Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 209 (2021) 105158

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Experimental Child

Psychology
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jecp

The mediating effect of language on the

development of cognitive and affective
theory of mind
Felicity J. Bigelow ⇑, Gillian M. Clark, Jarrad A.G. Lum, Peter G. Enticott
Cognitive Neuroscience Unit, School of Psychology, Deakin University, Geelong, Victoria 3220, Australia

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Theory of mind (ToM) development is critical to effective social

Received 7 September 2020 functioning and appears to depend on complementary language
Revised 18 February 2021 abilities. The current study explored the mediating influence of
Available online 7 May 2021
language on the development of both cognitive and affective
ToM. A total of 151 children aged 5–12 years completed ToM (cog-
Keywords:
nitive and affective) and language assessments, and parents pro-
Empathy
Cognitive empathy
vided ratings of their children’s empathic ability. Results showed
Cognitive theory of mind that language mediated the relationship between age and both
Affective theory of mind cognitive and affective ToM but not parent-reported cognitive
Language empathy. Examination of younger and older subgroups revealed
Early and middle childhood that language mediated cognitive and affective ToM differently
across developmental periods. Findings highlight the dynamic role
that language plays in the development of both cognitive and affec-
tive ToM throughout early and middle childhood.
Ó 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open
access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/).

Introduction

A key component of cognitive empathy is the ability to understand others’ mental and emotional
states, commonly referred to as theory of mind (ToM). ToM is critical to understanding social environ-
ments and is also thought to be necessary for proficient prosocial behavior (Astington & Jenkins,
1995). ToM is commonly separated into affective and cognitive components; affective ToM involves

⇑ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: fbigelow@deakin.edu.au (F.J. Bigelow).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2021.105158
0022-0965/Ó 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
F.J. Bigelow, G.M. Clark, Jarrad A.G. Lum et al. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 209 (2021) 105158

the ability to infer the emotions of another, whereas cognitive ToM involves inferring others’ mental
states such as thoughts, beliefs, intentions, and motivations (Sebastian et al., 2011).
Cognitive ToM and affective ToM follow different developmental trajectories throughout childhood
(Cassetta, Pexman, & Goghari, 2018). There is general consensus that children begin to display behav-
iors indicating the existence of cognitive ToM by 3 or 4 years of age (Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007;
Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). To acquire cognitive ToM, children must understand that others can
have independent beliefs that are distinct from reality (otherwise known as false beliefs). Following
the knowledge that someone can hold an independent belief, this skill is extended on throughout
childhood to include an understanding that someone can hold a false belief about another’s belief,
or a second-order false belief (Liddle & Nettle, 2006). Typically, children acquire the ability to attribute
second-order false beliefs (e.g., ‘‘She thinks that he thinks”) by 6 or 7 years of age (Astington, Pelletier,
& Homer, 2002; Perner & Wimmer, 1985). Recursive cognitive ToM skills continue to develop, with
children performing better than chance on third-order false belief tasks (e.g., ‘‘She thinks that he
thinks that she thinks”) by 10 or 11 years of age (Liddle & Nettle, 2006).
Affective ToM ability has been shown to develop with age across early childhood (Gallant, Lavis, &
Mahy, 2020) and into adulthood (Gabriel et al., 2021). The ability to recognize a facial emotion may
indicate an emerging affective ToM (Mier et al., 2010). Facial emotion discrimination is evident in chil-
dren as young as 7 months, indicating a very early capacity to perceive facial expressions (Kotsoni, de
Haan, & Johnson, 2001). Differentiating between affective expressions may illustrate initial affective
ToM skills during childhood as children are required to evaluate the emotional states depicted in
expressions. The recognition of certain emotions develops earlier in childhood than others. For exam-
ple, Lawrence, Campbell, and Skuse (2015) found that children aged 6–12 years were equally accurate
at identifying facial emotions of sadness and anger. For emotions such as disgust and surprise, how-
ever, accuracy improved across this age range and further into adolescence. To acquire affective ToM,
children must understand not only that others can have independent beliefs distinct from reality but
also that they can have independent emotional states. Previous research has suggested that affective
ToM is reliant on foundational skills associated with cognitive ToM (Shamay-Tsoory, Harari, Aharon-
Peretz, & Levkovitz, 2010), and therefore it is likely that the growth of more advanced affective ToM
abilities occurs later in development than the cognitive component. Typically, children begin to
develop the ability to attribute an understanding about a second-order emotional belief (e.g., ‘‘She
thinks that he feels”) at 9–11 years of age (Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999).
The emergence of cognitive and affective ToM-related abilities during early childhood coincides
with the development of other skills such as language and executive functioning (Astington &
Jenkins, 1999; Miller, 2001; Moses, 2001; Rajkumar, Yovan, Raveendran, & Russell, 2008; Wellman
et al., 2001). Indeed, language and ToM have been suggested to share a reciprocal relationship at dif-
ferent developmental stages (Ebert, 2020; Slade & Ruffman, 2005). Theoretically, language enables the
representation of unobservable mental states necessary for perspective taking and greater empathic
processes, including ToM (Ebert, 2020; Milligan et al., 2007). Therefore, during the period of early
to middle childhood, language may facilitate one’s ability to develop an understanding of others’ men-
tal and emotional states (Tomasello, 2018).
Two different theories can explain the relationship between language and ToM development. One
theory proposes that language may be dependent on ToM. This account suggests that young children
develop a false belief understanding before acquiring the abstract language surrounding mental and
emotional states necessary to reflect that false belief understanding (Astington & Jenkins, 1999). An
alternative theory proposes that ToM may be dependent on language. In this view, language develop-
ment may provide young children with skills, such as word meaning comprehension, that in turn
assist in facilitating a false belief understanding. Previous longitudinal research across early childhood
(Astington & Jenkins, 1999; de Villiers & Pyers, 2002) supports the application of this second theory to
explain the relationship between language and ToM development. This is further supported by studies
of children with language accessibility issues, such as deaf children with hearing parents, who often
experience language delays (Courtin, 2000; de Villiers, 2005, 2007). For example, Schick, de Villiers,
de Villiers, and Hoffmeister (2007) reported a significant ToM developmental delay in deaf children
with hearing parents when compared with deaf children with deaf parents. This suggests the natural
accessibility and exposure to language, whether spoken or signed, that children receive from their
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F.J. Bigelow, G.M. Clark, Jarrad A.G. Lum et al. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 209 (2021) 105158

