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Rationality in decision- and policy-making: Implications for strategic

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Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, volume 18, number 3, September 2000, pages 191–200, Beech Tree Publishing, 10 Watford Close, Guildford, Surrey GU1 2EP, UK.
Decision-making
Rationality in decision- and policy-making:
implications for strategic environmental
assessment
Lone Kørnøv and Wil A H Thissen
A proper integration of strategic environmental
assessment (SEA) into policy-making processes
is considered critical to the success of SEA.
Most of the work in SEA seems to be based on
the assumption that the provision of rational in-
formation will help improve decision-making,
but the literature points to other characteristics
of real decision-making processes, including
cognitive limitations, behavioural biases, ambi-
guity and variability of preferences and norms,
distribution of decision-making over actors and
in time, and the notion of decision-making as a
process of learning and negotiation between
multiple actors. All these are very relevant at the
planning and policy level. In the policy sciences
literature, some approaches may also hold
promise for SEA, such as supporting an open
learning process, variety in ways to support and
roles to play in these processes, and paying more
attention to the actor configuration and distri-
bution of interests, as a basis for finding
implementable and effective solutions to policy
problems. The elaboration of these ideas holds
promises as well as challenges for SEA.
Keywords: strategic environmental assessment; rationality;
decision-making models
Lone Kørnøv is in the Department of Development and Planning,
Aalborg University, Fibigerstraede 13, 9220 Aalborg, Denmark.
Wil A H Thissen is in the School of Systems Engineering, Policy
Analysis and Management, Delft University of Technology, PO
Box 5015, 2600 GA Delft, Netherlands.
Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal September 2000
I NTEGRATION OF STRATEGIC environmental
assessment (SEA) into the planning and pol-
icy-making processes is widely recognised as
critical to the success of SEA: “The links between
SEA and the PPP [policies, plans and programmes]-
making process are difficult to clearly identify and
explain, but are crucial to the effectiveness of SEA”
(Thérivel and Partidário, 1996; see also Partidário,
1996; Sadler, 1994; Partidário, 2000). Most of the
literature in the field concentrates on the substantive
aspects of decision alternatives and their anticipated
(environmental or integrated) impacts, and on discus-
sions about the formal or institutional status of SEA.
Relatively little attention so far has been given in the
SEA literature to the relevance and consequences of
theories and insights about policy- and decision-
making processes and the role of knowledge therein.
As a supplement to the important practical experience
being built up in SEA, we can learn from the experience
gained within the psychological, behavioural and policy
sciences, which all have a significantly longer empirical
and theoretical history. With this in mind, in this paper
we explore a selection of existing and emerging theories
about decision- and policy-making, and the lessons they
may hold for SEA practice and research.
Rationalities, norms and values
Much of the work in impact assessment is based on the
belief or assumption that the provision of better, sci-
entifically valid information or knowledge regarding
a decision issue will contribute to a better, more
1461-5517/00/030191-10 US$08.00 © IAIA 2000 191
Rationality in decision- and policy-making
rational decision, which may be defined as “… one
that pursues a logic of consequences” (March, 1994).
That is, a decision is considered more rational if the
process leading to it is based on insight into the conse-
quences of alternatives, and the selection follows the
logic of choosing the alternative that is expected to
best achieve one’s goals or objectives. Associated
with this notion is a model of the decision process as a
sequence of logical steps, starting with the establish-
ment of objectives or goals in a given decision con-
text, followed by identification or design of
alternatives, assessment of the impacts of alternatives,
and choice of the ‘best ‘ alternative in view of the
goals.
First, we note that this view of rationality in deci-
sion-making requires a distinction between the ratio-
nality of the process (meaning that rational
procedures are followed) and the rationality of the
outcome of the process (meaning that, in the end, the
best approach is chosen to achieve given aims). A ra-
tional procedure will not automatically lead to a ratio-
nal choice — considering imperfect information,
multiple objectives the preferences of which are often
not clearly established, and the fact that people do
not always behave as assumed in rational models for
decision-making.
Second, implicitly or explicitly, a separation is
made between objective, science-based knowledge
on the one hand, and subjective, decision-maker spe-
cific norms and values that come into play in making
the trade-offs between alternatives, assuming their
impacts are known.
Third, this model of decision-making is a norma-
tive one, that is, its proponents believe that it should be
applied as it will lead to improvement in real-world
decision-making over present practice. However, vir-
tually all empirical research shows that decision-
making processes in practice often do not follow such
a rational procedure, even in cases where significant
efforts are made to improve rationality (Brewer,
1973; March, 1987; 1988; 1994; Katz and Kahn,
1966; Simon and March, 1958; Lindblom, 1959;
Scott, 1987; Breheny and Hooper, 1985).
