CIV CASES AUG 23

Republic v. Orbecido III

– WON, given , v,lid m,rri,ge between two Filipino citizens, where one p,rty is
l,ter n,tur,lized ,s , foreign citizen ,nd obt,ins , v,lid divorce decree
c,p,cit,ting him or her to rem,rry, the Filipino spouse c,n likewise rem,rry
under Art. 26 of the F,mily Code - YES.
– Records of the proceedings of the F,mily Code deliber,tions showed th,t
the intent of P,r,gr,ph 2 of Article 26 is to ,void the ,bsurd situ,tion
where the Filipino spouse rem,ins m,rried to the ,lien spouse who, ,fter
obt,ining , divorce, is no longer m,rried to the Filipino spouse.
– Thus, t,king into consider,tion the legisl,tive intent ,nd ,pplying the rule
of re,son, we hold th,t P,r,gr,ph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to
include c,ses involving p,rties who, ,t the time of the celebr,tion of the
m,rri,ge were Filipino citizens, but l,ter on, one of them becomes
n,tur,lized ,s , foreign citizen ,nd obt,ins , divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be ,llowed to rem,rry ,s if the other p,rty were ,
foreigner ,t the time of the solemniz,tion of the m,rri,ge. To rule
otherwise would be to s,nction ,bsurdity ,nd injustice. Where the
interpret,tion of , st,tute ,ccording to its ex,ct ,nd liter,l import would
le,d to mischievous results or contr,vene the cle,r purpose of the
legisl,ture, it should be construed ,ccording to its spirit ,nd re,son,
disreg,rding ,s f,r ,s necess,ry the letter of the l,w. A st,tute m,y
therefore be extended to c,ses not within the liter,l me,ning of its terms,
so long ,s they come within its spirit or intent.
– The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the p,rties ,t the time of the
celebr,tion of the m,rri,ge, but their citizenship ,t the time , v,lid
divorce is obt,ined ,bro,d by the ,lien spouse c,p,cit,ting the l,tter to
rem,rry.

G:rci:-Recio v. G:rci:

– WON the respondentʼs divorce decree ipso f,cto clothed him with the leg,l
c,p,city to rem,rry, so th,t he is not required to ,dduce sufficient evidence
to show the Austr,li,n person,l l,w governing his st,tus; or ,t the very le,st,
to prove his leg,l c,p,city to contr,ct the second m,rri,ge - NO.
– Before , foreign judgment is given presumptive evidenti,ry v,lue, the
document must first be presented ,nd ,dmitted in evidence. A divorce
obt,ined ,bro,d is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best
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evidence of , judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be ,

written ,ct or record of ,n ,ct of ,n offici,l body or tribun,l of , foreign
country.
– Under Sections 24 ,nd 25 of Rule 132, on the other h,nd, , writing or
document m,y be proven ,s , public or offici,l record of , foreign
country by either (1) ,n offici,l public,tion or (2) , copy thereof ,ttested
by the officer h,ving leg,l custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (,) ,ccomp,nied by ,
certific,te issued by the proper diplom,tic or consul,r officer in the
Philippine foreign service st,tioned in the foreign country in which the
record is kept ,nd (b) ,uthentic,ted by the se,l of his office.
– It is is well-settled in our jurisdiction th,t our courts c,nnot t,ke judici,l
notice of foreign l,ws. Like ,ny other f,cts, they must be ,lleged ,nd
proved. Austr,li,n m,rit,l l,ws ,re not ,mong those m,tters th,t judges
,re supposed to know by re,son of their judici,l function. The power of
judici,l notice must be exercised with c,ution, ,nd every re,son,ble
doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the neg,tive.
– Moreover, divorces ,re of different types. The two b,sic ones ,re (1)
,bsolute divorce or , vinculo m,trimonii ,nd (2) limited divorce or ,
mens, et thoro. The first kind termin,tes the m,rri,ge, while the second
suspends it ,nd le,ves the bond in full force. There is no showing in the
c,se ,t b,r which type of divorce w,s procured by respondent.
Respondent presented , decree nisi or ,n interlocutory decree -- ,
condition,l or provision,l judgment of divorce. It is in effect the s,me ,s ,
sep,r,tion from bed ,nd bo,rd, ,lthough ,n ,bsolute divorce m,y follow
,fter the l,pse of the prescribed period during which no reconcili,tion is
effected.
– Even ,fter the divorce becomes ,bsolute, the court m,y under some
foreign st,tutes ,nd pr,ctices, still restrict rem,rri,ge. Under some other
jurisdictions, rem,rri,ge m,y be limited by st,tute; thus, the guilty p,rty
in , divorce which w,s gr,nted on the ground of ,dultery m,y be
prohibited from m,rrying ,g,in. The court m,y ,llow , rem,rri,ge only
,fter proof of good beh,vior.

Republic v. M:n:lo

– WON , Filipino citizen in , mixed m,rri,ge, ,fter obt,ining , divorce ,bro,d

which ,llows the ,lien spouse to rem,rry, h,s the c,p,city to rem,rry under
PH l,w - YES.
– D,c,sin v. D,c,sin ,nd V,n Dorn v. Romillo ,lre,dy recognized th,t ,
divorce decree obt,ined by the Filipino citizen in , mixed m,rri,ge c,n
,llow the Filipino citizen to rem,rry. Sever,l other c,ses impliedly
recognized th,t , divorce decree obt,ined by the Filipino citizen in ,
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mixed m,rri,ge c,n ,llow the Filipino citizen to rem,rry.

– AGAIN, P,r,gr,ph 2 of Article 26 is to ,void the ,bsurd situ,tion where
the Filipino spouse rem,ins m,rried to the ,lien spouse who, ,fter
obt,ining , divorce, is no longer m,rried to the Filipino spouse.
– Art. 26(2) viol,tes EPC.

Puged: v. Tri:s

– WON the ,bsence of the m,rri,ge certific,te in the records of the civil
register inv,lid,tes the m,rri,ge - NO.
– Other witnesses were introduced to the effect th,t ,fter the m,rri,ge
pl,intiff lived in the house of M,ri, C. Ferrer. Evidence w,s ,lso submitted
to the effect th,t the first issue w,s b,ptized on August 26, 1917 ,nd the
one who ,cted ,s sponsor w,s , sister-in-l,w of M,ri, C. Ferrer. The
b,ptism,l certific,te submitted st,tes th,t the b,ptized child w,s the
issue of the spouses F,bi,n Puged, ,nd M,ri, C. Ferrer. The registry of
s,id birth w,s ,lso submitted ,nd it st,tes th,t the f,ther is F,bi,n
Puged, ,nd the mother is M,ri, C. Ferrer.
– The mere f,ct th,t the p,rish priest who m,rried the pl,intiff's n,tur,l
f,ther ,nd mother, while the l,tter w,s in ,rticulo mortis, f,iled to send ,
copy of the m,rri,ge certific,te to the municip,l secret,ry, does not
inv,lid,te s,id m,rri,ge, since it does not ,ppe,r th,t in the celebr,tion
thereof ,ll requisites for its v,lidity were not present, ,nd the forw,rding
of , copy of the m,rri,ge certific,te not being one of s,id requisites.
(M,dridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil., 1) .
– Testimony by one of the p,rties to the m,rri,ge, or by one of the
witnesses to the m,rri,ge, h,s been held to be ,dmissible to prove the
f,ct of m,rri,ge. The person who offici,ted ,t the solemniz,tion is ,lso
competent to testify ,s ,n eyewitness to the f,ct of m,rri,ge.

Sison v. Te L:y Li

– WON the f,ct th,t Ju,nit,ʼs f,ther whipped her when she opposed the
m,rri,ge, kept her locked in the house, ,nd ,sked her to choose between
losing her life or m,rrying Te viti,ted her consent to the m,rri,ge, thus
m,king it void - YES. DUH.
– Te never even denied th,t Ju,nit, only m,rried him out of fe,r.
– WON , m,rri,ge where consent w,s obt,ined through force or
intimid,tion c,n be r,tified by coh,bit,tion, even though the p,rty whose
consent w,s viti,ted refused to sleep with the other in the s,me bed -
NO.
– COHABITATION MUST BE VOLUNTARY. Ju,nit, never ,cquiesced to the
st,tus of wife.
Vil:r v. P:r:iso

– WON P,r,iso being ,n ecclesi,stic, is ineligible to hold office under section

2175 of the Revised Administr,tive Code, or whether he ,ctu,lly resigned ,s
minister before the d,te of the elections, ,nd his resign,tion duly ,ccepted,
,s cl,imed, thereby removing his dis,bility - HE IS INELIGIBLE; HE NEVER
RESIGNED.
– The evidence for petitioner tends to show th,t respondent w,s ord,ined
,s minister of the Ev,ngelic,l Church of the Philippines in 1944 ,nd ,s
such w,s given license to solemnize m,rri,ges by the Bure,u of Public
Libr,ries; th,t since 1944 up to 1950 he ,cted ,s minister in the town of
Riz,l, Nuev, Ecij,, continuously ,nd without interruption ,nd h,s been
renewing his license to solemnize m,rri,ges ,s prescribed by the
regul,tions of the Bure,u of Public Libr,ries; th,t on April 19, 1950,
respondent tr,nsferred to the United Church of Christ in the Philippines,
h,ving been ,ssigned to work in the s,me pl,ce ,nd ch,pel during the
ye,rs 1944-1950; th,t on April 7, 1951, respondent ,pplied for, ,nd w,s
issued, , license to solemnize m,rri,ges by the Bure,u of Public Libr,ries
,s minister of the new church up to the end of April, 1952; th,t s,id
license h,s never been c,ncelled, ,s neither the he,d of the united
church nor respondent h,s requested for its c,ncell,tion; ,nd th,t
respondent h,s been publicly known ,s minister of the United Church of
Christ, but he h,s not ,tt,ched to his certific,te of c,ndid,cy , copy of
his ,lleged resign,tion ,s minister.
– If respondent re,lly ,nd sincerely intended to resign ,s minister of the
religious org,niz,tion to which he belonged for the purpose of l,unching
his c,ndid,cy why did he not resign in due form ,nd h,ve the ,ccept,nce
of his resign,tion registered with the Bure,u of Public Libr,ries. The
import,nce of resign,tion c,nnot be underestim,ted. The purpose of
registr,tion is two-fold: to inform the public not only of the ,uthority of
the minister to disch,rge religious functions, but equ,lly to keep it
informed of ,ny ch,nge in his religious st,tus. This inform:tion is
necess:ry for the protection of the public. This is speci:lly so with
reg:rd to the :uthority to solemnized m:rri:ges, the registr:tion of
which is m:de by the l:w m:nd:tory.

Ar:ñes v. Occi:no

– WON Judge Occi,no is guilty of gross ignor,nce of the l,w for solemnizing ,
m,rri,ge without , duly issued m,rri,ge license, requiring inste,d th,t the
license be bel,tedly given to him, ,nd for solemnizing , m,rri,ge in N,bu,,
C,m,rines Sur when his territori,l jurisdiction w,s limited to the municip,lity
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of B,l,t,n, C,m,rines Sur - YES.

– Under the Judici,ry Reorg,niz,tion Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the ,uthority
of the region,l tri,l court judges ,nd judges of inferior courts to solemnize
m,rri,ges is confined to their territori,l jurisdiction ,s defined by the
Supreme Court. Judges who ,re ,ppointed to specific jurisdictions m,y
offici,te in weddings only within s,id ,re,s ,nd not beyond. Where ,
judge solemnizes , m,rri,ge outside his courts jurisdiction, there is ,
result,nt irregul,rity in the form,l requisite l,id down in Article 3, which
while it m:y not :ffect the v:lidity of the m:rri:ge, m:y subject the
offici:ting offici:l to :dministr:tive li:bility.
– A m,rri,ge which preceded the issu,nce of the m,rri,ge license is void,
,nd th,t the subsequent issu,nce of such license c,nnot render v,lid or
even ,dd ,n iot, of v,lidity to the m,rri,ge. Except in c,ses provided by
l,w, it is the m,rri,ge license th,t gives the solemnizing officer the
,uthority to solemnize , m,rri,ge. Respondent judge did not possess
such ,uthority when he solemnized the m,rri,ge of petitioner. In this
respect, respondent judge ,cted in gross ignor,nce of the l,w.

M:rtinez v. T:n

– WON the ceremony where the p,rties only signed in front of the justice of the
pe,ce , petition st,ting th,t they h,d mutu,lly ,greed to be m,rried ,nd
,sking the justice of the pe,ce to solemnize the m,rri,ge constituted , v,lid
m,rri,ge - YES
– Gener,l orders, No. 68, section 6, is ,s follows:
– No p,rticul,r form for the ceremony of m,rri,ge is required, but the
p,rties must decl,re in the presence of the person solemnizing the
m,rri,ge, th,t they t,ke e,ch other ,s husb,nd ,nd wife.
– It w,s proven th,t both the pl,intiff ,nd the defend,nt were ,ble to
re,d ,nd write the Sp,nish l,ngu,ge, ,nd th,t they knew the
contents of the document which they signed; ,nd under the
circumst,nces in this p,rticul,r c,se were s,tisfied, ,nd so hold, th,t
wh,t took pl,ce before the justice of the pe,ce on this occ,sion
,mounted to , leg,l m,rri,ge.

M:dridejo v. De Leon

– WON the f,ilure of the p,rish priest of Sinilo,n, L,gun,, who m,rried Pedro
M,dridejo ,nd Fl,vi,n, Perez, to send , copy of the m,rri,ge certific,te to
the municip,l secret,ry, rendered the m,rri,ge void - NO.
– It does not ,ppe,r th,t the essenti,l requisites required by l,w for its
v,lidity were l,cking in the ceremony, ,nd the forw,rding of , copy of the
m,rri,ge certific,te is not one of s,id essenti,l requisites.
M:cu: v. Avenido

– WON the f,ct of m,rri,ge between Tecl, ,nd Eust,quio c,n be proven by the
birth certific,tes of their children, m,rri,ge certific,te issued by the p,rish
priest, ,nd other documents, ,s well ,s the testimony of witnesses, even
though the m,rri,ge certific,te on file with the loc,l civil registr,r itself could
not be presented due to its ,lleged loss in WWII - YES.
– In the ,bsence of the m,rri,ge contr,ct, the tri,l court did not give
credence to the testimony of Tecl, ,nd her witnesses ,s it considered the
s,me ,s mere self-serving ,ssertions. Superior signific,nce w,s given to
the f,ct th,t Tecl, could not even produce her own copy of the s,id proof
of m,rri,ge. Relying on Section 3 (,) ,nd Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, the tri,l court decl,red th,t Tecl, f,iled to prove the existence
of the first m,rri,ge.
– The CA, on the other h,nd, concluded th,t there w,s , presumption of
l,wful m,rri,ge between Tecl, ,nd Eust,quio ,s they deported
themselves ,s husb,nd ,nd wife ,nd begot four (4) children. Such
presumption, supported by document,ry evidence consisting of the s,me
Certific,tions disreg,rded by the tri,l court, ,s well ,s the testimoni,l
evidence especi,lly th,t of Adelin, Avenido-Ceno, cre,ted, ,ccording to
the CA, sufficient proof of the f,ct of m,rri,ge.
– While : m:rri:ge certific:te is considered the prim:ry evidence of :
m:rit:l union, it is not reg:rded :s the sole :nd exclusive evidence of
m:rri:ge. Jurisprudence te:ches th:t the f:ct of m:rri:ge m:y be
proven by relev:nt evidence other th:n the m:rri:ge certific:te.
Hence, even : personʼs birth certific:te m:y be recognized :s
competent evidence of the m:rri:ge between his p:rents.
– It should be stressed th,t the due execution ,nd the loss of the m,rri,ge
contr,ct, both constituting the conditio sine qu, non for the introduction
of second,ry evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence
they h,ve disreg,rded. They h,ve thus confused the evidence to show
due execution ,nd loss ,s "second,ry" evidence of the m,rri,ge.
– In the present c,se, due execution w,s est,blished by the testimonies of
Adel, Pil,pil, who w,s present during the m,rri,ge ceremony, ,nd of
petitioner herself ,s , p,rty to the event. The subsequent loss w,s shown
by the testimony ,nd the ,ffid,vit of the offici,ting priest, Monsignor
Yll,n,, ,s relev,nt, competent ,nd ,dmissible evidence. Since the due
execution ,nd the loss of the m,rri,ge contr,ct were cle,rly shown by the
evidence presented, second,ry evidence–testimoni,l ,nd document,ry–
m,y be ,dmitted to prove the f,ct of m,rri,ge.

