Psychological Review

1974, Vol. 81, No. 3, 199-213

A MOTIVATIONAL VIEW OF LEARNING,

PERFORMANCE, AND BEHAVIOR
MODIFICATION *
DALBIR BINDRA"
McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada

The theoretical formulation advanced here wholly discards the response-

reinforcement principle. It attributes learned behavior modifications to the
building of central representations of contingencies between situational
stimuli and incentive stimuli; certain situational stimuli are thereby turned
into conditioned incentive-discriminative stimuli. It is proposed that central
motivational states, generated by the joint influence of organismic-state
variables and unconditioned or conditioned incentive stimuli, influence the
response-eliciting potency of particular situational stimuli. The specific re-
sponse form that emerges is a fresh construction created by the momentary
motivational state and the spatio-temporal distribution of various distal and
contact discriminative-incentive stimuli in the situation. These and related
working assumptions are shown to clarify certain long-standing problems
of behavior theory and to provide a basis for deriving satisfactory interpre-
tations of several hitherto perplexing phenomena of conditioning, motiva-
tional modulation of instrumental behavior, and observational learning.

Perhaps the most incontrovertible law of modifications of behavior. One hypothesis

adaptive behavior is that an animal's ex-
perience with reinforcing stimuli in a sit-
uation can produce a marked and lasting
modification of its actions in that situation.
Reinforcing stimuli include such biologically
important objects, events, and situations as
food, water, an odor, a taste, a sexual part-
ner, a nest or home area, the call of a dis-
tressed offspring, a loud noise, a predator,
and injurious levels of heat or cold. They
are also called "affective," "hedonic," "emo-
tional," or "incentive" stimuli. They tend
to be pleasing or discomforting, that is, they
frequently elicit appetitive or aversive re-
actions; they are contrasted with "neytral"
stimuli which are neither pleasant nor un-
pleasant, but hedonically neutral.
There are two main hypotheses about the
exact role of reinforcing stimuli in learned
1
The preparation of this paper was supported
by Grant MH-03238-10 from the U. S. Public
Health Service (National Institute of Mental
Health) and Grant A-7918 from the National
Research Council of Canada. I have benefited
from discussions with several students and col-
leagues.
2
Correspondence concerning this paper should
be addressed to D. Bindra, Department of Psy-
chology, McGill University, P. O. Box 6070,
Montreal 101, Quebec, Canada.
199
is that reinforcing stimuli have "response-
reinforcing" properties which influence the
strength of association between the given
stimulus situation and those responses that
are instrumental in bringing about the re-
inforcing stimulation. This response-rein-
forcement principle attributes learned be-
havior modifications to the contingency
existing between a response and the rein-
forcing stimulation. The second hypothesis
is that reinforcing stimuli have "incentive-
motivational" properties which influence the
response-energizing capabilities of the stim-
uli that contribute to the occurrence of the
response. This incentive-motivational prin-
ciple attributes learned behavioral modifica-
tion to the contingency existing between
the situational stimuli and the reinforcing
stimulation.
For about half a century following the
enunciation of the law of effect (Thorndike,
1911), the response-reinforcing principle
gradually became the main accepted basis
for explaining the phenomena of behavior
modifications produced through the manip-
ulation of experiential (learning) or moti-
vational variables (e.g., Bollard & Miller,
1950; Hull, 1943; Skinner, 1938, 1953).
Though the incentive-motivational view had
200 DALBIR BINDRA
its proponents (e.g., Troland, 1932; Young,
1948), they had relatively little influence
on formal behavior theory. However, start-
ing about 1950, the incentive-motivational
principle began to appear in formal accounts
of learning and performance (Cofer, 1959;
Hull, 1952; Logan, 1960; Mowrer, 1947;
Seward, 1951, 1956; Sheffield, 1966;
Spence, 1956), and recently, a variety of
lines of investigation has produced strong
support for the incentive-motivational prin-
ciple ; these developments have been re-
viewed by, for example, Appley (1970),
Bindra (1968), and Bolles (1967, 1972).
Despite increasing interest in it, the incen-
tive-motivational principle has so far been
accepted mainly as an adjunct to the re-
sponse-reinforcement principle; the latter
continues to be regarded by most as the pri-
mary principle governing learned behavior
modifications.
However, there is now evident a clear
theoretical shift away from the response-
reinforcement interpretation of learned be-
havior modifications and toward the general
incentive-motivational idea (Bindra, 1969a,
1972; Bolles, 1972; Cofer & Appley, 1964;
Estes, 1969a, 1972; Logan, 1969; Mowrer,
1960; Walker, 1969). Bolles (1972), for
example, has argued that response-contin-
gent reinforcement is neither necessary nor
sufficient for instrumental learning, and he
has tried to explain learning largely in
terms of the contingencies of reinforcing
stimulation with other stimuli. Estes
(1969b, 1972) has suggested that reinforc-
ing stimulation does not act backward to
strengthen the response that preceded, "but
rather provides an opportunity for the or-
ganism to learn a relationship between the
stimulus which evoked its response and the
[reinforcing stimulation] [1972, p. 726,
italics added]." Similarly, Bindra (1969a,
1972) has argued that the primary effect of
the reinforcement procedure is "not re-
sponse strengthening, but the creation of
a motivational state that influences a wide
variety of subsequent behavior of the ani-
mal [1969a, p. 7]." He has concluded that
the incentive-motivational principle is suf-
ficient by itself to explain learned behavior
modifications and that the response-rein-
forcement principle is both unnecessary and
invalid.
