PESS 2021 - Sesi 7 - YIM

Topic-6 _ Tata Letak Pabrik & P&ID (Piping and July 31st, 2021
Instrumentation Diagram) _ Yulan Ibnu

Mulkam, ST
P&ID Reviews
using
Hazops Method
Process Engineering Summer School
July 31st, 2021
TTK Goes to Campus
Presented by
Yulan Ibnu Mulkam, ST
HAZOP Facilitator for Refinery Units
• RU II Dumai • RU IV Cilacap
• RU II Sei Pakning • RU V Balikpapan
• RU III Plaju • RU VI Balongan
Process Safety Consultant in various Industries:
Upstream Offshore & Onshore Facilities
Oil Refinery Unit
Gas Processing Plant
Bio-Refinery Plant
Petrochemical Plant
Power Plant
P&ID Review using HAZOPS Method 1

Mulkam, ST
Process Safety Review

Methods
Qualitative Methods Safety Reviews
Checklists
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
What-If Reviews
Hazard and Operability Reviews (HAZOP)
Bow-Tie Analysis (BTA)
Fishbone
Source : Safety and Security Review for the Process Industries, 4th Edition.

Mulkam, ST
Quantitative Methods Safety Reviews
Event Trees
Fault Trees
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
Layers of Protective Analysis (LOPA;
semiqualitative)
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Analysis
Hazard and Operability

Reviews
(HAZOP)

Mulkam, ST
Origins Of Qualitative Safety Reviews

HAZOP reviews originally began in the chemical industry in the United
Kingdom during the 1960s.
Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. (ICI) developed a standardized method of
analyzing processing hazards based on basic operation conditions and then
changed individual parameters one at a time to see the subsequent
consequences.
This evolved into a standard practice within their company and soon found its
way into the general chemical industry (although it was not universally or
consistently applied).
Limitations and Disadvantages
It needs a moderate level of skill to implement.

It may be slower to implement than other
methods.

Mulkam, ST
Advantages
It uses a systematic and logical approach.

It can analyze a combination of failures.
It provides an insight into operability features.
HAZOP
TEAM

Mulkam, ST
Minimum Team Members

Team Leader
Scribe
Project Manager (Project, Process, or Facility
Engineer)
Operations or Manufacturing Representative
Loss Prevention/Safety Representative
Security Officer (for SVA)
Supplemental Members
PSM Coordinator
Maintenance Representative
HSE (Health, Safety, and Environmental) Representative
Process, Chemical, Manufacturing, Facility, or Construction Engineers
Drilling or Production Engineers
Project Designers/Engineers (Electrical, Instrumentation, Piping, etc.)
Operation Technicians or Supervisors
Specialized Consultants
Equipment Fabricators or Vendors

Mulkam, ST
Leadership Influences
Look at things from the other person’s perspective.

Offer genuine appreciation and praise.
Harness the power of enthusiasm.
Respect the dignity of others.
Don’t be overly critical.
Give people a good reputation to live up to.
Keep a sense of fun and balance.
HAZOP
REFERENCE DATA

Mulkam, ST
HAZOP Reference Data

Piping and Instrumentation Drawings (P&IDs) that are “as-built” verified for the existing
processing facilities.
Plot plan or equipment and main piping layout and pertinent elevation drawings,
including surface drainage arrangements.
Cause and effects charts (SAFE charts) with schedule of alarm and trip settings
P&IDs for vendor packages
System design philosophy and process description
Fire and explosion protection system drawings or arrangements (fire and gas
detection/alarm, protection passive and active)
Chemical and physical properties of commodities involved, especially hazardous
materials (crude oil Gas Oil Ratio (GOR), Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS),
Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs), etc.)

ERPs indicating responsibilities and duties of management (if available, the
local fire station pre-incident plan should also be provided)
Operating procedures (including startup/shutdown and emergency) and
maintenance schedules
Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs) and material and energy balances
Electrical hazardous area diagrams
Full description and system design calculations of ESD isolation and depressing
(blowdown) capabilities including headers, vents, and flares
Design duties and basis of calculation of all relief valves, rupture disks, etc.
Corrosion monitoring and prevention systems

Mulkam, ST

Engineering design data sheets for all plant items including vendor items
Data sheets for instruments and control valves
Piping and material specifications (if not indicated elsewhere)
Flare, vent, and drainage header diagrams
Electrical single-line diagrams
Instrumentation philosophy (local/remote control, hardwired/data highway,
failure mode(s), analog/digital, emergency alarms, DCS display alarm
histories, etc.)
Drawings showing interfaces to existing systems

Special studies or calculations (vapor dispersions, blast over pressure, etc.)
Environmental ambient data (expected temperatures, weather, seismic, etc.)
Utilities specifications and reliability (power, water, sewer, etc.)
Design codes and standards employed (API, NFPA, ANSI, ASME, IEC, ISA, NACE,
etc.)
Manning levels, distribution of personnel, levels of supervision, and
evacuation routes or plans
Job Safety Analysis (JSA) for critical tasks
Ergonomic or human factors features (color coding, accessibility, practical
use, languages and instructions, etc.)

