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NA0092
Since the time of its establishment, CARE has successfully adopted twenty government schools
and established six CARE-owned schools with the aim of providing quality education.
CARE has been able to establish a model of government and private sector partnership in
the field of education. I strongly feel that this model must be replicated in order to benefit
hundreds of thousands of deserving children of Pakistan—a country with a population of
more than 140 million people. CARE has been asked to take over 140 government schools
to educate more than 50,000 students. I understand the enormity of this task, but at the
same time I feel that in order to make some positive contribution to the awful state of edu-
cation, this challenge needs to be considered.
I
n September 2002, Seema Aziz, chairperson and CEO of Cooperation for
Advancement, Rehabilitation and Education (CARE), was asked by the mayor of
Lahore, Pakistan, to take over the operation of 140 government schools in Ravi
Town.1 CARE was a private charitable organization that provided educational services to
the underprivileged, rehabilitated homes, and operated industrial and family welfare
centers.
This was not the first time CARE had received such a request. In 1998, Aziz had
accepted a similar proposal from the local government to adopt ten government schools
located in Lahore. By 2002, CARE had taken over twenty government schools, expand-
ing its educational operation from one CARE school with 250 students to a network of
six CARE schools and twenty government-adopted schools, educating more than25,000
students and employing more than 500 teachers and other staff members (See Exhibit
1).
In order to accept the mayor’s latest proposal, CARE would have to hire and train
additional staff, renew the schools’ infrastructure, and provide funding for ongoing oper-
ations. Aziz had to decide if it was appropriate for her and CARE to take on such an
enormous task. She wondered if CARE should concentrate on consolidating its existing
network of schools, strengthening current systems, and preparing for future leadership
or whether it should accept the government’s offer and try to rehabilitate and improve
the standard of 140 additional schools.
Copyright © 2010 by the Case Research Journal and Arif N. Butt, Humaira Arif, and Shezeen Hemani
The case study was prepared as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or inef-
fective handling of an administrative situation.
Cooperation for Advancement, Rehabilitation, and Education (CARE): Leadership in a Social Sector Organization 1
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That day, Aziz decided to build a school for the community. For her, this seemed a
long-term solution to the despondency she saw in the eyes of many. Aziz believed that
schooling was the right of every child, and everyone should be given an equal opportu-
nity to be empowered through education.
After carefully evaluating the idea of building a school for the underprivileged, Aziz
felt the need to formalize her work arrangement in the form of a trust. She named the
organization Cooperation for Advancement, Rehabilitation and Education (CARE). Its
scope of activities included education, rehabilitation of homes, and industrial and fam-
ily welfare centers. She appointed one family member and two friends to serve as
trustees. Aziz later stated that the trust was “only a formality,” since she primarily put in
the effort required to make CARE’s mission a reality (See Exhibit 2).
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According to Aziz, “there was despondency, hopelessness, and lack of belief that they
would ever come out of the clutches of poverty.” Despite this, Aziz remained steadfast
in her cause. Her dream was to see that every child in the country was provided with
an opportunity to receive an education, setting the vision for CARE “to educate every
child in this country.” In order to do so, Aziz spent most of her time in the school not
only to simply oversee and monitor the functioning of the school but, as she later
emphasized, “I was actually running the school myself—functioning as the headmas-
ter, the teacher—in short, performing any role that was required of me.”
In CARE’s first year, Aziz worked to establish new systems to ensure that everyone
associated with the school was supporting the organization’s vision. Initially, Aziz spent
a lot of time training and motivating the teachers to respect the children and to value
their profession. Aziz empowered teachers to believe that if they worked with integri-
ty they could make a major difference in the lives of their students. As time progressed,
Aziz could see significant changes; teachers became more efficient, disciplined, and
punctual. Students dressed neatly and started taking school more seriously. The school
infrastructure was well maintained and all basic amenities were provided.
The financing required to run CARE 1 came primarily from contributions made
by Aziz herself, her friends and acquaintances, and other donors she had approached.
CARE 1 also charged a nominal monthly tuition fee of 10 rupees per child (about 16
cents). This fee barely contributed to the school expenses, perhaps just enough to pay
for chalks and dusters for everyday use. Nonetheless, CARE charged fees to commu-
nicate to students that they were not on welfare but were actually paying for the serv-
ice they were getting. Many students were unable to pay even this small sum. CARE
offered these children completely free education and, where resources permitted, uni-
forms, shoes, sweaters, and other forms of assistance that they and their families des-
perately needed.
