SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY – PHINMA

SCHOOL OF LAW AND GOVERNMENT

COLLEGE OF LAW
Cebu City

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CASE DIGEST IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

FINAL TERM

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In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
in the Course
Administrative Law
(LAW 067)

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NOEL JUN L. LINGANAY

05-2122-001196
September 2021
Araneta vs. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil. 238

Facts:

Sometime in 1950, trawl operators from Malabon, Navotas and other places migrated to this region most
of them settling at Sabang, Calabanga, Camarines Sur, for the purpose of using this particular method of
fishing in said bay. On account of the belief of sustenance fishermen that the operation of this kind of gear
caused the depletion of the marine resources of that area, there arose a general clamor among the
majority of the inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay. In
response to these pleas, the President issued Executive Order prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel
Bay.

A group of Otter trawl operators took the matter to the court by filing a complaint for injunction and/or
declaratory relief with preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance praying that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Director of Fisheries from enforcing said executive order; to declare the same null and void, and for such
other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises. The CFI declared the Executive Order invalid;
the injunction prayed for is ordered to issue.

Issue:

Whether the EO Executive Orders are valid and does not encroach the authority of the Legislature in the
said Prohibition.

Ruling:

Yes, EO Executive Orders are valid for having been issued by authority of the Constitution, the Revised
Administrative Code and the Fisheries Act. The opinion of the SC that with or without said Executive
Orders, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come, under the law, within
the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who in compliance with his duties may
even cause the criminal prosecution of those who in violation of his instructions, regulations or orders are
caught fishing with trawls in the Philippine waters.

Under the law the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has authority to regulate or ban the
fishing by trawl which, it is claimed. The President of the Philippines exercise that same power and
authority according to Section 10(1),

Article VII of the Constitution of the Philippines which states that The President shall have control of all
the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercises general supervision over all local governments
as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and according to Section
63 of the Revised Administrative Code which states that Administrative acts and commands of the
President of the Philippines touching the organization or mode of operation of the Government or
rearranging or readjusting any of the district, divisions, parts or ports of the Philippines, and all acts and
commands governing the general performance of duties by public employees or disposing of issues of
general concern shall be made in executive orders, and Section 74 of the Revised Administrative Code also
provides that all executive functions of the government of the Republic of the Philippines shall be directly
under the Executive Departments subject to the supervision and control of the President of the Philippines
in matters of general policy.
 The Departments are established for the proper distribution of the work of the Executive, for the
performance of the functions expressly assigned to them by law, and in order that each branch of the
administration may have a chief responsible for its direction and policy. Each Department Secretary shall
assume the burden of, and responsibility for, all activities of the Government under his control and
supervision.

Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290

Facts:

Petitioner Antonio Carpio as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar, filed this petition,
questioning the constitutionality of RA 6975 with a prayer for TRO.

RA 6875, entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHIGN THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,” allegedly
contravened Art. XVI, sec. 6 of the 1986 Constitution: “The State shall establish and maintain one police
force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a
national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall
be provided by law.”

Issues:

1. Whether or not RA 6975 is contrary to the Constitution

2. Whether or not Sec. 12 RA 6975 constitutes an “encroachment upon, interference with, and an
abdication by the President of, executive control and commander-in-chief powers”

Ruling:

1. Power of Administrative Control NAPOLCOM is under the Office of the President.

The Supreme Court held that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive
officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. In the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, the
power of control means “the power of the President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former with that of the latter.” It is said to be at the very “heart of the meaning of Chief Executive.”

As a corollary rule to the control powers of the President is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency.”
As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he
will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand
that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
 performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

Thus, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who,
in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in
the executive department.”

The placing of NAPOLCOM and PNP under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment
that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and
the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies.

2. Sec. 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply provides for the transition
period or process during which the national police would gradually assume the civilian function of
safeguarding the internal security of the State. Under this instance, the President, to repeat, abdicates
nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here state, in reiteration of the preponderant view, that the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose
duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision “represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon
him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature.” His position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is
consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle that “civilian authority is, at all times,
supreme over the military.”

Tecson vs. Salas, 34 SCRA 275 (1970)

FACTS:
Jose C. Tecson, Superintendent of Dredging, Bureau of Public Works, was assigned to the Office of the
President to assist in the San Fernando Port Project through a directive from the Executive Secretary
worded as follows: "Mr. Jose G. Tecson, Superintendent of Dredging Bureau of Public Works, is hereby
detailed to the Office of the President, effective immediately, to assist in the San Fernando Port Project.
Mr. Tecson shall report directly to Commodore Santiago Nuval Presidential Assistant on Ports and
Harbors." It was clearly set forth therein that it was issued "by authority of the President."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the assignment of herein petitioner on temporary detail to the office of Commodore
Santiago Nuval, Presidential Assistant on Ports and Harbors, by the President of the Philippines thru the
Executive Secretary, constitutes removal from office without cause.

RULING:
According to paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments
are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required
by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed
by and through the executive department and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed
and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

The detail of petitioner to the Office of the President is unobjectionable. By no stretch of the imagination
could it be considered a removal. It was not even a transfer. Even if it could be so viewed, the same
conclusion would emerge, as such was allowable under the Civil Service Act provision then in force, so
long as there be no reduction in rank or salary, such transfer therefore not being considered disciplinary
when made in the interest of public service. Nor is there any merit to the assertion made in the brief of
petitioner that the directive of the Executive Secretary, acting upon authority of the President, needed
the approval of the Civil Service Commission and the Commissioner of the Budget for its enforcement.
Such a thought is repugnant to the very concept of a single, not a plural, executive in whom is vested the
whole panoply of executive power.

