Journal of Military Ethics

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/smil20

Risky Business: A Model of Sufficient Risk for

Anticipatory Self-Defence

Jamal Nabulsi

To cite this article: Jamal Nabulsi (2020) Risky Business: A Model of Sufficient
Risk for Anticipatory Self-Defence, Journal of Military Ethics, 19:4, 292-311, DOI:
10.1080/15027570.2021.1888503

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2021.1888503

Published online: 25 Feb 2021.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 44

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=smil20
JOURNAL OF MILITARY ETHICS
2020, VOL. 19, NO. 4, 292–311
https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2021.1888503

Risky Business: A Model of Sufficient Risk for Anticipatory

Self-Defence
Jamal Nabulsi
School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland, St Lucia, Australia

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
Drawing on the historical insight of Emer de Vattel to build on the Anticipatory war; pre-
contemporary arguments of Michael Walzer and David Luban, this emptive war; preventive war;
article develops a model of sufficient risk as a necessary condition risk; jus ad bellum
for anticipatory war to be deemed self-defence. This model holds
that an anticipatory war may constitute legitimate self-defence
(as opposed to aggression) when it aims to forestall a threat that
poses a sufficient risk to the anticipating state. This is the point
where a threat is both sufficiently likely to materialise and
sufficiently large to pose a grave risk. Due to crucial problems with
the imminence condition for self-defence, I propose that the
sufficient risk condition subsume that of imminence. The power of
this model lies in its ability to encapsulate all factors raised by
previous authors that are morally relevant specifically for
anticipatory wars and categorise them as contributing to the
judgement of the likelihood of the threat materialising and/or the
magnitude of the potential threat. This parsimonious categorisation
increases the accuracy and clarity of the moral theory on
anticipatory war, making it more robust to change in the types of
threats faced by states, and less ripe for manipulation to justify
immoral wars.

Introduction
Waging war is an immensely risky endeavour, and its consequences are grave. In the age
of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the stakes are unfathomably high. The annihil-
ation of an entire population can be brought about by the push of a button. The risk
posed by such weapons, along with the new types of threats posed by non-state actors,
have led to calls for the revision of existing theories on the moral justification of antici-
patory wars (see, e.g. Beard 2013, 2).
Existing theories, however, are incapable of responding to these calls, as they do not
sufficiently consider the magnitude of the potential threat and are founded on the flawed
notion of an “imminent” threat. This has left them open to manipulation to justify
immoral anticipatory wars, in response to vague and/or minor threats. By responding
militarily to the fear of such threats, states seek to export the risk that these threats
pose to them. They export the risk both to the states that they wage war on and to the

CONTACT Jamal Nabulsi j.nabulsi@uq.edu.au School of Political Science and International Studies, University of
Queensland, Level 5, General Purpose North (39A), St Lucia, Queensland 4072, Australia
© 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
 JOURNAL OF MILITARY ETHICS 293

world more broadly, which (paradoxically) includes themselves. One process through
which this occurs is the “boomerang effect”, whereby “in managing a future risk, new
risks proliferate” (Williams 2008, 66). Through exporting the risk posed by vague and/
or minor threats, the overall risk of war and instability posed to the world is increased.
Perhaps the clearest contemporary example of this is the “Bush Doctrine” and the
2003 Iraq War that it was used to justify. According to Shue and Rodin (2007, 11) the
Bush Doctrine, as articulated in the 2002 US National Security Strategy (NSS), “is
vague, sketchy, and inconsistent”. It manipulates existing theories on anticipatory war
by conflating the terms “pre-emptive” and “preventive”, invoking historical and legal jus-
tifications for pre-emptive war to justify a doctrine that legitimises the extensive use of
preventive force. It declares the right of the US to act pre-emptively against “emerging
threats before they are fully formed” (Bush 2002, v), “even if uncertainty remains as to
the time and place of the enemy’s attack” (15). Such a military response to vague and
unformed threats is in blatant contradiction with the definition of pre-emptive war as
responding to an imminent threat. The 2002 NSS attempts to justify this conflation of
terms by calling for an adaption of “the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities
and objectives of today’s adversaries” (15). These “capabilities” are WMDs, and these
“adversaries” are terrorists and so-called rogue states.
The Bush Doctrine was explicitly used to justify the 2003 Iraq War (see, e.g. Görener
2004). Arguably, this war and the subsequent occupation brought untold suffering upon
people and created massive instability in the Middle East, while allowing Iraq to become a
haven for terrorist groups—a catalyst for the formation of contemporary global threats,
including the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (see, e.g. Isakhan 2015). Many analysts
believe that the war has increased, and will continue to increase, the frequency of acts of
terrorism committed against the US and its allies (Sinnott-Armstrong 2007, 219). The
disastrous consequences of this war painfully demonstrate the boomerang effect and
the impact of exporting risk, highlighting the danger of a doctrine of anticipatory war
that is as ambiguous and permissive as the Bush Doctrine.
President Obama ostensibly rejected the Bush Doctrine, developing a security strategy
in 2010 that reflected a more nuanced understanding of the necessity condition for self-
defence (Obama 2010). However, the Obama administration took the Bush Doctrine’s
conception of imminence and adapted it to justify the use of more limited forms of pre-
ventive attack on a far wider scale, similarly seeking to export the risk posed to the US
(see Emery and Brunstetter 2016, 257). Successive US administrations have debated
and threatened the use of preventive war to eliminate the North Korean nuclear
threat, with the Trump administration being no exception (Roy 2017, 3–4). A preventive
strike against North Korea would likely set off the hair-trigger North Korean military
response, levelling the South Korean city of Seoul (home to 25 million people) with
the artillery and rocket launchers that they have arrayed against the city (Roy 2017, 5).
This flashpoint highlights the present danger of risk exportation through preventive war.
In exporting the risk posed by vague and/or minor threats, states undertake the futile
pursuit of absolute security, inflicting insecurity on the world as a whole. But true secur-
ity cannot rely on inflicting insecurity on others (Mythen and Walklate 2008, 236).
Therefore, states must accept a certain degree of risk to themselves in order to reduce
the overall risk of war and instability posed to the world. As Beard (2013, 1) argues, “a
risk of being subjected to aggression is the price for global peace”. However, as my
294 J. NABULSI

model will propose, there is a point where a risk to a state becomes sufficiently grave for
an anticipatory war to potentially be deemed self-defence.
This article builds on existing theories on anticipatory war by presenting a model of
sufficient risk, which aims to bring consistency, analytical clarity and robustness to
change. This model holds that an anticipatory war may be deemed self-defence if it
aims to forestall a catastrophic threat that is at least extremely likely to materialise,
or an at least severe threat that is all but certain to materialise, as represented in
Figure 1. (It should be noted that Figure 1 is purely illustrative and neither axis is
to scale.) Once this sufficient risk condition is met, the anticipatory war must also
satisfy the conditions of necessity and proportionality for it to be deemed a legitimate
act of self-defence, as opposed to aggression. Necessity requires that there be no less
harmful alternative to the use of military force to avert the threat.1 Proportionality
requires that the defensive force used be proportionate to the threat that one seeks
to avert (Rodin 2007, 160).2 This model allows for states to exercise their right to
self-defence in response to grave risks, without providing the ambiguity that allows
for manipulation to justify the exportation of risk through extensive preventive
measures.
In outlining this model, I will draw on the insight of eighteenth-century lawyer and
philosopher Emer de Vattel in adapting Michael Walzer’s notion of sufficient threat to
that of sufficient risk for an anticipatory war to be deemed self-defence.