As the community learned of the high standards of education provided by
CARE 1, student enrollment quickly increased. Starting from 250 students and
eleven teachers in 1991, CARE 1 grew to 850 students and twenty-five teachers by
1993. Aziz took immense pride in the progress of the students and recalled that it
was indeed a moment of deep happiness to see these children perform as well as any
given an equal opportunity to learn.
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When CARE adopted these schools, Aziz began repairing the buildings, construct-
ing classrooms, making science laboratories and libraries, and providing basic facilities
that were missing. Most importantly, Aziz decided to place CARE’s trained teachers in
each of the government schools to supplement the existing government staff. This sig-
nificantly improved the teacher-student ratio in each class. Further, CARE also took the
initiative of training the government teachers to improve the overall education standard
of these schools. Aziz also introduced a new human resource system that clearly stated
the responsibilities of the school staff including principals, teachers, and custodians to
ensure that each individual was performing his/her task as required (see Exhibit 3).
CARE and the government shared the financial burden of running the adopted
schools. By contract, the utility expenses, new rooms, annual repairs and whitewash, and
staff salaries remained the responsibility of the city government. CARE was responsible
for the salaries of additional teachers and staff, and payments for facilities not provided
for in the city government budget.
By 2000, the results of CARE’s initiatives became evident. Student enrollments dou-
bled and even tripled in many schools, requiring double shifts. Academic results
improved, with students receiving 80 percent marks in examinations as compared to
only 28 percent previously. All schools were well maintained and looked as good as any
private school.
Considering the improvements made by CARE in such a short span of time, the gov-
ernment asked Aziz to take over more schools. Aziz recalled that while rehabilitating the
first ten government schools, she had realized that there were many schools in the vicin-
ity which required similar attention. Aziz did not want to walk away from these schools
after seeing the appalling state of education which existed in them. As a result, Aziz went
ahead with adopting more schools. By 2002, CARE had adopted a total of twenty gov-
ernment schools, educating more than 20,000 students and employing a staff of over
300, in addition to six of its own schools with more than 4,000 students and 180 teach-
ers and staff.
Overcoming Challenges
The adoption of twenty government schools created a potential confrontation between
CARE and the government-run school teachers’ unions and government bureaucracy.
Each government school retained the government-recruited teachers and principals who
continued to belong to the teachers’ union. Since CARE did not pay for the salaries of
the government-hired teachers, they continued to be members of government teacher
union. Further, many lower-level government bureaucrats saw CARE as foreign invaders
aiming to change the education system for their personal agendas. They felt that most
of Aziz’s initiatives were for a better self-projection and not for the welfare of children.
Some also felt that their powers over resources and the education system were becoming
diluted. They felt a sense of insecurity and sometimes showed resentment by not approv-
ing proposals, creating unnecessary delays, subjecting to pointless scrutiny, and provid-
ing support to the unions.
Aziz believed in a non-confrontational approach toward the government teacher
union and hostile government representatives. She knew that in order to make a differ-
ence and attain results, her organization had to serve as a role model rather than waste
time on confronting the opposing forces. Aziz stated:
We are ready to take up this problem because we are not foreign; we are trying to look
at the problem from their eyes and want to make every possible effort to bring about
a positive change.
6 Case Research Journal • Volume 29 • Issue 3 and 4 • Summer/Fall 2010
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Although Aziz’s role in the organization was highly appreciated by most of her
friends, colleagues, and employees, some perceived her enthusiasm and commitment in
a different way. “Aziz is highly committed to her cause; therefore, she keeps decision-
making very personalized. She does not involve others in many activities and does not
tolerate ideas contrary to her own. One should not assume that everyone who disagrees
is wrong.”
One of the potential sponsors commented, “I met Aziz on a number of occasions
and offered help in her cause. However she seemed too inflexible in her thoughts about
how to achieve success in CARE. I felt she was unwilling to listen to my suggestions
which put me off.”
Viewing Aziz’s decision to take over twenty additional government schools, an expert
in the area of human resource management remarked, “CARE has grown very rapidly
and to manage this and future growth, Aziz will need to evolve systems at CARE espe-
cially about corporate governance, and include people who can provide an objective
evaluation of the current situation.”
A financial sponsor of a government school who also managed a well-established firm
in the textile industry remarked, “I think she has done tremendously well and is capable
of expanding her organization, but she needs to involve experts and professionals with-
in her organization to be able to do so successfully in the long run. Experts will need to
feel part of the process and also of the dream that Aziz has seen for CARE.”
