Reitan Sobre La Irreconciliabilidad

Florida State University Department of Philosophy
The Irreconcilability of Pacifism and Just War Theory: A Response to Sterba (1992)
Author(s): Eric Reitan
Source: Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 117-134
Published by: Florida State University Department of Philosophy
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23560301
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The Irreconcilability of Pacifism and Just War Theory: A
Response to Sterba (1992)
1. Introduction
In a recent article, "Reconciling Pacifists and Just War Theorists,"

James Sterba argues that the version of pacifism he refers to as
"anti-war pacifism" can be reconciled with the most morally
defensible version of the Just War theory, in the sense that both
can be seen to place the same restrictions on the practice of war.1
Sterba characterizes anti-war pacifism as the view that, while
violence (including lethal violence) can be justified on certain
occasions-in particular when it is directed against unjust aggres
sors in defense of one's own life or the lives of other innocents-it
can never be justified on the large scale that is exemplified in war.
Sterba goes on to outline the principles he thinks must underlie
such a view, and then suggests that these principles are substan
tially the same as those that would be held by the most responsible
just war theorists. These principles, it turns out, would rule out
almost all wars, but would justify at least some wars (Sterba
mentions India's military action against Pakistan in Bangladesh
and the Tanzanian incursion into Uganda during the rule of Idi
Amin as two limited wars that both anti-war pacifists and just war
theorists would have to accept as legitimate).2
If Sterba is right about the principles that underlie anti-war
pacifism, and if he is right in thinking that these principles do not
rule out all wars without exception, then he has succeeded in
showing more than what he claims to have shown. In particular,
he has shown that anti-war pacifism is an incoherent position. For
anti-war pacifism is precisely the position that all wars (but not all
acts of violence) are morally prohibited. Sterba argues that, since
anti-war pacifism grants the moral permissibility of violence in
Copyright 1994 by Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Summer 1994)
117
118 Social Theory and Practice
some cases, such as cases of private defense, the view is committed

to certain moral principles which would give warrant to at least a
few wars. But to say this is to say that anti-war pacifism is
incoherent, because as soon as a moral perspective renders
legitimate even a few wars, one no longer has a pacifist moral
perspective, but has instead a just war perspective. Granted, the
just war theory that emerges is not "radically opposed" to pacifism,
as Sterba contends just war theories have been traditionally
regarded to be. It is perhaps for this reason that Sterba thinks that
what he arrives at is still a version of pacifism. In fact, the pacifist
would find something of an ally in this "just war pacifist" (to use
Sterba's expression), given the extensive congruence of their
views on war. However, so long as some wars are regarded as
morally legitimate under a certain view, that view cannot be
regarded as truly pacifistic. The only way for a full congruence
between anti-war pacifism and just war theory to emerge is if the
principles underlying just war theory were such that the conditions
required for a just war could never be met in the real world. If such
were the case, then an adherent to this just war theory could rightly
be regarded as a pacifist. If, however, the principles underlying
antiwar pacifism allow for some wars, as Sterba contends, then
anti-war pacifism has been shown to be incoherent, and no
congruence between pacifism and just war theory has been
established.
In fact, there is a case for saying that anti-war pacifism,

understood as a moral opposition to all wars coupled with an
acceptance of at least some private violence, is problematic. To
see the problem with anti-war pacifism, consideran unjust military
attack in which the citizens of the victimized country, while not
organizing themselves into a military body, do individually defend
themselves and their families against the invading soldiers. So
long as their acts of violent defense are an individual or "private"
response to the belligerent acts of unjust aggressors (who happen
to be members of an invading army), the anti-war pacifists as
characterized by Sterba would be perfectly within their rights to
defend themselves and their families with even lethal violence. As
soon as these defenders organized themselves into some kind of a
military force, however, and worked together to make their
A Response to Sterba (1992) 119
defense of their homeland more effective, they would be

