Petroleum Development Oman L.L.C.

UNRESTRICTED Document ID : PR-1232

March 1999 Filing key : xxxxx

Design Integrity Review Procedure

Keywords: Design, Integrity, Hazard, Review, Safeguarding

This document is the property of Petroleum Development Oman, LLC. Neither the whole nor any
part of this document may be disclosed to others or reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or
transmitted in any form by any means (electronic, mechanical, reprographic recording or otherwise)
without prior written consent of the owner.
Design Integrity Review Procedure Version 1.0

Authorised For Issue

Signed :....................................................
David McMullan
CFDH Process Engineering

The following is a brief summary of the 4 most recent revisions to this document. Details of
all revisions prior to these are held on file by the issuing department.

Version No. Date Author Scope / Remarks

Version 1.0 Mar 99 Anton Sluijterman, First issue.

OYE/1

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CONTENTS

Authorised For Issue...................................................................................................................i

1. Introduction...........................................................................................................................2
1.1 Background.......................................................................................................................2
1.2 Purpose..............................................................................................................................2
1.3 Distribution/Target Audience...........................................................................................2
1.4 Structure of This Document..............................................................................................2

2. Design Integrity Procedure..................................................................................................3

2.1 Scope.................................................................................................................................3
2.2 Design Integrity Review Process......................................................................................3
2.3 Design Integrity Performance Indicators.........................................................................4
2.4 Maintaining Design Integrity............................................................................................4
2.5 Roles and Responsibilities................................................................................................4
2.6 Related Business Control Documents..............................................................................5
2.7 Review and Improvement.................................................................................................5
2.8 Step-out and Approval......................................................................................................5

Appendix A – Glossary of Terms, Definitions & Abbreviations...........................................6

Description........................................................................................................................6

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1. Introduction

1.1 Background

In June 1993 a very serious incident occurred in Marmul whereby a control valve
released high pressure gas into the drain system which resulted in a gas cloud
being released into the gas turbine housing and over-pressure of the flare system.
In response to this incident, comprehensive integrity reviews of the Yibal production
facilities and of various production facilities were carried out which revealed a
number of design, safety and operational deficiencies. These deficiencies are
principally attributed to additions and modifications to the facilities made in response
to changes in field development.

In the course of the Yibal integrity reviews, it was also identified that some integrity-
related documentation did not exist or was out of date. It was recognised that
similar deficiencies were likely to exist elsewhere, and therefore a comprehensive
integrity review of all remaining production facilities was carried out.

A Design Integrity Review (DIR) review process was set-up and is now in the
execution phase.

1.2 Purpose

The purpose of this procedure is to document the DIR process carried-out in the
past and to define the procedure for future design reviews. It is a PDO control
document, under the Project Engineering Code of Practice (Ref. 1).

1.3 Distribution/Target Audience

This procedure targets the engineers in each of the Product Flow Asset Teams
(PFATs) responsible for the implementation of the DIR process and for maintaining
the design integrity of their facilities.

1.4 Structure of This Document

The document is divided in two sections; the first section describes the DIR process
and the second describes the maintenance of design integrity.

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2. Design Integrity Procedure

2.1 Scope

The scope of this procedure is limited to the design integrity review process of
surface facilities. It excludes the design integrity review of off-plot pipelines and
electrical infrastructures. This procedure also excludes the steps required to ensure
design integrity in the design, procurement and construction phases of new surface
facilities.

2.2 Design Integrity Review Process

The Design Integrity Review (DIR) is a process of identifying any design

deficiencies which may lead to or cause a loss of Technical Integrity.

The five main steps carried-out in the ongoing reviews are:

1. Prepare and/or update (as-build) the key design integrity documents (specified
below).

2. Review the design by means of a HAZard and Operability (HAZOP) study,

3. Screen the recommended action items,

4. Prepare an implementation plan,

5. Execute the implementation plan

The deliverables from each step are:

Step 1 delivers for all surface facilities a set of as-built Process Engineering Flow
Schemes (PEFS), a Safeguarding Memoranda including Cause & Effect diagrams,
Hazardous Area drawings and a Flare/Blowdown Study.

Step 2 delivers a HAZOP Report which lists and categorises all the station
deficiencies as identified during the station HAZOP.

