﺎن‪.‬‬ ‫ي ن‬ ‫كﺎﻧﻮا‬

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9

The Role of Culture

These problems notwithstanding, culture does need to be taken
into account. Indeed, awareness of prior mistakes should make it
possible to assess the role of cultural factors in warfare.

John Keegan, the eminent historian of warfare, argues that

culture is a prime determinant of the nature of warfare. In
contrast to the usual manner of European warfare which he
terms "face to face," Keegan depicts the early Arab armies in the
Islamic era as masters of evasion, delay, and indirection.12

Examining Arab warfare in this century leads to the conclusion

that Arabs remain more successful in insurgent, or political
warfare13—what T. E. Lawrence termed "winning wars without
battles."14 Even the much-lauded Egyptian crossing of the Suez
in 1973 at its core entailed a masterful deception plan. It may
well be that these seemingly permanent attributes result from a
culture that engenders subtlety, indirection, and dissimulation in
personal relationships.15

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‫‪10‬‬

‫دور اﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﺔ‬

‫‪ .‬ن‬ ‫ﻋ� اﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ هﺬە اﻟﻤﺸﺎ�ﻞ‪� ،‬ﺠﺐ أن ﺗﺆﺧﺬ اﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﺔ ي ن‬

‫و� اﻟﺤﻘ�ﻘﺔ‪� ،‬ﻤﻜﻦ‬
‫اﻻﻋﺘبﺎر ي‬ ‫بﻌن‬
‫ﻟﻠﻮ� بﺎﻷﺧﻄﺎء اﻟﺴﺎبﻘﺔ أن ﺗتﻴﺢ ﺗﻘﻴ�ﻢ دور اﻟﻌﻮاﻣﻞ اﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓ�ﺔ ن ي� اﻟﺤﺮب‪.‬‬
‫ي‬

‫اﻟﺮﺋ�� ﻟﻄﺒ�ﻌﺔ‬
‫ي‬ ‫� اﻟﻤﺤﺪد‬
‫ي‬ ‫اﻟﺤﺮئ اﻟبﺎرز ﺟﻮن ﻛ�ﺠﺎن أن اﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﺔ‬
‫ي‬ ‫�‬ ‫�ﻘﻮل اﻟﻤﺆرخ‬
‫ً‬ ‫�‬
‫اﻟى أﺳﻤﺎهﺎ "وﺟﻬ ﺎ‬
‫اﻟﻤﻌﺘﺎدة ﻟﻠﺤﺮوب اﻷورو��ﺔ ي‬ ‫اﻟﺤﺮب‪ .‬وﻋ� اﻟﻨﻘ�ﺾ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻄ��ﻘﺔ‬
‫ن‬
‫اﻹﺳﻼ� بﺎﻋﺘبﺎرهﻢ‬
‫ي‬ ‫ﻟﻮﺟﻪ"‪� ،‬ﺼﻮر ﻛ�ﺠﺎن اﻟﺠﻴﻮش اﻟﻌ���ﺔ ي� وﻗﺖ ﻣبﻜﺮ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌ�‬
‫ن‬
‫ﺳﺎدة ي� اﻟﻤﺮاوﻏﺔ‪ ،‬واﻟﻤﻤﺎﻃﻠﺔ‪ ،‬واﻟﺘﻤﻠﺺ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﺪو‪(12).‬‬

