Kazakhstan Airlines Flight 1907

The most secure means of travelling has been proven to be air. Other forms of transportation i.e.
rail, road and water are not that secure because of the number of accidents that occur on them
within a given period of time. Transportation by air is also the fastest and so a large percentage
of people are inclined to use planes while moving from one place to the other. The only
shortcoming of air transportation is that a very small error can lead to numerous lives or property
being lost. Air accidents are rare but when they occur, they make headlines in every place in the
world. In the emergence of an error while on air transportation, very little can be done by the
staff members or technicians to save the situation. The most suitable option in such a case
scenario would be to equip all the members on board with parachutes and open the exits for
everyone to jump off the plane. Since planes travel at a very fast speed, it becomes difficult for
such safety measures to be realised. Kazakhstan airline flight 1907 is a good case study that
highlights human errors that can lead to people losing lives.
Khazkstan airlines flight 1907 collided with Saudi Arabian flight 763 on 12th November 1996.
The accident saw a total of 349 deaths from both airlines. The planes collide in a region known
as Charkhi Dadri, 100 kilometres to the west of Delhi. It has so far been the world’s deadliest
mid-air collision on Indian soil (Hartman pg. 2). The Saudi Arabian flight had 312 members on
boards and was flying on the first leg of a predetermined international service flight known as
Delhi Dhahran Jeddah. It had a registration HZ-AIH and was a Boeing 747-168B. Kazakhstan
airline, on the other hand, registered UN-76435, was from Chimkement Airport though on
charter service. Approach controller VK Dutta was used to control both fights. Gennadi
Cherepanov was the flight attendant for KZA 1907 and relied on Egor Repp who served as his
radio operator. The SVA 763 flight was under control by pilot Khalid Al Shubaily and engineer
Edris.
On reaching approximately 137 km from a beacon of the destined airport, KAZ 1907 was cleared
to descend to about 15,000 feet. SVA 73 at the time, was also travelling in the same path as KZA
1907 but in the opposite direction. SVA 73 was given clearance to reach up to 14,000 feet. Eight
minutes into the clearance, KZA 1907 reported having reached its expected attitude of 15,000
feet. The information was not somehow correct since the actual altitude was approximately 14,
500 feet. Even at this point, the KZA 1907 was still descending in altitude. Dutta, the controller
was somehow able to observe this inconvenience. The controller tried to communicate with the
pilot of the KZA 1907 and warn him that he was not flying on the required altitude (Shipley,
pg184). There was somehow an obstacle in communication faced and so the controller could not
communicate with the pilot.
The controller then proceeded to warn other flights to be wary of their distance. The
action/communication was somehow rather late for the staff who barded SVA 763. The two
aeroplanes had already collided. KZA 1907’s tail cut through the left wing of SVA 763 as well
as the horizontal stabiliser. The Boeing then lost control and quickly descended in a spiral
manner with fire noticeable on the wing. Sadly, the Boeing crushed even before hitting the
ground. The speed with which it hit the ground was approximately 1130 km/h. the Ilyushin, on
the other hand, remained intact even as it descended into the ground. It crashed into a field
although in a rapid and uncontrolled manner (Walker, pg40). Rescuers were then sent into the
field to offer medical services to those who might have been alive yet seriously injured. The
rescuers were able to locate four injured persons from the Ilyushin. Before any major medical
service could be conducted to the survivors, the passengers were pronounced dead. Meanwhile,
two passengers from the Saudi flight were found to be alive though in critical condition. They
were still strapped onto their seats and so most parts of their body was intact. They later
succumbed because of internal injuries. In the end, all 312 passengers from the SVA 763 and 37
passengers from the KZA 1907 were pronounced dead.
