Tampere Peace Research Institute, University of Tampere

THE THIRD WORLD IMPACT OF SUPERPOWER MILITARY COMPETITION: LINKS TO

MILITARIZATION AND POVERTY
Author(s): Anita Kemp
Source: Current Research on Peace and Violence, Vol. 7, No. 2/3 (1984), pp. 105-127
Published by: Tampere Peace Research Institute, University of Tampere
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 Anita Kemp
Departmentof Political Science
Universityof Nevada-Reno
Reno, Nevada
USA

THE THIRD WORLD IMPACT OF SUPERPOWER MILITARY COMPETITION:

LINKS TO MILITARIZATIONAND POVERTY

Under the stimulus of the United
States and the Soviet Union,the inter-
national system may now be labeled
the WorldMilitaryOrder (WMO). This
termdesignatesthe global importance
of the military.The concept of the
WMOas developedby Secares includes
"the total activities,relationsand pro-
cesses whichsubstantiateand finalize
the expansionof the military;generat-
ing a world pyramidof power,a sys-
tem of dominationand subordination,
a networkof hierarchical dependen-
cies and a control structurebased on
the manipulation of armed forces
(withall its components)insertedinto
contemporary international rela-
tions." The WMO is the result of the
conflictbetween the two superpowers
witha major indicatorbeing the mili-
tary competition.It is a "direct ex-
pressionof the strugglefor the main-
tenance and redivisionof the spheres
of influence(especially in the Third
World1...)."2
The global importanceof the mili-
taryis notedby a varietyof facts. The
cost of the arms race worldwideis
now exceeding 600 billion dollars a
year. The UnitedStates and the Soviet
Union are responsible for approxi-
mately 50 % of this amount.Twenty-
five millionpeople serve in the regular
armed forces witha 3 to 1 backingof
reserves, paramilitaryforces and ci-
vilians producinggoods related to the
military. The international conven-
tional armstrade is nowover 35 billion
dollarsa year withincreasingsophisti-
cation in weaponrysold.
The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. dominate
the military competition. There has
been a substantial explosion in the
numberof strategic nuclear weapons