‫وﺗﺆدي دراﺳﺔ اﻟﺤﺮوب اﻟﻌ���ﺔ ن� هﺬا اﻟﻘﺮن إ� اﺳتﻨﺘﺎج ﻣﻔﺎدە أن اﻟﻌﺮب ﻻ ﻳﺰاﻟﻮن �‬
‫أ��‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ً ن‬
‫�‬
‫ﻧﺠﺎﺣ ﺎ ي� ﺣﺮوب اﻟﻤﺘﻤﺮدﻳﻦ أو اﻟﺤﺮوب اﻟﺴ�ﺎﺳ�ﺔ)‪ ،(13‬وهﻮ ﻣﺎ وﺻﻔﻪ يي إي ﻟﻮر�ﺲ‬
‫ي ن‬
‫اﻟﻤ��ن ﻟﻘﻨﺎة اﻟﺴ��ﺲ ﻋﺎم‬ ‫بـ"ﻛﺴﺐ اﻟﺤﺮوب دون ﻣﻌﺎرك‪� "(14).‬‬
‫ﺣى أن ﻋﺒﻮر‬
‫ن‬
‫‪ ،1973‬اﻟﺬي أﺷﺎد بﻪ اﻟ�ﺜ ي�ون �ﺤﻤﻞ ي� ﺟﻮهﺮە ﺧﻄﺔ ﺧﺪاع بﺎرﻋﺔ‪ .‬ﻗﺪ ﺗﻜﻮن ﺗﻠﻚ‬
‫ن‬
‫اﻟﺼﻔﺎت اﻟﺴﺎﺋﺪة ﻧﺎﺟﻤﺔ ﻋﻦ ﺛﻘﺎﻓﺔ ﺗﻮﻟﺪ اﻟﺪﻗﺔ‪ ،‬واﻟﻤﺮاوﻏﺔ‪ ،‬واﻟﻤﺪاهﻨﺔ ي� اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎت‬
‫اﻟﺸﺨﺼ�ﺔ‪(15).‬‬

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11

Along these lines, Kenneth Pollack concludes his exhaustive

study of Arab military effectiveness by noting that "certain
patterns of behavior fostered by the dominant Arab culture were
the most important factors contributing to the limited military
effectiveness of Arab armies and air forces from 1945 to
1991."16

These attributes included over-centralization, discouraging

initiative, lack of flexibility, manipulation of information, and the
discouragement of leadership at the junior officer level.

The barrage of criticism leveled at Samuel Huntington's notion of

a "clash of civilizations"17 in no way lessens the vital point he
made—that however much the grouping of peoples by religion
and culture rather than political or economic divisions offends
academics who propound a world defined by class, race, and
gender, it is a reality, one not diminished by modern
communications.

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‫‪12‬‬
‫ن‬
‫ﻳﻨ� ﻛﻴن�ﺚ ﺑﻮﻻك دراﺳﺘﻪ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻔ�ﻀﺔ ﺣﻮل اﻟ�ﻔﺎءة اﻟﻌﺴﻜ��ﺔ‬ ‫ي‬ ‫و� هﺬا اﻻﺗﺠﺎە‪،‬‬
‫ي‬
‫� أهﻢ‬‫"أﻧﻤﺎط ﻣﻌﻴﻨﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺴﻠﻮك ﺗﻌﺰزهﺎ اﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﺔ اﻟﻌ���ﺔ اﻟﺴﺎﺋﺪة ي‬ ‫اﻟﻌ���ﺔ بﻘﻮﻟﻪ أن‬
‫�‬
‫اﻟﻌﻮاﻣﻞ اﻟﻤﺴﺎهﻤﺔ ي� اﻟ�ﻔﺎءة اﻟﻌﺴﻜ��ﺔ اﻟﻤﺤﺪودة ﻟﻠﺠﻴﻮش اﻟﻌ���ﺔ وﻗﻮاﺗﻬﺎ اﻟﺠ��ﺔ ﻣﻦ‬
‫‪ 1945‬إ� ‪"(16).1991‬‬

‫ﺷﻤﻠﺖ هﺬە اﻟﺼﻔﺎت اﻟﻤﺮﻛ��ﺔ اﻟﻤﻔﺮﻃﺔ‪ ،‬وﻋﺪم �ﺸﺠﻴﻊ اﻟﻤبﺎدرات‪ ،‬واﻻﻓﺘﻘﺎر إ�‬
‫اﻟ�ﻋﺎت اﻟﻘ�ﺪ�ﺔ ﻋ� ﻣﺴﺘﻮى اﻟﻀبﺎط‬‫اﻟﻤﺮوﻧﺔ‪ ،‬واﻟﺘﻼﻋﺐ بﺎﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت‪ ،‬وﻋﺪم �ﺸﺠﻴﻊ ن ن‬
‫اﻟﺼﻐﺎر‪.‬‬