linguistic environment appears to relate to the emergence of ToM false belief skills. Theoretically, this
exposure to language would provide children with resources capable of representing increasingly
abstract mental and emotional state representational skills (Astington & Jenkins, 1999; de Villiers,
2007; Nelson, 2005). Overall, this research indicates that language facilitates the development of ToM.
Conceptually, there are two opposing executive theories that can be extended to explore the role of
language as a facilitator of ToM development in young children. Expression accounts indicate that lan-
guage enables the expression of a preexisting belief concept (Moses, 2001). In this view, young chil-
dren may fail a false belief task because they are unable to inhibit references to reality (Carlson &
Moses, 2001). Alternatively, emergence accounts indicate that language is required to form an under-
standing and emergence of a belief concept (Moses, 2001). Therefore, young children may fail a false
belief task because they do not yet possess the linguistic and executive functioning skills necessary to
begin constructing belief concepts around the mental and emotional states of others. Previous
research across both early childhood (Carlson, Claxton, & Moses, 2015) and middle childhood (Lecce
& Bianco, 2018) supports the application of emergence accounts toward the relationship between lan-
guage and ToM development. A previous meta-analysis by Wellman et al. (2001) exploring factors that
influence false belief development in children aged 3 years supports an emergence hypothesis,
although an expression account cannot be entirely dismissed (Moses, 2001). However, the false belief
tasks included in the meta-analysis by Wellman et al. (2001) were predominantly cognitive-based
ToM tasks. Thus, it appears that language stimulates or facilitates the development of cognitive
ToM and perhaps also affective ToM.
It has been repeatedly shown that cognitive ToM and language are strongly related across child-
hood (Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Milligan et al., 2007). Performance on tasks assessing general lan-
guage skills (Pons, Lawson, Harris, & de Rosnay, 2003) or more specific grammatical skills (de
Villiers & Pyers, 2002; Miller, 2004; Mo, Su, Sabbagh, & Jiaming, 2014) or semantic skills (Im-Bolter,
Agostino, & Owens-Jaffray, 2016) has been shown to correlate with performance on cognitive ToM
tasks. Measures of language ability have also been correlated with false belief performance in pre-
school children (Longobardi, Spataro, D’Alessandro, & Cerutti, 2017; Slade & Ruffman, 2005) and ele-
mentary school children (Kuhnert, Begeer, Fink, & de Rosnay, 2017) and with second-order false belief
skills in children aged 8–11 years (Lonigro, Baiocco, Baumgartner, & Laghi, 2017) and children aged 11
and 12 years (Im-Bolter et al., 2016). Furthermore, some evidence supports the theory that language
influences cognitive ToM, with early language skills predicting later cognitive ToM performance in
preschool children (Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Brock, Kim, Gutshall, & Grissmer, 2019) and into early
adolescence (Ebert, 2020).
Language and affective ToM-related skills, such as emotion recognition and emotion understanding,
are also strongly correlated across childhood (Pons et al., 2003). That is, performance on largely nonver-
bal affective ToM tasks correlates with performance on tasks assessing general language abilities
(Rosenqvist, Lahti-Nuuttila, Laasonen, & Korkman, 2014). Measures of general language ability have
been shown to correlate with affective ToM performance in preschool children (Gallant et al., 2020;
Longobardi et al., 2017) and elementary school children aged 7–9 years (Beck, Kumschick, Eid, &
Klann-Delius, 2012) and across a wider age range of children aged 4–11 years (Pons et al., 2003). In addi-
tion, measures of verbal IQ performance have been shown to correlate with affective ToM abilities in
children aged 8–11 years (Cassetta et al., 2018). Furthermore, a study by Kårstad, Wichstrøm,
Reinfjell, Belsky, and Berg-Nielsen (2015) supports the theory that language influences affective ToM,
with early language skills predicting later affective ToM performance in children aged 4–6 years.
Thus, there is evidence to suggest that language might influence cognitive and affective ToM
throughout childhood. To date, however, most studies include children in only narrow age ranges,
most commonly during the preschool or adolescent years. Few studies have investigated the role of
language in both cognitive and affective ToM within the same sample. This is important because it
is possible that language may influence cognitive and affective ToM differently across early and mid-
dle childhood development. In the current study, this was explored by investigating relationships
between ToM and language across a wide age range (5–12 years) as well as separately during early
and middle childhood subgroups. To our knowledge, no study has examined the mediating role that
language may have in the development of both cognitive and affective ToM in a sample of children
encompassing a wide age range of 5–12 years.
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F.J. Bigelow, G.M. Clark, Jarrad A.G. Lum et al. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 209 (2021) 105158

Because ToM exists within the construct of cognitive empathy, it is important to determine
whether affective and cognitive ToM-related results are reflected at a more general level of cognitive
empathic functioning. Parent-report measures of cognitive empathy provide valuable insight into the
development of ToM-related abilities in children, yet such measures are often overlooked when
exploring ToM performance. Therefore, an exploratory arm of this study was to investigate the role
of language in the development of cognitive empathy using parent-report measures.
The current study aimed to explore the role of language ability as a mediator in the development of
both affective and cognitive ToM during childhood (5–12 years). It was hypothesized that language
would separately mediate the relationships between age and cognitive ToM, affective ToM, and cog-
nitive empathy while controlling for nonverbal IQ.

Method

Participants

Children
There were 153 children (75 female) initially recruited into the study. One participant was
removed due to a current diagnosis of a neurological or developmental disorder as reported by a par-
ent/guardian. One participant was removed due to English language comprehension difficulties when
listening to task instructions. This resulted in a final sample of 151 (74 female) typically developing,
English-speaking children with an average age of 9.37 years (SD = 1.92). Male participants (Mage = 9.68-
years, SD = 1.92) were slightly older than female participants (Mage = 9.05 years, SD = 1.88), t(149) =
2.03, p = .045, d = 0.30 (see Table 1).
In line with the emergence of second-order affective ToM-related abilities and definitions of early
childhood being from 0 to 8 years of age and middle childhood including 9–12 years (Lecce, Ronchi,
Del Sette, Bischetti, & Bambini, 2019), an age split at 8.99 years was applied to separate the sample
into younger and older subgroups. A chi-square test of independence revealed that there was no sig-
nificant gender difference between the older and younger subgroups, v2(1) = 2.35, p = .126.

Adults
Parents/guardians of all children were also included as participants in the study. Data were col-
lected for 138 children by their parents/guardians (130 female). Annual household income reported
ranged from less than $20,000 AUD (Australian dollars) to more than $180,000 AUD, with an average
household income ranging between $100,000 and $120,000 AUD. Education level of the primary care-
giver ranged from finishing some secondary schooling to completing postgraduate studies, with the
average primary caregiver typically completing undergraduate studies. Regarding their place of birth,
68% of primary caregivers reported this as Australia or New Zealand, 20% as Asia, 7% as Europe, 3% as
North America, and 1% as South America (1% did not disclose this information). Sixteen parents/-
guardians reported that a language other than English was spoken at home, with the most commonly
reported languages being Korean and Cantonese. Analyses revealed that English language ability did
not differ between participants speaking English or other languages at home (see online supplemen-
tary material).