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 106
of the two superpowersfromthe 1960s
to the 1980s. In 1962, there were ap-
proximately2,070 strategic nuclear
weapons;in 1970 5,800; in 1972 8,200;
in 1980 15,200; and in 1982 17,400
strategicnuclearweapons in the hands
of the superpowers. Nuclear weapons
technology is also advancing along
withdeployment.Since the late 1970s,
thishas not been counteredwitharms
controlagreements.
The role of the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. military expenditures are
central to the WMO.In 1979, the mili-
taryexpendituresof the UnitedStates
were 122,279 milliondollarsand those
of the Soviet Union were approxi-
mately 114,000 million dollars. In
1979, the military expenditures of
each separately were higherthan the
gross national products of 22 Latin
Americancountries(all except Brazil
and Mexico),higherthan the GNP's of
16 Middle Eastern countries, higher
thanthe GNP's of 5 SouthAsian coun-
tries,India beingthe exception;higher
than the GNP's of 14 Far Eastern
countries,China and Japan being the
regional exceptions; and higher than
the GNP's of 44 Africancountries.
These comparativefiguresindicate
the potentialfora strongimpact upon
Third World countries througheco-
nomic factors. The drain of economic
resources into the superpowerarms
race leaves fewer resources for the
developmentof the Third Worldand
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maintains the Old InternationalEco-
nomic Order (OIEO). But the political
componentinvolvedin the arms race
may be even more important.The re-
sultant political competitionsponsors
the spheresof influencestruggle.The
major componentsof the WMO indi-
cate thiscompetition.Componentsdi-
rectly involvingthe Third World as
noted by Secares are: the presenceon
foreignterritoriesof bases, troopsand
military facilities, direct or covert
militaryinterventionin domestic af-
fairsof otherstates, local armed con-
flicts with overt or covert foreign
participation,arms trade, defense in-
dustryand weapons productionfacili-
ties in developingcountries based on
foreignaid and/orlicense import,and
the emergence of "lumpen-militar-
ism", of militaryregimes and the in-
creased role of armed forces in de-
velopingcountries.
Data for the Third Worldclearly
demonstrate the increasing impor-
tance of the military.In constant1979
dollars, militaryexpenditureswere $
28 billion in 1960 and $ 106 billionin
1980. The growthof militaryexpendi-
tures was greater than that of the
economy.From 1960-1980,the regular
armed forces in developingcountries
increased from 8.7 to 15.1 million
men. They now represent60 % of the
worldtotal.
The political influenceof the mili-
tary is strongin the Third World.In
 107
1981, the' military was dominant in 46
% of the governments. Ball noted that
70 % of all countries in Africa, Asia,
the Middle East and Latin America
had experienced considerable military
involvement in politics since World
War II and that military influence has
grownover the last thirtyyears.
Two aspects of superpower mili-
tary competition will be examined: 1)
the economic aspect measured by the
summation of US and USSR military
expenditures, and 2) the competitive
aspect measured by an index derived
from United States and Soviet Union
military expenditures and a time pe-
riod dichotomy based on events analy-
sis. For the index five measures were
initially examined and three were
maintained throughout this study.
These were 1) the change in U.S. mili-
tary expenditures plus the change in
U.S.S.R. military expenditures ((mili-
tary expenditures of the U.S. at time 2
- military expenditures of the U.S. at
time 1) + (Soviet military expenditures
at time 2 - Soviet military expendi-
tures at time 1)); 2) the percent change
in U.S. military expenditures; and, 3)
the percent change in U.S.S.R. mili-
tary expenditures. The latter two can
provide an examination of the possible
differences in reactions of the super-
powers in the military competition.
The first is similar to the Wallace
arms race measure except that a
summation instead of a multiplication
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of terms is used, since the effect of
multiplyingtwo decreases is a positive
. .. .8
figure indicating more tension.
The second type of measure does
not directly tap the superpower mili-
tary competition but instead uses con-
flict and cooperation events between
the two countries. Papp, summarizing
analyses of U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations,
found conflict and cooperation time
9
periods. The two time periods of in-
terest for this study are 1960-68, de-
signated as a tense and competitive
period, and 1969-79 designated as the
detente period. Therefore, compari-
sons of conventional arms transfers,
military coups and superpower inter-
ventions will be made for these two
time periods. There is a relationship
between the two competitive meas-
ures. The military index is in a decline
for the 1969-1979 period, based upon
declining U.S. military expenditures in
constant dollars. Kjell Goldmann
and Johan Lagerkranz have taken a
content analysis approach to this prob-
lem of measuring competition.
It is to be hoped that thisexamination
will provide some additional informa-
tion on the impact of the superpower
military competition on the Third
World. Is it true as Secares asserts
that "the arms race (WMO) is apt to
play a crucial role in the establish-
ment, maintenance, expansion and re-
organization (adjustment) of the eco-
nomic and political order based on
 108
inequality, domination and exploita-
tion, and on the supremacy of the
great powersand richcountries?"
1. Militarization
A major dimensionof the WorldMili-
tary Orderis militarization.This con-
cept has been defined as the social,
economic,political structuresthatcan
be measuredby increasingmilitaryex-
penditures,arms trade and military
coups by Lumsden. Militarization
and the socio-culturaldimensioncal-
led militarismhave been linked be
Luckham to the ideology of military
power transmittedthroughthe sale of
weapons, militarytrainingand assist-
ia
ance programsof the superpowers.
Klare noted the externalconditionsof
imperial intervention,big power in-
volvementin local conflictsand inter-
nationalarms marketing,amongother
causes. Albrechtmentionedthe in-
fluxof modernweapons as one of the
external factors. To be examined
are the links of conventional arms
transfers and military coups with
superpowermilitarycompetition.
a. ConventionalArmsTransfers
Major weapons and arms exports to
the ThirdWorldfromthe superpowers
have increased from$ 928 millionin
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1960 at 1975 prices to $ 6019 million
in 1980.17 From1965 to 1975, the U.S.
transferredto developingcountries$
2751* million in current dollars and
the Soviet Union transferred$ 1*260
million. This represents75 % of all
arms transfers. Not only are the
amounts large and increasingbut the
content of the transfershas changed
over the 1960 to 1980 time period.
From 1960-1970, the arms transfers
were mainlyin the formof military
aid withmuchof thisin dated weapons
systems.From 1970-1980,arms trans-
fers were mostlycash sales with the
mostsophisticatedweaponrybeing for
sale.
What mightbe the impact of the
superpowerarms race on the trendin
their conventional arms transfers?
This relationshiphas most often been
viewed as an effect of the political
strugglebetween the superpowers.It
has, however,on occasion been thought
of in economicterms.Cole noted that
"In terms of the operation of their
economies in the world market, an
arms race between the UnitedStates
and the Soviet Unionbecomes mutual-
ly advantageous only when other na-
tions are drawn into the competi-
18
tion." Economies of scale are an
importantfactor in promotingsales
abroad. In fact, Cole claimed that
Third Worldconflicts may be mani-
pulatedby the superpowersto increase
arms sales and to test designs of ar-
 109
mamentsand weaponssystemswithout
jeopardizing the lives of superpower
nationals.
The political motive has received
better documentation.Väyrynencon-
cluded that for socialist countriesthe
political motives for arms transfers
are moreimportantthanthe economic
19
considerations. Kolodziej, Harkavy
and Mihalka stressed the importance
of the strategic competitionbetween
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in explaining
arms transfers.20
Kolodziej noted that
arms sales are used to enlarge the
military power of the superpowers
through the manipulation of Third
Worldactors. Arms are used to get
militarybases, to supportregimesfa-
vorable to a superpower(as in Angola,
andintheCongointhe 1960fs),to secure
the power of a regional power as do-
minant in an area (as the U.S. sup-
ported Iran and now Saudi Arabia),
and to encourage frontline action
against the opposingsuperpoweror its
allies (as the U.S. use of Pakistan to
counter the Soviet actions in
Afghanistan).
The importanceof arms transfers
as a tool in the global competitionto
acquire and maintain strategic mili-
tary access in the Third Worldand to
deny such to the opposingsuperpower
is supportedby Harkavy. 22
The Soviet
Uniongained strategic access in eight
countries followingarms transfersin
the early and mid-1960fs. The U.S.
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already had significant worldwide
bases due to the post-WorldWar II
situation,but there also seemed to be
a relationshipbetween arms transfers
and access in Greece, Turkey,
Morocco, Thailand,
Tunisia,
Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea,
Oman, Kenya, Singapore and Iran.
Harkavy concludes that "there is a
significantcorrelation between arms
transfersacquisition pattern and the
grantingof strategic access." How-
ever, there are substantial cases in
whicharms transferswere not trans-
lated into strategic access. For the
U.S.S.R., these cases involvedFinland,
North Korea, China prior to 1961,
Algeria, Pakistan, Nigeria, Sudan, and
Uganda. For the U.S., these were
Jordan, Israel, Kuwait, Indonesia,
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan after 1965,
Zaire and a numberof Latin American
countries.
Mihalka noted the strong bloc
orientation of supplyingarms along
with excessive supply to arenas of
Oil
U.S.-U.S.S.R. competition. From
1967-1976, the top 6 arms recipients
in developingcountriesaccounted for
between 48-64 % of total value of
arms transferred.Frequently among
the top six were the Republic of
Vietnam (for nine of the ten years
examined), Iran and the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam(7 years), Egypt
(6), Turkey and Israel (5) and the
Republic of South Korea and Iraq (4).
 110

Therefore,as the arms race heats up,
it can be expected that the competi-
tion will increase in the Third World
and can resultin increasingarms sales
to these nations.Armstransfersto the
Third Worldare central to the global
reach of the World Military Order.
They allow the superpowersto in-
tegrate the Third World into this
Order for the superpowers1military
benefit.
The data forUS and USSR military
expendituresand arms transfersare
from the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute. For arms
transfers,SIPRI uses the value of ex-
ports of major weapons to the third
worldin US dollarsin 1975 prices. This
includes licenses sold. It is the value
of actual shipmentsand deliveries of
weapons rather than signed agree-
mentsor financialtransfersto pay for

Table 1. ConventionalArmsTransfersand SuperpowerCompetition

Conventional U.S. U.S.S.R.