‫اﻟئ ﺗﻠﻘﺘﻬﺎ ﻓﻜﺮة ﺻﻤﻮﺋ�ﻞ هﻨتﻨﺠﺘﻮن ﻋﻦ "ﺻﺪام‬ ‫�‬

‫ﻻ �ﻘﻠﻞ وابﻞ اﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎدات ي‬
‫�‬
‫اﻟي ﻳﻨﺎﻗﺸﻬﺎ‪ ،‬ﻓﺘﺠﻤﻊ‬
‫اﻟﺤﻀﺎرات")‪ (17‬بﺄي ﺣﺎل ﻣﻦ اﻷﺣﻮال ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﻘﻄﺔ اﻟﺤﻴ��ﺔ ي‬
‫�� ء‬‫واﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﺔ بﺪﻻ ﻣﻦ اﻻﻧﻘﺴﺎﻣﺎت اﻟﺴ�ﺎﺳ�ﺔ أو اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎد�ﺔ ي‬ ‫اﻟﺸﻌﻮب ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل اﻟﺪﻳﻦ‬
‫ن‬ ‫ي ن‬
‫�‬‫ي‬ ‫ﺗﻠﻚ‬ ‫وﻟ�ﻦ‬ ‫واﻟﺠنﺲ‪،‬‬ ‫واﻟﻌﺮق‪،‬‬ ‫اﻟﻄبﻘﺔ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺗﺤﺪدە‬ ‫ﻋﺎﻟﻢ‬ ‫�‬
‫ﺎد�ﻤﻴن اﻟﺬﻳﻦ �ﻌﺘﻘﺪون ي‬ ‫ﻟﻸ�‬
‫ﺗﻐﻴ�هﺎ اﻻﺗﺼﺎﻻت اﻟﺤﺪﻳﺜﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫�‬
‫اﻟى ﻟﻢ ﺗﻘﺪر ﻋ�‬
‫ي‬ ‫و� اﻟﺤﻘ�ﻘ�ﺔ ي‬ ‫اﻟﺤﻘ�ﻘﺔ اﻟﻮاﻗﻌﺔ‪ ،‬ي‬

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13

But how does one integrate the study of culture into military
training? At present, it has hardly any role. Paul M. Belbutowski,
a scholar and former member of the U.S. Delta Force, succinctly
stated a deficiency in our own military education system:
"Culture, comprised of all that is vague and intangible, is not
generally integrated into strategic planning except at the most
superficial level."18 And yet it is precisely "all that is vague and
intangible" which defines low-intensity conflicts.

The Vietnamese communists did not fight the war the United
States had trained for, nor did the Chechens and Afghans fight
the war the Russians prepared for. This entails far more than
simply retooling weaponry and retraining soldiers. It requires an
understanding of the enemy's cultural mythology, history,
attitude toward time, etc.—demanding a more substantial
investment in time and money than a bureaucratic organization
is likely to authorize.

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‫‪14‬‬
‫ن‬
‫وﻟ�ﻦ ﻛ�ﻒ �ﻤﻜﻦ ﻟﻠﻤﺮء دﻣﺞ دراﺳﺔ اﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﺔ ي� اﻟﺘﺪر�ﺐ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي؟ ﻟ�ﺲ ﻟﺬﻟﻚ أي دور‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ﻮﺳ� ‪-‬وهﻮ بﺎﺣﺚ وﻋﻀﻮ ﺳﺎﺑﻖ ي� ﻗﻮة دﻟﺘﺎ‬ ‫ي‬ ‫اﻟﺤﺎ� ‪ .‬ي‬
‫�ﺸ� ﺑﻮل إم بﻠبﺎﺗ‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ي� اﻟﻮﻗﺖ‬
‫ً‬
‫ﻋﻤﻮﻣ ﺎ‪ ،‬ﻻ ﻳﺘﻢ‬ ‫اﻷﻣ�ﻛ�ﺔ‪ -‬ﺑ��ﺠﺎز إ� ﻧﻘﺺ ن� ﻧﻈﺎم �‬
‫اﻟ���ﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜ��ﺔ اﻟﺨﺎﺻﺔ ﺑﻨﺎ‪" :‬‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ي‬
‫ن‬ ‫�‬ ‫ي ن‬
‫وﻏ� ﻣﻠﻤﻮس‪ ،‬ي� اﻟﺘﺨﻄ�ﻂ‬ ‫اﻟي ﺗﺘﺄﻟﻒ ﻣﻦ كﻞ ﻣﺎ هﻮ ﻏﺎﻣﺾ ي‬ ‫ﺗﻀﻤن اﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﺔ‪ ،‬ي‬
‫اﻷ�� ﺳﻄﺤ�ﺔ‪ (18)".‬إﻻ أن ﻛﻮﻧﻬﺎ ﺗﺘﺄﻟﻒ ﻣﻦ " كﻞ ﻣﺎ هﻮ‬ ‫�‬ ‫اﺗ�� إﻻ ﻋ� اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻮى‬ ‫�‬
‫اﻻﺳ� � ي‬
‫ﻏ� اﻟﺤﺎدة‪.‬‬ ‫�‬
‫وﻏ� ﻣﻠﻤﻮس" هﻮ ي� ﺣﺪ ذاﺗﻪ ﻣﺎ �ﺤﺪد ﻃﺒ�ﻌﺔ اﻟ�اﻋﺎت ي‬ ‫ﻏﺎﻣﺾ ي‬

