Professional Documents
Culture Documents
14/06/10 0 Issued for Operations JV HSE Mgr Ops Manager Vice President
DOCUMENT NUMBER
ISG UU00 A XXPP 000 0037 Rev 3
NUMERO DE DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT NUMBER
IAO JM OX 99 00 33014 X04
NUMERO DE DOCUMENT
17/4/22
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Notification and Reporting Procedure
Contents
1. PURPOSE 4
2. SCOPE 4
4.2. Joint Venture IA/ISG/Wells HSE Managers (or their designate) role and responsibility 7
5. INVESTIGATION 8
6. CLASSIFICATION 8
7. REPORTING 9
APPENDIX 1: ABREVIATIONS 10
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Notification and Reporting Procedure
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Notification and Reporting Procedure
1. Purpose
This document sets the requirements for reporting, recording, classification, & notifications of In
Salah Gas (ISG) and In Amenas (IA) HSE and operational incidents, spills, near misses and unsafe
or unhealthy conditions. It sets out consistent processes to support:
The ISG & IA requirement to always promptly report any accident, injury, illness, unsafe or
unhealthy condition, incident, spill or release of material to the environment so that steps can be
taken to correct, prevent or control these conditions immediately.
Accurate and complete recording of reported incidents via the ISG and IA system SYNERGI.
Classification of incidents according to their actual and potential severity such that action can be
taken according to the risk.
Appropriate and rapid notification of serious incidents to line management and shareholders.
Ensure appropriate level of investigation to determine what went wrong and implement actions
to mitigate adverse effects, including unsafe/unhealthy conditions.
2. Scope
This procedure applies to all members of the ISG & IA workforce for any incident, near miss and
unsafe or unhealthy condition occurring within the IA and ISG projects, facilities, sites and
operations. See Appendix 17: Operational Boundaries.
It applies to all contractors and their associated subcontractors who perform work in the ISG & IA
work environment on behalf of ISG & IA. Contractors can use their own system to report and
investigate incidents, provided they meet the minimum requirements of this procedure. IA & ISG
shall provide guidance and assistance if requested, and at times may deem it necessary to conduct
its own investigation, which will require the co-operation and participation of the contractor.
Failure of any person to report an incident in a timely manner may result in disciplinary action being
taken.
All incidents as listed below must be reported through the normal channels at the site where the
incident occurred or injured person is employed.
Fatality or Occupational Injury. Classifications are made in accordance with OSHA injury
classifications; First Aid (FA), Medical Treatment (MT), Restricted Work/Job Transfer, Day Away
from Work Case (DAFWC), and Fatality.
Occupational Illness or Disease
Loss of Primary Containment of Hydrocarbon Liquids or Gasses (LOPC)
Spills
Fires and/or Explosions
Flammable Gas Releases
Road Traffic Accidents (RTA).
Integrity Related Incidents
Non-trivial Property Damage (PD)
Any Near-miss or unsafe condition having a potential outcome of any of the above, including
process safety incidents
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Security Incident
Significant adverse reaction from Government Agencies & Authorities, Media, Non-Government
Organisations and/or Public
Whether an incident injury is recordable or not does not alter the need to investigate it to prevent
recurrence and learn lessons.
API 754 & OGP 456 identifies leading and lagging process safety indicators useful for driving
performance improvement. It’s a framework for measuring activity, status or performance, and
classifies process safety indicators into four tiers of leading and lagging indicators. Tiers 1 and 2 are
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Notification and Reporting Procedure
suitable for shareholder or public reporting and Tiers 3 and 4 are intended for internal use at
individual sites and support continuous improvement.
Fig 1 depicts a process safety pyramid with four classifications or tiers. The tiers of the pyramid
represent a continuum of leading and lagging process safety indicators. Tier 1 is the most lagging
and Tier 4 is the most leading. (See API 754 / OGP 456 )
JV selected KPI’s -
Target’s set to100% compliance
Tiers 1 and 2 represent mainly lagging KPIs and cover asset integrity major and less severe
incidents. A description of the consequence thresholds is in Appendix 13.
Tier 3 PSE’s typically record a ‘near miss’ that has challenged the safety system by getting
through at least one barrier. See Appendix 14.
Tier 4 PSE’s assess the systematic activities of the JV’S to maintain and improve its risk
control barriers. These performance indicators monitor a management system’s success in
achieving safe and reliable operations. See Appendix 14.
1. For Tier 1 and Tier 2 Process Safety Event, the LOPC classification is based on acute flow –
see definition
2. Process Safety staff need to independently verify any release, unless the release is below the
level 5 threshold in Appendix 11. All material releases must be quantified and the final
calculation attached to the incident report (IR) in Synergi.
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Notification and Reporting Procedure
3. IA & ISG use the 1-5 levels in Appendix 11 which is based on total release. API Tier 1 & Tier 2
can use a combination of Personal Safety incident and release volumes contained in Appendix
13. All LOPC Investigations shall report the released total volume (Appendix 11) &
calculate if the incident/release meets the API LOPC Tier 1 & Tier 2 Criteria (Appendix 13)
and if it does, report both Level 1-5 severity and LOPC Tier 1-2 in any investigation
report.
