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Pacifism
William J. Hawk

Pacifism involves a number of related moral positions, endorsed for different

reasons, often evoking powerful emotional responses. To understand pacifism, we
need to identify what pacifism is, or what pacifisms there are, by (1) looking at
pacifism’s core meaning, etymology, uses, near neighbors, and relationship to just
war theory; (2) distinguishing absolute versus contingent pacifism; (3) categorizing
pacifism’s chief motivators such as nonviolence, nonkilling, moral autonomy,
libertarianism, nuclear war, and religious teachings; (4) highlighting pacifism’s role
in international relations in the United Nations, pacifist nations, the human rights
debate, and legal standing as conscientious objectors; and (5) articulating and
responding to pacifism’s perennial criticisms.

What Is Pacifism?
Pacifism at its core is moral rejection of war. Pacifists reject warfare and/or their
participation in it as morally wrong. Many pacifists hold that, because war is immoral,
they have both negative obligations to refuse to participate as well as  positive
obligations to work for alternatives. At its core, pacifism challenges the widely
held view that warfare can be morally justified and that citizens morally ought to
participate in wars when their nations call.
Self-described pacifists use the term to reference a large number of positions and
beliefs, some having to do with moral rejection of war and others pertaining to
advocacy of nonviolence, absolute prohibitions against intentional killing, and other
forms of peace advocacy. Critics frequently use “pacifism” as a derogatory epithet
referring to unwelcome behaviors or attitudes ranging from naïve or wrong-headed
moral reasoning to cowardice and treason.
Etymologically, “pacifism” comes from the Latin pax “peace” and ficus (from
facere) “to make or produce.” Pacifists, technically, are peacemakers; and pacifism
refers to the beliefs, theories, and practices which make for peace.
The actual use of the term “pacifism” has diverged from its etymological beginnings.
According to Jenny Teichman, the word “pacifism” first appeared in English when an
attendee to a 1902 international peace conference used it as a positive synonym for
the less-elegant-sounding anti-warism. Teichman (1986: 1) quotes a 1915 National
Review article which reinforces pacifism’s anti-war (see war) connotation by calling
World War I “the greatest war in history … now being fought in the cause of paci-
fism.” The “war to end all wars” was characterized as a war to achieve pacifism! Thus,
from its first instances, pacifism has been identified as and associated with peace-
making activities that specially focus on the elimination of war.

The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Edited by Hugh LaFollette, print pages 3771–3782.
© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2013 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/ 9781444367072.wbiee102
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One way to locate pacifism is by distinguishing it from its rivals political realism,
holy war (and jihad), and just war theories. Political realism and holy war (and jihad)
claim that warfare is not properly subject to moral assessment. Political realism is the
view that a nation’s political necessities or interests that favor war trump attempts at
moral criticism. Holy war (and some jihad) advocates contend that if divine authority
sanctions war, then countervailing moral judgments necessarily fail. Each position
dismisses moral criticisms of war as misguided, wrong-headed, or both.
Just war theories share pacifism’s view that war as an enterprise is a proper subject
of moral appraisal. Contrary to pacifism, however, just war theorists find some wars
morally justified and hence find persons morally required to participate in or
support them. Just war theory attempts to untangle the conditions necessary for
morally justified war. Morally relevant considerations include considerations of
initiating war (jus ad bellum) and how a war should be conducted (jus in bello).
Pacifism agrees with just war theory’s claim regarding war’s amenability to moral
appraisal but rejects the idea that war is ever justified (see just war theory,
history of).

The Moral Critique of War

Pacifists are united by their moral critique of war. However, that critique may be
applied with different levels of strenuousness, i.e., for all or only some wars.
The paradigm instance of pacifism rejects as immoral all wars – historic, current,
and future. War as an intentional human enterprise is judged as categorically
immoral. This position, known as absolute pacifism, is most often criticized or
caricatured by opponents and most often envisioned by self-proclaimed pacifists.
Absolute pacifists condemn all wars, including those fought in self-defense or
defense of others, those fought for honorable causes (such as the defense of freedom,
the promotion of lofty political ideals or even, as with World War I, the elimination
of warfare itself), and even World War II, which featured a ruthless despot aspiring
to dominate the world.
Agreeing that all wars are categorically condemned does not mean that absolute
pacifists agree on what makes them condemnable – for some, it is war’s total
consequences, including the magnitude of destructiveness; for others, the killing of
innocents; and for yet others, the utility losses from environmental damage and
productivity declines. Kantian pacifists focus on the irrationality and patent
immorality of war and reason’s demand for “perpetual peace” (Kant 1983). William
James (2006) sees warfare as an inculcator of important virtues which might,
however, be attained through activities less damaging to the human community.
Some reject war as an expression of political aspirations for power or resources, or
as being generated covertly by capitalist business interests. Religious absolutist
pacifists may view war as a violation of God’s command or God’s will, or antithetical
to the reign of God’s Kingdom (see war and religion). Followers of the Buddha
(see buddhist ethics) or Jesus might reject war because their teachers do.
In  assessing any absolutist pacifism, it is critical first to recognize that there are
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different, perhaps competing, moral justifications at work, and secondly, to evaluate