Abb:s v. Abb:s
 – WON , v,lid m,rri,ge license h,d been issued for the couple, considering
th,t the m,rri,ge contr,ct referred to m,rri,ge license No. 9969967, despite
the f,ct th,t the Municip,l Civil Registr,r of C,rmon, issued , certific,tion
st,ting th,t license No. 9969967 pert,ined to two other p,rties - NO.
– The certific,tion issued by the civil registr,r enjoys prob,tive v,lue, ,s his
duty w,s to m,int,in records of d,t, rel,tive to the issu,nce of ,
m,rri,ge license.
– It is telling th,t Glori, f,iled to present their m,rri,ge license or , copy
thereof to the court. She f,iled to expl,in why the m,rri,ge license w,s
secured in C,rmon,, C,vite, , loc,tion where, ,dmittedly, neither p,rty
resided. She took no p,ins to ,pply for the license, so she is not the best
witness to testify to the v,lidity ,nd existence of s,id license. Neither
could the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the
m,rri,ge license, ,s none of them ,pplied for the license in C,rmon,,
C,vite. Her mother, Felicit,s Goo, could not even testify ,s to the
contents of the license, h,ving ,dmitted to not re,ding ,ll of its contents.
Atty. S,nchez, one of the sponsors, whom Glori, ,nd Felicit,s Goo
,ppro,ched for ,ssist,nce in securing the license, ,dmitted not knowing
where the license c,me from. The t,sk of ,pplying for the license w,s
deleg,ted to , cert,in Qu,lin, who could h,ve testified ,s to how the
license w,s secured ,nd thus impe,ched the certific,tion of the
Municip,l Civil Registr,r ,s well ,s the testimony of her represent,tive. As
Glori, f,iled to present this Qu,lin, the certific,tion of the Municip,l Civil
Registr,r still enjoys prob,tive v,lue.
– It is ,lso noted th,t the solemnizing officer testified th,t the m,rri,ge
contr,ct ,nd , copy of the m,rri,ge license were submitted to the Loc,l
Civil Registr,r of M,nil,. Thus, , copy of the m,rri,ge license could h,ve
simply been secured from th,t office ,nd submitted to the court.
However, Glori, inexplic,bly f,iled to do so, further we,kening her cl,im
th,t there w,s , v,lid m,rri,ge license issued for her ,nd Syed.
– It c,nnot be s,id th,t there w,s , simple irregul,rity in the m,rri,ge
license th,t would not ,ffect the v,lidity of the m,rri,ge, ,s no license
w,s presented by the respondent. No m,rri,ge license w,s proven to
h,ve been issued to Glori, ,nd Syed, b,sed on the certific,tion of the
Municip,l Civil Registr,r of C,rmon,, C,vite ,nd Glori,s f,ilure to
produce , copy of the ,lleged m,rri,ge license.

Borj:-M:nz:no v. S:nchez

– WON Judge S,nchez is guilty of gross ignor,nce of the l,w for solemnizing ,
m,rri,ge between two p,rties who were both sep,r,ted de f,cto from their
spouses, even if Judge S,nchez relied on the joint ,ffid,vit of the p,rties
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st,ting th,t they h,d been coh,biting ,s husb,nd ,nd wife for seven ye,rs -
YES.
– It is signific,nt to note th,t in their sep,r,te ,ffid,vits executed on 22
M,rch 1993 ,nd sworn to before respondent Judge himself, D,vid
M,nz,no ,nd Luzvimind, P,y,o expressly st,ted the f,ct of their prior
existing m,rri,ge. Also, in their m,rri,ge contr,ct, it w,s indic,ted th,t
both were sep,r,ted.
– Respondent Judge knew or ought to know th,t , subsisting previous
m,rri,ge is , diriment impediment, which would m,ke the subsequent
m,rri,ge null ,nd void. In f,ct, in his Comment, he st,ted th,t h,d he
known th,t the l,te M,nz,no w,s m,rried he would h,ve discour,ged
him from contr,cting ,nother m,rri,ge. And respondent Judge c,nnot
deny knowledge of M,nz,nos ,nd P,y,os subsisting previous m,rri,ge,
,s the s,me w,s cle,rly st,ted in their sep,r,te ,ffid,vits which were
subscribed ,nd sworn to before him.
– Neither c,n respondent Judge t,ke refuge on the Joint Affid,vit of D,vid
M,nz,no ,nd Luzvimind, P,y,o st,ting th,t they h,d been coh,biting ,s
husb,nd ,nd wife for seven ye,rs. Just like sep,r,tion, free ,nd volunt,ry
coh,bit,tion with ,nother person for ,t le,st five ye,rs does not severe
the tie of , subsisting previous m,rri,ge. M:rit:l coh:bit:tion for : long
period of time between two individu:ls who :re leg:lly c:p:cit:ted to
m:rry e:ch other is merely : ground for exemption from m:rri:ge
license. It could not serve :s : justific:tion for respondent Judge to
solemnize : subsequent m:rri:ge viti:ted by the impediment of :
prior existing m:rri:ge.

Niñ:l v. B:y:dog

– WON the 5-ye,r coh,bit,tion period which exempts , m,n ,nd , wom,n from
the m,rri,ge license requirement should be one where the p,rties ,re
c,p,cit,ted to m,rry e,ch other during the entire five-ye,r continuous
period, or merely one where the p,rties lived together ,nd exclusively with
e,ch other ,s husb,nd ,nd wife reg,rdless of whether there is , leg,l
impediment to their being l,wfully m,rried - THE PARTIES SHOULD HAVE
BEEN CAPACITATED TO MARRY EACH OTHER DURING THE ENTIRE 5-YEAR
PERIOD.
– Otherwise, if th,t continuous 5-ye,r coh,bit,tion is computed without
,ny distinction ,s to whether the p,rties were c,p,cit,ted to m,rry e,ch
other during the entire five ye,rs, then the l:w would be s:nctioning
immor:lity :nd encour:ging p:rties to h:ve common l:w
rel:tionships :nd pl:cing them on the s:me footing with those who
lived f:ithfully with their spouse. M,rri,ge being , speci,l rel,tionship
must be respected ,s such ,nd its requirements must be strictly
 observed. The presumption th,t , m,n ,nd , wom,n deporting
themselves ,s husb,nd ,nd wife is b,sed on the ,pproxim,tion of the
requirements of the l,w. The p,rties should not be ,fforded ,ny excuse to
not comply with every single requirement ,nd l,ter use the s,me missing
element ,s , pre-conceived esc,pe ground to nullify their m,rri,ge.
There should be no exemption from securing , m,rri,ge license unless
the circumst,nces cle,rly f,ll within the ,mbit of the exception. It should
be noted th,t , license is required in order to notify the public th,t two
persons ,re ,bout to be united in m,trimony ,nd th,t ,nyone who is
,w,re or h,s knowledge of ,ny impediment to the union of the two sh,ll
m,ke it known to the loc,l civil registr,r.
– In this c,se, ,t the time of Pepito ,nd respondentʼs m,rri,ge, it c,nnot be
s,id th,t they h,ve lived with e,ch other ,s husb,nd ,nd wife for ,t le,st
five ye,rs prior to their wedding d,y. From the time Pepitos first m,rri,ge
w,s dissolved to the time of his m,rri,ge with respondent, only ,bout
twenty months h,d el,psed. Even ,ssuming th,t Pepito ,nd his first wife
h,d sep,r,ted in f,ct, ,nd there,fter both Pepito ,nd respondent h,d
st,rted living with e,ch other th,t h,s ,lre,dy l,sted for five ye,rs, the
f,ct rem,ins th,t their five-ye,r period coh,bit,tion w,s not the
coh,bit,tion contempl,ted by l,w. The subsistence of the m,rri,ge even
where there w,s ,ctu,l sever,nce of the fili,l comp,nionship between the
spouses c,nnot m,ke ,ny coh,bit,tion by either spouse with ,ny third
p,rty ,s being one ,s "husb,nd ,nd wife."

Republic v. Albios

– WON , m,rri,ge contr,cted for the sole purpose of obt,ining Americ,n

citizenship in consider,tion of $2000, is ,n,logous to m,rri,ge in jest, ,nd
thus void of l,ck of consent - NO.
– In decl,ring the respondentʼs m,rri,ge void, the RTC ruled th,t when ,
m,rri,ge w,s entered into for , purpose other th,n the est,blishment of
, conjug,l ,nd f,mily life, such w,s , f,rce ,nd should not be recognized
from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSGʼs motion for
reconsider,tion, the RTC went on to expl,in th,t the m,rri,ge w,s
decl,red void bec,use the p,rties f,iled to freely give their consent to the
m,rri,ge ,s they h,d no intention to be leg,lly bound by it ,nd used it
only ,s , me,ns for the respondent to ,cquire Americ,n citizenship.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled th,t the essenti,l requisite of consent
w,s l,cking. It held th,t the p,rties cle,rly did not underst,nd the n,ture
,nd consequence of getting m,rried. As in the Rubenstein c,se, the CA
found the m,rri,ge to be simil,r to , m,rri,ge in jest considering th,t the
p,rties only entered into the m,rri,ge for the ,cquisition of Americ,n
citizenship in exch,nge of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into ,
 m,rri,ge contr,ct ,nd never intended to live ,s husb,nd ,nd wife or build
, f,mily.
– The respondentʼs m,rri,ge is not ,t ,ll ,n,logous to , m,rri,ge in jest.
Albios :nd Fringer h:d :n undeni:ble intention to be bound in order
to cre:te the very bond necess:ry to :llow the respondent to :cquire
Americ:n citizenship. Only : genuine consent to be m:rried would
:llow them to further their objective, considering th:t only : v:lid
m:rri:ge c:n properly support :n :pplic:tion for citizenship. There
w,s, thus, ,n ,pp,rent intention to enter into the ,ctu,l m,rri,ge st,tus
,nd to cre,te , leg,l tie, ,lbeit for , limited purpose. Genuine consent
w,s, therefore, cle,rly present.
– The ,vowed purpose of m,rri,ge under Article 1 of the F,mily Code is for
the couple to est,blish , conjug,l ,nd f,mily life. The possibility th:t the
p:rties in : m:rri:ge might h:ve no re:l intention to est:blish : life
together is, however, insufficient to nullify : m:rri:ge freely entered
into in :ccord:nce with l:w. The s,me Article 1 provides th,t the
n,ture, consequences, ,nd incidents of m,rri,ge ,re governed by l,w
,nd not subject to stipul,tion. A m:rri:ge m:y, thus, only be decl:red
void or void:ble under the grounds provided by l:w. There is no l,w
th,t decl,res , m,rri,ge void if it is entered into for purposes other th,n
wh,t the Constitution or l,w decl,res, such ,s the ,cquisition of foreign
citizenship. Therefore, so long ,s ,ll the essenti,l ,nd form,l requisites
prescribed by l,w ,re present, ,nd it is not void or void,ble under the
grounds provided by l,w, it sh,ll be decl,red v,lid.

Perido v. Perido

– WON the civil st,tus of the decedent Lucio Perido ,s , widower, ,s st,ted in
the certific,tes of title issued to him in 1923, is sufficient to rebut the
presumption th,t persons living together ,s husb,nd ,nd wife ,re m,rried to
e,ch other - NO.
– This presumption, especi,lly where legitim,cy of the issue is involved, ,s
in this c,se, m,y be overcome only by cogent proof on the p,rt of those
who ,llege the illegitim,cy. "The b:sis of hum:n society throughout the
civilized world is th:t of m:rri:ge. M,rri,ge in this jurisdiction is not
only , civil contr,ct, but it is , new rel,tion, ,n institution in the
m,inten,nce of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently,
every intendment of the l:w le:ns tow:rd leg:lizing m:trimony.
Persons dwelling together in :pp:rent m:trimony :re presumed, in
the :bsence of :ny counter-presumption or evidence speci:l to the
c:se, to be in f:ct m:rried. The re,son is th,t such is the common
order of society, :nd if the p:rties were not wh:t they thus hold
themselves out :s being, they would he living in the const:nt
 viol:tion of decency :nd of l:w. A presumption est,blished by our Code
of Civil Procedure is "th,t , m,n ,nd wom,n deporting themselves ,s
husb,nd ,nd wife h,ve entered into , l,wful contr,ct of m,rri,ge." (Sec.
334, No. 28) Semper pr,esumitur pro m,trimonio — Alw,ys presume
m,rri,ge."

Fiel v. B:n:w:

– WON the inform,l civil p,rtnership between N,t,lio B,n,w, ,nd Doming, Fiel
c,n be recognized for the purpose of p,rtitioning the properties they ,cquired
during their coh,bit,tion, even though Doming, Fiel w,s leg,lly m,rried to ,
cert,in Eusebio Potest,s during the period of their coh,bit,tion - YES.
– Philippine l,w does not recognize common-l,w m,rri,ges. A m,n ,nd
wom,n not leg,lly m,rried who coh,bit for m,ny ye,rs ,s husb,nd ,nd
wife, who represent themselves to the public ,s husb,nd ,nd wife, ,nd
who ,re reputed to be husb,nd ,nd wife in the community where they live
m,y be considered leg,lly “m,rried” in common l,w jurisdictions but not
in the Philippines. At the s,me time, our l,w c,nnot brush ,side the f,ct
th,t such rel,tionships ,re present in our society, ,nd th,t they produce ,
community of properties which much be governed by l,w.
– Art. 144 of the CC ,pplies the rules on co-ownership to the properties
,cquired during the period of the common l,w rel,tionship:
– When , m,n ,nd , wom,n live together ,s husb,nd ,nd wife, but
they ,re not m,rried, or their m,rri,ge is void from the beginning, the
property ,cquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their w,ges ,nd s,l,ries sh,ll be governed by the rules on
co-ownership.
– Where both m,n ,nd wom,n ,re m,rried to living spouses, Art. 144 does
not ,pply bec,use the e,rnings ,nd income of either the m,n or the
wom,n pert,in to his or her re,l, leg,l, ,nd existing conjug,l p,rtnership.
However, the requirement of “no impediment to , v,lid m,rri,ge” is not
yet , definite ,nd unequivoc,l rule. On the combined strength of leg,l ,nd
equit,ble consider,tions, we rule th,t the co-ownership rules provided by
Art. 144 ,re ,pplic,ble. The properties in p,rt c,m from her own swe,t,
br,ins ,nd efforts.