participating in what could rightly be described as a war (albeit a
wholly defensive war). According to anti-war pacifism, since all
participation in war is illegitimate, such organized defense would
be disallowed. But a view which holds that the unorganized and
ineffective private violence of citizens in defense of their homes
and lives is morally legitimate while the organized and more
effective violence in defense of the same is not, seems at first
glance to be an absurd view. There seems to be no morally
significant reason to prefer such unorganized private violence to
organized collective violence.
I will argue in what follows that there may well be a morally
significant reason to prefer unorganized private violence to
organized military action. I will try to show that there is a plausible
moral principle that can serve as the basis for anti-war pacifism,
a principle that rules out all wars without qualification, but
nevertheless leaves room for private acts of violent defense. This
principle, furthermore, is one which Sterba overlooks. Once this
principle is acknowledged, anti-war pacifism can be seen to be a
plausible and coherent position that is clearly distinct from any
just war theory that legitimates some wars. I will not attempt to
show here that anti-war pacifism is preferable to the just war
position, or to other versions of pacifism (my own preference is
for a version of nonlethal pacifism of the sort Sterba dismisses in
his article). I will simply show that there is a plausible foundation
for anti-war pacifism that resists the kind of reconciliation of
pacifists and just war theorists that Sterba wants to effect.
2. The Principle of Non-Aggressor Immunity
The principle that can serve as the foundation for an uncompro

mising anti-war pacifism is the following, what I will call the
Principle of Non-Aggressor Immunity (PNI): violence is morally
permissible only if, first, the violence is a response to an immediate
threat to the life or well-being of oneself or other innocent persons;
second, the violence is directed against a person who is immedi
ately responsible for this threat by virtue of being presently
engaged in an act of unjust aggression; and third, violence is the

only plausible way to protect the life or well-being of the threat
ened person(s) from the unjust aggressor. According to this prin
ciple, violence, in order to be legitimate, must be practiced against
an unjust aggressor at the time of the aggression. What an anti-war
pacifist might hold is that, as soon as defensive violence becomes
organized, there is an inevitable tendency to launch preemptive
strikes, to initiate assaults, to seek out invading soldiers and kill
them before they have a chance to do any damage, to strike at
soldiers in a belligerent force who are not immediately engaged
in hostile actions, etc. Organizing defensive violence by creating
a military force designed for public defense, while it may not lead
inevitably to the practice of violence against noncombatants or
innocent bystanders, does lead inevitably to the practice of vio
lence against combatants who are not in the immediate act of
initiating or practicing an unjust assault. If organizing defensive
violence into a military force does indeed have this consequence
inevitably proceeding from it (a not implausible assumption, given
observations of the practices of real military and paramilitary
organizations), we would have a foundation for anti-war pacifism
based on the principle that only violence directed against unjust
aggressors at the "moment" of aggression is legitimate.
Alternatively, the anti-war pacifist could hold that any war
waged in conformity with the restrictions imposed by PNI would
be doomed to failure, or at least have a very low possibility of
success. Thus, if one were to adopt PNI in conjunction with the
traditional just war principle that a war must have a reasonable
chance of success in order to be legitimate, one would again have
a foundation for anti-war pacifism. I will explicitly consider this
second foundation for anti-war pacifism in what follows.
Sterba does not consider PNI, or the possibility of basing
anti-war pacifism on this principle. Instead, Sterba moves
immediately from the observation that anti-war pacifists allow for
some acts of even lethal violence to the conclusion that the basis
for anti-war pacifism is an opposition to the sheer magnitude of
the violence that occurs in war. But the anti-war pacifist need not
make such a move. If we look at the critique of nonlethal pacifism
presented by Sterba, we see that the anti-war pacifist can accept
that critique and yet remain opposed to all war on grounds different
from the magnitude of violence associated with war. Sterba argues
that nonlethal pacifism (the view that all killing of human beings
is wrong) fails because it rules out killing an aggressor who is in
the act of doing serious or lethal harm to you, when such killing
is the only way to prevent the threatened harm. Sterba maintains
that, in this circumstance,
killing is not evil, or at least not morally evil, because anyone who is wrongfully
engaged in an attempt upon your life has already forfeited his or her right to life
by engaging in such aggression. So, provided that you are reasonably certain
that the aggressor is wrongfully engaged in an attempt upon your life, you
would be morally justified in killing, assuming that it is the only way of saving
your life.
Sterba takes this criticism to be a strong one, and then observes