It is not only illogical, but it does not make sense, to require as a prerequisite to its validity the approval
of subordinate to an action taken by their superior, the President, who tinder the Constitution is the
Executive, all prerogatives attaching to such branch being vested in him solely. In that sense, for those
discharging purely executive function in the national government, he lie gives orders to all and takes
orders from none.

Franche vs. Hernandez, 109 Phil. 782 (1960)

Facts:

On August 29, 1957, the National Economic Council approved in its meeting, the above request for
integration and, thereupon, forwarded an official request for said integration, thru the Budget
Commissioner to the President of the Philippines (Annex "B" to Petition). The Budget Commissioner
approved this integration and the positions of the petitioners were inserted or integrated into the
appropriation for the Bureau of the Census and Statistics for the fiscal year 1958-1959. This appropriation
was approved and is contained in the appropriation act for that year, Republic Act No. 2080.

On June 30, 1958, the Director of the Statistical Survey Project requested information from the
Commissioner of Civil Service whether there was need of issuing any appointments in favor of the
incumbents of the integrated positions, calling attention to the fact that said incumbents hold
appointments duly approved by all the offices concerned. The Commissioner of Civil Service replied that
there was no need of new appointments since the appointments of these employees, whose positions
had been integrated, had previously been approved.

Issue:

Whether or not the position of the Secretary of Commerce and Industry canbe sustained

Ruling:

No. The position of the Secretary of Commerce and Industry cannot be sustained. It follows as a
consequence that as the petitioners herein, with the exception of the five who were not reappointed
because of lack of civil service qualifications and other valid reasons, hold civil service positions with
salaries therefor appropriated in the appropriation act for ]958-]959, which salaries were the same as
what they used to receive while the Statistical Survey Project to which they belonged was still under the
National Economic Council, they are entitled to the salaries provided in the said appropriation act, and
the refusal by the Secretary of Commerce and Industry to authorize payment of said salaries is a violation
of their rights and privileges as civil service employees.

The National Economic Council is an office in the Executive Branch of the Government of the Philippines
(Commonwealth Act No. 2), and its employees are embraced within the Philippine Civil Service. So are
those paid from counterpart funds as these were appointed with the concurrence of the Commissioner
of the Civil Service and the Commissioner of the Budget.

The integration or transfer of the positions in question from the NEC to the Bureau of the Census and
Statistics did not have the effect of depriving the employees affected of their status as employees in the
Philippine Civil Service, or make their salaries subject to reduction at the will and by action of the Secretary
of Commerce and Industry. Since the appropriation act carried the same salaries that they used to receive
in the NEC, the legislative intent is clear that it intended to grant them the same salaries. And since the
Cabinet and the President had authorized the payment of their salaries in the meanwhile, such action
cannot be countermanded by the Secretary of Commerce and Industry who is a more subordinate of the
President.

Wherefore, it is hereby declared that the petitioners, with the exception of the five above-mentioned, are
entitled to receive the salaries for the positions they hold as provided in the appropriation act for 1958-
1959, and so the writ of mandamus prayed for is granted and the respondents are hereby ordered to pay
petitioners their salary differentials as indicated in the plantilla of personnel.

Noblejas vs. Salas, 67 SCRA 47 (1975)

Facts:

Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner of Land Registration, a
position created by Republic Act No. 1151. By the terms of section 2 of said Act, the said Commissioner is
declared “entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court
of First Instance.”

On March 7, 1968, the respondent, Claudio Teehankee sent a letter which requires him to explain why no
disciplinary action must be taken against him for “approving or recommending approval of subdivision,
consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by
the original titles.” Noblejas then answered that he could be only suspended and investigated in the same
way as a Judge of first instance and therefore, all these actions must be submitted to the Supreme Court,
conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary act (R.A. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

March 17, 1968 he received a communication from the executive secretary which states that he is
suspended and has a pending investigation for his gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public
interest.
March 18, 1968, the petitioner applied to the court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his letter to
the Secretary of Justice claiming the lacking of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion on the letter.

Issue:

Whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view
of the conferment upon him by the Statutes heretofore mentioned Rep. Act 1151 and Appropriation Laws
of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.

Ruling:

It is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land Registration is a District Judge, or
in fact a member of the Judiciary at all.

In the second place, petitioner’s theory that the grant of “privileges of a Judge of First Instance” includes
by implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed
upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being possessed by a variety of
executive officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges.

Incidentally, petitioner’s stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor General, another
appointee of the President, could not be removed by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer upon
the Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these Justices are
only removable by the Legislature, through the process of impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2).
Such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature when it granted these executive
officials the rank and privileges of Judges of First Instance. It is thereby shown that where the legislative
design is to make the suspension or removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable
to other officers, provision to that effect is made in plain and unequivocal language.

But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, if the Legislature had really
intended to include in the general grant of “privileges” or “rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of
First Instance” the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only
upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it
would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the
administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro
tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials. Therefore, the writs of prohibition and
injunction applied for are denied.

Fortich vs. Corona, 289 SCRA 624 (1998)

Facts:

This case involves a 144-hectare land located at Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Quisumbing, Sr.
Management and Development Corporation. In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to
the Philippine Packing Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation,
for a period of ten (10) years under the Crop Producer and Growers Agreement duly annotated in the
certificate of title. The lease expired in April, 1994.
In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the
entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value at P2.38 million.
In February, 1992, NQSRMDC sought and was granted by the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), through
its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in DARAB Case No. X-576, a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction.