ArmsTransfers Transfers Transfers

U.S. + U.S.S.R. aã «c ii
MilitaryExpenditures

Military J5 >u ao
CompetitionIndex
U.S. Military
CompetitionIndex .15 .10 .11

U.S.S.R. Military 17 itl nq

CompetitionIndex

Figuresare partialcorrelationscontrollingfortime.
tests are two-tailedwith* indicatingthe .05 level of significanceand
Significance
** the .01 level.

1960-68 1969-79

Conventional $ ^80.6
ArmsTransfers $ 126¿^8

The amountsare dividedby the numberof years in each periodand are constant
dollars.

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 Ill
weapons. Grant militaryassistance is
included in the militaryexpenditures
of the donor and purchases on credit
are includedat time of debt incurred
not at time of payment. The SIPRI
source for militaryexpenditureis felt
to be more objective than the other
commonlyused source, Arms Control
and DisarmamentAgency.ACDA uses
confidentialsource. There is no de-
tailed informationon sources nor on
methodsof data preparation.Further-
more, it may be suspect of govern-
mentmanipulation.
The correlationsshow no relation
between the superpower military
spendingand conventionalarms trans-
fers. Arms transfers are increasing
over time while the militaryexpendi-
tures index of the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. has been declining,in general
from 1970-1980. The explanation for
this result may lie in the leverage of
the supplierparticularitywhere there
are othersuppliers(as in this situation
with increasingcompetitionfromthe
WesternEuropeans). The leverage of
the buyer may be increasing and
thereforethe trendof increasingsales
may be difficultto stop (witness the
failure of the Carter arms policy).
Also the complexity of arms sales,
particularly for the United States,
makes governmentcontrol for foreign
policy purposesdifficult.Dörfernoted
that arms transactions"forma web of
negotiationsbetween service, corpor-
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ate, and political interests with nu-
merousplayers." Husbandsexamined
the U.S. case and listed the govern-
ment organizations involved in arms
transfersas the Defense Department,
State Department,Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, the National
Security Council staff, Central Intel-
ligence Agency, Defense Intelligence
Agency, Agency for International
Development,Office of Management
and Budget, Treasury Department,
Commerce Department and Con-
28
gress. This multitudeof interests
makesrestraintdifficult.
Examiningthe impact of military
sales on the ThirdWorldcountries,the
economic implications should be
noted. Lock stated that armstransfers
probablyamount to one fifthof the
volume of importedproductiontech-
29
nology. Arms exports of the U.S.
represent19.2 % of all the machinery
and transportequipment sent to the
ThirdWorld."Armstransfersand mili-
tarily induced transfersof technology
absorb growingshares of importcapa-
cityand affectthe potentialto expand
the productivebase of peripherycoun-
tries. Militaryexports and increasing
procurementsin turnoccupy industrial
capacities in suppliercountries which
would otherwisebe used to contribute
to a so-called New InternationalEco-
nomic Order." Lock and Wulfnoted
that technologically advanced
weapons systems require a chain of
 112
supplementary import demands.
Supportfacilities,spare parts, foreign
specialists are often required for
modernfighteraircraft,tanksor naval
units.These authorspointto a possible
interaction between arms transfers
and the economic inequalitybetween
developedand underdevelopednations.
At this systemic level there is no
significantbivariate relationshipbe-
tweenconventionalarms transfersand
economic inequalitybetween the de-
veloped and underdevelopedworlds.
But there is a significantnegative
relationshipto economicgrowthof the
Third World(-.50 correlation signifi-
cant at .05). There is a positivecorre-
lation between arms transfersand US
official developmentassistance (.47,
significantat .01) withouta lag.
b. MilitaryCoups
A second aspect of militarizationto
be examinedis militarycoups. Leiten-
berg in his examinationof coups found
that militaryjuntas rarely turn over
their power to civilians after a coup
and that more than half of the devel-
oping countriesare ruled by military
32
governments. Welchnoted that only
one out of twentypost-coup govern-
ments gives way to civilian govern-
ments.
The causal factors have been
studiedby Nordlingerwho foundthat
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most coups are linkedto the mainte-
nance or increase of the militaryfs
34
corporate interests. Some of the
institutional-interest interventions
are: the unityof the armedforces,the
authority of officers over enlisted
men, the monopolyof armed force by
the traditionalmilitaryservices, the
special status of armed forces com-
pared to civilians,the maintenanceor
increase of currentlevel of spending
on the military,internal order, and
borderdefense,amongothers.
McGowan found that in African
states where the militarywas central
because of its repression role and
large percentage of governmentre-
venue, the militaryoften became in-
volved in politics. Militaryinstitu-
tional motivationswere foundto play
a role. 3ohnsonand Slater, testingthe
institutional thesis in Africa from
1960-1982, also found support.
Thompson,however,examiningcoups
from 1946-1970,does not supportthe
Nordlingerinstitutionaltheses, except
a -
sforAsian 37
coups.
This institutionalthesis does not
eliminatethe role playedby the super-
powers. Such a role may be direct
interventionsponsoringa coup or in-
direct setting the atmospherefavor-
able to militaryrule. Coups are one
method of insuringfriendlygovern-
ments if the present governmentis
antagonistic. A more competitive
stage between the U.S. and the
 113
U.S.S.R. "wouldthereforepromotemil-
itary coups. Withinsecure spheres of
influence,coups would be less likely
since thereare other more respectable
waysof influence.
Lefever found that where there
was a moderate or large amount of
military aid and advisors, military
coups were fewer(particularlythe un-
successful ones). He attributedthis
to the rational influenceof U.S. mili-
taryadvisors.
A U.S. militaryofficerassigned to
a Latin Americancapital spoke to
this point in an interviewwiththe
author. Making a distinctionbe-
tween constructive coups (those
with some chance of correcting
gross corruption or subversion),
and nonconstructivecoups (those
that seemed to be onlya changing
of the guard or seemed likely to
develop subversive external con-
tacts), he said that the very pres-
ence of a U.S. military mission,
withits prudentday-by-dayadvice
and emphasis on professionalism,
had the effect of helpingto pre-
vent some contemplated military
interventions,particularly badly
plannedones. ... In such situations,
U.S. advice probablyhas had the
effect of reducingthe numberof
coups, particularly those that
would have been abortive rather
thansuccessful,^q
Anotherexplanationof the Lefever
resultsmay be that regimesreceiving
U.S. military missions are already
withinthe U.S. sphereof influenceand
have governmentsfavorable to the
U.S.; therefore,it would be unlikely
that the U.S. would sponsor a coup
40
againstsucha government.
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Rowe found that militaryaid is
sometimespositivelyrelated to coups
41
but sometimes negatively related.
From 1948-1972, U.S. militaryassis-
tance was associated with subsequent
decreases of coups (bothsuccessfuland
unsuccessful)against militaryregimes
but with increases against other types
of regimes. He concluded that U.S.
militaryassistance appeared to be a
contributingfactor underminingthe
civilian element and supportingthe
militarizationof Third Worldnations.
Therefore,the type of regime against
which the coup is being staged may
explain the differing results with
Lefever.
Schmitter felt that the linkage
42
may be more complex. Studying
Latin America from1962-1970,he did
not find U.S. militaryaid related to
military rule. But military aid in-
creased domestic military spending
(both gross and per capita) and mili-
taryrule was related to domesticmili-
tary spending.Perhaps the causation
goes from U.S. military aid to in-
creased domestic militaryspendingto
increased military rule; however
Schmitterhimselfdid not make such
an inference.
These previousstudies are of U.S.
involvementin militarycoups withthe
variable of militaryassistance in weap-
onryand training.Examiningthe U.S.
and U.S.S.R. involvementscreates the
problemof comparabledata. The arms
 11*

