J 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 8926 2021 1 AIR Bom R 361 20jglsamaheshwari Jgueduin 20220128 183542 1 20

SCC Online Web Edition, © 2022 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 1 Friday, January 28, 2022

Printed For: aarya maheshwari, Jindal Global University
SCC Online Web Edition: http://www.scconline.com
© 2022 EBC Publishing Pvt.Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2020 SCC OnLine Bom 8926 : (2021) 1 AIR Bom R 361
In the High Court of Bombay

(BEFORE RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.)
Civil Application No. 6480/2020

Natha Bhimrao Mote And Others
Versus
Director General, Water and Land Management Institute
With
Civil Application No. 3447/2020
Indubai Ramesh Thorat and Others
Versus
Director General, Water And Land Management Institute
With
Review Application No. 67/2020
Director General Water and Land Management Institute
Versus
Raybhan Chandrabhan Shelke
With
Versus
Indubai Ramesh Thorat
With
Versus
Ramesh Devrao Thorat
With
Versus
Suresh Dattu Mungse
With
Versus
Baban Mhasu Surade
With
Versus
Suresh Damodar Gund Through Lrs Meerabai Damodar Gund
With
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Versus
Prauagbai Tukaram Sawant
With
Versus
Sushilabai Bhagwan Pankhede
With
Versus
Prabhat Punjaji Salve Through Lrs Savita Punjaji Salve
With
Versus
Sheshrao Dhansing Ade
With
Versus
Tatyarao Mathu Pawar
With
Versus
Ashok Chambatrao Khadke Through Lrs Kiran Ashok Khadke
With
Versus
Kamalbai Mukundrao Misal
With
Versus
Asrabai Davrao Suchlade
With
Versus
Shaikh Rafiq Shaikh Tamijodin
With
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Versus
Prakash Rambhau Kharbe
With
Versus
Bhaurao Bhikaji Solankar Through Lrs Kamalbai Bhaurao Solankar
With
Versus
Dattatray Dyandev Mutekar
With
Versus
Sayrabi Razzak Baig
With
Versus
Yashodabai Dattu Kshirsagar
With
Versus
Ashok Anandrao Ahire
With
Versus
Chandrabhan Kishan Pagare Through Lrs Dwarkabai Chandrahan
Pagare
With
Versus
Gangahar Bapurao Sathe Through Lrs Suman Gangadhar Sathe
With
Versus
Bharat Asaram Ingle
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
With
Versus
Anjanabai Dadarao Kale
With
Versus
Sayyed Gani Sayyed Hussain
With
Versus
Indubai Tukaram Thorat
With
Versus
Deepak Suryakant Saraf
With
Versus
Sanjay Nathuji Ingle
With
Versus
Bhanudas Sarjerao Sawant Through Lrs Rukminbai Bhanudas
Sawant
With
Versus
Eknath Punjaram Waghmode
With
Versus
Pandurang Murlidhar Gund
With
Versus
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Waman Bhimrao Biradar Through Lrs Nanda Bhimrao Biradar

