2022 NEW POINTERS

CIVIL LAW
CASES AND NOTES
ATTY. JOSE R. ORTIZ, JR.


Department Chairs

Prof. Jose Ortiz, Jr.

Chairperson, Civil Law Department

State Solicitor Ruben S. Ayson, Jr.

Political Law Department

Chief City Prosecutor Aldrin P. Evangelista

Criminal Law Department

Dean Salvador Moya

Remedial Law Department

Atty. Voltaire T. Duano

Labor Law Department

Dean Aristeo R. Cruz

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Atty. Mark Anthony Tamayo

Taxation Law

Atty. Alma Lanzo

Legal Ethics Department
 Bar Operations Committee
Political and International Law
Atty. Evangeline Omadto (Supervising Lawyer)
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Mary Ann; Grospe, Kathryne Joy; Mirador, Jerome

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 Executive Committee
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Mark JR. Alipio

Assistant

Atty. Fitz Lexine Ayala

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Nikki Singson
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Kim A. Domingo
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Victorio D. Barrameda III

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Members
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Atty.Cattleya Cañete Atty. Jethro Reales
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Atty. Allyzza Concepcion Atty. Bea Unas
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DEAN RODERICK MANZANO
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Legal Aid Clinic’s Staff
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

TAÑADA v. TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986

Publication is indispensable.

Presidential Decrees/Issuances of General Applicability must be published.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

The term “laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation. This is true not only of penal laws but also of non-penal
laws like the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Even if the effectivity clause will provide that a law shall take effect immediately, it cannot
take effect without publication because it would offend the due process clause of the
Constitution.

OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the DOJ and the
Office of the Ombudsman outlining authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the
DOJ and of the Office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation. OMB-
DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 DOES NOT regulate the conduct of persons nor the public, in
general.

Accordingly, there is no merit to petitioner's submission that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-
001 has to be published. (GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, petitioner, v. THE PANEL OF
INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, G.R. No.
159747 April 13, 2004).

ARTICLE 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

This rule applies to local laws, because foreign laws must be
alleged and proved.

NOTA BENE Online publication is not yet recognized under any laws.

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 DOCTRINE OF a.k.a. Presumed Identity Approach in International Law means if
PROCESSUAL the foreign law is not properly alleged and proved, the
PRESUMPTION presumption is that it is the same as our law. (Recently applied in
the case of Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707,
December 10, 2014

LEAL v. I.A.C.
G.R. No. 65425, November 5, 1987

Prohibition to sell to third parties except the vendor is null and void. Contrary to Art. 1306
because it amounts to perpetual restriction on the right of ownership.

OPERATIVE FACT is a legislative or executive act, prior to its being declared as

DOCTRINE unconstitutional by the court, is valid and must be complied with.

STARE DECISIS (Let it stand, et non quieta movere) is the doctrine, which is really
adherence to precedents, states that once a case has been decided
in one way, then another case, involving exactly the same point at
issue, should be decided in the same manner.

CIR vs AICHI FORGING

G.R. No. 184823, October 6, 2010
(Tax Refund Issue)

As between the Civil Code, which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and the
Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year is composed of 12 calendar months, it is
the latter that must prevail following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogate priori.

SAMPLE 20th calendar month November 15, 1999 to December 14, 1999
COMPUTATION: 21st calendar month December 15, 1999 to January 14, 2000
ADMINISTRATIVE 22nd calendar month January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000
CODE 23rd calendar month February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000
24th calendar month March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000

ARTICLE 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a
third person with a right recognized by law.

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 People of the Philippines v. DONATO
G.R. No. 79269, June 5, 1991

Right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. We hereby rule that
the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which
is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

ORION SAVINGS BANK v. SHIGEKANE SUZUKI

G.R. No. 205487, November 12, 2014

Philippine Law governs the transfer of real property.

It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of
the country or state where it is located. The reason is found in the very nature of immovable
property — its immobility. Immovables are part of the country and so closely connected to it
that all rights over them have their natural center of gravity there.