the specific reasons adduced for pacifism in any given case.
Not all pacifists are absolutist. Contingent or conditional pacifism rejects one or
more, but not all wars, because of particular features in that or those wars. For
instance, contingent pacifists during the Vietnam War emphasized specific problems
in Vietnam. The use of napalm in a guerrilla war, indiscriminate killing of innocent
women and children, the absence of a credible compelling rationale (skepticism
regarding the Cold War’s Domino Theory, for example), resistance to the military
draft, etc., lead many persons to contingent pacifism. More generally, some have
adopted pacifism as a result of the tremendous destructiveness of modern military
weaponry. The morally egregious realities of specifically modern war, as represented,
for instance, by Jonathan Glover (2000), have generated a number of contingent
pacifists with respect to modern war. In terms of moral analysis, many versions
of  contingent pacifism appear indistinguishable from just war theorizing. The
differences seem more presentational than substantive.
As with absolutist pacifism, there are many – sometimes competing – moral
reasons for contingent pacifisms. The reasons adduced by absolutists may prove
compelling when applied to a particular war even though they fail as reasons for
rejecting all wars. Both Bertrand Russell (see russell, bertrand) and Albert
Einstein endorsed a form of contingent pacifism when they backed away from
absolute pacifism in response to the evils perpetrated by Adolph Hitler. Russell
(1943) termed his position relative pacifism. Contingent pacifism may be pacifism
derived from the failure to pass just war tests.

Refusing to Participate in War

The core notion of pacifism condemns war and refuses to support or participate in
it. Reasons specific to pacifist war refusal vary. Some, but by no means all, of the
supporting reasons for pacifism include those discussed in the following
subsections.

Nonviolence
In the twentieth century, primarily due to India’s Mohandas K. Gandhi and America’s
Martin Luther King, Jr., nonviolence (see nonviolence in religions) gained
attention as a critique and alternative to war. Gandhi, relying upon resources
common to Hinduism, Christianity, and the pacifism of Leo Tolstoy, practiced
ahimsa (nonviolence) and satyagraha (truth force). M. L. King, Jr., influenced by
Christianity and Gandhi’s example, modeled nonviolence as a morally sound and
effective force for social change (see king, jr., martin luther). Each employed
nonviolent direct action to achieve social and political revolutions, in the one
instance defeating colonialism and in the other disenfranchising racism. Gandhi,
King, and their followers saw nonviolence as more than a critique of the immorality
of warfare. They understood nonviolence as encompassing a comprehensive plan of
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life as well as a strategy to address social and political injustices, to resolve conflicts,
and to bring about social change, without resorting to interpersonal violence or war.
Within the community of those who espouse nonviolence, there is a division between
the principled absolutists and those who view nonviolence as an effective strategy.
Strategic nonviolence practitioners are often referred to as pragmatic pacifists.

Nonkilling
Lt. Col. Dave Grossman (1995) identified human repugnance to killing (see killing)
running so deep that modern militaries had to implement methods of operant
conditioning in order to transform soldiers into killers. While not committed to
nonviolence per se, some persons become pacifists as an expression of their profound
moral repulsion to killing. Homicide rejection may be religiously, morally, or even
affectively based. Refusing to kill may be rationally expressed (1) as a Kantian
categorical imperative (see categorical imperative), (2) as a virtue (as in Socrates’
argument [Crito 49a] that it is always impermissible to harm someone [Drake
1959]), or (3) as a religious duty, for example, “Thou shalt not kill.” Aesthetically, the
sight or smell of human death sometimes turns the bravest, most bellicose soldier
into a pacifist. Stemming from many sources, honoring absolute prohibition against
homicide operates as both a de facto and de jure moral limit for some persons. For
them, refusing to participate in war expresses their basic moral commitment. The
basic commitment not to kill another human being approximates what Cheyney
Ryan (1983: 520) identified as “the pacifist impulse.”