Table 1
Means, standard deviations, and sex ratios across age groups.

Age group
5 years 6 years 7 years 8 years 9 years 10 years 11 years 12 years
n=8 n = 14 n = 16 n = 20 n = 30 n = 27 n = 23 n = 13
Mage (years) 5.51 6.64 7.35 8.48 9.55 10.46 11.40 12.28
SD 0.31 0.26 0.31 0.28 0.24 0.31 0.31 0.23
M/F 3/5 7/7 7/9 8/12 14/16 13/14 17/6 8/5

Note. M/F, male/female sex ratio.

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F.J. Bigelow, G.M. Clark, Jarrad A.G. Lum et al. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 209 (2021) 105158

Informed consent was obtained from parents or legal guardians, and assent was obtained from
child participants. Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the Deakin University human
research ethics committee.

Materials

Theory of mind
The Social Perception domain of the NEPSY-II (Developmental NEuroPSYchological Assessment–
Second Edition; Korkman, Kirk, & Kemp, 2007) was used to measure cognitive ToM and affective
ToM. These are well-established standardized measures that demonstrate adequate validity and
test–retest reliability.

Cognitive ToM. The Theory of Mind subtest from the NEPSY-II (Korkman et al., 2007) was used to
assess children’s ability to determine the mental states of others. This subtest includes 15 verbal
and 6 contextual items. Because the contextual items included an emotional component and thus
may also rely on affective ToM, only the verbal items were included to assess cognitive ToM. This deci-
sion did not alter the pattern of results (refer to supplementary material for results including contex-
tual items). In the 15-item verbal task, participants were shown pictures or read different scenarios by
the examiner and were asked questions pertaining to the images or scenarios. The questions required
children to employ first- and second-order false belief skills. Other items in this task required partic-
ipants to understand appearance–reality distinctions and to infer the meaning of an expression within
a social context that extends beyond the literal such as an idiom. In each item, a brief answer was
often sufficient, with the exception of one imitation item that required children to mimic the actions
of the instructor as they acted out a rhyme. An overall raw score of 22 could be achieved, with higher
scores indicating proficiency in understanding the perspectives, beliefs, and experiences of others.
Raw uncorrected scores were used for all analyses.

Affective ToM. The 35-item Affect Recognition subtest from the NEPSY-II (Korkman et al., 2007) was
used to assess children’s ability to make inferences about the emotions of others across four tasks. Par-
ticipants were shown photographs of similarly aged children’s faces, which displayed different emo-
tions (happy, sad, angry, fearful, disgusted, and neutral). The stimuli included eight children (both
male and female) of Asian, Black, Caucasian, and Latino ethnicities. The first task required children
to determine whether two stimuli exhibited the same affect via a yes/no response. The second task
required children to identify two faces exhibiting the same emotion among a selection of either three
or four stimuli. The third task required children to identify which one of four faces exhibited the same
emotion as that depicted at the top of the page. In the fourth task, children were shown a face exhibit-
ing an emotion for 5 s and subsequently were required to select two faces exhibiting the same affect
from a choice of six stimuli. The maximum score was dependent on age, with participants aged 5 and
6 years scoring a maximum of 25 and older participants scoring a maximum of 35. Higher scores indi-
cated proficiency in recognizing and distinguishing between the emotional states of others. Emotion
recognition tasks have been shown to correlate strongly with other affective ToM measures because
they require participants to adopt and compare several emotional perspectives (Mier et al., 2010;
Yao, Bull, Khng, & Rahim, 2018). Data from this task were excluded for 1 child due to time constraints.
Raw uncorrected scores were used for all analyses.

Language
Language ability was measured using two complementary tasks that have previously been found to
assess different aspects of language (Archibald, 2013). Although these tasks assess different linguistic
skills, previous research has reported a positive correlation between the measures (Archibald, 2013).

Recalling Sentences. The 32-item Recalling Sentences subtest from the Clinical Evaluation of Language
Fundamentals–Fourth Edition: Australian Standardization (CELF-4; Semel, Wiig, & Secord, 2006) was
used to assess broad language ability. The task requires key aspects of language processing, including
speech production, grammatical processing, and linguistic knowledge. The task has high test–retest
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F.J. Bigelow, G.M. Clark, Jarrad A.G. Lum et al. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 209 (2021) 105158

reliability, and correlates highly with more comprehensive measures of overall language functioning
(Semel et al., 2006). Children were instructed to repeat verbatim the sentence spoken to them by the
examiner, with items increasing in length and complexity. The maximum possible score was 96, with
higher scores indicating greater language proficiency. Data from this task were excluded for 2 children
because they either did not understand or did not complete the task. Raw uncorrected scores were
used for all analyses.

Verbal IQ. The Vocabulary subtest from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence–Second Edition
(WASI-II; Wechsler, 2011) was included to assess language skills. This subtest assesses overall verbal
IQ and thus is a measure of general language ability, although with a stronger emphasis on semantic
knowledge than the Recalling Sentences subtest from the CELF-4. Verbal IQ has been used as a mea-
sure of language ability in previous studies and has been shown to correlate with ToM tasks (e.g.,
Cassetta et al., 2018). The 31-item Vocabulary subtest was used to assess children’s word knowledge
and degree of language development. For picture items (Items 1–3) children were instructed to name
the object, whereas verbal items (Items 4–31 presented orally and visually) required children to define
the word. The maximum score was dependent on age, with participants aged 6 years scoring a max-
imum of 42, participants aged 7–11 years scoring a maximum of 47, and participants aged 12 years
scoring a maximum of 53. Higher scores were indicative of enhanced word knowledge understanding.
The Vocabulary subtest demonstrates high reliability and moderately correlates with other language
measures across child samples (Wechsler, 2011). Raw uncorrected scores were used for all analyses.
Children under 6 years of age (n = 8) completed an equivalent measure from the Wechsler Preschool
and Primary Scale of Intelligence–Fourth Edition: Australian and New Zealand Standardized Edition
(WPPSI-IV A&NZ; Wechsler, 2014).

Nonverbal IQ
Research has illustrated that intelligence is associated with both language skills and ToM perfor-
mance (e.g., Buitelaar & van der Wees, 1999). To ensure that any mediation results were specific to
language skills rather than a reflection of general intelligence, nonverbal IQ was included as a covari-
ate in the analyses. The Matrix Reasoning subtest from the WASI-II (Wechsler, 2011) was included as a
measure of nonverbal IQ. The 30-item task required children to select the correct response (from five
options) that completed an otherwise incomplete series of images. The maximum score was depen-
dent on age, with participants aged 6–8 years scoring a maximum of 24 and older participants scoring
a maximum of 30. Children under 6 years of age (n = 7) completed an equivalent measure from the
WPPSI-IV A&NZ (Wechsler, 2014). Data from this task were not collected from 1 participant due to
time constraints.