With
Versus
Sahebrao Khanduji Tarange Through Lrs Padmabai Sahebrao
Tarange
With
Versus
Bhagwan Appaji Pankhede
With
Versus
Chandraprabhu Bhikaji Huse
With
Versus
Gufabai
Civil Application No. 6480/2020, Civil Application No. 3447/2020, Review
Application No. 67/2020, Review Application No. 68/2020, Review Application No.
69/2020, Review Application No. 70/2020, Review Application No. 71/2020,
Review Application No. 72/2020, Review Application No. 73/2020, Review
Application No. 102/2020 and Review Application No. 171/2020
Decided on November 4, 2020
Advocates who appeared in this case:
Advocate for the Workers : Shri Joshi Prabhakar K. and Shri V.S. Khairnar
Advocate for the Management/Walmi : Shri V. J. Dixit, Senior Counsel h/f Shri S.V.
Dixit
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.:— These Review Applications are filed by the original
petitioner/Management, Water and Land Management Institute (WALMI),
Kanchanwadi, Paithan Road, Aurangabad, in Writ Petition No. 2827/2019 and other
connected writ petitions, seeking review of the order dated 26.07.2019.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Civil Application Nos. 6480/2020 and 3447/2020 have been filed by the workers,
who are beneficiaries of the order dated 26.07.2019 delivered in a group of Writ
Petition No. 2827/2019 and connected petitions, seeking withdrawal of amounts.
3. At the outset, it needs to be noted that 141 workers, claiming payment of unpaid
wages for the work performed on State and National holidays, had approached the
learned Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 11889/2015. By order dated
14.09.2016, this Writ Petition was disposed off since these workers had a statutory
efficacious remedy under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and for
which, they were granted liberty to approach the Labour Court at Aurangabad.
Pursuant to this order, 46 workers out of 141, approached the Labour Court under
Section 33-(C)(2). Nine applications were dismissed in default and it is informed by
the learned advocate for the workers that their restoration applications are pending
before the Labour Court. In 37 applications, the Labour Court delivered identical
judgments on 23.04.2018 granting the claims of these 37 workers and crystallizing
their claims for an amount of Rs. 1 lac each towards the unpaid wages for having
worked on the State and National holidays in between 01.10.1995 till 01.12.2009.
Interest at the rate of 10% per annum was also granted on the said amount.
4. By these Review Applications, the Management contends that there are errors
committed by this Court in appreciating the record available before it in it's
supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, notwithstanding
the fact that the petitions filed by the Management/Walmi were partly allowed to the
extent of reducing the amount from Rs. 1 lac to Rs. 97,000/- per worker and the
interest amount having been reduced from 10% per annum to 7% per annum.
5. The grounds put forth by the Review Petitioner/Management are reproduced
verbatim hereunder:—
“I. The Hon'ble High Court ought to have considered contentions of applicant in
respect of inapplicability of public holidays and other holidays as applicable to
other employees during period as claimed by respondent in her Application i.e.
from 01.10.1995 to 01.12.2009. Therefore, there was no question of respondent
working on public holiday and payment of remuneration of such alleged work on
public holiday.
II. Hon'ble High Court ought to have appreciated that, the claim of respondent was
mainly based upon Circular dated 26.11.2009 and it is stated that, said Circular
dated 26.11.2009 states that, respondent is entitled for monetary benefit with
retrospective effect for discharging work on public holiday. However said Circular
dated 26.11.2009 itself indicates that, employees would be given benefits of
public holidays and if employee is required to work on public holiday then such
employee would be entitled for compensatory holiday in lieu of such holiday.
Said Circular nowhere speaks of payment of any monetary compensation for work
discharged on public holiday.
III. It is an error on the face of the record by not considering that, Circular dated
26.11.2009 is not retrospective in nature and said Circular has to be made
applicable prospectively from 01.12.2009. As Circular is not retrospective,
respondent is not entitled to claim any benefit of the Circular for the period prior
to Circular is brought into effect. Therefore, claim of respondent seeking
remuneration for alleged work on public holiday is not tenable and Application
U/Sec. 33 (c)(1)(2) of Industrial Disputes Act ought to have been dismissed.
IV. It is an error on the face of the record by not considering that, respondent
became permanent w.e.f. 01.10.1995. Such employees were not having benefit
of public holidays and were given weekly holiday as per circular dated
26.04.1996. Therefore, Establishment Committee of applicant took decision on
15.09.2009 to give benefit of public holiday as per Resolution passed by
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Governing Council of applicant on 25.08.1995 and it was also decided that, if any
employee is required to work on public holiday then such employee would be
entitled for compensatory holiday alternate compensatory holiday. In view of
such Resolution, passed by Governing Council and Establishment Committee,
Circular dated 26.11.2009 was issued w.e.f. 01.12.2009. As the date of giving
effect to such Circular is also stated in Circular itself, such Circular could not
have been considered as retrospective in application.
V. Hon'ble High Court ought to have appreciated that, Circular dated 26.04.1996 of
applicant makes it clear that, Watchmen will get only one weekly holiday and
they are not entitled for other public holidays. Therefore, employees discharging
work of Watchman cannot claim benefit of public holidays.
VI. Hon'ble High Court ought to have appreciated that, Circular dated 26.04.1996 of
applicant specifies that employees who are discharging field work would not be
entitled for public holidays and are entitled for holidays as referred in said
circular.
VII. It is an error apparent on the face of the record by not considering that, claim
of respondent was not supported by any documentary evidence and even no
record was produced before Learned Labour Court and Hon'ble High Court
indicating alleged work on permissible public holiday by respondent. Therefore,
in absence of any such material, no inference could have been drawn to presume
that, respondent has worked on permissible public holidays and entitled for any
compensation.
VIII. It is an error apparent on the face of the record in not considering that, the
Judgment and Order passed by Learned Labour Court nowhere takes into
consideration that, respondent employee has not pleaded about working on
weekly holidays or rejection of any compensatory holiday for working on weekly
holiday.
IX. It may be noted that administrative officer on 05.12.2011 issued circular to all
officers seeking information of public holidays and financial burden for making
payment of monetary remuneration for work discharged on public holidays.
Further issued letter on 20.04.2012 to accounts officer by misinterpreting
circular that benefit of public holidays is to be given from 01.10.1995 and
therefore, amount be determined. On 30.04.2012, accounts officer pointed out
that if employee works on public holiday, compensatory holiday is permissible. If
such compensatory holiday is not utilized within 1 year or if such holidays
exceeds more than three then such compensatory holiday gets cancelled.
Therefore, no remuneration is payable and entire salary of month is paid to
employees at relevant time. Accounts officer further sought guidance about
provision in government resolution about payment of remuneration and rate of
calculation of such remuneration. In reply to this, administrative officer asked to
divide monthly salary by 30 and to determine amount payable for a day and
asked to calculate accordingly. No rule was referred in said noting. This discloses
manner of vague calculations which are not supported by any legal provisions of
law referred in letter dated 25.05.2012.
X. It may be noted that, calculation of Rs. 1.5 crore is based upon calculation of
public holidays, local holidays and holidays of 2nd and 4th Saturday as applicable
to other employees. However, circular dated 26.04.1996 was not taken into
consideration for considering entitlement of respondent employee and erroneous
assessment was made. Therefore, such erroneous assessment of public holidays
and remuneration for such holidays ought not to have been relied.
XI. It is an error apparent on the face of the record in not considering that, the
Judgment and Order passed by Learned Labour Court is mainly based upon
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Letter dated 25.05.2012, issued by Administrative Officer of the applicant. Such