People v. Mendoz:

– WON Mendoz, c,n be held guilty of big,my by m,rrying C,rmencit, P,nlilio

while still being m,rried to Olg, Lem,, even though the m,rri,ge to Olg,
Lem, w,s contr,cted during the subsistence of his m,rri,ge to Jovit, de Asis
- NO.
– The m,rri,ge l,w pl:inly m:kes : subsequent m:rri:ge contr:cted by
 –
:ny person during the lifetime of his first spouse illeg:l :nd void from
its perform:nce, :nd no judici:l decree is necess:ry to est:blish its
inv:lidity, :s distinguished from mere :nnul:ble m:rri:ges. There is
here no pretence th,t ,ppell,nt's second m,rri,ge with Olg, Lem, w,s
contr,cted in the belief th,t the first spouse, Jovit, de Asis, h,s been
,bsent for seven consecutive ye,rs or gener,lly considered ,s de,d, so
,s to render s,id m,rri,ge v,lid until decl,red null ,nd void by ,
competent court.
– DISSENT (Reyes):
– Though the logici,n m,y s,y th,t where the former m,rri,ge w,s void
there would be nothing to dissolve still it is not for the spouses to judge
whether th,t m,rri,ge w,s void or not. Th,t judgment is reserved to the
courts.

People v. Ar:gon

– WON Ar,gon c,n be held guilty of big,my by m,rrying Jesus, M,gl,s,ng

while still being m,rried to M,ri, F,icol, without ,ny judici,l decl,r,tion of
nullity of his m,rri,ge to F,icol, even though the m,rri,ge to F,icol w,s void
for being contr,cted during the subsistence of his m,rri,ge to Gorre, - NO.
– The very fund:ment:l principle of strict construction of pen:l l:ws in
f:vor of the :ccused, which principle we m:y not ignore, seems to
justify our st:nd in the :bove-cited c:se of People vs. Mendoz:. Our
Revised Pen,l Code is of recent en,ctment ,nd h,d the rule enunci,ted in
Sp,in ,nd in Americ, requiring judici,l decl,r,tion of nullity of ,b initio
void m,rri,ges been within the contempl,tion of the legisl,ture, ,n
express provision to th,t effect would or should h,ve been inserted in the
l,w. In its ,bsence, we ,re bound by s,id rule of strict interpret,tion
,lre,dy ,dverted to.
– DISSENT (Reyes):
– S,me ,s in People v. Mendoz,.

Tolentino v. P:r:s

– WON the inst,nt proceeding for correction of the de,th certific,te of Am,do
is the proper remedy for the decl,r,tion of petitioner Tolentino ,s the l,wful
surviving spouse of dece,sed Am,do Tolentino - YES.
– Although petitioner's ultim,te objective is the correction of entry
contempl,ted in Article 412 of the Civil Code ,nd Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court, she initi,lly seeks , judici,l decl,r,tion th,t she is the l,wful
surviving spouse of the dece,sed, Am,do, in order to l,y the b,sis for the
correction of the entry in the de,th certific,te of s,id dece,sed. The suit
below is , proper remedy. It is of ,n ,dvers,ry ch,r,cter ,s contr,sted to
 , mere summ,ry proceeding. A cl,im of right is ,sserted ,g,inst one who
h,s ,n interest in contesting it. Priv,te respondent, ,s the individu,l most
,ffected, is , p,rty defend,nt, ,nd h,s ,ppe,red to contest the petition
,nd defend her interests. The Loc,l Civil Registr,r is ,lso , p,rty
defend,nt. The public,tion required by the Court below pursu,nt to Rule
108 of the Rules of Court is not ,bsolutely necess,ry for no other p,rties
,re involved. After ,ll, public,tion is required to b,r indifferently ,ll who
might be minded to m,ke ,n objection of ,ny sort ,g,inst the right
sought to be est,blished.[2] Besides, even ,ssuming th,t this is ,
proceeding under Rule 108, it w,s the Court th,t w,s c,lled upon to order
the public,tion[3], but it did not. In the ultim,te ,n,lysis, Courts ,re not
concerned so much with the form of ,ctions ,s with their subst,nce.
– WON the de:th certific:te should be corrected so th:t the surviving
spouse is Tolentino inste:d of M:ri: Clemente, on the ground th:t the
dece:sed h:d been convicted for big:my - YES.
– Considering th,t Am:do, upon his own ple:, w:s convicted for
Big:my, th,t sentence furnishes the necess,ry proof of the m,rit,l
st,tus of petitioner ,nd the dece,sed. There is no better proof of
m,rri,ge th,n the ,dmission by the ,ccused of the existence of such
m,rri,ge. The second m:rri:ge th:t he contr:cted with priv:te
respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null :nd void from
the beginning :nd of no force :nd effect. No judici:l decree is
necess:ry to est:blish the inv:lidity of : void m:rri:ge. It c,n be
s,fely concluded, then, without need of further proof nor rem,nd to the
Court below, th,t priv,te respondent is not the surviving spouse of the
dece,sed Am,do, but petitioner. Rectific,tion of the erroneous entry in
the records of the Loc,l Civil Registr,r m,y, therefore, be v,lidly m,de.

Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy

– WON, in , c,se pr,ying for the decl,r,tion of nullity of , m,rri,ge ,llegedly

contr,cted during the subsistence of , prior m,rri,ge, the defend,nt should
be given the ch,nce to present evidence th,t the first m,rri,ge w,s void for
viti,tion of her consent- NO.
– There is no need of introducing evidence ,bout the existing prior m,rri,ge
of her first husb,nd ,t the time they m,rried e,ch other, for then such :
m:rri:ge though void still needs :ccording to this Court : judici:l
decl:r:tion of such f:ct :nd for :ll leg:l intents :nd purposes she
would still be reg:rded :s : m:rried wom:n :t the time she
contr:cted her m:rri:ge with respondent K,rl Heinz Wiegel;
,ccordingly, the m,rri,ge of petitioner ,nd respondent would be reg,rded
VOID under the l,w.
Don:to v. Lun:

– WON , crimin,l c,se for big,my should be suspended in view of , pending

civil c,se for ,nnulment of m,rri,ge on the ground th,t the l,tter constitutes
, prejudici,l question - NO
– The requisites of , prejudici,l question do not obt,in in the c,se ,t b,r. It
must be noted th,t the issue before the Juvenile ,nd Domestic Rel,tions
Court touching upon the nullity of the second m,rri,ge is not
determin,tive of petitioner Don,to's guilt or innocence in the crime of
big,my. Assuming th:t the first m:rri:ge w:s null :nd void on the
ground :lleged by petitioner, the f:ct would not be m:teri:l to the
outcome of the crimin:l c:se. P:rties to the m:rri:ge should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the s:me must be
submitted to the judgment of the competent courts :nd only when
the nullity of the m:rri:ge is so decl:red c:n it be held :s void, :nd
so long :s there is no such decl:r:tion the presumption is th:t the
m:rri:ge exists. Therefore, he who contr:cts : second m:rri:ge
before the judici:l decl:r:tion of nullity of the first m:rri:ge :ssumes
the risk of being prosecuted for big:my. The lower court therefore, h,s
not ,bused, much less gr,vely ,bused, its discretion in f,iling to suspend
the he,ring ,s sought by petitioner."
– Pursu,nt to the doctrine discussed in L,ndicho vs. Relov,, petitioner
Don,to c,nnot ,pply the rule on prejudici,l questions since , c,se for
,nnulment of m,rri,ge c,n be considered ,s , prejudici,l question to the
big,my c,se ,g,inst the ,ccused only if it is proved th,t the petitioner's
consent to such m,rri,ge w,s obt,ined by me,ns of duress, violence ,nd
intimid,tion in order to est,blish th,t his ,ct in the subsequent m,rri,ge
w,s ,n involunt,ry one ,nd ,s such the s,me c,nnot be the b,sis for
conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the c,se ,t b,r.

Terre v. Terre

– WON Atty. Terre should be disb,rred for m,rrying Helin, M,licdem when
there w,s no judici,l decl,r,tion of nullity of his prior m,rri,ge to Dorothy
Terre, on the ground th,t he believed th,t his m,rri,ge to Dorothy w,s void ,s
it w,s contr,cted during the subsistence of Dorothyʼs m,rri,ge to , cert,in
Merlito Bercenill, - YES
– Th,t pretended defense is the s,me ,rgument by which he h,d inveigled
compl,in,nt into believing th,t her prior m,rri,ge to Merlito A. Bercenill,
being incestuous ,nd void ,b initio (Dorothy ,nd Merlito being ,llegedly
first cousins to e,ch other), she w,s free to contr,ct , second m,rri,ge
with the respondent. Respondent Jord,n Terre, being , l,wyer, knew or
should h,ve known th,t such ,n ,rgument r,n counter to the prev,iling
 c,se l,w of this Court which holds th,t for purposes of determining
whether : person is leg:lly free to contr:ct : second m:rri:ge, :
judici:l decl:r:tion th:t the first m:rri:ge w:s null :nd void :b initio
is essenti:l. Even if we were to ,ssume, ,rguendo merely, th,t Jord,n
Terre held th,t mist,ken belief in good f,ith, the s,me result will follow.
For if we ,re to hold Jord,n Terre to his own ,rgument, his first m,rri,ge
to compl,in,nt Dorothy Terre must be deemed v,lid, with the result th,t
his second m,rri,ge to Helin, M,licdem must be reg,rded ,s big,mous
,nd crimin,l in ch,r,cter.

Republic v. Gr:n:d:

– WON the petition for decl,r,tion of presumptive de,th should be gr,nted

where the petitioner cl,imed th,t in the 9 ye,rs since her husb,nd went to
T,iw,n, she h,d not received ,ny communic,tion from her husb,nd,
notwithst,nding efforts to loc,te him - YES, BUT THE RTC DECISION
GRANTING THE PETITION HAD ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY
SINCE THE REPUBLIC UTILIZED THE WRONG REMEDY. (A summ,ry
proceeding for decl,r,tion of presumptive de,th is not subject to ordin,ry
,ppe,l!)
– Art 41 of the FC imposes more stringent requirements th,n does Article
83 of the Civil Code. The Civil Code provision merely requires either th,t
there be no news th,t the ,bsentee is still ,live; or th,t the ,bsentee is
gener,lly considered to be de,d ,nd is believed to be so by the spouse
present, or is presumed de,d under Articles 390 ,nd 391 of the Civil
Code. In comp,rison, the F:mily Code provision prescribes : well-
founded belief th:t the :bsentee is :lre:dy de:d before : petition for
decl:r:tion of presumptive de:th c:n be gr:nted. There ,re four
requisites:
o. Th,t the ,bsent spouse h,s been missing for four consecutive ye,rs,
or two consecutive ye,rs if the dis,ppe,r,nce occurred where there
is d,nger of de,th under the circumst,nces l,id down in Article 391,
Civil Code;
p. Th,t the present spouse wishes to rem,rry;
q. Th,t the present spouse h,s , well-founded belief th,t the ,bsentee
is de,d; ,nd
r. Th,t the present spouse files , summ,ry proceeding for the
decl,r,tion of presumptive de,th of the ,bsentee.
– The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper :nd
honest to goodness inquiries :nd efforts to :scert:in the
where:bouts of the :bsent spouse :nd whether the :bsent spouse is
still :live or is :lre:dy de:d. Whether or not the spouse present :cted
on : well-founded belief of de:th of the :bsent spouse depends upon
 the inquiries to be dr:wn from : gre:t m:ny circumst:nces occurring
before :nd :fter the dis:ppe:r:nce of the :bsent spouse :nd the
n:ture :nd extent of the inquiries m:de by present spouse.
– Petitioner points out th,t respondent Yol,nd, did not initi,te , diligent
se,rch to loc,te her ,bsent husb,nd. While her brother Diosd,do
C,d,cio testified to h,ving inquired ,bout the where,bouts of Cyrus from
the l,tterʼs rel,tives, these rel,tives were not presented to corrobor,te
Diosd,dos testimony. In short, respondent w,s ,llegedly not diligent in
her se,rch for her husb,nd. Petitioner ,rgues th,t if she were, she would
h,ve sought inform,tion from the T,iw,nese Consul,r Office or
,ssist,nce from other government ,gencies in T,iw,n or the Philippines.
She could h,ve ,lso utilized m,ss medi, for this end, but she did not.
Worse, she f,iled to expl,in these omissions.
– The Republics ,rguments ,re well-t,ken. Nevertheless, we ,re
constr,ined to deny the Petition.