Provincial Development Council (PDC) of Bukidnon, headed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, passed
Resolution No. 6, dated January 7, 1993, designating certain areas along Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part
of theBukidnon Agro-Industrial Zones where the subject property is situated. On March 4, 1993, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting or re-classifying 144
hectares of land in Bgy. San Vicente, said Municipality, from agricultural to industrial/institutional

On 12 October 1993, the Bukidnon Provincial Land Use Committee approved the said Ordinance.
Accordingly, on 11 December 1993, the instant application for conversion was filed by Mr. Gaudencio
Beduya in behalf of NQSRMDC/BAIDA (Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Development Association). On
November 14, 1994, the DAR, thru Secretary Garilao, invoking its powers to approve conversion of lands
under Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued an Order denying the instant application for the conversion of
the subject land from agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the same under the compulsory
coverage of CARP and directed the distribution thereof to all qualified beneficiaries. Governor Carlos O.
Fortich of Bukidnon appealed the order of denial to the Office of the President and prayed for the
conversion/reclassification of the subject land.

To prevent the enforcement of the DAR Secretary’s order, NQSRMDC, on June 29, 1995, filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction. On October 23, 1995,
CA issued a Resolution ordering the parties to observe status quo pending resolution of the petition.
In resolving the appeal, the Office of the President, through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres,
issued a Decision in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, dated March 29, 1996, reversing the DAR Secretary’s decision
and approving the conversion of a one hundred forty-four (144)-hectare land from agricultural to agro-
industrial/institutional area.

On May 20, 1996, DAR filed a motion for reconsideration of the OP decision. NQSRMDC found out that
the DAR, without giving just compensation, caused the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title on August 11, 1995
and had it transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, on September 25, 1995,
DAR caused the issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 andhad it
registered in the name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries. On April 10, 1997, NQSRMDC filed a complaint with
the RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon (Branch 9) for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and
injunction against DAR and 141 others. RTC issued TRO against DAR and 141 others. On June 23, 1997, an
Order was issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres denying DARs motion for reconsideration
for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. The said order further declared
that the March 29, 1996 OP decision had already become final and executory. On October 9, 1997 alleged
farmer-beneficiaries protested the March 29, 1996 Decision of the Office of the President

This led the Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue
the so-called Win-Win Resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its earlier Decision after
it had already become final and executory. The said Resolution modified the approval of the land
conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered the
remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
Issue:

Whether the Public Petitioner is required to obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify private
Petitioners’ property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.

Ruling:

No, the Public Petitioner is need not to obtain approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify private
Petitioners’ property from agricultural to non-agricultural use. Specifically, the issue of whether or not the
power of the local government units to reclassify lands is subject to the approval of the DAR having been
decided by this Court in the case of Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. Court of Appeals wherein we held
that local government units need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from
agricultural to non-agricultural use.

Borres vs. Canonoy, 108 SCRA 181 (1981)

Facts:

In 1968, herein petitioner Eulogio Borres was then the acting mayor of Cebu City, while private respondent
Silverio Parages was a detective in the Cebu Police Department. On November 14, 1968, acting on verbal
complaints that respondent Parages had been molesting Chinese businessman

On December 7, 1968, Parages filed a petition for prohibition and injunction in the court a quo against
petitioner. The court, however, did not issue the writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for, but preferred
to hear the evidence before taking any action.

In the order of March 3, 1969, the lower court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
decision and granted the immediate execution of the judgment pending appeal upon filing by private
respondent of a bond in the sum of P 3,000.00.

Issue:

whether or not private respondents German 0. Lumapac and Bartolome Elizondo may be dismissed,
without cause or hearing, on the mere ground of lack of confidence.

Ruling:

Although the President, in Executive Order No. 399, declared the position of secretary to the board of a
government corporation "primarily confidential in nature," it does not follow that a board secretary
whose appointment was permanent may be removed from office without a formal charge specifying the
ground for removal and without giving him an opportunity of being heard. A position declared primarily
confidential comes within the purview of Section 4, Article XII of the Constitution with respect to removal
of the permanent incumbent thereof.

it may also be said, with equal vigor, that when petitioner Eulogio Borres, terminated the services of
private respondents "due to lack of confidence," they were not "removed" or "dismissed" from the
service; their "term" in their respective positions merely "expired." Hence, they were not illegally
"removed" or "dismissed" from the service.

Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, 322 SCRA 160 (2000)

Facts:

On June 18, 1999 the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request
for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant
for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with the request.
Charges include:

1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US

2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax
3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television
4. False statement or entries
5. Election contribution in name of another

The Department of Justice, through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and
assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed.
Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for
him to be given ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff. grounds:

1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that point in
time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant
law (PD 1069—Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with
by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation
like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution
inapplicable.

2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents.
3. Finally, the country is bound to the Vienna convention on the law of treaties such that every treaty in
force is binding upon the parties. The respondent filed for petition of mandamus, certiorari, and
prohibition. The RTC of NCR ruled in favor of the respondent. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a
copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings.

Issues:

Whether or not private is respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing

Ruling:

Yes. Section 2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as “the removal of an accused from the Philippines with
the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him in connection
with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under
the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government.” Although the inquisitorial power
exercised by the Department of Justice as an administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply
lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the extradition process which may ultimately
result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extradite.