Figure 1. A model of sufficient risk for anticipatory self-defence.

 JOURNAL OF MILITARY ETHICS 295

I propose that my model of sufficient risk should subsume the imminence condition
for self-defence due to two key definitional problems that bear on both the imminence
condition and the commonly used definitions of pre-emptive and preventive war. This
leads me also to redefine pre-emptive and preventive wars along a spectrum of the like-
lihood of the threat materialising, which forms the X-axis of Figure 1, defining pre-
emptive wars as those that respond to at least extremely likely threats. I will then
outline the types of factors that should be considered in making this likelihood judge-
ment, before building on David Luban’s (2004, 2007) arguments against preventive
wars to claim that these cannot be deemed self-defence. Following this, I will contend
that pre-emptive wars may be deemed self-defence when they respond to at least extre-
mely likely and catastrophic threats, or to at least severe threats that are all but certain,
outlining the relevant considerations for judging the magnitude of the potential threat.
I will present three cases of anticipatory war to help illustrate my model: the Israeli
strike on Iraq’s Osirak reactor; the Six-Day War; and the 2008–2009 Gaza War. The
first two cases are paradigmatic examples of preventive and pre-emptive war, respect-
ively, while the third represents a unique case where a small threat is all but certain to
materialise. As such, they are the best contemporary cases to illustrate my points. All
three are cases of Israel launching anticipatory war. This provides consistency across
the cases, at the cost of diversity. In presenting these cases, I will set aside history, as
anticipatory war can only be understood within a narrow timeframe (Walzer 2015,
108). This allows the cases to serve the illustrative purpose for which I am employing
them. My model alone cannot deem a war to be an act of legitimate self-defence, as
this would also require the satisfaction of the proportionality and necessity conditions
for legitimate self-defence. However, it can deem a war to be an act of aggression and
to therefore be unjust.
My model does not seek to eliminate the need to make practical judgements in decid-
ing whether to launch an anticipatory war. What it does is refine the parameters and
guidelines for making such judgements. The power of my model lies in its ability to
encapsulate all factors raised by previous authors that are morally relevant specifically
for anticipatory wars and categorise them as contributing to the judgement of the like-
lihood of the threat materialising and/or the magnitude of the potential threat. That is,
my model accounts for those factors which are morally relevant in waging anticipatory
war specifically, besides those factors that are morally relevant in waging all forms of war.
This parsimonious categorisation increases the accuracy and clarity of the moral theory
on anticipatory war, making it more robust to change in the types of threats faced by
states, and less ripe for manipulation to justify immoral wars.

Sufficient risk
To establish my model, I must first lay out its theoretical foundations, which can be found
primarily in the works of Swiss philosopher, jurist and diplomat Emer de Vattel (1714–
1767) and contemporary Just War theorist Michael Walzer. Walzer (2015, 101–112)
seeks to find a middle point between the unrealistically restrictive “legalist para-
digm”—which holds that anticipatory war may only be undertaken in response to “a
necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation” (Webster 1841, 1129)—and the classic case for preventive
296 J. NABULSI

war, which relies on the overly subjective notion of fear, resulting in “innumerable and
fruitless wars” (Burke 1761, 3). Due to the failings of these two extreme positions, Walzer
seeks to find the point in between them “where a threat is sufficiently substantive to be
objectively verifiable” (O”Driscoll 2008, 37). This point is markedly near to the position
of Emer de Vattel.3
Vattel ([1758] 1852, 411) recognises that “an increase of power cannot, alone and of
itself, give any one a right to take up arms in order to oppose it … it must be accompanied
by the will”. That is, in addition to increasing power, a state must display aggressive
intention for anticipatory war against them to be justified. Vattel proposes a high epis-
temic standard for the judgements of power and intention by providing indicators
that would constitute sufficient evidence for inferring the aggressive intention of
another state. The first of these indicators is when another state is seen to be preparing
for an aggressive war, such as when a state “erects fortresses on our frontier, equips a
fleet, augments his troops, assembles a powerful army, fills his magazine” (416).
However, the observation of such preparations is not sufficient to infer aggressive inten-
tion. The state must also be deemed to be of questionable moral character by having
“given proofs of injustice, rapacity, pride, ambition, or an imperious thirst of rule” (411).4
The key insight of Vattel ([1758] 1916, 249) is that “one is justified in forestalling a
danger in direct ratio to the degree of probability attending it, and to the seriousness
of the evil with which one is threatened”. This insight forms the basis of my model of
sufficient risk, with the likelihood of the threat materialising corresponding to the “prob-
ability attending it” and the magnitude of the potential threat corresponding to the “ser-
iousness of the evil”. Vattel presents this as an additional criterion to those of power and
intention, however, it actually subsumes the other criteria. Power can be taken to contrib-
ute to the judgements of both the “seriousness of the evil” and the “probability attending
it”, and intention can be taken to contribute to the judgement of the latter.
Despite drawing heavily on Vattel’s work, Walzer (2015, 107) fails to acknowledge
Vattel’s key insight when he presents his three criteria that constitute a sufficient threat:

(1) A manifest intent to injure

(2) Active military preparation
(3) A situation such that waiting or pursuing non-military means would gravely endan-
ger the state

These criteria can likewise be subsumed under those of my Vattelian model. A mani-
fest intent to injure would contribute to the judgement of the likelihood of the threat
materialising, as would active military preparation. Such preparation could also increase
the magnitude of the potential threat. The third criterion both hints at the magnitude and
corresponds to the necessity condition for self-defence.
Although Walzer’s criteria are useful in determining whether an anticipatory war may
be deemed self-defence—as they contribute to the judgements of likelihood, magnitude
and necessity—they are too vague, incomplete and fail to account for new types of
threats. Walzer fails to elaborate sufficiently on the observable phenomena that could
contribute to judging the intentions of a state, this vagueness leaving his theory open
to manipulation. His theory likewise does not sufficiently consider the magnitude of
the potential threat, as making the magnitude judgement requires observing more
 JOURNAL OF MILITARY ETHICS 297