‫�‬
‫اﻟي ﺗﺪر�ﺖ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ اﻟﻮﻻ�ﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪة‪ ،‬وﻟﻢ‬ ‫َ‬
‫ﻟﻤ ﺎ ﻟﻢ �ﺨﺾ اﻟﺸﻴﻮﻋﻴﻮن اﻟﻔﻴتﻨﺎﻣﻴﻮن اﻟﺤﺮب ي‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫اﻟى أﻋﺪهﺎ اﻟﺮوس‪ .‬هﺬا ﻳﻨﻄﻮي ﻋ� أ�� ي‬
‫بﻜﺜ� ﻣﻦ‬ ‫�ﺨﺾ اﻟﺸ�ﺸﺎﻧﻴﻮن واﻷﻓﻐﺎن اﻟﺤﺮب ي‬
‫اﻷﺳﺎﻃ� اﻟﻌﺪو‬
‫ي‬ ‫ﺗﺠﻬ� اﻷﺳﻠﺤﺔ و�ﻋﺎدة ﺗﺪر�ﺐ اﻟﺠﻨﻮد‪ .‬ﻓﻬﻮ ﻳﺘﻄﻠﺐ ﻓﻬﻢ‬ ‫ي�‬ ‫ﻣﺠﺮد إﻋﺎدة‬
‫اﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓ�ﺔ‪ ،‬واﻟﺘﺎر�ـ ــﺦ‪ ،‬واﻟﺘﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻊ اﻟﻮﻗﺖ‪ ،‬وﻣﺎ إ� ذﻟﻚ‪ ،‬و�ﺘﻄﻠﺐ اﻟﻤ��ﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻻﺳتﺜﻤﺎرات‬
‫ا� ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺮ‬ ‫وﻗ‬‫اﻟﺒ�‬ ‫اﻟﺘﻨﻈ�ﻢ‬ ‫ﻳت�ﺤﻪ‬ ‫اﻟﺬي‬ ‫ﻣﻦ‬ ‫اﻟ�ﺒ�ة ن� اﻟﻮﻗﺖ واﻟﻤﺎل �‬
‫أ��‬
‫ي‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ي ي‬

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15

Mindful of walking through a minefield of past errors and present

cultural sensibilities, I offer some assessments of the role of
culture in the military training of Arabic-speaking officers. I
confine myself principally to training for two reasons.

First, I observed much training but only one combat campaign

(the Jordanian Army against the Palestine Liberation
Organization in 1970). Secondly, armies fight as they train.
Troops are conditioned by peacetime habits, policies, and
procedures; they do not undergo a sudden metamorphosis that
transforms civilians in uniform into warriors.