The fact that real-world decision processes do not
appear to follow rational principles does not automati-
cally mean that attempts at increasing rationality are
undesirable. Nevertheless, insight into the reasons
why attempts in the past have often not been success-
ful may increase our understanding of the limits of the
rational model, and of the merits of other models that
may provide additional guidance for our efforts to af-
fect decision-making.
In addition to the distinctions between process and
substantive or outcome characteristics, between sci-
entific knowledge and values, and between normative
and descriptive views of decision-making, it is helpful
to distinguish conceptually different levels of deci-
sion processes: the individual level, where an individ-
ual actor or decision-maker develops insight and
comes to a choice of a strategy or action, and the
collective level, where individuals interact, possibly
192
resulting in (partial) agreement or commitment to a
jointly chosen course of action. There is a wide varia-
tion of situations at the collective level, for example,
team or group decision-making, decision-making
within an organisation, and decision-making between
independent parties.
For the sake of simplicity, we will adopt the simple
conceptual dichotomy of individual versus collective
or multi-actor decision-making. Note that collective
decisions are always based on a set of decisions of in-
dividuals, and that in many real-world processes both
types of decision-making are intertwined.
We will start with an exploration of models of deci-
sion-making at the individual level, proceed to the
multi-actor situation, then discuss some insights and
developments in the field of decision support, and
finally return to the implications for SEA.
Limits to individual rationality
Individuals make decisions all the time — both simple
(such as deciding which paper the environmental
statement has to be printed on, or which train to take to
work) and complex with far reaching consequences
(such as buying an expensive house, migrating to an-
other part of the world, changing a national strategic
decision towards recycling of paper, glass, metal, gar-
bage and so on to decrease landfill).
The process of problem solving at the individual
level is often described as consisting of three overall
types of activity, frequently referred to as stages
(Simon, 1957):
· finding or identifying occasions calling for a
decision;
· inventing, developing and analysing possible alter-
native courses of action; and
· selecting a particular alternative from those
available.
These activities are, at the individual level, affected
by several limitations to rationality, which we will
divide into two categories: cognitive and resource
limitations; and behavioural variations and biases.
Cognitive and resource limitations
Traditional economic theory assumes complete ratio-
nality: the ‘economic decision-maker’ maximises
profit by systematic search for the best solution to a
problem. It assumes complete and perfect information
for the decision-maker, and demands consideration of
all alternatives and consequences to make the optimal
decision.
It is self-evident that the theory of rational–
economic behaviour is hardly applicable to individual
reality. The decision-maker does not and cannot know
all alternatives, consequences and preferences. Alter-
natives have to be searched, consequences have to be
researched and finally preferences have to be found
Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal September 2000

In theories of limited rationality,
attention is seen as a scarce resource:
decision-makers — like all other
people — have a natural limited
mental capacity and are therefore only
able to cope within these limits and
with a limited volume of information
and developed. In theories of limited rationality
(Simon, 1957), attention is seen as a scarce resource.
Decision-makers — like all other people — have a
natural limited mental capacity and are therefore only
able to cope within these limits and with a limited vol-
ume of information.
There is a link between (a) attention, (b) available
resources and (c) search and development for alterna-
tives, consequences and preferences. The available at-
tention to search and develop is limited, which
therefore limits the search for information and thereby
also affects the decision itself (March, 1994). The
number of alternatives considered is limited by both
the mental capacity of the decision-maker and the
available resources. In addition, decision-makers do
not have perfect information about resulting conse-
quences upon which to determine the best alternative.
As a consequence, there will always be uncertainty
and risk about the eventual impacts of decisions taken,
which means that a fully rational decision may even-
tually lead to an undesired effect.
To replace the unrealistic idea of “the economic
man” Simon (1957) proposes a model of “the admin-
istrative man”. The economic man maximises and
reaches for the optimal choice, while the administra-
tive man tries to satisfice: “… making an optimal deci-
sion is like searching a haystack for the sharpest
needle, but making a satisficing decision is like
searching a haystack for a needle just sharp enough
with which to sew” (Simon and March, 1958). A sum-
mary of the differences between the rational–
economic model and the administrative model is
shown in Table 1.
Figure 1. Expectations and preferences define how a person
participates in decision-making
Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal September 2000
Rationality in decision- and policy-making
Table 1. Characterisation of ‘the rational–economic model’
and ‘the administrative model’
Aspect Rational–economic Administrative
model model
Rationality of Perfect Bounded
decision-maker
Available Complete, and Limited
information complete access
Selection of Optimal, rational choice Satisficing choice
alternatives
Behavioural variations and biases
Common decision-making procedures do not follow a
rational pattern, but include such principles as habit,
tradition, doing similar things as other people would
do, repeating what worked in the past, or imitating
successful people (Dawes, 1988, pages 8–9). Empiri-
cal research shows that the framing of decisions af-
fects our preference. In Figure 1 we make a distinction
between what a person ‘likes’ (preferences) and what
a person ‘sees’ (perceptions and expectations) in a de-
cision situation.