that anti-war pacifists avoid this criticism by contending that it is
war, and not lethal violence generally, that is prohibited. Anti-war
pacifism, according to Sterba, contends that "any participation in
the massive use of lethal force in warfare is morally prohibited."4
He appeals to the works of Robert Holmes and Duane Cady for
defenses of this view.5 In the remainder of his article, Sterba
assumes that it is by virtue of the magnitude of the lethal force in
warfare that war is morally prohibited; his reconciliation of
anti-war pacifism with just war theory depends on this assumption.
This assumption comes out most obviously in the following
passage:
Where the just war theory goes wrong, according to the anti-war pacifists, is not
in its restriction on harming innocents but rather its failure to adequately
determine when belligerent correctives are too costly to constitute a just cause
or lacking in the proportionality required in a just means. According to anti-way
pacifists, just war theory provides insufficient restraint in both of these areas.
In other words, war is ruled out, according to the anti-war

pacifist, because the magnitude of lethal violence involved makes
it disproportionately costly. But the demands for proportionality,
and for a just cause or objective whose attainment outweighs the
costs of belligerence, are demands made by just war theorists as
well as pacifists.7 From here it is a short step to Sterba's
conclusion, that anti-war pacifism and just war theory can be
reconciled. Sterba's strategy in the remainder of the paper is to

show that there are cases in which waging war is neither too costly
nor lacking in proportionality, and that therefore anti-war pacifism
amounts to a kind of just war theory that, while it places very
stringent restrictions on the practice of war, does not rule out war
altogether.
If Sterba's argument succeeds at all here, however, it does not
succeed in reconciling anti-war pacifism and just war theory.
Instead, it merely shows that the magnitude and costliness of war
is not a plausible basis for anti-war pacifism, since what results
from a moral opposition to disproportionately massive lethal
violence is a very restrictive just war theory, not an anti-war
pacifism. PNI, however, can serve as a plausible foundation for
anti-war pacifism; PNI allows for private acts of defensive
violence, even lethal violence, but rules out all war categorically.
In short, what S terba overlooks is the possibility that the primary
reason for the anti-war pacifist's objection to war is not the
magnitude of the violence involved, not even the likelihood of
disproportionate harm to innocents (although both of these are
likely additional reasons for opposition). Rather, the principal
reason for opposition is that in any war that has a reasonable
chance of success, violent attacks will be initiated against soldiers
who are not immediately engaged in unjust aggression. What
grounds the opposition to all war is not an opposition to violence
of such magnitude, but to violence directed at illegitimate targets
(namely nonaggressors, where an aggressor is someone who is
immediately engaged in unjust aggression). The anti-war pacifist
who maintains that it is legitimate to use lethal violence only
against someone who is engaged in an act of unjust aggression
(and only if such violence is the only way to prevent the unjust
aggression) can meet Sterba's objection to nonlethal pacifism
without compromising the categorical opposition to all wars.
3. Criticisms and Clarifications
There are two important criticisms that can be leveled against this
form of anti-war pacifism. The first criticism objects that PNI,
upon which this version of anti-war pacifism is based, is not itself

a plausible principle. The second criticism, related to the first,
objects that under any plausible interpretation of PNI, the attack
upon nonaggressors is not in fact necessary in order for organized
and "militarized" violence to be successful; rather, it is only under
the most implausible interpretations of the principle that war, in
order to achieve its ends, must involve the attack upon nonaggres
sors.
To deal with these objections, I must show that there is a

plausible reading of PNI which in fact rules out (at least in
conjunction with other plausible principles) all wars. If such a
reading can be found, then we have a moral basis for an
uncompromising anti-war pacifism. I need, then, to look at the
various ways in which PNI can be interpreted.
PNI states essentially that it is morally legitimate to do violence
to another human being only if that human being is presently
engaged in an act of unjust aggression, and violence is the only
plausible way to prevent or end that aggression. The interpretive
difficulty of this principle lies with the question of what it means
to be "presently engaged in an act of unjust aggression." One
possible interpretation, what I will call the strict reading, holds that
in order to be engaged in unjust aggression one must be presently
inflicting injury upon an innocent person (i.e., one is firing one's
weapon, one is plunging one's knife into an innocent's body, one
is swinging one's fist towards an innocent's face, etc.). This is a
very restrictive reading whose only real advantage is the fact that
recognizing when aggression is taking place is a rather easy matter.
Another possible interpretation, what I will call the moderate
reading, holds that in order to be engaged in unjust aggression one
must be at least preparing to inflict injury on an innocent person
(i.e., one is aiming one's weapon in order to fire, one is drawing
one's knife in order to stab, one is preparing to swing one's fist,
etc.). Under this reading, someone is an aggressor just in case the
person has a present intention to inflict injury and is acting to carry
out that intention, whether or not these actions have come so far
as to actually involve injury-producing acts. Under the moderate
reading, it becomes somewhat more difficult to determine whether
or not someone is engaged in unjust aggression (a person may draw
a knife without actually meaning to use it). Contextual clues,