Letter is in the nature of Proposal seeking Approval of Government for payment
of compensation for alleged work discharged on public holidays by respondent.
However, it is not brought to the Notice of this Hon'ble Court that, such proposal
was rejected by State Government on 31.10.2012. It is stated in the said Letter
that, no such provision is available in Maharashtra Civil Services (Leave) Rules
1982 to give any monetary remuneration to employee for work discharged on
public holidays. Therefore, Letter dated 25.05.2012 ought not to have been relied
and, therefore, Impugned Order based upon such Letter deserves to be quashed
and set-aside.
XII. It may be noted that, the Hon'ble Court ought to have appreciated that, Letter
dated 25.05.2012 was seeking permission of State Government to make
provision for payment of monetary compensation for work discharged by
employees on public holidays. Such proposal cannot be said to be decision of
applicant or acceptance of claim by applicant. It is mere proposal based upon
representation by an organization seeking such benefit. It only refers that,
approx. amount would be Rs. 1.5 Crore but in fact such amount was not based
upon any factual assessment of alleged work discharged by respondent and
similarly situated employees on public holidays and such assessment is vague
and not based upon record of actual work. Therefore, Letter dated 25.05.2012,
issued by Administrative Officer ought not to have been relied to adjudicate
claim of respondent.
XIII. It is an error apparent on the face of the record in not appreciating that, the
claim seeking monetary remuneration for work discharged on public holidays was
made in the year 2016 and considering Provisions of Limitation Act no claim
ought to have been entertained by Learned Labour Court after lapse of three
years from the date of entitlement. Considering afterthought and belated
Application by respondent, no amount could have been directed to be paid to
such employee.
XIV. The Hon'ble High Court ought to have appreciated that, payment of monetary
remuneration to employees which is not provided in any of service rules and
regulations amounts to making new policy and such policy decision was required
to be taken by governing council of applicant. Governing Council of applicant
never took any decision of making payment to employees in respect of
remuneration for work discharged on public holidays. Therefore, proposal sent by
Administrative Officer without getting any sanction from Governing Council is of
no significance and cannot be considered to be valid proposal in the eyes of law,
which was relied by Ld. Labour Court for accepting claim of respondent.
XV. The Hon'ble High Court ought to have considered that, the Learned Labour
Court failed to appreciate effect of Circular dated 26.11.2009 as the said Circular
nowhere enables employee to claim monetary remuneration of earlier public
holidays. Even Learned Labour Court did not consider any of the submissions of
applicant as Administrative Officer of applicant submitted Letter dated
25.05.2012.
XVI. The Hon'ble High Court ought to have considered that, Learned Labour Court
erred in holding that, applicant ought to have produced record of employees,
who have worked on public holidays. Learned Labour Court ought to have
appreciated that, burden to prove that, respondent-employee has worked on
public holidays was on respondent and not on the applicant. Respondent was
required to discharge such burden and in absence of any material produced on
record in discharge of such burden, claim of employee on the basis of
assumption ought not to have been allowed.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
XVII. The Hon'ble High Court ought to have appreciated that, all 155 employees
were not working on same post and, therefore, equal division of amount amongst
all the 155 employees is incorrect and not based upon any factual assessment
and record.
XVIII. Hon'ble High Court failed to appreciate that, respondent employee has not at
all claimed monetary remuneration on the basis of any provision of law and
reliance placed upon, Circular dated 26.11.2009 and Letter dated 25.05.2012,
issued by Administrative Officer of applicant cannot confer any right in favour of
respondent employee to claim monetary remuneration. In absence of any such
right, Application U/Sec. 33(c)(1)(2) itself was not tenable and ought to have
been dismissed in limine.
XIX. It may be noted that, since the record was old, it could not be produced before
Hon'ble Court. However no public holiday was available to respondent employee
till 01.12.2009 and only one weekly holiday was available, which was utilized by
such employee. Therefore, there was no question of maintaining any independent
record of respondent employee in respect of alleged work on public holidays. As
far as Muster of the employee is concerned, entire record was not available in
respect of all the employees, but applicant could get record of some of the
employees, which indicates that, those employees have given weekly holiday
and, therefore, such employees are not eligible for claiming any monetary
compensation for alleged work discharged on public holidays.
XX. It is an error apparent on the face of the record in not considering that, the
Judgment and Order passed by Learned Labour Court failed to appreciate
government resolution dated 12.09.1980 contemplates only alternate
compensatory holiday if any employee discharges work on public holiday and
also provides limitation of 1 year for claiming such compensatory holiday. It is
further provided in the said government resolution that no monetary
remuneration would be payable for such compensatory holiday.
XXI. It is an error apparent on the face of the record by that, this Hon'ble Court
granted benefit in favour of 118 employees, who are similarly situated without
considering that, those employees have not at all claimed any monetary
compensation before Learned Labour Court and such conduct of not claiming
amount by the employees would amount to acceptance of their ineligibility to
receive such monetary compensation.”
6. I have heard the learned senior advocate on behalf of the Review
Petitioner/Walmi for almost 45 minutes and the learned advocate for the workers.
7. While considering the submissions of the learned Senior Advocate and the
grounds formulated in the Review Applications reproduced above, I deem it
appropriate to refer to the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court delivered in the
case of Lily Thomas v. Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 224 : AIR 2000 SC 1650, wherein,
the Honourable Supreme Court has cast fetters upon the High Courts while hearing the
review petitions, which read thus:—
“52. The dictionary meaning of the word “review”, “the act of looking, offer
something again with a view to correction or improvement”. It cannot be denied
that the review is the creation of a statute. This Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi v.
Pradyumansinghji Arjunshinghji, (1971) 3 SCC 844 : AIR 1970 SC 1273 held
that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law
either specifically or by necessary implication. The review is also not an appeal in
disguise. It cannot be denied that justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers
and the rules or procedures or technicalities of law cannot stand in the way of
administration of justice. Law has to bend before justice. If the Court finds that
the error pointed out in the review petition was under a mistake and the earlier
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
judgment would not have been passed but for erroneous assumption which in
fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice
nothing would preclude the Court from rectifying the error. This Court in S.
Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka, 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595 held:
“Review literally and even judicially means reexamination or re-consideration.
Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility.
Yet in the realm of law the Courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour
of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and
judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of
justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by
the highest Court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order
the Courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of
justice. In Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhary v. Sukhraj Rai, AIR 1941 FC 1 that Court
observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest
Court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow ground
developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court approved the
principle laid down by the Privy Council in Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind
Singh (1836) 1 Moo PC 117 that an order made by the Court has final and could
not be altered.
“………nevertheless, if by misprison in embodying the judgments, by errors
have been introduced, these Courts possess, by Common Law, the same power
which the Courts of record and statute have of rectifying the mistakes which
have crept in ….. The House of Lords exercises a similar power or rectifying
mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must possess
the same authority. The Lords have however gone a step further, and have
corrected mistakes introduced through in inadvertence in the details of
judgments; or have supplied manifest defects in order to enable the decrees to
be enforced, or have added explanatory matter, or have reconciled
inconsistencies. Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision
as under:
‘It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly
owing to the natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable injustice being
done by a Court of last resort, where by some accident, without any blame, the
party has not been heard and an order has been inadvertently made as if the
party had been heard.’
Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that
justice is above all, it is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing
finality. When the Constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify or
recall the order passed by this Court was specifically provided by Art. 137 of the
Constitution. Our Constitution makers who had the practical wisdom to visualise
the efficacy of such provision expressly conferred the substantive power to
review any judgment or order by Art. 137 of the Constitution. And Cl. (c) or Art.
145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which any
judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise of this power Order 40 had been
framed empowering this Court to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds
analogous to Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The expression, ‘for
any other sufficient reason’ in the clause has been given an expanded meaning
and a decree or order passed under misapprehension of true state of
circumstances has been held to be sufficient ground to exercise the power. Apart
from Order 40, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules this Court has the Inherent
power to make such orders as may be necessary in the interest in justice or to
prevent the abuse of process of Court. The Court is thus not precluded from
recalling or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
for sake of justice.”

