Vietnam US relations

Phạm Phương Uyên

Đinh Thu Vân
Nguyễn Hà My
Twenty-five years after the establishment of bilateral relations in 1995, the United
States and Vietnam are trusted partners with a friendship grounded in mutual respect.
U.S.-Vietnam relations have become increasingly cooperative and comprehensive,
evolving into a flourishing partnership that spans political, economic, security, and
people-to-people ties. The United States supports a strong, prosperous, and
independent Vietnam that contributes to international security; engages in mutually
beneficial trade relations; and respects human rights and the rule of law. Relations are
guided by the 2013 U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership, an overarching
framework for advancing the bilateral relationship, and Joint Statements issued by our
two countries’ leaders in 2015, 2016, and in May and November 2017. In 2020,
Vietnam and the United States commemorated 25 years of diplomatic relations
between the two countries, renewing their commitment to strengthened cooperation.

The Comprehensive Partnership underscores the enduring U.S. commitment to the

Indo-Pacific and provides a mechanism to facilitate cooperation in areas including
political and diplomatic relations, trade and economic ties, defense and security,
science and technology, education and training, environment and health, humanitarian
assistance/disaster relief, war legacy issues, protection and promotion of human rights,
people-to-people ties, and culture, sports, and tourism. The United States supports
capacity building for Vietnam’s law enforcement, regional cross-border cooperation,
and implementation of international conventions and standards. Vietnam is a partner
in nonproliferation regimes, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism, and takes advantage of expertise, equipment, and training available under
the Export Control and Related Border Security program. In 2016, the United States
and Vietnam signed a letter of agreement to increase cooperation on law enforcement
and the justice sector and the two countries are working jointly to implement the
agreement. The United States and Vietnam hold regular dialogues on labor, security,
energy, science & technology, and human rights.

Achieving the fullest possible accounting of Americans missing and unaccounted for
in Indochina is one of the United States’ highest priorities in Vietnam. The Joint
POW/MIA Accounting Command conducts four major investigation and recovery
periods a year in Vietnam, during which specially trained U.S. military and civilian
personnel investigate and excavate hundreds of cases in pursuit of the fullest possible
accounting. Vietnamese-led recovery teams have become regular participants in these
recovery missions since August 2011.

Vietnam remains heavily contaminated by explosive remnants of war, primarily in the

form of unexploded ordnance (UXO) including extensive contamination by cluster
munitions dating from the war with the United States. The United States is the largest
single donor to UXO/mine action in Vietnam, contributing more than $140 million
since 1994, and the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on
continued unexploded ordnance cooperation in December 2013. U.S. efforts to
address legacy issues such as UXO/demining, MIA accounting, and remediation of
Agent Orange provided the foundations for the U.S.-Vietnam defense relationship.
The United States and Vietnam are committed to strengthening defense cooperation
between the two countries as outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding on
Advancing Bilateral Defense Cooperation in 2011 and the U.S.-Vietnam Joint Vision
Statement on Defense Relations signed in 2015, giving priority to humanitarian
cooperation, war legacy issues, maritime security, peacekeeping, and humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief.

In May 2016, the United States fully lifted its ban on the sale of lethal weapons to
Vietnam and continued to provide Vietnam with maritime security assistance –
including through the Maritime Security Initiative, the Cooperative Threat Reduction
program, and Foreign Military Financing. The United States transferred Hamilton-
class Coast Guard cutters to Vietnam in 2017 and 2020 to help improve Vietnam’s
maritime law enforcement capabilities. The United States reaffirmed its support for
Vietnam’s peacekeeping efforts through assistance to Vietnam’s first deployment of
UN peacekeeping forces in 2018, to South Sudan.

U.S.-Vietnam people-to-people ties have flourished. Tens of thousands of Vietnamese

study in the United States, contributing nearly $1 billion to the U.S. economy. The
Fulbright University Vietnam, which matriculated its first undergraduate cohort in
Fall 2019, brings world-class, independent U.S.-style education to Vietnam. More
than 25,000 young Vietnamese are members of the Young Southeast Asia Leaders
Initiative network in Vietnam. The United States and Vietnam signed a Peace Corps
implementing agreement in 2020.

This year marked the transition to a new leadership in Vietnam. Even as Nguyen Phu
Trong stayed on for a third term as general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist
Party (VCP), the other key posts, including president and prime minister, changed
hands. Following the twice-in-a-decade leadership change in April, there have been a
flurry of high-ranking exchanges between Vietnam and its key international partners.

In a phone call with Trong on April 5, Russian President Vladimir Putin accepted an
invitation to visit Vietnam in 2021. This was followed by an official visit by Chinese
Defense Minister Wei Fenghe during May 27-29. Then, upon the completion of the
Vietnam’s National Assembly election in early July, a high-ranking U.S. defense
delegation led by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin arrived in Hanoi on July 28 for a
two-day visit. Soon after, the White House announced that U.S. Vice President
Kamala Harris would visit Vietnam on August 24-26.

This succession of diplomatic exchanges, coming in the midst of the COVID-19

pandemic, reflects the intensifying competition for influence in Vietnam, which has
for years maintained a delicate balancing act among the major powers. On the heels of
Harris’ trip, it is worth asking whether, with two new governments in Hanoi and
Washington, U.S.-Vietnam relations will see any significant changes going forward.