Republic v. C:ntor

– WON respondent h,d , well-founded belief th,t her husb,nd Jerry w,s de,d
considering th,t she c,me to such , conclusion ,fter she m,de inquiries
,bout Jerryʼs where,bouts from her in-l,ws, neighbors ,nd friends, ,nd ,fter
she s,w to it th,t she looked through the p,tientsʼ directory whenever she
went to , hospit,l,, hoping to find Jerry - NO.
– The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show th,t ,ll the
requisites under Article 41 of the F,mily Code ,re present. Since it is the
present spouse who, for purposes of decl,r,tion of presumptive de,th,
subst,nti,lly ,sserts the ,ffirm,tive of the issue, it st,nds to re,son th,t
the burden of proof lies with him/her. He who ,lleges , f,ct h,s the
burden of proving it ,nd mere ,lleg,tion is not evidence.
– Mere :bsence of the spouse (even for such period required by the
l:w), l:ck of :ny news th:t such :bsentee is still :live, f:ilure to
communic:te or gener:l presumption of :bsence under the Civil Code
would not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise th:t
Article 41 of the F:mily Code pl:ces upon the present spouse the
burden of proving the :ddition:l :nd more stringent requirement of
"well-founded belief" which c:n only be disch:rged upon : showing
of proper :nd honest-to-goodness inquiries :nd efforts to :scert:in
not only the :bsent spouseʼs where:bouts but, more import:ntly,
th:t the :bsent spouse is still :live or is :lre:dy de:d.
– The l,w did not define wh,t is me,nt by "well-founded belief." It depends
upon the circumst,nces of e,ch p,rticul,r c,se. Its determin,tion, so to
spe,k, rem,ins on , c,se-to-c,se b,sis.
– First, the respondent did not :ctively look for her missing
 –
husb:nd. It c,n be inferred from the records th,t her hospit,l visits
,nd her consequent checking of the p,tientsʼ directory therein were
unintention,l. She did not purposely undert,ke , diligent se,rch for
her husb,nd ,s her hospit,l visits were not pl,nned nor prim,rily
directed to look for him. This Court thus considers these ,ttempts
insufficient to engender , belief th,t her husb,nd is de,d.
– Second, she did not report Jerryʼs :bsence to the police nor did
she seek the :id of the :uthorities to look for him. While , finding
of well-founded belief v,ries with the n,ture of the situ,tion in which
the present spouse is pl,ced, under present conditions, we find it
proper ,nd prudent for , present spouse, whose spouse h,d been
missing, to seek the ,id of the ,uthorities or, ,t the very le,st, report
his/her ,bsence to the police.
– Third, she did not present :s witnesses Jerryʼs rel:tives or their
neighbors :nd friends, who c,n corrobor,te her efforts to loc,te
Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she ,llegedly m,de inquiries,
were not even n,med. As held in Nol,sco, the present spouseʼs b,re
,ssertion th,t he inquired from his friends ,bout his ,bsent spouseʼs
where,bouts is insufficient ,s the n,mes of the friends from whom he
m,de inquiries were not identified in the testimony nor presented ,s
witnesses.
– L:stly, there w,s no other corrobor:tive evidence to support the
respondentʼs cl:im th:t she conducted : diligent se:rch. Neither
w,s there supporting evidence proving th,t she h,d , well-founded
belief other th,n her b,re cl,ims th,t she inquired from her friends
,nd in-l,ws ,bout her husb,ndʼs where,bouts. In sum, the Court is of
the view th,t the respondent merely eng,ged in , "p,ssive se,rch"
where she relied on uncorrobor,ted inquiries from her in-l,ws,
neighbors ,nd friends. She f,iled to conduct , diligent se,rch
bec,use her ,lleged efforts ,re insufficient to form , well-founded
belief th,t her husb,nd w,s ,lre,dy de,d. As held in Republic of the
Philippines v. Court of Appe,ls (Tenth Div.),"[w]hether or not the
spouse present ,cted on , well-founded belief of de,th of the ,bsent
spouse depends upon the inquiries to be dr,wn from , gre,t m,ny
circumst,nces occurring before ,nd ,fter the dis,ppe,r,nce of the
,bsent spouse ,nd the n,ture ,nd extent of the inquiries m,de by
[the] present spouse."
– In view of the summ,ry n,ture of proceedings under Article 41 of the
F,mily Code for the decl,r,tion of presumptive de,th of oneʼs spouse, the
degree of due diligence set by this Honor,ble Court in the ,bove-
mentioned c,ses in loc,ting the where,bouts of , missing spouse must
be strictly complied with. The ,pplic,tion of this stricter st,nd,rd
becomes even more imper,tive if we consider the St,teʼs policy to protect
 ,nd strengthen the institution of m,rri,ge. Since m,rri,ge serves ,s the
f,milyʼs found,tion ,nd since it is the st,teʼs policy to protect ,nd
strengthen the f,mily ,s , b,sic soci,l institution, m,rri,ge should not be
permitted to be dissolved ,t the whim of the p,rties.

Jones v. Hortiguel:

– WON the decedentʼs first husb,nd h,d been ,bsent for ,t le,st seven
consecutive ye,rs ,t the time she contr,cted , second m,rri,ge to Felix
Hortiguel,, considering th,t the second m,rri,ge w,s contr,cted on M,y 6,
1927, when only 6 ye,rs ,nd 14 d,ys h,d el,psed from April 23, 1921, which is
when the court issued ,n order for the t,king effect of the decl,r,tion of
,bsence - YES.
– For the purposes of the civil m:rri:ge l:w, it is not necess:ry to h:ve
the former spouse judici:lly decl:red :n :bsentee. The decl:r:tion of
:bsence m:de in :ccord:nce with the provisions of the Civil Code
h:s for its sole purpose to en:ble the t:king of the necess:ry
prec:utions for the :dministr:tion of the est:te of the :bsentee. For
the celebr,tion of civil m,rri,ge, however, the l,w only requires th,t the
former spouse h,s been ,bsent for seven consecutive ye,rs ,t the time of
the second m,rri,ge, th,t the spouse present does not know his or her
former spouse to be living, th,t such former spouse is gener,lly reputed
to be de,d ,nd the spouse present so believe ,t the time of the
celebr,tion of the m,rri,ge.
– The ,bsence of M,rci,n, Esc,ño's former husb,nd should be counted
from J:nu:ry 10, 1918, the d:te on which the l:st news concerning
Arthur W. Jones w:s received, :nd from s:id d:te to M:y 6, 1927,
more th:n nine ye:rs el:psed. S,id m,rri,ge is, therefore, v,lid ,nd
l,wful.

In re Sz:tr:w

– WON , petition for presumptive de,th is proper where it w,s not filed for the
purpose of the settlement of the est,te of the person sought to be decl,red
presumptively de,d - NO.
– This presumption m,y ,rise ,nd be invoked ,nd m,de in , c,se, either in
,n ,ction or in , speci,l proceeding, which is tried or he,rd by, ,nd
submitted for decision to, , competent court. Independently of such ,n
,ction or speci,l proceeding, the presumption of de,th c,nnot be
invoked, nor c,n it be m,de the subject of ,n ,ction or speci,l
proceeding. In this c,se, there is no right to be enforced nor is there ,
remedy pr,yed for by the petitioner ,g,inst her ,bsent husb,nd. Neither
is there , pr,yer for the fin,l determin,tion of his right or st,tus or for the
 ,scert,inment of , p,rticul,r f,ct (H,g,ns vs. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880),
for the petition does not pr:y for : decl:r:tion th:t the petitioner's
husb:nd is de:d, but merely :sks for : decl:r:tion th:t he be
presumed de:d bec:use he h:d been unhe:rd from in seven ye:rs. If
there is ,ny pretense ,t securing , decl,r,tion th,t the petitioner's
husb,nd is de,d, such , pretension c,nnot be gr,nted bec,use it is
un,uthorized. The petition is for , decl,r,tion th,t the petitioner's
husb,nd is presumptively de,d. But this decl:r:tion, even if judici:lly
m:de, would not improve the petitioner's situ:tion, bec:use such :
presumption is :lre:dy est:blished by l:w. A judici:l pronouncement
to th:t effect, even if fin:l :nd executory, would still be : prim: f:cie
presumption only. It is still disput:ble. It is for th:t re:son th:t it
c:nnot be the subject of : judici:l pronouncement or decl:r:tion, if it
is the only question or m,tter involved in , c,se, or upon which ,
competent court h,s to p,ss. The l,tter must decide fin,lly the
controversy between the p,rties, or determine fin,lly the right or st,tus of
, p,rty or est,blish fin,lly , p,rticul,r f,ct, out of which cert,in rights
,nd oblig,tions ,rise or m,y ,rise; ,nd once such controversy is decided
by , fin,l judgement, or such right or st,tus determined, or such
p,rticul,r f,ct est,blished, by , fin,l decree, then the judgement on the
subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the right or st,tus of ,
p,rty or upon the existence of , p,rticul,r f,ct, becomes res judic,t,,
subject to no coll,ter,l ,tt,ck, except in , few r,re inst,nces especi,lly
provided by l,w. It is. therefore, cle,r th,t , judici,l decl,r,tion th,t ,
person is presumptively de,d, bec,use he h,d been unhe,rd from in
seven ye,rs, being , presumption juris t,ntum only, subject to contr,ry
proof, c,nnot re,ch the st,ge of fin,lity or become fin,l. Proof of ,ctu,l
de,th of the person presumed de,d bec,use he h,d been unhe,rd from
in seven ye,rs, would h,ve to be m,de in ,nother proceeding to h,ve
such p,rticul,r f,ct fin,lly determined. If , judici,l decree decl,ring ,
person presumptively de,d, bec,use he h,d not been he,rd from in seven
ye,rs, c,nnot become fin,l ,nd executory even ,fter the l,pse of the
reglement,ry period within which ,n ,ppe,l m,y be t,ken, for such
presumption is still disput,ble ,nd rem,ins subject to contr,ry proof, then
, petition for such , decl,r,tion is useless, unnecess,ry, superfluous ,nd
of no benefit to the petitioner.
– A decl:r:tion such :s the one pr:yed for by the petitioner, if gr:nted,
m:y m:ke or le:d her to believe th:t the m:rit:l bonds which bind
her to her husb:nd :re torn :sunder, :nd th:t for th:t re:son she is
or m:y feel free to enter into : new m:rri:ge contr:ct. The fr,mers of
the rules of court, by the presumption provided for in the rule of evidence
in question, did not intend ,nd me,n th,t , judici,l decl,r,tion b,sed
solely upon th,t presumption m,y be m,de. A petition for : decl:r:tion
 such :s the one filed in this c:se m:y be m:de in collusion with the
other spouse. If th:t were the c:se, then : decree of divorce th:t
c:nnot be obt:ined or gr:nted under the provisions of the Divorce
L:w (Act No. 2710) could e:sily be secured by me:ns of : judici:l
decree decl:ring : person unhe:rd from in seven ye:rs to be
presumptively de:d. This is ,nother strong re,son why , petition such
,s the one presented in this c,se should not be counten,nced ,nd
,llowed. Wh,t c,nnot be obt,ined directly under the provisions of Divorce
L,w could indirectly be secured.

Republic v. Molin:

– WON the ,lleg,tions of the wife th,t her husb,nd w,s , highly imm,ture ,nd
h,bitu,lly qu,rrelsome individu,l who thought of himself ,s , king to be
served, th,t he w,s irresponsible ,s , husb,nd ,nd , f,ther since he
preferred to spend more time with his peers ,nd friends on whom he
squ,ndered his money; ,nd th,t he depended on his p,rents for ,id ,nd
,ssist,nce, ,nd w,s never honest with his wife in reg,rd to their fin,nces, is
sufficient ground to ,nnul their m,rri,ge on the ground of the husb,ndʼs
psychologic,l inc,p,city - NO.
– There is no cle,r showing to us th,t the psychologic,l defect spoken of is
,n inc,p,city. It ,ppe,rs to us to be more of , "difficulty," if not outright
"refus,l" or "neglect" in the perform,nce of some m,rit,l oblig,tions.
Mere showing of "irreconcili,ble differences" ,nd "conflicting
person,lities" in no wise constitutes psychologic,l inc,p,city. It is not
enough to prove th,t the p,rties f,iled to meet their responsibilities ,nd
duties ,s m,rried persons; it is essenti,l th,t they must be shown to be
inc,p,ble of doing so, due to some psychologic,l (nor physic,l) illness.
The evidence :dduced by respondent merely showed th:t she :nd
her husb:nd could nor get :long with e:ch other. There h:d been no
showing of the gr:vity of the problem; neither its juridic:l
:ntecedence nor its incur:bility. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison
showed no incur,ble psychi,tric disorder but only incomp,tibility.
– GUIDELINES IN RESOLVING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY CASES:
o. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the m:rri:ge belongs to the
pl:intiff. Any doubt should be resolved in f,vor of the existence ,nd
continu,tion of the m,rri,ge ,nd ,g,inst its dissolution ,nd nullity.
p. The root c:use of the psychologic:l inc:p:city must be (:) medic:lly
or clinic:lly identified, (b) :lleged in the compl:int, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts :nd (d) cle:rly expl:ined in the decision. The
evidence must convince the court th,t the p,rties, or one of them, w,s
ment,lly or physic,lly ill to such ,n extent th,t the person could not h,ve
known the oblig,tions he w,s ,ssuming, or knowing them, could not h,ve
 given v,lid ,ssumption thereof. Although no ex,mple of such inc,p,city
need be given here so ,s not to limit the ,pplic,tion of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root c,use must be
identified ,s , psychologic,l illness ,nd its inc,p,cit,ting n,ture
expl,ined. Expert evidence m,y be given qu,lified psychi,trist ,nd
clinic,l psychologists.
q. The inc,p,city must be proven to be existing :t "the time of the
celebr:tion" of the m:rri:ge.The m,nifest,tion of the illness need not
be perceiv,ble ,t such time, but the illness itself must h,ve ,tt,ched ,t
such moment, or prior thereto.
r. Such inc,p,city must ,lso be shown to be medic,lly or clinic,lly
perm,nent or incur:ble. Such incur,bility m,y be ,bsolute or even
rel,tive only in reg,rd to the other spouse, not necess,rily ,bsolutely
,g,inst everyone of the s,me sex. Furthermore, such inc,p,city must be
relev,nt to the ,ssumption of m,rri,ge oblig,tions, not necess,rily to
those not rel,ted to m,rri,ge, like the exercise of , profession or
employment in , job.
x. Such illness must be gr:ve enough to bring ,bout the dis,bility of the
p,rty to ,ssume the essenti,l oblig,tions of m,rri,ge. Thus, "mild
ch,r,cteriologic,l peculi,rities, mood ch,nges, occ,sion,l emotion,l
outbursts" c,nnot be ,ccepted ,s root c,uses. The illness must be shown
,s downright inc,p,city or in,bility, nor , refus,l, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will.
y. The essenti:l m:rit:l oblig:tions must be those embr:ced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the F:mily Code :s reg:rds the husb:nd :nd wife :s
well :s Articles 220, 221 :nd 225 of the s:me Code in reg:rd to
p:rents :nd their children. Such non-complied m,rit,l oblig,tion(s)
must ,lso be st,ted in the petition, proven by evidence ,nd included in
the text of the decision.
z. Interpret:tions given by the N:tion:l Appell:te M:trimoni:l Tribun:l
of the C:tholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given gre:t respect by our courts. It is cle,r th,t
Article 36 w,s t,ken by the F,mily Code Revision Committee from C,non
1095 of the New Code of C,non L,w, which bec,me effective in 1983 ,nd
which provides: The following ,re inc,p,ble of contr,cting m,rri,ge:
Those who ,re un,ble to ,ssume the essenti,l oblig,tions of m,rri,ge
due to c,uses of psychologic,l n,ture.
◆ Since the purpose of including such provision in our F,mily Code is to
h,rmonize our civil l,ws with the religious f,ith of our people, it
st,nds to re,son th,t to ,chieve such h,rmoniz,tion, gre,t
persu,sive weight should be given to decision of such ,ppell,te
tribun,l. Ide,lly — subject to our l,w on evidence — wh,t is decreed
,s c,nonic,lly inv,lid should ,lso be decreed civilly void.
 ◆ This is one inst,nce where, in view of the evident source ,nd purpose
of the F,mily Code provision, contempor,neous religious
interpret,tion is to be given persu,sive effect. Here, the St,te ,nd the
Church — while rem,ining independent, sep,r,te ,nd ,p,rt from
e,ch other — sh,ll w,lk together in synod,l c,dence tow,rds the
s,me go,l of protecting ,nd cherishing m,rri,ge ,nd the f,mily ,s
the inviol,ble b,se of the n,tion.
{. The tri:l court must order the prosecuting :ttorney or fisc:l :nd the
Solicitor Gener:l to :ppe:r :s counsel for the st:te. No decision sh,ll
he h,nded down unless the Solicitor Gener,l issues , certific,tion, which
will be quoted in the decision, briefly st,ting therein his re,sons for his
,greement or opposition, ,s the c,se m,y be, to the petition. The Solicitor
Gener,l, ,long with the prosecuting ,ttorney, sh,ll submit to the court
such certific,tion within fifteen (15) d,ys from the d,te the c,se is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor Gener,l sh,ll
disch,rge the equiv,lent function of the defensor vinculi contempl,ted
under C,non 1095.