than just active military preparation; the type of military preparation and the defensive
capabilities of the anticipating state must also be considered. Finally, the military prep-
arations and intentions of non-state actors are far more difficult to judge than those of
states, therefore, Walzer’s formulation is not robust to deal with contemporary threats.
My model will directly address these deficiencies by drawing on Vattel’s insight to
adapt Walzer’s point of sufficient threat to that of sufficient risk. This is the point
where a threat poses a risk that is sufficiently grave for an anticipatory war to forestall
the threat to be deemed self-defence. While a threat refers to a present, immediate and
certain danger, risk “refers to a future threat that has not yet materialised and may
never do so … When the consequences of any given risk become real, then the risk
becomes a threat” (Clapton 2009, 22). Therefore, as the dangers that anticipatory wars
respond to are inherently probabilistic future dangers, sufficient risk is a more appropri-
ate concept for this context.
Although Vattel did not explicitly recognise it, his insight invokes the concept of risk,
as “risk is based upon probability and the magnitude of consequences” (Heng 2003, 79). I
use the term likelihood, rather than probability, as probability implies the positivist cal-
culation of objective risk. This is problematic because risk has both objective and subjec-
tive dimensions that must be considered. The term risk refers both descriptively to the
danger posed by a threat and normatively to a wish to undertake risk management activi-
ties to forestall the threat (Heng 2006, 71). Risks are both real in an objective sense and
socially constructed in that the classifications of particular risks and how they should be
appropriately responded to are subject to mediation and contestation through political
discourse (Clapton 2011, 282). Probability and the associated quantification of risk
give risk the veneer of precision, when it is in fact an imprecise judgement. This
veneer could be exploited politically to justify waging war without reaching the epistemic
standards of judgement that I set out in this article. The use of the term likelihood avoids
these problems as it denotes reasoned judgement, based on available evidence.
Although grounded in objective reality, risk assessments are inherently subjective jud-
gements. This subjectivity cannot be expunged from risk assessment, however, it should
be tempered. Total objectivity of judgement is unattainable, however, it should be an
ideal to strive towards. Therefore, judgements of risk should be grounded in observable
phenomena, not the overly subjective experience of fear.

Problems with imminence

I propose that my model of sufficient risk subsume imminence as a condition for antici-
patory self-defence for two reasons. Firstly, the imminence condition disregards the mag-
nitude of the potential threat in its decision to deem an anticipatory war an act of self-
defence or aggression. This issue has been highlighted in calls to alter existing theories
on anticipatory war in light of the new type of threat posed by WMDs (see, e.g. Beard
2013, 2).
Secondly, there are two key definitional problems that bear on both the imminence
condition for the right to self-defence and the commonly used definitions of pre-
emptive and preventive war. The imminence condition for self-defence requires that
the threat that one seeks to avert be imminent, rather than remote or distant (Rodin
2007, 160). Pre-emptive wars are commonly defined as responding to attacks that are
298 J. NABULSI

imminent (Beard 2013, 2). Whereas, preventive wars aim to forestall an unfavourable
shift in relative power and may rely on nothing more than speculation or suspicion
(Levy 2011, 87). It is evident that the definition of pre-emptive war maps on to the
definition of the imminence condition for self-defence.
As demonstrated in the introduction, the term “imminent” has been manipulated to
justify immoral anticipatory wars. The key problem with the term is that the absolute cer-
tainty implied by “imminence” is simply unattainable. Human judgements about future
occurrences are inherently fallible. So, certainty about future events is unattainable,
especially in the realm of international relations. Even if the troops are amassing at the
border or the launch sequence for the missile has begun, a last-second termination of
the attack is not unthinkable. It could be argued that such situations provide a form of
practical certainty, where the likelihood of the threat materialising is high enough to
be deemed certain in a practical sense. However, this practical certainty is a distinct
concept from absolute certainty and constitutes what I call “all but certainty”.
The second problem is that there is a definitional gap between threats that are immi-
nent and those that are remote or distant. Although the definitions of pre-emptive and
preventive wars are mutually exclusive and the burden of proof for preventive wars is
clearly lower, there is a large gap between the two definitions, where many cases of antici-
patory war would fall. For example, if a threat is deemed to be extremely likely to mate-
rialise, based on observable phenomena, it is not clear whether a military response to this
threat would be preventive or pre-emptive—it would not be pre-emptive as the threat is
not imminent, and it would not be preventive as the perception of the threat is based on
far more than mere speculation or suspicion. To address these problems, I will redefine
pre-emptive and preventive wars along a spectrum of the likelihood of the threat
materialising.

Pre-emptive or preventive war?

Although my model could stand without distinguishing between pre-emptive and pre-
ventive wars, these categories serve to clarify and aid in the application of the model. I
set out pre-emptive and preventive wars on a spectrum of anticipatory war, which dis-
tinguishes between them simply in terms of the likelihood of the threat materialising.
This spectrum forms the X-axis of Figure 1. This spectral definition of pre-emptive
and preventive wars means that no cases of anticipatory war fall outside of the
definitions.
Given that certainty is unattainable, the distinction between pre-emptive and preven-
tive wars must be short of certainty. Therefore, I propose that a pre-emptive war
responds to a threat that is at least extremely likely to materialise. “Extreme likelihood”
requires overwhelming evidence of the threatening actor’s intention and capability of
carrying out a threat. Another important point on the spectrum, with an even higher
burden of proof, “all but certainty” requires incontrovertible evidence of the threatening
actor’s intention and capability of carrying out a specific threat.
It is conceivable that the distinction between preventive and pre-emptive war could be
drawn at the point of “all but certainty” instead. However, placing the distinction at the
point of “extreme likelihood” brings the definition of preventive war closer to that which
is commonly used and enables the model to deem all preventive wars to be aggressive.
 JOURNAL OF MILITARY ETHICS 299

This was chosen because the unequivocal rejection of preventive wars is crucial to the
model, as a threat that is less than extremely likely to materialise is too tenuous of a
basis for waging anticipatory war. This redefinition means that the burden of proof for
pre-emption is actually attainable (although is extremely high) and provides a clear fra-
mework for judging whether an anticipatory war is preventive or pre-emptive.

Judging likelihood
It is not possible to compile a definitive or exhaustive “checklist” of factors for judging the
likelihood of any given threat materialising, as the judgement takes on substantial signifi-
cance from the specific context of the threat. However, I will outline types of factors that
could contribute to the judgement of the likelihood, providing examples. Following the
thought of Vattel and Walzer, for a threat to be deemed at least extremely likely to mate-
rialise, both the threatening actor’s intention and its capability of carrying out the threat
must be observed.
The intention of the threatening actor to carry out a threat may be inferred from the
observation of a variety of factors. The first type of factor, which may not occur particu-
larly often in practice, is the discovery of actual plans to carry out a specific attack. What-
ever the means of intelligence collection, the sources of information for uncovering plans
of an attack must be deemed reliable. If the primary source is deemed reliable and the
intelligence is supported by evidence from additional reliable sources, the discovery of
actual plans to carry out a specific attack can be a sufficient condition to infer aggressive
intention.
The second type of factor that could contribute to inferring aggressive intention is the
judgement that the threatening actor is of an aggressive character. Whether a state or
non-state actor, the degree of the actor’s aggression could be judged by its history of car-
rying out violent attacks, violent provocations by its leadership, or by it being under-
pinned by a violent ideology. The degree of aggression displayed by any one actor
must be assessed on its own terms, avoiding characterisations such as rogue state or ter-
rorist organisation, as these characterisations serve only to instil fear in the mind of the
decision-maker and bias the judgement of likelihood, as well as being open to intentional
exploitation for political ends. An aggressive character is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for inferring aggressive intention. A judgement of aggressive charac-
ter must be accompanied by either discovering actual plans for an attack and/or by the
observance of threatening action.
The third type of factor for judging aggressive intention is threatening action. In the
case of non-state actors, threatening action could be the development of explosive devices
or the explicit training of militants to carry out violent attacks against civilians. In the
case of a state, threatening action might be the mobilisation of forces, enforcement of
a naval blockade or an incursion over the border of the anticipating state. However,
the mere expansion of military capabilities or build-up of forces would not constitute
threatening action, as such action is often carried out with defensive or deterrent inten-
tions. Depending on the specific context and action, threatening action can conceivably
constitute a sufficient condition for inferring aggressive intention, however, it would gen-
erally need to be accompanied by a judgement of aggressive character and/or the discov-
ery of actual plans of an attack.
300 J. NABULSI