Our interpretation of what we see and expect is af-
fected by our past experiences, by availability of in-
formation and examples, by our norms and values
(that is, what we would like to see) and by what we ex-
pect to see. Typically, the first considered alternative
tends to be close to the situation today, marginal
changes are examined and the number of alternatives
being considered is restricted (March, 1994;
Lindblom, 1959). In addition, empirical research
shows that one’s judgement of a situation is affected
by the way it is framed, for example, by the ordering
of alternatives and presentation of consequences
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
It is also important to recognise that not all deci-
sions involve all three stages, and thereby neither do
they involve all the stages of the rational approach.
Decisions under immediate pressure may result in an
immediate ‘jump to a solution’ with little analysis of
the problem, no search for alternatives and little effort
to weigh the consequences (Katz and Kahn, 1966).
This is often the case after the occurrence of disasters
or the discovery of some new serious problem.
Another situation in which the rational decision-
making model is not followed is when decision-making
results from following rules. Decision-making can
then be seen as a consequence of standardised work-
ing procedures, professional standards, cultural
norms and institutional structures (March, 1994). You
can imagine that decision-makers ask the questions
(March, 1994, page 58):
1. Situation: What kind of situation is this?
2. Identity: What kind of person am I? or what kind
of organisation is this?
3. Rules: What will be appropriate to do in a situa-
tion like this?
193
Rationality in decision- and policy-making
The rules do not have to be expressed explicitly. It can
be a collection of attitudes and understandings of how
the world functions, who you are and how to act.
Rule-based action will therefore mean that the ratio-
nal decision model is not followed. Because experi-
ence and thereby learning is incorporated in rules,
exploration of rules and changes in rules are an im-
portant source for understanding decision-making in
organisations.
Multi-actor decision-making
When several persons or organisations are involved in
decision-making, mutual dependencies and the distri-
bution of power or authority among the participants
become important dimensions that characterise the
process. At the organisational and policy level, the na-
ture of decision-making can vary widely. At one end
of the spectrum are situations of centralised control
where essentially one powerful individual makes de-
cisions regarding matters that concern the whole
organisation or even society. At the other end, we see
policy processes in which, sometimes, large numbers
of essentially independent actors debate and negotiate
(for instance, the international process on reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions and prevention of long-
term climatic change).
In between are many variations, in which individ-
ual policy-makers (for instance, a minister) formally
make a decision that has been prepared in negotia-
tion-like processes, or in which a group or body of ac-
tors or representatives (such as a senate) take formal
decisions. For SEA, oriented to policy and planning
processes, the situations in which power or influence
is distributed over several actors are most relevant,
and our focus will be on these.
Not unlike the situation at the individual level, two
kinds of views on policy-making in multi-actor situa-
tions can be found in the literature. Normative or
‘ideal’ views are often characterised by:
· The notion of a single decision-making group
or entity (unicentric), such as an agency or a gov-
ernment, capable of controlling developments in
society; often also referred to as the notion of
centralistic governance;
· A recognisable key decision point in time;
· Process and substantive rationality as an explicit or
implicit norm.
These idealised views are not only coherent with the
rational view of individual decision-making, they also
model multi-actor decision-making as if it were indi-
vidual (except for the processes taking place within
the unitary group).
Other views or models do take the multi-actor na-
ture more explicitly into account, and conceptualise
decision-making as a process of negotiation between
different actors with different interests. However, not
unlike the economic model, ideal models like those
194
developed in fields such as game theory and conflict
analysis assume rational behaviour of individual ac-
tors, including clarity of objectives and full informa-
tion availability.
As in the individual case, empirical research dem-
onstrates the invalidity of these idealised assump-
tions. Decision-making depends on individual
preferences and interests, which can contradict, most
likely change over time, and can develop based on ex-
perience with the issues at hand (March, 1981; 1994;
March and Olsen, 1989). In multi-actor situations,
there is often a high level of confusion and complex-
ity. Views and preferences diverge and change just
like the alliances between participants in the process.
Participants often do not really know what the prob-
lem is, what to aim for, how to achieve it, even less
what the best way is to achieve it. Decision-makers
have to consider uncertain outcomes, act in a political
system, face many new and interlinked situations and
problems and thereby continuously have to search for
new ways to handle them.