Note: The convention in API RP 754 to use the terminology ‘PSE Rate’ (as opposed to frequency) and have
separate PSER’s for Tier 1 and Tier 2 Process Safety Events. See Appendix 13 for details of release thresholds
If the operations or activity is occurring in District (D3) or In Amenas the RRP must report all
incidents to the ISG /IA Field Manager respectively for information, inclusion in the daily report and in
case of the need for medical or emergency response support.
4.2. Joint Venture IA/ISG/Wells HSE Managers (or their designate) role and
responsibility
Ensure notification of RRP of all accidents / incidents, to provide investigation guidance to those
involved, ensure JV notification as per notification lists, support development of Terms of Reference
for the RRP, ensure entry into Synergi and if required follow on action closure.
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Notification and Reporting Procedure
Any person who is involved in, and/or who witnesses or discovers an incident or spill shall report
it immediately to his/her Supervisor. If it is an incident involving a sub-contractor, then they must
first report it to their primary Contractor Management. The senior Contractor Site Representative
shall then report the incident to the Contract Accountable Manger (CAM).
The Line and/or Contractor Supervisor shall immediately notify the Responsible Reporting
Person (RRP).
The RRP shall immediately notify the JV HSE Manager based at Hassi Messaoud or designate,
who shall be responsible for all Shareholder notification & reporting. Local Incident Notification
and Reporting is the responsibility of the local HSE team. Notification & Reporting is completed
in accordance with Appendix 2 Incident reporting flow chart, Appendix 7 Guidance of notification
and reporting, Appendix 8 SH and M.E.M reporting requirements, Appendix 9 Notification lists
and Appendix 12 Dropped objects.
The Initial Incident Announcement Form (IIA), see Appendix 3, shall be completed by the Line or
Site supervisor with support from the local HSE Function and approved by the RRP for all
incidents of severity level 1 to 4 . The timing and distribution list of IIA forms is detailed in
Appendix 7. For incidents classified as a High Potential (HIPO) or Major Incident then the HiPo
Announcement form and Major Incident Announcement (MIA) form will be used and distributed
within 24 hrs, see Appendix 4 and Appendix 5. The notification of a Major Incident to the SH
AST Director and appropriate Equinor and BP Vice President must be through personal
conversation. The MIA to the Sonatrach Notification List will be sent within 2 hours.
All work related accident s & incidents should be notified by the line manager/supervisor and the
Doctor/Medic to legal CNAS through HR representative at site or HMD within 48hours in
accordance with JV HR procedures and legal requirements.
All incidents should be reported within 24 hours to the Ministry (DMI) via the JV HSE Manager in
HMD in the daily report by fax or e-mail, Appendix 7 summarises Sonatrach and MEM
requirements.
In addition to the Notification & Reporting process, all incidents shall be listed on the Daily report to
Sonatrach and Monthly reports to all shareholders.
5. Investigation
All incidents shall be investigated in order to learn from the failure in the management system and
ensure corrective actions are defined. The degree of investigation shall be determined by the
potential severity of the incident. The relevant TA will decide the appropriate degree of investigation
required for integrity related incidents and near misses. With the exception of MIAs, HiPos and
DAFWCs all investigation reports will be completed within a one week from the incident.
All MIAs, HIPOs, DAFWCs and Process Safety Events Tier 1&2 require a formal Root Cause
Analysis and use of the Comprehensive List of Causes (CLC). The RRP requesting the investigation
will provide Terms of Reference (ToR). The investigation protocol is described in the JV
Investigation Procedure (ISG UU00-A-XXPP-00-0068 & IAO-JM-OX-99-00-33013).
Algerian Decree Nº 05-09 of January 08th, 2005: Art. 6. Requires members of the Committee of
Hygiene and Security (CHS Workforce members) to be part of the investigation process. It is
recommended as a minimum, this is for level 3 incidents and above.
Appropriate IA / ISG Supervision and Management will review all high severity incidents once the
investigation team has completed the investigation and recorded all findings and actions, this is
mandatory for the following type of incidents; HIPO, MIA, DAWFC and Process Safety Event.
After an Integrity Management or PSE Tier 1 events incident a pre-start-up safety review shall be
conducted to assure people, plant and process are ‘fit for purpose’.
6. Classification
Incidents, near misses and unsafe conditions shall be classified for actual severity and for potential
severity in accordance with Appendix 11 which defines incident outcomes associated with various
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Notification and Reporting Procedure
severity incident levels. Appendix 12 shall be used to determine the potential effects of dropped
objects
Line Managers/Supervisors at each location are responsible for assigning the initial classification of
each incident, and for notifying the relevant personnel of the event. Incidents will be classified in
terms of their severity and whether they are integrity related. Integrity related incidents will require
review by both the HSE and IM function.
The RRP will evaluate the classification to ensure it meets the OSHA criteria and determine if other
reporting is required (e.g. HIPO, MIA etc). The local HSE Function shall advise on incident
classification and review the accuracy of the submitted incident records. As classification can be
complex, the investigation team should seek direction from the HMD HSE Manager when
considering the classification of an incident before finalising the report. Where there is a potential for
several classifications in one event, the general rule is to focus on the priority of People,
Environment then Plant/Equipment and actual rather than potential severity, recognising for example
a large dropped object may be more significant classification than a First Aid Case.