transfersdata which includes aid and superpowers.Only case studies could

sales is the best alternative. This
variable, however, did not play the
interveningrole betweenU.S.-U.S.S.R.
military competition and military
coups. Conventional arms transfers
were not significantlyrelated to the
military competition nor to coups.
This suggeststhat coups are a modeof
influenceindependentof conventional
arms transfers.Comparedto military
assistance and training,coups are a
more radical influenceattempt that
may be a tool during periods of
greater competition between the
give definiteevidence for this direct
link. IndirectlyU.S.-U.S.S.R. military
competitionmay introducean atmos-
phere favorable to Third Worldmili-
tarization throughexample and in-
creased world-widetensions.
Military coup data were taken
from Li and Thompson who divide
coups into successfuland unsuccessful
43
ones. These data were supple-
mentedby the Europa Yearbook 1983
Uli
and Finer. Li and Thompsondefinea
militarycoup as "occurringwhenever
membersof the regulararmed forces

Table 2. MilitaryCoups and SuperpowerCompetition

Successful Unsuccessful
Coups Coups Coups

U.S. and U.S.S.R. -- ¿.^ ,?iHtr

MilitaryCompetition
U.S. Military ¿%^
Competition
U.S.S.R. Military ao ,««« cc**
Competition

Figuresare partialcorrelationscontrollingfortime.
Significancetests are two-tailedwith* indicatingthe .05 level of significanceand
** the .01 level.

1960-68 1969-79

Coups 14.2 5.1

Unsuccessful ¿A ,,
Coups
Successful «o o*
Coups

The numberof coups is dividedby the numberof years in each time period.

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 115
removeor attemptto removea statefs
chief executive throughthe use or
threatof force."
There are some significantrela-
tionshipsbetween the tension indices
and militarycoups. It appears to be
the unsuccessfulcoups that are more
correlated with superpower military
competition.Witha one year lag, the
significantcorrelationsdisappear.This
is consistentwith Lefever's study in
which U.S. militarypresence prevents
unsuccessfulmilitarycoups. Com-
petitive periodsopen areas to dispute
where spheres of influenceand mili-
tary presence are not establishedand
therefore, increased coup attempts
withoutadequate backingand instruc-
tion occur. Supportingevidence for
the correlation is given by the fact
that the 1960-68periodhad moremili-
tary coups than the 1969-79 detente
period.
2. Globalization of East-West
Conflict
Another aspect of the WMO is
the penetration of the superpowers
into the conflicts that were once
regional or internal to a country.
"Superpower strategic maneuvers
coupled with the drive to ensure raw
material sources have expanded
East/Westconfrontationto the point
wherenot a single regionof the Third
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Worldis sparedof penetration."
Luckhamdetails the involvements
48
on the Africancontinent. The super-
power involvementin the Horn of
Africa, the Western involvementin
Zaire and its defense in Shaba I (1977)
and Shaba II (1978), superpowercon-
testationin Angola,and the use of the
Cubans and French as superpower
proxies are parts of the globalization
processof East-Westconflict.
Kende has examined foreignmili-
tary involvementin wars throughout
49
the world from 1945-1976. Devel-
oped capitalist countries have been
involved in 64 interventions from
1945-76, twentyof these in 1967-76.
The correspondingyears spent in war
as a foreign participant were 233.4
from 1945-76 and 87.8 years from
1967-76. For the developed socialist
countries, there were 6 foreign war
involvementsfrom1945-76. 3 of these
from1967-76.This correspondsto 21.3
years of war involvementfrom1945-
76, and 12.4 war years from1967-76.
Clearly the greaterintervenorwas the
developed capitalist world with the
United States as the greatest among
the developedcapitalist countries.The
U.S. intervenedmilitarilyin 27 wars
from 1945-76, 11 of these were in
1967-76. This involved96.6 war years
from1945-1976,46.3 war years from
1967-76. The conclusion Kende
reached was that foreignmilitaryin-
volvement was on the increase from
 116
1945-67 but on the decrease from
1967-76. Kende hypothesizesthat the
hesitation to intervenein the posti-
Vietnamperiodhas led to an increase
in the arms trade as an alternative
control method. Accordingto Kende
therehas been an increase in the arms
trade as the interventionshave de-
creased. The negativerelationshipis
substantiallymore pronouncedfor the
Westthanforthe East.
We will use the Sivard data
on wars whichlists wars withrecorded
deathsof 1,000 or more. Intervenors
and aggressorsare noted. Intervention
is defined as action by foreign
military forces at the invitation
of the recognized government.
Invasions are hostile intrusions
by a foreign country. They include
air and missile attacks whether
accompanied by land invasionor not.
The intervenor was identified
only when it was the first to take
such action and when the action
was overt. The Sivard source of
wars and estimated deaths was
the "records maintained by William
Eckhardt, Director, peace Research
Laboratory, St. Louis, Missouri.
His principal sources are: Azar's
conflict and peace data bank of
the University of Maryland, lists
of wars published by Bouthoul
and Carrere in Peace Research,
and battle deaths in Singer and
Small's computer records at the
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University of Michigan. These
records were supplemented by
news sources available through
July 1982. Information on deaths
associated with wars is incomplete,
and Eckhardt emphasizes that
all estimates must be used with
caution. No central official records
are kept. Civilian deaths are less
reliable than battle deaths and
are often unavailable. War-related
famine was a major cause of high
death rates in conflicts in Nigeria,
Bangladesh,and Cambodia."
Examining the Sivard data from
1960-1980,three dependentmeasures
are used. All are ratios of numberof
intervenorand/or aggressor wars as
percent of nonsuperpowerintervenor
wars. The first measure is the ratio
for the US and allies (in these cases
France). The second is for the USSR
and allies (in these cases Cuba). The
thirdis the ratio for the two super-
powersand allies combined.
 117