Whether the incentive-motivational prin-
ciple remains an adjunct to the response-
reinforcement principle or becomes a self-
sufficient alternative to it depends largely
on how far a coherent framework can be
developed around the concept of incentive
motivation and how successfully the frame-
work can be used to deal with the varied
phenomena of learning, performance, and
behavior modification. The purpose of this
article is to outline one such framework, to
indicate its main points of departure from
other attempts to emphasize the role of mo-
tivation in behavior, and to examine some
of its implications.
MOTIVATION, LEARNING, AND
PERFORMANCE
Like other theoretical accounts of learned
behavior modifications, the motivational
framework presented here has three main
aspects: some assumptions about the nature
of motivation, some about the nature of
learning, and some about how the two com-
bine to produce the observed changes in
performance. Since several elements of the
proposed framework must be already fa-
miliar to the reader, I shall merely outline
the main points.
Nature of Motivation
The view of motivation adopted here is
that motivational processes should not be
linked either exclusively to organismic-state
variables (or "homeostatic drives"), empha-
sized by Woodworth (1918), Richter
(1927), Hull (1943), and Estes (1958),
or exclusively to stimulus properties ("he-
donic quality") of environmental incentive
objects, emphasized by Troland (1932,
chap. 23), Young (1948), and Pfaffmann
(1960), but equally to both. According to
this emerging view of motivation (e.g.,
Bindra, 1968, 1969a, 1969b; Black, 1969;
Cofer & Appley, 1964; Flynn, 1967; Pfaff
& Pfaffmann, 1969), the source of any mo-
tivational influence on behavior is neither
any (humoral or sensory) aspect of or-
ganismic states as such, nor any incentive
 MOTIVATION AND LEARNING
stimulus per se, but some process that com-
bines the two.
The basic motivational concept of the
proposed framework is the central motive
state (Bindra, 1968; Morgan, 1943; Stellar,
1954). As used here, the central motive
state is a hypothetical set of neural pro-
cesses that promotes goal-directed actions in
relation to particular classes of incentive
stimuli—for example, it promotes food-
seeking and eating in relation to food, or
defensive fighting and escape in relation to
a predator. Motivational state and "emo-
tional state" are interchangeable terms
(Bindra, 1969b). A central motive state is
generated by the joint influence of (a) cer-
tain specific aspects of organismic-state fac-
tors (variations in the humoral concentra-
tions of salts, sugar, or hormones, the
sensory inflow from viscerosomatic changes,
etc.) and (£>) certain potent stimulus prop-
erties of environmental incentive objects
(usually gustatory, cutaneous, or olfactory
qualities but also certain visual or auditory
qualities). Stimuli arising from an appeti-
tive incentive object generate (when or-
ganismic state is appropriate) an appetitive
central motive state, and this creates a ten-
dency to approach the incentive object when
the object is located distally, and, on con-
tact with the object, to perform whatever
response is compatible with the contact
stimulus features of the object . (e.g., its
size, taste, hardness). Stimuli arising from
an aversive incentive object generate (when
organismic state is appropriate) an aversive
central motive state, and this creates a ten-
dency to struggle or reject and to move
away from the object when the animal is
in contact with it, and to avoid it when the
aversive stimuli are distal. Note that the
central motive state determines the (incen-
tive) object in relation to which the animal
will act; the exact form of the response is
determined by the specific discriminative
properties of the object and its spatial posi-
tion in relation to the animal.
As shown in Figure 1, the response an
animal displays in relation to incentive stim-
uli (under certain specific organismic-state
conditions) consists partly of regulatory
(viscerosomatic) reactions, partly of trans-
201
Unconditioned Response
Food »•(?
Hunger -
FIGURE 1. A schematic plan of the hypothetical
motivational process and its influence on three as-
pects of response. (Abbreviations: cms, central
motive state; e, eating central motive state; f,
central representation of food; s-m coord., sen-
sory-motor coordinations.)
actional (consummatory or rejectional)
acts, and partly of instrumental (locomo-
tion and skilled) actions. How are these
different aspects of response influenced by
a prevailing central motivational state?
Figure 1 shows possible mechanisms by
which a food-related or, for convenience,
say "eating" central motive state influences
the three aspects of response. An eating
central motive state (e) is generated by the
combined influence of certain organismic-
state features (say, low blood-sugar level,
sensory inflow from an empty stomach,
etc.) and the central representation of cer-
tain properties of food (e.g., its odor). The
eating central motive state has a general
excitatory or priming influence on those
sensory-motor coordinations which are typi-
cally involved in appetitive behavior as op-
posed to those typically involved in aversive
behavior. In addition, the central motive
state has two specific influences. First, it
directly activates certain regulatory sensory-
motor coordinations, thus producing specific
viscerosomatic reactions, such as salivation.
Second, the central motive state, through
its reciprocal connections with the central
representation of food (f), excites it fur-
ther; that is, the central representation of
food, which provided the incentive sensory
qualities required for the generation of the
central motive state, is itself excited fur-
ther by the same central motive state. The
enhancement of the excitation of the central
representation of food results in the acti-
vation of the sensory-motor coordinations
202 DALBIR BINDRA
of instrumental and transactional acts (pre-
viously developed through maturation and
learning). The central representation of
the distal (e.g., visual or olfactory) dis-
criminative properties of food activate the
sensory-motor coordinations of instrumental
approach acts; once the animal has come in
contact with food, the central representation
of the contact stimulus properties of food
(e.g., touch, taste) activate consummatory
acts of eating.