A captain who happened to be operating a different plane observed the collision. In his own
words, he saw “a large cloud lit up with an orange glow”. He was yet to make an initial approach
while on a Lockheed C-141B when he noticed the mid-air collision. He had previously not
witnessed such an accident before and so was shocked. He could not believe what he had seen
and so had to stare at the orange glow for a while. He then proceeded to land in order to know
what exactly had happened on air that made the cloud be lit. Captain Timothy J. Place, happened
to be working for the United States air force and was the only eyewitness to the event.
The Saudi aircraft remains was found in Bhiwani district at a place known as Dhani village.
Kazakh aircraft remains, on the other hand, were found in Rohtak district at a place known as
Birohar village. The whole collision occurred 100 km to the west of Delhi. The parts of the
aircraft were scattered over a wide distance and so locating the surviving passengers became an
issue. A considerable amount of time was taken in locating the survivors of the unfortunate
incident.
The captain in control of the KZA 1907 was 44 years of age and had previously flown for more
than 9,000 hours. A Kyrgyzstan company chartered the flight and on board were Russian Kyrgyz
citizens with the aim of shopping in India. A total of 13 Kyrgyz traders were present on the
aircraft. The captain of the SVA 763 was 45 years of age and had a record of 9,800 hours of
successful flight to his name. 215 Indian members boarded the flight and worked in Saudi
Arabia. 40 Nepalis, 3 Americans and people from 17 other nationalities boarded the Saudi
Arabian plane with no knowledge that death awaited them.
Lahoti commission investigated the mid-air collision accident under the authority of Delhi high
court judge at that time Ramesh Chandra Lahoti. Depositions from the air traffic controllers’
guild as well as the two airlines were taken for investigation. Supervision was from the air crash
investigators based in Famborough and Moscow, England. Saudi and Khazkstan airlines decoded
the flight data decoders to be used for the investigation. The primary cause of the accident was
discovered to be by the Kazakhstan air flight 1907. The pilot of the aircraft failed to follow ATC
instructions. The reason could have been either as a result of cloud turbulence but most probably
communication barrier.
The commission well elaborated on the fact that the Kazakh commander descended from
assigned altitude without any guidance. At first, he descended to 14,500 feet instead of 15,000
feet. He later continued to descend lower into the ground. The pilot did not conduct himself in an
ethical manner and so caused the death of many innocent people. The operating procedures were
seriously breached and seemingly it was because of the communication barrier. The pilot did not
understand well the English language and so relied on the radio operator for communication. The
radio operator, on his part, did not have own flight instrumentation and so had to struggle to be
able to make a reading. Apparently, the plane descended even lower than anticipated because the
pilots were fighting turbulence amidst humongous cumulus cloud.
Measuring terms also seem to have been an issue for the Kazakh pilots. Throughout their
training, they were used to interpreting data in a given measuring quantity. Miles quantity of
measuring is most of the times used by pilots in doing the calculation and even speed is
calculated in miles (Walker, pg39). Every pilot is mandated to know how to use miles and feet as
well as their associated terms. Indian air controller’s complained that the Kazakh pilots had
difficulty when it came to a calculation. This is because they knew how to use well the meter and
kilometers measurements as opposed to the feet and nautical miles used by other countries. At
times, they had to convert the readings recorded/given to them into familiar measurements which
gave room to error. They could, therefore, end up taking much time doing basic calculation while
in the air which could have led to the rapid accident.
From the accident scene, it was obvious that the Kazakhstan air flight 1907 hit the Saudi Arabian
flight from below. The Saudi Arabian flight had no information that a plane was approaching
from beneath and so did not engage in any encountering activity that could have saved the
situation (Shipley, pg184). The radio operator from the Kazakhstan air flight 1907 realised that
they had gone much lower in terms of altitude. He might have made calculations to be assured
that the altitude from which they were operating was lower than expected. He then informed the
pilot of this finding which made the pilot order a full throttle. The plane then began climbing in a
bid to reach the altitude of 15,000 feet that was assigned to them previously. While climbing the
altitude, the Kazakhstan plane hit the Saudi plane’s left wing. It is likely that without the
captain’s order for full throttle, the Kazakhstan plane would have proceeded well under the Saudi
flight and no accident could have resulted.