Table 3. and SuperpowerCompetition

Interventions

Ratio Ratio U.S.+

Ratio U.S.+ U.S.S.R.+ U.S.S.R.+
Allies Allies Allies

Superpower ^ _Q[ n^
MilitaryCompetition
U.S. Military _Qtt ¿^
Competition
U.S.S.R. Military Q ?9^ m n^
Competition

Figuresare partialcorrelationscontrollingfortime.
Significancetests are two-tailedwith* indicatingthe .05 level of significanceand
** the .01 level.
The ratio is superpowerintervenorwars to nonintervenorwars in the ThirdWorld.

1960-68 1969-79

Ratio U.S.+ 7*1 ci

U.S.S.R. + Allies

The numberof wars is lividedby the numberof years in the time period.

The USSR and Cuba are veryminor
intervenorscompared to the US and
France. This is clear in the correla-
tions where there is no relationship
between USSR interventionsand any
of the tensionindices; however,a po-
sitive correlation is present for US
interventions.With a one year lag,
significantcorrelationsdisappear.
The data do illustrate that as the
arms race between the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
heats up, there is more overt super-
power interventionin Third World
wars. This coincides with more inter-
ventionsoccuringin 1969-68compared
to 1969-79. Pearson and Baumann
examined 1952-1979 data from the
MiddleEast and foundsome supporting
evidence. Opposing powers would
not interveneif there were clear vis-
ible commitmentsby anotherpowerto
regional actors - such as aid, bases,
advisors,alliances or threats. Kende's
hypothesis that conventional arms
transferswould be a substitute for
interventionswas not supportedhere.
Conventionalarms transfersled to an
increase in interventions.Armstrans-
fers often involve the superpowerin
subsequent interventionsto support

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 118
recipientgovernmentsor to safeguard
political investments.It may be more
revealingto examinethe covert inter-
ventionsthan the overt interventions;
however,this information comes only
in bits and pieces oftenyears after the
actions.
3. Economic Inequality between
the Developed and Under-
developedWorlds
It mustbe acknowledgedthat a large
amount of resources is being con-
sumedin the arms race. Thorssonsum-
marized the report of the United
Nations Group of GovernmentalEx-
pertson the RelationshipbetweenDis-
armamentand Development,of which
54
she was the chairperson. This report
noted that between 5-6 % of the
world's resources go to the military
and are not available for socially pro-
ductive ends. The remaining94-95 %
are not as efficientlyallocated due to
the militaryspending.This has a signi-
ficant long-termimpact. "Assuminga
futurerate of real increaseof military
expenditureby, say, 2 or 3 percent
annually,the value of the additional
resourcesdeniedto the civilian sector
over the next 20 years wouldbe equi-
valent to one-quarter and one-half,
respectively,of currentworldproduc-
tion." If it had been possibleto take
half of the militaryfundsspent from
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1970-75and investthemin the civilian
sector, $ 200 billion more in annual
output would have been produced at
the end of the five years. The con-
tinuinginvestmentin the militarysec-
tors is drainingresourcesthat could be
used to decrease the economic gap
betweenthe richand poor countriesof
the world.
Bandyopadhyayanoted a structural
link between arms expendituresand
development assistance. Both are
decliningas percent of gross national
product (GNP) during the years he
examines, 1962-73; however, official
development assistance is declining
faster. In 1971-73, militaryexpendi-
tures as percentof GNP were 76 % of
what they were in 1962-64; however,
official development assistance as
percentof GNP was 65 % of the 1962-
64 amount.
Using Sivard data on GNP and
GNP/Capita for 1960-78 in 1979 dol-
lars, the ThirdWorld'sGNP was 22 %
of the developedworkTsin 1960 but 29
% in 1976.57 ExaminingGNP/Capita,
in 1960 the Third World'swas 9 % of
the developed world's.In 1976, it was
9.5 %. These figuresshow a general
lesseningof the comparativeeconomic
gap between developed and under-
developed countries. Relating the
GNP/Capita differencesbetween the
two worlds to the summationof the
militaryexpendituresof the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R., a negative Pearson cor-
 119
relationof -.53 emerges whichis sig-
nificantat the .05 level for a two-
tailed test. The greater the military
expendituresof the superpowers,the
smaller the gap between the rich and
poor nations.This negativecorrelation
also held whenGNPfswere used. How-
ever, whenone examinesthe change in
Third WorldGNP/Cap and GNP's, ne-
gative correlationsare found(-.53 and
-.51, significantat .05). There is also a
negativecorrelationforthe total mili-
tary expendituresof the superpowers
and change in officialdevelopmentas-
sistance (-.70 significantat .01). Offi-
cial developmentassistance is taken
from the United Nations Statistical
Yearbooks.
Links between the militaryexpen-
ditures of the superpowersand eco-
nomicdevelopmentof the ThirdWorld
may be throughdeclining economic
aid, and/orthroughthe drain of con-
ventionalarms transfersand the mili-
tarization of Third World govern-
ments.Examinationsof the impact of
divertingresources fromthe military
to civiliandevelopmentof ThirdWorld
nations have been undertaken by
Alcock among others.58 The results
indicate a substantial benefit for in-
creased development.
4. Summaryof BivariateAnalysis
The patternof the U.S.-U.S.S.R. mili-
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tarycompetitionis positivelylinkedto
the patterns in the US interventions,
unsuccessfulcoups and to smaller in-
creases in Third WorldGNP/Cap. No
relationshipwas found with conven-
tional arms transfers.Whethermore
exists here than the chance relation-
ship of patternsover time can not be
assessed by the bivariate examinations
undertaken.Clearly any potentialcau-
sal relationshipsinvolvea multivariate
model, along with indepth historical
and case studies. The beginningsof
sucha modelmaybe suggested.
The superpowerarms race has im-
pact uponthe ThirdWorldthroughtwo
aspects - the economic and the poli-
tical. Its economic impact hindersthe
development of the Third World
throughthe loweredavailabilityof re-
sources to be transferredto the civil-
ian sector and thereforemaintainsthe
Old InternationalEconomic Order. Its
political aspect of tensionand compe-
tition between the two superpowers
supportsmilitarycoups and interven-
tions to maintainand increase spheres
of influencewithinthe WorldMilitary
Order. There are, in turn,interactions
among the variables of conventional
arms transfers,militarycoups, eco-
nomicgrowth,and internationalization
of conflict.
5. MultivariateAnalysis
The initial model to be examinedwas
 120