Mulkam, ST
HAZOP
PROCEDURE
HAZOP Study Procedure

Definitions
Initiate the study
Define Scope and objectives
Define roles and responsibilities
Preparation
Plan the study
Collect data and documentation
Establish guide words and deviation
Source : BS EN 61882:2016 Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP studies) – Application Guide

Mulkam, ST
HAZOP Study Procedure

Examination
Structure the examination
Perform the examination
Documentation and Follow Up
Establish method of recording
Output the study
Record the information
Sign off the documentation
Follow up and responsibilities
HAZOP
WORKSHEET

Mulkam, ST
HAZOP Worksheet
Guideword (GW): Simple word or phrase used to generate deviations by
application on a system or process activities (e.g., pressure, level, and temp)
Deviation: A departure from the design and operating intention (e.g., high,
low, more, and less)
Causes: Reasons that deviations occur (failures, wrong operation, etc.)
Consequences: The effects of a deviation resulting from various causes (fire,
explosion, process upset, etc.)
Safeguards: Measures taken to prevent or mitigate the risk of accidents
(operator surveillance, instrumentation, ESD, blowdown, etc.)
Severity: The magnitude of physical or intangible loss consequences
(qualitative measure of consequences compared to industry experience)
HAZOP Worksheet
Likelihood: A measure of the expected frequency of an event’s occurrence
(qualitative measure of probability based on historical data or theoretical
estimate)
Ranking: The qualitative estimation of risk from severity and likelihood levels
in order to provide a prioritizing of risk based on its magnitude (refer to
corporate risk matrix for ranking based on severity and likelihood levels)
Recommendations: Activities identified that may reduce a risk through the
lowering of a probability or consequence level (suggested safety improvement
to a process to reduce risk level)
Comments: Technical notes of the facility, system, or process under study
(supplemental information about the issue being discussed)

Mulkam, ST
HAZOP
REVIEW
HAZOP Review Step

Mulkam, ST
HAZOP Review Step
Define the assumptions about the facility to be accepted

during the review process.
Define the boundaries and operational mode(s) of the
facility under review.
Select and confirm the scope of a node.
Explain the general design intentions and operating
conditions of the node.
Specify the node’s process parameters.
HAZOP Review Step

Select a process parameter (flow, pressure, etc.) and
specify the design intention relating to this parameter.
Apply a deviation (more, less, etc.) to the parameter and
develop a meaningful scenario (causes/hazards) from the
intention.
Identify all scenarios (causes/hazards) of the deviation
from the intention.
Identify all major consequences associated with each
cause without regard to safeguards.
Specify predominate safeguards against each
consequence.

Mulkam, ST
HAZOP Review Step

Determine the probability and severity of each consequence
Make recommendations to mitigate the consequences if the severity or
probability is unacceptable, according to the company’s risk acceptance
levels.
Reiterate above steps for other guidewords.
Reiterate above steps for other process parameters.
Reiterate above steps for all other nodes in review.
The review team should rank all produced recommendations in priority of
assigned risk for schedule of implementation. Ranking of recommendations
assists senior management in allocating resources.
Prepare summary and listing of recommendations in order of priority
(ranking).
HAZOP
GUIDEWORDS

Mulkam, ST
HAZOP Parameter
Source : HAZOP Guide to Best Practice, 3rd Edition, IChemE.
Basic Guide Words and Their Generic

Meanings

Mulkam, ST
Guide Words Relating To Clock Time And

Order Or Sequence
HAZOP Deviation Matrix

Mulkam, ST
HAZOP
POSSIBLE CAUSES
Parameter, Deviation, and Possible

Causes
Flow
High
Increased pumping capacity
Increased suction pressure
Reduced delivery head
Greater fluid density
Exchanger tube leaks

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Flow
High
Restriction orifice plates not installed
Cross-connection of systems
Control faults
Control valve trim changed
Running multiple pumps

Causes
Flow
Less
Restriction
Wrong routing
Filter blockage
Defective pump(s)
Fouling of vessel(s), valves, orifice plates

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Flow
Less
Density or viscosity changes
Cavitation
Drain leaking
Valve not fully open

Causes
Flow
None
Wrong routing
Blockage
Incorrect slip plate
One-way (check) valve in backward
Pipe or vessel rupture