however, can often be used to give reasonable certainty that, in
fact, the actions proceed from a present intention to inflict injury.
A third possible interpretation holds that someone is engaged
in an act of aggression just in case that person is performing or
preparing to perform some act that would contribute in some way
towards the infliction of injuries, with the added stipulation that
the person recognizes that his act serves this role. An example
would be a soldier during wartime who is repairing or preparing
to repair some weapon of destruction that he knows will be used
in combat once the repairs are complete. Another example would
be a soldier who patrols an area in search of enemy soldiers: while
not presently inflicting or preparing to inflict injury, this soldier is
contributing towards the infliction of injuries by looking for
enemies to injure. It seems, however, that a military doctor who
treats injured soldiers so that they can return to combat more
quickly is contributing towards the infliction of injuries, and is
therefore presently engaged in an act of aggression under this
reading. But to call the activity of a doctor busily trying to save
the life of a wounded soldier an act of aggression is obviously a
mistake. Thus, we need to modify this reading of PNI if it is to be
at all plausible. We can do so if we modify the reading to hold that,
in order for an action that contributes in some way to the infliction
of injury to be an act of aggression, the action must be such that it
would not be performed were it not for the end of inflicting injury.
Put another way, there would be no reason to perform the act were
it not for the objective of inflicting injury. Thus, commanding
soldiers into battle would not be done did the commander not have
as an objective (not necessarily a final objective) the infliction of
injuries on enemies. The military engineer would neither make nor
repair weapons of destruction (deterrence aside) were it not for the
objective of inflicting injuries. The surgeon would still treat
wounded soldiers, however, and the cook would still feed them,
because health and nutrition are valuable ends in themselves.
Thus, an act of aggression would be an act whose sole (or at least
principal) rationale is to bring about or facilitate the infliction of
injuries. I will call this the purposive reading of PNI.
Finally, there is what I will call the associational reading, in

which someone is said to be engaged in aggression if the person
is associated in a supportive way with a group organized for the
purposes of performing acts of aggression. A new recruit to a
wartime army, who has yet to contribute in any way towards the
practice of aggression short of associating himself with the
military organization, is an example. A soldier on the front who is
neither firing his weapon, preparing to fire, nor assisting or
preparing to assist his fellows in their acts of inflicting injury,
would be another example. Once again, however, a military doctor
engaged in the business of saving soldiers' lives would be engaged
in unjust aggression under this reading. To avoid this consequence,
we might say that what is required under the associational reading
is that one be associated with an aggressive military organization
in a specific way, in particular through having taken on the role of
combatant. Even if one restricts the associational reading in this
way, however, one is still forced to say that off-duty soldiers are
engaged in aggression while they eat lunch, and that on-duty
combatant soldiers who are asleep at their posts are engaged in
aggression. We might rename this the occupational reading, to
indicate that it is the person's status as a combatant in an aggressive
military force that makes him an aggressor.8
We have, then, four readings of PNI. The strict reading (PNIS)
states that it is morally legitimate to do violence to another human
being only if that human being is presently inflicting injuries
unjustly. The moderate reading (PNIM) states that it is morally
legitimate to do violence to another human being only if that
person is presently inflicting or preparing to inflict injuries
unjustly. The purposive reading (PNIP) states that it is morally
legitimate to do violence to another human being only if that
person is performing an act whose primary rationale is to
contribute to the unjust infliction of injuries. The occupational
reading (PNIO) states that it is morally legitimate to do violence
to another human being only if that person is either inflicting or
preparing to inflict injuries unjustly, or is a member of some group
that is presently engaged in unjust infliction of injuries, and has
taken on a role that would at least potentially involve him in acts
of inflicting injuries unjustly. In all four versions, furthermore, we
must add the stipulation that, in order for the violence to be