MODEL 1.

k^"^ -.46* .38^*

U.S.+U.S.S.R. i^ -^ CONVENTIONAL* * SUPERPOWER
MILITARY EXPENDITURES ARMS TRANSFERS MILITARY COMPETITION
(XI) V (X2) (X3) I

-.70* ' -.50*/ ' .67**

Jl*y

OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ¡/ ¿ ^
ASSISTANCE / INTERVENTIONS MILITARY COUPS
(X*) / (X6) (X5)

.19 y J--29
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA
for THIRD WORLD
(X7)

Partíais are for the linkages shown with time and all preceding variables in the
model controlled. Significance is noted by * for the .05 level and ** for the .01
level with a two-tailed test. The variables of official development assistance,
interventions, military coups, gross national product per capita are change
variables.

set up in accordance with the biva-
riate analyses and the studies cited.
In the model, the total military
expenditures of the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. are posited to have a negative
impact upon official development as-
sistance given to the Third World by
the superpowers. This will in turn
channel a negative effect to the
change in GNP/Cap for the under-
developed countries indirectly through
ODA and directly (which allows for
other causal chains whose inter-
mediary variables are not measured
here). Conventional arms transfers
also have a negative effect upon Third
World economic growth through the
diversion of Third World resources
from economic military uses.
to
Superpower military competition is
positively related to superpower inter-
ventions and military coups in the
Third World. The interventionscan be
directly linked to the increased com-
petition of the superpowers extending
to the Third World. Military coups are
perhaps less a direct effect than the
result of the increasing militarization
of the world system.
The technique of analysis used is
59
that of Simon-Blalock. This tech-
nique yields the basic informationcon-

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 121

cerningthe existence or nonexistence when possible and if the changes sug-

of causal linkages in a recursive
model. One tests the model through
predictionsthat certain partial corre-
lationsare zero. Each of the nonlinked
variables providesthis test. There are
no clear rules for deciding when the
actual partial is close enoughto zero
to be taken as zero. We will take the
differenceof greater than .10 to de-
signate model mispecification.Given
mispecif¡cations, the model should be
altered to alleviate the problems,
gested by the partíais are theoretical-
ly justified.
Model 1 makes 12 predictionsof
zero partial correlations. Examining
these withthe data, the resultsfind»
of these to be close to zero as shown
in Table ». Eightare greaterthan.10.
Strongrelationshipsare foundbetween
economic growthin the Third World
and the competition index, and be-
tween the index and the change in
official developmentassistance. It is

Table ». Predictedand EstimatedPartíais forModel 1

Partial Prediction Estimation

r
62.1235 0 .08
r
73.12* 0 .82**
r
76.123* 0 .30
r
75.123» 0 .12
r
»2.13 0 -.08
r
»3.12 0 .63**
r
»6.123 0 .2»
r
»5.123 0 .2»
r
61.23 0 .10
r
51.23 0 -.12
r
52.13 0 -.03
r
65.123 0 -.»2

** indicatessignificanceof two-tailedtest at the .01 level Controlis on time.

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 122

MODEL 2.
^ _^^

-.46* .38 ^*
/^
l¿ CONVENTIONAL* » SUPERPOWER
U.S.+U.S.S.R. * * ARMS MILITARY
MILITARYEXPENDITURES TRANSFERS COMPETITION
(XI) (X2) (X3)
^r

-.70* ' .71** / .67**

.63**^^^

OFFICIAL k<' / /
DEVELOPMENT / < MILITARY
ASSISTANCE / -.29/ INTERVENTIONS< » COUPS
(X4) / / (X6) -M2 (X5)

.19 / /-.50*

GROSS NATIONAL
PRODUCT PER CAPITA
(X7)