For HIPOs, MIAs and Tier 1 PSE, the RRP in consultation with the JV (ISG &IA) HSE Manager will
convene a team to evaluate the initial incident notification and to confirm the classification. This will
occur with the input from the affected contractor, the IA or ISG Site Representative, relevant
Contract Accountable Manager, local HSE Function and Technical Authority as required by the
nature of the incident.
7. Reporting
All investigations will be documented, the report template is provided under IA & ISG Investigation
procedure: IAO-JM-OX-99-00-33013-X03 and for UU00-A-XXPP-000-0068 respectively. The report
must be confirmed and signed by all members of the investigation team. The RRP shall approve the
final version of the investigation report. In the case of integrity related or process safety incidents the
report shall be approved by both the RRP and relevant TA. A one page lessons learned report will
be produced by the investigation Team Leader for all incidents of severity level 3 and above, see
Appendix 5. (The Investigation Report can be distributed as lessons learnt document ‹ level 3)
SYNERGI is the IT system for recording and following up HSE and operational incidents, near
misses and unsafe acts / conditions (note: Wells utilise Drilling contractor UA/UC systems). In
synergi unsafe acts/ unsafe conditions are reported as safety observations/ safety conversation. It is
the responsibility of the RRP to ensure all incidents data and reports are entered in SYNERGI. The
RRP is accountable for the accuracy of the data entered in to SYNERGI, including classifications.
Actions from the investigation report must be recorded in the system for follow-up purposes. In
addition, other facts regarding the incident which have been recorded in SYNERGI must be updated
in accordance with the conclusions of the investigation report. The investigation report and
supporting documentation will be attached to the case in SYNERGI. The actual and potential
severity of incidents shall be established in accordance with the severity matrix in Appendix 11 and
recorded within SYNERGI.
The RRP will ensure all spills are entered into SYNERGI as incidents including those below the
notification criteria of less than a barrel to ensure any corrective actions and lessons learned are
captured.
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Notification and Reporting Procedure
APPENDIX 1: ABREVIATIONS
D3 : District three
DPP : Direction de Protection du Patrimoine (Ministry)
CAM Contract Accountable Manger
CLC : Comprehensive List of Causes
CNAS : Caisse Nationale d’Assurance sociale (Insurance)
DAFWC : Day Away From Work Case
ER : Emergency response
FA : First Aid
FAC : First Aid Case
HIPo : High Potential Accident
HR : Human Resource
IA : In Amenas
IIA : Initial Incident Announcement
IM : Incident Management
ISG : In Salah Gas
JV : Joint Venture
LEL : Lower Explosive Limit
LOPC : Loss Of Primary Containment
MEM : Ministry of Energy and Mines
MIA : Major Incident Announcement
MT : Medical Treatment
MTC: Medical Treatment Case
OSHA : Occupational safety and Health Administration
PD : Property Damage
RRP : Responsible Reporting Person
RTA : Road Traffic Accidents
RWC : Restricted Work Case
SH : SONATRACH
Synergi : Software system for recording and following up HSE inputs.
TA : Technical Authority
ToR : Terms of Reference
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Notification and Reporting Procedure
INCIDENT
No No Is the
Is the incident incident an Yes
Severity Level MIA or HiPo
3 or 4
Verbal communication
Yes to Shareholders
Competent person to update SYNERGI case data / classifications within 48 hours of issue
of the final report. Note: Final report to be an attached document within SYNERGI.
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Notification and Reporting Procedure
URGENT
Association: Contact:
(JV BP/SH/ Equinor)
Project/Operation Name:
Potential Outcome/Severity:
Likely Cause:
Actions Taken:
Management Comments:
Person in charge:
Name:
Company:
Email Distribution for Level 4 incidents and above: ISG: GHSEISGInitialincidnotiflist@jvgas.com or IA:
GHSEIAInitialincidnotiflist@jvgas.com or GHSEHMDInitialincidnotiflist@jvgas.com
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Notification and Reporting Procedure
Business impact/damage/loss:
External agencies involved:
News media coverage seen:
What assistance has been requested:
JV person in JV Manager / JV
charge of Leader
response/
Investigation
Office telephone: Office telephone:
Mobile telephone: Mobile telephone
Home telephone:
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Potential Outcome:
Likely Causes:
Actions Taken:
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Safety Communication
Type of Incident:
Business Unit: North Africa
Country: Algeria System Causes: Job Factors
Location of Incident: Actions being taken to prevent recurrence:
Date of Incident:
SYNERGI Case No:
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Notification and Reporting Procedure
Note: HMD HSE Manager is responsible for all Shareholder email Notification & Reporting. Local / site Notification and Reporting is the
responsibility of the local HSE Manager / team. Joint Venture IA/ISG/Wells HSE Managers or their designate to ensure correct compliance
with this procedure and any entry into Synergi.
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Notification and Reporting Procedure
These contact details are updated frequently. The latest list of names and contacts is held by the HMD HSE Manager and
HSE coordinator.