Exploratory variables
Cognitive empathy. The 6-item Cognitive Empathy subscale from the Griffith Empathy Measure–
Parent Report (GEM-PR; Dadds et al., 2008) was used to assess parental impressions of their children’s
ability to understand what others think and feel. Parents responded to items such as ‘‘My child would
eat the last cookie in the cookie jar even when he/she knows that someone else wants it” using a
9-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree (Dadds et al., 2008, p. 116). A
maximum score of 24 could be obtained, with higher scores indicating that parents perceived their
children as possessing a higher level of cognitive empathy. The GEM-PR has been shown to have
adequate reliability, and has shown moderate correlations with other empathy measures including
self-report assessments (Dadds et al., 2008). Data from this task were excluded for 14 children because
the parents/guardians did not complete the task. Raw uncorrected scores were used for all analyses.

Affective empathy. Affective empathy is separate from cognitive empathy in that it refers to the pro-
cess of simulating an individual’s emotional state, and it is often referred to as emotional contagion
(Rueda, Fernández-Berrocal, & Baron-Cohen, 2015). Because ToM exists within the construct of cogni-
tive empathy, it would be expected that neither cognitive nor affective ToM performance would cor-
relate strongly with affective empathy. Indeed, previous research has shown that affective empathy
does not correlate with either affective or cognitive ToM performance in children (Bensalah,
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F.J. Bigelow, G.M. Clark, Jarrad A.G. Lum et al. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 209 (2021) 105158

Caillies, & Anduze, 2016; Rueda et al., 2015). Furthermore, verbal IQ skills in children correlated with
the Cognitive Empathy subscale but not with the Affective Empathy subscale from the GEM-PR (Dadds
et al., 2008). Because the behavioral measures explored cognitive and affective ToM-related skills in
children, it was important to ensure that any parent-report measures of empathy reflected similar
abilities. Therefore, as a mode of comparison, the Affective Empathy subscale was included to ensure
that any mediation results found for cognitive empathy were specific to the domain of cognitive
empathy and did not reflect empathic functioning in general. The 9-item Affective Empathy subtest
from the GEM-PR (Dadds et al., 2008) was included to assess children’s ability to ‘‘feel” what others
feel, as reported by their parents. Parents responded to items such as ‘‘My child becomes sad when
other children around him/her are sad” using a 9-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree
to strongly agree (Dadds et al., 2008, p. 116). A maximum score of 36 could be obtained, with higher
scores indicating that parents perceived their children as having a higher level of affective empathy.
Data from this task were excluded for 14 children because the parents/guardians did not complete
the task. Raw uncorrected scores were used for all analyses.

Procedure

Participants were tested in a quiet room at the child’s school or at Deakin University. The tasks
were completed within a single session. The order of tasks within the session was randomized, with
breaks during testing being given when necessary. Prior to the session beginning, written informed
consent was obtained on behalf of all children from parents or legal guardians. Children were also
informed of all procedures in the study and agreed to participate. Parents/guardians were given a ser-
ies of questionnaires and demographic information to complete. Parents/guardians were reimbursed
with a $20 AUD department store voucher.

Data analysis

Mediation model
Mediation analyses using ordinary least squares path analyses were primarily used to test
hypotheses. Each model tested whether language skills mediate the relationship between age and
cognitive or affective ToM or cognitive empathy. Mediation analyses were conducted using PROCESS
Version 3.3 Macro Model 4 (Hayes, 2017) and IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows Version 26.0 (IBM
Corp., Armonk, NY, USA). In line with Hayes (2017), mediation was said to have occurred if the con-
fidence interval of the indirect effect of the independent variable (IV) on the dependent variable (DV)
(referred to as Path ab in Fig. 1) did not include zero (Hayes, 2017, p. 101). In accordance with pre-
vious research (see Hayes & Scharkow, 2013), percentile bootstrapped confidence intervals (95%)
were calculated (k = 5000) to determine the significance of the indirect effect and to address issues
of multiple comparisons. The percentile bootstrap confidence interval does not assume symmetrical
sampling distribution of the indirect effect and possesses adequate control over the Type I error rate

Fig. 1. Mediation model with significant mediation indirect effect pathway highlighted in bold. IV, independent variable; M,
mediator; CV, covariate variable; DV, dependent variable; Path ab, indirect effect; Path c, total effect; Path c’, direct effect.

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F.J. Bigelow, G.M. Clark, Jarrad A.G. Lum et al. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 209 (2021) 105158

(Hayes, 2009; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). In addition, the percentile bootstrap confidence interval does
not inflate the risk of Type II error rates (Hayes & Scharkow, 2013). In this type of mediation analysis,
the additional assumptions required in the causal steps approach by Baron and Kenny (1986) were
not necessary, thereby limiting the number of inferential tests required (Hayes & Rockwood, 2017).
However, for completeness, the unstandardized coefficients for both the direct pathway (Path c)
and total pathway (Path c’) are also included. As an indicator of effect size, R2 is reported for the total
model, showing how much variance in the DV is explained by the combination of IV, covariate vari-
able (CV), and mediator (M).

Mediation analyses
A series of six mediation analyses was conducted using ordinary least squares path analysis. A ser-
ies of standard regressions was conducted to test the prediction that language mediates the relation-
ship between age and cognitive ToM, affective ToM, and cognitive empathy. Nonverbal IQ was entered
as a covariate to ensure that results did not reflect general cognitive ability. Although both the Recall-
ing Sentences and Vocabulary subtests assess broad expressive language skills, Recalling Sentences
appears to be particularly sensitive to grammatical and verbal working memory proficiency (Conti-
Ramsden, Botting, & Faragher, 2001; Plaza, Cohen, & Chevrie-Muller, 2002), whereas measures of word
knowledge, such as Vocabulary, are sensitive to semantic knowledge (McGregor, Newman, Reilly, &
Capone, 2002). Similarly, Cognitive ToM, Affective ToM, and Cognitive Empathy measure different
behavioral components within social cognitive functioning (Bensalah et al., 2016; Dadds et al.,
2008). Thus, each of these measures was also included in separate analyses. For mediation to occur,
a significant indirect effect of the IV (Age) on the DV (Cognitive ToM/Affective ToM/Cognitive Empa-
thy) through the M (Recalling Sentences/Vocabulary) while controlling for the CV (Nonverbal IQ) was
required.

Mediation analyses for separate younger and older subgroups. To further investigate possible develop-
mental effects, additional analyses examined whether the mediating effect is relevant to a specific
age group within the data. Therefore, a series of six additional mediation analyses was conducted
for both the younger and older subgroups. For mediation to occur, a significant indirect effect of the
IV (Age in younger subgroup and older subgroup) on the DV (Cognitive ToM/Affective ToM/Cognitive
Empathy) through the M (Recalling Sentences/Vocabulary) while controlling for the CV (Nonverbal IQ)
was required.