Autonomy
A concern for moral autonomy (see autonomy) prompts some to pacifism. Military
operations require chain-of-command organization with obedience. Personal
moral judgments disrupt effective war efforts. Those who value moral autonomy as
fundamental to their moral integrity may refuse war even though they reject
nonviolence and nonkilling as absolutes. This contingent pacifism may not reject
justified killing, but it does reject participating in warfare because military command
practices violate moral autonomy.

Nuclear pacifism
The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union featured, among
other things, a defense strategy called Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). MAD
involved the production of military arsenals with sufficient nuclear firepower to
wipe out humanity many times over. Thousands of nuclear warheads, the strategic
willingness to use them, and the foreseeable devastation that would result from such
use combined to cause a reaction from many who previously were silent about the
morality of warfare. Albert Einstein and members of the Union of Concerned
Scientists spearheaded a new contingent pacifist position, which was termed nuclear
pacifism.
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Libertarianism
Rejecting war may come as an inference from a prior judgment against the institution
of modern nation-states or from a moral judgment prioritizing individual rights.
John Hospers (1971: 400), a defender of libertarianism, stated, “War in any form
must now be opposed.” Hospers’ critique focused on the illegitimacy of war’s
indiscriminate killing:

The libertarian’s basic attitude toward war must then be: it is legitimate to use violence
against criminals in defense of one man’s rights of person and property; it is completely
impermissible to violate the rights of other innocent people. War, then, is only proper when
the exercise of violence is rigorously limited to the individual criminals. We may judge for
ourselves how many wars or conflicts in history have met this criterion. (1971: 401)

Hospers’ libertarian pacifism is contingent in that he recognizes the logical possibility,

although he implies the empirical counterfactuality, of morally legitimate war (see
libertarianism).

Religious pacifism
In other traditions, aspiring to be peacemakers and rejecting warfare have histori-
cally been ideals found in religious callings. Among the various religious pacifists,
the moral prohibition against warfare is frequently expressed in terms of reverence
for the sanctity of human life. Some honor God’s sovereignty over life and draw the
inference that human beings lack the intellectual discernment and moral authority
to decide who should die.
Jain (see jain ethics) reverence for the sanctity of all life is expressed as nonviolence,
for example, by sweeping away living organisms in their path lest they step on one and
cause death. Buddhists, at least Buddhist monks, are generally ranked among the
pacifists. Pacifist Hindus, Jews, and Muslims, minorities in their respective religious
communities, strive to honor their gods by loving and/or reverencing all of creation.
In Christianity, which some claim to be the originator of much of Western
pacifism, Roman Catholics and mainline Protestants tend toward just war theory.
The historic peace churches of Christian Protestantism – Church of the Brethren,
Mennonite, and Quaker – refuse war and often observe nonkilling as a moral
constraint in their efforts to follow Jesus and his teachings (Brethren and Mennonite)
or reverence of God in others (Quaker). The late Mennonite theologian John
Howard Yoder (1971) distinguished and identified more than two dozen distinct
versions of religiously based pacifism and claimed that his list was not exhaustive.
The moral reasoning to be found among the various Christian pacifists covers
a  spectrum from consequentialism to deontologism, virtue and care theories, to
divine command approaches. Some view pacifism (contra-war), nonresistance
(“turn the other cheek”), or nonviolent resistance to evil (pursue justice, eschew
violence) as incumbent on all, while others understand their stance vocationally or
as a matter of special religious calling.
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Pacifism: Nations and Citizens

Typically, pacifism applies at the personal level with someone’s refusal to engage in
warfare. However, in modern times, pacifism has had an impact in international
affairs. What motivated the creation of the League of Nations and the United Nations
was a moral critique of war. After World War II, Japan’s constitution made it a
permanently pacifist nation. In addition, international human rights theories may
carve out a space for pacifist consciences to be recognized in the status of conscien-
tious objection.