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NOTIFICATION LIST 1
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Standard
00213-23-483-030
General Communications SH
Fax
HSE: +213 (0)29 187 626
Security: +213 (0)29 187 604
Main alarm & Notification Centre (Fibre, Sonatrach network))
+213 (0)29 459 835
Extension numbers via optic fibre
PCT In Amenas: Main Alarm&
#21 2501 3856
Notification center #21 2501 3857
Fax HSE Department INAS
Ligne Fax +213 (0)29 459 834
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Acute Flow The calculation of LOPC severity is based on the acute flow from primary
containment. The use of acute flow is a way of acknowledging that slow,
long-term releases that are able to diffuse away, or be easily dispersed,
are potentially less hazardous than sudden releases of significant
amounts.
Acute flow is the maximum quantity of material released in any hour. If the
release duration of the material is less than one hour, then the total
amount released is the quantity that is used to determine the severity of
the LOPC.
Aviation incident See ICAO’s Annex 13, Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation for
standards and recommended practices on the conduct of aircraft accident
and incident investigation (Information also included in IOGP report 590
Aircraft Management Guidelines )
Carbon Dioxide C02 Colourless and Odourless gas, and may accumulate at low elevations as
1.5 time heavier than air. At low concentrations gaseous carbon dioxide
appears to have little toxicological effect and is not harmful to health. High
concentrations can displace oxygen in air & can affect respiratory
functions, nausea, confusion and potential for loss of life through
asphyxiation. This may be more prevalent in confined spaces, cellars &
sumps where oxygen is displaced.
Chemical Spill A release from primary containment of any pure chemical, chemical
mixture or compound ( excluding gaseous releases to the atmosphere) for
which an MSDS is required
Consequence The effect, result or outcome of an event
Contractor An individual who is under a contractual relationship to supply
ISG or IA with goods and/or services. A contractual relationship covers:
All individuals contracted directly or sub-contracted
All employees of companies contracted directly or sub-contracted
All situations where a contract has not been raised but ISG/ IA’s
procurement policy would normally expect there to be a contract in
place. This applies to all levels including sub-contracted
relationships.
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Notification and Reporting Procedure
Dropped Objects The DROPS Calculator is effectively a graph template upon which you
Calculator "plot" a dropped object, based upon the mass of the object and the
distance it fell, in order to determine its potential effects.
Explosion An Incident involving the unintentional, rapid and destructive release of
materials and / or energy, including detonations, deflagrations and
physical overpressures that result in physical damage.
Third Party Any Incident that results in the death of a third party who is
in or impacted by the JV Work Environment. This includes
both work-related and non-work-related fatalities.
Fire
An incident involving either the unintentional ignition of material resulting in
flame, smoke, charring or singeing, or the evidence that any of these have
occurred, regardless of the presence of flame.
Guidance: Any fire of any magnitude is included irrespective of whether it
is considered a Process Safety Event or not.
Examples of fires that are not normally considered Process Safety Events
include:
• A paper or cardboard fire in a garbage/ trash can in an office building.
• A fire during equipment repair in a maintenance shop.
• A solvent fire in a laboratory.
• A fire from a 120 or 220Volt shorted switch in an operation handling
hydrocarbons.
First Aid Case (FAC) A work-related injury that requires one-time treatment and subsequent
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Notification and Reporting Procedure
Note: The Hydrocarbon spill metric includes spills >= 1bbl, irrespective of
severity or material category
High Potential An incident or near miss including a security incident, where the most
Incident (HiPo) serious probable outcome is a Major Incident, see MIA definition for
examples.
Incident An unplanned event or occurrence that affects or has the potential to affect
the health or safety, or security of people, or assets, or the environment.
It includes:
Incidents with consequence: Accidents
Incidents without consequence: Near Miss
Incident Actual The classification of the actual consequence of the Incident
Severity according to the Incident Severity matrix in Appendix 9.
Incident Potential The classification, using the guidelines in Appendix 9, of the consequence
Severity of the incident that might have occurred under different circumstances.
Integrity Related Where a loss of containment has occurred or there has been a failure of
Incident an engineered system (including mechanical, electrical, structural, lifting,
and protective systems/ devices) where actual/ potential for harm to
people or the environment exists.
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Leaks A leak will cause sufficient concern to fix it quickly. It is a release equal or
exceeding;
In the case of oil; 1 drop per 15 seconds (4 drops per minute) or 1 litre
per 24hrs
In the case of gases; ‘20% LEL’ reading on the hand held gas
detectors placed 10cm downwind of the leak source.
Loss of Primary An unplanned or uncontrolled release of material from primary
Containment (LOPC) containment.
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Operational These are incidents where all protective devices and operational controls
Excursions Beyond have failed and one or more design limits of equipment have been
Design Limits exceeded, e.g. for internal or external pressures, temperatures, flow
velocities or structural loadings. Such incidents require formal
investigation irrespective of the severity of the excursion or whether there
is any immediate consequence.