The mere fact that two views on the same subject are possible is no ground to
review the earlier judgment passed by a Bench of the same strength.”
“55. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for
correction of a mistake and not to substitute a view. Such powers can be
exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with exercise of power. The
review cannot be treated an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views
on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no
further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the
practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different
views by the Benches of co-ordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be
followed and practiced. However, this Court in exercise of its powers under Art.
136 or Art. 32 of the Constitution and upon satisfaction that the earlier
judgments have resulted in deprivation of fundamental rights of a citizen or
rights created under any other statute, can take a different view notwithstanding
the earlier judgment.”
8. In Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, 2013 ALL SCR 3411, the Honourable Supreme
Court dealt with the review jurisdiction and it's scope and came to the conclusion that
a review would be maintainable for the following reasons:—
“(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of
due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be
produced by him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
(iii) Any other sufficient reason.”
9. In Kamlesh Verma (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court also culled out the
principles as to when a review petition would not be maintainable and the same read
thus:—
“(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded
adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of
the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is
reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has
to be fished out and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the
appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing
the main matter had been negatived.”
10. Considering the above, I have no doubt in my mind that if any material placed
before the Labour Court was not properly considered by it and by this Court, when it
delivered the order on 26.07.2019, which has led to an error apparent on the face of
the order, I could consider the grounds raised by the Review Petitioner/Management.
However, I find from the judgment of the Labour Court that the witness of the
Management Smt. Nidhi Narendra Gajbe has truthfully admitted in her cross-
examination that the Management had approached the State Government for financial
assistance of Rs. 1.50 crore to be paid to each of such 155 workers, prior to the
judgment of the Labour Court dated 23.04.2018. In such proposal forwarded to the
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
State Government, the Management of Walmi had conceded that these workers had
worked on holidays in between 01.10.1995 to 01.12.2009, which includes the State
and National holidays and on occasions even on weekly holidays. The Regional Officer
of the Walmi conducted a detailed assessment and prepared the statistical data which
indicated that, on the one hand, these workers worked on holidays and on the other
hand, were not granted alternative holidays or the payment of wages for
having worked on such holidays. The said witness did not suppress the information
from the Labour Court. Consequentially, the Labour Court analyzed her deposition in
it's judgment.
11. Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 reads as under:—
“33-C. Recovery of money due from an employer : -
(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or
any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any
question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which
such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules
that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be
specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government within a period not
exceeding three months:
Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it
necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing,
extend such period by such further period as he may think fit.”
12. It is the contention of the Management/Walmi that they had prepared a scheme
of granting weekly holidays to certain daily wagers vide Government Resolution dated
12.09.1980, wherein, it was decided that those workers who worked on a holiday
would be entitled for an alternative holiday, which is normally termed as
“compensatory holiday” in the industrial and labour sector and that, such holidays
should be availed off by the said workers within one year from having worked on a
holiday. No payment was to be made to such workers for having worked on holidays.
13. In this backdrop, I called upon the litigating parties to point out from the oral
and documentary evidence recorded before the Labour Court as to whether, the
Management/Walmi has placed any material before the Court, in the backdrop of their
admission that the workers had worked on holidays and were entitled for payment, to
indicate that these workers were granted such compensatory holidays and that they
have availed off such holidays as a consequence of which they would not be entitled
for any payment thereof. The learned Senior Advocate, on instructions and the record
available before him, submits that it was the obligation cast upon the workers to avail
off compensatory holidays within one year and if they did not avail off such holidays, it
should be deemed that they have acquiesced their right to a compensatory holiday.
14. I find that this argument to be unacceptable for the reason that the litigants
before this Court were hand-to-mouth and were not able to have two square meals a
day. They were daily wage labourers and they were willing to work on all such days on
which the employer would allot them work, only to ensure that they could feed their
family/children by earning daily wages. They had zero bargaining power and were at
the mercy of the Management. If the Management banks upon the Government
Resolution dated 12.09.1980 then, it is the duty of the Management to ensure that
compensatory holidays are given to those workers, who had worked on holidays when
it was the policy of the Management that they would not be paid any wages, much
less extra wages for having worked on holidays. It is unacceptable that the workers
should be made to work on holidays and should not be paid wages coupled with an
obligation that if they do not opt to take a compensatory holiday, their right would
cease to exist.
15. The learned Senior Advocate has then turned to the letter dated 25.05.2012
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
written by the Administrative Officer, Walmi to the Principal Secretary, Irrigation