Cho: v. Cho:

– WON the evidence ,g,inst respondent is grossly insufficient to support ,ny

finding of psychologic,l inc,p,city, such th,t , deni,l of , demurrer to
evidence would be , gr,ve ,buse of discretion - YES.
– Evidence:
– Filing by the wife of , series of ch,rges ,g,inst him ,re proof of the
her psychologic,l inc,p,city to comply with the essenti,l oblig,tions
of m,rri,ge. These ch,rges included Compl,ints for perjury, f,lse
testimony, concubin,ge ,nd deport,tion.
– It is the height of ,bsurdity ,nd inequity to condemn her ,s
psychologic,lly inc,p,cit,ted to fulfill her m,rit,l oblig,tions,
simply bec,use she filed c,ses ,g,inst him. The evidence
presented, even if t,ken ,s true, merely est,blishes the
prosecution of the c,ses ,g,inst him.
– (1) l,ck of ,ttention to their children, (2) imm,turity ,nd (3) l,ck of ,n
intention of procre,tive sexu,lity.
– The psychologic,l inc,p,city must be more th,n just , difficulty,
, refus,l or , neglect in the perform,nce of some m,rit,l
oblig,tions. We stressed th,t , mere showing of irreconcil,ble
differences ,nd conflicting person,lities in no wise constitutes
psychologic,l inc,p,city.
– expert testimony of Dr. G,uzon
– His testimony est,blished merely th,t the spouses h,d ,n
incomp,tibility, , defect th,t could possibly be tre,ted or
 –

,llevi,ted through psychother,py. Furthermore, the ,ssessment

of petitioner by Dr. G,uzon w,s b,sed merely on descriptions
communic,ted to him by respondent. The doctor never conducted
,ny psychologic,l ex,min,tion of her.

B:rcelon: v. CA :nd Bengzon

– WON the petition for ,nnulment of m,rri,ge on the ground of psychologic,l

inc,p,city should be dismissed for f,ilure to st,te , c,use of ,ction, given
th,t such petition did not ,llege the root c,use of the psychologic,l
inc,p,city, th,t the inc,p,city existed from the celebr,tion of the m,rri,ge.
th,t it is perm,nent or incur,ble, th,t the illness w,s so gr,ve to bring ,bout
the dis,bility of the petitioner to ,ssume the essenti,l oblig,tions of m,rri,ge,
,nd th,t such petition did not even st,te the m,rit,l oblig,tions which the
wife ,llegedly f,iled to comply with - NO
– Under the new Rules on Decl,r,tion of Absolute Nullity of Void M,rri,ges
,nd Annulment of Void,ble M,rri,ges, , petition under Article 36 of the
F,mily Code sh,ll specific,lly ,llege the complete f,cts showing th,t
either or both p,rties were psychologic,lly inc,p,cit,ted from complying
with the essenti,l m,rit,l oblig,tions of m,rri,ge ,t the time of the
celebr,tion of m,rri,ge even if such inc,p,city becomes m,nifest only
,fter its celebr,tion. The complete f:cts should :llege the physic:l
m:nifest:tions, if :ny, :s :re indic:tive of psychologic:l inc:p:city
:t the time of the celebr:tion of the m:rri:ge but expert opinion need
not be :lleged.
– The obvious effect of the new Rules providing th:t expert opinion
need not be :lleged in the petition is th:t there is :lso no need to
:llege the root c:use of the psychologic:l inc:p:city. Only experts in
the fields of neurologic,l ,nd beh,vior,l sciences ,re competent to
determine the root c,use of psychologic,l inc,p,city. Since the new Rules
do not require the petition to ,llege expert opinion on the psychologic,l
inc,p,city, it follows th,t there is ,lso no need to ,llege in the petition the
root c,use of the psychologic,l inc,p,city.

Republic v. Quintero-H:m:no

– WON the ,b,ndonment by the husb,nd of his f,mily only , month ,fter the
m,rri,ge constitutes psychologic,l inc,p,city such th,t the m,rri,ge is void -
NO.
– The Molin, guidelines incorpor,te the three b,sic requirements e,rlier
m,nd,ted by the Court in S,ntos: psychologic,l inc,p,city must be
ch,r,cterized by (,) gr,vity (b) juridic,l ,ntecedence ,nd (c) incur,bility.
The foregoing guidelines do not require th,t , physici,n ex,mine the
 –

person to be decl,red psychologic,lly inc,p,cit,ted. In f,ct, the root

c,use m,y be medic,lly or clinic,lly identified. Wh,t is import,nt is the
presence of evidence th,t c,n ,dequ,tely est,blish the p,rtyʼs
psychologic,l condition. For indeed, if the tot,lity of evidence presented
is enough to sust,in , finding of psychologic,l inc,p,city, then ,ctu,l
medic,l ex,min,tion of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
– Petitioner showed th,t Toshio f,iled to meet his duty to live with, c,re for
,nd support his f,mily. He ,b,ndoned them , month ,fter his m,rri,ge to
respondent. Respondent sent him sever,l letters but he never replied. He
m,de , trip to the Philippines but did not c,re ,t ,ll to see his f,mily.
– We find th,t the tot,lity of evidence presented fell short of proving
th,t Toshio w,s psychologic,lly inc,p,cit,ted to ,ssume his m,rit,l
responsibilities. Toshios :ct of :b:ndonment w:s doubtlessly
irresponsible but it w:s never :lleged nor proven to be due to
some kind of psychologic:l illness. After respondent testified on
how Toshio :b:ndoned his f:mily, no other evidence w:s
presented showing th:t his beh:vior w:s c:used by :
psychologic:l disorder. Although, :s : rule, there w:s no need for
:n :ctu:l medic:l ex:min:tion, it would h:ve gre:tly helped
respondents c:se h:d she presented evidence th:t medic:lly or
clinic:lly identified his illness. This could h:ve been done through
:n expert witness. This respondent did not do.
– According to the ,ppell,te court, the requirements in Molin, ,nd S,ntos
do not ,pply here bec,use the present c,se involves , mixed m,rri,ge,
the husb,nd being , J,p,nese n,tion,l. We dis,gree. In proving
psychologic,l inc,p,city, we find no distinction between ,n ,lien spouse
,nd , Filipino spouse. We c,nnot be lenient in the ,pplic,tion of the rules
merely bec,use the spouse ,lleged to be psychologic,lly inc,p,cit,ted
h,ppens to be , foreign n,tion,l. The medic,l ,nd clinic,l rules to
determine psychologic,l inc,p,city were formul,ted on the b,sis of
studies of hum,n beh,vior in gener,l. Hence, the norms used for
determining psychologic,l inc,p,city should ,pply to ,ny person
reg,rdless of n,tion,lity.

Republic v. Encel:n

– WON Lolit,ʼs ,ff,ir ,nd ,b,ndonment of the conjug,l home constitute

sufficient b,sis to nullify Ces,r's m,rri,ge to her on the ground of
psychologic,l inc,p,city - NO.
– In ,ny event, sexu,l infidelity ,nd ,b,ndonment of the conjug,l dwelling,
even if true, do not necess,rily constitute psychologic,l inc,p,city; these
,re simply grounds for leg,l sep,r,tion. To constitute psychologic:l
inc:p:city, it must be shown th:t the unf:ithfulness :nd
 –

:b:ndonment :re m:nifest:tions of : disordered person:lity th:t

completely prevented the erring spouse from disch:rging the
essenti:l m:rit:l oblig:tions. No evidence on record exists to support
Ces,r's ,lleg,tion th,t Lolit,'s infidelity ,nd ,b,ndonment were
m,nifest,tions of ,ny psychologic,l illness.
– Ces,r mist,kenly relied on Dr. Flores' psychologic,l ev,lu,tion report on
Lolit, to prove her ,lleged psychologic,l inc,p,city. The psychologic,l
ev,lu,tion, in f,ct, est,blished th,t Lolit, did not suffer from ,ny m,jor
psychi,tric illness. Dr. Flores' observ,tion on Lolit,'s interperson,l
problems with co-workers, to our mind, does not suffice ,s ,
consider,tion for the conclusion th,t she w,s ,t the time of her m,rri,ge
psychologic,lly inc,p,cit,ted to enter into , m,rit,l union with Ces,r.
Aside from the time element involved, , wife's psychologic,l fitness ,s ,
spouse c,nnot simply be equ,ted with her profession,l/work rel,tionship;
workpl,ce oblig,tions ,nd responsibilities ,re poles ,p,rt from their
m,rit,l counterp,rts.

Lontoc-Cruz v. Cruz

– WON the testimonies of the expert witnesses th,t the p,rties both suffered
from psychologic,l disorders constitute sufficient ground to decl,re the
m,rri,ge void for psychologic,l inc,p,city - NO.
– The ,ctu,l medic,l ex,min,tion of the one cl,imed to h,ve psychologic,l
inc,p,city is not , condition sine qu, non, for wh:t m:tters is the
tot:lity of evidence to sust:in : finding of such psychologic:l
inc:p:city. While it behooves this Court to weigh the clinic,l findings of
psychology experts ,s p,rt of the evidence, the courtʼs h,nds ,re
nonetheless free to m,ke its own independent f,ctu,l findings. “It be,rs
repe,ting th,t the tri,l courts, ,s in ,ll the other c,ses they try, must
,lw,ys b,se their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented
by the p,rties but on the tot,lity of evidence ,dduced in the course of the
proceedings.”
– Even gr,nting th,t both p,rties did suffer from person,lity disorders ,s
ev,lu,ted by the expert witnesses, we find th,t the conclusions re,ched
by these expert witnesses do not irresistibly point to the f,ct th,t the
person,lity disorders which pl,gue the spouses ,nted,ted the m,rri,ge;
th,t these person,lity disorders ,re indeed gr,ve or serious; or th,t these
person,lity disorders ,re incur,ble or perm,nent ,s to render the p,rties
psychologic,lly inc,p,cit,ted to c,rry out ,nd c,rry on their m,rit,l
duties. Wh:t c:n be inferred from the tot:lity of evidence, :t most, is
: c:se of incomp:tibility. For : person:lity disorder to be decl:red
clinic:lly or medic:lly incur:ble or perm:nent is one thing; for :
spouse to refuse or to be reluct:nt to perform his/her m:rit:l duties
 is :nother.
– In the c,se of Nilo, wh,t brought ,bout the bre,kdown of his rel,tionship
with M,rivi w,s not necess,rily ,ttribut,ble to his so-c,lled
“psychologic,l disorder” but c,n be imputed to his work ,nd m,rit,l
stress, ,nd his ordin,ry hum,n f,ilings.
– It is signific,nt to note th,t M,rivi f,iled to subst,nti,te Niloʼs pench,nt
for wom,nizing ,s , m,nifest,tion of his psychologic,l inc,p,city. Aside
from her b,re ,lleg,tions, which were chiefly b,sed on wh,t other people
told her, she never presented irrefut,ble proof to corrobor,te her cl,ims
of his sexu,l proclivities, i.e., th,t these proclivities were ,lre,dy existing
before the m,rri,ge ,nd during the first ye,rs of their m,rri,ge. Nilo, on
the other h,nd, c,tegoric,lly ,dmitted to h,ving extr,m,rit,l ,ff,irs in
1992, 2002, ,nd 2006, the period when the m,rri,ge w,s ,lre,dy on the
rocks. Neither is there evidence of Niloʼs ,lleged oedip,l complex, the
m,nifest,tions of which were not cited by the experts, th,t c,used the
couple to f,ll out of love.
– Anent M,riviʼs c,se, b,sed on her f,mily history ,s reflected in the
expertsʼ clinic,l ev,lu,tion, she grew up in , well-functioning, supportive,
,nd emotion,lly he,lthy f,mily environment. Even Nilo himself ,ttested
th,t she w,s , good wife ,nd , good mother to their children. Her
dem,nd for ,ttention, time, love, ,nd fidelity is norm,l for , wife. The
,nger she felt within her is ,lso , legitim,te re,ction.
– Yet the psychologist Dr. Enc,m,cion himself ,cknowledged th,t M,riviʼs
so-c,lled psychologic,l inc,p,city is in f,ct, cur,ble.

G:rlet v. G:rlet

– WON the testimony of the expert witness on Vencidor is sufficient to prove

psychologic,l inc,p,city ,nd hence render the m,rri,ge void - NO.
– Refus,l to look for , job per se is not indic,tive of , psychologic,l defect.

B:kun:w: v. Reyes-B:kun:w:

– WON the tot,lity of evidence is sufficient to prove th,t the p,rties ,re
psychologic,lly inc,p,cit,ted to perform the essenti,l oblig,tions of m,rri,ge
- NO.
– Dr. Villeg,s' conclusion th,t M,nuel is ,fflicted with Intermittent Explosive
Disorder ,nd th,t Nor, h,s P,ssive Aggressive Person,lity Disorder
which render them psychologic,lly inc,p,cit,ted under Article 36 of the
F,mily Code,[19] is solely b,sed on her interviews with M,nuel ,nd the
p,rties' eldest child, Moncho. Consequently, the CA did not err in not
,ccording prob,tive v,lue to her psychologic,l ev,lu,tion report ,nd
 testimony.
– If the inc,p,city c,n be proven by independent me,ns, no re,son exists
why such independent proof c,nnot be ,dmitted to support , conclusion
of psychologic,l inc,p,city, independently of , psychologist's
ex,min,tion ,nd report.
– In this c,se, the only person interviewed by Dr. Villeg,s ,side from M,nuel
for the spouses' psychologic,l ev,lu,tion w,s Moncho, who could not be
considered ,s , reli,ble witness to est,blish the psychologic,l inc,p,city
of his p,rents in rel,tion to Article 36 of the F,mily Code, since he could
not h,ve been there ,t the time his p,rents were m,rried.
– While the Court h:s decl:red th:t there is no requirement th:t the
person to be decl:red psychologic:lly inc:p:cit:ted should be
person:lly ex:mined by : physici:n, much less be subjected to
psychologic:l tests, this rule finds :pplic:tion only if the tot:lity of
evidence presented is enough to sust:in : finding of psychologic:l
inc:p:city. In this c,se, the supposed person,lity disorder of M,nuel
could h,ve been est,blished by me,ns of psychometric ,nd neurologic,l
tests which ,re objective me,ns designed to me,sure specific ,spects of
people's intelligence, thinking, or person,lity.
– With reg,rd to the Confirm,tory Decree of the N,tion,l Tribun,l of
Appe,ls, which ,ffirmed the decision of the Metropolit,n Tribun,l of First
Inst,nce for the Archdiocese of M,nil, in f,vor of nullity of the C,tholic
m,rri,ge of M,nuel ,nd Nor,, the Court ,ccords the s,me with gre,t
respect but does not consider the s,me ,s controlling ,nd decisive, in line
with prev,iling jurisprudence.