Operational Boundary An incident is within the “Operational Boundary” if any of the following
applies:
It occurs at a JV operated asset (which includes unmanned assets
such as wellheads and pipelines where JV Workforce are not present
on a day to day basis,
It occurs at an “E&P contractor-led site doing a significant amount of
work for the JV
It is an operational incident that occurs at a JV operated site,
irrespective of who is operating the equipment
Vehicles/Aircraft: The asset in question is solely dedicated
to JV business use
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Notification and Reporting Procedure
reportable
Exceptions: Acetylsalicylic acid (Aspirin) , acetaminophen
(paracetamol) and dermal applications of NSAID’s not obtained by
prescription are not considered medical treatment
All dermally applied steroid applications. Exceptions: Hydrocortisone
preparations in strengths of 1 percent or less
All vaccinations used for work-related exposure. Exceptions: Tetanus
All narcotic analgesics (except codeine as listed above)
All bronchodilators. Exceptions: Epinephrine aerosol 5.5 mg/ml or less
All muscle relaxants (e.g., benzodiazepines, methocarbamol, and
cyclobenzaprine)
All injections are reportable unless specified above
All other medications (not listed above) that legally require a prescription
for purchase or use in the state or country where the injury occurred.
Exception: Medication used for the sole purpose of diagnosis (e.g. dilating
or numbing an eye for exam purposes only) is not considered medical
treatment.
For areas that are not clear, please seek the advice from a Company
physician or medical consultant and document your reasoning for
classification.
Primary Containment A tank, vessel, pipe or equipment intended to serve as the primary
container or used for the transfer of the material. Primary containers may
be designed with secondary containment systems to contain and control
the release. Secondary containment systems include, but are not limited
to, tank dykes, curbing around process equipment, drainage collection
systems into segregated oily drain systems, the outer wall of double walled
tanks etc.
Process Safety A disciplined framework for managing the integrity of hazardous operating
systems and processes by applying good design principles, engineering
and operating practices. It deals with the prevention and control of
incidents that have the potential to release hazardous materials or energy.
Such incidents can cause toxic effects, fire or explosion and could
ultimately result in serious injuries, property damage, lost production and
environmental impact.
Process Safety An unplanned event or occurrence which has, or could have, released
Incident hazardous materials or energy. Examples include:
Loss of Primary Containment, eg oil spills, gas release from process
plant
Fires or Explosions resulting from a flammable liquid or gas release
Injuries or Fatalities resulting from fire or explosion
A Tier 1 Process Safety Event (T-1 PSE) is a LOPC with greatest
Process Safety Event consequence. It’s an unplanned or uncontrolled release of any material,
Tier 1 including non-toxic and non-flammable materials (for example,
compressed air), from a process that results in one or more of the
consequences listed:
An employee, contractor or sub-contractor DAFW injury and/or
fatality.
A hospital admission and/or fatality of a third party.
An officially declared community evacuation or community shelter-in-
place.
A fire or explosion resulting in greater than or equal to $25,000 of
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Process Safety Event A Tier 2 PSE (T-2 PSE) represents LOPC events with a lesser
Tier 2 consequence. Tier 2 PSEs (even those contained by secondary systems)
indicate barrier system weakness that may be potential precursors of
future, more significant incidents. A Tier 2 PSE is an LOPC with a lesser
consequence. It’s an unplanned or uncontrolled release of any material,
including non-toxic and non-flammable materials (for example, steam, hot
condensate, N2), from a process that results in one or more of the
consequences listed below and isn’t reported in Tier 1.
An employee, contractor or sub-contractor recordable Injury.
A fire or explosion resulting in greater than or equal to $2,500 of direct
cost to the company.
PRD discharge to atmosphere whether directly or via a downstream
destructive device that results in one or more of the following four
consequences:
Liquid carryover.
Discharge to a potentially unsafe location.
An onsite shelter-in-place.
Public protective measures (for example, road closures).
A discharge quantity of material greater than the threshold
quantities in Appendix 14 in any one-hour period
Process Safety Tier 3 KPIs are used to monitor the performance of the barriers that
Events Tear 3 prevent Tier 1 and 2 LOPC events.
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failure of a barrier; therefore, targets for Tier 3 KPIs are typically set
towards zero.
Process Safety Tier 4 KPIs are used to monitor the implementation (operating discipline)
Events Tear 4 and effectiveness (performance) of the Management System Elements
that support the performance of key barriers.
Process Safety Near An unplanned event or occurrence that did not result in a release of
Miss hazardous materials or energy but could have, with the potential to result
in a loss of primary containment, process fire or explosion
Produced Water Formation water from the oil reservoir that is co-produced with the oil and
subsequently separated. Separated perched and condensed water from
gas/condensate fields is included in this category.
Process Safety An unplanned event or occurrence which has, or could have, released
Incident hazardous materials or energy. Examples include:
Loss of Primary Containment (e.g. oil spills, gas releases) from
process plant
Fires or Explosions resulting from a flammable liquid or gas
release
Injuries or Fatalities resulting from a Fire or Explosion.
PRD Pressure Reducing Device A device designed to open and relieve excess
pressure (e.g. safety valve, thermal relief, rupture disk, rupture pin,
deflagration vent, pressure/vacuum vents, etc.).