Project and Development, Irrigation Department, State of Maharashtra, which is the
basis on which the right is accrued to these workers. The contention of the learned
Senior Advocate is that though in this communication there is a semblance of the
Management accepting the claims of the workers, it was purely a proposal sent to the
Government, which the Government has subsequently rejected. It is, therefore,
canvassed that once the Government has rejected the said proposal, the workers have
no right.
16. I find it legally unacceptable that on the one hand, the Management makes the
workers work on holidays in the backdrop of the Government Resolution dated
12.09.1980 and on the other hand, the State Government refuses payment of wages
for the work performed. Once the Government had formulated it's policy to give
compensatory holidays, it was an obligation of the Management to prepare their
calender in such a way that all such daily wagers, who worked on daily wages, would
be granted compensatory holidays within a year. It is unconceivable to exploit the
daily wagers by canvassing that though they have worked on holidays they would not
be entitled for wages and if they do not opt for compensatory holidays voluntarily,
their rights would be extinguished after one year.
17. The learned advocate for the workers has placed reliance upon Kamaljit Singh
v. Sarabjit Singh, (2014) 16 SCC 472, to contend that the doctrine of estoppel would
prevent the Review Petitioner/Management from taking a stand that these workers
were not entitled for wages because of the Government Resolution dated 12.09.1980.
Had that been so, the Management should not have communicated vide letter dated
25.05.2012 to the Government that these workers were entitled for such payments
and the sanction should be granted for releasing the funds. It has been held in
Kamaljit Singh (supra) as under:—
“10. …….. It is trite that the doctrine of estoppel is steeped in the principles of
equity and good conscience. Equity will not allow a person to say one thing at
one time and the opposite of it another time. It would estop him from denying
his previous assertion, act, conduct or representation to say something contrary
to what was implied in the transaction under which he obtained the benefit of
being let in possession of the property to be enjoyed by him as a tenant.
11. Lord Edward Coke, Chief Justice of the King's Bench and 17th Century
English Jurist explains “estoppel” thus:
“Cometh of the French Word ‘estoupe’, from where the English word stopped;
and it is called an estoppels or conclusion, because a man's own act or
acceptance stoppeth or closet up his mouth to allege or plead the truth.” [Co.
Litt. 352a]
12. Law Lexicon (Second Edition, Page 656) defines “estoppel” in the following
words:
“An Estoppel is an admission, or something which the law treats as an
equivalent to an admission, of so high and conclusive a nature that any one who
is affected by it is not permitted to contradict it.” [11th Edn p. 744 in the note to
the Dutchess of Kingston's case] “An admission or determination under
circumstances of such solemnity that the law will not allow the fact so admitted
to be questioned by the parties or their privies.” “The preclusion of a person from
asserting a fact, by previous conduct inconsistent therewith, on his own part, or
on the part of those under whom he claims.”
13. Black's Law Dictionary (9th Edn., page 629) describes “estoppel” as:
“Estoppel : - A bar that prevents one from asserting a claim or right that
contradicts what one has said or done before or what has been legally
established as true.”
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. The learned Senior Advocate has relied upon Rajender Singh v. Lt. Governor,
Andaman and Nicobar Islands, (2005) 13 SCC 289, in which the Honourable Supreme
Court has held in paragraphs 15 and 16 as under:—
“15. We are unable to countenance the argument advanced by learned
Additional Solicitor General appearing for the respondents. A careful perusal of
the impugned judgment does not deal with and decide many important issues as
could be seen from the grounds of review and as raised in the grounds of special
leave petition/appeal. The High Court, in our opinion, is not justified in ignoring
the materials on record which on proper consideration may justify the claim of
the appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant has also explained to this Court
as to why the appellant could not place before the Division Bench some of these
documents which were not in possession of the appellant at the time of hearing
of the case. The High Court, in our opinion, is not correct in overlooking the
documents relied on by the appellant and the respondents. In our opinion,
review jurisdiction is available in the present case since the impugned judgment
is a clear case of an error apparent on the face of the record and non-
consideration of relevant documents. The appellant, in our opinion, has got a
strong case in their favour and if the claim of the appellant in this appeal is not
countenanced, the appellant will suffer immeasurable loss and injury. Law is well
-settled that the power of judicial review of its own order by the High Court
inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice.
16. The power, in our opinion, extends to correct all errors to prevent
miscarriage of justice. The courts should not hesitate to review its own earlier
order when there exists an error on the face of the record and the interest of the
justice so demands in appropriate cases. The grievance of the appellant is that
though several vital issues were raised and documents placed, the High Court
has not considered the same in its review jurisdiction. In our opinion, the High
Court's order in the revision petition is not correct which really necessitates our
interference.”
19. I am in respectful agreement with the law laid down by the Honourable
Supreme Court. However, the distinguishing feature in these cases is that these cases
have their origin in their applications before the Labour Court and on the basis of the
oral and documentary evidence recorded before the Labour Court, the applications of
37 workers were allowed since the Management had admitted that these workers had
worked on holidays and were not paid their wages. I also do not find from the record,
any material to indicate that these workers were granted compensatory holidays after
working on holidays and as such, having availed off such compensatory holidays they
would not be entitled for any payment thereof. When the Management failed to
establish before the Labour Court, which is the court of record, that these workers had
enjoyed compensatory holidays and were seeking payment, as if seeking double
benefits, the oral submissions of the Management cannot be accepted, much less in a
review petition.
20. In view of the above, the Review Applications to the extent of 37 workers,
whose names are mentioned herein below, stand rejected:—
“1) Indubai Ramesh Thorat Age 50 yrs. Occ. Service
2) Sayrabi Razzak Baig Age 63 yrs. Occ. Service/Retired
3) Chandrabhan Kisan Pagare Died Through his L.Rs. Dwarkabai Chandrabhan
Pagare Age 65 yrs. Occ. Household
4) Raybhan Chandrabhan Shelke Age 64 yrs. Occ. Retired
5) Bhagwan Appaji Pankhede Age 64 yrs. Occ. Retired
6) Kamalbai Mukundrao Misal, Age 52 yrs. Occ. Service
7) Ramesh Devrao Thorat Age 54 yrs. Occ. Service
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
8) Dattatray Dnyandev Mutekar Age 62 yrs. Occ. Retired

9) Sayyed Gani Sayyed Hussain Age 57 yrs. Occ. Service
10) Prakash Rambhau Kharbe Age 54 yrs. Occ. Service
11) Suresh Damodar Gund Died Through his L.Rs. Meerbai Suresh Gund Age 53 yrs.
Occ. Household
12) Tatyarao Mathu Pawar Age 63 yrs. Occ. Retired
13) Gufabai @ Gumphabai Daulat Kakade Age 65 yrs. Occ. Retired
14) Ashok Champatrao Khadke Died Through his L.Rs. Smt. Kiran Ashok Khadke
Age 48 yrs. Occ. Household
15) Baban Mhasu Surade Age 65 yrs. Occ. Retired
16) Pandurang Murlidhar Gund Age 57 yrs. Occ. Service
17) Bhanudas Sarjerao Sawant Died through his L.Rs. Smt. Rukminbai Bhanudas
Sawant Age 57 yrs. Occ. Household.
18) Deepak Suryaknat Saraf Age 61 yrs. Occ. Retired
19) Chandraprabhu Bhikaji Huse Age 57 yrs. Occ. Service
20) Sanjay Nathuji Ingle Age 56 yrs. Occ. Service
21) Asrabai Devrao Suchlade Age 66 yrs. Occ. Retired
22) Sahebrao Khanduji Tarange Died through his L.Rs. Smt. Padminibai Sahebrao
Trange Age 57 yrs. Occ. Household
23) Prayagbai Tukaram Sawant Age 64 yrs. Occ. Retired
24) Waman Bhimrao Biradar Died through his L.Rs. Smt. Nanda Waman Biradar
25) Ashok Anandrao Ahire Died through his L.Rs. Smt. Shila Ashok Ahire Age 52
yrs. Occ. Retired
26) Shesharao Dhansing Ade Age 63 yrs. Occ. Retired
27) Anjanabai Dadarao Kale Age 65 yrs. Occ. Retired
28) Bhaurao Bhikaji Solankar Died through his L.Rs. Kamlabai Bhaurao Sonaklar
29) Bharat Asaram Ingle Age 65 yrs. Occ. Retired
30) Gangadhar Bapurao Sathe Died through his L.Rs. Suman Gangadhar Sathe Age
58 yrs. Occ. Household
31) Sushilabai Bhagwan Pakhede Age 56 yrs. Occ. Service
32) Prabhat Punjaji Salve Died through his L.Rs. Smt. Savita Prabhat Salve Age 55
yrs. Occ. Household
33) Yashodabai Dattu Kishirsagar Age 66 yrs. Occ. Retired
34) Eknath Punjaram Waghmode Age 63 yrs. Occ. Retired
35) Shaikh Rafid Shaikh Tamijoddin Age 57 yrs. Occ. Service
36) Suresh Dattu Mungse Age 63 yrs. Occ. Retired
37) Indubai Tukaram Thorat Age 65 yrs. Occ. Retired All R/o Walmi, Kanchanwadi,
Paithan Raod, Aurangabad, Tq. & Dist. Aurangabad.”
21. Consequentially, the above 37 workers would be entitled for withdrawal of their
amounts, which they have sought by filing their Civil Application No. 3447/2020. The
learned Senior Advocate has strenuously opposed the withdrawal of amounts.
Notwithstanding his objection, I find that the Civil Application filed by these 37
workers, deserves to be allowed for the reason that the amount has been deposited in
this Court by the Management and even after the order of this Court dated
26.07.2019, these workers have not been able to receive their amounts for almost 17
months. Most of them are senior citizens and have retired from service long ago. As
such, Civil Application No. 3447/2020 filed by these 37 workers is allowed on
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
the following conditions:—