Thus, all matters concerning the title and disposition of real property are determined by what
is known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title can pass
from one person to another, or by which an interest therein can be gained or lost. This general
principle includes all rules governing the descent, alienation and transfer of immovable
property and the validity, effect and construction of wills and other conveyances.

ARTICLE 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad. (Nationality Theory)

However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect

to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions (capacity
to succeed), shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.

ARTICLE 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of
the country where it is situated. (Also known as Lex Rei Sitae)

ARTICLE 17. The forms of solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which
they are executed. (Also known as Lex Loci Celebrationis)

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 ARTICLE 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance
(FAMILY CODE). with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38.

HUMAN RELATIONS

ST. LUKE’s COLLEGE OF MEDICINE – WILLIAM H. QUASHA MEMORIAL

FOUNDATION, et al. vs. SPS. PEREZ, et al .
G. R. No. 222740, September 28, 2016

[T]he present case is one between a school and its students, with their relationship being based
on the enrollment contracts. x x x [I]nstitutions of learning have the “built-in” obligation of
providing a conducive atmosphere for learning, an atmosphere where there are no constant
threats to life and limb, and one where peace and order are maintained. In the case at bar, the
Cabiao Community Clinic is to be considered as part of the campus premises of St. Luke’s. In
the course description of the clerkship program in preventive and community medicine, it is
stated that the Cabiao Community Clinic serves as the base operation of the clerkship program.
As such, petitioner had the same obligation to their students, even though they were stationed
in the Cabiao Community Clinic, and it was incumbent upon petitioners to ensure that said
Clinic was conducive for learning, that it had no constant threats to life and limb, and that peace
and order was maintained thereat. After all, although away from the main campus of St. Luke’s,
the students were still under the same protective and supervisory custody of petitioners as the
ones detailed in the main campus. Thus, as the school may still avoid liability by providing that
the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence, here
statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature
of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place.

Petitioners additionally aver that the Clinic was built under the direction, supervision,
management and control of the Municipality of Cabiao, and that it ensured that there was an
agreement for the Municipality of Cabiao to provide 24-hour security to the Clinic. Petitioners,
however, cannot escape liability based on these arguments. As held in Saludaga v. FEU, et al.,
a learning institution should not be allowed to completely relinquish or abdicate matters of
safety and security to a third party as to do so would result to contracting away its inherent
obligations of ensuring a safe learning environment for its students. x x x Similarly, we cannot
turn a blind eye on petitioners’ total reliance on the Municipality of Cabiao in ensuring the
safety and security of their students. The enrollment contract is between petitioners and the
victims, and petitioners cannot abdicate on their contractual obligation to provide their students
a safe learning environment, nor can it pass or contract away such obligation to a third party.

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 WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION v. JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 195549, September 3, 2014

UNFAIR COMPETITION. THE CONCEPT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION UNDER THE

CIVIL CODE IS VERY MUCH BROADER THAN THAT COVERED BY THE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS. — The concept of “unfair competition” under Article
28 is very much broader than that covered by intellectual property laws. Under the present
article, which follows the extended concept of “unfair competition” in American jurisdictions,
the term covers even cases of discovery of trade secrets of a competitor, bribery of his
employees, misrepresentation of all kinds, interference with the fulfillment of a competitor’s
contracts, or any malicious interference with the latter’s business.

Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
action might arise did not exist.

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.

ZAPANTA v. MONTESA
4 SCRA 510, February 28, 1962

A married B. Thereafter, A married C. A was sued for bigamy. A then filed a suit to declare
his marriage with C void on the ground of threat, force, and intimidation.

Held: There was prejudicial question.

These requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the question for annulment of the second
marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that,
according to the evidence, petitioner’s consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force,
and intimidation, it is obvious that this act was involuntary and cannot be the basis of his
conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan.