Data transformation and screening

Prior to conducting analyses, data transformations were applied to Vocabulary and Matrix Reason-
ing scores from participants aged 5;0 (years;months) to 5;11 (n = 8) who were administered the
WPPSI-IV. Scaled scores on the WPPSI-IV were converted to equivalent WASI-II T scores (Wechsler,
2011, Table A.2, p. 175). These T scores were then converted into the corresponding WASI-II raw scores
of children aged 6;0–6;3 (Wechsler, 2011, Table A.1, p. 152). Previous research has suggested that
these scores are comparable (Zhou, and Raiford, 2011). Although this method likely resulted in under-
estimating the cognitive functioning of participants aged 5;0–5;11, it provided important develop-
mental information.
Data were then screened for missing values and assumption violations using IBM SPSS Statistics for
Windows Version 26.0. Data screening revealed that assumptions of multicollinearity, normality, lin-
earity, homogeneity, and homoscedasticity were met. Refer to supplementary material for assumption
testing.
To estimate sample size necessary for the proposed analyses, a power analysis was conducted using
G*Power 3.19.4 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). In accordance with recent literature (see
Szucs & Ioannidis, 2017), conservative effect sizes (Cohen’s f2 = .15) were estimated. The power anal-
ysis revealed that a minimum of 85 participants would be required to achieve an appropriate power
level of .80 for this study.

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F.J. Bigelow, G.M. Clark, Jarrad A.G. Lum et al. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 209 (2021) 105158

Results

Preliminary analyses

Summary results across the child behavioral tasks and parent-report measures are presented in
Table 2. Pearson correlations were used to determine the relationship among measures of language
competence, theory of mind, and parent-reported empathy and are presented in Table 3. Analyses
indicated that Age was positively correlated with language proficiency tasks, Nonverbal IQ, and Cog-
nitive and Affective ToM, with ability increasing alongside development (ps < .01). Age displayed a
moderate negative correlation with parent-reported Affective Empathy (r = .19, p = .029) but not
with parent-reported Cognitive Empathy (r = .01, p = .956). As expected, Cognitive and Affective
ToM tasks correlated strongly (r = .51, p < .001). Neither Cognitive ToM nor Affective ToM correlated
with the broader construct of parent-reported Cognitive Empathy or the comparative Affective
Empathy. Both measures of language correlated strongly with behavioral ToM tasks and Nonverbal
IQ (ps < .01).

Mediation analyses

The first set of mediation analyses explored whether language mediated the relationship between
Age and Cognitive or Affective ToM, or Cognitive Empathy for the whole sample of children. Refer to
Fig. 2 for all mediation models and to Table 4 for all indirect mediation effects.

Cognitive ToM
Cognitive ToM and Recalling Sentences. There was a significant indirect effect of Age on Cognitive ToM
through Recalling Sentences while controlling for Nonverbal IQ, b = 0.23, SE = 0.07, bias-corrected and
accelerated confidence interval (BCa CI) [0.11, 0.37], indicating that mediation had occurred. The over-
all model had an R2 = .55, p < .001, indicating that the model explained 55% of the variance in Cognitive
ToM.

Table 2
Descriptive statistics for test measures for the overall sample and younger and older subgroups.

Possible Overall age Younger subgroup Older subgroup Comparison of

range (n = 151) (n = 58) (n = 93) younger and
older subgroups
Variable Min Max M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) t df
Age (years) 5.0 12.99 9.37 (1.92) 7.31 (1.06) 10.65 (1.00)
Recalling 0 96 62.98 (16.25) 51.27 (15.91) 70.03 (11.82) 7.65** 92a
Sentences
Vocabulary 0 53b 28.86 (6.49) 23.41 (5.54) 32.26 (4.40) 10.30** 101a
Matrix 0 30c 16.48 (5.01) 13.00 (4.74) 18.61 (3.86) 7.54** 101a
Reasoning
Cognitive ToM 0 22 17.70 (2.99) 15.36 (3.00) 19.16 (1.85) 8.67** 84a
Affective ToM 0 35d 25.38 (4.37) 22.70 (4.50) 27.02 (3.38) 6.24** 94a
Cognitive 24 24 9.84 (7.63) 9.11 (7.28) 10.33 (7.85) 0.92 135
Empathy
Affective 36 36 7.64 (9.71) 9.27 (9.04) 6.54 (10.05) 1.63 135
Empathy

Note. ToM, theory of mind. Raw scores were used for all test measures.
a
Degrees of freedom are rounded due to unequal variance.
b
Due to age cutoffs, participants aged 6 years could score a maximum of 42; participants aged 7–11 years could score a
maximum of 47.
c
Due to age cutoffs, participants aged 6–8 years could score a maximum of 24. Equality of variances was not assumed.
d
Due to age cutoffs, participants aged 5 and 6 years could score a maximum of 25.
**
p  .01.

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F.J. Bigelow, G.M. Clark, Jarrad A.G. Lum et al. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 209 (2021) 105158

Table 3
Pearson correlations among age, language tasks, ToM tasks, and parent-reported empathy.

Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Age (months) –
2. Recalling Sentences .61** –
3. Vocabulary .75** .78** –
4. Matrix Reasoning .56** .57** .68** –
5. Cognitive ToM .70** .69** .72** .62** –
6. Affective ToM .53** .48** .52** .45** .51** –
7. Cognitive Empathy .01 .12 .08 .07 .07 .08 –
8. Affective Empathy .19* .11 .02 .01 .02 .13 .05

Note. ToM, theory of mind. Raw scores were used for all test measures.
*
p < .05.
**
p  .01.

Fig. 2. Mediation analyses with unstandardized regression coefficients and overall R2 values as effect sizes. Analyses illustrate
the indirect effect of Age on: Cognitive Theory of Mind (ToM) through Recalling Sentences (A), Cognitive ToM through
Vocabulary (B), Affective ToM through Recalling Sentences (C), Affective ToM through Vocabulary (D), Cognitive Empathy
through Recalling Sentences (E), and Cognitive Empathy through Vocabulary (F). Significant mediation indirect effect pathways
are highlighted in bold. c, total effect; c’, direct effect. *p < .05; **p  .01.

Cognitive ToM and Vocabulary. There was a significant indirect effect of Age on Cognitive ToM through
Vocabulary while controlling for Nonverbal IQ, b = 0.26, SE = 0.07, BCa CI [0.12, 0.41], again demon-
strating that mediation had occurred. The overall model had an R2 = .56, p < .001, indicating that
the model explained 56% of the variance in Cognitive ToM.

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F.J. Bigelow, G.M. Clark, Jarrad A.G. Lum et al. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 209 (2021) 105158

Table 4
Indirect mediation analyses effects and overall variance explained across the model.