(a) The above 37 applicants/workers shall submit their latest photograph and copy
of their Voter Identity Card issued by the Election Commission of India and/or
copy of their Adhar Card.
(b) They shall produce their recent address proof.
(c) They shall produce the latest bill for their cellphone or land line, if any.
(d) While withdrawing the amount of Rs. 97,000/- (Rupees Ninety Seven
Thousand) each, they shall tender an undertaking duly identified by their
advocate representing them in this matter stating therein that if the
Management succeeds before the Honourable Supreme Court and it is finally
concluded that these workers had no right to such amounts, they would return
the said amount within eight weeks from the date of such adverse order.
22. The learned Senior Advocate has canvassed to the extent of the remaining 118
workers out of 155, that though this Court has taken a pragmatic view and has shown
magnanimity in granting benefits to all these 155 workers, 09 workers before the
Labour Court had suffered the “dismissed in default” orders and 109 workers had not
approached the Labour Court at all after their joint writ petition was disposed off by
the learned Division Bench of this Court granting them liberty to approach the Labour
Court under Section 33-C(2). He, therefore, canvassed that as Section 33-C(2) deals
with individual claims of the workers for recovery of unpaid wages from the employer,
each worker will have to approach the Labour Court and the order delivered by this
Court on 26.07.2019 in the group of 37 workers cases, would be an order restricted
only to 37 workers.
23. I find that the learned Senior Advocate is right in his submission as I had taken
the said view to avoid multiplicity of the litigation and to avoid rigours of litigation to
be suffered by the 118 workers, most of whom are senior citizens and have retired and
would be required to spend on litigation.
24. The learned advocate for the workers submits that this Court had passed the
following order with regard to the remaining 118 workers, only to avoid multiplicity of
litigation and soften the sufferings of the workers:—
“16. In order to avoid multiplicity of litigation, I deem it proper to direct the
petitioner to pay Rs. 97,000/- to each of the remaining 118 similarly situated
workers, within twelve weeks from today. This would avoid further litigation,
hardships and litigation costs of the petitioner as well as the said 118 workers.”
25. He fairly submits that 09 workers have suffered the Dismissed in Default order
and their restoration applications are pending before the Labour Court and 109
workers had not approached the Labour Court at all. However, now 104 workers out of
109 are before this Court for withdrawal of the amount, this Court may grant liberty to
all these 118 to approach the Labour Court within six weeks. Until then, the amount of
Rs. 97,000/- payable to each of such 118 workers may be preserved in this Court until
the decision before the Labour Court. He tenders the names of 104 workers out of 109,
who are before this Court and who had not approached the Labour Court and 09
workers whose cases were dismissed in default, as under:—
(a) 09 Workers, whose cases were dismissed in default:—
“1) Ganpat Laxman Ghait Age 62 yrs. Occ. Retired
2) Smt. Venubai Visram Mhaske Age 44 yrs. Occ. Service
3) Murali Bandu Solankar Age 53 yrs. Occ. Service
4) Smt. Raibai Manikrao Sarag (Died) Through her L.R. Ambadas Manikrao Sarag
Age 34 yrs. Occ. Labour
5) Raosaheb Sheshrao Walunje Age 63 yrs. Occ. Retired
6) Sadiq Khairatee Baig (Died) Through his L.R. Smt. Rajiya Sadiq Baig Age 55
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
yrs. Occ. Housewife

7) Ramnath Bhivsan Magar Age 63 yrs. Occ. Retired
8) Baburao Ramrao Dhas Age 50 yrs. Occ. Service
9) Smt. Hirabai Asaram Mote Age 48 yrs. Occ. Service All R/o WALMI,
Kanchanwadi, Paithan Road, Aurangabad, Tq. & District Aurangabad.”
(b) The names of 104 workers who are before this Court in Civil Application No.
6480/2020 and who have not approached the Labour Court:—
1) Natha s/o Bhimrao Mote, Age 58 years, Occu. Service.
2) Dhanpal s/o Guddusingh Chavan, Age 61 years, Occu. Retired.
3) Dnyanoba s/o Raosaheb Fasate, Age 62 years, Occu. Retired.
4) Waman s/o Ramchandra Satpute, Age 61 years, Occu. Retired.
5) Bhimrao s/o Mahadu Kakade, Age 51 years, Occu. Service.
6) Raosaheb s/o Sopanrao Gaikwad, Age 56 years, Occu. Service.
7) Harishchandra Raibhan Motichur, Age 56 years, Occu. Service.
8) Kalyan s/o Bhimrao Gadekar, Age 52 years, Occu. Service.
9) Sk. Rasheed s/o Sk. Naseer, Age 52 years, Occu. Service.
10) Sk. Rasheed s/o Sk. Kaseem, Age 58 years, Occu. Service.
11) Changdev s/o Baraku Domale, Age 54 years, Occu. Service.
12) Bhausaheb s/o Sarangdhar Devkate, (Died), Through his L.R. Smt. Meerabai
w/o Bhausaheb Devkate, Age 52 years, Occu. Household.
13) Narayan s/o Baburao Shirale, Age 56 years, Occu. Service.
14) Kailas s/o Santu Giri (Died) Through his L.R. Smt. Kasabai w/o Kailas Giri Age
58 years, Occu. Household.
15) Harishchandra s/o Shankar Ahire, Age 50 years, Occu. Service.
16) Bharat s/o Madhavrao Kakade, Age 55 years, Occu. Service.
17) Saleemkhan s/o Raheemkhan, Age 61 years, Occu. Retired.
18) Madhukar s/o Sukaram Shelke, Age 55 years, Occu. Service.
19) Bhausaheb s/o Damodar Gund, Age 63 years, Occu. Retired.
20) Sahebrao s/o Bajirao Dale, Age 62 years, Occu. Retired.
21) Kacharu s/o Maruti Mahanoor, Age 59 years, Occu. Service.
22) Madhukar s/o Shivram Dhanedar, Age 49 years, Occu. Service.
23) Rasheed Baig s/o Razzak Baig, Age 48 years, Occu. Service.
24) Sayed Rafiq s/o Sayed Sherif, Age 48 years, Occu. Service.
25) Razzak Baig Maqbool Baig (Died) Through her L.R. Smt. Saira Baig Razzak Baig,
Age 56 years, Occu. Service.
26) Dattu s/o Murlidhar Waghchoure, Age 61 years, Occu. Retired.
27) Sk. Saleemoddin Sk. Hamimoddin, Age 62 years, Occu. Retired.
28) Balaji s/o Laxman Mahajan, Age 62 years, Occu. Retired.
29) Waman s/o Shamrao Waghmode, Age 63 years, Occu. Retired.
30) Ganesh s/o Ratan Jadhav, Age 49 years, Occu. Service.
31) Bhanudas s/o Punjaram Waghmode, Age 51 years, Occu. Service.
32) Radhakishan s/o Kashinath Kolekar (Died), Through his L.R. Waman s/o
Radhakishan Kolekar, Age 35 years, Occu. Labour.
33) Smt. Rajiya Manwar Baig, Age 50 years, Occu. Service.
34) Ramesh s/o Bhikaji Solankar, Age 55 years, Occu. Service.
35) Raghunath s/o Kisan Wankhede, Age 61 years, Occu. Retired.
36) Appa s/o Rangnath Gadekar, Age 54 years, Occu. Service.
37) Ashok s/o Bhagwanrao Ankushkar, Age 62 years, Occu. Retired.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
38) Karmavir s/o Gyanrao Bumbak, Age 53 years, Occu. Service.