Various models have been developed to character-
ise these multi-actor policy processes. Examples in-
clude terms such as ‘policy soups’, ‘garbage cans’ or
‘policy arenas’ (Cohen et al, 1972; Kingdon, 1995) all
of which express the idea of multi-actor situations in
which a plethora of objectives, problems and solu-
tions are present, and out of which decisions emerge
in unpredictable ways. The process of policy-making
has been described as consisting of independent
streams of actors with goals or objectives, solutions,
and problems. Occasionally, specific views on prob-
lems, available solutions, and objectives happen to
match, resulting in a so-called “policy window”
(Kingdon, 1995).
Another model, the so-called ‘rounds model’, con-
centrates on the time dimension (Teisman, 1992): De-
cision-making often does not happen at one specific
point in time, but is a far more gradual and continuous
process of interaction, negotiation and learning,
in which rounds can be distinguished in which
agreement on a certain aspect or part is reached
and accepted as a basis for the next round.
Taking actor configurations as a central perspec-
tive, decision-making may be described as interac-
tions in a ‘policy network, which is defined as a more
or less stable pattern of social relations between inde-
pendent actors, which takes shape around specific
policy problems or programmes (Kickert et al, 1997).
“Policy formation and policy implementation are
inevitably the result of interactions among a plurality
of separate actors with separate interests, goals, and
strategies” (Scharpf et al, 1978).
Actors participate in the network, as they are mutu-
ally dependent on each other to achieve their goals. At
the same time, each actor tries to steer towards his/ her
own preferences. Individual actor’s views, strategies
and influences are not very predictable, and, thus nei-
ther are the policy outcomes. In addition, interactions
between actors may change relation patterns, which in
turn will influence the interaction patterns.
Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal September 2000

Table 2. Key differences between the rational, unicentric and the network or policy-centric views on multi-actor policy-making
Aspect Rational, unicentric model
Power structure A central decision-maker or decision-making
group
Primary basis for decisions Rational/intellectual
Decision results from Scientific evidence led by pre-formulated
objectives/goals
Process Sequential, in rational steps or phases
Basis for agreement More knowledge will lead to convergence
Role of norms and values Explicit separation of objective knowledge
from values
Use of knowledge Instrumental, decisive
Focus of support Technical/analytical
Research in the policy sciences also points out that
political power play and compromise-making are of-
ten more important than scientific evidence in deter-
mining the outcome. The ideal of separation of
objective knowledge from subjective values is con-
sidered unrealistic since all perceptions, information
selections and inferences are affected by one’s inevi-
table bias (Fisher and Forester, 1993; Schön and Rein,
1994). Policy-making is not a cognitive activity start-
ing with fixed objectives resulting in the best way to
achieve these, but rather an open interactive process in
which problems, solutions and preferences, along
with problem and solution perceptions, develop.
Objectives and targets are then an output rather than
an input to the process.
Table 2 summarises a number of key differences
between the unicentric or rational view, and the em-
pirical network view on policy-making. We point out
that in reality elements of both models often co-exist
or compete. The distinction however clarifies the con-
ceptual discussion.
Supporting decision processes
As in SEA, a significant part of the traditional litera-
ture on knowledge-based support of decision pro-
cesses is based on the (often implicit) assumption of
rationality, a unicentric process, and a stepwise
approach. Guidelines and methods are focused on the
collection, analysis and presentation of objective
information on the basis of which the decision-maker
can improve his or her judgement.
While initially most of the attention was given to
assessing the impacts of alternatives and choosing
among a given set of alternatives with known out-
comes (such as in cost–benefit analysis or decision
analysis, see for instance, Stokey and Zeckhauser,
1978; Keeney and Raiffa, 1976), later publications in
this thread of thinking broaden the approach to paying
significantly more attention to formulating the prob-
lem, identifying the values of interest and identifying
Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal September 2000
Rationality in decision- and policy-making
Network or polycentric model
Decision-making takes place in a network of
interdependent actors
Political/strategic power play
Compromise, often more determined by available
means and solutions than by goals
Unpredictable rounds
Political will and support determines possibility for
solution
Facts and values cannot be separated; objective
knowledge does not exist
Knowledge can provide idea’s, but will mostly be used
as strategic ammunition
Process management, catalytic, search for exchanges,
compromises
a wide enough range of alternatives (Miser and
Quade, 1985; 1988; Patton and Sawicki, 1993; Dunn,
1994; Keeney, 1994). As a result of practical experi-
ence with this approach showing limited success, and
under the influence of empirical research in the policy
sciences, a number of new ideas and approaches to the
support of decision and policy processes have
emerged over the last decades.
Participative or interactive modes
First, participative or interactive modes of policy de-
velopment and associated policy support have been
developed. An important trigger was the frustration
with decisions that were made from a centralistic
governance point of view, but which appeared to be
ineffective because of lack of support among those
who were involved in the implementation. Similarly,
policy studies performed by experts in their study
offices often had no impact, ending up on a shelf col-
lecting dust.