Mediation variable Indirect mediation effect Model

b SE 95% CI R2 p
Cognitive ToM + Recalling sentences 0.23 0.07 [0.11, 0.37] .55 <.001
Cognitive ToM + Vocabulary 0.26 0.07 [0.12, 0.41] .56 <.001
Affective ToM + Recalling Sentences 0.20 0.11 [0.02, 0.43] .30 <.001
Affective ToM + Vocabulary 0.24 0.16 [ 0.08, 0.55] .31 <.001
Cognitive empathy + Recalling Sentences 0.28 0.20 [ 0.13, 0.69] .01 .646
Cognitive empathy + Vocabulary 0.42 0.38 [ 0.32, 1.18] .01 .663
Affective empathy + Recalling Sentences 0.15 0.27 [ 0.69, 0.40] .04 .053
Affective empathy + Vocabulary 0.92 0.49 [ 0.02, 1.91] .05 .030

Note. CI, confidence interval; ToM, theory of mind. All mediation analyses were controlled for Nonverbal IQ.

Affective ToM
Affective ToM and Recalling Sentences. There was a significant indirect effect of Age on Affective ToM
through Recalling Sentences while controlling for Nonverbal IQ, b = 0.20, SE = 0.11, BCa CI [0.02,
0.43], demonstrating that mediation had occurred. The overall model had an R2 = .30, p < .001, indi-
cating that the model explained 30% of the variance in Affective ToM.

Affective ToM and Vocabulary. Vocabulary was not a significant mediator of Age and Affective ToM.

Cognitive Empathy
Cognitive Empathy and Recalling Sentences. Recalling Sentences was not a significant mediator of Age
on Cognitive Empathy while controlling for Nonverbal IQ.

Cognitive Empathy and Vocabulary. Vocabulary was not a significant mediator of Age on Cognitive
Empathy while controlling for Nonverbal IQ.
Neither Recalling Sentences nor Vocabulary mediated the relationship between Age and Affective
Empathy while controlling for Nonverbal IQ.

Mediation analyses by subgroups

Next, a set of analyses was conducted on the mediation models, although within younger and older
age groups separately. Refer to Fig. 3 for all mediation models and to Table 5 for all indirect mediation
effects.

Cognitive ToM
Cognitive ToM and Recalling Sentences. In the younger subgroup, there was a significant indirect effect
of Age on Cognitive ToM through Recalling Sentences while controlling for Nonverbal IQ, b = 0.42,
SE = 0.19, BCa CI [0.10, 0.86], indicating that mediation for Age in the younger subgroup had occurred.
The overall model had an R2 = .44, p < .001, indicating that the model explained 44% of the variance in
Cognitive ToM.
In the older subgroup, Recalling Sentences did not significantly mediate the relationship between
Age and Cognitive ToM while controlling for Nonverbal IQ.

Cognitive ToM and Vocabulary. In the younger subgroup, there was a significant indirect effect of Age
on Cognitive ToM through Vocabulary while controlling for Nonverbal IQ, b = 0.37, SE = 0.17, BCa CI
[0.09, 0.76], illustrating that mediation for Age in the younger subgroup had occurred. The overall
model had an R2 = .45, p < .001, indicating that the model explained 45% of the variance in Cognitive
ToM.
In the older subgroup, there was a significant indirect effect of Age on Cognitive ToM through
Vocabulary while controlling for Nonverbal IQ, b = 0.15, SE = 0.07, BCa CI [0.02, 0.30], demonstrating
11
F.J. Bigelow, G.M. Clark, Jarrad A.G. Lum et al. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 209 (2021) 105158

Fig. 3. Mediation analyses with unstandardized regression coefficients and overall R2 values as effect sizes across younger and
older subgroups. Analyses illustrate the indirect effect of Age in the younger subgroup on: Cognitive Theory of Mind (ToM)
through Recalling Sentences (A), Cognitive ToM through Vocabulary (B), Affective ToM through Recalling Sentences (C), and
Affective ToM through Vocabulary (D) and the indirect effect of Age in the older subgroup on: Cognitive ToM through Recalling
Sentences (E), Cognitive ToM through Vocabulary (F), Affective ToM through Recalling Sentences (G), and Affective ToM through
Vocabulary (H). Significant mediation indirect effect pathways are highlighted in bold. c, total effect; c’, direct effect. *p < .05;
**
p  .01.

that mediation had occurred. The overall model had an R2 = .19, p < .001, indicating that the model
explained 19% of the variance in Cognitive ToM.

Affective ToM
Affective ToM and Recalling Sentences. In the younger subgroup there was a significant indirect effect of
Age on Affective ToM through Recalling Sentences while controlling for Nonverbal IQ, b = 0.68,
SE = 0.32, BCa CI [0.17, 1.40], demonstrating that mediation had occurred. The overall model had an
R2 = .44, p < .001, indicating that the model explained 44% of the variance in Affective ToM.
In the older subgroup, Recalling Sentences did not significantly mediate the relationship between
Age and Affective ToM while controlling for Nonverbal IQ.

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F.J. Bigelow, G.M. Clark, Jarrad A.G. Lum et al. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 209 (2021) 105158

Table 5
Indirect mediation analyses effects for younger and older subgroups and overall variance explained across the model.

Mediation variables Indirect mediation effect Model

b SE 95% CI R2 p
Younger subgroup
Cognitive ToM + Recalling Sentences 0.42 0.19 [0.10, 0.86] .44 <.001
Cognitive ToM + Vocabulary 0.37 0.17 [0.09, 0.76] .45 <.001
Affective ToM + Recalling Sentences 0.68 0.32 [0.17, 1.40] .44 <.001
Affective ToM + Vocabulary 0.56 0.31 [ 0.001, 1.23] .44 <.001
Cognitive Empathy + Recalling Sentences 0.30 0.51 [ 0.79, 1.29] .01 .807
Cognitive Empathy + Vocabulary 0.64 0.70 [ 0.81, 1.95] .02 .624
Affective Empathy + Recalling Sentences 0.21 0.81 [ 1.68, 1.55] .05 .270
Affective Empathy + Vocabulary 10.18 0.97 [ 0.79, 3.05] .07 .138
Older subgroup
Cognitive ToM + Recalling Sentences 0.07 0.07 [ 0.05, 0.23] .19 <.001
Cognitive ToM + Vocabulary 0.15 0.07 [0.02, 0.30] .19 <.001
Affective ToM + Recalling Sentences 0.04 0.07 [ 0.20, 0.07] .004 .802
Affective ToM + Vocabulary 0.03 0.17 [ 0.36, 0.30] .004 .802
Cognitive Empathy + Recalling Sentences 0.07 0.16 [ 0.24, 0.43] .02 .423
Cognitive Empathy + Vocabulary 0.31 0.41 [ 0.06, 1.19] .02 .423
Affective Empathy + Recalling Sentences 0.02 0.15 [ 0.38, 0.26] .02 .450
Affective Empathy + Vocabulary 0.81 0.57 [ 0.16, 2.08] .02 .450

Note. CI, confidence interval; ToM, theory of mind. All mediation analyses were controlled for Nonverbal IQ.