39) Jabaji s/o Haribhau Jarad, Age 61 years, Occu. Retired.
40) Dwaraknath s/o Kisan Waghchaure, Age 54 years, Occu. Service.
41) Arjun s/o Kashinath Badade, Age 54 years, Occu. Service.
42) Radhakisan s/o Damodhar Thote, Age 50 years, Occu. Service.
43) Devidas s/o Shenphadu Pawar, Age 53 years, Occu. Service.
44) Satish s/o Shrinivas Deshpande, Age 62 years, Occu. Retired.
45) Arifoddin Khan Ajajoddin Khan, Age 51 years, Occu. Service.
46) Sarangdhar s/o Dattatrey Auti, Age 52 years, Occu. Service.
47) Bhaskar s/o Sukadev Shinde, Age 54 years, Occu. Service.
48) Kamalesh Keshavlal Sharma, Died through L.R. Smt. Shradha d/o Kamlesh
Sharma, Age 21 years, Occu. Education.
49) Pandit s/o Santosh Pande, Age 51 years, Occu. Service.
50) Karbhari s/o Kisan Bilwane, Age 63 years, Occu. Retired.
51) Ravindra s/o Mahadeo Manware, Age 54 years, Occu. Service.
52) Prakash s/o Kesuba Jangle, Age 63 years, Occu. Retired.
53) Sitaram s/o Rangnath Jadhav, Age 53 years, Occu. Service.
54) Dattu s/o Baraku Domale, Age 51 years, Occu. Service.
55) Ramesh s/o Kaduba Salve, Age 55 years, Occu. Service.
56) Dadarao s/o Manohar Tarange, Age 52 years, Occu. Service.
57) Kailas s/o Asaram Bhivsane, Age 62 years, Occu. Retired.
58) Vithal s/o Janardan Rane (Died), Through his L.R. Smt. Pushpa w/o Vitthal
Rane, Age 52 years, Occu. Household.
59) Ramnath s/o Bhivsan Barfe, Age 62 years, Occu. Retired.
60) Suresh s/o Laxman Pale, Age 63 years, Occu. Retired.
61) Kundlik s/o Bhagaji Mahanur, Age 54 years, Occu. Service.
62) Kafinnath s/o Dada Mali, Age 53 years, Occu. Service.
63) Bandu s/o Gopidas Rathod, Age 55 years, Occu. Service.
64) Bhagwan s/o Asaram Kenekar, Age 51 years, Occu. Service.
65) Smt. Asha Baburao Dhas, Age 47 years, Occu. Service.
66) Ashok s/o Devram Waghmare, Age 50 years, Occu. Service.
67) Sunil s/o Baburao Houjwala, Age 51 years, Occu. Service.
68) Mohan s/o Haribhau Jarhad, Age 51 years, Occu. Service.
69) Sukhadev s/o Dharmaji Gaikwad, Age 50 years, Occu. Service.
70) Devidas s/o Bandu Pawar, Age 63 years, Occu. Retired.
71) Devendra s/o Namdev Thorat, Age 50 years, Occu. Service.
72) Balu s/o Girijaram Mhaske (Died), Through his L.R. Smt. Chandrabhaga w/o
Balu Mhaske, Age 62 years, Occu. Household.
73) Mohan s/o Murlidhar Waghchaure, Age 62 years, Occu. Retired.
74) Bapu s/o Baburao Sathe, Age 51 years, Occu. Service.
75) Kaduba s/o Trimbak Suradkar, Age 69 years, Occu. Retired.
76) Vasant s/o Dada Daund, Age 64 years, Occu. Retired.
77) Bhalchandra s/o Rangnath Bhale, Age 51 years, Occu. Service.
78) Uttam s/o Gangram Waghmode, Age 63 years, Occu. Retired.
79) Devidas s/o Sakharam Ajinath, Age 63 years, Occu. Retired.
80) Dharampal Rambhajan Shirishwal, Age 51 years, Occu. Service.
81) Daud Habib Pathan, Age 53 years, Occu. Service.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
82) Girijaram s/o Laxman Laghane, Age 52 years, Occu. Service.