Three essential—and more or less dis-
tinctive—features of this model of the na-
ture of motivational influence on response
should be noted. First, by specifying three
separate mechanisms for the production of
visceral-regulatory, transactional, and in-
strumental acts, the model implies that the
three need not be perfectly correlated. Thus
the observed instances of "dissociation" be-
tween the visceral-regulatory and instru-
mental responses (see Rescorla & Solomon,
1967) need not be perplexing; the source
of the perplexity is the common assumption
of a unitary determination of the various
aspects of response.
Second, the traditional view, arising from
the writings of Tolman (1932) and Hull
(1943, 1952), was that the motivational
factor does not enter into determining which
response would occur, but serves merely to
push out the response selected by a prior
response-selection process ("habit," "ex-
pectancy," etc.). This left unanswered the
question of how the response selection and
motivational arousal combine to lead to the
occurrence of a particular instrumental re-
sponse. If motivational arousal is a purely
energizing factor without any directional or
selective function, why, for example, does
food motivation produce actions that lead
the animal to food, and sexual motivation
produce actions that lead the animal to a
sexual partner, and not vice versa? The
concept of sensory feedback, from "drive
stimuli" (Hull, 1943), from "emotion"
(Mowrer, 1960), or from anticipatory goal
reactions (Hull, 1952; Spence, 1960), was
one way of answering the question. How-
ever, evidence shows that the integration of
motivation and response selection does not
critically depend on feedback from prior
internal reactions (for a review, see Bindra,
1968; Rescorla & Solomon, 1967). Ac-
cording to the present view, response selec-
tion and motivation are integrated because
the environmental object (e.g., food) in re-
lation to which a response (e.g., approach
and eating) is made is the same object
whose stimuli (e.g., food odor) have earlier
contributed to the generation of the food-
related central motive state (see Figure 1);
the motivation and the goal of the response
are determined by the same incentive ob-
ject—hence the integration. This interpre-
tation is similar to that offered by Cofer
and Appley (1964), who suggested that
motivation-arousing stimuli also serve as
discriminative cues. The present model
goes a step further in indicating how the
potency of particular environmental stimuli
—unconditioned or conditioned incentive
stimuli—may be selectively enhanced by a
certain central motive state (see Figures 1
and 2). The motivational influence does
not energize or activate a preselected re-
sponse, but leads to the production of a
fresh response which gets constructed as
the animal acts in relation to certain en-
vironmental stimuli which have been made
more potent.
Third, it is important to note that, in the
model proposed here, motivational fluctua-
tions are not dependent on the feedback
from response consequences (e.g., reinforc-
ing stimulation produced by a response),
which is emphasized in the cybernetic the-
ories of Mowrer (1960), Miller (1963),
Konorski (1967), and Estes (1969a). As
Bolles (1972) has noted, such theories fail
to explain the occurrence of the first re-
sponse whose feedback is postulated to in-
duce motivation and to control further re-
sponding. According to the present model,
the central motive state is generated directly
by organismic-state and incentive variables,
and, once generated, "feeds forward" to
make certain particular environmental stim-
uli so potent that the animal must act in
relation to them rather than in relation to
any other stimuli.
 MOTIVATION AND LEARNING
What Is Learned?
As a first approximation, it seems reason-
able to say that what a mammal learns in a
situation—the representations that somehow
become incorporated into its brain—are the
contingent relations existing between the
events that regularly occur in that situation.
A contingent relation between two stimulus
events, Si and 82, is often said to be "posi-
tive" or "negative." A positive contin-
gency, 81:82, means that the occurrence of
51, the signaling or conditioned stimulus is
followed, for a certain duration, by an in-
crease in the probability of occurrence of
52, the predicted or unconditioned stimulus,
the increase being relative to background
("noncontingent") probability of 82; this
contingency makes Si and S2 concomitant
events. A negative contingency, 81:82,
means that the occurrence of Si is followed,
for a certain duration, by a decrease in the
probability of occurrence of Sg below the
prevailing background probability; this con-
tingency makes Si and 82 disconcomitant
events. Encounters with certain positive
and negative contingencies, that is, experi-
ence with concomitance and disconcomit-
ance of the stimulus events, leads to con-
tingency learning, that is, the development
of central representations of the environ-
mental contingencies. Such central repre-
sentations may be called central contingency
organisations. When activated by Si, a
positive contingency organization excites
and a negative contingency organization in-
hibits the central representation of 82. The
degree of such conditioned excitation or in-
hibition reflects the "expectancy" or ex-
pected imminence of the occurrence of Sa
following the occurrence of Si. The greater
the contingent increase in the probability of
S2 predicted by Si, the greater will be the
(positive) expectancy or the conditioned
excitation of the central representation of
82; the greater the contingent decrease in
the probability of S2 predicted by Si, the
greater will be the (negative) expectancy
or the conditioned inhibition of the central
representation of 82.