Y:ptinch:y v. Torres

– WON gr,ve ,buse of discretion ,ttended the CFI judge's order issuing ,n
injunctive writ tr,nsferring possession of the Forbes house from Teresit, to
Virgini, Y. Y,ptinch,y, considering th,t Teresit, ,s , common-l,w wife is
cl,iming ownership b,sed on Article 144 of the Civil Code - NO.
– Nor c,n petitioner's cl,im of ownership presum,bly b,sed on the
provisions of Article 144 of the Civil Code be decisive. S,id Article 144
s,ys th,t: "When m,n ,nd , wom,n live together ,s husb,nd ,nd wife,
but they ,re not m,rried, or their m,rri,ge is void from the beginning, the
property ,cquired by either or both of them through their work or industry
or their w,ges ,nd s,l,ries sh,ll be governed by the rules on co-
ownership." .
– But stock must be t,ken of the f,ct th,t the cre:tion of the civil
rel:tionship envis:ged in Article 144 is circumscribed by conditions,
the existence of which must first be shown before rights provided
thereunder m:y be deemed to :ccrue. One such condition is th,t there
 –

must be : cle:r showing th:t the petitioner h:d, during coh:bit:tion,

re:lly contributed to the :cquisition of the property involved. Until
such right to co-ownership is duly est,blished, petitioner's interests in the
property in controversy c,nnot be considered the "present right" or title
th,t would m,ke ,v,il,ble the protection or ,id ,fforded by , writ of
injunction. For, the existence of , cle,r positive right especi,lly c,lling for
judici,l protection is w,nting. Injunction indeed, is not to protect
contingent or future rights; nor is it , remedy to enforce ,n ,bstr,ct right.
– Teresit, presented proof in the form of lo,ns th,t she h,d contr,cted
during the period when s,id house w,s under construction. But evidence
is w,nting which would correl,te such lo,ns to the construction work. On
the contr,ry, there is much to the document,ry proof presented by
petitioner which would tend to indic,te th,t the lo,ns she obt,ined from
the Republic B,nk were for purposes other th,n the construction of the
North Forbes P,rk home.

Fujiki v. M:rin:y

– WON , husb,nd or wife of , prior m,rri,ge c,n file , petition to recognize ,

foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent m,rri,ge between his or her
spouse ,nd , foreign citizen on the ground of big,my - YES.
– The Rule on Decl,r,tion of Absolute Nullity of Void M,rri,ges ,nd
Annulment of Void,ble M,rri,ges (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not ,pply
in , petition to recognize , foreign judgment rel,ting to the st,tus of ,
m,rri,ge where one of the p,rties is , citizen of , foreign country.
Moreover, in Juli,no-Ll,ve v. Republic, this Court held th,t the rule in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC th,t only the husb,nd or wife c,n file , decl,r,tion of
nullity or ,nnulment of m,rri,ge "does not ,pply if the re,son behind the
petition is big,my.
– To hold th:t A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC :pplies to : petition for
recognition of foreign judgment would me:n th:t the tri:l court :nd
the p:rties should follow its provisions, including the form ,nd contents
of the petition, the service of summons, the investig,tion of the public
prosecutor, the setting of pre-tri,l, the tri,l ,nd the judgment of the tri,l
court. This is :bsurd bec:use it will litig:te the c:se :new. It will
defe,t the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit
repetitive litig,tion on cl,ims ,nd issues."
– Fujiki h:s the person:lity to file : petition to recognize the J:p:nese
F:mily Court judgment nullifying the m:rri:ge between M:rin:y :nd
M:ek:r: on the ground of big:my bec:use the judgment concerns his
civil st:tus :s m:rried to M:rin:y. For the s,me re,son he h,s the
person,lity to file , petition under Rule 108 to c,ncel the entry of
m,rri,ge between M,rin,y ,nd M,ek,r, in the civil registry on the b,sis
 of the decree of the J,p,nese F,mily Court.
– There is no doubt th,t the prior spouse h:s : person:l :nd m:teri:l
interest in m:int:ining the integrity of the m:rri:ge he contr:cted
:nd the property rel:tions :rising from it. There is ,lso no doubt th,t
he is interested in the c,ncell,tion of ,n entry of , big,mous m,rri,ge in
the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his m,rri,ge.
The interest derives from the subst:ntive right of the spouse not only
to preserve (or dissolve, in limited inst:nces) his most intim:te
hum:n rel:tion, but :lso to protect his property interests th:t :rise
by oper:tion of l:w the moment he contr:cts m:rri:ge. These
property interests in m,rri,ge include the right to be supported "in
keeping with the fin,nci,l c,p,city of the f,mily" ,nd preserving the
property regime of the m,rri,ge.
– Section 2(,) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude , spouse of ,
subsisting m,rri,ge to question the v,lidity of , subsequent m,rri,ge on
the ground of big,my. On the contr:ry, when Section 2(:) st:tes th:t
"[:] petition for decl:r:tion of :bsolute nullity of void m:rri:ge m:y
be filed solely by the husb:nd or the wife"—it refers to the husb:nd
or the wife of the subsisting m:rri:ge. Under Article 35(4) of the
F:mily Code, big:mous m:rri:ges :re void from the beginning. Thus,
the p,rties in , big,mous m,rri,ge ,re neither the husb,nd nor the wife
under the l,w. The husb,nd or the wife of the prior subsisting m,rri,ge is
the one who h,s the person,lity to file , petition for decl,r,tion of
,bsolute nullity of void m,rri,ge under Section 2(,) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC.

G:rci:-Qui:zon v. Belen

– WON Elise, ,s Eliseoʼs n,tur,l child, h,s the right to h,ve Eliseoʼs m,rri,ge to
Ameli, decl,red void - YES.
– In , void m,rri,ge, it w,s though no m,rri,ge h,s t,ken pl,ce, thus, it
c,nnot be the source of rights. Any interested p,rty m,y ,tt,ck the
m,rri,ge directly or coll,ter,lly. A void m,rri,ge c,n be questioned even
beyond the lifetime of the p,rties to the m,rri,ge. It must be pointed out
th,t ,t the time of the celebr,tion of the m,rri,ge of Eliseo ,nd Ameli,,
the l,w in effect w,s the Civil Code, ,nd not the F,mily Code, m,king the
ruling in Niñ,l v. B,y,dog ,pplic,ble four-squ,re to the c,se ,t h,nd. In
Niñ,l, the Court, in no uncert,in terms, ,llowed therein petitioners to file ,
petition for the decl,r,tion of nullity of their f,therʼs m,rri,ge to therein
respondent ,fter the de,th of their f,ther, by contr,distinguishing void
from void,ble m,rri,ges, to wit:
– Consequently, void m,rri,ges c,n be questioned even ,fter the de,th
of either p,rty but void,ble m,rri,ges c,n be ,ss,iled only during the
 –

lifetime of the p,rties ,nd not ,fter de,th of either, in which c,se the
p,rties ,nd their offspring will be left ,s if the m,rri,ge h,d been
perfectly v,lid. Th,t is why the ,ction or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike void,ble m,rri,ges where the ,ction
prescribes. Only the p,rties to , void,ble m,rri,ge c,n ,ss,il it but
:ny proper interested p:rty m:y :tt:ck : void m:rri:ge.
– It w,s emph,sized in Niñ,l th,t in , void m,rri,ge, no m,rri,ge h,s t,ken
pl,ce ,nd it c,nnot be the source of rights, such th,t ,ny interested p,rty
m,y ,tt,ck the m,rri,ge directly or coll,ter,lly without prescription,
which m,y be filed even beyond the lifetime of the p,rties to the
m,rri,ge.
– Relev,nt to the foregoing, there is no doubt th:t Elise, whose
succession:l rights would be prejudiced by her f:therʼs m:rri:ge to
Ameli:, m:y impugn the existence of such m:rri:ge even :fter the
de:th of her f:ther. The s,id m,rri,ge m,y be questioned directly by
filing ,n ,ction ,tt,cking the v,lidity thereof, or coll,ter,lly by r,ising it ,s
,n issue in , proceeding for the settlement of the est,te of the dece,sed
spouse, such ,s in the c,se ,t b,r. Ineluct,bly, Elise, ,s , compulsory
heir, h,s , c,use of ,ction for the decl,r,tion of the ,bsolute nullity of
the void m,rri,ge of Eliseo ,nd Ameli,, ,nd the de,th of either p,rty to
the s,id m,rri,ge does not extinguish such c,use of ,ction.

Republic v. Ol:yb:r

– WON , petition under Rule 108 for c,ncell,tion of entries in , m,rri,ge

contr,ct is the correct remedy where the petitionerʼs identity w,s used by ,n
unknown person to contr,ct m,rri,ge with , Kore,n n,tion,l - YES.
– It is true th,t in speci,l proceedings, form,l ple,dings ,nd , he,ring m,y
be dispensed with, ,nd the remedy [is] gr,nted upon mere ,pplic,tion or
motion. However, , speci,l proceeding is not ,lw,ys summ,ry. The
procedure l,id down in Rule 108 is not , summ,ry proceeding per se. It
requires public,tion of the petition; it m,nd,tes the inclusion ,s p,rties of
,ll persons who m,y cl,im interest which would be ,ffected by the
c,ncell,tion or correction; it ,lso requires the civil registr,r ,nd ,ny
person in interest to file their opposition, if ,ny; ,nd it st,tes th,t
,lthough the court m,y m,ke orders expediting the proceedings, it is
,fter he,ring th,t the court sh,ll either dismiss the petition or issue ,n
order gr,nting the s,me. Thus, ,s long ,s the procedur,l requirements in
Rule 108 ,re followed, it is the ,ppropri,te ,dvers,ry proceeding to effect
subst,nti,l corrections ,nd ch,nges in entries of the civil register.
– To be sure, , petition for correction or c,ncell,tion of ,n entry in the civil
registry c,nnot substitute for ,n ,ction to inv,lid,te , m,rri,ge. A direct
,ction is necess,ry to prevent circumvention of the subst,ntive ,nd
 –

procedur,l s,fegu,rds of m,rri,ge under the F,mily Code, A.M. No.

02-11-10-SC ,nd other rel,ted l,ws. Among these s,fegu,rds ,re the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of m,rri,ge,
support pendente lite of the spouses ,nd children, the liquid,tion,
p,rtition ,nd distribution of the properties of the spouses ,nd the
investig,tion of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct
,ction for decl,r,tion of nullity or ,nnulment of m,rri,ge is ,lso
necess,ry to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the F,mily
Courts under the F,mily Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), ,s ,
petition for c,ncell,tion or correction of entries in the civil registry m,y be
filed in the Region,l Tri,l Court where the corresponding civil registry is
loc,ted. In other words, , Filipino citizen c,nnot dissolve his m,rri,ge by
the mere expedient of ch,nging his entry of m,rri,ge in the civil registry.
– While we m:int:in th:t Rule 108 c:nnot be :v:iled of to determine
the v:lidity of m:rri:ge, we c:nnot nullify the proceedings before the
tri:l court where :ll the p:rties h:d been given the opportunity to
contest the :lleg:tions of respondent; the procedures were followed,
:nd :ll the evidence of the p:rties h:d :lre:dy been :dmitted :nd
ex:mined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullific:tion of
m:rri:ge :s there w:s no m:rri:ge to spe:k of, but the correction of
the record of such m:rri:ge to reflect the truth :s set forth by the
evidence.

*Under Article 349 of the Revised Pen:l Code, the elements of the crime of
Big:my :re:

(1) th:t the offender h:s been leg:lly m:rried;

(2) th:t the first m:rri:ge h:s not been leg:lly dissolved or, in c:se his or her
spouse is :bsent, the :bsent spouse could not yet be presumed de:d
:ccording to the Civil Code;

(3) th:t he contr:cts : second or subsequent m:rri:ge; :nd

(4) th:t the second or subsequent m:rri:ge h:s :ll the essenti:l requisites
for v:lidity.

Morigo v. People

– WON , petition under Rule 108 for c,ncell,tion of entries in , m,rri,ge

contr,ct is the correct remedy where the petitionerʼs identity w,s used by ,n
unknown person to contr,ct m,rri,ge with , Kore,n n,tion,l - YES.
– The present c,se is ,n,logous to, but must be distinguished from
 –
Merc,do v. T,n. In the l,tter c,se, the judici:l decl:r:tion of nullity of
the first m:rri:ge w:s likewise obt:ined :fter the second m:rri:ge
w:s :lre:dy celebr:ted. We held therein th,t:
– A judici,l decl,r,tion of nullity of , previous m,rri,ge is necess,ry
before , subsequent one c,n be leg,lly contr,cted. One who enters
into , subsequent m,rri,ge without first obt,ining such judici,l
decl,r,tion is guilty of big,my. This principle ,pplies even if the
e,rlier union is ch,r,cterized by st,tutes ,s void.
– In the inst:nt c:se, however, no m:rri:ge ceremony :t :ll w:s
performed by : duly :uthorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner :nd
Luci: B:rrete merely signed : m:rri:ge contr:ct on their own. The
mere priv:te :ct of signing : m:rri:ge contr:ct be:rs no sembl:nce
to : v:lid m:rri:ge :nd thus, needs no judici:l decl:r:tion of nullity.
Such ,ct ,lone, without more, c,nnot be deemed to constitute ,n
ostensibly v,lid m,rri,ge for which petitioner might be held li,ble for
big,my unless he first secures , judici,l decl,r,tion of nullity before he
contr,cts , subsequent m,rri,ge.
– *NOTE: big,my c,se w,s filed AFTER the c,se for decl,r,tion of nullity,
but w,s decided by the tri,l court BEFORE the c,se for decl,r,tion of
nullity