In addition to displaying aggressive intention, for a threat to be deemed at least extre-

mely likely to materialise, the threatening actor must be deemed to have the capability to
carry out the threat. An obvious example of capability is that, if the intended threat
involves the use of nuclear weapons, there must be reliable evidence that the threatening
actor is in possession of deliverable nuclear weapons. Observations used to judge the
threatening actor’s capability would also factor into the judgement of the magnitude
of the potential threat.
The estimated time until the threat will materialise is an additional factor that must be
considered in judging the likelihood. This time is negatively correlated with the likeli-
hood— the longer the time until the threat is thought will materialise, the higher the
possibility is that an unknown factor will interfere to prevent the attack from materialis-
ing, therefore, the less likely it is that the threat will materialise. Also, the longer this time
is, the wider the margin of error in making the likelihood judgement will be.
The judgements of both the likelihood and the magnitude of the potential threat
require a high degree of second-order epistemic confidence—that is to say, a narrow
margin of error for the judgement. The anticipating actor must have a high degree of
confidence in the sources of information used to make the judgements, and collated
information must point overwhelmingly to one conclusion. This high epistemic standard
is necessary to prevent states from manipulating the model to justify immoral anticipat-
ory wars.
The observations that contribute to judging the likelihood of the threat materialising
are highly context-dependent and therefore must be assessed in relation to the specific
case. However, generally, for a threat to be deemed extremely likely to occur, the
anticipating state must have overwhelming evidence of the threatening actor’s inten-
tion and capability of carrying out a threat, based on a variety of factors from reliable
sources. For a threat to be deemed all but certain to occur, the anticipating state must
have incontrovertible evidence of the threatening actor’s intention and capability of
carrying out a specific threat, based on a wide range of factors from a variety of reliable
sources.
In some cases, although there is a high degree of certainty that a threat will materialise,
the precise time and/or place of the attack is unknown. Emery and Brunstetter (2016,
260) term these cases of “lagged imminence”, where there is “a real threat always on
the horizon, albeit not immediately”. In such cases, my standard of “all but certainty”
cannot be reached, as this standard requires knowledge of a specific threat. However,
in cases where there is overwhelming evidence that a threat will materialise, but its
exact time and/or place are unknown, the threat may be considered extremely likely to
occur. Therefore, such threats must be of a catastrophic magnitude for an anticipatory
war to forestall them to be deemed self-defence.

Israeli strike on Osirak

The paradigmatic contemporary case of a preventive strike is Israel’s bombing of the
Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 (Levy 2008, 12). Although the magnitude of the
potential threat was huge, the likelihood of the threat materialising was well short of
extremely likely. Therefore, this act of anticipatory war was preventive and, as such,
aggressive.
 JOURNAL OF MILITARY ETHICS 301

Throughout the 1970s, under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, Iraq undertook the
ambitious project of developing a nuclear weapons capability. The centrepiece of this
project was the Osirak nuclear reactor, where the fissile material would be produced
(McCormack 1996, ch. 2). The purchase of the reactor itself, equipment necessary to
create nuclear weapons and weapons-grade uranium made it clear that Iraq were
seeking to develop nuclear weapons with the fissile material produced by the reactor
(Feldman 1982, 115). Therefore, the future capability of Iraq to attack Israel with
nuclear weapons was clear.
However, for a threat to be deemed extremely likely to materialise, the manifest inten-
tion to carry out the threat is also required. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was of an aggressive
character—Saddam often spouted belligerent, anti-Israel rhetoric, and demonstrated his
aggressive character by attacking Iran in 1980 (Levy 2008, 12–13). However, deeming an
actor to be of an aggressive character is not a sufficient condition for inferring aggressive
intention. There were no plans for an Iraqi attack on Israel and Iraq did not display any
threatening action towards Israel in the lead up to the strike on the Osirak reactor. There-
fore, there was insufficient evidence that Iraq had aggressive intention and, as such, the
Iraqi threat was not extremely likely to materialise. Additionally, the threat was not of a
specific attack and was temporally distant, further detracting from the likelihood that it
would materialise. In fact, at the time “neither the French nor the Americans believed
Osirak signalled any serious threat” (Taw 2016, 49).
Rather than the more objective judgement of likelihood, the decision of Israel to attack
the Osirak reactor was based on the overly subjective fear of an adverse shift in the
regional balance of power (see, e.g. Levy 2008, 12; Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph
2003, 70), seeking to export the risk posed to them by the Iraqi nuclear threat. The
attack was launched on June 6, 1981, with Israeli fighter-bombers destroying the
Osirak reactor, killing or injuring nine Iraqis and one French technician (Mueller
et al. 2006, 215), and drawing condemnation from the international community (Nakdi-
mon 1987, 281). Although Iraq did not retaliate militarily, they responded by investing
heavily in and accelerating their nuclear weapons programme, this time housing their
multiple reactors in underground facilities that would not be vulnerable to a similar
attack in the future (Mueller et al. 2006, 216). Exiled Iraqi nuclear scientists claimed
that the Osirak attack produced “a much larger danger in the longer range” by
sending the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme into “overdrive” (Hamza 2003),
thereby having the exact opposite effect of that intended by Israel. These effects were
not limited to the region, as the Osirak attack “forced every state seeking nuclear
weapons [such as Pakistan in the 1980s] to disperse and conceal its operations” (Lobel
2006, 322). This demonstrates the boomerang effect and the wildly unpredictable conse-
quences of seeking to export risk, increasing the overall risk of war and instability posed
to the world.

Against preventive war

Permitting preventive wars would result in “innumerable and fruitless wars” (Burke
1761, 3), therefore, prevention must be held to be an aggressive and unjust form of
war. David Luban (2004, 2007) presents three convincing rule-consequentialist argu-
ments against preventive war. Luban’s first argument is simply that, by broadening the
302 J. NABULSI