The key notion in participation is to involve rele-
vant actors in the policy preparation process. Rele-
vance of parties may be determined by their formal
position (for instance, a government authority), their
control of relevant resources (for instance, money,
expertise), their power to hinder or block implementa-
tion (lobby groups, implementers) or by the stakes in
the issue (for instance, proponents of some policy).
Initially focus was on assessing the
impacts of alternatives with known
outcomes: later significantly more
attention was paid to formulating the
problem, identifying the values of
interest and identifying a wide enough
range of alternatives
195
Rationality in decision- and policy-making
The idea is that participation will improve the process
in four different ways (Guba and Lincoln, 1989;
Mayer, 1997):
· Increased richness of information and creativity, as
the points of view and knowledge of a variety of ac-
tors are taken into account.
· Increased acceptance of the result of the assess-
ment and/or decision process, as participation may
lead to shared visions and a sense of ownership of
the results.
· Incorporation instead of exclusion of the dynamics
and learning so characteristic of many such pro-
cesses. Rather than a study process in which objec-
tives and problems are fixed at the start, a
participative process allows for emergent insights
and shifts in problem perspectives and objectives
over time, with the consent of all those involved.
· Contribution to the democratic character of the
process, depending on how the participants are
selected, how the process is managed, and how
‘democratic’ is defined.
Participation can be realised in a wide variety of forms
and degrees of intensity. Expert participation is pri-
marily beneficial to knowledge provision and integra-
tion; stakeholder participation may contribute to both
knowledge enrichment and the building of a support
base; and public participation may be more oriented to
enhancing the democratic nature of the process. Par-
ticipation may take the form of hearings or more ac-
tive involvement, and it may take place at one or more
specific points in the process, or on a more continuous
basis. A wide variety of techniques may be used to
structure participative processes, including gaming,
scenario workshops and the like (Mayer, 1997).
Normative debates
Second, it has been argued that concentration on sub-
stantive, scientific and ‘objective’ aspects of a policy
issue, such as the range of alternatives and their im-
pacts, does not address the core issues of many policy
debates (Fisher and Forester, 1993; Schön and Rein,
1994, White, 1994). The underlying debates are often
essentially normative. The views of participants on
what the problem is, what the possible solutions are,
and what is desirable are framed by their world view
and underlying norms. For example, conflicts on PVC
regulations have been dominated by the normative
differences on how to act under the inevitable uncer-
tainty about the impacts of PVC on the environment
and human health, which uncertainty cannot be re-
solved by more analysis (Bras-Klapwijk, 1999; van
Eeten, 1999).
Even when participants have largely the same val-
ues, they may still have difficulties in communication
because they may not speak the same ‘language’
(Bogetoft and Pruzan, 1997). As a response, so-called
‘argumentative’ policy analysis has been proposed. In
an argumentative discourse, the debate and learning
196
among the participating actors concentrates on the full
lines of arguments followed to support or reject cer-
tain positions, including the underlying differences in
perceptions and values (Fisher and Forester, 1993)
The objective of the approach is to increase the mutual
understanding of participant’s differences of view,
and to attempt a “frame-reflective discourse” (Schön
and Rein, 1994) in which frames are adjusted and new
joint views are constructed as a basis for action.
Accordingly, methods and techniques for identify-
ing and portraying actor perceptions are being devel-
oped (for instance, Durning, 1999). Critics have
pointed out, however, that such an approach can only
be productive in situations in which all participants
adopt an open and constructive attitude towards each
other. This is often not the case, particularly if strong
differences in norms or interests exist, the stakes are
high, and the situation is perceived in terms of winners
and losers. In such situations, we see more of a
court-room type of discourse, in which each of the
participants attempts to improve and add to their argu-
mentation in an attempt to win the case, rather than to
search for openings and a more open, joint solution.
Therefore, the style and culture of the policy envi-
ronment seem to be important contextual conditions
that determine the potential for success of discourse
approaches.
Process design
A third line of innovation emphasises the process de-
sign rather than the content of the interaction process.
The assumption is that an adequate set of agreed-upon
rules for interaction and decision-making is a neces-
sary condition for effective and efficient substantive
deliberations between the participants. Guidelines for
process design emphasise things such as openness of
the process, transparency of procedures, a certain de-
gree of freedom and protection for participants, the
provision of opportunities for parties to enter or leave
the process, and so on (Kickert et al, 1997; de Bruijn
and ten Heuvelhof, 1999).
Complementary to the development of ideas on
different types of support that may fit different types
of policy situations (or may even complement each
other) is the notion that supporting specialists or ana-
lysts may play a variety of roles in a policy process.