justified, it must be the only plausible way to prevent the unjust
aggression.
What can be said of these four versions of PNI? The first
version, PNIS, is so restrictive that we would not be unwarranted
in dismissing it right away. Surely, if one has a right to use lethal
violence in order to defend oneself from someone who would,
barring such defense, actively inflict injury or death, then one has
a right to do so as soon as one is practically certain that the person
will, barring such defense, actively inflict injury or death. One
need not wait until the bullet is in the air or the knife is slashing
down in order to have such certainty, at least not always; and if
one were required to wait for such harm-causing actions,
self-defense would become almost impossible. If one has a right
to lethal self-defense at all, it seems one has a right to initiate that
defense at a time when it is likely to have some efficacy, assuming
that one is reasonably certain at that time that an attack will take
place. Thus, it seems that if one has a right to use lethal violence
in self-defense at all, one has a right, at least on some occasions,
to use lethal violence when the attacker is preparing to inflict
injury.9
Thus, we are left with three versions of PNI. Can any of these
serve as a foundation for anti-war pacifism? Clearly, the
occupational version, PNIO, will not do as a foundation for
anti-war pacifism. For if all combatants are engaged in acts of
aggression simply by virtue of being soldiers, there is little
difficulty in discriminating between aggressors and
nonaggressors. So long as one targets only combatants (a
requirement of just war theory), one is meeting the requirements
of PNIO. And it certainly seems possible to wage a successful war
in which only combatants are targeted.
That leaves PNIM and PNIP. I would argue that PNIM, at least
when coupled with the traditional just-war principle that violent
action must have a reasonable chance of success in order to be
legitimate, serves as a strong foundation for anti-war pacifism. In
brief, any organized military response to an organized military
aggression that is limited in its means of response by PNIM will
be hopelessly ineffective and doomed to failure. Since it seems a
reasonable requirement on the waging of war that it have some

chance of success, someone who holds to PNIM would be forced
to the conclusion that no war can be justified. Either the war is
foredoomed, in which case it is pointless to wage it, or the war
must employ unacceptable means, in which case the war is again
illegitimate.
It is not difficult to see why PNIM would cripple the effective
waging of war. PNIM states that it is legitimate to do violence to
a person only if, first, the person is preparing to inflict harm
unjustly, and second, the only way to prevent the harm is through
violence. Let us imagine a nation which tries to follow this
principle in the face of an invasion. First of all, the principle would
prohibit violence whenever running away, hiding, surrendering,
and the like would be as effective in preventing the infliction of
harm. Only when these and all other methods fail, and innocents
are about to be injured, can violent responses be resorted to, and
then only against those enemy soldiers who are preparing to inflict
the harm. It is hard to imagine an organized military force acting
according to these principles, in which surrender and flight take
moral precedence over standing and fighting. It is even harder to
imagine such a fighting force having any success in responding to
the enemy-unless, of course, civilian based nonviolent defense
tactics of the sort articulated by Gene Sharp are employed in
addition to violence. What one would then have, however, would
not appear to qualify as a war in the traditional sense. The response
would not be a military response, but a nonviolent response in
which violence was occasionally used in private acts of defense.
Given PNIM, then, a violent resistance campaign would be so
hampered as to be ineffectual, and any hope of successful
resistance would have to rest on the success of a nonviolent
campaign. The nation which follows the requirements of PNIM,
then, would not wage war on the invader, but would wage a
nonviolent campaign. The members of this nation might not balk
at defending themselves and others with violence when an attack
is imminent. But that is a far cry from war.
PNIP would not place as many restrictions on the use of
violence as PNIM. Since soldiers on patrol are, by the definition
of aggression employed in PNIP, actively engaged in aggression,
seeking out these soldiers, ambushing them, and the like is morally
legitimate (hiding from them would not end or prevent their
aggression, since it would not stop them from patrolling, and thus
flight does not have the same moral priority over combat that we
find in the case of PNLM). Thus, a war waged within the limits
imposed by PNIP is not foredoomed to failure (although the
likelihood of success might be truncated by the fact that attacks
could only be directed towards enemy soldiers who are actively
pursuing actions whose primary rationale is to facilitate the
infliction of injury).
It seems, then, that of the four interpretations of PNI, PNIS, and
PNEM are the only ones that support anti-war pacifism. PNIS, we
have already seen, is implausible. What about PNIM?
The criticism that was leveled against PNIS does not similarly
apply to PNIM. While it may not be possible to engage
successfully in private violent defense when one must wait until
an act of inflicting injury is already underway, it is certainly
possible to engage in private violent defense if one only need wait
until it is clear that the person is preparing to inflict injury. That
PNIM is a plausible principle is supported by the fact that this
principle seems to be what underlies the legal justificatoiy
framework for self-defense and other-defense. According to most
legal traditions, violence in self-defense or other-defense is
justified just in case, first, it is a response to an imminent threat,
and second, it is reasonable to believe that this response is the only
one that is likely to succeed in fending off the threat.10 The
requirement that violent response be to an imminent threat is
substantially the same as the requirement in PNIM that the
response be directed towards someone who is engaged in or
preparing to engage in the infliction of harm. The law does not, at
least presently, regard as legitimate self-defense or other-defense
that is directed towards someone who is not even preparing to
inflict harm, as is evidenced by the current difficulties that battered
women who shoot their husbands while they sleep have in
pleading innocence on grounds of self-defense. While this feature
of our current legal system has been challenged, it nevertheless
remains the underlying principle of justifiable self-defense and
other-defense.11 As a principle guiding when it is appropriate to
do violence in private contexts, then, this principle has