The learning of a contingency between
two stimuli requires, of course, that they be
203
observed to occur concomitantly or discon-
comitantly. However, "contingency rein-
forcement," the procedure of presenting
reinforcing stimulation following Si or fol-
lowing Si:S2, is not a necessary condition
for contingency learning. That animals
learn contingencies without reinforcement
(of stimulus contingencies or of responses)
is shown by certain types of habituation ex-
periments. For example, it is known that
not only the introduction of a novel stimu-
lus but also the removal or absence of a
routinely encountered stimulus from a fa-
miliar test situation evokes orientation re-
sponses (e.g., Berlyne, 1960; Grings, 1960;
Peeke & Grings, 1968; Unger, 1964). The
fact that the absence of an object can evoke
orientation reactions indicates that the con-
tingency existing between the situation (the
background stimulus complex) and the ob-
ject must have been learned during the fa-
miliamation or habituation trials—in the
absence of any reinforcing stimulation (by
definition, the habituation procedure is a
nonreinforcement procedure). The results
of experiments on perceptual learning, la-
tent learning, and sensory preconditioning
(see Kimble, 1961) are also most directly
interpretable as learning without the influ-
ence of reinforcing stimulation.
There are two essential points in the
above characterization of learning. The first
is that contingent relations are learned
through observation; reinforcing or incen-
tive stimulation is neither necessary for con-
tingency learning, nor does it contribute
anything to the learning. On this point,
my view resembles that of several present-
day theorists, including Estes (1969b) and
Bolles (1972). The second point is that,
according to the view outlined above, learn-
ing involves the development of stimulus-
stimulus contingencies only; stimulus-re-
sponse or response-stimulus contingencies
are not critical in learned behavior modifica-
tions. Contrary to this, Estes' view is that
learning can involve stimulus-stimulus,
stimulus-response, as well as response-
stimulus "associative linkages," while Bolles
argues that animals can learn response-
stimulus expectancies in addition to stimu-
lus-stimulus expectancies. In one sense,
204 DALBIR BINDRA
a) Conditioning (Early Trials
Light
Food *• Approaching
Hunger *• Eating
•Salivating, etc
b) Conditioning (Test Trials)
L,ght —
[>«*
not giv> Approaching
Salivating . etc
FIGURE 2. A schematic plan of the hypothetical
process by which through conditioning (a) an
initially neutral stimulus (light) can become capa-
ble of generating a motivational influence (b)
which then affects various aspects of response out-
put. (Abbreviations: 1, central representation of
light; cms, central motive state; e, eating central
motive state; f, central representation of food;
s-m coord., sonsory-motor coordination.)
the difference between the position of Estes
and Bolles on the one hand and mine on the
other may be trivial. For their positions
may mean merely that response-produced
stimuli may form a part of some so-called
response-stimulus contingencies; so that,
in fact, any learned contingency would be a
stimulus-stimulus contingency, even though
in procedural terms it may be convenient
to describe it as a response-stimulus one.
However, there may be an important differ-
ence between the two positions. The Estes-
Bolles interpretation of a procedural re-
sponse-stimulus contingency seems to be
that the contingency between the stimuli
arising from a response and the subsequent
(reinforcing) stimulation is the critical one
in instrumental training. My interpreta-
tion is that it is the contingency between
the stimuli that elicits or contributes to the
occurrence of a response and the subse-
quent stimulation (incentive or neutral)
that is critical, no matter what the training
procedure. They allow an important role
for contingencies involving response-^ro-
duced stimuli; I regard contingencies in-
volving response-producing stimuli as the
critical ones. The fact that monkeys with
total spinal deafferentation can learn and
efficiently perform an instrumental skill
(Taub & Herman, 1968) indicates that, at
least in the adult animal, any possible con-
tingencies between response-produced stim-
uli and subsequent stimulation are probably
not critical for instrumental learning.
Learning, Motivation, and Response
Production
The main working assumption about the
interrelations of learning, motivation, and
response production proposed here is this:
The modification of behavior produced by
contingency learning depends on the moti-
vational properties acquired by certain in-
itially neutral stimuli during the contingency
learning. Figure 2 illustrates this for a
conditioning experiment in which a light
onset is the conditioned stimulus and food
is the unconditioned stimulus. During the
early stage of conditioning (Figure 2a) a
light .'food contingency is gradually learned,
which is shown as broken-line reciprocal
connections between the central representa-
tion of light (/) and the central representa-
tion of food (/). During this stage the
occurrence of the response still depends on
the presentation of food, and the light lacks
the capability of producing any aspect of
the response produced by food. After con-
ditioning has been achieved (Figure 2b~),
the onset of light excites /, and through its
learned contingency with food, / excites /
thereby creating the eating central motive
state ( e ) , which then enhances the central
representation of first food and then light.
As noted earlier in the description of Figure
1, the enhancement of the central represen-
tation of the distal stimulus features of the
light would produce approach responses di-
rected at the light. If the animal is able to
make contact with the light, it would also
display some consummatory acts that may
resemble, to some degree, those elicited by
the contact stimuli of food (acts such as
gnawing, licking, biting), but because the
 MOTIVATION AND LEARNING
light source lacks the stimulus features of
an edible object, the whole consummatory
action would not occur until food is pre-
sented. However, the viscerosomatic reac-
tions linked to the central motive state of
eating would occur, for they are not de-
pendent on specific discriminative stimuli.
Note that, unlike the response-reinforce-
ment view, the role of a conditioned stimu-
lus postulated here is not that of becoming-
associated with a specific response, but one
of providing the motivational arousal that
can influence a wide range of behavior in
relation to that conditioned stimulus (in the
absence of the unconditioned incentive
stimulus). The precise form of the re-
sponse is not predetermined but is shaped
by the prevailing motivational state and
the current environmental discriminative
stimuli.