category of permissible wars, permitting preventive wars makes the resort to war more
likely (2007, 172). A doctrine permitting preventive war brings the launching of war
into the realm of regular politics, making it simply another policy decision. Such political
routinisation of aggression increases the likelihood of the resort to war (2004, 225).
Luban then argues that, as subjective judgements about the threat posed by another
state will inevitably diverge, permitting preventive wars would increase the occurrence
of war by permitting them in situations of reasonable disagreement between parties
over the threats that they pose to each other. A doctrine of preventive war would
mean that war could be justifiably launched by both parties in any situation of tension
between states (227). It would thereby justify wars launched by both India and Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia and Iran, North Korea and the US.
Following from this, Luban’s third argument is that, in such situations, a doctrine of
preventive war actually makes the states serious risks to one another. This creates a self-
fulfilling prophecy, where a state that would be justified in launching a preventive war
against another state in turn becomes a risk to the second state, which could then be
justified in launching its own preventive war against the first state (2007, 172). This
idea is referred to by Crawford (2007, 120) as the “spiral of anticipation”, where preven-
tive war creates a cycle of mutual fear, which fuels “the cycle of perpetual war” (Chatterjee
2016, 334).
Luban (2007, 172) goes on to argue that there should be exceptions to a general rule
against preventive wars in cases where rogue states possess or seek to develop WMDs.
The allowance of this exception undermines the rule against preventive wars, danger-
ously leaving the door open for further exceptions to the rule. This opens the theory
up to potential manipulation to justify immoral anticipatory wars, on the basis of suppo-
sedly exceptional circumstances. Therefore, exceptions to the rule against preventive war
should not be allowed on the basis of any case-specific arguments.
David Rodin criticises rule-consequentialist arguments against preventive war for
their “general absence of reference to empirical evidence” (Rodin 2007, 153). However,
there is an abundance of empirical evidence for the logic of preventive war leading to
countless wars. One study found that every war that was fought between great powers
between 1848 and 1918 began as a preventive war (Taylor 1954). Another study
claimed that virtually all of the major European wars fought between the 16th and
20th centuries were driven by the logic of preventive war (Copeland 2000).
As the exportation of risk through preventive war leads to a proliferation in the
number of wars, it also produces many wars of disastrous consequence. It was the
logic of preventive war that led Germany to initiate the First World War, and Japan to
launch their 1941 attack on Pearl Harbour, both leading to devastating consequences
(Lobel 2006, 315–317). It is not only the direct consequences of preventive wars that
are grave, but also the effects that they have on the post-conflict political order. They
often have destabilising effects on the international order; creating heightened fear,
deep hostility and entrenching rivalries between states, thereby sowing the seeds for
future conflict (see Silverstone 2011, 111).
The use of more limited preventive force is similarly problematic in terms of its con-
sequences. Firstly, the use of limited preventive force can lead to escalation into an all-out
preventive war; as Walzer (2015, 79) points out, “aggression opens the gates of hell”. It
can likewise contribute to setting a precedent for resort to preventive war. If states
 JOURNAL OF MILITARY ETHICS 303

such as the US are permitted to carry out targeted killings with predator drones and to
consider them military strikes short of an armed attack, then other states could well
follow this precedent and carry out similar targeted killings (with or without the use
of drones) in their own state interest. This could escalate into a system of international
targeted killings, operating contrary to deeply held international norms, and ultimately
causing international instability (Sonnenberg 2016, 127). The use of limited preventive
force can also itself have devastating immediate consequences. This is evident in the
effects of US drone strikes in North Waziristan, Pakistan, which have had “devastating
economic, social, and psychological effects” (126) on the local population, while extre-
mist networks from North Waziristan have spread across Pakistan and have successfully
infiltrated every one of its major cities (126).
Critics might argue that the use of empirical claims about past occurrences of pre-
ventive war to support rule-consequentialist arguments is problematic as the counter-
factuals are inherently indeterminable (e.g. Rodin 2007). We do not (and cannot)
know whether, perhaps, the world would have been even worse off without
Germany initiating the First World War, Japan attacking Pearl Harbour, or the US
waging war on Iraq in 2003. Although counterfactuals are indeterminable with cer-
tainty, their relative plausibility can be assessed and reasonably judged by experts.
It seems exceedingly plausible that the abovementioned preventive wars led to disas-
trous consequences, compared to a case in which they were not waged. This is the
most that we can hope for in an indeterminate world where our judgements are
inherently fallible, and it is arguably enough to deem that preventive wars generally
lead to disaster.
In supporting rule-consequentialist claims with empirical evidence, the problem of
induction also looms large. Inductive methods—generalising from specific past occur-
rences to rules about future occurrences—are problematic in that there is nothing to
support the claim that the future occurrences will follow the same pattern as those of
the past. My final argument against preventive wars directly addresses the problem of
induction. Carl von Clausewitz ([1832] 1976, 85) claimed of war that “no other
human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with chance”. The conse-
quences of launching wars are inherently wildly unpredictable—the “predictably unpre-
dictable horrors” (Shue and Rodin 2007, 10) of war are known all too well. Therefore,
given the immensely high stakes in the age of WMDs, where an entire population can
be wiped out by the push of a button, states should display the utmost restraint in launch-
ing wars. As such, states must refrain from launching preventive wars, and only launch
pre-emptive wars in the face of grave risk.

Pre-emptive war
A pre-emptive war may be deemed self-defence if it responds to a threat that poses a
sufficient risk to the anticipating state. As such, once a potential threat is deemed
sufficiently likely for an anticipatory war to forestall it to be deemed pre-emptive, the
magnitude of the potential threat posed to the anticipating state must also be sufficiently
large for the pre-emptive war to be deemed self-defence. As represented in Figure 1,
sufficient risk is posed by a catastrophic threat that is at least extremely likely to materi-
alise, or an at least severe threat that is all but certain to materialise.
304 J. NABULSI

Judging magnitude
A catastrophic threat is one that would cause untold human suffering through massive-
scale death, injury or sickness; or the destruction of critical infrastructure or institutions
that would lead to such suffering. A severe threat is one that would cause considerable
human suffering through large-scale death, injury or sickness; or the destruction of infra-
structure or institutions that would lead to such suffering. In making the magnitude jud-
gement, it is not just the offensive capabilities of the threatening actor that should be
considered, but also the defensive capabilities of the anticipating state. They must both
be considered as it is the potential impact of the threat on the anticipating state that is
morally relevant.
Thus far, the need to consider the magnitude of the potential threat has largely
referred to the existence of WMDs, however, catastrophic threats are not confined to
WMDs, and not all WMDs pose catastrophic threats. WMDs typically refer to the
three categories of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons (Luban 2007, 187).
However, these three types of weapons are not necessarily more destructive than conven-
tional weapons. Many biological and chemical weapons cannot kill huge numbers of
people without aerial delivery systems, with which conventional weapons can kill simi-
larly huge numbers (187–188). Therefore, offensive capabilities that could pose a cata-
strophic threat are nuclear weapons, highly infectious biological weapons, or an
arsenal of chemical or conventional weapons that could overwhelm the defences of the
anticipating state to cause massive-scale destruction. Offensive capabilities that could
pose a severe threat are all other forms of WMDs, or conventional weapons that could
overcome the defences of the anticipating state to cause large-scale destruction.
The magnitude of the potential threat is inversely proportional to the ability of the
anticipating state to repel the threat. A threatening actor might have a small military
that, if left unchallenged, could wreak havoc and slaughter hundreds of thousands of civi-
lians. If the anticipating state had no means of defending its people against this military,
then that would constitute a catastrophic threat. However, if the anticipating state had a
far superior military that could easily repel the threatening actor’s attack with minimal
casualties, then the potential threat would not be deemed even severe. Likewise, if the
threatening actor had the capability to launch massively destructive missiles, then the
potential threat would be deemed catastrophic if the anticipating state had limited
means of defending itself against the missiles, but it would not be deemed even severe
if the anticipating state had a highly effective missile defence system that was able to neu-
tralise the missiles.
For a potential threat to be deemed catastrophic or severe due to the suffering caused
by its destruction of critical infrastructure or institutions, it must be a specific threat or
planned attack, not simply the possession of weapons that could cause such destruction.
This is because such destruction could foreseeably be caused using basic weaponry, for
example, through the destruction of a vital dam with relatively low-level explosives.
Therefore, the mere capability of causing such destruction would be possessed by vir-
tually every state and non-state actor, rendering the magnitude judgement almost redun-
dant. Nonetheless, such destruction of infrastructure or institutions must still be
considered in the magnitude judgement, as it has similarly devastating consequences
on the effected people, albeit indirectly.
 JOURNAL OF MILITARY ETHICS 305

All pre-emptive wars in response to less than severe threats are aggressive, as the
threats do not pose a sufficient risk to the anticipating state. Even when a threat is
deemed all but certain to materialise, there remains some doubt as to whether it will
materialise. Therefore, the allowance of pre-emptive wars in response to less than
severe threats, even those that are deemed all but certain to materialise, would lead to
the proliferation of wars, with all their wildly unpredictable and potentially disastrous
consequences. Moreover, in the case of a less than severe threat, the cost of waiting
for the threat to materialise before launching a defensive war is comparatively minor.
States being morally compelled to potentially absorb such threats is a small price to
pay to significantly reduce the overall risk of war and instability posed to the world.