CARE SYSTEMS
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Financing
CARE’s growth was largely attributable to its success in fund raising; most of it had to
do with Aziz’s success in persuading local donors to contribute to CARE. “Friends of
CARE,” a network of volunteers comprising mainly of Aziz’s friends and other con-
cerned citizens, was established in 1993 primarily to collect funds for the trust. Most
funds came from volunteers’ personal contacts and from fund raisers. Further, constant
awareness campaigns were launched to reach out to new donors. One such example was
the “CARE: Buy a Brick Campaign” launched in private schools in Lahore. In 1993, a
system was created whereby a donor could sponsor a student (US$5/month), sponsor an
entire class (US$85/month), equip a library (US$1,200) or laboratory (US$1,000), or
build a classroom (US$2,400).
The average monthly expense for running a CARE-owned school ranged between
Rs. 100,000 to Rs. 300,000 and between Rs. 40,000 to Rs. 50,000 for a government-
adopted school. CARE raised that money from donations and sponsorships from
friends, family, and acquaintances. In 2002, CARE also held annual fundraisers that
generated up to Rs. 400,000 to Rs. 500,000 per event. Aziz explained, “The fund rais-
ing events never served as our bread and butter but were kept as back up in the event of
a short fall in meeting our expenses.”
By 2002, Aziz also created an Enterprise Development Department. This depart-
ment was responsible for producing CARE crafts such as handmade pouches, envelopes,
greeting cards, cushions, and other home accessories. These items were sold to generate
profits for contributions to the CARE schools and to create income-generating oppor-
tunities for skilled women residing within the vicinity of CARE schools.
Aziz and her team’s fundraising efforts led to a steady growth in the donations to
CARE (see Exhibit 4).
Human Resources
CARE’s human resources team worked under the direct supervision of Aziz (see Exhibit
5 and Exhibit 6). As the CARE school network expanded and it became impractical for
Aziz to monitor the educational standards in each school single-handedly, Aziz hired an
academics and training manager. She was responsible for formulating and implementing
policies pertaining to academics and teacher training. Responsibilities also included
monitoring and counseling the teaching staff and ensuring that education standards were
maintained.
A group of external and internal coordinators monitored the schools. Generally, a
CARE teacher served as an “internal coordinator” in each school; this person was respon-
sible for monitoring the performance of CARE-appointed and government teachers, and
ensuring that day-to-day schedules were followed in the school. External coordinators
were volunteers from “Friends of CARE” and served as a liaison between the head office
and the school. External coordinators were mainly Aziz’s close friends and associates who
belonged to the elite, affluent and educated class. Other than contributing their time to
monitoring and visiting the school every alternate day, they also frequently contributed
when there was a need for financial assistance such as purchasing stationery and other
miscellaneous expenses of the schools allocated to them.
Once a month the external and internal coordinators of each school met at the
CARE head office with the academic coordinator and Aziz to report their progress and
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Expenditures
Expenditures on
CARE schools 526,204 937,348 777,668 1,561,514 1,982,887 2,386,157 3,461,989 4,327,913 6,508,167 7,751,656
Expenditure by
CARE on
CDGL schools 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,887,170 4,337,812 7,865,438 10,297,062
Student scholarship 0 0 0 0 8,121 43,450 21,300 18,470 63,199 74,790
Expenses on
enterprise
development 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 71,852 187,879
Taxation 0 0 0 0 0 0 702,923 22,202 14,255 40,648
Total (b) 526,204 937,348 777,668 1,561,514 1,991,008 2,429,607 6,073,382 8,706,397 14,522,911 18,352,035
Surplus (a–b) 1,119,127 2,062,845 1,200,469 1,204,453 2,216,473 5,444,062 857,918 3,370,019 1,785,475 1,963,195
discuss issues. This provided a good opportunity to Aziz to communicate her vision, pri-
orities and concerns to her team so that the team could implement them in the schools.
Although Aziz believed the government employed teachers and principals would be
able to deliver according to CARE standards, she also expected conflicts to arise between
the government and CARE teachers. Therefore, she strived to develop and promote a
culture whereby the government and CARE teachers worked together in a congenial and
professional environment. Training of both the CARE and government teachers was
emphasized. CARE teachers were motivated and trained so that they could serve as
teacher trainers and core staff capable of being moved to schools which were in dire need
of better staff. New teaching staff was also hired and selection was made after the candi-
dates were interviewed personally by Aziz and put through a stringent interview process.
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It was the first time that education gained prominence in the government. All city gov-
ernment officials met weekly to thrash out the education related problems and discussed
possible solutions. I felt an integral part of this change because of what CARE had
achieved over the years.