General George Patton was fond of relating the story about

Julius Caesar, who "In the winter time ... so trained his legions in
all that became soldiers and so habituated them to the proper
performance of their duties, that when in the spring he
committed them to battle against the Gauls, it was not necessary
to give them orders, for they knew what to do and how to do
it."19

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‫‪16‬‬
‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫�‬
‫اﻟﻤﺎ� واﻟﺤﺴﺎﺳ�ﺎت اﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓ�ﺔ اﻟﺤﺎﻟ�ﺔ‪،‬‬
‫ي‬ ‫أﺧﻄﺎء‬ ‫ﺧﻠﻘﺘﻪ‬ ‫أﻟﻐﺎم‬ ‫ﺣﻘﻞ‬ ‫�‬
‫ي‬ ‫وﺣى ﻻ ﻧﺪﺧﻞ‬
‫ن‬
‫أﻗﺪم بﻌﺾ اﻟﺘﻘﻴ�ﻤﺎت ﻟﺪور اﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﺔ ي� اﻟﺘﺪر�ﺐ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي ﻟﻀبﺎط اﻟﺠﻴﻮش اﻟﻨﺎﻃﻘﺔ‬
‫ي ن‬
‫ﻟﺴبﺒن ‪.‬‬ ‫أﺳﺎ� ﻋ� اﻟﺘﺪر�بﺎت‬ ‫ﺣﺪﻳي �ﺸكﻞ‬ ‫�‬ ‫بﺎﻟﻌ���ﺔ‪ .‬و�ﻘﺘ�‬
‫ي‬ ‫ي‬

‫اﻟ�ﺜ� ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﺪر�بﺎت‪ ،‬ﻣﻘﺎبﻞ ﺣﻤﻠﺔ ﻋﺴﻜ��ﺔ واﺣﺪة )ﺣﺎرب ﻓﻴﻬﺎ‬

‫ي‬ ‫ﻷﻧي ﺷﻬﺪت‬ ‫أوﻻ‪ ،‬ن‬
‫ن‬ ‫ي‬
‫اﻷردي ﺿﺪ ﻣﻨﻈﻤﺔ اﻟﺘﺤ��ﺮ اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻄﻴن�ﺔ ﻋﺎم ‪ً .(1970‬‬
‫ﺛﺎﻧ� ﺎ‪ ،‬ﺗﺤﺎرب اﻟﺠﻴﻮش كﻤﺎ‬ ‫اﻟﺠ�ﺶ‬
‫ي‬
‫ﻓ� ﻻ ﺗﺨﻀﻊ‬‫ﺗﺘﺪرب‪ .‬ﺗﺘﺄﺛﺮ اﻟﻘﻮات بﻌﺎدات أوﻗﺎت اﻟﺴﻠﻢ‪ ،‬واﻟﺴ�ﺎﺳﺎت‪ ،‬واﻹﺟﺮاءات؛ ي‬
‫ي ن‬
‫ﻣﺤﺎر�ن ‪.‬‬ ‫ي ن‬
‫اﻟﻤﺪﻧﻴن اﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﻳﺮﺗﺪون اﻟﺰي اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي إ�‬ ‫ﻟﺘﺤﻮﻻت ﻣﻔﺎﺟﺌﺔ ﻳﺘﺤﻮل ﻓﻴﻬﺎ‬

‫ن‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ن‬

‫"� ﻓﺼﻞ اﻟﺸﺘﺎء‬‫ي‬ ‫كﺎن‬ ‫اﻟﺬي‬ ‫ﻗ��‪،‬‬ ‫ﻳﻮﻟﻴﻮس‬ ‫ﻗﺼﺔ‬ ‫بﺤ�‬
‫ي‬ ‫ﺎ‬ ‫ﻣﻮﻟﻌ‬ ‫بﺎﺗﻮن‬ ‫ﺟﻮرج‬ ‫ال‬
‫اﻟﺠ�‬ ‫كﺎن‬
‫ً‬ ‫ن‬ ‫‪ ...‬ﻳ��ﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺗﺪر�ﺐ اﻟﺠﺤﺎﻓﻞ �‬
‫اﻟى ﺗتبﻌﻪ ي� كﻞ ﻣﺎ �ﺠﻌﻠﻬﻢ ﺟﻨﻮد ا و�ﺠﻌﻠﻬﻢ �ﻌﺘﺎدون ﻋ�‬‫ي‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫أى اﻟ��ﻴﻊ وﺟﻌﻠﻬﻢ �ﺤﺎر�ﻮن اﻻﻏ��ﻖ‪ ،‬ﻟﻢ �ﺼﺒﺢ ﻣﻦ‬ ‫ﺣﺴﻦ أداء واﺟبﺎﺗﻬﻢ‪ ،‬ﺣى أﻧﻪ ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ ي‬
‫اﻟ�وري أن �ﻌﻄﻴﻬﻢ أواﻣﺮ‪ ،‬ﻷﻧﻬﻢ كﺎﻧﻮا �ﻌﺮﻓﻮن ﻣﺎ �ﺠﺐ اﻟﻘ�ﺎم بﻪ وﻛ�ﻔ�ﺔ اﻟﻘ�ﺎم‬ ‫ن‬
‫بﺬﻟﻚ‪(19)".‬‬