The Six-Day War

The archetypal example of pre-emptive war is Israel’s initiation of the Six-Day War
against Egypt, Jordan and Syria in 1967 (Levy 2008, 5). The manifest intent and ability
of these three countries to wage a catastrophic war on Israel posed a grave risk. Therefore,
this case satisfies my model of sufficient risk and, if it also satisfied the conditions of
necessity and proportionality, could be deemed self-defence.
Although no plans for a specific attack were discovered, Israel had sufficient evidence
to infer the intentions of Egypt, Syria and Jordan to wage war on Israel, based on their
threatening action in the lead up to the war and their aggressive stance towards Israel
more generally. The most significant threatening action that immediately preceded
Israel’s anticipatory war was carried out by Egypt (DeFalco 2011, 31). On 14 May
1967, Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal and began a major military build-up in
the Sinai Peninsula, approaching the Egyptian-Israeli border. Then, on 18 May, Egypt
expelled the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)—an international peacekeeping
force that had been deployed in the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip in 1956, after
the Suez War. Egypt subsequently continued its huge military build-up in the Sinai,
before closing the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping on 22 May. After the Suez War,
the Straits were recognised as international waters and Israel had stated on multiple
occasions that their closure would constitute a justification for war (Walzer 2015,
109). These moves by Egypt clearly constituted threatening action.
On 30 May, Jordan signed a mutual defence agreement with Egypt, of which Syria
were already a part, placing Jordanian forces under the command of the Egyptian leader-
ship (109). This left Israel surrounded by states that had demonstrated their deep oppo-
sition towards Israel’s very existence. Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser explicitly
sought to “annihilate Israel” (as quoted in Oren 2002, 24), while Syrian Prime Minister
Yusuf Zaayyin had sworn to dig “a final grave for Israel” (30). Such statements demon-
strate the hostility towards Israel that characterised these states. Together with the threa-
tening action, this is sufficient to infer the aggressive intentions of these states.
These statements also indicate the magnitude of the potential threat—the very exist-
ence of Israel was on the line. The consequences of a war waged by Egypt, Syria and
Jordan on Israel could have been the elimination of Israel and untold suffering for the
Israeli people. It is also clear that they had the capability to carry out this threat—the
Arab states had a huge quantitative military advantage and, although Israel had the quali-
tative edge, which in the end proved key in their military victory, it was far from clear
306 J. NABULSI

preceding the war that this edge would allow them to be victorious (Ben-Yehuda and
Sandler 2002, 106).
Although the capability and intention to attack were manifest, there was no specific
attack planned by the Arab states. Therefore, the threat must be deemed to have been
extremely likely, but not all but certain, to materialise. The potential threat was cata-
strophic, therefore, the risk posed by the threat was sufficient to satisfy my model.
On 4 June, Israel initiated the Six-Day War by annihilating Egypt and Syria’s air forces
before they could scramble to respond. After the six days of ensuing war, the result was
an overwhelming Israeli victory, with Israel occupying the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula,
Syrian Golan Heights, the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Mueller et al. 2006, 204). Fifty
years later, the ongoing military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza continues to
cause widespread suffering for the Palestinian people, seeing Israel face mounting inter-
national pressure. Some argue that the Six-Day War also “added fuel to the fires of Arab
discontent, contributing to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism” (205). This demonstrates
that the boomerang effect is equally applicable to pre-emptive wars, which can likewise
have devastating and unexpected long-term consequences.

The Gaza War (2008–2009)

Although a far less clear-cut case of anticipatory war than the two cases presented thus
far, Israel sought to justify their initiation of the 2008–2009 Gaza War primarily with the
anticipatory logic. The threat of Hamas and other Palestinian factions launching rockets
from Gaza into Israel was all but certain to materialise, however, the magnitude of the
potential threat was less than severe. Therefore, this war was pre-emptive but, nonethe-
less, aggressive and unjust.
Hostilities between Israel and Hamas (and other Palestinian factions) had been
ongoing for years. However, the Gaza War of 2008–2009 was “qualitatively different
from any previous military action by Israel in Occupied Palestinian Territory”
(UNHRC 2009, 405), with Israel mobilising their air force, navy and army for the first
full-scale war against Palestinians in Gaza (86). Moreover, the anticipatory logic was
the primary Israeli justification for war, with its stated objective being “to improve the
safety and security of Southern Israel” (255) by “increasing Israeli deterrence and redu-
cing the likelihood of hostilities against Israel” (254). Despite being a less clear-cut case of
anticipatory war, this war is highly illustrative as it is a unique case of a threat emanating
from a non-state actor that was all but certain to materialise, but of less than severe
magnitude.
When Israel launched its first war on Gaza on 27 December 2008 (71), the threat of
Palestinian armed groups firing rockets into Israel was all but certain to materialise.
The intention of these groups to do so was clear, given their aggressive action and
outward hostility towards Israel. Over 500 mortars and rockets were launched from
Gaza into Israel between 18 June 2008 and 26 December 2008, and Palestinian armed
groups were continuously training militants and further developing weapons (347). In
addition, these groups openly stated their intention to target Israeli civilians with these
weapons, as retaliation for civilian casualties in Gaza (32). They also clearly had the capa-
bility to carry out this threat—they were continuously developing the rudimentary
rockets and mortars that were used in the attacks.
 JOURNAL OF MILITARY ETHICS 307

Although the threat was all but certain to materialise, the magnitude of the potential
threat was less than severe. The more than 500 mortars and rockets launched from Gaza
into Israel between 18 June 2008 and 26 December 2008 caused no Israeli fatalities and
six Israelis were reported wounded (348). The small impact of these rocket and mortar
attacks is due to both the extremely rudimentary weapons that were used for the
attacks and the effective Israeli defence system, which included an early warning
system and the fortification of public buildings (32). The magnitude of the potential
threat was small, and certainly well short of severe. Therefore, despite the threat being
all but certain to materialise, the magnitude of the potential threat was insufficient for
this pre-emptive war to be deemed legitimate self-defence.
In conjunction with the ongoing blockade and subsequent wars launched by Israel, the
2008–2009 Gaza War has created a humanitarian disaster in Gaza (259). Doctors from
the Gaza Mental Health Programme stated that such “conditions were in turn likely to
increase the readiness to embrace violence and extremism” (25). This diagnosis is mani-
fest in the war’s failure to achieve its objective of halting the firing of mortars and rockets
from Gaza into Israel, with over 150 fired between 19 January and 31 July 2009 (349).
These points highlight both the disastrous humanitarian consequences of exporting
risk through anticipatory war and the ineffectiveness of anticipatory war in achieving
its ends.