The most important environmental de-
terminers of the form of response appear to
be (fl) the spatio-temporal arrangement of
the various conditioned and unconditioned
incentive stimuli in the given situation, and
(b) the physical characteristics of condi-
tioned stimuli in relation to those of the
unconditioned stimuli. If the conditioned
stimulus is presented in the same situation
and in roughly the same spatial and tem-
poral positions in which the unconditioned
stimulus is normally presented, the animal
is likely to display the same instrumental
acts (approach or withdrawal) in relation
to the conditioned stimulus as it would nor-
mally make in relation to the unconditioned
stimulus in that situation. If, in addition
to keeping the total situation the same, the
conditioned stimulus resembles the uncon-
ditioned stimulus in physical appearance,
the animal might also display some of the
same type of transactional acts in relation
to the conditioned stimulus as it would
normally display in relation to the uncon-
ditioned stimulus. In general, responses
that depend on distal receptors, such as
certain viscerosomatic regulatory reactions
(e.g., salivation or heart rate changes) and
instrumental acts, may be expected to be
roughly the same for the conditioned stim-
ulus and the unconditioned stimulus, but
the transactional (consummatory or rejec-
205
tional) responses, which depend largely on
contact receptors, are likely to be quite dif-
ferent. This explains why the conditioned
response in Pavlovian experiments is not
always exactly the same as the total uncon-
ditioned response; while the viscerosomatic
(e.g., salivation) and some instrumental
(e.g., orientation to the conditioned stim-
ulus, neck stretching) appear regularly, the
consummatory acts (e.g., biting, chewing)
made in relation to the incentive object
(e.g., food) are not normally made when
the conditioned stimulus is presented alone.
Clearly, the animal acts in relation to the
conditioned stimulus in the same way as it
would to the unconditioned stimulus only
to the extent that the spatio-temporal posi-
tion in relation to other stimuli and the
physical characteristics of the conditioned
stimulus are the same as those of the un-
conditioned stimulus.
If the form of the instrumental response
is determined by the momentary incentive
value of the various unconditioned and con-
ditioned incentive stimuli in the situation,
how does the response become uniform, sta-
ble, and stereotyped with practice? This is
a question that was left unanswered by
Mowrer's (1960) motivational account of
learning, and he was criticized for it (Mil-
ler, 1963). In the present framework, the
answer to this question is to be found in the
uniformity and stability of the spatio-tem-
poral arrangement of the incentive stimuli
in the training situation. Consider a hun-
gry rat learning a simple running response
in a straight alley placed between a start
box at one end and a goal box containing
some food at the other. In the first few
trials, the rat explores the runway until it
happens to reach the goal box and the food.
Food stimuli would generate a feeding cen-
tral motive state and lead to eating. As
the animal is given further training trials,
certain salient stimuli would become con-
ditioned incentive stimuli. The conditioned
incentive value of these stimuli would form
a gradient with the conditioned stimuli in
the start box having the lowest values.
Now, when the animal is placed in the
start box, it would move from one location
to another, always approaching an area of
206 DALBIR BINDRA
relatively greater conditioned incentive
value, until it reaches the food. With fur-
ther training, as the incentive values of the
conditioned stimuli increase and explora-
tory responses decline, the speed with which
the response is completed would increase.
Further, as a consequence of practice, with
the arrangement of the situational stimuli
kept constant, the central representations of
the successive conditioned stimuli would be-
come associated so that the central repre-
sentation of a particular stimulus (say, the
middle section of the runway) would be-
come excited before any input from that
stimulus. This integration of the central
representation of the chain of successive
conditioned stimuli would result in "short-
circuiting," leading to action in relation to
anticipated remote conditioned stimuli; for
example, the rat, instead of looking at and
approaching each intermediate conditioned
stimulus in the runway, would look at the
end of the runway and approach it directly.
Thus the response would transform from a
"guided" series of discrete and disjointed
acts to one that is unified, smooth, and "bal-
listic," which could be triggered as a whole
by the initial conditioned stimuli. At this
stage even gross sensory insults, for exam-
ple, blinding, would have little effect on
performance (DeFeudis, 1968; Honzik,
1936). The essential point of this view is
not to deny response integration but to sug-
gest that the integrated response does not
arise from the integration-by-reinforcement
of successive stimulus-act components, but
from the integration-by-contingency learn-
ing of the central representation of condi-
tioned stimuli, which is made possible by the
uniformity and stability of the situation.
If the uniformity, stability, and stereo-
typing of the final response resides in the
uniformity and stability of the training sit-
uation, then the response integration should
eventually break down if the spatial layout
of the critical unconditioned and conditioned
stimuli were to be altered; for example, if
the food were made available in another
part of the runway. The disintegration of
the response and the development of a new
stable response in relation to the new loca-
tion of food would not be immediate be-
cause the animal would no longer be acting
in relation to specific intermediate stimuli.
Only after the reinstigation of exploratory
responses, owing to the absence of food in
the habitual location, would a new response
begin to take shape. Even while the new
response is being integrated, the animal will
occasionally forget that the situation has
been altered and will perform the old re-
sponse (Spear, 1967; Staddon, 1972). A
delay in the disintegration of a trained re-
sponse is also seen when, after training,
food is made available at an additional loca-
tion in the runway (e.g., in the middle of
the runway) ; the rat does not immediately
give up the trained response of going to the
goal box in favor of eating in the middle
of the runway (Stoltz & Lott, 1964). How-
ever, in these experiments food is presented
in two places so that the factors of familiar-
ity of the location at which food is nor-
mally eaten and the predictability of the
time of food delivery may become relatively
more important than the extra effort re-
quired. The importance of the factor of
familiarity of eating location is shown by
the observation that the rat is quite likely
to transport the food from the middle of the
alley to the goal box and then eat it there
(Cohen-Salmon & Blancheteau, 1967).
