Table 8.
2: Analyses of North Korea’s Use of Smart Power under Kim Jong-il
Analyses
Year North Korea’s Power Resources
Cases
(Hard Power)
Kim Jong-il and Vice Marshal Jo
Myong-rak engaged the U.S. at the
highest levels. Their efforts were
complemented by skilled
North Korean 1994
negotiators from the Ministry of
Nuclear
Foreign Affairs who used the
Weapons
hardline of the KPA and KWP to
Development
influence senior U.S. officials,
negotiators, and some in the IC.
Kim Jong-il directly engaged with
leaders of South Korea and Japan
to promote his aims. At the same
time, the North Koreans exerted
pressure on the U.S. by conducting
a nuclear test and missile
launches. They also leveraged
Second 2002 select groups of U.S. interlocutors,
Nuclear Crisis both official and unofficial, to elicit
nuclear negotiations or convey
nuclear threats. The North
Koreans used their experienced
diplomats to negotiate nuclear
deals and monitor the course of
their implementation to protect their
aim of survival.
Probability of Success (Rationality)
High probability of success.
Once President Carter intervened to
defuse the crisis, North Koreans
probably realized that, as long as
they were willing to address
Washington’s concerns about its
nascent nuclear program, a deal
could be made with the U.S.
Uncertainty of success with U.S.
but high probability with
Seoul/Tokyo.
North Korea probably believed Bush
sought regime change, and the U.S.
invasion of Iraq forced Pyongyang to
attempt various forms of coercion and
persuasion to seek bilateral
negotiations. When the U.S. war in
Iraq began to falter and Bush
appointed Chris Hill to negotiate with
Pyongyang, the North likely sensed
probability of success was increasing.
Kim sensed he had little difficulty with
the South Koreans and the Japanese
but misjudged the latter’s reaction to
the abductions.
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Use of Soft Power
Yes. North Korean
negotiators manipulated and
persuaded U.S. negotiators
that Kim Jong-il was serious
about nuclear negotiations
despite KPA and KWP
opposition. In fact, the
Clinton administration was
convinced Kim could be a
trusted partner.
Yes. Bush preferred regime
change; however, North
Korea was able to
manipulate and persuade
some in Washington to
pursue diplomacy. This
eventually convinced Bush
to overlook Pyongyang’s
illicit (e.g., BDA) and nuclear
proliferation activities.
Use of Smart Power
Yes. The U.S. seriously
considered use of force
against the North; however,
it eventually chose to
negotiate. The concessions
that Kim Jong-il received as
a result of the 1994 Agreed
Framework were critical in
North Korea’s survival
strategy during the famine
years.
Yes. The September 2005
Joint Statement also helped
Kim to resist Bush’s hardline
policy and survive the
growing international
sanctions regime against
Pyongyang.

North Korean North Korea used a submarine
Sinking of the 2010 from the RGB to conduct its covert
Cheonan action to sink the Cheonan and
deployed conventional artillery to
conduct a limited artillery attack on
Yeonpyeong Island.
High probability of success.
Kim correctly assessed that using
covert assets would improve his
likelihood of success. He used his
strengths of surprise and underwater
warfare to defeat a much more
capable South Korean surface navy.
The investigation also took too long
for South Korean retaliation.
Yes. Kim used covert
action, which made it
difficult for South Korea and Yes. Kim Jong-il was able
the to avenge the losses from
U.S. to conclusively argue the November 2009 naval
North Korea was clash and successfully
responsible for the challenged Seoul’s hardline
Cheonan sinking. As a policy against the North.
result, Beijing and Moscow
supported him, and the
majority of South Koreans
were manipulated to believe
the North was not
responsible.

High probability of success. Yes. Kim attempted to

Shelling of KPA had the advantage of surprise manipulate the incident by Yes. Kim used the artillery
Three batteries of multiple rocket
Yeonpyeong 2010 and preparedness. Kim argued he claiming the North was attack to bolster his son as
launchers fired about 170 rounds
Island warned Seoul he would defend North protecting its territorial his successor, defender of
toward the island.
Korea’s sovereignty. He probably sovereignty but offered a North Korea’s sovereignty,
was ready to apologize to de- half-hearted apology for and a master military
escalate. those killed during the attack strategist.
to show credibility of his
claims. The South retaliated
but was largely ineffective.

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 When Kim Jong-il assumed power he faced a constellation of forces that
threatened the survival of his regime. Unlike his father, Kim became more
pragmatic and understood that reunification was no longer a realistic aim,
focusing instead on regime survival. He successfully used smart power to
resolve the nuclear issue with Presidents Clinton and Bush to deter U.S. military
action, legitimize his rule, and obtain some of the resources he needed to
survive from the mid-1990s to 2008. Although many have argued Kim’s
strategy was purely coercive, the evidence suggests he used smart power to
convince two U.S. presidents to seek a negotiated settlement. With the Clinton
administration, Kim used the KPA and the KWP to threaten nuclear breakout
and as leverage to gain the upper hand during negotiations. He also employed
high-level diplomacy to demonstrate his competence to build trust with Clinton.
On the other hand, Kim reached out to the Bush administration by
engaging both official and unofficial U.S. contacts, but they initially failed.
However, when the Iraq War faltered, Bush was more open to negotiations.
Having said that, the U.S. hardliners continued to apply pressure by declaring
BDA a primary money laundering concern. After North Korea conducted its first
nuclear test in 2006 and launched more missiles, the BDA issue was resolved.
Kim was successful despite crossing Bush’s redline on nuclear proliferation
because he was pragmatic and took significant steps to dismantle his plutonium
program. Yet, Kim hedged by denying the existence of his HEU program.
Kim also seized the moment to engage Seoul’s progressive governments
from 1998 to 2008. He used benignity to attract benefits and offered a more
positive perception of North Korea in the South by personally engaging in the
reconciliation process. When North-South reconciliation was reversed after Lee
Myung-bak assumed power in 2008, Kim resorted to carefully planned
provocations to retaliate against Lee’s hardline policy and to support the
leadership succession of his son. When he attacked Yeonpyeong, Kim invoked
defense of sovereignty claim and offered a quasi-apology. With the exception
of the Bush gambit, Kim probably felt the probability of success was high for the
other cases and finally convinced Obama to negotiate a deal before his death.