Objections and refutations

At this point, some objections to my model may have arisen in the mind of the reader.
One potential objection is that my model creates a slippery slope between preventive and
pre-emptive war, loosening the definition of pre-emption to the point where the argu-
ments against preventive war can equally be made against it. This objection argues
that, due to errors in the inherently subjective judgements of risk,5 even a strictly
limited moral permission of anticipatory war could form a slippery slope and lead to
states open-endedly advocating for preventive wars, tumbling into the spiral of antici-
pation (Chatterjee 2016, 317).
In response, my model does not purport to reach the unattainable ideal of objectivity.
It seeks simply to approach this ideal and temper the subjectivity of the risk judgements.
It does so by having an extremely high burden of proof, held to a high epistemic standard,
for making these judgements. Because of these stipulations, the spiral of anticipation
cannot initiate, as the mere fear of a first strike from the opposing party is never
sufficient to justify launching an anticipatory war. The clarity and specificity of my
model make it robust to political manipulation and prevent it from creating a slippery
slope between aggressive and self-defensive anticipatory wars.
An opposing objection is that my model is too restrictive and does not sufficiently
provide for states to exercise their right to self-defence. For example, in a case where a
catastrophic threat is very likely (but not extremely likely) to materialise, or a case
where a large (but not severe) threat is all but certain, my model would not permit an
anticipatory war to forestall the threat. Some may argue that, in such cases, a state
must be permitted to exercise its right to self-defence, given that the threats pose a
serious risk. However, a system that permits anticipatory war in response to threats
that pose a less than grave risk would see the number of wars proliferate, with states
308 J. NABULSI

tumbling into the spiral of anticipation, increasing the overall risk of war and instability
posed to the world.
My model strikes the balance between these two counterarguments. Through its
specificity and high epistemic standard, it avoids falling into the spiral of anticipation
and sliding down the slippery slope to open-ended abuse of anticipatory war.
However, it provides the moral space for states to exercise their legitimate right to
self-defence against threats that pose a grave risk.
A third objection is that the standards of intelligence required by my model are too
exacting and unrealistic.66 This touches on a key problem that my model seeks to
address: anticipatory wars are waged far too frequently on the basis of uncertain intelli-
gence. The 2003 Iraq War is a case in point. More exacting standards must be expected of
decision-makers. If not, the outlined perils of risk exportation will be perpetuated and
intensified. There is a tension here between practicality and morality; between standards
that are realistic and those that are morally stringent. Ethical standards must lean towards
the latter, as they will inevitably be pulled towards the former in their application. Fur-
thermore, the standards set out in the model of sufficient risk, although exacting, are rea-
listic and can be met. The presented case of the Six-Day War serves to demonstrate this. I
believe that the best way to further demonstrate this, and to refine the specifics of my
model, is through applying the model in a diverse range of additional cases, which is
an important direction for further research.
A related objection is that there might seem to be a dissonance between the high epis-
temic standard of my model with regards to predicting a threat and the argument against
allowing preventive war because of the wild unpredictability of its consequences—how
can the model both rely on accurate predictions of risk and hold that the risks involved
in launching a war are inherently unpredictable? The response to this objection is that
they are different types of predictions. The prediction of the risk posed to the anticipating
state through my model involves the consideration of a variety of factors in judging the
likelihood and magnitude of a specific event. Whereas, in predicting the consequences of
a war, the prediction is of the innumerable short and long-term effects of an event. One is
judging factors converging on an event, the other is judging the infinite effects emanating
from an event. For the first, we can arrive at a confident judgement of risk, the other is
unknowable with any degree of certainty.
A final objection to my model is that all anticipatory wars inherently violate one of the
other two conditions for legitimate self-defence. Therefore, whether my model deems an
anticipatory war to satisfy the sufficient risk condition is irrelevant. Some argue that
anticipatory wars cannot satisfy the condition of proportionality, as war is inherently dis-
proportionate to a threat that is yet to materialise (e.g. Beard 2013, 4). However, in the
case of anticipatory war, proportionality should be applied in reference to the threat
posed to the anticipating state. The anticipatory war should be proportional to the mag-
nitude of the potential threat.
It could also be argued that anticipatory wars cannot satisfy the criterion of necessity,
as where a threat is yet to materialise, there is always the possibility that it could be
averted by means other than war. However, the criterion of necessity merely calls for a
state to have “exhausted all plausible, peaceful alternatives to resolving the conflict”
(Orend 2000, 525). Although there are many cases of anticipatory war that would be
deemed aggressive due to their failure to satisfy the necessity condition, a case of
 JOURNAL OF MILITARY ETHICS 309

anticipatory war where peaceful alternatives have been tried and are simply no longer
plausible is certainly conceivable.
I have addressed these final counterarguments only briefly as the primary aim of this
article was to propose my model of sufficient risk as a condition for self-defence.
Sufficient risk would inevitably interact with the conditions of proportionality and neces-
sity, for example, the magnitude judgement would be used in the assessment of propor-
tionality. A comprehensive assessment of the relationship between sufficient risk,
proportionality and necessity should form the substance of further research. Although
it has not provided a panacea, this article has built on existing theories by presenting a
clear framework for assessing when anticipatory war may be deemed self-defence.

Notes
1. For the purposes of this paper, the criterion of necessity will be considered as broadly equiv-
alent to that of last resort.
2. For a thorough look at current debates on the ethics of national defence, see Fabre and Lazar
(2014).
3. O”Driscoll (2008) provides an excellent discussion of Walzer’s “spectrum of anticipation”
and how his notion of sufficient threat relates to the ideas of Vattel and other historical
thinkers.
4. Reichberg (2007, 25–31) outlines well Vattel’s ideas on anticipatory war.
5. For example, studies in political psychology have revealed that humans tend to exaggerate
foreign threats (e.g., Mueller 2005). While work on prospect theory has found that actors are
risk averse in cases where the action is framed in terms of potential gains, they take far more
risky action when it is framed in terms of potential losses (e.g., Jervis 1992).
6. I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for raising this objection.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributor
Jamal Nabulsi is a PhD Candidate at the School of Political Science and International Studies at
the University of Queensland. He was formerly a Sessional Academic at the College of Asia and the
Pacific at the Australian National University. His research interests span the ethics of war, norma-
tive international relations theory, the role of emotion in world politics, and the politics of Pales-
tine/Israel. These interests stem from a diverse, interdisciplinary academic background across the
fields of Philosophy, Psychology and International Relations. His PhD research explores the role of
emotions in everyday forms of Palestinian resistance.