Tenebro v. CA

– WON ,n individu,l who contr,cts , second or subsequent m,rri,ge during

the subsistence of , v,lid m,rri,ge is crimin,lly li,ble for big,my,
notwithst,nding the subsequent decl,r,tion th,t the second m,rri,ge is void
,b initio on the ground of psychologic,l inc,p,city - YES.
– The subsequent judici:l decl:r:tion of nullity of m:rri:ge on the
ground of psychologic:l inc:p:city does not retro:ct to the d:te of
the celebr:tion of the m:rri:ge insof:r :s the Philippinesʼ pen:l l:ws
:re concerned.
– As , second or subsequent m,rri,ge contr,cted during the subsistence
of petitionerʼs v,lid m,rri,ge to Vill,reyes, petitionerʼs m,rri,ge to
Anc,j,s would be null ,nd void ,b initio completely reg,rdless of
petitionerʼs psychologic,l c,p,city or inc,p,city. Since : m:rri:ge
contr:cted during the subsistence of : v:lid m:rri:ge is
:utom:tic:lly void, the nullity of this second m:rri:ge is not per se
:n :rgument for the :void:nce of crimin:l li:bility for big:my.
Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Pen,l Code crimin,lizes ",ny
person who sh,ll contr,ct , second or subsequent m,rri,ge before the
former m,rri,ge h,s been leg,lly dissolved, or before the ,bsent spouse
h,s been decl,red presumptively de,d by me,ns of , judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings". A pl,in re,ding of the l,w, therefore, would
 indic,te th,t the provision pen,lizes the mere ,ct of contr,cting , second
or , subsequent m,rri,ge during the subsistence of , v,lid m,rri,ge.
– Thus, ,s soon ,s the second m,rri,ge to Anc,j,s w,s celebr,ted on April
10, 1990, during the subsistence of the v,lid first m,rri,ge, the crime of
big,my h,d ,lre,dy been consumm,ted. To our mind, there is no cogent
re,son for distinguishing between , subsequent m,rri,ge th,t is null ,nd
void purely bec,use it is , second or subsequent m,rri,ge, ,nd ,
subsequent m,rri,ge th,t is null ,nd void on the ground of psychologic,l
inc,p,city, ,t le,st insof,r ,s crimin,l li,bility for big,my is concerned.
– MALI WTF ———> Moreover, the decl,r,tion of the nullity of the second
m,rri,ge on the ground of psychologic,l inc,p,city is not ,n indic,tor
th,t petitionerʼs m,rri,ge to Anc,j,s l,cks the essenti,l requisites for
v,lidity. The requisites for the v,lidity of , m,rri,ge ,re cl,ssified by the
F,mily Code into essenti,l (leg,l c,p,city of the contr,cting p,rties ,nd
their consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) ,nd
form,l (,uthority of the solemnizing officer, m,rri,ge license, ,nd
m,rri,ge ceremony wherein the p,rties person,lly decl,re their
,greement to m,rry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of ,t
le,st two witnesses). Under Article 5 of the F,mily Code, ,ny m,le or
fem,le of the ,ge of eighteen ye,rs or upw,rds not under ,ny of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 ,nd 38 m,y contr,ct m,rri,ge.
– CARPIO (dissent):
– For more th,n 75 ye,rs now, this Court h,s consistently ruled th,t if the
second m,rri,ge is void on grounds other th,n the existence of the first
m,rri,ge, there is no crime of big,my. It is ,n essenti,l element of the
crime of big,my th,t the ,lleged second m,rri,ge, h,ving ,ll the
essenti,l requisites, would be v,lid were it not for the subsistence of the
first m,rri,ge.
– If the second m,rri,ge is void solely bec,use of the existence of the first
m,rri,ge, the nullity of the second m,rri,ge proceeds from its illeg,lity or
big,mous n,ture. However, if the second m,rri,ge is void on grounds
other th,n the existence of the first m,rri,ge, the nullity does not proceed
from its illeg,lity or big,mous n,ture. The first situ,tion results in the
crime of big,my while the second does not.
– The pl,in ,nd ordin,ry me,ning of Article 349 could only be th,t the
second m,rri,ge must be v,lid were it not for the existence of the first
m,rri,ge. This h,s been the consistent interpret,tion of the Court for
more th,n seven dec,des since the en,ctment of the Revised Pen,l
Code. Text writers in crimin,l l,w h,ve never entert,ined or ,dv,nced ,ny
other interpret,tion. There is no cogent re,son to dep,rt from the well-
est,blished jurisprudence on Article 349 of the Revised Pen,l Code.

C:pili v. People
 – WON the subsequent decl,r,tion of nullity of the second m,rri,ge for being
contr,cted during the lifetime of the leg,l wife is , ground for dismiss,l of the
crimin,l c,se for big,my - NO.
– Jurisprudence is replete with c,ses holding th,t the ,ccused m,y still be
ch,rged with the crime of big,my, even if there is , subsequent
decl,r,tion of the nullity of the second m,rri,ge, so long ,s the first
m,rri,ge w,s still subsisting when the second m,rri,ge w,s celebr,ted.
– It is cle,r then th,t the crime of big,my w,s committed by petitioner from
the time he contr,cted the second m,rri,ge with priv,te respondent.
Thus, the fin,lity of the judici,l decl,r,tion of nullity of petitionerʼs
second m,rri,ge does not impede the filing of , crimin,l ch,rge for
big,my ,g,inst him.
*pet ,rgued th,t the c,se of Tenebro spe,ks for itself; itʼs ,n exception which only
,pplies to the f,cts of the c,se, th,t is, where the ground for nullity of the second
m,rri,ge w,s psychologic,l inc,p,city
*court mixed up nullity of second m,rri,ge ,nd nullity of first m,rri,ge

People v. Odtuh:n

– WON , motion to qu,sh ,n inform,tion for big,my is proper, given th,t there
exists , subsequent decl,r,tion of nullity of the first m,rri,ge bec,use of the
,bsence of , m,rri,ge license - NO.
– Respondentʼs evidence showing the courtʼs decl:r:tion th:t his
m:rri:ge to Modin: is null :nd void from the beginning bec:use of
the :bsence of : m:rri:ge license is only :n evidence th:t seeks to
est:blish : f:ct contr:ry to th:t :lleged in the inform:tion th:t : first
v:lid m:rri:ge w:s subsisting :t the time he contr:cted the second
m:rri:ge. This should not be considered ,t ,ll, bec,use m,tters of
defense c,nnot be r,ised in , motion to qu,sh.
– Respondentʼs motion to qu,sh w,s founded on the tri,l courtʼs
decl,r,tion th,t his m,rri,ge with Modin, is null ,nd void ,b initio. He
cl,ims th,t with such decl,r,tion, one of the elements of the crime is
w,nting. Thus, the ,lleg,tions in the inform,tion do not ch,rge the
offense of big,my, or ,t the very le,st, such court decree extinguished his
crimin,l li,bility. Both respondent ,nd the CA he,vily relied on the Courtʼs
pronouncement in Morigo v. People where the ,ccused therein w,s
,cquitted bec,use the elements of the crime of big,my were incomplete.
In s,id c,se, the first m,rri,ge w,s decl,red null ,nd void, bec,use the
p,rties only signed the m,rri,ge contr,ct without the presence of ,
solemnizing officer. Considering, therefore, th,t the decl,r,tion of nullity
retro,cts to the d,te of the first m,rri,ge, the Court held th,t there w,s
no m,rri,ge to spe,k of when the ,ccused contr,cted the second
 m,rri,ge. Logic,lly, the ,ccused w,s ,cquitted.
– Wh,t m,kes , person crimin,lly li,ble for big,my is when he contr,cts ,
second or subsequent m,rri,ge during the subsistence of , v,lid
m,rri,ge. P,rties to the m,rri,ge should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the s,me must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts ,nd only when the nullity of the m,rri,ge is so decl,red
c,n it be held ,s void, ,nd so long ,s there is no such decl,r,tion, the
presumption is th,t the m,rri,ge exists. Therefore, he who contr,cts ,
second m,rri,ge before the judici,l decl,r,tion of nullity of the first
m,rri,ge ,ssumes the risk of being prosecuted for big,my. If we ,llow
respondentʼs line of defense ,nd the CAʼs r,tiocin,tion, , person who
commits big,my c,n simply ev,de prosecution by immedi,tely filing ,
petition for the decl,r,tion of nullity of his e,rlier m,rri,ge ,nd hope th,t
, f,vor,ble decision is rendered therein before ,nyone institutes ,
compl,int ,g,inst him.
– Respondent, likewise, cl:ims th:t there :re more re:sons to qu:sh
the inform:tion :g:inst him, bec:use he obt:ined the decl:r:tion of
nullity of m:rri:ge before the filing of the compl:int for big:my
:g:inst him. Ag,in, we c,nnot sust,in such contention. In ,ddition to the
discussion ,bove, settled is the rule th,t crimin,l culp,bility ,tt,ches to
the offender upon the commission of the offense ,nd from th,t inst,nt,
li,bility ,ppends to him until extinguished ,s provided by l,w ,nd th,t the
time of filing of the crimin,l compl,int or inform,tion is m,teri,l only for
determining prescription

Go-B:ng:y:n v. B:ng:y:n

– WON the m,rri,ge between the p,rties w,s void for being big,mous,
considering th,t the second m,rri,ge w,s contr,cted without , m,rri,ge
license - NO.
– On whether or not the p,rtiesʼ m,rri,ge is big,mous under the concept of
Article 349 of the Revised Pen,l Code, the m,rri,ge is not big,mous. It is
required th,t the first or former m,rri,ge sh,ll not be null ,nd void. The
m,rri,ge of the petitioner to Azucen, sh,ll be ,ssumed ,s the one th,t is
v,lid, there being no evidence to the contr,ry ,nd there is no tr,ce of
inv,lidity or irregul,rity on the f,ce of their m,rri,ge contr,ct. However,
if the second m:rri:ge w:s void not bec:use of the existence of the
first m:rri:ge but for other c:uses such :s l:ck of license, the crime
of big:my w:s not committed. In People v. De L,r, [CA, 51 O.G., 4079],
it w,s held th,t wh,t w,s committed w,s contr,cting m,rri,ge ,g,inst
the provisions of l,ws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised
Pen,l Code. Concluding, the m,rri,ge of the p,rties is therefore not
big,mous bec,use there w,s no m,rri,ge license. The d,ring ,nd
 repe,ted st,nd of respondent th,t she is leg,lly m,rried to petitioner
c,nnot, in ,ny inst,nce, be sust,ined. Assuming th,t her m,rri,ge to
petitioner h,s the m,rri,ge license, yet the s,me would be big,mous,
civilly or crimin,lly ,s it would be inv,lid,ted by , prior existing v,lid
m,rri,ge of petitioner ,nd Azucen,.
– For big:my to exist, the second or subsequent m:rri:ge must h:ve :ll
the essenti:l requisites for v:lidity except for the existence of : prior
m:rri:ge. In this c:se, there w:s re:lly no subsequent m:rri:ge.
Benj:min :nd S:lly just signed : purported m:rri:ge contr:ct
without : m:rri:ge license. The supposed m:rri:ge w:s not recorded
with the loc:l civil registr:r :nd the N:tion:l St:tistics Office. In
short, the m:rri:ge between Benj:min :nd S:lly did not exist. They
lived together ,nd represented themselves ,s husb,nd ,nd wife without
the benefit of m,rri,ge.
* On 7 M,rch 1982, in order to ,ppe,se her f,ther, S,lly brought Benj,min to ,n
office in S,ntol,n, P,sig City where they signed , purported m,rri,ge contr,ct.
S,lly, knowing Benj,minʼs m,rit,l st,tus, ,ssured him th,t the m,rri,ge contr,ct
would not be registered.

Jocson v. Robles

– WON , motion for summ,ry judgment m,y be gr,nted in ,n ,ction for

,nnulment of m,rri,ge - NO.
– Before it c,n p,ss upon pl,intiff's pr,yer for the decl,r,tion of nullity of
her m,rri,ge to defend,nt, there is necessity for proof th,t when he
contr,cted m,rri,ge with pl,intiff, defend,nt Robles h,d , previous ,nd
subsisting v,lid m,rri,ge.The evidenti,ry requirement to est,blish these
f,cts w,s not met in the motion for summ,ry judgment. Defend,nt's ple,
to h,ve his m,rri,ge decl,red ,s h,ving been brought ,bout by force ,nd
intimid,tion, w,s ,lso denied, the court finding indic,tions of collusion
between the p,rties in their ,ttempt to secure the nullific,tion of s,id
m,rri,ge.
– On the merits, we ,re s,tisfied th,t the Court of Domestic Rel,tions
correctly denied the motion for summ,ry judgment in view of the first
p,r,gr,ph of Articles 88 ,nd 1011 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, th,t
expressly prohibit the rendition of , decree of ,nnulment of , m,rri,ge
upon , stipul,tion of f,cts or , confession of judgment. The ,ffid,vits
,nnexed to the petition for summ,ry judgment pr,ctic,lly ,mount to
these methods not counten,nced by the Civil Code.

Tolentino v. Vill:nuev:

– WON in , c,se for ,nnulment of m,rri,ge where the wife f,iled to ,ppe,r ,nd
 –
w,s decl,red in def,ult, ,n Order issued by the judge referring the c,se to the
City Fisc,l of M,nil, for investig,tion to determine whether collusion exists
between the p,rties is v,lid - YES.
– Articles 88 ,nd 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit
the rendition of , decision in suits for ,nnulment of m,rri,ge ,nd leg,l
sep,r,tion b,sed on , stipul,tion of f,cts or by confession of judgment
,nd direct th,t in c,se of non-,ppe,r,nce of defend,nt, the court sh,ll
order the prosecuting ,ttorney to inquire whether or not collusion
between the p,rties exists, ,nd if none, s,id prosecuting ,ttorney sh,ll
intervene for the St,te to prevent f,bric,tion of evidence for the pl,intiff.
Thus, Articles 88 ,nd 101 st,te:
– "ART. 88. No judgment ,nnulling , m,rri,ge sh,ll be promulg,ted
upon , stipul,tion of f,cts or by confession of judgment In c,se
of non-,ppe,r,nce of the defend,nt, the provisions of ,rticle 101,
p,r,gr,ph 2, sh,ll be observed."
– "ART. 101. No decree of leg,l sep,r,tion sh,ll be promulg,ted
upon , stipul,tion of f,cts or by confession of judgment. In c,se
of non-,ppe,r,nce of the defend,nt, the court sh,ll order the
prosecuting ,ttorney to inquire whether or not , collusion
between the p,rties exists.  If there is no collusion, the
prosecuting ,ttorney sh,ll intervene for the St,te in order to t,ke
c,re th,t the evidence for the pl,intiff is not f,bric,ted."
– The prohibition expressed in the ,forecited l,ws ,nd rules is predic,ted
on the f,ct th,t the institutions of m:rri:ge :nd of the f:mily :re
s:cred :nd therefore :re :s much the concern of the St:te :s of the
spouses; bec:use the St:te :nd the public h:ve vit:l interest in the
m:inten:nce :nd preserv:tion of these soci:l institutions :g:inst
desecr:tion by collusion between the p:rties or by f:bric:ted
evidence. The prohibition ,g,inst ,nnulling , m,rri,ge b,sed on the
stipul,tion of f,cts or by confession of judgment or by non-,ppe,r,nce of
the defend,nt stresses the f,ct th,t m:rri:ge is more th:n : mere
contr:ct between the p:rties; :nd for this re:son, when the
defend:nt f:ils to :ppe:r, the l:w enjoins the court to direct the
prosecuting officer to intervene for the St:te in order to preserve the
integrity :nd s:nctity of the m:rit:l bonds

Bucc:t v. Bucc:t

– WON the m,rri,ge should be ,nnulled on the ground th,t the wife, who g,ve
birth 89 d,ys ,fter getting m,rried, h,d conce,led her pregn,ncy before the
m,rri,ge - NO.
– It w,s unlikely th,t Godofredo, , first ye,r l,w student, did not suspect
,nything ,bout the pregn,ncy considering th,t it w,s ,lre,dy in ,n
 –

,dv,nced st,ge when they got m,rried.