The air crash investigation team came up with some recommendations after the incident to help
prevent future casualties. A number of procedures, as well as infrastructure at the New Delhi’s
airspace, were put in place. To start with, air corridors were to be constructed. The air corridors
would help in separating the inbound and outbound aircraft (Walker, pg42). Secondly, collision
avoidance equipment would have to be installed on all commercial aircraft within Indian
airspace. Thirdly, a secondary air traffic control radar with the purpose of controlling aircraft
data would have to be installed. Last but not least, the aircraft investigation team recommended a
reduction of airspace within New Delhi. Previously, New Delhi had total control of the Indian air
force but that now had to change.
Saudi Arabian Airlines Flight 763:
The captain of the flight was a 45-year old veteran pilot with more than 9,800 flying hours. The
report stated that 40 Nepalis and three Americans boarded the Saudi flight. The passenger
manifest included 17 people of other nationalities, including nine Nepalis, three Pakistanis, two
Americans, one Bangladeshi, one Briton, and one Saudi. Twelve of the crew members, including
five anti-terrorism officials, were Saudi citizens.
Kazakhstan Airlines Flight 1907:
The captain of Flight 1907, aged 44, was also highly experienced, with more than 9,200 flight
hours. A company from Kyrgyzstan chartered the flight, and the passenger manifest mostly
included ethnic Russian Kyrgyz citizens planning to go shopping in India.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
KZA1907 was cleared to descend to 15,000 feet (4,600 m) when it was 74 nautical miles (137
km) from the beacon of the destination airport while SVA763, travelling on the same airway as
KZA1907 but in the opposite direction, was cleared to climb to 14,000 feet (4,300 m). About
eight minutes later, around 18:40, KZA1907 reported having reached its assigned altitude of
15,000 feet (4,600 m) but it was actually lower, at 14,500 feet (4,400 m), and still descending. At
this time, ATC advised the flight, "Identified traffic 12 o'clock, reciprocal Saudi Boeing 747, 10
nautical miles (19 km). Report in sight.
When the controller called KZA1907 again, he received no reply. He warned of the other flight's
distance, but it was too late. The two aircraft had collided, the tail of KZA1907 cutting through
SVA763's left wing and horizontal stabilizer. The crippled Boeing quickly lost control and went
into a rapidly descending spiral with fire trailing from the wing. The Boeing broke up before
crashing into the ground at a nearly supersonic speed of 1,135 km/h (705 mph). The Ilyushin
remained structurally intact as it entered a steady but rapid and uncontrolled descent until it
crashed in a field. Rescuers discovered four critically injured passengers from the Ilyushin, but
they all died soon afterwards. Two passengers from the Saudi flight survived the crash, still
strapped to their seats, only to die of internal injuries soon after. In the end, all 312 people on
board SVA763 and all 37 people on KZA1907 were killed.
FINDINGS:
The Kazakhstan aircraft Ilyushin IL-76 TD No-UN-76435 was on a non-scheduled chartered
flight from Chimkent to Delhi.
The IL-76 aircraft took off from Chimkent on 12.11.1996 at 10.25 UTC for Delhi. The flying
time was about 3 hrs. There were 37 persons on board, including 5 cockpit crew and five cabin
crew.
The IL-76 aircraft came in first contact with Delhi Approach at 13.04.55 and reported passing
FL230 and 74 miles from DPN.
The IL-76 was cleared by the Delhi Approach to descend to FL150 at 13.05.06 and this was
acknowledged by the aircraft five minutes before collision.
At 13.08.54 the D-APP asked the IL-76 for the distance from DPN and the aircraft responded at
13.08.59 "Kazak-1907, now reached one five zero, four six miles from Delta Papa November
(DPN), Radial two seven zero".