traditionally been regarded as plausible in legal contexts. While
this point does not establish that the principle is correct, it does
show that it is a lively and respectable principle to ascribe to. Thus,
an anti-war pacifism based on this principle cannot be easily or
summarily dismissed as implausible. And, as we have seen, PNIM,
in conjunction with the principle that wars must have a legitimate
chance of success in order to be justly waged, implies the
prohibition of all wars.
4. Objections to PNIM
Before concluding, however, let me consider a pair of objections

to PNIM. If successful, these objections would show the implau
sibility of PNIM. The first objection would hold that, not only is
it obviously permissible to defend oneself against someone pre
paring to inflict injury, but it is also obviously permissible to do
violence to anyone who clearly intends to inflict injury, whether
or not this intention has manifested itself in any action whatever.
Sterba says that it is legitimate to attack present aggressors
(understood here to be anyone inflicting or preparing to inflict
injury) because, by engaging in unjust aggression, the aggressor
forfeits the right to life. But the individual who merely intends to
inflict injury, but has yet to take any steps to do so, is not engaging
in unjust aggression, and therefore this justification for doing
violence to the potential aggressor is not available. One might
argue, however, that the feature of the unjust aggressor that makes
him forfeit his rights is the fact that he intends to inflict injury, and
not the fact that he is engaged in activities aimed at inflicting
injury. If so, then it would seem that we could do violence to
anyone who intends to inflict injury, since the mere intention is
enough to warrant the forfeiture of rights.
Two things need to be said here. First of all, we need to
distinguish between two senses of "intention," only one of which
seems a plausible candidate for warranting the forfeiture of
rights.12 The first sense of intention is the sort of intention that I
might have when I say that I have the intention to go to the bank
after work today. "Intention" in this sense refers to a wholly mental

phenomenon, one not directly connected with an immediate action
of any sort. To say that I intend to inflict injury in this sense is to
say that I have a strong disposition to inflict injury. But is such a
strong disposition enough to warrant the forfeiture of rights? We
all know that intentions of this sort have a tendency to change.
Sometimes we "change our minds"; we talk ourselves out of our
intentions, or new information or revelations serve to change our
intentions. We might even have a "conversion experience" as soon
as we move to carry out these intentions. Given these possibilities,
it seems implausible to rest the forfeiture of rights on an intention
to inflict injury in this sense.
The other sense of "intention" is the sense in which an intention
is not divorced from a specific act, is not wholly mental, but is

connected to a specific act in the sense of explaining in what way
the act was carried out. Thus, an act is done wi th a certai n intention,
and the intention helps describe what kind of act is being done. If
I fire a gun at a target with the intention to hit the person standing
behind it, my action is different than if I fire the gun at the target
with the intention to hit the bulls-eye, and inadvertently hit the
person behind it. An intention of this sort can be had only when
one is immediately engaged in carrying out a course of action.
While having an intention to inflict injury in this sense can be
plausibly thought to warrant the forfeiture of rights, one cannot
have such an intention if one is not immediately inflicting or
preparing to inflict injury. Thus, if it is intentions of this sort that
result in the forfeiture of rights, one is justified in doing violence
to someone only if that person is immediately engaged in inflicting
or preparing to inflict harm. But this is simply PNIM.
Of course, someone might argue, despite my protestations to
the contrary, that the mental intention to inflict violence, divorced
from any immediate actions to that effect, is by itself enough to
warrant forfeiture of the right to life. Even if this is true, however,
there is some question about whether or not we can be reasonably
certain that someone intends to inflict injury unless that person is
at least preparing to inflict injury. Short of the evidence of someone
actively preparing to inflict injury, we do not seem to have
sufficient grounds for believing that the person has such intentions.
Even if the simple mental intention, divorced from any actions, is