Affective ToM and Vocabulary. Vocabulary did not significantly mediate the relationship between Age
and Affective ToM while controlling for Nonverbal IQ for either the younger or older subgroup.

Cognitive Empathy
Cognitive Empathy and Recalling Sentences. Recalling Sentences was not a significant mediator of Age
on Cognitive Empathy while controlling for Nonverbal IQ for either the younger or older subgroup.

Cognitive Empathy and Vocabulary. Vocabulary was not a significant mediator of Age on Cognitive
Empathy while controlling for Nonverbal IQ for either the younger or older subgroup.
Neither Recalling Sentences nor Vocabulary mediated the relationship between Age and Affective
Empathy while controlling for Nonverbal IQ for either the younger or older subgroup.

Discussion

The current study aimed to explore the role of language as a mediator in the development of both
affective and cognitive components of ToM and cognitive empathy across children aged 5–12 years,
while controlling for nonverbal IQ. In support of the hypotheses, language mediated the relationship
between age and both cognitive and affective ToM. In contrast, language failed to mediate the rela-
tionship between age and parent-report cognitive empathy. Exploratory analyses revealed that for
the younger subgroup, language mediated the relationship between age and both cognitive and affec-
tive ToM. For the older subgroup, language mediated the relationship between age and cognitive ToM
but not between age and affective ToM. Finally, language did not mediate the relationship between
age and parent-report cognitive empathy for either the younger or older subgroup.
In support of previous research (Gabriel et al., 2021; Grazzani, Ornaghi, Conte, Pepe, & Caprin,
2018), cognitive ToM increased with age, which is broadly indicative of expected developmental
effects. The mediation analysis showed that age indirectly influenced participants’ ability to under-
stand the thoughts and beliefs of others through its effects on language while controlling for nonver-
bal abilities. Also consistent with expectations, results demonstrated that both measures of language
(Recalling Sentences and Vocabulary) mediated the relationship between cognitive ToM and age while
controlling for nonverbal IQ. These findings indicate that the ability to interpret the beliefs and
thoughts of others is, to some degree, reliant on a range of language skills across childhood that are
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F.J. Bigelow, G.M. Clark, Jarrad A.G. Lum et al. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 209 (2021) 105158

independent from nonverbal intelligence. Furthermore, by controlling for nonverbal intelligence,

results support previous work indicating that it is language, as opposed to a more general intelligence,
that plays a pivotal role in developing social cognitive skills (Rajkumar et al., 2008).
Differences across the younger and older age groups suggest that certain aspects of language may
be more relevant to cognitive ToM at specific developmental periods. Across the younger subgroup,
results demonstrated that both measures of language mediated cognitive ToM performance, with
models including Recalling Sentences and Vocabulary explaining 44% and 45% of the variance in cog-
nitive ToM, respectively. This suggests that language may serve a fundamental role in facilitating cog-
nitive ToM in younger children. Conversely, only Vocabulary was a mediator for cognitive ToM
performance across the older age group, explaining 19% of the variance in cognitive ToM. It is possible
that increasingly specialized aspects of language (such as semantic knowledge assessed by Vocabu-
lary) may continue to facilitate cognitive ToM across middle childhood.
Consistent with existing literature (Gabriel et al., 2021; Gallant et al., 2020; Rosenqvist et al., 2014;
Vetter, Altgassen, Phillips, Mahy, & Kliegel, 2013), affective ToM performance also increased with age.
This indicates that children from 5 to 12 years of age are fine-tuning their ability to recognize, under-
stand, and differentiate between facial expressions. The simple mediation analysis showed that age
indirectly influenced participants’ ability to understand the emotions of others through its effects
on Recalling Sentences while controlling for nonverbal abilities. However, mediation was not present
for the Vocabulary task. It is possible that this result may reflect that affective ToM may be influenced
by language skills but is not heavily reliant on semantic knowledge.
Differences across the younger and older age groups indicated that certain aspects of language may
be more relevant to affective ToM at specific developmental periods. Recalling Sentences mediated the
relationship between age and affective ToM in the younger subgroup but not in the older subgroup.
This suggests that the successful mediation across age may be disproportionately weighted by the
younger participants. Therefore, it is possible that language serves an initial role in developing the
foundations necessary for affect recognition. In addition, it is possible that language may cease to pro-
vide assistance in affective ToM past a certain developmental point. These results indicate develop-
mental differences, suggesting that the relationships between language and cognitive and affective
ToM are dynamic across childhood.
A key finding of this study is that language mediated the relationship between age and affective
ToM for younger children but not for older children. As language develops during early childhood,
children begin to reliably label emotions and differentiate between emotions within the same valence
(Widen & Russell, 2003). It is the construction of emotion perception that provides children in early
childhood with the emotion words to differentiate between facial emotions rather than merely faces
of different valence (Lindquist & Gendron, 2013). Because the affective ToM task required children to
categorize facial expressions as similar (e.g., ‘‘Show me the two children who look as if they feel the
same way”), it is possible that linguistic skills are assisting in the transformation of a facial expression
into a perception of an emotion category such as anger, happiness, disgust, sadness, fear, or neutral.
Subsequently, once language has constructed emotion categories, it may serve little additional use.
It is possible that language did not mediate the relationship between age and affective ToM in older
children due to the emotion categories used in this study. Previous research by Lawrence et al. (2015)
showed that emotions such as sadness and anger were recognized to a similar degree in 6-year-olds
and 16-year-olds, whereas emotions such as disgust and surprise continued to improve in recognition
throughout adolescence. Interestingly, the affective ToM task primarily includes emotions that are
recognized earlier in childhood and did not include the emotion category of surprise. Furthermore,
the task uses static images, although some research suggests that identification of morphed emotional
stimuli is more sensitive to developmental changes (Thomas, De Bellis, Graham, & LaBar, 2007). This
would help to explain the lack of mediation across affective ToM performance in the older subgroup. It
is possible that the emotional state verbs required in the task did not require an increasingly nuanced
linguistic vocabulary. Thus, it may be that language does mediate affective ToM during middle child-
hood, but only for more subtle stimuli or for more complex emotions such as disgust and surprise.
A remaining issue to be addressed in this study is the finding that this mediational relationship
between language and affective ToM was present only when language was assessed by Recalling Sen-
tences and not Vocabulary. It is possible that aspects of language necessary for the sentence repetition
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F.J. Bigelow, G.M. Clark, Jarrad A.G. Lum et al. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 209 (2021) 105158

