Essay based on “An Evaluation of the Persistence of Blat in Post-Soviet Societies:

a Case Study of Ukraine’s Health Services Sector, Colin C. Williams, Olga Onoshchenko”

Nowadays, the problem of using the personal connections for receiving some benefits or
privileges is extremely significant. This phenomenon is widespread in different spheres of life and
is known as blat. Having had some web searching, I concluded that there is a lack of official studies
dedicated to this topic. Meanwhile, the problem exists, affects everyday lives, and needs more
analysis. Therefore, the paper of C. Williams and O. Onoshchenko is one the most valuable sources
of theoretical and practical data of post-socialist blat. It gives us a clear idea of modern
transformation of this practice in comparison to its development in Soviet societies and
demonstrates the citizens’ attitude and state’s policy toward it. Based on this paper I would like to
highlight three main points which describe the persistence of blat in post-Soviet Societies,
primarily in Ukraine. Moreover, I will give my personal opinion on these statements referring to
some articles and statistics on the Internet. Finally, I will share my views on how these ideas can
be applied in Ukraine.
The first idea from the paper is that blat is perceived as a positive or neutral phenomenon
in Ukraine as well as in other post-Soviet countries. It is based on results of the interview which
was conducted in Mykolaiv and covered Ukraine’s health services sector. Responses have shown
that only 12% of the surveyed people view blat as a negative practice. Williams and Onoshchenko
link it with the legacy of the Soviet Union period, when blat was extremely helpful while tackling
the shortages of goods and services, hence it was perceived positively. It is evident that post-Soviet
countries do not suffer from such a phenomenon as shortages, conversely, there are many
opportunities to take advantage of. However, blat still exists and is an appealing way for many
people to simplify their everyday lives. Besides, authors have noted that despite the general
positive attitude toward blat, there are cases of double standards – when blat can be viewed both
positively and negatively in different situations. Thus, patients tend to show loyalty when the
initiate comes from themselves and are more critical if blat is initiated by doctors.
From my perspective, the attitude toward blat among post-Soviet nations cannot be
described concretely as positive, while the idea of double standards is more suitable in this case.
However, authors do not reveal this duality properly and make their general conclusion based
exclusively on the interview. I believe there are at least two more cases which could prove that
blat is not merely accepted as an advantage. For this, I would use the experience of Ukraine.
The first statement is based on my personal observation and has been accepted by 8 people
out of 10 from my encirclement. According to it blat is viewed positively by those people who are
able to receive some benefits for themselves from it. On the contrary, when there are no suchlike
opportunities, people are likely to criticize all demonstrations of blat in their environment. For
instance, another research of Williams and Onoshchenko (2013) has demonstrated that 34% of
respondents rely on blat to find a job. Meanwhile, there are statistics according to which
approximately the same percentage of Ukrainians find employment by blat inappropriate
(Ignatowski G. et al., 2019). Moreover, Ukrainian portal Work.ua (2017) pays attention to
unacceptance of “blat workers” by their colleagues. This confirms the assumption that a great share
of people do not tolerate blat until it can be beneficial for themselves.
The second case of double standards is associated with a different attitude toward blat on
the state and private levels. Although there are examples of using different forms of personal
connections in both of them, people tend to be more critical when those ones occur in public sectors
(Ignatowski G. et al., 2021). This can be traced among the Ukrainian politicians, who are often
treated negatively by citizens and media for using nepotism or cronyism, which are negative forms
of blat. Rapid development of this phenomenon is linked by experts with policy of the ex-President
of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko (Dorosh L. & Ivasechko O., 2015). Moreover, this practice has
been preserved till nowadays and is reflected in the policy of the current President – Volodymyr
Zelensky (Committee of Voters of Ukraine, 2020). The distinguishing attitude toward blat in this
case is reasonable – representatives of state sectors take on more responsibility before citizens and
have to meet all their expectations. Therefore, this nuance should be considered while researching
blat.
Another conclusion which was made by Williams and Onoshchenko in their paper is about
change in the nature of blat in post-Soviet countries. According to them the role of money in the
USSR was not significant, so blat had a more friendly and selfless character. On the contrary,
contemporary post-Soviet societies face more monetized forms of blat and are looking for profit.
The traditional style of blat persists, but mainly among relatives and friends (in 83% of cases).
Meanwhile, 70% of people pay money (or give presents) when dealing with distant social relations.
However, there is no evidence of which form of blat is prevailing. According to respondents who
have received medical help, monetized blat is more common since they paid money or gave
presents in 52% of cases. Whereas doctors’ responses give us grounds to believe in the opposite –
only 22% affirmed they have received money or presents.
In general, authors assert that contemporary blat has negative character and is a form of
such negative practices as cronyism, nepotism, and corruption. Thence, it must be eradicated.
However, the paper does not give us a clear illustration of the line between help and profit.
According to interview results, a reward for medical help is thought to be a compulsory bribe by
patients, while doctors believe it is simply a voluntary gift.