Empirical research on the roles played by policy
analysts in practice, has shown the existence of dif-
ferent roles being played (adapted from Meltsner,
1976):
· the technician;
· the mediator–facilitator (also indicated as catalyst);
· the policy entrepreneur;
· the policy advocate.
A technician mainly concentrates on collecting and
presenting objective, science-based information to
the decision-maker or the set of actors participating in
the process. He or she limits attention to what can be
Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal September 2000

Table 3. Typology of problem situations with indicated
support approach
Social/value Strong conflicts of
consensus values, interests
Ample substantive Rational problem Mediation
knowledge solving Negotiation support
Technical, objective
design
Lack of Additional research Argumentative and
knowledge, high Risk approach other approaches
uncertainty Facilitation or
entrepreneurial styles
Source: Adapted from Flood and Jackson, 1991; Hisschemoller,
1993; Dunn, 1994
considered value-free knowledge, leaving normative
issues and trading off values to the individual or group
supported. A mediator–facilitator takes a more active
role in the process by being instrumental in exchang-
ing information between actors, pointing out differ-
ences and areas of agreement, and structuring the
discussion. He may search for compromises, identify
new options, suggest inviting new actors in, and so on.
Both technicians and mediator–facilitators adopt a
more or less neutral, serving position with respect to
the parties and interests involved.
A policy entrepreneur, however, may explicitly
choose to support a particular policy point of view that
he or she sees as being the most beneficial outcome of
the process, and then act from that perspective as a
leader instead of a servant. Policy advocates analyse
and act deliberately as the a priori representatives of
one of the stakeholders or interests, and concentrate
on providing information and arguments from that
particular point of view. Generally, the role of policy
advocate is considered to be incompatible with the
technician and mediator roles, as these require inde-
pendence with respect to the interests of the parties
involved.
The distinction of different roles an analyst may
play is similar to a distinction of different ways in
which (scientific) information is, or can be, used in a
policy debate. First, information can be used in the tra-
ditional, rational sense as input to solving a given and
well specified problem, generally of the character
‘find the best solution given specific objectives and
constraints’. Second, information can provide new
ideas to a policy debate, opening the way to new op-
tions, to look at other angles, and so on (van Eeten,
1999). Third, information can be used as ammunition
in a strategic debate, to strengthen one’s own argu-
ments and weaken those of the opponents.
The recognition of different types of roles and con-
tributions, and different types of problem situations,
has led several authors to come up with typologies in-
tended to assist analysts and policy-makers in choos-
ing an appropriate approach in a given situation. This
typology generally identifies problem situation char-
acteristics on the one hand, and approaches that best
fit these characteristic situations on the other. One
simple typology mentioned by various authors in
Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal September 2000
Rationality in decision- and policy-making
different terms distinguishes situations according to
first the availability of substantive knowledge, and
second the degree of social or value consensus on the
other (see Table 3).
Four archetypical situations emerge. When social
consensus is combined with sufficient knowledge, a
rational problem-solving approach will probably
work. When knowledge is lacking, either more re-
search can provide a solution, or the choice of a solu-
tion is guided by a conscious (agreed upon) approach
to taking risks. When there are strong value conflicts
and ample knowledge, additional analysis will not
help, and either negotiation support and mediation
approaches or a courtroom set-up with agreed deci-
sion rules might lead to an accepted solution. Cata-
lytic or entrepreneurial approaches are generally
advised in the messiest situations: combinations of
lack of knowledge and disagreement on values or
conflicts of interests may support the reaching of a
compromise solution.
Implications for SEA
Much of the earlier work in SEA is based on the as-
sumption that the provision of better information on
the environmental impacts of plans or policies will re-
sult in decision-makers taking environmental aspects
more seriously than would be the case without SEA,
and that this will lead to decisions that will turn out to
be better for the environment. Recently, broader ap-
proaches are being adopted targeting sustainability
and pointing out the need for adaptation and integra-
tion (several papers in this issue). In addition, there is
a tendency towards participatory approaches
(Thérivel and Partidário, 2000). Here, we will now
concentrate on the implications of the theoretical and
empirical notions discussed above for the practice of
SEA and for SEA-related research.
First and foremost, the notion that different roles
can be fulfilled in the context of a multi-actor decision
process relates to the very essence of SEA. SEA in-
tends to promote environmental preservation or, more
broadly, sustainability. By taking that stance, it takes a
position probably not shared by (all) other stake-
holders and thereby becomes a stakeholder itself. As a
consequence, SEA plays an advocative role, and will
be seen as such by other stakeholders even if SEA
practitioners would prefer to consider themselves as
being objective scientists.