References
Beard, Matthew. 2013. “Risking Aggression: Toleration of Threat and Preventive War.” The
Heythrop Journal 54 (5): 1–12.
Ben-Yehuda, Hemda, and Shmuel Sandler. 2002. The Arab-Israeli Conflict Transformed: Fifty
Years of Interstate and Ethnic Crises. New York: State University of New York Press.
Burke, Edmund. 1761. The Annual Register, or a View of the History, of Politicks, and Literature, of
the Year 1760. London: R. and J Dodsley.
310 J. NABULSI

Bush, George W. 2002. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington,
DC: The White House.
Chatterjee, Deen. 2016. “Beyond Preventive Force: Just Peace as Preventive Non-Intervention.” In
Preventive Force: Drones, Targeted Killing, and the Transformation of Contemporary Warfare,
edited by Kerstin Fisk, and Jennifer Ramos, 313–340. New York: New York University Press.
Clapton, William. 2009. “Risk and Hierarchy in International Society.” Global Change, Peace and
Security 21 (1): 19–35.
Clapton, William. 2011. “Risk in International Relations.” International Relations 25 (3): 280–295.
Clausewitz, Carl Von. (1832) 1976. On War. Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Copeland, Dale. 2000. The Origins of Major War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Crawford, Neta. 2007. “The False Promise of Preventive War: The “New Security Consensus” and
a More Insecure World.” In Preemption, edited by Henry Shue, and David Rodin, 89–125.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
DeFalco, Ralph. 2011. “Striking First: Efficacy, Legitimacy and Morality of Preemptive and
Preventive Acts of State.” PhD dissertation, Georgetown University.
Emery, John, and Daniel Brunstetter. 2016. “Restricting the Preventive Use of Force: Drones, the
Struggle Against Non-State Actors, and Jus ad Vim.” In Preventive Force: Drones, Targeted
Killing, and the Transformation of Contemporary Warfare, edited by Kerstin Fisk, and
Jennifer Ramos, 257–282. New York: New York University Press.
Fabre, Cécile, and Seth Lazar, eds. 2014. The Morality of Defensive War. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Feldman, Shai. 1982. “The Bombing of Osiraq—Revisited.” International Security 7 (2): 114–142.
Görener, Aylin. 2004. “The Doctrine of Pre-Emption and War in Iraq Under International Law.”
Perceptions 9 (3): 33–44.
Hamza, Khdir. 2003. Interviewed by Paul Begala. CNN Crossfire. February 7, 2003. Accessed
August 24, 2017. http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0302/07/cf.00.html.
Heng, Yee-Kuang. 2003. “War as Risk Management.” PhD dissertation, London School of
Economics and Political Science.
Heng, Yee-Kuang. 2006. “The ‘Transformation of War’ Debate: Through the Looking Glass of
Ulrich Beck’s World Risk Society.” International Relations 25 (3): 69–91.
Isakhan, Benjamin. 2015. The Legacy of Iraq: From the 2003 War to the “Islamic State”. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press.
Jervis, Robert. 1992. “Political Implications of Loss Aversion.” Political Psychology 13 (2): 187–204.
Levy, Jack. 2008. “Preventive War and Democratic Politics.” International Studies Quarterly 52 (1):
1–24.
Levy, Jack. 2011. “Preventive War: Concept and Propositions.” International Interactions 37 (1):
87–96.
Lobel, Jules. 2006. “Preventive War and the Lessons of History.” University of Pittsburgh Law
Review 68 (1): 307–339.
Luban, David. 2004. “Preventive War.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 32 (3): 207–248.
Luban, David. 2007. “Preventive War and Human Rights.” In Preemption, edited by Henry Shue,
and David Rodin, 171–201. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McCormack, Timothy. 1996. Self-Defense in International Law: The Israeli Raid on the Iraqi
Nuclear Reactor. New York: St Martin’s Press.
Mueller, John. 2005. “Simplicity and Spook: Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration.”
International Studies Perspectives 6 (2): 208–234.
Mueller, Karl, Jasen Castillo, Forrest Morgan, Negeen Pegahi, and Brian Rosen. 2006. Striking
First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy. Santa Monica:
RAND Corporation.
Mythen, Gabe, and Sandra Walklate. 2008. “Terrorism, Risk and International Security: The Perils
of Asking ‘What if?’” Security Dialogue 39 (2–3): 221–242.
Nakdimon, Shelomoh. 1987. First Strike: The Exclusive Story of How Israel Foiled Iraq’s Attempt to
Get the Bomb. New York: Summit Books.
 JOURNAL OF MILITARY ETHICS 311

Obama, Barrack. 2010. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington,
DC: The White House.
O”Driscoll, Cian. 2008. Renegotiation of the Just War Tradition and the Right to War in the
Twenty-First Century, 27–50. London: Palgrave.
Oren, Michael. 2002. Six Days of War. New York: Oxford University Press.
Orend, Brian. 2000. “Michael Walzer on Resorting to Force.” Canadian Journal of Political Science
33 (3): 523–547.
Perlmutter, Amos, Michael Handel, and Uri Bar-Joseph. 2003. Two Minutes Over Baghdad. 5th
edition. London: Frank Cass.
Reichberg, Gregory. 2007. “Preventive War in Classical Just War Theory.” Journal of the History of
International Law 9 (1): 5–34.
Rodin, David. 2007. “The Problem with Prevention.” In Preemption, edited by Henry Shue, and
David Rodin, 143–170. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Roy, Dennis. 2017. “Misunderstanding North Korea.” Analysis from the East-West Center 133: 1–8.
Shue, Henry, and David Rodin. 2007. “Introduction.” In Preemption, edited by Henry Shue, and
David Rodin, 1–22. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Silverstone, Scott. 2011. “Preventive War and the Problem of Post-Conflict Political Order.”
International Interactions 37 (1): 107–116.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2007. “Preventive War, What Is It Good For?” In Preemption, edited
by Henry Shue, and David Rodin, 202–221. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sonnenberg, Stephan. 2016. “Why Drones Are Different.” In Preventive Force: Drones, Targeted
Killing, and the Transformation of Contemporary Warfare, edited by Kerstin Fisk, and
Jennifer Ramos, 115–141. New York: New York University Press.
Taw, Jennifer. 2016. “Preventive Force: The Logic of Costs and Benefits.” In Preventive Force:
Drones, Targeted Killing, and the Transformation of Contemporary Warfare, edited by Kerstin
Fisk, and Jennifer Ramos, 33–57. New York: New York University Press.
Taylor, Alan. 1954. The Struggle for Mastery of Europe 1848–1918. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
United Nations Human Rights Council. 2009. Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission
on the Gaza Conflict, A/HRC/12/48. September 25, 2009. Accessed December 15 2020. https://
www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/12session/A-HRC-12-48.pdf
Vattel, Emer de. (1758) 1852. The Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of Nature, applied to the
Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns. Translated by Joseph Chitty. Philadelphia: T. &
J.W. Johnson.
Vattel, Emer de. (1758) 1916. The Law of Nations, or, the Principles of Natural Law: Applied to the
conduct and to the affairs of nations and sovereigns. Translated by Charles Fenwick.
Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution.
Walzer, Michael. 2015. Just and Unjust Wars. 5th ed. New York: Basic Books.
Webster, Daniel. 1841. Daniel Webster to Henry Fox, April 24, 1841. In British and Foreign State
Papers.
Williams, Michael. 2008. “(In)Security Studies, Reflexive Modernization and the Risk Society.”
Cooperation and Conflict 43 (1): 57–79.