This deprivation can be effected at two stages: The provisional arrest of the prospective extradite pending
the submission of the request and the temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency
of the extradition petition in court. Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s
liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. Because of such consequences, the evaluation process is
akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are
essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for and
ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extradite.

In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. There are
certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecution. But the Court has
ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture
of life, liberty, or property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such
forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty.

In the case at bar, similar to a preliminary investigation, the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to
his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty. Thus, the extraditee must be accorded due process rights
of notice and hearing according to Art. 3 sec 14(1) and (2), as well as Art. 3 sec 7—the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern and the corollary right to access to official records and
documents.

Evangelista vs. Jarencio, 68 SCRA 99 (1975)

Facts:

The President of the Philippines under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966 created the Presidential
Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO). He charged the agency with the responsibility
to investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruption, smuggling,
lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the government.

The President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee including the power to
summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence
relevant to the investigation. On June 7, 1968, pursuant to the powers vested in the Agency, petitioner
Quirico Evangelista as Undersecretary of the agency, issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then
Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him to be and
appear as witness at the office of the PARGO. Instead of obeying the subpoena, Manalastas filed a Petition
for prohibition and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order which was granted
by the CFI of Manila, hence, this petition.
Issue:

Whether or not the Agency enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding
investigations.

Ruling:

YES. Manalastas lost. Ratio: An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only
in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain
information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken and may require the
attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. The petitioner draws its
subpoena power in EO No. 4 and the enabling law fixes no distinction when and in what the subpoena
power function should be exercised.

The Court finds no reason to depart from the established rule, ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos. Nor could the court find merit in the argument that the subpoena power granted by Section
580 of the Revised Administrative Code is restricted under the Rules of Court to abridge its application.
The Rules of Court require that the subpoena may be issued only when a specific case is pending before
a court for hearing or trial and that the hearing or trial must be in connection with the exercise of the
court’s judicial or adjudicatory functions before a non-judicial subpoena can be issued. However, a
distinction must be made that an administrative subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena.

To an extent, the restrictions and qualifications referred to in Section 580 of the RAC could mean that the
restraints against infringement of constitutional rights or when the subpoena is unreasonable or
oppressive and when the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear. Administrative
may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved,
and whether or not probable cause is shown and even before the issuance of a complaint. It is not
necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending
or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized
purpose. The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon
which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies.

The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or controversy
in order to get evidence but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just
because it wants assurance that it is not.

The subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is:

1. Within the authority of the agency;

2. The demand is not too indefinite; and
3. The information is reasonably relevant.

Administrative may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication
is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown and even before the issuance of a complaint. It
is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law be
pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully
authorized purpose.
Carino vs. Commission on Human Rights, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)

Facts:

On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher, among them the 8
herein private respondents who were members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA)
and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook “mass concerted actions” to “dramatize and
highlight” their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances
that had time and again been brought to the latter’s attention. The respondents were preventively
suspended by the Secretary of Education. They complained to CHR.

Issue:

Whether or not, CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations

Ruling:

No, the Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the character of
finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of
Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the
teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on said matter, if still timely.

The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to do so; whether
or not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers
over, or the power to try and decide, or dear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged
human rights violations involving civil or political rights.

The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the fundamental law to
be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions
of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that
it may investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official.

The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.

This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power
to “investigate,” cannot and not “try and resolve on the merits” (adjudicate) the matters involved in
Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if there
be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated
and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.
Occena vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 755

Facts:

Samuel C. Occena filed a petition for prohibition seeking that sections 4 and 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982, be declared as unconstitutional insofar as it
prohibits any candidate in the Barangay election of 17 May 1982 "from representing or allowing himself
to be represented as a candidate of any political party or prohibits a political party, political group, political
committee from intervening in the nomination of a candidate in the barangay election or in the filing of
his certificate of candidacy, or giving aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable
to or against his campaign for election." On this basis, it is also prayed that "judgment be rendered
declaring the 1982 Barangay elections null and void ab initio, for being unconstitutional, and directing the
holding of new barangay elections without any ban on the involvement of political parties, political
committees, political organizations and other political group."

Issue:

Whether the ban on the intervention of political parties in the election of barangay officials is violative of
the constitutional guarantee of the right to form associations and societies for purposes not contrary to
law.

Ruling:

The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law is neither absolute nor
illimitable; it is always subject to the pervasive and dominant police power of the state and may
constitutionally be regulated or curtailed to serve appropriate and important public interests .

Whether a restriction imposed is constitutionally permissible or not depends upon the circumstances of
each case. Examining Section 4 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982, the right to organize is intact. Political
parties may freely be formed although there is a restriction on their activities, i.e., their intervention in
the election of barangay officials on 17 May 1982 is proscribed. But the ban is narrow, not total. It operates
only on concerted or group action of political parties.

Members of political and kindred organizations, acting individually, may intervene in the barangay
election. As the law says: "Nothing (therein) shall be construed as in any manner affecting or constituting
an impairment of the freedom of individuals to support or oppose any candidate for any barangay office."
Moreover, members of the family of a candidate within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity
as well as the personal campaign staff of a candidate (not more than 1 for every 100 registered voters in
his barangay) can engage in individual or group action to promote the election of their candidate. There
are reasons for insulating the barangay from the divisive and debilitating effects of a partisan political
campaign.