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Table 8.3: Analyses of North Korea’s Use of Smart Power under Kim Jong-un
Analyses
Year North Korea’s Power Resources
Cases
(Hard Power)
Kim reportedly ordered the missile
deployment as a demonstration of
Deployment
power to declare he had a nuclear
of Long- 2013
ICBM capability to defend the
Range
country. The escalation during the
Missiles to
provocation was largely caused by
Strike the U.S.
the intense propaganda from the
regime that expressed its intent to
preemptively strike the U.S.
homeland with nuclear ICBMs.
KPA probably used light infantry to
emplace the landmines and
employed tactical artillery near the
DMZ to heighten tensions. Kim
Landmine also used diplomacy to de-escalate
the situation. The North effectively
Incident in the 2015
DMZ used its media to signal threats,
desire for engagement, and provide
the rationale for policy positions
such as Juche, Songun, Byungjin,
nuclear weapons, and the civilian
space program.
Probability of Success (Rationality)
High probability of success.
North Koreans were probably
convinced they could control the
escalation ladder as long as they
refrained from launching the missile.
If all else failed, the exit strategy
was to employ high-level diplomacy
and use the KIC as leverage to
return to the status quo.
High probability of success.
The covert use of landmines was at
the lower end of the conflict
spectrum, and it would be difficult to
prove conclusively North Korea was
responsible.
414
Use of Soft Power
Yes. U.S. reassured South
Korea by deploying
bombers and missile
defense forces, and called
on China to pressure the
North. In spite of the rhetoric
and the reported
deployment of a nuclear
ICBM, Kim Jong-un
manipulated international
sanctions and military
exercises in South Korea to
demonstrate his
competence and leadership.
He de-escalated the
situation by sending Cho
Ryong-hae to Beijing and
reopening the KIC.
Yes. South Korea
responded to the incident
by ordering its troops to
prepare for war, resuming
loudspeaker broadcasts,
and return artillery fires. Kim
manipulated the 70th
anniversary of Korean
liberation to demonstrate his
leadership and quickly de-
escalated by initiating high-
level talks and offering an
expression of regret.
Use of Smart Power
Yes. Kim Jong-un used
Exercise KEY RESOLVE
and the overt deployment of
B-52 and B-2 bombers to
justify North Korea’s status
as a nuclear weapons state
in April 2013. He also
reaffirmed his own
adaptation of Kim Il-sung’s
Byungjin line (simultaneous
development of economy
and nuclear weapons).
Yes. Kim was perceived by
some as a more rational and
capable leader than
previously assessed based
on his pragmatic choices
during the incident. The
North also made the point its
leadership had more
legitimacy to rule all of
Korea. It also cited military
exercises in the South to
defend its nuclear and
missile programs.
 As Kim Jong-un began to consolidate his power in 2012, North Korea
conducted a space launch in April even though the U.S. claimed space launches
were in violation of the February 2012 nuclear agreement because it viewed them
as long-range missile tests. After claiming its sovereign right to conduct space
launches, the North followed up in December with a successful space launch and a
third nuclear test in February 2013. Pyongyang then boasted it had successfully
tested a miniature nuclear device. In other words, North Korea claimed it
possessed a nuclear ICBM. The North Koreans did not have to wait long before
they would try to demonstrate this capability. The combined U.S.-South Korean
military exercises in March 2013 as well as the first overt B-52 and B-2 bomber
flights over Korea were manipulated to justify Pyongyang’s declaration as a nuclear
weapons state in April 2013. Subsequently, Kim ordered the deployment of a
nuclear ICBM to the east coast. The evidence suggests North Korea probably
believed the likelihood of success was high because, after demonstrating it had a
nuclear ICBM capability, it refrained from launching the missile and was prepared
to de-escalate by sending a senior official to Beijing and re-opening the KIC.
The second provocation in August 2015 was more of a surprise to many
observers. Although some in South Korea claimed this incident was a case of
miscalculation on Kim’s part, it appears that it was a well-planned provocation
manufactured to manipulate North Korea’s legitimacy over the Park Geun-hye
administration in Seoul. As the Koreans prepared to celebrate the 70 th anniversary
of their liberation from Japanese colonial rule, Kim probably realized this was a
unique opportunity to differentiate the backgrounds of the ruling families of the two
Koreas and to tout the North’s nuclear weapons. His family descended from anti-
Japanese guerrilla fighters while Park’s father was an officer in the Japanese Army
who fought for the enemy. For Kim, it was the perfect time to wage the war of
legitimacy and he even turned back the clock to prove it. Kim also used the
opportunity to demonstrate his competent leadership, and evidence suggests some
observers are convinced he is more capable a leader than previously imagined.

415
Moreover, the probability of success was high because there was no
conclusive evidence the North Koreans had planted the landmines.
Like his forefathers, he was prepared to offer regrets to de-escalate –
the issuance of a quasi-apology has been a regular tactic of the Kims.
The H-bomb test in January 2016 sets the tone for Kim Jong-un to
celebrate the success of his Byungjin policy during the fifth year of his
rule.

416