Responsible The person accountable for and controlling the operation or activity (via a
Reporting Person Control of Work/ permitting system) and those whom authority has been
(RRP) delegated for specific operational activities. See list above
Restricted Work Case A work-related injury which causes the injured person to:
(RWC) or Job Be assigned to another job on a temporary basis, or
Transfer
Work at their permanent job less than full-time, or
Work at their permanent job without undertaking all the normal
duties.
Where no meaningful restricted work is being performed, the
incident is recorded as a DAFWC
An incident is classified as a restricted work or job transfer case when:
The member of the JV Workforce/ Contractors is kept from
performing one or more of the routine functions of his or her job, or
from working the full workday that he or she would otherwise have
been scheduled to work or is transferred to a different job for all or
part of his/her period of recuperation.
A physician or other licensed health care professional
recommends that the member of the JV Workforce/ Contractors
not perform one or more of the routine functions of his or her job,
or not work the full workday that he or she would otherwise have
been scheduled to work or is transferred to a different job for all or
part of his/her period of recuperation and/or work period.
Road Traffic A work-related accident involving a motor vehicle that occurs on or off-
Accident (RTA) road resulting in injury, or loss/damage, or harm to the environment,
whether this impacts JV and/or its contractor directly, or impacts a third
party. This is irrespective of whether the accident was preventable or non-
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Accidents involving vehicles which occur on the road and result in damage
or a work related injury, includes work related operation of vehicles by JV
employees (although the vehicle may be owned, hired or leased) and
product delivery vehicles or vehicles over 3.5 T unladen operated by JV
contractors
This is irrespective of whether the accident was preventable or non-
preventable. It excludes all accidents where:
The JV workforce vehicle was legally parked- to be reported as
property damage
Minor wear and tear is the case (e.g. stone damage to a windscreen,
minor paintwork damage, doors or mirrors bumped in parking lots)
An incident is the result of vandalism, or theft
A low speed, low severity PD incident (impact with stationary object)
which has no potential to cause harm to an individual.
A company provided vehicle is being driven on non-work related
activities (e.g. private business, leisure).
Secondary Secondary containment systems include, but are not limited to, tank
containment dykes, curbing around process equipment, drainage collection systems
into segregated oily drain systems, the outer wall of double walled tanks.
Security Incident An incident involving terrorist activity, or theft of company, personal, or
Business Partner (contractor) property or information, burglary, robbery,
assault, arson, information loss, threats, alcohol or drugs, firearms, fraud,
or other violation of company policy that warrants notification of
Management Team and may require further escalation to shareholders
and invocation of the Civil Crisis Plan
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In the JV- non work related incidents shall be reported but no recorded in
the HSE statistics of the Joint Venture. Appendix 19 provides information
on Operational Boundary, reporting and recording of HSE incidents
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Regulatory compliance
Damage to sensitive environment
issue does not lead to
1 or more 1 or more with restoration to equivalent
regulatory or higher
permanent health permanent injury capability > 1 months $10- Downtime Serious criminal act
3 severity level
disabilities disabilities Damage to non-sensitive $100m > 3 days Significant theft
consequence.
DAFWC DAFWC environment with restoration to
Possible investigation or
equivalent capability > 3 months.
query from shareholders
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Notification and Reporting Procedure
LOPC POTENTIAL SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION - FOR USE IN SYNERGI REPORTING – Total release
Table 1: LOPC* of Flammable Gases, Liquids and Other Hazardous Categories
Type of Substance Flammable Gases and Vapours Flammable Liquids Other Hazardous Categories including combustible or corrosive gases/
(Rule of Thumb: conversion factor is approximately 150 fluids/vapours or solids
Impact Level Confined Releases Unconfined releases kg = 1 barrel)
Table 2: Potential Severity Classification (Potential Human Inhalation Hazard) – LOPC of Toxic Substances
Substance Class Lower Toxicity Substance Medium Toxicity Substance Higher Toxicity Substance Acutely Toxic Substance
(Class D) (Class C) (Class B) (Class A)
Impact Level All gas, vapour, mist or aerosol LOPC, regardless of location
Level 2 2000 < 4000 kg 1000 < 2000 kg 250 < 1000 kg 15 < 50 kg
Level 3 200 < 2000 kg 100 < 1000 kg 25 < 250 kg 5.0 kg < 15 kg
* Where the event is a Spill or Uncontrolled Material Release, (See definition) the above tables shall be used
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Notification and Reporting Procedure
All dropped objects that occur on, or at a JV establishment or location, or as a result of JV-
related work, will be appropriately assessed and reported. Whilst the actual severity of any
dropped object is generally easy to determine, it’s important that in all cases the most likely
potential severity of the dropped object is understood. To assist in understanding the most likely
potential severity, the JV uses the industry standard Dropped Object Prevention Scheme
(DROPS) consequence calculator (see below). The use of DROPS gives an indication of the
likely severity of a dropped object. In any analysis consider the following questions:
Was the energy potential expended in some way as the object fell (such as deflected by
pipe-work)? If so, it should be assumed that DROPS may have overestimated the likely
potential severity.
Was the object that dropped of differing size? The DROPS calculator was based on an
object delivering a force over a small surface area (point load), so the force delivered
from an object of differing size and makeup needs to be considered.