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Flow
None
Large leak
Equipment failure
Isolation in error
Incorrect pressure differential
Gas locking

Causes
Flow
Reverse
Defective one-way (check) valve
Siphon effect
Incorrect pressure differential
Two-way flow
Emergency venting

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Flow
Reverse
Incorrect operation
In-line spare equipment
Pump failure
Pump reversed

Causes
Level
High
Outlet isolated or blocked
Inflow greater than outflow control failure
Faulty level measurement
Gravity liquid balancing

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Level
High
Flooding
Pressure surges
Corrosion
Sludge

Causes
Level
Low
Inlet flow stops
Leak
Outflow greater than inflow
Control failure
Faulty level measurement

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Level
Low
Draining of vessel
Flooding
Pressure surges
Corrosion
Sludge

Causes
Pressure
High
Surge problems
Connection to high pressure
Gas (surge) breakthrough
Inadequate volume of vents

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Pressure
High
Incorrect vent set pressure for vents
Relief valves isolated
Thermal overpressure
Positive displacement pumps

Causes
Pressure
High
Failed open PCV
Boiling
Freezing
Chemical breakdown

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Pressure
High
Scaling
Foaming
Condensation
Sedimentation

Causes
Pressure
High
Gas release
Priming
Exploding
Imploding

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Pressure
High
External fire
Weather conditions
Hammer
Changes in viscosity/density

Causes
Pressure
Low
Generation of vacuum conditions
Condensation
Gas dissolving in liquid
Restricted pump/compressor line

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Pressure
Low
Undetected leakage
Vessel drainage
Blockage of blanket gas regulating valve
Boiling

Causes
Pressure
Low
Cavitation
Freezing
Chemical breakdown
Flashing

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Pressure
Low
Sedimentation
Scaling
Foaming

Causes
Pressure
Low
Gas release
Priming
Exploding
Imploding

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Pressure
Low
Fire conditions
Weather conditions
Changes in viscosity/density

Causes
Pressure
Low
Cavitation
Freezing
Chemical breakdown
Flashing

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Pressure
Low
Sedimentation
Scaling
Foaming

Causes
Temperature
High
Ambient conditions
Fouled or failed exchanger tubes
Fire situation
Cooling water failure
Defective control valve

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Temperature
High
Heater control failure
Internal fires
Reaction control failures
Heating medium leak into process
Faulty instrumentation and control

Causes
Temperature
Low
Ambient conditions
Reducing pressure
Fouled or failed exchanger tubes

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Temperature
Low
Loss of heating
Depressurization of liquefied gas—Joule
Thompson effect
Faulty instrumentation and control

Causes
Part of
Concentration Wrong
Leaking isolation valves
Leaking exchanger tubes
Phase change
Incorrect feedstock specification

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Part of
Concentration Wrong
Process control upset
Reaction byproducts
Ingress of water, steam, fuel, lubricants,
corrosion products from high pressure system
Gas entrainment

Causes
As Well as
Contaminants
Leaking exchanger tubes
Leaking isolation valves
Incorrect operation of system
Interconnected systems
Wrong additives
Ingress of air: shutdown and start-up conditions

Mulkam, ST

Causes
As Well as
Contaminants
Elevation changes, fluid velocities
Ingress of water, steam, fuel, lubricants, corrosion
Products from high-pressure system
Gas entrainment
Feed stream impurities (mercury, H2S, CO2, etc.)

Causes
Other Than
Wrong Material
Incorrect or off specification feedstock
Incorrect operation
Wrong material delivered

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Viscosity
More
Incorrect material or composition
Incorrect temperature
High solids concentration
Settling of slurries

Causes
Viscosity
Less
Incorrect material or composition
Incorrect temperature
Solvent flushing

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Relief System
Relief philosophy (process/fire)
Type of relief device and reliability
Relief valve discharge location

Causes
Relief System
Pollution implications
Two-phase flow
Low capacity (inlet and outlet)

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Corrosion / Erosion
Cathodic protection arrangements (internal and
external)
Coating applications
Corrosion monitoring methods and frequencies
Materials specification
Zinc embrittlement

Causes
Corrosion / Erosion
Stress corrosion cracking
Fluid velocities
Sour service (H2S, mercury, etc.)
Riser splash zone

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Service Failures
Instrument air
Steam
Nitrogen
Cooling water

Causes
Service Failures
Hydraulic power
Electric power
Water supply
Telecommunications

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Service Failures
PLCs/computers/DCS
HVAC
Fire protection (detection and suppression)

Causes
Abnormal Operation
Purging
Flushing
Start-up
Normal shutdown

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Abnormal Operation
Emergency shutdown
Emergency operations
Inspection of operating machines
Guarding of machinery