For years, the U.S. has been pushing to upgrade the relationship to the strategic
level. In 2010, during the State Secretary Hilary Clinton’s visit to Hanoi, she
broached the idea of a bilateral strategic partnership. What followed was a
comprehensive partnership agreement in July 2013, when then-Vietnamese
President Truong Tan Sang visited the White House and held talks with then
President Barack Obama. The idea was reiterated again this year in the meeting
between Austin and Vietnamese President Nguyen Xuan Phuc in Hanoi on July 29.
Elevating bilateral relations to a strategic partnership would seem befitting of the
increased cooperation between the two countries and set the ground for more
strategic cooperation.

Yet, sometime on July 29, in its reporting the aforementioned meeting in Hanoi,
the online portal of the VCP surreptitiously revised the headline, from “Elevating
Vietnam-U.S. relations toward Strategic Partnership” to “Vietnam always sees the
U.S. as a leading partner in its foreign policy.” The revision was so quick that it
escaped scrutiny, but was momentous enough to indicate Hanoi’s persistent
reservations about attaching the word “strategic” to its relations with Washington.

This reflects the deep-seated caution that underpins Vietnam’s characterization of

its relations with the United States. In July 2013, upon the issuance of the U.S.-
Vietnam Joint Statement, the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
allegedly directed the media to report the comprehensive partnership in terms of
having been declared, not upgraded. One may question the extent of Hanoi’s trust
toward Washington given its view of the U.S. as a leading partner without
explicitly calling it a strategic partner.

Despite seeing eye-to-eye on the strategic importance of maritime security in the

South China Sea, Vietnam remains hesitant about declaring a strategic partnership
with the U.S. for several reasons.

First, the Vietnamese political system is highly conservative and risk-averse, and
politicians are traditionally reluctant to make decisions that could alter the balance
of Vietnam relations with the major powers. This is true even when taking into
account factionalism for example between conservative/pro-China and
reformist/pro-Western tendencies – within the VCP. While different camps in the
ruling elites may diverge in their agendas and goals, they are unlikely to sway
policy in a drastic manner.

Second, since the doi moi economic reforms of 1986, Vietnam has maintained a
delicate balancing strategy that strictly adheres to the “four-noes”: no military
alliances, no affiliating with one country to counter another, no foreign military
bases on Vietnamese territory, and no force or threats to use force in international
relations. This means that Vietnam is able to maintain its special ties to Russia and
sustain and even deepen cooperation with China, all the while reaching out to other
states, including the U.S., to strengthen economic and military ties. In terms of
military-to-military relations, of Vietnam’s three comprehensive strategic partners,
only Russia is its arms supplier – and by far its biggest. Even India has not been
able to sell its BrahMos missile system to Vietnam despite engaging in talks about
it since 2016. And Israel is the only arms supplier to Vietnam with which the
nation has not signed a strategic or comprehensive partnership.

Seen in this light, Vietnam’s openness to more military-to-military cooperation

with the U.S. is not necessarily an embrace of strategic alignment. While China’s
growing power and its encroachment on Vietnamese territorial waters in the South
China Sea have put the policy to test, Vietnam has found its current strategy to be
by and large successful, and sees no need for change. One unspoken principle
remains in place, which is that as an expression of friendship and desire for
peaceful relations with China, Vietnam is expected to abstain from partnerships or
cooperation with powers that are hostile to China.

This position was voiced in subtle terms by Nguyen Phu Trong in front of the
National Assembly on March 24: “There are works that cannot be publicized,
[such as] how to handle certain times and incidents in the East Sea [South China
Sea], how the western and southwestern parts are, and how our relations with our
neighbors are. Comrades, I must be honest that sometimes handling these issues
was very sensitive, very delicate, but our whole system has done very well.” If
ongoing attempts to defuse tensions in the South China Sea have worked, it is
unlikely that Vietnam will opt for more adventurous moves.

Lastly, a strategic alignment between Vietnam and the U.S. is unlikely to

materialize for the foreseeable future for simple geopolitical reasons. In its
rebalance to Asia, the U.S. has renewed alliances and strengthened partnerships,
attempts that China views as containment or encirclement. Taking sides in the
competition between two great powers is an undesirable prospect. One approach
that has worked well for Vietnam is to raise its voice in the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). As a rising middle power in Southeast Asia,
Vietnam has taken up diplomatic initiatives to reassure and build trust in ASEAN,
raising its profile as a potential leader of the regional bloc.

ASEAN, despite the structural limitations of its non-interference and consensus-

building principles, remains an important arena in which member states position
themselves. By embracing the same principle of neutrality as ASEAN, Vietnam
effectively refrains from not taking sides all the while pushing for other members
to do the same, in order to limit external interference in Southeast Asian affairs,
whether that be from China or the United States.

All things considered, the revision of a headline on a party media mouthpiece

serves as a reminder to observers and analysts that while U.S.-Vietnam relations
have grown by leaps and bounds in many areas, even bordering on the strategic
level in certain aspects of security and defense cooperation, in the current climate
of post-COVID uncertainty, Vietnam is unlikely to embrace an explicit declaration
of strategic partnership.