International pacifism
Political theory holds that sovereign, legitimate nation-states reserve, as a right, a
final recourse to war for settling disputes. Pacifists work for a new political order in
which nations renounce the right to warfare. In 1928, under a multilateral agreement
titled the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, better known as the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, war was “permanently” renounced as an instrument of national
policy. After World War II, the United Nations Charter stated a pacifist agenda as its
first purpose:

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law,
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace …

The UN Charter goes on in Article 2(3) to renounce recourse to warfare saying: “All
Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a man-
ner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”
After World War II, modern Japan was organized under a constitution which
contains a provision that is known as the pacifist clause:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of
force as means of settling international disputes. (2) To accomplish the aim of the
preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never
be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

While this article has been subject to debate both inside and outside Japan, it
provides the constitutional framework for the nation.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights generates debates about whether the
refusal to participate in a nation’s wars is a fundamental human right. James Madison,
author of the Bill of Rights, proposed such a basic right for the US Constitution,
although it was defeated. Some argue that the right to pacifism is already recognized
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in the UN Declaration through the proper interpretation of Article 18, which reads:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship and observance.” Currently, for example, the German
Constitution Article 4(3) recognizes the right to pacifism stating: “No person shall be
compelled against his conscience to render military service involving the use of arms”
(see international bill of rights). Legal recognitions of pacifism (absolute or
contingent) use the language of “conscientious objection.” The category also applies
to critics of war who refuse to voluntarily pay taxes or engage in other war-resistance
activities. Absolute pacifists are labeled conscientious objectors; contingent pacifists
are labeled selective conscientious objectors. Selective conscientious objection
presents greater recognition problems for states because selection permits citizens to
make personal political judgments which contradict their nation’s.

Challenges to Pacifism
In what follows, we explore some of the common criticisms raised against pacifism
and consider an array of typical responses by pacifists.

Cowardice
In war time, the most common criticism of pacifism is that it provides a cover for
cowardice. According to this charge, fear prompts the cowardly to shirk political or
moral obligations and espouse pacifism.
Actual pacifists frequently confront hostile and threatening responses from fel-
low citizens and, in some instances, government officials or soldiers. Social stig-
matism, prison, physical abuse, and even death await many who declare pacifism.
There is little empirical evidence that the pacifist/nonpacifist demarcation tracks
the coward/courage distinction. Many pacifists, Gandhi and King heading the list,
prove their courage by standing for their moral principles against intimidation
and death threats.

Treason
“The pacifist is as surely a traitor to his country and to humanity as is the most
brutal wrongdoer.” These sentiments, expressed by Theodore Roosevelt in 1917,
are indicative of another common charge against pacifism. The charge is that pac-
ifists are traitors. In a similar fashion, Alfred North Whitehead charged: “The
absolute pacifist is a bad citizen; times come when force must be used to uphold
right, justice  and ideals.” Whitehead apparently broke off his professional
relationship and personal friendship with Bertrand Russell in part over the latter’s
pacifism.
Pacifists frequently understand themselves along the lines of a Socratic gadfly, a
prophetic voice for justice, or as Ronald Dworkin (1977: 207) characterized draft
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dissenters, as among society’s “most loyal and law-respecting citizens.” As gadfly,

prophet, or loyal opposition, pacifists often claim that their stance expresses their
nation’s core values better than their war-justifying critics.

Pacifism as self-contradictory
In a widely read and influential article in the 1960s, Jan Narveson (1965) con-
tended that pacifism is self-contradictory. Narveson conceives of pacifism as a
commitment to nonviolence and alleges that the real point of pacifism is opposi-
tion to violence.  The self-contradiction is generated by recognizing that being
opposed to violence entails that one is willing to stop violence. Yet, being willing
to stop violence, Narveson contends, entails being willing to use violence. Hence,
to oppose violence requires that one be willing to use violence, so that pacifism is
inconsistent. Narveson joins Reinhold Neibuhr’s famous allegation that pacifists
display naïveté.
Pacifists see Narveson’s refutation as overly simplistic. Many pacifists are not
committed to full nonviolence, but even for those who are, the argument fails.
To oppose violence is to be unwilling to use it. And to be unwilling to use violence
entails not participating in warfare. What distinguishes pacifists from nonpacifists is
not their allegedly self-contradictory refusal to be violent to stop violence, but rather
their perfectly consistent opposition to using violence because they are opposed to
it. Anyone who says they oppose violence but uses it anyway verges on a pragmatic
self-contradiction. Naïveté applies to those who believe that war and violence solves
anything.