The phenomena of "working" (e.g., lever
pressing) in the presence of "free" food
may also be similarly interpreted (e.g.,
Morgan, in press). In these situations the
animal usually does eat the free food in the
early part of the trial; this argues against
the idea that any reinforced motor organi-
zation has to be obliterated before the ani-
mal will approach the new location of free
food.
IMPLICATIONS AND PREDICTIONS
In the course of the above exposition I
mentioned some long-standing problems in
the fields of motivation and learning that
can be adequately dealt with by the pro-
posed ideas. How are motivational arousal
and response selection integrated to pro-
duce responses that are appropriate both
motivationally and in terms of environmen-
tal discriminative stimuli? Why are the
 MOTIVATION AND LEARNING
viscerosomatic, consummatory, and instru-
mental components of a response somewhat
independent of each other? Why, in Pav-
lovian conditioning, is the conditioned re-
sponse not an exact replica of the uncon-
ditioned response? How is the stability
and stereotypy of habits learned in the lab-
oratory to be reconciled with the flexibility
and innovativeness seen in the behavior of
animals in their natural environments?
Answers to such questions, which have per-
plexed theorists for many years, are explicit
or clearly implied in the theoretical frame-
work outlined in the previous pages. It
now remains to examine some distinctive
predictions that may be derived from the
proposed ideas in order to test them.
There are two essential ideas in the pres-
ent view of the principles underlying learned
modifications of behavior. The first is that
the principle of contingency learning be-
tween stimuli (which is conceptually de-
rived from the classical conditioning para-
digm) is sufficient for explaining learned
behavioral modifications; the principle of
response reinforcement is unnecessary. The
second is that performance—the production
and form of an instrumental response—is
determined jointly by the type of the pre-
vailing organismic state and the spatio-
temporal layout of the conditioned incentive
stimuli in the situation. For the purpose
of illustrating how these ideas may be used
to derive specific predictions that bear di-
rectly on the issue of incentive-motivational
versus response-reinforcement interpreta-
tion of adaptive behavior, I have selected
examples from three areas of research.
These are (a) distinction between classical
conditioning and instrumental training, (6)
effects of extraneous conditioned stimuli
on instrumental responses, and (c) learn-
ing by observation of models.
Classical Conditioning and Instrumental
Training
If learning is wholly a matter of building
central representations of stimulus-stimulus
contingencies, then it should be possible to
obtain uniform and stable instrumental re-
sponses by arranging such contingencies
207
only, as is clone in the typical classical con-
ditioning experiment. Indeed the appear-
ance of stable "instrumental components"
(e.g., superstitions and preparatory acts)
has long been noted in the course of classi-
cal conditioning (e.g., Pavlov, 1927; Skin-
ner, 1948; Zener, 1937). More formally,
several recent experiments have shown that
what appear in all respects to be instru-
mental responses may be shaped and con-
trolled by arranging response-independent,
stimulus-contingent incentive stimulation.
The influence of the stimulus-stimulus con-
tingency may be clearly observed in the la-
tency of occurrence of the first response,
that is, before the training procedure can be
said to have been contaminated by any re-
sponse-incentive contingency, and the prob-
ability of responding can be shown to vary
directly with the strength of the stimulus-
stimulus contingency (e.g., Brown & Jen-
kins, 1968; Gamzu & Schwartz, 1973;
Gamzu • & Williams, 1973; Moore, 1973;
Williams & Williams, 1969).
However, the demonstration that instru-
mental responses can be shaped without any
explicit response-reinforcement contingency
need not mean that response-incentive con-
tingencies contribute nothing to learning as
it normally occurs in most training situa-
tions. In order to prove the present thesis,
that response-incentive contingencies are
completely without effect, it would be neces-
sary to isolate the stimulus-incentive and
response-incentive contingencies. Since, ac-
cording to the present view, the critical
stimulus contingencies are those involving
the stimuli in relation to which the response
is to be made (e.g., the manipulandum),
we would require the isolation of such
response-determining stimuli from the ac-
tual response occurrence (e.g., isolation of
the observation of lever stimuli from the
lever-pressing response). No way of neatly
achieving this has yet been devised. How-
ever, the question may be approached, if
not unequivocally resolved, by determining
the relative efficacy of stimulus-incentive
and response-incentive contingencies. While
not specifically addressed to this issue, some
experiments by Williams and Williams
(1969) suggest that variations of stimulus-
208 DALBIR BINDRA
incentive contingencies can have such pro-
found effect on an animal's behavior as to
override the effects usually attributed to
response-incentive contingencies.
Though more systematic studies of the
question are required, the available findings
make it plausible at least to entertain the
idea that response-incentive contingencies
may contribute nothing to learning. The
apparent superiority of the instrumental
training procedure over the classical one for
response shaping may simply be the conse-
quence of the fact that arranging a response-
incentive contingency is the best way so far
discovered for insuring that the animal will
observe the critical stimulus features which
must enter into the stimulus-incentive con-
tingency for producing the specified re-
sponse promptly and reliably. If response-
incentive contingencies are proved to be
useless, the observed differences in the be-
havioral outcomes of the typical classical
and instrumental training procedures would
have to be accounted for in terms of differ-
ences in the types of stimulus-incentive con-
tingencies that typically operate in the two
procedures (see Bindra, 1972).