The Barangay Captain and the Barangay Council, apart from their legislative and consultative powers, also
act as an agency for neutral community action such as the distribution of basic foodstuff and as an
instrument in conducting plebiscites and referenda. The Barangay Captain, together with the members of
the Lupon Tagapayapa appointed by him, exercises administrative supervision over the barangay
conciliation panels in the latter's work of settling local disputes. The Barangay Captain himself settles or
helps settle local controversies within the barangay either through mediation or arbitration. It would
definitely enhance the objective and impartial discharge of their duties for barangay officials to be
shielded from political party loyalty. In fine, the ban against the participation of political parties in the
barangay election is an appropriate legislative response to the unwholesome effects of partisan bias in
the impartial discharge of the duties imposed on the barangay and its officials as the basic unit of our
political and social structure.

U.S. vs. Barrias, 11 Phil. 327 (1908)

Facts:

In 1904, Congress, through a law (Act No. 1136), authorized the Collector of Customs to regulate the
business of lighterage. Lighterage is a business involving the shipping of goods by use of lighters or cascos
(small ships/boats). The said law also provides that the Collector may promulgate such rules to implement
Act No. 1136. Further, Act No. 1136 provides that in case a fine is to be imposed, it should not exceed one
hundred dollars. Pursuant to this, the Collector promulgated Circular No. 397.
Meanwhile, Aniceto Barrias was caught navigating the Pasig River using a lighter which is manually
powered by bamboo poles (sagwan). Such is a violation of Circular No. 397 because under said Circular,
only steam powered ships should be allowed to navigate the Pasig River. However, in the information
against Barrias, it was alleged that the imposable penalty against him should be a fine not exceeding
P500.00 at the discretion of the court – this was pursuant to Circular No. 397 which provides:
For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to a fine of
not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court.
Barrias now challenged the validity of such provision of the Circular as it is entirely different from the
penal provision of Act. No. 1136 which only provided a penalty of not exceeding $100.00 (Note at that
time the peso-dollar exchange was more or less equal).

Issue:

Whether or not the penal provision in the Circular is valid.

Ruling:

No. The Commissioner cannot impose a different range of penalty different from that specified by
Congress. If the Collector is allowed to do so, then in effect, it is as if he is being delegated the power to
legislate penalties. One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the
legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to anybody or authority. Where the
sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; only by the constitutional
agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed. The power to whose
judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been entrusted can not relieve itself of the
responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be developed, nor can its substitutes
the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism and of any other body for those to which alone the people have
seen fit to confide this sovereign trust.

This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but
a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately
upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. The Collector cannot
exercise a power exclusively lodged in Congress. Hence, Barrias should be penalized in accordance to the
penalty being imposed by Act No. 1136. In this case, the Supreme Court determined that the proper fine
is $25.00.

Pasigan vs. Angeles, G.R. No. 64279, April 30, 1984

Facts:

Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelino Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in a 10-wheeler truck in April
1982, 26 carabaos and a calf, from Camarines Sur to Batangas. Despite the health certificate, permit to
transport, and certificate of inspection issued to them by the provincial veterinarian, provincial
commander and constabulary command, respectively, while petitioners were negotiating the town of
Basud, Camarines Norte, the carabaos were confiscated by private respondents, Police Station
Commander Lt. Zanarosa, and provincial veterinarian Dr. Miranda.

The confiscation was based on Executive Order 626-A which prohibited the transport of carabaos from
one province to another. Pursuant to EO 626-A, Dr Miranda distributed the carabaos to 25 farmers of
Basud. Petitioners filed for recovery of the carabaos and damages, against private respondent Judge
Angeles who heard the case in Daet and later transferred to Caloocan City, and dismissed the case for lack
of cause of action.

Issue:

Whether or not EO 626-A be enforced before its publication in the Official Gazette.

Ruling:

Said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already
noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14,
1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section
11 of the Revised Administrative Code.

The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations which
prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and
make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.

Maceda vs. Macaraig, Jr. 197 SCRA 771 (1991);

Facts:

Commonwealth Act 120 created NAPOCOR as a public corporation to undertake the development of
hydraulic power and the production of power from other sources. RA 358 granted NAPOCOR tax and duty
exemption privileges. RA 6395 revised the charter of the NAPOCOR, tasking it to carry out the policy of
the national electrification and provided in detail NAPOCOR’s tax exceptions. PD 380 specified that
NAPOCOR’s exemption includes all taxes, etc. imposed “directly or indirectly.” PD 938 dated May 27, 1976
further amended the aforesaid provision by integrating the tax exemption in general terms under one
paragraph.

Issue:

Whether or not NPC has ceased to enjoy indirect tax and duty exemption with the enactment of PD 938
on May 27, 1976 which amended PD 380 issued on January 11, 1974

Ruling:

No, it is still exempt. NAPOCOR is a non-profit public corporation created for the general good and welfare,
and wholly owned by the government of the Republic of the Philippines. From the very beginning of the
corporation’s existence, NAPOCOR enjoyed preferential tax treatment “to enable the corporation to pay
the indebtedness and obligation” and effective implementation of the policy enunciated in Section 1 of
RA 6395.

From the preamble of PD 938, it is evident that the provisions of PD 938 were not intended to be
interpreted liberally so as to enhance the tax exempt status of NAPOCOR.

It is recognized that the rule on strict interpretation does not apply in the case of exemptions in favor of
government political subdivision or instrumentality. In the case of property owned by the state or a city
or other public corporations, the express exception should not be construed with the same degree of
strictness that applies to exemptions contrary to the policy of the state, since as to such property
“exception is the rule and taxation the exception.”