Causes
Maintenance / Procedures
Isolation philosophy
Drainage
Purging
Cleaning

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Drying
Access
Rescue plan
Training

Causes
Pressure testing
Work permit system
Condition monitoring
Lift and manual handling

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Static
Flame arrestors
Hot work
Hot surfaces
Auto-ignition or pyrophoric materials

Causes
Spare Equipment
Installed/not installed
Availability of spares
Modified specifications
Storage of spares
Catalog of spares

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Sampling / Procedures
Sampling procedure
Time for analysis results
Calibration of automatic samplers
Reliability/accuracy of representative
sample
Diagnosis of results

Causes
Time
Too long
Too short
Wrong time

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Action
Overkill
Underestimated
None
Reverse

Causes
Action
Incomplete
Knock-on
Wrong action

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Information
Confusing
Inadequate
Missing
Misinterpreted

Causes
Information
Partial
Stress
Wrong information

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Sequence
Operation too early
Operation too late
Operation left out
Operation performed backward

Causes
Sequence
Operation not completed
Supplemental action taken
Wrong action in operation

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Safety Systems
Fire and gas detection and alarms
Emergency shutdown (ESD) arrangements
Emergency response/pre-incident plans
Firefighting response

Causes
Safety Systems
Emergency training
Threshold limit values (TLVs) of process
materials and method of detection
First aid/medical resources
Vapor and effluent disposal

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Safety Systems
Testing of safety equipment
Compliance with local and national
regulations
Quantitative risk assessments

Causes
Global
Layout and arrangement
Public encroachment toward facility
Weather (temperature, humidity, flooding, winds,
sandstorm, blizzards, etc.)
Geological or seismic
Human factors (labeling, identification, access,
instructions, training, qualifications, etc.)

Mulkam, ST

Causes
Global
Fire and explosion
Adjacent facility exposures
Incorrect rail car operations or
precautions
Cyberattacks on operating systems
P&ID Reviews
using
Hazops Method
Examples

Mulkam, ST
Thank You
Process Engineering Summer School
July 31st, 2021
TTK Goes to Campus

PESS 2021 - Sesi 7 - YIM

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Topic-6 _ Tata Letak Pabrik & P&ID (Piping and July 31st, 2021

Instrumentation Diagram) _ Yulan Ibnu

P&ID Review using HAZOPS Method 1

Process Safety Review

Qualitative Methods Safety Reviews

P&ID Review using HAZOPS Method 2

Quantitative Methods Safety Reviews

Hazard and Operability

P&ID Review using HAZOPS Method 3

Origins Of Qualitative Safety Reviews

Limitations and Disadvantages

It needs a moderate level of skill to implement.

P&ID Review using HAZOPS Method 4

It uses a systematic and logical approach.

P&ID Review using HAZOPS Method 5

Minimum Team Members

P&ID Review using HAZOPS Method 6

Look at things from the other person’s perspective.

P&ID Review using HAZOPS Method 7

HAZOP Reference Data

HAZOP Reference Data

P&ID Review using HAZOPS Method 8

HAZOP Reference Data

HAZOP Reference Data

P&ID Review using HAZOPS Method 9

HAZOP Study Procedure

P&ID Review using HAZOPS Method 10

HAZOP Study Procedure

P&ID Review using HAZOPS Method 11

P&ID Review using HAZOPS Method 12

HAZOP Review Step

P&ID Review using HAZOPS Method 13

HAZOP Review Step

Define the assumptions about the facility to be accepted

HAZOP Review Step

P&ID Review using HAZOPS Method 14

HAZOP Review Step

P&ID Review using HAZOPS Method 15

Source : HAZOP Guide to Best Practice, 3rd Edition, IChemE.

Basic Guide Words and Their Generic

P&ID Review using HAZOPS Method 16

Guide Words Relating To Clock Time And

HAZOP Deviation Matrix

P&ID Review using HAZOPS Method 17

Parameter, Deviation, and Possible

P&ID Review using HAZOPS Method 18

Parameter, Deviation, and Possible

Parameter, Deviation, and Possible

P&ID Review using HAZOPS Method 19

Parameter, Deviation, and Possible

Parameter, Deviation, and Possible

P&ID Review using HAZOPS Method 20

Parameter, Deviation, and Possible

Parameter, Deviation, and Possible

P&ID Review using HAZOPS Method 21

Parameter, Deviation, and Possible

Parameter, Deviation, and Possible

P&ID Review using HAZOPS Method 22

Parameter, Deviation, and Possible

Parameter, Deviation, and Possible

P&ID Review using HAZOPS Method 23

Parameter, Deviation, and Possible

Parameter, Deviation, and Possible