Effects of Extraneous Conditioned Stimuli
on Instrumental Responses
It has long been known that a conditioned
stimulus developed in a classical condition-
ing (response-independent) procedure can
influence an instrumental response trained
separately and without any association with
that conditioned stimulus (e.g., Estes, 1943;
Estes & Skinner, 1941). According to the
present view, the type of influence the con-
ditioned stimulus (CS) has depends on the
type of motivational properties it has ac-
quired during its pairing with an uncondi-
tioned stimulus (US). If the uncondi-
tioned stimulus is an incentive object, the
conditioned stimulus would generate the
same central motive state as is generated by
the unconditioned stimulus (provided the
appropriate organismic state is present).
If the unconditioned stimulus is a neutral
stimulus, the conditioned stimulus would
not become capable of generating any spe-
cific central motive state, and even if an
investigatory motive state is first aroused
(owing to the novelty of the unconditioned
stimulus), it would be dissipated or attenu-
ated with repetition of that unconditioned
stimulus. These CS-US contingencies may
be positive (concomitance, CS:US), or
negative (disconcomitance, CS:US), and
the US may be an appetitive incentive stim-
ulus (US I a p ), an aversive incentive stimu-
lus (US IaT ), or a neutral stimulus (US N ).
The motivational properties acquired by a
conditioned stimulus would depend on both
the type of contingency (positive or nega-
tive) and the nature of the incentive prop-
erties of the unconditioned stimulus (ap-
petitive, aversive, or neutral). We may
thus recognize six types of conditioned
stimuli, _CSIaP, CSf^, CS IaT , CS1", CSN,
and CSN. When the contingency is positive
and the unconditioned stimulus is an in-
centive stimulus (appetitive or aversive),
the conditioned stimulus becomes capable
of enhancing the corresponding (appetitive
or aversive) central motive state and pro-
motes instrumental (approach or with-
drawal) responses (but not transactional
acts—see above) in relation to itself (CS)
of the type that, were the unconditioned
stimulus present, would be performed in
relation to it (US). When the contingency
is negative and the unconditioned stimulus
is an incentive stimulus, the conditioned
stimulus becomes capable of attenuating the
prevailing central motive state and thereby
suppresses responses that would normally
be performed in relation to the conditioned
stimulus in the situation. And when the
unconditioned stimulus is itself a neutral
stimulus, the conditioned stimulus produces
a decline in the existing central motive
states and reduces the probability of any
response, yielding the observations made in
typical novelty-habituation experiments.
Thus, the influence on instrumental re-
sponses of all three types—promotion of
responding, suppression of responding, and
habituation of responding—are regarded
here as arising from the motivation-enhanc-
ing and motivation-attenuating consequences
of conditioned stimuli.
It follows that, in general, the introduc-
tion of conditioned aversive stimuli (e.g.,
 MOTIVATION AND LEARNING 209

a tone that has been paired with an electric Now consider the reported discrepancy
shock) would enhance the occurrence of an between the dramatic and consistent effects
aversive instrumental response (e.g., an on instrumental responses obtained with
avoidance response) and suppress the oc- response-independent aversive conditioned
currence of an appetitive instrumental re- stimuli and the rather weak and variable
sponse (e.g., lever pressing for food), and effects obtained with corresponding appeti-
the introduction of conditioned appetitive tive stimuli. As seen above, in the case of
stimuli (e.g., a tone paired with free de- an avoidance instrumental response, the in-
livery of food) would enhance the occur- troduction of a response-independent aver-
rence of an appetitive instrumental response sive conditioned stimulus (say, a tone) in
and suppress the occurrence of an aversive the start box would increase the conditioned
instrumental response. The fact that this aversive properties of the start box and
prediction has not always been confirmed, make the animal withdraw from it quickly ;
especially in the case of appetitive condi- the instrumental response would be facili-
tioned stimuli, has produced discussion but tated both in terms of latency and response
no solution. However, the present view time. However, in the case of a food-
now offers a solution. approach instrumental response in the same
As noted earlier, the form and occurrence alley, the introduction of a response-inde-
of an instrumental response is determined pendent appetitive conditioned stimulus
by the nature and spatio-temporal distribu- (the same tone) in the start box would
tion of conditioned incentive stimuli in the make the animal act in relation to the tone
experimental situation. This means that in the start box itself. The acts displayed
the influence on an instrumental response in relation to the tone in the start box would
of any particular extraneous conditioned be orientation toward and exploration of
stimulus would vary with the topographical the direction of sound source. Only after
position of the stimulus. Consider an ex- failing to find the food in the start box
ample. In a typical avoidance experiment would the animal traverse the runway to
in a unidirectional alley, the avoidance- the goal box. Thus, the latency of instru-
response performance may be altered by mental response initiation may be raised,
the introduction of a conditioned stimulus, but the number of trials required for ex-
say, a tone that has previously been corre- tinction may also be greater than the num-
lated with an electric shock or some other ber required in the absence of the con-
aversive unconditioned stimulus. The in- ditioned stimulus. Such effects of the
strumental response of running from the introduction of an aversive or appetitive
dangerous start box to the safe box at the conditioned stimulus in the start box have
end of the alley would be facilitated by the been observed by Rice (1966) and Bolles
introduction of the tone. This would occur (1970). Thus, according to the present
because the tone would enhance the moti- view, the main reason for the discrepancy
vational state and thus increase the condi- in the effects of response-independent ap-
tioned incentive (aversive) properties of petitive and aversive conditioned stimuli lies
the start box (in the absence of the shock). in the fact that, in typical experiments of
But suppose that the tone, instead of being this type, the locations of the conditioned
presented as an unlocalizeable encompassing appetitive stimulus (start box) and the un-
sound, as is usually the case, is presented conditioned appetitive stimulus (goal box)
through a loudspeaker placed in the safe tend to be different, whereas the locations
box at the end of the runway. According of the conditioned aversive stimulus (start
to the present view, the tone would suppress box) and the unconditioned aversive stimu-
the instrumental response (of running in lus (start box) tend to be the same. Fur-
the direction of the aversive tone). Certain ther experimental tests of this interpreta-
experimental findings (e.g., Bolles & Gros- tion are needed; in the meantime it may be
sen, 1970; Katzev, 1967) support this type noted that the interpretation is a more gen-
of prediction. eral one and can explain a wider range of
210 DALBIR BINDRA
obtained results than the idea of motivation
promoting a predetermined instrumental
response.