‫‪May 16, 2018‬‬ ‫‪Ali MMQE - http://translearner.weebly.com - https://www.facebook.com/Translearner/‬‬

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17

Information as Power
In every society information is a means of making a living or
wielding power, but Arabs husband information and hold it
especially tightly.

U.S. trainers have often been surprised over the years by the
fact that information provided to key personnel does not get
much further than them. Having learned to perform some
complicated procedure, an Arab technician knows that he is
invaluable so long as he is the only one in a unit to have that
knowledge; once he dispenses it to others he no longer is the
only font of knowledge and his power dissipates.

This explains the commonplace hoarding of manuals, books,

training pamphlets, and other training or logistics literature. On
one occasion, an American mobile training team working with
armor in Egypt at long last received the operators' manuals that
had laboriously been translated into Arabic.

The American trainers took the newly-minted manuals straight

to the tank park and distributed them to the tank crews. Right
behind them, the company commander, a graduate of the armor
school at Fort Knox and specialized courses at the Aberdeen
Proving Grounds ordnance school, collected the manuals from
the crews.

May 16, 2018 Ali MMQE - http://translearner.weebly.com - https://www.facebook.com/Translearner/

17
‫‪18‬‬

‫اﻟﻤﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﻗﻮة‬
‫ن‬
‫ي� كﻞ اﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻌﺎت‪ ،‬ﺗﻜﻮن اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت وﺳ�ﻠﺔ ﻟ�ﺴﺐ اﻟﻌ�ﺶ أو اﻣﺘﻼك اﻟﻘﻮة‪ ،‬ﻟ�ﻦ اﻟﻌﺮب‬
‫�ﺪﺧﺮون اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت و�ﺤﺘﻔﻈﻮن ﺑﻬﺎ ﺑ�ﺣكﺎم ﺧﺎص‪.‬‬

‫�‬
‫اﻟى‬ ‫ي ن‬
‫اﻟﺴﻨن بﺤﻘ�ﻘﺔ أن اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ي‬ ‫اﻷﻣ�ﻛﻴﻮن ﻋ� ﻣﺮ‬
‫ي‬ ‫وﻏﺎﻟبﺎ ﻣﺎ �ﻔﺎﺟﺄ اﻟﻤﺪر�ﻮن‬
‫ﻋﺮئ ﺗﻨﻔ�ﺬ بﻌﺾ‬ ‫اﻟﻤﺴﺌﻮﻟن اﻟ�بﺎر ﻻ ﺗﺘﺨﻄﺎهﻢ‪ .‬ﻓبﻌﺪ أن ﻳﺘﻌﻠﻢ أي ن‬
‫ي ن‬
‫ي‬ ‫ﻓئ �‬
‫ي‬ ‫�ﻘﺪﻣﻮﻧﻬﺎ إ�‬
‫ن‬
‫اﻹﺟﺮاءات اﻟﻤﻌﻘﺪة‪ ،‬ﻓﻬﻮ �ﻌﺮف أﻧﻪ اﻵن ﻻ �ﻘﺪر ﺑﺜﻤﻦ ﻃﺎﻟﻤﺎ أﻧﻪ هﻮ اﻟﻮﺣ�ﺪ ي� وﺣﺪﺗﻪ‬
‫اﻟﺬي �ﻤﺘﻠﻚ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﻤﻌﺮﻓﺔ؛ و�ﻤﺠﺮد أن ﻳﻮزﻋﻬﺎ ﻋ� اﻵﺧ��ﻦ‪ ،‬ﻟﻦ �ﻌﺪ هﻮ ﻣﺮﻛﺰ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺔ‬
‫اﻟﻮﺣ�ﺪ‪ ،‬ﻣﻤﺎ ﻳبﺪد ﺳﻠﻄﺘﻪ‪.‬‬