Absolute moral rules and assessing consequences

In challenging pacifism, critics typically focus on the absolute variety. They contend
that absolute pacifism suffers from the maladies common to all deontological moral
prescriptions. Are there really no consequences sufficiently dire to defeat
the  proposed moral rule? Must the rule be followed “though the heavens fall”?
In addition, they ask, what is to be done when absolute moral rules conflict, as in the
moral duty to save the innocent versus the obligation not to kill? Moral absolutism’s
critics frequently amass hypothetical or historical cases in which the balance of
negative outcomes so overwhelms following an absolute moral rule that no
reasonable moral agent could be expected to resist.
Responses to these criticisms depend chiefly on the reasons for the particular
absolute pacifism in question. For example, an absolute prohibition to war proves
easier to defend than absolute nonviolence.
Along with living a life dedicated to nonviolence, proponents of nonviolence view
absolute pacifism as the necessary expression of nonviolence in the domain of
warfare. War’s violence adds to the moral evils in the world and fails to solve
problems. Neither history nor contrived hypotheticals present a moral imbalance
favoring war. The supposed good consequences of war always depend upon an
accounting of current outcomes which is too narrow and the failure to expand the
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temporal scope of negative outcomes into the distant future. Pacifism – either as a
symbolic gesture or as actual nonviolence – contributes to a future in which the
balance of good over evil rewards an absolute commitment.
Those committed to an absolute principle of not killing contend that only this
principle is absolute, i.e., that the nonkilling principle can and should be universalized
for all of humanity. The alleged problem of conflicting absolutes falls short here
because not killing is ranked as the most basic moral requirement.
Absolutist pacifists typically welcome consequentialist challenges which allege
the justifiability of war. A legitimate and full accounting of the real and total costs of
warfare, as opposed to the idealized versions given by war advocates, will, the
absolutist argues, support and not undermine their position. In addition, absolute
pacifists frequently point to the reasonableness of their skepticism about the real as
opposed to the purported justifications of warfare. A wide variety of epistemic
problems pertaining to issues of self-deception and unforeseen consequences serve
to buttress the absolute pacifist’s confidence in the face of what is often an avalanche
of criticisms.
With contingent pacifists, criticisms originate from adversaries with differing
assessments of the consequences (real or anticipated) from a particular war.
Nonpacifists tend to focus on war’s alleged benefits, and contingent pacifists focus
on war’s costs. Nonpacifists iterate things worth dying for. Contingent pacifists
counter with a list of values not worth killing for.

Dirty hands vs. moral purity

Following Michael Walzer (1973), critics suggest that pacifists are unjustifiably
concerned with personal moral purity. In their self-absorbed moral self-interest,
pacifists leave to others the necessary unpleasantries which require dirtying one’s
hands (see dirty hands). Pacifists are said to be moral free-riders who benefit from
war but fail to carry their weight in relation to its moral burdens.
Some pacifists are fastidious about their moral purity, perhaps unjustifiably so.
They can take heart from Bernard Williams’ (see williams, bernard) critique of an
exclusively outcomes-based orientation in moral thinking, one which unjustifiably
disregards personal identity and integrity (Williams and Smart 1973). Others deem
the so-called “dirty hands” necessity as a convenient excuse for immorality. According
to this tack, “dirty hands” all too conveniently exculpates those who fire-bomb
Dresden, destroy Hiroshima, drop napalm on Vietnam, and guide drone air attacks
that sometimes kill innocents. Pacifists argue that dirty hands activities frequently
undermine and erode the very values which justify getting one’s hands dirty.

Negative responsibility
For moral consequentialists, someone may be as responsible for not preventing as
they would be for causally bringing about an evil. Negative responsibility involves
the assignment of responsibility for those special times when people have it within
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their power to prevent something bad from happening, but fail to do so. Employing
negative responsibility arguments, critics charge pacifists with an array of adverse
consequences that result from refusing to engage in war. For example, Hitler would
have ruled Europe but for World War II.
Some pacifists challenge the controversial concept of negative responsibility itself.
However, pacifists also tend to expand the scope of moral responsibility, often includ-
ing failure to prevent moral evils among moral duties. Accordingly, pacifists argue for
the duty that we all have to prevent wars. If the human community spent but a small
fraction of its personal, economic, and technological resources to prevent conflicts
and, if they arise, to solve them amicably, rather than preparing for war, the problems
of negative responsibility would evaporate. Einstein said, “You cannot simultaneously
prevent and prepare for war.” In this way, pacifists turn negative responsibility back to
those who prepare for war, and even to those who do nothing to prevent it, laying at
their doorstep the moral responsibility for war’s harms (see doing and allowing).