Tatad vs. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330 (1997);

Facts:

The petitions assail the constitutionality of various provisions of RA 8180 entitiled the “Downstream Oil
Industry Deregulation Act of 1996.” Under the deregulated environment, any person or entity may import
or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or
own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same
for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy.

Issues:

Whether or not Sec. 15 of RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power

Whether or not RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in
restraint of trade and unfair competition

Ruling:

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power:
the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in
all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only
thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard
test. Congress expressly provided in RA 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997,
regardless of the occurrence of any event.

Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone
it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation.
The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March
1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President. He is to time it as far as
practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and
when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.

Petitioners also argued that some provisions of RA 8180 violate Sec. 19, Art. XII of the Constitution. Section
19, Art. XII of the Constitution espouses competition. The desirability of competition is the reason for the
prohibition against restraint of trade, the reason for the interdiction of unfair competition, and the reason
for regulation of unmitigated monopolies. Competition is thus the underlying principle of Sec. 19, Art. XII
of the Constitution which cannot be violated by RA 8180. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major
league players in the oil market.

As the dominant players, they boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of
4% on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products therefore works to their immense benefit. It
erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power
of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those
who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their
product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field.

The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex against
prospective new players. Petron, Shell and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement of RA
8180 in view of their existing storage facilities. Prospective competitors again will find compliance with
this requirement difficult as it will entail a prohibitive cost. The most important question is whether the
offending provisions can be individually struck down without invalidating the entire RA 8180.

The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another
part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The exception to
the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as
conditions, considerations, inducements or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. RA 8180 contains a
separability clause.

The separability clause notwithstanding, the Court held that the offending provisions of RA 8180 so
permeate its essence that the entire law has to be struck down. The provisions on tariff differential,
inventory and predatory pricing are among the principal props of RA 8180. Congress could not have
regulated the downstream oil industry without these provisions. Unfortunately, contrary to their intent,
these provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing inhibit fair competition, encourage
monopolistic power and interfere with the free interaction of market forces.
Lovina vs. Moreno, 9 SCRA 557;

Facts:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila enjoining the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications from causing the removal of certain dams and dikes in a fishpond owned by
Primitivo and Nelly Lovina in the Municipality of Macabebe Province of Pampanga. The cause started by
a petition of numerous residents of the said municipality to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, complaining that appellees had blocked the "Sapang Bulati", a navigable river in
Macabebe, Pampanga, and asking that the obstructions be ordered removed, under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 2056.

After notice and hearing to the parties, the said Secretary found the constructions to be a public nuisance
in navigable waters, and, in his decision dated 11 August 1959, ordered the land owners, spouses Lovina,
to remove five (5) closures of Sapang Bulati; otherwise, the Secretary would order their removal at the
expense of the respondent. After receipt of the decision, the respondent filed a petition in the Court of
First Instance of Manila to restrain the Secretary from enforcing his decision.

The trial court, after due hearing, granted a permanent injunction, which is now the subject of the present
appeal. The position of the plaintiffs-appellees in the court below was that Republic Act No. 2056 is
unconstitutional because it invests the Secretary of Public Works and Communications with sweeping,
unrestrained, final and unappealable authority to pass upon the issues of whether a river or stream is
public and navigable, whether a dam encroaches upon such waters and is constitutive as a public nuisance,
and whether the law applies to the state of facts, thereby Constituting an alleged unlawful delegation of
judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

Issue:

Whether or not the objections to the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 2056, not only as an undue
delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works but also for being unreasonable and
arbitrary, tenable

Ruling:

No. It will be noted that the Act (R.A. 2056) merely empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized
obstructions or encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no private person was anyway
entitled to make, because the bed of navigable streams is public property, and ownership thereof is not
acquirable by adverse possession.

It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act necessarily involves the determination
of some questions of fact, such as the existence of the stream and its previous navigable character; but
these functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the exercise of the power
granted by law to clear navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions or encroachments, and authorities
are clear that they are, validly conferable upon executive officials provided the party affected is given
opportunity to be heard, as is expressly required by Republic Act No. 2056, section 2.

Appellees invoke American rulings that abatement as nuisances of properties of great value can not be
done except through court proceedings; but these rulings refer to summary abatements without previous
hearing, and are inapplicable to the case before us where the law provides, and the investigator actually
held, a hearing with notice to the complainants and the, appellees, who appeared therein. It is noteworthy
that Republic Act 2605 authorizes removal of the unauthorized dikes either as "public nuisances or as
prohibited constructions" on public navigable streams, and those of appellees clearly are in the latter
class.

Considering the well-established rule that findings of fact in executive decisions in matters within their
jurisdiction are entitled to respect from the courts in the absence of fraud, collusion, or grave abuse of
discretion, none of which has been shown to exist in this case, we agree with appellant that the court
below erred in rejecting the findings of fact of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. RATIO:

The judicial power which may be exercises by administrative agencies is a restricted one, limited to what
is incidental and reasonably necessary to the proper and efficient administration of the statutes that are
committed to them for administration. Arbitrary powers or uncontrolled discretion may not be conferred
upon administrative agencies either in the exercise of rule-making or adjuticatory functions.

Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986);

Facts:

Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of
Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The government
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon approval.

The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The
court ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances
which are of general force and effect.