Was the dropped object made of solid material? DROPS assumes a solid object. In
some rare cases the material may not always be solid and DROPS may have
overestimated the likely potential severity.
Where an object falls into an area that is barriered off or into an area where no
personnel were present due to infrequent visits by individuals (for example, maintenance
carried out once per month), it should be assumed that people would not have been
present when the object fell. However, the opposite also holds true for an object falling in
an area where it would be reasonable to expect someone could have been present (for
example, a high-use walkway).
Note: Any re-assessment of the likely severity as a result of any of the above questions is going
to be subjective. The purpose of this guidance is to make sure that a meaningful review of the
likely potential severity indicated by the DROPS calculator is carried out, even if the eventual
outcome remains unchanged
Decide whether the incident is JV reportable as a HiPo. The ultimate potential of any dropped
object incident is determined by asking what the most serious probable outcome would have
been. For a HiPo, the most relevant serious probable outcome refers to those incidents that
could have led to either:
A fatality
Multiple serious injuries.
In reaching a conclusion as to the likely potential severity of a dropped object incident, further
consideration will also be given to the following:
The location in which the object falls, locations rarely accessed by people would not be
High Potential.
There has to be proximity – for a dropped object incident to be defined as a HiPo, the
following two criteria must be met: 1)An individual needs to be close to the impact area
when the dropped object actually lands. 2) In a position where it would be reasonable
to assume that in slightly different circumstances they could have been struck by the
object (such as they have just left the area where it actually landed).
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Notification and Reporting Procedure
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Notification and Reporting Procedure
An LOPC, including Pressure Relief Devise (PRD) discharge and upset emission from a permitted
or regulated source, is a Tier 1 or 2 PSE when it results in one or more of the consequences,
irrespective of the amount of material released:
PSE Level
Consequence Tier 1 Tier 2
Injury to employee or Fatality and/or Lost Workday Recordable occupational injury
contractor Case (days away from work (Restricted work case or Medical
case) treatment case)
Injury to third party Fatality, or injury/illness that None
results in a hospital admission
*Fire or explosion Fire or Explosion resulting in Fire or Explosion resulting in
greater than or equal to greater than or equal to $2,500 of
$100,000 of direct cost to the direct cost to the Company.
Company
*For a fire or explosion, the classification should be done on the fire or explosion direct cost not the
release rate. Fire or Explosion takes precedence over release rate in this case. Source IOGP report 456
Process Safety KPI’s
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Notification and Reporting Procedure
(Taken from OGP Report: Process safety – Recommended practice on Key Performance
Indicators 456 – Nov 2018)
Tier 3 and 4 indicators are primarily designed for monitoring and review of barriers and the
management systems that support their performance, especially at the operational level.
Tier 3 indicators
KPIs can provide considerable insight into systematic weaknesses and improvement opportunities
for hardware barriers, particularly Process Containment, and human barriers, with response to
process alarm and upset conditions
Barrier challenges:
Tier 4 indicators
These are leading measures that monitor operational activity to maintain or strengthen a barrier or
management system. Barriers can be assessed using a combination of leading and lagging KPIs.
Tier 3 KPIs are more lagging and record the number of failures of a barrier.
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Notification and Reporting Procedure
In general, Tier 3 indicators are selected such that targets are set towards 0 in the long term, while
Tier 4 indicators are selected such that targets are set towards 100% conformance in the long
term.
Tier 4 indicators proactively measure the asset’s efforts to maintain and improve the completeness,
integrity, strength, or quality of barriers and supporting Management System Elements.
Tier 4 indicators support understanding of the effort required to reduce barrier weaknesses to an
appropriate level in terms of risk management.
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Notification and Reporting Procedure
LOPC Classification
1. A valve leak occurred in a gas turbine acoustic enclosure which is Tier 2
accessible to the workforce. The quantity of gas released was 40 kg
within 1 hour. This is a Tier 2 PSE, because the LOPC exceeds the
threshold quantity for an indoor release of flammable gas. If equipment
or a work area is enclosed (apart from louvers and/or air intakes) then
the indoor release threshold quantities should be used for determining
whether an LOPC occurring in any one-hour period is a Tier 1 or Tier 2
PSE
2. An operator opens a quality control sample point to collect a routine Tier 2
sample of oil and material splashes on him. The operator runs to a safety
shower leaving the sample point open and a Tier 2 threshold quantity is
released. This is a Tier 2 PSE since the release of a threshold quantity
was unplanned or uncontrolled.
3. There is a 10 bbl. spill of condensate that steadily leaks from piping Not Tier 1 or
outdoor onto soil over a two-week time period. Simple calculations show Tier 2, report
the spill rate was approximately 0.03 bbl. per hour. This is not a Tier 1 or in Synergi
Tier 2 PSE since the spill event did not exceed the threshold quantity in
any one-hour period.
4. A pipeline leaks and releases 2,200 lbs./1000 kg of flammable gas Tier 1
above ground within one hour; however, the release occurred in a
remote location and not on a facility. This is a reportable Tier 1 PSE
since ‘remoteness’ is not a consideration and the release exceeded a
Tier 1 threshold quantity.