Exhibit 5 Organizational structure at CARE (2001–2002)
While talks between the local government and CARE continued, Aziz sent her sur-
vey team to visit all the schools located in Ravi Town to report the actual conditions of
the schools. The government was willing to hand over 140 schools to CARE but was
willing to contribute only to certain operating expenses (See Exhibit 7). The schools
were in the same terrible conditions as those that CARE had adopted in 1998. If CARE
took over these schools, Aziz would face a lot of challenges, much more and of greater
magnitude than those faced earlier.
Aziz knew that she was at a critical juncture that would shape the destiny of her
organization and the education system at the national level. She recalled that in 1998
when she had faced the same dilemma, the task of adopting ten government schools
seemed large, but CARE had taken up the challenge. Aziz was well aware that this time,
the number of schools to be taken over was huge and hence the decision needed to be
well planned rather than made on instinct.
Aziz could either accept the offer to adopt 140 government schools and run them
along the lines of the previously established model or reject the offer and continue to
strengthen the existing CARE schools and twenty government-adopted schools. A third
option was to construct new CARE schools which would require heavy financing,
around Rs. 7–Rs. 8 million to construct a new school, and yet not be able to reach the
number of students that could potentially be reached by adopting government schools.
As Aziz looked through the proposed “adoption contract” between CARE and the
government (see Exhibit 7), she remembered the heart-wrenching images of the children
in the government schools at the time of their adoption and the issues that CARE had
to confront while dealing with the bureaucracy and the government staff. Aziz thought
that it was a complex yet perhaps a doable task. Aziz knew from experience that if she
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Assistant to manager
Data entry and correspondence.
academics and training 1
took the challenge of adopting 140 schools, she would have to strengthen her team and
motivate and guide a much larger organization in the right direction.
While Aziz contemplated the offer and its enormous scope, she also considered the
extended benefits of her decision of going with the government’s offer. She thought that
her consent would strengthen the model of public-private partnership in the education
sector, which could be replicated by other NGOs. At the same time, Aziz would face sev-
eral challenges if she took the decision to take over 140 government schools. First, each
school would require additional staff, resulting in a significant jump in the monthly
expenses. The government was not willing to make any financial commitments towards
salary expenses of additional staff. Aziz was concerned that CARE would not be able to
raise sufficient money through her existing donor base and fundraisers. Second, CARE’s
constant struggle with the opposing bureaucracy and teacher unions would only grow
worse once Aziz took over 140 additional schools. Could this possibly lead to a shift in
focus from providing education to fighting with a non-progressive system? Third, Aziz
contemplated whether CARE would be able to find individuals who had sufficient
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integrity, motivation, and discipline for this challenging task. Would CARE be able to
succeed in motivating staff where the government had failed? Would it be possible to
finance so many additional schools, and would Aziz be able to run such a complex
organization?
Was it worthwhile to take over another 140 schools at this point in time, or was it
wise to wait until the institution and leadership were prepared to take over and sustain
such an accelerated pace of growth? Aziz’s belief in her cause and her genuine sense of
concern for her people tempted her to take up the government’s offer. She was of the
view, “every year that we wait and contemplate, thousands of children lose a chance to
life, as they go beyond school- going age without going to school.” However, she knew
that she must choose her options wisely. The growth and future of the organization
depended on her decision.
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Exhibit 7 (continued)
The City District Government acknowledges that the “CARE” shall be taking steps and incurring expense and outlay on upgrading
the schools and therefore shall retain, through the committee, management of the affairs of the schools in accordance with the terms
of the agreement.
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APPENDIX
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and accessibility of a school in the area, and the availability of water and electricity.
Moreover, there is also the phenomenon of “ghost schools.” These public schools exist
only on paper. Funds may have been released by the government for their construction
and some teachers may also be drawing salaries against notified posts, but the schools
do not actually exist on the ground.
The inability of the government schools to provide “quality education” has led to the
growth of private schools, NGO schools, and Madrasas. Private schools cater to the
more privileged segments of the population, charging tuition fees that are unaffordable
to a majority of Pakistani citizens. Most private schools use English as a medium for
instruction, follow internationally accepted systems (e.g., University of Cambridge
International Examinations), recruit qualified and trained teaching staff, and adopt the
latest teaching methodologies. As a result, private schools’ graduates outshine not only
in Pakistan but a significant percentage makes it to foreign universities for higher edu-
cation. Madrasas, on the other hand, offer free education, boarding and lodging, pro-
viding incentives to the homeless and less privileged sectors of society whose demand
for education is weighed down by economic restraints. The standard of education
imparted in government schools and Madrasas is much lower than that at private
schools.