There need to be nothing wrong with this. The pro-
vision of information about environmental impacts,
and the development and promotion of more sustain-
able alternatives may indeed have the desired impact
on the decisions eventually taken. An advocative role
may be very appropriate in situations characterised as
a battle of special interest analyses, where SEA would
provide counterarguments and balance amidst
economic, traffic, health, safety, or whatever other
partial impact assessments. Criteria for success of
SEA would then relate to the degree to which
197
Rationality in decision- and policy-making
SEA’s dilemma is whether to stick to
the original objectives, provide partial
analyses and play an advocative role,
or to aim at ‘good’ decision-making by
providing balanced overall
assessments and ‘outside’ support to
the learning and negotiation process of
stakeholders and policy-makers
environmental or sustainability concerns have been
taken into account in the decision process, and to the
eventual impact of this on the environment.
Problems may develop, however, when the origi-
nal mission of SEA evolves into, or is substituted by,
the ambition to provide integrated assessments and
decision process support. Integrated support, whether
it is directed at (technical) knowledge integration,
stakeholder process facilitation, public participation,
or a combination of these, requires a neutral position
with respect to the issues at hand and the stakeholders
involved, and an equal ability on the part of the analyst
to understand the different stakes and points of view.
This is at odds with the original mission and position
of SEA. Success criteria for such integrated support
emphasise process efficiency and richness, stake-
holder satisfaction, openness, balanced knowledge
provision, and so on, irrespective of the decision out-
come (Thissen and Twaalfhoven, 2000).
The dilemma for SEA and its practitioners is
whether to stick to the original objectives, provide
partial analyses and play an advocative role, or to shift
to a position close to that of (traditional or
participative) policy analysis and integrated planning,
aiming at ‘good’ decision-making by providing bal-
anced overall assessments and providing ‘outside’
support to the learning and negotiation process of
stakeholders and policy-makers.
The crucial point here is that SEA practitioners
should be aware of this dilemma, and make conscious
choices regarding their objectives and associated
roles, and also make it very clear to clients and stake-
holders what their position is (Thissen, 1997).
Second, and irrespective of the choice of primary
objectives discussed in the preceding paragraph, im-
pact assessors should more deliberately choose the
kind of approach that seems to be the most promising
to achieve the objectives chosen. As indicated in Ta-
ble 3 and in the discussion above, different situations
may require different approaches. To make a well
considered choice, attention should be given at the
very beginning of a process to the nature and context
of the decision situation, the style and culture of the
actor network involved, the mutual dependencies and
fundamental interests of the actors, requirements in
terms of openness and democratic nature, and
probably other relevant factors.
198
In addition to the analysts’ own objectives and
those of the client, these conditions provide some
guidance to the choice among a variety of approaches,
answering questions such as:
· Should the approach concentrate on substance or
on process?
· Should the process be open and interactive, or
closed?
· If interactive, what is the prime objective of the
interaction? Enrichment of content? Enhancement
of democracy? Ensuring the commitment of im-
portant players?
· What actors or persons should be invited to partici-
pate? Should they be experts or scientists? Prime
stakeholder representatives?
· What should be the nature of the discourse to be
started? Is there an opportunity for an open, con-
structive debate? Or are parties entrenched, which
may make a successful participative approach
much harder to realise?
Scientific theory and empirical evaluations, however,
do not yet provide clear and unambiguous guidelines
for answering these questions, leaving much to crafts-
manship and good judgement. However, this is no ex-
cuse for not realising that these choices are made, and
for attempting to make them as well as possible.
Third, impact assessors can only deal effectively
with the dynamics and unpredictability of decision
processes if they adopt a flexible, adaptive and learn-
ing approach themselves. If they do not, they run the
risk of writing a thorough report based on an initial but
fixed problem formulation, only to find out after a
while that the policy agenda and issues have changed
significantly in the mean time, as a consequence of
which a well researched report remains unused and in-
effective.
A key requirement for analysts is to maintain good
and regular communication with stakeholders and de-
cision-makers during the whole process (Majone and
Quade, 1980; Miser and Quade, 1988). Participative
approaches are less vulnerable than non-participative
to the risk of working with a fixed but outdated prob-
lem formulation in as far as the stakeholders take the
process seriously, and the major parties of relevance
are involved.
Fourth, the cognitive and attention limitations re-
sulting in satisficing rather than optimising behaviour
suggest that refinement of analysis to include larger
numbers of alternatives, more detailed impacts, and
more scientific rigour will not necessarily lead to
more impact on the decision situation. Rather, an ap-
proach focusing on a limited set of key issues to be
brought to the attention of decision-makers seems to
be advisable.