‫وﻏ�هﺎ ﻣﻦ أدﺑ�ﺎت‬ ‫�‬

‫واﻟن�ات اﻟﺘﺪر�ب�ﺔ‪ ،‬ي‬ ‫وهﺬا ﻣﺎ �ﻔ� اﻋﺘ�ﺎد ا�ﺘﻨﺎز اﻟ�ﺘيبﺎت واﻟ�ﺘﺐ‬
‫َ َ �‬ ‫ن‬
‫اﻟﺘﺪر�ﺐ أو اﻟﺨﺪﻣﺎت اﻟﻠﻮﺟﺴت�ﺔ‪ .‬ي� أﺣﺪ اﻟﻤﺮات‪ � ،‬ﺴ ﻠ ﻢ ﻓ��ﻖ ﺗﺪر�ﺐ ﻣﺘﻨﻘﻞ ﻣﻦ‬
‫اﻷﻣ��� �ﻌﻤﻞ ﻣﻊ اﻟﻘﻮات اﻟﻤﺪرﻋﺔ اﻟﻤ��ﺔ بﻌﺪ ﻃﻮل اﻧﺘﻈﺎر آﺧﺮ ﻛﺘيبﺎت‬‫ي‬ ‫اﻟﺠ�ﺶ‬
‫اﻟى ﺗﺮﺟﻤﺖ إ� اﻟﻠﻐﺔ اﻟﻌ���ﺔ بﻤﺸﻘﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫�‬
‫اﻟتﺸﻐ�ﻞ ي‬

‫�‬
‫ﻣبﺎ�ة إ� ﺳﺎﺣﺔ اﻟﺪبﺎبﺎت وﻗﺎﻣﻮا‬ ‫أﺧﺬ اﻟﻤﺪر�ﻮن اﻷﻣ��ﻜﻴﻮن اﻟ�ﺘيبﺎت ﺣﺪﻳﺜﺔ اﻟﻄبﺎﻋﺔ‬
‫�‬
‫ﻣبﺎ�ة ﻗﺎﺋﺪ اﻟ��ﺔ‪ -‬وهﻮ ﺧ��ـ ــﺞ ﻣﺪرﺳﺔ‬ ‫ﺑﺘﻮز�ﻌﻬﺎ ﻋ� ﻃﺎﻗﻢ ﺟﻨﻮد اﻟﺪبﺎبﺎت‪ .‬ﻟﺤﻖ ﺑﻬﻢ‬
‫ن‬ ‫اﻟﻤﺪرﻋﺎت ن� ﻓﻮرت ﻧﻮﻛﺲ كﻤﺎ �‬
‫ﺗﻠ� دورات ﻣﺘﺨﺼﺼﺔ ي� ﻣﺪرﺳﺔ ذﺧﺎﺋﺮ اﺑﺮدﻳﻦ‪ -‬ﻟ�ﺠﻤﻊ‬ ‫ي‬
‫اﻟ�ﺘيبﺎت ﻣﻦ ﻃﻮاﻗﻢ‪.‬‬

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19

Questioned why he did this, the commander said that there was
no point in giving them to the drivers because enlisted men
could not read. In point of fact, he did not want enlisted men to
have an independent source of knowledge.

Being the only person who can explain the fire control
instrumentation or boresight artillery weapons brings prestige
and attention. In military terms this means that very little cross-
training is accomplished and that, for instance in a tank crew, the
gunners, loaders, and drivers might be proficient in their jobs but
are not prepared to fill in for a casualty.

Not understanding one another's jobs also inhibits a smoothly

functioning crew. At a higher level it means there is no depth in
technical proficiency.