83) Uttam s/o Karbhari Bodkhe, Age 54 years, Occu. Service.
84) Gautam s/o Kachru Pagare, Age 55 years, Occu. Service.
85) Nandkishor Prabhakar Sakharekar, Age 54 years, Occu. Service.
86) Sadashiv s/o Baburao Pankar, Age 62 years, Occu. Retired.
87) Kaduba s/o Dadaba Kolse, Age 55 years, Occu. Service.
88) Santuk s/o Kisan Dabhade, deceased through L.R. Smt. Ramkour Santuk
Dabhade, Age 50 years, Occu. Household, R/o Kanchanwadi, Aurangabad.
89) Sarjerao s/o Kisanrao Mhaske, deceased through L.R. of mother Smt. Sarsabai
Kisanrao Mhaske, Age 84 years, Occu. Household, R/o Kanchanwadi,
Aurangabad.
90) Chandrakant s/o Rajaram Pathe, deceased through L.R. Smt. Parigabai
Chandrakant Pathe, Age 55 years, Occu. Household, R/o Nakashtrawadi,
Aurangabad.
91) Shaikh s/o Nabee Shaikh Ali, Age Major, Occu. Service, working in WALMI,
Kanchanwadi, Tq. & Dist. Aurangabad.
92) Kisan s/o Kanhuji Tribhuwan, Age Major, Occu. Retired, R/o Rahul Nagar, Near
Jalan Nagar, Aurangabad.
93) Kashinath s/o Girdhari Chavan, Age 63 years, Occu. Retired, R/o Kanchanwadi
Parisar, Aurangabad.
94) Kaduba s/o Bhimaji Tarange, Age 68 years, Occu. Retired.
95) Shantilal s/o Bhaskar Jain, Age 50 years, Occu. Service.
96) Raybhan s/o Sarangdhar Devkate, Age 55 years, Occu. Service.
97) Avinash s/o Prabhakar Mule, Age 50 years, Occu. Service.
98) Prakash s/o Kisanrao Age, Age 63 years, Occu. Retired.
99) Dhondiram s/o Haribhau Gaikwad, Age 56 years, Occu. Service.
100) Rajaram s/o Kanhoba Agale, Age 62 years, Occu. Retired.
101) Mukunda s/o Sadashiv Ingle, Age 63 years, Occu. Retired.
102) Sanjay s/o Shriram Thakare, Age 57 years, Occu. Service.
103) Tukaram Rangnath Thorat Died through L.Rs. Smt. Indubai Tukaram Thorat
Age 65 yrs. Occ. Household.
104) Kachru Manajo Kedare Age 61 yrs. Occ. Retired. All R/o WALMI, Kanchanwadi,
Paithan Road, Aurangabad, Tq. & District Aurangabad.
26. The learned Senior Advocate has strenuously canvassed that if the Civil
Application is being allowed to the extent of 118 workers, notwithstanding the liberty
to approach the Labour Court, the amount of Rs. 97,000/- (multiplied by 118) be
forthwith returned to the Management/Walmi.
27. Though I find that the learned Senior Advocate would be justified in making
such contention, I cannot ignore the fact that this amount has been deposited in this
Court after the Management/Walmi received the funds with great difficulty from the
State Government. In the Covid-19 pandemic, if this amount is returned to the
Government and in future, if the workers succeed before the Labour Court, it would be
extremely difficult for the State Government to once again generate such amount.
28. In view of the above, Civil Application No. 6480/2020 filed by these 113
workers seeking recovery of amount, therefore, stands disposed off as being
infructuous.
29. Be that as it may, the amount of Rs. 97,000/- multiplied by the above
mentioned 118 workers, shall be preserved in this Court till 15.01.2021 subject to
these 118 workers approaching the Labour Court with their individual or joint
application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, on or before
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
21.12.2020. They shall seek further orders as regards the deposited amounts in this
Court. It would be open to the Labour Court to decide as to whether, the amounts be
returned to the Management/Walmi or be preserved until the decision of the cases
preferred by these 109 workers along with the restoration cases of other 09 workers. It
would be open to the Management/Walmi to make a separate application for this
purpose. It would also be open to these 118 workers to file an application jointly or
individually to pray for preservation of the said amount in any nationalized bank so as
to generate interest on the said amount during the pendency of litigation.
30. Needless to state, the cases of 118 workers would be subject to the settled
procedure of adjudication before the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Labour Court shall deal with the claims of these
workers individually on their own merits.
31. At this juncture, the learned Senior Advocate made a request to absolve the
Chief Engineer and Executive Director of the Management/Walmi from paying 3% of
interest over and above, if the amounts were not deposited in this Court within 12
weeks from the date of the order. Admittedly, they have committed a default and have
not abided by the mandate of 12 weeks. Paragraph 14 of the order dated 26.07.2019
reads as under:—
“14. So also, the interest levied is reduced to 7% p.a. from the date of the
application until the amount is actually paid. If the amounts directed by this
Court are not paid within a period of 12 weeks from today, the rate of interest
shall be restored to 10% and the amount of 3% rise in interest shall be
recovered from the salary of the Chief Engineer and Executive Director of the
petitioner.”
32. The learned advocate for the workers graciously consents for absolving the
Chief Engineer and Executive Director of the Walmi of the said liability.
33. As such, these two officers would stand absolved from the said liability as set
out in paragraph 14 of the order.
———
Disclaimer: While every effort is made to avoid any mistake or omission, this casenote/ headnote/ judgment/ act/ rule/ regulation/ circular/
notification is being circulated on the condition and understanding that the publisher would not be liable in any manner by reason of any mistake
or omission or for any action taken or omitted to be taken or advice rendered or accepted on the basis of this casenote/ headnote/ judgment/ act/
rule/ regulation/ circular/ notification. All disputes will be subject exclusively to jurisdiction of courts, tribunals and forums at Lucknow only. The
authenticity of this text must be verified from the original source.

J 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 8926 2021 1 AIR Bom R 361 20jglsamaheshwari Jgueduin 20220128 183542 1 20

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

J 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 8926 2021 1 AIR Bom R 361 20jglsamaheshwari Jgueduin 20220128 183542 1 20

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

SCC Online Web Edition, © 2022 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.

Page 1 Friday, January 28, 2022

2020 SCC OnLine Bom 8926 : (2021) 1 AIR Bom R 361

In the High Court of Bombay

Civil Application No. 6480/2020

Review Application No. 73/2020

Review Application No. 82/2020

Waman Bhimrao Biradar Through Lrs Nanda Bhimrao Biradar

Letter dated 25.05.2012, issued by Administrative Officer of the applicant. Such

for sake of justice.”

written by the Administrative Officer, Walmi to the Principal Secretary, Irrigation

8) Dattatray Dnyandev Mutekar Age 62 yrs. Occ. Retired

the following conditions:—

yrs. Occ. Housewife

38) Karmavir s/o Gyanrao Bumbak, Age 53 years, Occu. Service.

82) Girijaram s/o Laxman Laghane, Age 52 years, Occu. Service.

You might also like