NGO schools started mushrooming during the 1980s and 1990s. While the public
sector was struggling to achieve desirable levels of quality, access and affordability of
education, many NGOs (for example, CARE, The Citizens Foundation (TCF))
stepped in to play their role as socially responsible institutions. With more than one
third of the country’s population living below the poverty line, population rates escalat-
ing each year, and the evident failure of the government in addressing the education
needs at the grass roots through a more micro level presence, NGOs clearly played a sig-
nificant part. According to a survey, there were over 20,000 NGOs present in the coun-
try catering to the education needs of the poor living in the remotest regions of the
country. The main reasons for the growing acceptance of the social sector presence was
the realization that (a) there was a serious funding shortfall which the government could
not bridge on its own and (b) there were many problems at the grass root level (e.g., lack
of competent teachers, high drop out rates, students’ inability to pay for school books
and supplies) which required micro incentives difficult to be addressed by the govern-
ment. Therefore, under the Education Sector Reforms (ESR) 2001-2004, the govern-
ment planned to contract out the up gradation and management of 10 percent (approx-
imately 16,000 schools) of its currently established but under-utilized schools to the pri-
vate sector/NGOs by 2004. The government also planned to offer several incentives,
such as provision of free land, utilities such as electricity and gas at discounted rates to
the private sector/NGOs to improve the education sector of the country.
NOTES
1
Lahore is the capital of the Pakistani province of Punjab. According to the 1998 cen-
sus, Lahore’s population was nearly 7,000,000. This makes Lahore the second largest
city in Pakistan, fifth largest city in South Asia and the 26th largest city in the world.
Under the latest revision of Pakistan’s administrative structure, promulgated in
2001, Lahore was tagged as a City District, and divided into nine towns. Ravi Town
is one of them and comprises one-sixth of Lahore (area wise).
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lahore)
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2
www.sarenapk.com
3
Punjab is the second largest of the four provinces of Pakistan. It is spread over
an area of 205,344 km (79,284 square miles) and is home to nearly 60 percent
of the country’s population. The province is divided into thirty-five districts.
Sheikhupura District is one of the districts of Punjab and is spread over an area
of 3,280 square kilometers. According to the 1998 census of Pakistan, the dis-
trict had a population of 3,321,029, of which 25.45 percent were urban.
(http://pportal.punjab.gov.pk, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lahore)
4
1 Kanal = approximately 44- square yards.
5
Qarshi Industries Pvt. Ltd, established in 1968, is a manufacturer of about 200
herbal based products including medicines, natural spring water and refreshing
drinks. Qarshi Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. is one of the largest natural products company
in Pakistan operating with modern and state-of-the-art production facilities, and is
the only organization in SAARC, Middle East and Africa that has six International
Certifications/Accreditations ISO 9001, ISO 14001, HACCP, ISO 17025 (Norway
and PNAC) and Organic Certification.
6
According to the Labor Force Survey conducted by the government of Pakistan
(2000–2002), the national literacy rate was 50 percent, of which 33.5 percent of the
literate persons had received an education less than grade 10, 9.3 percent had received
an education more than grade 10 but less than grade 12, 3.6 percent had passed grade
12 but less than an undergraduate degree, and only 3.1 percent degree and above
level. The literacy rate for the province of Punjab was 51.8 percent (Rural: 44.3 per-
cent, Urban: 67.4 percent). (Source: : http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/fbs/publica-
tions/lfs2001_2002/results.pdf)
7
Case Study “Cooperation for Advancement, Rehabilitation and Education (CARE):
Empowerment through Education.” Asian Journal of Management Cases Vol. 1, No.
1, 39–60 (2004).
SOURCE
Education Sector Reforms: Action Plan, 2001–2004
(http://www.moe.gov.pk/esr/Chap2.pdf )
Social Development in Pakistan: Annual Review 2002–2003. The State of Education,
SPDC, Karachi.
Human Development in South Asia (2001), Mahbub ul Haq Human Development
Center, Islamabad.
Shah, G. H., Bari F., Ejaz, N. 2005. “The Role of NGOs in Basic and Primary
Education in Pakistan” NGO Pulse Report.
Survey Data (2001) collected by Society for Higher Education (SAHE), Lahore-based
NGO. http://merln.ndu.edu/archive/icg/pakistanreformingtheeducationsector.pdf
Cooperation for Advancement, Rehabilitation, and Education (CARE): Leadership in a Social Sector Organization 19
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