Self-defense or defense of others

Surely, self-defense (see self-defense) justifies using deadly force against an aggres-
sor. While individuals may welcome their own sacrifice due to their moral scruples
against killing, some argue that permitting other innocents to be fatally harmed or a
nation to not fight back in self-defense cannot be morally expected or required.
The self-defense justification for personal and national lethal force has received
careful analytical attention from philosophers. Cheyney Ryan (1983), a reformed
conscientious objector, framed some difficulties attending the self-defense
justification for lethal violence. More recently, David Rodin (2002), in a carefully
nuanced and tightly argued analysis, shows, in effect, that the self-defense analogy
for justifying war runs into a series of damning problems, most having to do with
the difficulties involved in treating nations as persons. Though neither Ryan nor
Rodin necessarily espouse pacifism, they demonstrate that self-defense justifications
for lethal force prove problematic.

Just war theorizing

Just war theorists argue that the real moral problem with pacifism is that there are
instances when war is justifiable. If one is attentive to the conditions necessary for
going to war, one will find that such conditions have existed in the past. War is
sometimes morally justified.
Pacifists counter that the differences between pacifism and just war theorizing
cause such animosity because the two positions have so much in common. Put
simplistically, just war theorists tend to look to conditions which justify going to war
and then find ways to justify the conduct of the war. Pacifists tend to look at the
immorality of the conduct of war and then attempt to find alternatives to going to war.
Were we to begin with the immoralities attendant to the conduct of war as pacifists do,
all of our moral reasoning – deontological, consequentialist, virtue, care, and divine
will – would prompt us to oppose war and do everything that we can to make peace.
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See also: autonomy; buddhist ethics; categorical imperative; dirty

hands; doing and allowing; international bill of rights; jain ethics; just
war theory, history of; killing; king, jr., martin luther; libertarianism;
nonviolence in religions; russell, bertrand; self-defense; war; war and
religion; williams, bernard

REFERENCES
Drake, Henry L. 1959. Plato’s Complete Works. Paterson, NJ: Littlefield, Adams.
Dworkin, Ronald 1977. “Civil Disobedience,” Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Glover, Jonathan 2000. Humanity: A Moral History of the 20th Century. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Grossman, Lt. Col. Dave 1995. On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War
and Society. Boston: Little, Brown.
Hospers, John 1971. Libertarianism: A Political Philosophy for Tomorrow. Los Angeles: Nash
Publishing.
James, William 2006. “The Moral Equivalent of War,” in Larry May, Eric Rovie, and Steve
Viner (eds.), The Morality of War: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Upper Saddle
River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Kant, Immanuel 1983. Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, trans. Ted Humphrey. Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing.
Narveson, Jan 1965. “Pacifism: A Philosophical Analysis,” Ethics, vol. 75, pp. 259–71.
Rodin, David 2002. War and Self-Defense. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Russell, Bertrand 1943. “The Future of Pacifism,” American Scholar, vol. 13, pp. 7–13.
Ryan, Cheyney C. 1983. “Self-Defense, Pacifism and the Possibility of Killing,” Ethics, vol. 93,
pp. 508–24.
Teichman, Jenny 1986. Pacifism and the Just War: A Study in Applied Philosophy. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Walzer, Michael 1973. “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands,” Philosophy and Public
Affairs, vol. 2, pp. 160–80.
Williams, Bernard, and J. J. C. Smart 1973. Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Yoder, John Howard 1971. Nevertheless: A Meditation on the Varieties and Shortcomings of
Religious Pacifism. Scottdale, PA: Herald Press.

FURTHER READINGS
Brock, Peter 1968. Pacifism in the U.S.A. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Cady, Duane L. 1989. From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum. Philadelphia: Temple
University Press.
Camus, Albert 1972. Neither Victim nor Executioners. Chicago: World Without War.
Chambers, John, and Charles Moskos Jr. (eds.) 1993. The New Conscientious Objection: From
Sacred to Secular. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Eller, Cynthia 1991. Conscientious Objectors and the Second World War: Moral and Religious
Arguments in Support of Pacifism. New York: Praeger.
Gandhi, Mohandas K. 1972. Non-Violence in Peace and War, 1942–1949. New York: Garland Press.
12

Gray, J. Glenn 1959. The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle. New York: Harcourt Brace.
Hallie, Philip 1979. Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed: The Story of the Village of Le Cambon and
How Goodness Happened There. New York: Harper & Row Publishers.
Hauerwas, Stanley 1984. Should War be Eliminated? Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press.
Holmes, Robert 1989. On War and Morality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Johnson, James Turner 1981. Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War. Princeton: Princeton
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