The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those
which are not. The publication means complete publication, and that publication must be made in the
official gazette. In a comment required by the solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion was a
request for an advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed. And on the clause “unless otherwise
provided” in Article 2 of the new civil code meant that the publication required therein was not always
imperative, that the publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.

Issues:

1. Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.

2. Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in full.

Ruling:

(1) The court held that all statute including those of local application shall be published as condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature.
(2) The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the laws. Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation
itself does not provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of publication is material for determining
the date of the effectivity which must be 15 days following the completion of its publication, but not when
the law itself provides for the date when it goes to effect. Publication of laws is part of substantive due
process.

Lupangco vs. CA, 160 SCRA 848 (1988);

Facts:

Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 which embodied that no examinee
shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out,
review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any
reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similars institutions
during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day. Any
examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the
Rules and Regulations of the Commission.

Herein Petitioners filed a complaint for injuction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary
injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution
and to declare the same unconstitutional.

The lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission
from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional. CA declared
that the decision of the lower court is null and void.

Issue:

Whether or not PRC Resolution No. 105 is unconstitutional.

Ruling:

Yes. SC realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to
preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak
to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an
examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out,
review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any
reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar
institutions.

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as
to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from
taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants.
They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should
be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their personal growth.

The term "liberty" means more than mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It
means freedom to go where one may choose and to act in such a manner not inconsistent with the equal
rights of others, as his judgment may dictate for the promotion of his happiness, to pursue such callings
and vocations as may be most suitable to develop his capacities, and give to them their highest enjoyment.

Cojuangco, Jr. vs. PCGG, 190 SCRA 226 (1997);

Facts:

President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Solicitor General to prosecute all persons involved in the misuse
of coconut levy funds. Pursuant to the above directive the Solicitor General created a task force to conduct
a thorough study of the possible involvement of all persons in the anomalous use of coconut levy funds.
the Solicitor General filed two criminal complaints with respondent PCGG

The PCGG assigned both complaints to prosecutor Cesario del Rosario for preliminary investigation. At the
scheduled preliminary investigation on January 31, 1990 petitioner appeared through counsel. Instead of
filing a counter-affidavit, as required in the subpoena, he filed two motions addressed to the PCGG,
namely; (1) a motion to disqualify/inhibit PCGG; alternatively, a motion to dismiss; and (2) motion to have
the PCGG itself hear or resolve Cojuangco’s motion to disqualify/inhibit PCGG alternatively, motion to
dismiss.

Prosecutor del Rosario denied both motions and declared the proceedings closed and the cases submitted
for resolution. Thereafter, petitioner requested the PCGG to resolve directly his aforesaid motion. The
PCGG issued an order denying petitioner’s motions and required him, together with all the respondents
in I.S. Nos. 74 and 75 to submit counter-affidavits within five (5) days from receipt thereof. Petitioner did
not submit the required counter-affidavit.

He filed in this Court on March 12, 1990 the herein petitions for prohibition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction. He alleges that the PCGG may not conduct a preliminary
investigation of the complaints filed by the Solicitor General without violating petitioner’s rights to due
process and equal protection of the law, and that the PCGG has no right to conduct such preliminary
investigation.

On May 4, 1990 petitioner filed a reply to the consolidated comment as required by the Court. In a
resolution dated June 5, 1990, the Solicitor General was required to file a rejoinder. On May 31, 1990, a
motion for hearing of said cases was filed by petitioner and this was granted by the Court on June 21,
1990. It was directed that the Ombudsman be impleaded as party-respondent. The Court required the
Ombudsman to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from notice. The case was set for hearing
on Tuesday, July 17, 1990 at 10:00 in the morning. The Ombudsman submitted his comment on July 3,
1990 and the Court required petitioner to file a reply to the same.

On July 6, 1990, Maria Clara Lobregat and Jose R. Eleazar, Jr. filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and a
Motion to Admit Petition to Intervene wherein they ask that the PCGG desist from further proceeding
with the preliminary investigation of I.S. Nos. 74, 75, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, and 84 charging the intervenors
and other respondents, including petitioner, with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(Republic Act No. 3019) in connection with the, coconut levy funds. The intervenors question the authority
of the PCGG to conduct a preliminary investigation of the said cases. They maintain that even assuming
that the PCGG has such authority, the same cannot be delegated to a prosecutor or his assistants.

Issue:

Whether under the circumstances of this case, it would be fair and just for the PCGG to conduct the
preliminary investigation of the said complaint instead of the Ombudsman or any other duly authorized
investigating agency.

Ruling:

Upon the creation of the PCGG under Executive Order No. 1 issued by President Aquino, the PCGG was
charged with the task of assisting the President not only in the recovery of ill-gotten wealth or unexplained
wealth accumulated by the former President, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates but also in the investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign
to the Commission from time and to prevent a repetition of the same in the future.

From the foregoing provisions of law, it is clear that the PCGG has the following powers and authority:
To conduct an investigation including the preliminary investigation and prosecution of the ill-gotten
wealth cases of former President Marcos, relatives and associates, and graft and corruption cases assigned
by the President to it;

 Issue sequestration orders in relation to property claimed to be ill-gotten;

 Issue “freeze orders” prohibiting persons in possession of property alleged to be ill-gotten from
transferring or otherwise disposing of the same;

 Issue provisional takeover orders of the said property;

 Administer oaths and issuesubpoenas in the conduct of its investigation;

 Hold any person in direct or indirect contempt and impose the appropriate penalties as provided
by the rules.