 I, personally, agree that blat in post-Soviet countries has a double character and friendly
help still exists. However, it does prevail in so-called inner circles (Bigge, V. & Thorén, M., 2016,
20-21), which means groups of people with common values and interests. Meanwhile, most people
are outside these circles and have to resort to different forms of bribes in order to enter them. This
statement can be applied to medicine in Ukraine. According to EUACI research (2020), medicine
is believed to be one of the most corrupt sectors in Ukraine (together with customs, police, and
public authorities). That is why I tend to believe that blat has merely monetized character and
engenders different negative phenomena in society.
Moreover, I agree with Williams and Onoshchenko that blat has to be eradicated. Based on
the research of Balabanova et al (2016) I can confirm that blat enhances inequality which in turn
enhances blat. If everything in Ukraine was based on meritocracy, not on favoritism, all people
would receive what they deserve, and incompetent specialists would not generate social,
economic, and political problems. However, it sounds like an Utopia, and if to be more realistic,
blat cannot be completely eradicated as long as there are people who see personal benefits in it.
Alternatively, we can refer to the experience of some countries which show that blat may
have non-destructive nature and coexist with the high level of development of the nation. The first
example is China with its unique type of blat – guanxi (see P. Karhunen et al., 2018, for more).
Unlike post-Soviet blat, it is based on moral principles, not on receiving profit, and is merely used
for maintaining business relations at the best level. And another example is Germany, where every
third vacancy in companies goes to candidates through private connections (IAB-Discussion
paper, 2016). Nevertheless, Barbara Täte in the interview for DW (2017) confirmed that so-called
Miki (from Mitarbeiterkinder – employee’s children) must participate in the standard selection
alongside with other candidates for the post. Thus, the German blat is fair and does not affect
negatively organizational performance.
The final point from the paper of Williams and Onoshchenko is that the government does
nothing in order to eliminate blat in Ukraine. Moreover, it and its policy are often called the reason
why blat has been prospering. Based on the interview responses, low wages of doctors in Ukraine
encourage them to accept money or gifts from patients, while absence of proper control and
penalties in general only enhances this illicit practice. As a solution, authors suggest three options:
apply penalties, provide incentives, or increase awareness of the nation.
I totally agree with the last point and believe that Ukrainian politicians still have not taken
effective measures to tackle blat. Although de jure such forms of blat as corruption and nepotism
are fixed in the current law (Закон України “Про запобігання корупції”) and regulated by
special institutions, de facto this does not bring the desired results. According to the statistics of
EUACI (2020), Ukrainian experts estimate effectiveness of anti-corruption measures on quite low
level (2,7 points of 5). In addition, this same statistic has shown that Ukrainians do not trust the
public authorities and view them as one the most corrupt institutions in the country. Thus, the
existence of such negative phenomena on the state level would not contribute to eradication of
“blat-mentality” among other citizens.
Finally, I would like to make some suggestions concerning tackling blat in Ukraine. Above
all, I believe that we do not have to eradicate absolutely all demonstrations of blat but should be
selective and thorough. As the foreign practice has shown, blat can be effective and non-
destructive. For instance, we can implement German experience of employing people by blat on
the conditions they prove their competence. It is essential concerning the increasing role of
corporate social responsibility with its demands of ethical behavior of enterprises based on
honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness (Vveinhardt J. & Sroka W., 2020).
Meanwhile, the main attention should be paid to those sectors, where monetized and
harmful forms of blat prevail. As we could examine, they are mostly state institutions like custom,
police, medicine, and public authorities. In the first stages, the government should follow the
principle of sticks, which means implementation of strict rules and penalties for violating them.
For this goal Ukraine should refer to the experience of Georgia. In ten years, this country has
succeeded in reduction of corruption by applying such radical measures as mass dismissal of
dishonest employees; establishment of independent inspection service; simplification of the
procedure for arresting those accused of bribery; liquidation of the bureaucratic barrier;
legalization of some corrupt procedures and others (see Prikhodko А., 2020, for more). However,
the state should not always focus its policy exclusively on restrictive measures but combine them
with so-called carrots, which include incentives and awareness raising campaigns. Such
Scandinavian countries as Norway, Sweden and Denmark are great examples of developed
societies where all citizens are motivated to be honest and care about the wellbeing of their nation
being sure that the state will care about them in response. Thus, Ukraine has to provide its citizens
with all necessary options which would let them forget about blat – high wages in public sectors,
honest and clear formal procedures inside them, equal conditions for everybody and so on.
In conclusion, the problem of blat does exist in Ukraine and is gradually gaining negative
forms such as nepotism, cronyism, and corruption. Still, there are conscientious citizens who view
blat as an unacceptable phenomenon. The main task of the Ukrainian government is to eliminate
all harmful practices of blat by toughening control and punishment procedures (particularly, in the
state sectors) and by stimulating citizens to be more honest and aware of their actions.
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University). URL: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-56430
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