The IL-76 and the D-APP were in continuous two-way contact, during which time D-APP asked
the IL-76 to maintain FL150 which the aircraft acknowledged. The D-APP also informed the IL-
76 of the reciprocal Saudi Boeing at FL 140. In response to the D-APP asking the IL-76 to report
if the. Boeing is in sight, the 106 responded at 13.09.41, "Now looking 1907". This was the last
transmission from the IL-76 to the ATC.
The entire communication from the IL-76 aircraft to the ATC was by the Radio Operator and it
was in English.
The Saudi Boeing-747 was on a scheduled flight from Delhi to Dhahran and took off from IGI
Airport Delhi at 13.03 UTC on 12.11.1996. There were 312 persons oh board including 3 cockpit
crew and 20 cabin crew.
Initially the Boeing was cleared by ATC to climb to FL 100 and at 13.06.13 the aircraft was
cleared to climb to FL 140. The aircraft reported approaching FL140 at 13.08.41 and the ATC
asked the aircraft at 13.08.44 to maintain FL 140, and standby for higher. At 13.08.52 the Saudi
Boeing acknowledged Saudi seven six three (will) maintain one four zero" (AAIB Report page
00216). This was the last transmission from the Saudi aircraft to the ATC.
The Saudi B-747 had been assigned FL140 whereas the Kazak IL-76 was. assigned FL150 for a
safe crossing on the reciprocal tracks.
Vertical separation of 1,000 feet for the crossing of the two aircraft as assigned by the Delhi Air
Traffic Control was adequate and met the ICAO standards of safety.
The Saudi Aircraft meticulously maintained FL140.
The Kazak Aircraft descended to FL140 (departing from the assigned FL150) just prior to the
anticipated crossing.
The factors contributing to the unauthorized descent of Kazak aircraft to FL-140, departing from
the assigned FL-150,
Inadequate knowledge of English language of Kazak pilot, resulting in wrong
interpretations of ATC instructions
Poor airmanship and lack of proper CRM (Crew Resource Management) skill on the part
of PIC (Pilot-in-Command) compounded by leadership quality lacking in him.
Casual attitude of the crew and lack of coordination in the performance of their
respective duties by crew of Kazak aircraft.
Absence of standard callouts from any crew member.
All in all, air accidents can be minimized by implementing stringent measures. In the case of
Kazakhstan airline flight 1907, a better communication channel could have helped save the 349
lives lost. The pilot in control of the plane at the time had a good experience as he had flown a
number of planes successfully. The pilot’s only weakness was the inability to interpret the
English language. He relied on other personnel for instructions which led to him heading into a
collision with another plane. Accidents are not only because of human error but sometimes
technical error. Aero planes, therefore, need to check each and every time they depart or land in
any given airline. Constant maintenance can help discover some faults within an aero plane and
hence preventive

CONCLUSION and RECOMMEDATIONS:

The Directorate General of Civil Aviation subsequently made it mandatory for all
aircraft flying in and out of India to be equipped with an airborne collision avoidance
system. This set a worldwide precedent for mandatory use of Traffic Collision Avoidance
System.
The requirement of proficiency in English, which is the language accepted by ICAO for
radio communications on international flights, should be strictly ensured by contracting
States. ICAO should devise ways and means to ensure such compliance by contracting
States so as to avoid lapses in their part.
Meaningful Crew Resource Management Program should be made an integral part of
crew training curriculum with special emphasis laid on the importance of standard call-
outs and its efficacy be evaluated during periodic license renewal checks.
Before a pilot is appointed as "Pilot-in-Command" his having acquired effective CRM
skill and qualities of leadership should be meticulously ensured.
In the enroute phase, a crew other than pilots may handle radio communications with
ATC subject to basic flying instruments being in his view
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Society Of Korea, doi:10.30529/amsok.2018.16.3.002.

Walker, P.B. "The Scientific Investigation Of Aircraft Accidents". Aircraft Engineering And

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