5. A faulty tank gauge results in the overfilling of a storage tank containing Tier 1
oil with a flash point <23°C (73 °F)/API Gravity over 15. Approximately
50 barrels (7,000 kgs) of liquid overflows into the tank’s diked area. This
incident is a Tier 1 PSE since it is a release of (1000 kg/7 bbl.) or more of
a flammable liquid within any one-hour period, regardless of secondary
containment.
If the spill had been less than (1000 kg/7 bbl.), but equal to or greater
than (100 kg/0.7 bbl.), it would be a Tier 2 PSE
6. An operator purposely drains 20 bbl. of hydrocarbon with a flash point Not a PSE
>60 °C (140 °F) ≤ 93°C (200 °F) at a temperature below its flash point event
into an oily water collection system within one hour as part of a vessel
cleaning operation. Since the drainage is planned and controlled and the
collection system is designed for such service, this is not a reportable
Tier 1 or 2 PSE.
Injury
7. An operator walks through a process unit and slips and falls to the
ground and suffers in an occupational injury, which is a lost work day DAFWC not
case (LWDC). The slip/fall is due to weather conditions, ‘chronic’ oily PSE event
floors, and slippery shoes. This is not a Tier 1 or Tier 2 PSE. Personal
safety ‘slip/trip/fall’ incidents that are not directly associated with
evacuating from or responding to a LOPC are specifically excluded.
Same as above, except that the operator slips and falls while responding
8. to a small spill of liquid with a flash point <23 °C (73 °F) quantity less Tier 1 PSE
than 7 barrels in 1 hour, resulting in a recordable LWDC incident. This and DAFWC
would also be recorded as a Tier 1 PSE since the operator is responding
to an LOPC, even though the LOPC is below the Tier 1 threshold
quantity in Table
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Notification and Reporting Procedure
9. Same as above, except that the operator slips and falls several hours DAFWC not
after the incident has concluded. This is a recordable LWDC incident but PSE event
would not be a reported as a PSE. Occupational safety events that are
not directly associated with onsite response to a LOPC are excluded. A
slip or fall after the LOPC has concluded (such as ‘after-the-fact’ clean-
up and remediation) is not directly associated with onsite response
10. A scaffolding contractor is injured after falling from a scaffold ladder while Tier 1 PSE
evacuating from a LOPC on nearby equipment. The contractor is absent and DAFWC
from work for 5 days and the injury is recorded as a recordable DAFWC
incident and the LOPC is then classified as a Tier 1 PSE, whether or not
the release exceeded the Threshold quantities.
11. A maintenance contractor opens a process valve and gets sprayed with Tier 1 &
less than the Tier 1 or Tier 2 Threshold Quantity of sulphuric acid DAFWC
resulting in severe burn and several weeks off work due to the injury.
This is a Tier 1 PSE because it is an unplanned or uncontrolled LOPC
that results in a lost work day case.
Fire
12. A pump lube oil system fire from a leak causes damage greater than Tier 1
$100,000, but does not create a LOPC greater than the threshold
quantity or cause a fatality or serious injury. This is a Tier 1 PSE since
the damage was greater than $100,000.
13. An electrical fire impacts the operation of the process resulting in an Tier 1
acute release outdoors of 3,300 lbs. (1500 kg or about 10 bbl.) of oil (API
Gravity ca. 40, flash point). This is a Tier 1 PSE since the LOPC exceeds
the reporting threshold quantity of 2,200 lb. (1000 kg, 7bbl) for a
flammable liquid.
Drilling
14. During an extended well test at 10,000 Barrel Per Day rate with 1250 Tier 1
gas-to-oil ratio, a slug of liquid extinguished the flare flame, resulting in a
release of un-combusted natural gas at 520,000 SCF per hour until the
flare was reignited 10 minutes later. This is a Tier 1 PSE because the
flare failed to operate as designed (it was not designed for cold venting)
when it flamed out resulting in an unplanned and uncontrolled release
(LOPC) of flammable gas significantly exceeding the Tier 1 release
quantity of 1100 lb. (500 kg) within one hour.
15. While drilling a well, there is a loss of hydrostatic overbalance resulting in Not a Tier 1 or
a well kick. Standard Well Control procedures are implemented to re- Tier 2, report
establish full control. These procedures result in the planned venting of in Synergi
the kick through the rig’s choke and kill system and de-gasser. No
flammable impacts were observed on the rig or area. This was a planned
release consistent with procedures and therefore not a Tier 1 or Tier 2
PSE, even though the gas release may have exceeded the release
quantity thresholds for the PSE KPI. Companies may report this within
their Tier 3 KPIs because this is a demand on a safety system or a PRD
activation.
16. While drilling a well, a shallow gas pocket is struck, causing a loss of well Tier 1 & Spill
control. Mud, cuttings and 100 barrels of oil are released to the
environment, and 1.8 MMSCF of gas (about 64,000 kg) are discharged
through the diverter valve to the atmosphere. The release continued for
two days at an average of 900,000 SCFD. This meets the criteria for
both a Tier 1 PSE because of the flammable gas LOPC. It is also a
reportable spill (over 1 barrel) to the environment under environmental
reporting requirements.
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NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
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Notification and Reporting Procedure
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