– SHE WAS 6-7 MONTHS PREGNANT ALREADY!

Aquino v. Delizo

– WON the m,rri,ge should be ,nnulled on the ground th,t the wife, who g,ve
birth 4 months ,fter getting m,rried, h,d conce,led her pregn,ncy before the
m,rri,ge - NO.
– Here the defend,nt wife w,s ,lleged to be only more th,n four months
pregn,nt ,t the time of her m,rri,ge to pl,intiff. At th,t st,ge, we ,re not
prep,red to s,y th,t her pregn,ncy w,s re,dily ,pp,rent, especi,lly
since she w,s "n,tur,lly plump" or f,t ,s ,lleged by pl,intiff. According to
medic,l ,uthorities, even on the 5th month of pregn:ncy, the
enl:rgement of : wom:n's :bdomen is still below the umbilicus, th:t
is to s:y, the enl:rgement is limited to the lower p:rt of the :bdomen
so th:t it is h:rdly notice:ble :nd m:y, if noticed, be :ttributed only
to f:t form:tion on the lower p:rt of the :bdomen. It is only on the
6th month of pregn:ncy th:t the enl:rgement of the wom:n's
:bdomen re:ches : height :bove the umbilicus, m:king the
roundness of the :bdomen more gener:l :nd :pp:rent.
– SHE WAS ONLY IN THE 4TH MONTH OF PREGNANCY.
– If, ,s cl,imed by pl,intiff, defend,nt is "n,tur,lly plump", he could h,rdly
be expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not she w,s pregn,nt
,t the time of their m,rri,ge more so bec,use she must h,ve ,ttempted
to conce,l the true st,te of ,ff,irs. Even physici,ns ,nd surgeons, with
the ,id of the wom,n herself who shows ,nd gives her subjective ,nd
objective symptoms, c,n only cl,im positive di,gnosis of pregn,ncy in
33% ,t five months ,nd 50% ,t six months.

An:y: v. P:l:ro:n

– WON the non-disclosure of Fern,ndo to Auror, th,t prior to their m,rri,ge he

h,d , pre-m,rit,l rel,tionship with , close rel,tive of his constituted fr,ud
which is , ground for ,nnulment of their m,rri,ge - NO.
– Fr,ud, ,s vice of consent, is limited exclusively by l,w to those kinds or
species of fr,ud enumer,ted in Article 86, ,s follows:
– "Art. 86. Any of the following circumst,nces sh,ll constitute fr,ud
referred to in number 4 of the preceding ,rticle:
– (1) Misrepresent,tion ,s to the identity of one of the
contr,cting p,rties;
– (2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other
p,rty of , crime involving mor,l turpitude, ,nd the pen,lty
imposed w,s imprisonment for two ye,rs or more;
 – (3) Conce,lment by the wife of the f,ct th,t ,t the time of the
m,rri,ge, she w,s pregn,nt by , m,n other th,n her
husb,nd.
– "No other misrepresent,tion or deceit ,s to ch,r,cter, r,nk,
fortune or ch,stity sh,ll constitute such fr,ud ,s will give grounds
for ,ction for the ,nnulment of m,rri,ge."
– The intention of Congress to confine the circumst,nces th,t c,n
constitute fr,ud ,s ground for ,nnulment of m,rri,ge to the foregoing
three c,ses m,y be deduced from the f,ct th,t, of ,ll the c,uses of nullity
enumer,ted in Article 85, fr,ud is the only one given speci,l tre,tment in
, subsequent ,rticle within the ch,pter on void ,nd void,ble m,rri,ges.
If its intention were otherwise, Congress would h,ve stopped ,t Article 85,
for, ,nyw,y, fr,ud in gener,l is ,lre,dy mentioned therein ,s , c,use for
,nnulment. But Article 86 w,s ,lso en,cted, expressly ,nd specific,lly
de,ling with "fr,ud referred to in number 4 of the preceding ,rticle", ,nd
proceeds by enumer,ting the specific fr,uds (misrepresent,tion ,s to
identity, non-disclosure of , previous conviction, ,nd conce,lment of
pregn,ncy), m,king it cle,r th,t Congress intended to exclude ,ll other
fr,uds or deceits. To stress further such intention, the enumer,tion of the
specific fr,uds w,s followed by the interdiction: "No other misrepresen-
t,tion or deceit ,s to ch,r,cter, r,nk, fortune or ch,stity sh,ll constitute
such fr,ud ,s will give grounds for ,ction for the ,nnulment of m,rri,ge”.
– Non-disclosure of , husb,nd's pre-m,rit,l rel,tionship with ,nother
wom,n is not one of the enumer,ted circumst,nces th,t would constitute
, ground for ,nnulment; ,nd it is further excluded by the l:st
p:r:gr:ph of the :rticle, providing th:t "no other misrepresent:tion
or deceit :s to .... ch:stity" sh:ll give ground for :n :ction to :nnul :
m:rri:ge.

Ruiz v. Atienz:

– WON the thre,t to Ruiz to obstruct his ,dmission to the B,r if he would not
m,rry Pel,gi, by filing ch,rges ,g,inst him for immor,lity constitutes duress
which is ground for ,nnulment of the m,rri,ge - NO.
– Where , m,n m,rries under the thre,t of, or constr,int from, , l,wful
prosecution for seduction or b,st,rdy, he c,nnot ,void the m,rri,ge on
the ground of duress.

S:r:o v. Guev:r:

– WON impotence ,s , ground for the ,nnulment of m,rri,ge me,ns the

inc,p,city to procre,te - NO.
– The test of impotency is not the ,bility to procre,te. The defect must be
 –
one of copul,tion. Here, the m,rri,ge m,y not be ,nnulled, bec,use the
wife w,s not impotent ,t the time she m,rried the pl,intiff. According to
the opinion of the doctor who oper,ted on her, the existence of , fibrous
tumor in the ov,ries did not necess,rily render her inc,p,ble of
copul,tion or even of procre,tion. The remov,l of the dece,sed p,rts, it is
true, rendered her sterile, but it by no me,ns m,de her unfit for sexu,l
intercourse.
– If pl,intiff w,s not ,ble to consumm,te , c,rn,l ,ct with his wife the first
time he h,d ,ccess with her, it w,s due to his own volunt,ry desist,nce.

Jimenez v. C:niz:res

– WON , m,rri,ge m,y be ,nnulled on the strength only of the lone testimony
of the husb,nd who cl,imed ,nd testified th,t his wife w,s ,nd is impotent -
NO.
– M,rri,ge in this country is ,n institution in which the community is deeply
interested. The st,te h,s surrounded it with s,fegu,rds to m,int,in its
purity, continuity ,nd perm,nence. The security ,nd st,bility of the st,te
,re l,rgely dependent upon it. It is the interest of e,ch ,nd every member
of the community to prevent the bringing ,bout of , condition th,t would
sh,ke its found,tion ,nd ultim,tely le,d to its destruction. The incidents
of the st,tus ,re governed by l,w, not by will of the p,rties. The l,w
specific,lly enumer,tes the leg,l grounds, th,t must be proved to exist by
indubit,ble evidence, to ,nnul , m,rri,ge.
– In the c,se ,t b,r, the ,nnulment of the m,rri,ge in question w,s decreed
upon the sole testimony of the husb,nd who w,s expected to give
testimony tending or ,iming ,t securing the ,nnulment of his m,rri,ge he
sought ,nd seeks. Whether the wife is re:lly impotent c:nnot be
deemed to h:ve been s:tisf:ctorily est:blished, bec:use from the
commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she
h:d :bst:ined from t:king p:rt therein. Although her refus:l to be
ex:mined or f:ilure to :ppe:r in court show indifference on her p:rt,
yet from such :ttitude the presumption :rising out of the suppression
of evidence could not :rise or be inferred bec:use women of this
country :re by n:ture coy, b:shful :nd shy :nd would not submit to :
physic:l ex:min:tion unless compelled to by competent :uthority.
This the Court m,y do without doing violence to ,nd infringing in this
c,se is not self-incrimin,tion. She is not ch,rged with ,ny offense. She is
not being compelled to be , witness ,g,inst herself.
– "Impotency being :n :bnorm:l condition should not be presumed.
The presumption is in f:vor of potency." The lone testimony of the
husb,nd th,t his wife is physic,lly inc,p,ble of sexu,l intercourse is
insufficient to te,r ,sunder the ties th,t h,ve bound them together ,s
 –

husb,nd ,nd wife.

Lukb:n v. Republic

– WON , petition for judici,l decl,r,tion th,t petitioner is , widow of her

husb,nd who is presumed to be de,d ,nd h,s no leg,l impediment to
contr,ct , subsequent m,rri,ge is ,uthorized by l,w - NO.
– A petition for judici,l decl,r,tion th,t Petitionerʼs husb,nd is presumed to
be de,d c,nnot be entert,ined bec,use it is not ,uthorized by l,w, ,nd if
such decl,r,tion c,nnot be m,de in , speci,l proceeding simil,r to the
present, much less c,n the court determine the st,tus of Petitioner ,s ,
widow since this m,tter must of necessity depend upon the f,ct of de,th
of the husb,nd. This the court c,n decl,re upon proper evidence, but not
to decree th,t he is merely presumed to be de,d.
– A judici,l pronouncement to th,t effect, even if fin,l ,nd executory, would
still be , prim, f,cie presumption only. It is still disput,ble. It is for th,t
re,son th,t it c,nnot be the subject of , judici,l pronouncement or
decl,r,tion, if it is the only question or m,tter involved in , c,se, or upon
which , competent court h,s to p,ss. It is, therefore, cle,r th,t , judici,l
decl,r,tion th,t , person is presumptively de,d, bec,use he h,d been
unhe,rd from in seven ye,rs, being , presumption juris t,ntum only,
subject to contr,ry proof, c,nnot re,ch the st,ge of fin,lity or become
fin,l.
– Appell:nt cl:ims th:t the remedy she is seeking for c:n be gr:nted in
the present proceedings bec:use in the c:se of H:g:ns vs.
Wislizenus, 42 Phil., 880, it w:s decl:red th:t : speci:l proceeding is
“:n :pplic:tion or proceeding to est:blish the st:tus or right of :
p:rty, or : p:rticul:r f:ct”; c
– BUT, ,s ,lre,dy s,id, th:t remedy c:n be invoked if the purpose is
to seek the decl:r:tion of de:th of the husb:nd, :nd not, :s in
the present c:se, to est:blish : presumption of de:th. If it c,n be
s,tisf,ctorily proven th,t the husb,nd is de,d, the court would not
cert,inly deny , decl,r,tion to th,t effect ,s h,s been intim,ted in
the c,se of Nicol,s Sz,tr,w.
– Appell,nt ,lso cl,ims th,t the present petition c,n be entert,ined
bec,use ,rticle 349 of the Revised Pen,l Code, in defining big,my,
provides th,t , person commits th,t crime if he contr,cts , second
m,rri,ge “before the :bsent spouse h:s been decl:red presumptively
de:d by me:ns of : judgment rendered in the proper proceedings”
,nd, it is cl,imed, the present petition comes within the purview of this
leg,l provision.
– The ,rgument is unten,ble for the words “proper proceedings”
used in s:id :rticle c:n only refer to those :uthorized by l:w such
 –

:s those which refer to the :dministr:tion or settlement of the

est:te of : dece:sed person. For the purposes of the civil m,rri,ge
l,w, it is not necess,ry to h,ve the former spouse judici,lly decl,red
,n ,bsentee. The decl,r,tion of ,bsence m,de in ,ccord,nce with
the provisions of the Civil Code h,s for its sole purpose to en,ble the
t,king of the necess,ry prec,utions for the ,dministr,tion of the
est,te of the ,bsentee. For the celebr,tion of civil m,rri,ge, however,
the l,w only requires th,t the former spouse h,s been ,bsent for
seven consecutive ye,rs ,t the time of the second m,rri,ge, th,t the
spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living,
th,t e,ch former spouse is gener,lly reputed to be de,d ,nd the
spouse present so believes ,t the time of the celebr,tion of the
m,rri,ge.

Gue v. Republic

– WON , petition for decl,r,tion of presumptive de,th, which is not for the
settlement of the est,te of the ,bsentee, is ,uthorized by l,w - NO.
– The rule invoked by the l,tter is merely one of evidence which permits the
court to presume th,t , person is de,d ,fter the f,ct th,t such person
h,d been unhe,rd from in seven ye,rs h,d been est,blished. This
presumption m,y ,rise ,nd be invoked ,nd m,de in , c,se, whether in ,n
,ction or in , speci,l proceeding, which is tried or he,rd by, ,nd
submitted for decision to, , speci,l proceeding. In this c,se, there is no
right to be enforced nor is there , remedy pr,yed for by the petitioner for
the fin,l determin,tion of his right or st,tus or for the ,scert,inment of ,
p,rticul,r f,ct (H,g,ns vs. Wislizenus, 42 Phil., 880), for the petition
does not pr,y for , decl,r,tion th,t the petitioner's husb,nd is de,d, but
merely ,sks for , decl,r,tion th,t he be presumed de,d bec,use he h,d
been unhe,rd from in seven ye,rs.
– According to ,ppell,nt, with the promulg,tion of the New Civil Code in
1950, p,rticul,rly, Article 390 thereof, the Courts ,re now ,uthorized to
decl,re persons presumptively de,d.
– This ,rgument is unten,ble. In Lukb,n vs. Republic of the Philippines,
decided long ,fter the New Civil Code went into effect, we reiter,ted
the doctrine l,id down in Nicol,i Sz,tr,w.

People v. M:sinsin

– WON Const,nci, is guilty of prem,ture m,rri,ge under Art. 351 of the RPC for
m,rrying Guillermo only 5 months ,fter her husb,nd Irineo h,d died, given
th,t she ,nd Irineo were m,rried for 18.5 ye,rs without h,ving ,ny children,
,nd given th,t 5 months before she m,rried Irineo, Irineo w,s decl,red to be
–

impotent by his doctor - NO.

– The purpose of Art. 351 is to prevent doubtful p,ternity. Thus, , wom,n
will not be li,ble under Art. 351 if:
– She h,s ,lre,dy delivered, or
– She h,s conclusive proof th,t she w,s not pregn,nt by her first
spouse since he w,s perm,nently sterile.
– PROHIBITION OF 301 DAYS ONLY APPLIES IN CASES WHEREIN THERE
EXISTS A POSSIBILITY OF PREGNANCY BY THE DECEASED HUSBAND.