Learning by Observation of Models
The learning of a certain denned instru-
mental response by an animal may be facili-
tated if it observes another animal, usually
a member of the same species, perform a
similar response. Traditional explanations
of such learning by observing the perform-
ance of models have invoked the response-
reinforcement principle or have attributed
it to the learning of a "generalized re-
sponse" of doing what the model does (e.g.,
Miller & Dollard, 1941; Mowrer, 1950).
But such explanations are inadequate (Ban-
dura, 1962; Bandura & Walters, 1963;
Estes, 1970). First, they are internally in-
consistent because they attribute learning to
the response-reinforcement principle and
yet postulate learning without prior occur-
rence of the response-to-be-learned; the
principle of response reinforcement requires
that the response occur before—be instru-
mental in producing—the reinforcement.
Second, the suggestion that learning from
models may represent a generalized re-
sponse to do what the model is doing merely
begs the question; even if it is true that the
generalized response is acquired through re-
sponse reinforcement, how does such a gen-
eralized response facilitate the learning of
a specific instrumental action?
An alternative explanation of learning by
observation of models may be derived from
the account of learning and performance
proposed here. Assume that the model is
a strong conditioned appetitive incentive
stimulus for the learner. Then, according
to the present view, the learner, who is ob-
serving the model—say, a child observing
his mother-—would frequently follow the
mother and thus would encounter the same
environmental objects as the mother does.
Now, the mother, by performing certain ac-
tions in relation to some of the objects,
would impart to the child some knowledge
about the incentive properties those objects
have for the mother. This would occur be-
cause, by following the mother, the child
would observe the (stimulus) contingencies
between various environmental objects and
the mother's approach and withdrawal re-
actions in relation to those objects. This
is one way in which the child may be guided
to or away from various situational stimuli
which have incentive properties for the
mother. The particular actions performed
by the child need not always resemble those
of the mother, but they would tend to re-
semble those of the mother if the child's
motivational state is the same as that of the
mother at the time of the test, and if the
child has been able to observe the specific
stimulus features of the objects in relation
to which the mother has acted. Observa-
tional learning then is not response learn-
ing, nor is it a generalized tendency to copy
the actions of the model; rather, it is learn-
ing the incentive value of various stimulus
events vicariously through the observed
transactions of an attractive (appetitive)
model with those stimulus events. The re-
sults of some recent experiments with rats
(e.g., Galef, 1971; Galef & Clark, 1971)
and with cats (e.g., Chesler, 1969) support
such an incentive-motivational account of
observational learning.
An interesting prediction may be derived
from the above interpretation. If the con-
tribution of observing the model depends
wholly on the learner's learning about the
actions of the model in relation to various
environmental stimuli, then it should be
possible for the learner to learn without ob-
serving the consequences (rewarding or
punishing) of the model's actions (for the
model). In other words, the critical re-
quirement is not that the learner observe
the model being reinforced but only that he
observe the model's prereinforcement trans-
actions with certain discriminative stimuli.
In order to determine if this is so, it is
necessary to isolate the learner's observa-
tion of the model's transactions with dis-
criminative stimuli from the learner's ob-
servation of the model being reinforced, as
well as of the model's reaction to the rein-
forcement. Two such properly controlled
animal studies were reported recently.
They showed that the benefit that rats de-
rived in discrimination learning from ob-
serving a model perform the same task was
 MOTIVATION AND LEARNING
attributable to the viewing of the model
"contiguous with the cue pattern" and not
to the viewing of the model being rein-
forced or punished (Groesbeck & Duer-
feldt, 1971; Kohn & Dennis, 1972). It is
known from several experiments on chil-
dren (e.g., Bandura, 1971) that the obser-
vation of the model being reinforced may
facilitate the emergence of the model's
behavior in the learner. This would be pre-
dicted from the present formulation because
the observation of an incentive stimulus in
relation to the discriminative cues (and
the model) would enhance conditioned mo-
tivation and hence, performance. However,
the main point here is that observational
learning by observing only the model's
transactions with discriminative cues is pos-
sible, and this may well be the only basis
of observational learning per se—apart from
performance.
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