enough to warrant the forfeiture of rights, we cannot legitimately
act contrary to these rights unless we have sufficient grounds for
believing that they have in fact been forfeited. Thus, the principle
that we can do violence only to those who we are reasonably
certain intend to inflict injury, even if we assume that such an
intention can exist divorced from the activity of preparing to do
harm, reduces to PNIM when we consider the epistemological
difficulties of determining when such an intention is present.
Someone might respond to this argument by observing that in
the situation of war, where soldiers have as their occupation the
infliction of injury, we have enough evidence to know their
intentions without having to see them actively preparing to inflict
injury. Thus, we can ambush them, we can kill them in their sleep,
we can shoot them from behind while they stand guard, etc.
Setting aside the difficulties created by such historic examples
as soldiers who, in World War I, consistently aimed to miss enemy
soldiers,13 it is still clear that this argument will not work. If it is
the case that the mere intention to inflict injuries, divorced from
any actions, does warrant the forfeiture of rights, it must be
because this intention is indicative of a guilty mind, or a "bad
soul"; it must be because it is thought that having such an intention,
divorced from any action, is enough to make one unworthy of
possessing the rights in question. However, when we make assess
ments about whether or not someone has a guilty mind, that
person's intentions are not the only relevant criteria. Whether or
not the person is acting under duress, for example, and whether or
not the person believes her actions are just, will figure into the
determination of mental culpability. Since so many soldiers are
conscripted into the army against their will, and so many others
are duped into believing in the justice of their cause by state
propaganda, it would seem that even those who intend to do
violence are not thereby "stained in their souls" and unworthy of
the right to life. As soon as we try to justify violence against a
person on grounds other than that person's actions, we open up a
quagmire of difficulties, and we make the actual justification of
violence exceedingly difficult. An army that had orders to shoot
only those enemies who they knew to be of an evil will would be
paralyzed by uncertainty, and would be able to shoot no one

at all.
Thus, it does not seem we can render PNIM implausible by
appealing to notions of intention. It might be further objected,
however, that one is justified not only in attacking present aggres
sors, but also in attacking past aggressors, as a form of punishment.
With respect to past aggressors who are not immediately threaten
ing any innocent person, it might seem that a modified version of
the justification Sterba uses to justify violence against present
aggressors is available. After all, one might say that the past
aggressor, by having done some wrong in the past, has thereby
forfeited the right to life and can be legitimately killed. This seems
to be the rationale used for justifying capital punishment. There is
a significant disanalogy, however, between the situation of war
and that of punishment. When a criminal is punished, in order for
that punishment to be regarded as legitimate, it is normally thought
that some sort of procedure must be followed to establish guilt,
one in which various exculpatory claims such as insanity or
coercion are explored and either dismissed or confirmed. In war
no such procedure is followed before an enemy soldier is shot. In
fact, no such procedure could be followed, except with captured
enemies (who, it is interesting to note, are not typically killed).
Enemy soldiers are shot without regard for whether or not they are
presently engaged in or have engaged in unjust aggression. It is
enough that the soldier is a member of the enemy force. That is
the nature of war, and that is part of the reason why anti-war
pacifists are opposed to war.
Might it not be argued, however, that it is so certain that enemy
soldiers have engaged in unjust aggression in the past that there is
no need for a trial procedure of the sort used with criminals?
First of all, it does not seem that so much certainty can be had.
In any war there are always new recruits who have yet to fire their
first shot at the enemy, and even veteran soldiers may have done
little actual fighting. This point aside, however, there again arises
the question of the actual culpability of enemy soldiers in war.
Even when a soldier is part of an unjust invading force, and
actively engages in military aggression, there are questions that
arise about the culpability of soldiers who are merely acting under
the orders of their superiors, who may have been conscripted