May 16, 2018 Ali MMQE - http://translearner.weebly.com - https://www.facebook.com/Translearner/

19
‫‪20‬‬
‫ي ن‬
‫ﻟﻠﺴﺎﺋﻘن‬ ‫وﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ ﺳﺌﻞ ﻋﻦ ﺳبﺐ أﺧﺬە ﻟﻠ�ﺘيبﺎت‪ ،‬ﻗﺎل اﻟﻘﺎﺋﺪ أﻧﻪ ﻻ ﻓﺎﺋﺪة ﻣﻦ إﻋﻄﺎﺋﻬﺎ‬
‫ً‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫ن‬
‫ﻣﺼﺪرا‬ ‫ﻷن اﻟﻤﺠﻨﺪﻳﻦ ﻻ �ﺴﺘﻄ�ﻌﻮن اﻟﻘﺮاءة‪ .‬ﻟ�ﻨﻪ ي� اﻟﻮاﻗﻊ ﻟﻢ ﻳ �ﺮد أن �ﺠﺪ اﻟﻤﺠﻨﺪﻳﻦ‬
‫ً‬
‫ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻼ ﻟﻠﻤﻌﺮﻓﺔ‪.‬‬

‫ﻓﻜﻮﻧﻪ اﻟﺸﺨﺺ اﻟﻮﺣ�ﺪ اﻟﺬي �ﻤﻜﻨﻪ ��ح وﺳ�ﻠﺔ إﻃﻼق ي‬

‫اﻟﻨ�ان أو ﺗﺼ��ﺐ أﺳﻠﺤﺔ‬
‫ً‬ ‫ن‬
‫�ﻌي أن اﻟﻘﻠ�ﻞ ﺟﺪ ا ﻣﻦ‬
‫اﻟﻌﺴﻜ��ﺔ‪ ،‬هﺬا ي‬ ‫اﻟﻤﺪﻓﻌ�ﺔ �ﺠﻠﺐ اﻟﻬﻴبﺔ واﻻهﺘﻤﺎم‪ .‬وﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﺎﺣ�ﺔ‬
‫ً‬ ‫اﻟﺘﺪر�بﺎت �‬
‫ﻏ�هﻢ‪ ،‬ﻓﻤﺜﻼ بﺎﻟنﺴبﺔ ﻟﻄﺎﻗﻢ اﻟﺪبﺎبﺎت‪ ،‬ﻗﺪ‬
‫اﻟى ﺗﺘﻼﻗﻬﺎ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﻘﻮات ﺗنﺘﻘﻞ إ� ي‬‫ي‬
‫ن‬
‫�ﻜﻮن ﺟﻨﻮد اﻟﻤﺪﻓﻌ�ﺔ‪ ،‬واﻟﺤﻤﺎﻟﻮن‪ ،‬واﻟﺴﺎﺋﻘﻮن بﺎرﻋﻮن ي� وﻇﺎﺋﻔﻬﻢ وﻟ�ﻨﻬﻢ ﻟ�ﺴﻮا ﻋ�‬
‫اﺳﺘﻌﺪاد ﻟﻠﻘ�ﺎم بﺪور آﺧﺮ � ي� ﺣﺎل وﻗ�ع اﻹﺻﺎبﺎت‪.‬‬

‫ن‬
‫بﻌﻀﻬﻢ اﻟبﻌﺾ ﻗ�ﺎﻣﻬﻢ بﺎﻟﻌﻤﻞ �ﺴﻼﺳﺔ‪ .‬كﻤﺎ ي‬
‫�ﻌئ اﻷﻣﺮ ﻋ�‬
‫ن‬
‫و�ﻘ�ﺪ ﻋﺪم ﻓﻬﻢ وﻇﺎﺋﻒ‬
‫اﻟ�اﻋﺔ اﻟﺘﻘﻨ�ﺔ‪.‬‬
‫ﻣﺴﺘﻮى أﻋ� ﻋﺪم وﺟﻮد ﻋﻤﻖ ي� �‬

‫‪May 16, 2018‬‬ ‫‪Ali MMQE - http://translearner.weebly.com - https://www.facebook.com/Translearner/‬‬

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