task, including speech production, grammatical processing, and speech perception, are more critical to
the foundation of affective social cognitive abilities than semantic knowledge. Indeed, it may be that
the syntactic properties of Recalling Sentences assist in following the unveiling of socially relevant
information to a greater extent than Vocabulary (de Villiers & Pyers, 2002; Mo et al., 2014). Previous
research by Im-Bolter et al. (2016) demonstrated that mastery of syntactic aspects of language was a
significant predictor of perspective taking during middle childhood but not early adolescence. The
grammatical and working memory properties of Recalling Sentences may assist in acquiring a concep-
tual understanding that allows individuals to hold several contrasting emotional states of others
simultaneously (e.g., Tim feels X, but Sam feels Y). Conversely, the semantic knowledge assessed by
Vocabulary may provide minimal affective ToM-related information.
There is an alternative explanation for the finding that Recalling Sentences, but not Vocabulary,
mediated age and affective ToM. Recalling Sentences is known to rely not only on language skills
but also on working memory and attention (Klem et al., 2015; Plaza et al., 2002). This in turn may
assist affective ToM performance. Although nonverbal IQ was controlled for, it may be that these exec-
utive function components of the task explain the relationship. Conversely, the possibility that lan-
guage does not play a role in the later development of affective ToM cannot be dismissed.
Both cognitive and affective ToM displayed unique mediational relationships with language mea-
sures. This suggests that elements of language provide initial assistance when developing the ability to
represent the mental and emotional states of others. Therefore, it is possible that syntax may play a
crucial role in developing a foundational cognitive and affective ToM, whereas increasingly nuanced
mental and emotional state verbs (e.g., ‘‘embarrassed” vs. ‘‘surprised”) may provide more information
during higher-order cognitive ToM tasks in later development. This would support the mediating role
of Vocabulary but not Recalling Sentences in cognitive ToM performance across the older subgroup.
Alternatively, it is possible that the linguistic skills crucial for the later development of cognitive
and affective ToM were not addressed in either of the language measures. Therefore, ceiling effects
in both the cognitive and affective ToM tasks may have masked the ongoing role that language plays
in social cognition.
In opposition to previous research (Dadds et al., 2008), parent-report cognitive empathy did not
improve with age. Furthermore, language did not facilitate the development of parent-reported cog-
nitive empathy. Following an age split, results remained nonsignificant, thereby demonstrating the
absence of any developmental effects. Parent-report cognitive empathy failed to correlate with behav-
ioral measures of cognitive and affective ToM. This finding contradicts some previous research report-
ing significant correlations between cognitive empathy and cognitive ToM measures (Bensalah et al.,
2016). In line with our findings, however, a growing body of literature indicates that measures assess-
ing different aspects of ToM and the broader construct of cognitive empathy do not correlate (Warnell
& Redcay, 2019). Therefore, it is possible that a lack of correlation may reflect the multidimensional
nature of cognitive empathy. Although ToM exists within the construct of cognitive empathy, it is pos-
sible that the lack of correlation across affective ToM, cognitive ToM, and parent-reported cognitive
empathy may be because the measure of cognitive empathy includes empathic-specific components
distinct from ToM.
Because the measure of cognitive empathy in this study (GEM-PR) is parents’ assessment of their
children’s empathy, results are reliant on parents’ capability to access an awareness of others’ (their
children’s) mental states. Gallant et al. (2020) found that parent-reported empathy did not correlate
with affective ToM performance in children aged 4–6 years. Consequently, accuracy of GEM-PR results
would be partially dependent on parents’ empathic capabilities. Therefore, it is important to consider
whether the GEM-PR is a measure of children’s empathic abilities or a measure of parents’ perception
of their children’s social functioning. Furthermore, there is a focus on behavioral observations across
the cognitive empathy items, including ‘‘My child doesn’t seem to notice when I get sad” and ‘‘My
child reacts badly when they see people kiss and hug in public”. A study by Murphy (2019) supports
the contention that the cognitive empathy subscale of the GEM-PR may instead reflect a broader cal-
lousness in behavior. Although it is the contention of Dadds et al. (2008) that higher levels of cognitive
empathy would be associated with increased enactment of that empathic behavior, it cannot be
assumed. This also highlights the differences between child performance and parent-report measures

15
F.J. Bigelow, G.M. Clark, Jarrad A.G. Lum et al. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 209 (2021) 105158

and the need for multimodal measurement when exploring complex constructs such as ToM and
empathy.
There are several limitations of this study. Despite the relatively large sample size, it is possible
that small age effects (especially at the age subgroup level) were unable to be detected. Furthermore,
it is acknowledged that the age distribution across participants was unequal, and thus there is the pos-
sibility that a lack of individuals in early childhood may have influenced the results. Given the emer-
gence of ToM understanding during early childhood, it is recommended that future studies explore the
mediating role that language has in ToM development in this younger population. Subsequently, a lar-
ger, evenly distributed sample would also allow for gender effects to be explored at a subgroup level.
Results indicated that language mediated the development of affective ToM in younger children but
not in older children. However, it is possible that other more complex linguistic skills not assessed
in this study remain important during later childhood. Thus, tasks assessing specific aspects of lan-
guage such as sentential complements could be used in future studies because they previously have
been found to have strong correlations with ToM development (Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003; Mo
et al., 2014). Alternatively, it is important to acknowledge whether language measures used in this
study reflected specific aspects of language or whether results reflected a broader impact of a general
language factor.
Due to the multidimensional nature of ToM, there is no one task that incorporates all elements of
affective and cognitive ToM. Nevertheless, because both affective and cognitive ToM were assessed
using only one task, it is likely that not all related ToM skills were explored. Therefore, the inclusion
of tasks incorporating advanced facial emotion processing measures, faux pas detection tests involving
dynamic social exchanges, and both first- and second-order emotional and mental beliefs would pro-
vide a more comprehensive assessment of ToM functioning. Furthermore, the findings of this study
suggest issues with relying solely on parent-report measures to assess cognitive empathy functioning
in children. The use of a battery of ToM tasks, in addition to both behavioral and parent-report mea-
sures of empathy, would help to address this issue in the future.

Conclusion

The findings of this study highlight the important role that language has in the development of cog-
nitive and affective ToM skills in children aged 5–12 years. The results illustrate the importance of
considering language when it comes to social brain development in children. This not only has ram-
ifications for understanding how these processes develop and what supports them but also might
guide educational and intervention efforts that serve to promote empathy, emotional literacy, and
interpersonal understanding across clinical and nonclinical samples.

Acknowledgments

FJB received support from an Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship. PGE
is funded by a Future Fellowship from the Australian Research Council (FT160100077). We thank all
the children, parents, and schools that participated in this study.

Appendix A. Supplementary material

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2021.

105158.

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