unwillingly into the army, and who may fight under the threat of
punishment or the delusion that their cause is just.14 These are
concerns that do not arise in the case of a private attack, but which
do arise in the case of war, and put into doubt not only whether the
past aggressor has forfeited his rights, but even whether the present
aggressor has forfeited his rights.
In short, it seems that the principle I impart to the anti-war
pacifist, that it is legitimate to do violence only to someone who
is inflicting or preparing to inflict injury, is a plausible one, not
immediately refutable, and is such that, together with the principle
that a war must be winnable in order to be legitimate, it implies
anti-war pacifism. At the same time, this principle allows for
violence, even lethal violence, in private self-defense and
other-defense. This form of pacifism, furthermore, cannot be
reconciled with just war theory, since it prohibits all wars and not
just most wars. Thus, Sterba's thesis collapses.
Notes
1. James Sterba, "Reconciling Pacifists and Just War Theorists," Social Theory
and Practice 18 (1992): 213-18.
2. Sterba: 34.
3. Sterba: 23. Of course, this criticism of nonlethal pacifism is contestable. The
notion of the forfeiture of rights is a difficult one, and needs considerable
analytic clarification if any sense is to be made of it.
4. Sterba: 23. Italics mine.
5. Duane L. Cady, From Warism to Pacifism (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1989) and Robert L. Holmes, On War and Morality (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1989). It seems, however, that both Cady and
Holmes oppose all wars, not simply because the use of lethal force is on
such a massive scale, but also because persons who cannot be legitimately
killed are inevitably killed in war. Holmes, for example, argues that war is
illegitimate because innocents are killed. See especially chapter 6 of On War
and Morality. Thus, the foundation for anti-war pacifism put forward by
Sterba may be something of a straw man.
6. Sterba: 282-89.
7. See Sterba: 35, for a summary of what Sterba takes to be the most defensible
version of just war theory.
8. There is a fifth possible understanding of what it means to be presently

engaged in unjust aggression: namely, one is engaged in unjust aggression
just in case one is unlawfully or illegitimately trespassing on the territory of
someone else. Under this understanding of unjust aggression, however, PNI
does not seem to be at all plausible, since trespassing does not seem to be
enough to warrant the forfeiture of the right to life. Therefore, I have not
included this version of unjust aggression in my analysis.
9. Of course, it is quite possible to reject the antecedent of this conditional, as
I do.
10. See Hyman Gross, A Theory of Criminal Justice (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1979), p. 178, for a concise statement of this traditional
view.
11. For a good discussion of female violence and a challenge to the traditional
position on self-defense, see Lance K. Stell, "The Legitimation of Female
Violence," in James B. Brady and Newton Garver, eds., Justice, Law, and
Violence (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), pp. 241-59.
12. This analysis of intention was in part inspired by the work of Alan White.
See Alan White, Grounds of Liability (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985),
especially pp. 636-41.
13. See Tony Ashworth, Trench Warfare, 1914-1918: The Live and Let Live
System (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1980). See also Robert Axelrod, The
Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1984), pp. 73-87.
14. See On War and Morality, p. 187.
Eric Reitan
Philosophy Dept.
Pacific Lutheran University

Reitan Sobre La Irreconciliabilidad

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Reitan Sobre La Irreconciliabilidad

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Florida State University Department of Philosophy

In a recent article, "Reconciling Pacifists and Just War Theorists,"

some cases, such as cases of private defense, the view is committed

In fact, there is a case for saying that anti-war pacifism,

defense of their homeland more effective, they would be

2. The Principle of Non-Aggressor Immunity

The principle that can serve as the foundation for an uncompro

engaged in an act of unjust aggression; and third, violence is the

Sterba takes this criticism to be a strong one, and then observes

In other words, war is ruled out, according to the anti-war

reconciled. Sterba's strategy in the remainder of the paper is to

3. Criticisms and Clarifications

upon which this version of anti-war pacifism is based, is not itself

To deal with these objections, I must show that there is a

a knife without actually meaning to use it). Contextual clues,

Finally, there is what I will call the associational reading, in

must add the stipulation that, in order for the violence to be

reasonable requirement on the waging of war that it have some

do violence in private contexts, then, this principle has

Before concluding, however, let me consider a pair of objections

after work today. "Intention" in this sense refers to a wholly mental

is not divorced from a specific act, is not wholly mental, but is

Even if the simple mental intention, divorced from any actions, is

paralyzed by uncertainty, and would be able to shoot no one

the orders of their superiors, who may have been conscripted

8. There is a fifth possible understanding of what it means to be presently

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