Considering that the PCGG, like the courts, is vested with the authority to grant provisional remedies of
(1) sequestration, (2) freezing assets, and (3) provisional takeover, it is indispensable that, as in the case
of attachment and receivership, there exists aprima facie factual foundation, at least, for the
sequestration order, freeze order or takeover order, an adequate and fair opportunity to contest it and
endeavor to cause its negation or nullification. Both are assured under the foregoing executive orders and
the rules and regulations promulgated by the PCGG.

Insofar as the general power of investigation vested in the PCGG is concerned, it may be divided into two
stages. The first stage of investigation which is called the criminal investigation stage is the fact-finding
inquiring which is usually conducted by the law enforcement agents whereby they gather evidence and
interview witnesses after which they assess the evidence and if they find sufficient basis, file the complaint
for the purpose of preliminary investigation. The second stage is the preliminary investigation stage of the
said complaint. It is at this stage, as above discussed, where it is ascertained if there is sufficient evidence
to bring a person to trial.

In the petition before this Court, it is not denied that the PCGG conducted the appropriate criminal
investigation of petitioner and intervenors as a law enforcer. In the process it sequestered all the
properties of the petitioner after aprima facie finding that the same amount to ill-gotten wealth and/or
were acquired in relation to allegedly anomalous disposition or misuse of the coconut levy funds.

The Court cannot close its eyes to the glaring fact that in earlier instances, the PCGG had already found
aprima facie case against the petitioner and intervenors when, acting like a judge, it caused the
sequestration of the properties and the issuance of the freeze order of the properties of petitioner.
Thereafter, acting as a law enforcer, in collaboration with the Solicitor General, the PCGG gathered the
evidence and upon finding cogent basis therefor filed the aforestated civil complaint. Consequently the
Solicitor General filed a series of criminal complaints.

It is difficult to imagine how in the conduct of such preliminary investigation the PCGG could even make
a turn about and take a position contradictory to its earlier findings of aprima facie case against petitioner
and intervenors. This was demonstrated in the undue haste with which I.S. Nos. 74 and 75 was
investigated and the informations were filed in court even as the petitioner and intervenors questioned
its authority, invoked the denial of due process and promptly informed the PCGG of the filing of this
petition.

It is in such instances that We say one cannot be “a prosecutor and judge at the same time.” Having
gathered the evidence and filed the complaint as a law enforcer, he cannot be expected to handle with
impartiality the preliminary investigation of his own complaint, this time as a public prosecutor.

Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and freeze orders against petitioner’s properties, it
was on the basis of aprima facie finding that the same were ill-gotten and/or were acquired in relation to
the illegal disposition of coconut levy funds. Thus, the Court finds that the PCGG cannot possibly conduct
the preliminary investigation of said criminal complaints with the “cold neutrality of an impartial judge,”
as it has prejudged the matter. Add to this the fact that there are many suits filed by petitioner and the
intervenors against the PCGG and vice versa.

PNB vs. Florendo, 206 SCRA 582 (1992)

Facts:

Plaintiffs are tenants of four (4) parcels of land located in the municipality of Mabinay, Negros Oriental,
whose previous owner Ricardo Valeroso, mortgaged the same to the Philippine National Bank (PNB, for
short). In 1971, said parcels of land were bought by spouses Agripino and Soledad Viloria who assumed
the mortgage with PNB (Rollo, Comment, p. 90).

In 1974, defendant PNB requested defendant Provincial Sheriff of Negros Oriental to foreclose the
mortgage on the aforesaid parcels of land after the failure of the owners thereof to pay certain
amortization and the same was sold at public auction to the defendant bank as the highest bidder (Rollo,
Brief for Private Respondents, p. 147; Annex "2", p. 3). Notwithstanding the fact that said lands were
already brought under the Land Reform Program of the government, the PNB caused the titles to said
parcels of land transferred in its name to the prejudice of plaintiffs.

On September 8, 1981, plaintiffs Vivienne B. Viloria, et al. filed a complaint for "Declaration of Nullity of
the Foreclosure Proceedings in Violation of P.D. Nos. 27 and 946" against the defendants PNB, et al. in the
Court of Agrarian Relations, 12th Judicial District, Branch IV, Dumaguete City.

On October 7, 1981, defendant PNB answered the complaint with counterclaim for damages. Plaintiffs, in
turn, filed their reply to the counterclaim dated October 10, 1981. Defendant PNB then moved for leave
of court to file third party complaint dated October 20, 1981 against the registered owners-mortgagors of
the subject parcels of land.

Plaintiffs Vivienne Viloria, et al. moved for the amendment of their complaint to implead the heirs of the
deceased plaintiff-Agripino Viloria which respondent Judge admitted in an order dated February 26, 1982.

Issue:

Whether or not the Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in admitting the First Amended Complaint which adds
another parcel of land not within the coverage of Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. 27.

Ruling:

The petition is impressed with merit. Upon the abolition of the Court of Agrarian Relations by BP 129
enacted on August 10, 1981 and fully implemented on February 14, 1983, jurisdiction over agrarian
disputes is now vested in the appropriate Regional Trial Court pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 19(7) of
the said law.

In view of such supervening event, it is now the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Oriental that has jurisdiction over the case. Be that as it may, the same law provides that whenever a
Regional Trial Court takes cognizance of agrarian cases, the special rules of procedures applicable under
the present laws to such cases shall continue to be applied, unless amended by law or by rules of court
promulgated by the Supreme Court.

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