Step 3, produces an acceptable technical solution for all of the identified

deficiencies, identified by the Safeguarding Memoranda, Flare/Blowdown study and
HAZOP. This is generally achieved by interaction between the Asset Concept
Engineer, the Asset Operations Engineer and the Design Consultant. This stage is
time consuming and relies on the focused effort of two individuals per asset. The
solution is technically acceptable when it does not contravene any standards and is
approved by a process engineer with a level 2 technical authority. In cases where
standards do not have to be applied retroactively, the engineer might want to seek
advice from the relevant Corporate Function Discipline Head (CFDH). Lateral
learning on those solutions will be distributed by the CFDH.

Step 4, delivers Asset Development Plan (ADP), which covers the agreed scope of
work, the costs, project execution strategy and schedule.

Step 5, delivers facilities that satisfy an agreed level of design integrity.

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2.3 Design Integrity Performance Indicators

The DIRs resulting from the 1993 incident are scheduled to be completed by the
end of 1999 and is monitored by the Design Integrity Performance Indicator (DIPI),
which is reported by each PFAT on a monthly basis. The DIPI is defined in
Composite Integrity Performance Indicator Compilation Procedure (Ref. 3) and
summarised below.

The DIPI has been broken down into 5 categories:

DIPI-1 is the aggregate score for the completion of as-building and preparing the
key
documents.
DIPI-2 is the aggregate score for completing the reviews.
DIPI-3 is the aggregate score for screening all action lists.
DIPI-4 is the score for completing the Asset Development Plan’s per station.
DIPI-5 is the score for implementing the modifications in accordance with the ADP.

Each indicator receive a score from 0 % (actions completed) to 100 % (no

progress). The composite DIPI is the weighted summation of each score.

2.4 Maintaining Design Integrity

To maintain design integrity the Project Engineering Code of Practice needs to be

complied with for all new project and modifications. It is recognised that a number of
deficiencies might escape the attention of the project team. It is therefore required
to perform a design integrity review once every 5 years. The same procedure used
for the ongoing reviews and described in section 2.2 shall be applied.

The HAZOP step, however, shall be replaced by the Process Hazard Review (PHR)
method described in EP95-0300, Shell Hazard and Effect Management Manual,
since the latter method achieves the same results much faster. The PHR is an
‘expert review’ led by an experienced leader, containing design engineers but
heavily weighted towards plant operators and maintenance staff. The review
primarily focuses on potential causes of ‘loss of containment’. The study progresses
through the plant looking at each major equipment item, applying a leader’s
checklist of causes of loss of containment. The current design and operation of the
plant is assessed and a critical examination made of the revision history to identify
any causes of release resulting from changes to the design and operation of the
equipment item since commissioning. The team also reviews any hazards arising
from variations (due to the age of the plant) from current design or operating
standards. The PHR delivers a report including identified deficiencies and proposed
actions.

2.5 Roles and Responsibilities

The responsibility for the design integrity review of the surface facilities lies with the
Engineering Team Leader of the relevant Asset. This responsibility is delegated to
individual engineers by setting yearly tasks and targets. The surface facilities
include all production stations, pumping stations and gathering stations.

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2.6 Related Business Control Documents

The following business control documents apply:

Type of document Ref. Title PDO reference

Code of Practice 1 Project Engineering CP-117

Specification None

PDO Engineering 2 Preparation of Plant Design ERD-00-12

Reference Manual
Documents

Procedure 3 Composite Integrity Performance PR_1012

Indicator Compilation Procedure

Shell 4 Safeguarding Memorandum DEP

Design 1.00.02.12
Engineering 5 Hazard and Effect Management .Gen
Practices Manual
EP 95-0300

Guidelines None

2.7 Review and Improvement

2.8
The procedure needs to be reviewed and updated on a 3 yearly basis by the
CFDH Process Engineering, UEP.

2.9 Step-out and Approval

2.10
Deviations from this procedure have to be approved by the Corporate Function
Discipline Head for Process Engineering, UEP.

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Appendix A – Glossary of Terms, Definitions & Abbreviations

Abbreviation Description

CFDH Corporate Function Discipline Head

DIPI Design Integrity Performance Indicator

DIR Design Integrity Review

HAZOP HAZard and Operability study

PEFS Process Engineering Flow Scheme

PFAIMS Product Flow Asset Integrity Management System

PFAT Product Flow Asset Team

PHR Process Hazard Review

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