Partial Prediction Estimation

r
62.1235 0 .08

73.124 0 .81**
r
76.123* 0 .30
r
75.1234 0 .12
r
42.13 0 -.08
r
46.123 0 .24
r
45.123 0 .24
r
61.23 0 .10
r
51.23 0 -.12
r
52.13 0 -.03

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 123
possible that increased US-USSR mili-
tary competition may lead to in-
creased economic involvementin the
ThirdWorld.However,the direct link
between military competition and
Third Worldeconomic growth is not
logical.
Given these results, revisionsare
clearly in order. Model 2 includes a
link between the competition index
and changein ODA as one path forthe
impact on economic growth;however,
this will not decrease the index-
economic growth partial since ODA
was originally controlled. Also in-
cluded is the nondirectedcorrelation
between interventions and coups.
These appear to be alternativeeffects
of superpower military competition.
Model 2 makes 10 predictionsof zero
partialcorrelations.Four out of the 10
are substantiated.
Other correlations are relatively
weak except for the competition
index-economic growth correlation;
however,this link is not theoretically
specified and will not be introduced.
(Insertingan additionalcorrelationbe-
tween ODA and interventionsdoes
reduce the index-economic growth
partial to .7*7, but this is not a large
enough change to warrant this in-
clusion.)
This model presents the possibili-
ties that need furtherexamination.
The goal was to examine some poten-
tial impacts of superpower military
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competition upon the Third World.
Two aspects of militaryspendingwere
hypothesized- economic and military
competitive. The amount of military
spendingwas foundto have a negative
relationship to ODA and to Third
Worldeconomic growth.The military
competitionwas foundto have a posi-
tive relationshipto superpowerinter-
ventionsand to militarycoups in the
ThirdWorld.Conventionalarms trans-
fers were not foundto be dependent
upon militarycompetitionnor did it
interact with interventionsor coups.
Conventionalarms transfersdid have
a negative relationshipto economic
growth.
The general outlineof a WorldMi-
litary Order whichhas a relationship
to the Old International Economic
Orderexists. However,the delineation
of specific causal linkages would re-
quire a substantial number of addi-
tional variables and the national level
of analysis to divide groupsof nations
withdifferentpatterns.
 12*

Notes and References Measuring Military Expenditure.

Cooperationand Conflict,Vol. 3
1. Vasile Secares, A Global (1983) forfurtherdiscussion.
Perspective on the Arms
Race: The World Military 9. Daniel S. Papp, Contemporary
Order. Bulletin of Peace InternationalRelations. New York
Proposals, Vol. 12, No. * 1984.
(1981), pp. 350-351.
10. Stockholm International Peace
2. Ibid.,p. 351. Research Instituteop.cit. 1981.

3. Data are from the Stockholm 11. Kjell Goldmann and Johan
International Peace Research Lagerkranz, Neither Tension nor
Institute, World Armaments Detente: East-West Relations in
and Disarmament Yearbook. Europe, 1971-75. Cooperationand
London 1979, 1980, 1981; Conflict,Vol. 12 (1977), pp. 251-
and, Ruth Sivard, World 26*.
Militaryand Social Expenditures.
Leasburg,Virginia1982. 12. Secares oo.cit., 1981,p. 12.

*. Sivardop.cit. 1982. 13. Malvern Lumsden, Militarism:

Cultural Dimensions of Militari-
5. Secares op.cit. 1981. zation, in L. Herreraand R. Väy-
rynen(eds.), Peace, Development
6. Nicole Ball, ThirdWorldMilitaries and the New InternationalOrder.
and Politics: An Introductory Tampere 1979,pp. 50-60.
Essay. Cooperation and Conflict,
Vol. 17(1982), pp. 41-60.
1*. Robin Luckham,Armaments,Un-
7. Five measures were initially derdevelopment and Demilitariza-
examined: (1) the simple tion in Africa. Alternatives,Vol.
difference between US and 6, No. 2, pp. 179-2*5.
USSR military expenditures;
(2) the change in US military 15. Michael Klare, Militarism:The Is-
expenditures plus the change sues Today, in A. Eide and M.
in USSR military expenditures; Thee (eds.), Problemsof Contem-
(3) the percent change in porary Militarism.London 1980,
US military expenditures pp. 36-46.
plus the percent change in
USSR military expenditures; 16. Ulrich Albrecht,Technologyand
(*) the US percent change; Militarization of Third World
and, (5) the USSR percent Countries in Theoretical Per-
change. spective.Bulletinof Peace Propo-
sals, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1977), pp. 12*-
8. Michael Wallace, Armaments 126.
and Escalation: Two Competing
Hypotheses. International 17. Stockholm International Peace
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 26, Research Institute op.cit. 1979,
No. 1 (1982), pp. 37-56. 1980.
It must be noted that Soviet
military expenditures data 18. Sam Cole, The War System and
are subject to much dispute; the New InternationalEconomic
however, the SIPRI data appear Order: Directives for Disarma-
to be the most reliable and ment. Alternatives,Vol. 6, No. 2
valid set. See Hakan Wiberg, (1980), pp. 2*7-286.