This is not to say that scientific rigour is bad; argu-
ments based on data that cannot be supported in a sci-
entific debate are vulnerable, and scientists should
continue to work on improved understanding of
environmental impacts. However, to be effective in a
Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal September 2000

decision context, emphasis should not be on the
advancement of science, but on the use of existing
scientific insights to enlighten decision-makers, and
the information should be tuned to decision-maker
capabilities, interests and timetables.
The challenge for impact assessors is to identify
those key issues in an effective and timely way.
Quick-scan approaches early in the process look
promising. For example, a few interactive rounds with
stakeholders identifying their key interests, views on
the issues and on potential solutions, supported by a
broad-brush evaluation may provide a good basis for
determining the scope of further analyses (Enserink,
2000).
Fifth, impact assessors should consider broadening
their analytic scope in two respects: broaden the sys-
tem to be analysed, and broaden the aspects taken into
account.
Traditionally, impact assessment has mostly con-
centrated on policies, plans or projects and their po-
tential impacts on the environment and other aspects
of relevance. Decision- and policy-making, however,
in essence are activities of and between actors with
different interests in and perspectives on the problem
situation. That means that an analysis of the positions,
interests and interrelations of the actors involved in a
decision situation may provide insights that could
help to identify creative and workable solutions.
Equally relevant is the suggestion of including val-
ues and arguments in addition to ‘facts’ in an analysis
of a decision situation. This will help clarify the rea-
sons for diverging views or positions, and may, de-
pending on the situation, provide ways to build
bridges between different viewpoints (van Eeten,
1999).
Sixth, and following directly from the preceding
point, the present focus of methods for analysis and
assessment on the substance of the decision issue (for
instance, on alternatives and their impacts) should be
broadened to include methods for analysis of actor
configurations, their interests and perceptions.
Methods to be developed may also extend to identifi-
cation of possible exchanges between actors. Recent
literature in the field of social sciences and policy
analysis provides some interesting starting points
(Coleman, 1990).
Seventh, the need for flexibility and adaptability in
policy contexts provides arguments against detailed
regulation or legal prescription. The open and flexible
approach required might be at conflict with the rigour
and fixed terms that are often part of formal environ-
mental impact assessments. Therefore, possible legal
frameworks for SEA should prescribe what should be
achieved (depending on the specific objectives of
SEA) rather than how exactly this should be done.
Eighth, the points made above suggest a number of
new research directions in SEA. Generally, research
in and on SEA should pay more attention to the
multi-actor characteristics of decision situations. At
present, most of the attention is either focused on the
formal, institutional and/or legal structures in which
Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal September 2000
Rationality in decision- and policy-making
SEA (or EIA) is embedded, or on specific approaches,
techniques or tools to perform the content analysis,
that is, the design of alternatives and the exploration
of their impacts. More attention should be given to is-
sues such as process design, matching approaches to
problem and context characteristics, and to the selec-
tion of methods and combinations of tools in relation
to problem characteristics.
As a consequence, evaluative and comparative re-
search should be broadened beyond evaluation of the
qualities of the assessment process and its direct prod-
ucts (usually the report). The use of assessment results
in, and their impacts on, decision-making should also
be observed, as well as the contextual conditions
within which the assessment was performed and how
the assessment was designed to match those condi-
tions. In addition, a sufficiently broad set of possible
impacts should be monitored, including impacts re-
lated to the learning of participants and the social
structure (Thissen, 2000).
Concluding remarks
SEA is intended to affect policy processes and their
outcomes. If SEA is to have the intended impact; the
approach should be guided by insights into the nature
of decision processes and the ways to influence these
processes. In this paper, we have explored a limited
number of characteristics of decision processes and
paid attention to two levels: the individual and the
multi-actor. Individual decision characteristics justify
only to a limited extent the assumption of rationality
in the process, and of the added value of more detailed
assessment information.
At the multi-actor level, which is most relevant for
SEA, the problems with the assumptions of full ratio-
nality are even deeper. Research findings in, and
theories from, decision and policy sciences, and
developments in decision support and policy analysis
provide a number of insights and experiences that
may help to redirect SEA to make it more effective.
Key notions include the type of information to be pro-
vided, the transition to more open and emergent ap-
proaches based on interaction with relevant parties,
the need to include actor configurations and interests
as central elements in the analysis, and the need
deliberately to choose a role and function in the
process.
In addition, the debate on the roles of knowledge
and knowledge workers in policy processes points to
the need for SEA to keep fundamentally apart two
missions that tend to get mixed up in present-day dis-
cussions: its advocative mission as an instrument to
enhance the preservation of the natural environment,
and the ambition to support balanced decision-
making which requires a neutral position towards the
stakes in the process.
Nevertheless, the policy and decision sciences do
not offer final answers. Both SEA and the policy
sciences may benefit from further experiments and
199
Rationality in decision- and policy-making
research into what works and what does not, under
what conditions, and for whom.
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