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 125
19. Raimo Väyrynen,Economic and
Political Consequences of Arms
Transfersto the ThirdWorld.Al-
ternatives,Vol. 6, No. 1 (19$UT,
pp. 131-155.
20. EdwardKolodziej, ArmsTransfers
and InternationalPolitics: The In-
terdependence of Independence,
in S. Neuman and R. Harkavy
(eds.), Arms Transfers in the
Modern World. New York 1979,
pp. 3-26; and Robert Harkavy,
The New Geopolitics: Arms
Transfersand the Major Powers,
in S. Neuman and R. Harkavy
(eds.), Arms Transfers in the
Modern World. New York 1979,
pp. 131-151; and, Michael
Mihalka,Supplier-ClientPatterns
in Arms Transfers:The Develop-
ing Countries, 1967-1976, in S.
Neuman and R. Harkavy (eds.),
Arms Transfers in the Modern
World.New York 1979, pp. 49-76.
21. Harkavyop.cit. 1979.
22. Harkavyop.cit. 1979.
23. Harkavyop.cit. 1979, p. 147.
24. Harkavyop.cit. 1979.
25. All monetarydata used in this
studyare in constant1975 dollars.
Time is introducedas a control
factor. First differencesare used
for the dependentvariables. No
lag and one year lag were exa-
mined.The no lag resultsare re-
ported and the differencesunder
the one year lag are noted.
26. Saadet Deger and Ron Smith,Mi-
litaryExpendituresand Growthin
Less Developed Countries. Jour-
nal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.
27, No. 2 (1983), pp. 335-353.
27. IngemarDörfer,ArmsDeals: When,
Whyand How?, in S. Neumanand
R. Harkavy(eds.), ArmsTransfers
in the Modern World.New York
1979, pp. 200-215.
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28. Jo L. Husbands,How the United
States Makes Foreign Military
Sales, in S. Neuman and R.
Harkavy(eds.), ArmsTransfersin
the Modern World. New York
1979,pp. 155-172.
29. Peter Lock, Armaments Dyna-
mics: An Issue in Development
Strategies. Alternatives, Vol. 6,
No. 2 (1980), pp. 157-178.
30. Ibid.,p. 174.
31. Peter Lock and HerbertWulf,The
Economic Consequencesof Trans-
Techno-
fers of Military-oriented
logy, in M. Kaldor and A. Eide
(eds.), The WorldMilitaryOrder;
The Impact of Military Techno-
logy in the Third World.London
1979.
32. MiltonLeitenberg,WorldwideMi-
litary Coups Since 1945: A Short
Note on Data Collection, in M.
Kaldor and A. Eide (eds.), The
WorldMilitaryOrder; The Impact
of Military Technology in the
Third World. London 1979, pp.
378-389.
33. Claude Welch, Long-termConse-
quences of MilitaryRule: Break-
down and Extrication.Journalof
Strategic Studies, Vol. 1 (1978),
pp. 139-153.
34. E. A. Nordliner,Soldiers in Poli-
tics; MilitaryCoups and Govern-
ments. Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey1976.
35. Patrick McGowan, The Predicta-
bility of African MilitaryCoups
d'Etat, 1960-1982: A Replication
and Extension.Paper presentedat
the Annual InternationalStudies
Association Meeting, Mexico
City, 1983.
36. Thomas Johnson with Robert
Slater, An Examinationof Com-
peting Models of MilitaryInter-
vention in Sub-Saharan African
 126
Politics, 1960-1982. Paper pre-
sentedat the AnnualInternational
Studies Association Meeting,
Mexico City, 1983.
37. William Thompson, Corporate
Coup-maker Grievances and
Types of Regime Targets. Com-
parativePolitical Studies,Vol. 12,
No. 4(1980), pp.485-496.
38. Ernest Lefever, Arms Transfers,
Military Training and Domestic
Politics, in S. Neuman and R.
Harkavy(eds.), ArmsTransfersin
the Modern World. New York
» » 276-293.
1979.» DD.
39. Ibid.,p. 287.
40. Ibid.
41. Edward Thomas Rowe, Aid and
Coups d'Etat, InternationalStud-
ies Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2
(1974), pp. 239-255.
42. Philippe Schmitter,Foreign Mili-
taryAssistance,National Military
Spending and Military Rule in
Latin America, in P. Schmitter
(ed.), Military Rule in Latin
America; Function,Consequences
and Perspectives. Beverly Hills
1973,pp. 117-187.
43. Richard Li and W.R. Thompson,
fCoup Contagion1 Hypothesis.
Journal of Conflict Resolution,
No. 1 (1975), pp. 63-88.
44. S.E. Finer, The Man on Horse-
back; The Role of the Militaryin
Politics. New York1976.
45. Li and Thompson,op.cit. 1975.
46. Lefever,op.cit. 1979.
47. Lock, op.cit. 1980,p. 163.
48. Robin Luckham, Militarism:
Force, Class and International
Conflict,in M. Kaldorand A. Eide
(eds.), The WorldMilitaryOrder;
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The Impact of MilitaryTechno-
logy on the WorlcE New York
1979,pp. 232-256.
49. Istvan Kende, Local Wars 1945-
1976, in A. Eide and M. Thee
(eds.), Problemsof Contemporary
Militarism.London 1980, pp. 261-
285.
50. Istvan Kende, Dynamicsof Wars,
of Arms Trade and of Military
Expenditurein the Third World1,
1945-1976. Instant Research on
Peace and Violence,Vol. 7, No. 2
(1977), pp. 59-67.
51. Sivard,op.cit. 1982.
52. Sivard,op.cit. 1982,p. 36.
53. Frederic Pearson and Robert
Bauman, Toward a Regional
Model of International Military
Intervention:The Middle Eastern
Experience. Paper presented at
the InternationalStudies Associa-
tion Meeting,Mexico City, 1983.
54. Inga Thorsson,Studyon Disarma-
mentand Development.The Bul-
letin of The Atomic Scientists,
Vol. 38, No. 6 (1982), pp. 41-44.
55. Ibid. p. 43.
;>6. Jayantanuja aanayopaanyaya,
Disarmament and Development:
StructuralLinkages. Alternatives,
Vol. 4 (1978-79),pp. 11-34.
57. Sivard,op.cit. 1982.
58. Norman Alcock, Peace, Justice
and Prosperity:Proposals for a
Linkage between Disarmament
and Development. Bulletin of
Peace Proposals, Vol. 8, No. 4
(1977), pp. 340-343.
59. Herbert Asher, Causal Modeling.
Beverly Hills 1976; and, Herbert
Blalock, Causal Inferences in
NonexperimentalResearch. New
York 1964.
 127

60. The Simon-Blalock technique is model, first order autocorrelation

based on regression analysis and
requires all of its assumptions. We
have tested the potentially se-
rious problem of autocorrelation.
Examining the regression equa-
tions that correspond to this
was not substantiated according
to the Durbin-Watson statistics.
This allows us to use partial cor-
relations without an autocorrela-
tion correction.

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