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 TE v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 126746, November 29, 2000

We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative
and the other is civil. (PRC case v. COURT case)

QUIAMBAO v. OSORIO
G.R. No. L-48157, March 16, 1988 (MTC vs DAR)

Generally, the doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play in a situation where civil and
criminal actions are both pending and the issues involved in both cases are similar or so closely
related than an issue must be preemptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal action
can proceed.

Technically, prejudicial question does not exist in this case. But because of the intimate
correlation between the two cases, stemming from the fact that the right of private respondents
to eject petitioner from the disputed property depends primarily on the resolution of the pending
administrative case. For while respondents may have prior possession, the same has been
terminated, suspended, or cancelled. Whether or not private respondents can continue to
exercise their right of possession is but a necessary logical consequence of the issue involved
in the pending administrative case assailing the validity of the cancellation, and the subsequent
award of the disputed portion to petitioners. If the cancellation is voided, then private
respondents would have the right to eject petitioner from the disputed area.

Annulment of certificate of sale not a prejudicial question in a petition for the issuance of
a writ of possession.

FAMILY CODE/MARRIAGE

ARTICLE 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are

present:
1. Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male
and a female; and
2. Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.

ARTICLE 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

1. Authority of the solemnizing officer;
2. A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in
Chapter 2 of this Title; and
3. A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of
the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and
wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

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 ARTICLE 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage

voidable as provided in Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity

of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
(n)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS,

G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013
(Is love the only consideration in marriage?)

Whether or not a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship
in consideration of $2,000.00 is void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent.

Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of
the same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void
ab initio. For consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
solemnizing officer.A “freely given” consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code,
such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.

Consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent that
conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent
was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage.

NOTA BENE: It is very important to note that Article 7 of the Family Code defines
the limits and scope of the authority granted to the solemnizing
officer e. g. Consuls have no authority to solemnize marriage in the
Philippines.

MARIATEGUI v. C. A.
January 24, 1992

The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to
be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was
likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the

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marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are
present.

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo
and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and woman, deporting themselves as husband and
wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there
being no divorce, is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course
of nature and the ordinary habits of life (Section 5(z), (bb), (cc), Rule 131, Rules of Court.)

CASTILLO v. CASTILLO,
G.R. No. 189607, April 18, 2016
(First Marriage: May 25, 1972/Second Marriage: January 6, 1979)

The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law
in effect at the time of its celebration. In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted
both marriages was the Civil Code. The children of the parties were also born while the Civil
Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using
the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80, 81, 82, and
83 (first par.); and those on voidable marriages are Article 83 (second par.), 85, and 86.

It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat,
Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriage celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly required where the nullity of a
previous marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. A second marriage
contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered bigamous and
void. x x x However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero and Ty v. Court of Appeals,
the requirement of a judicial decree of nullity does not apply to marriages that were celebrated
before the effectivity of the Family Code, particularly if the children of the parties were born
while the Civil Code was in force. As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and
Aragon is applicable to this case. The Court thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of
Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the
absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was
void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a
requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the R.T.C. of
Parañaque City declaring the nullity of Lea’s first marriage only serves to strengthen the
conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.

IRENEO G. GERONIMO v. C.A.

July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 494

Non-recording in the Marriage Contract of the Marriage License Number: Valid Marriage.
What was proved was the non-recording of the marriage license number but not the non-
issuance of the license itself.

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 SPS. SALGADO v. ANSON
G.R. No. 204494, July 27, 2016
(Confirmatory marriage but no first marriage)

“[T]o be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that
the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very
least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license
was issued to the parties.” Considering that the absence of the marriage license is apparent on
the marriage contract itself, with a false statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional
character, and no proof to the contrary was presented, there is no other plausible conclusion
other than that the marriage between Luis and Severina was celebrated without a valid marriage
license and is thus, void ab initio.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Dayot, the Court similarly declared that a marriage solemnized
without a marriage license based on a fabricated claim of exceptional character, is void. In lieu
of a marriage license, therein parties to the marriage executed a false affidavit of marital
cohabitation. In declaring the marriage void, the Court rejected the notion that all the formal
and essential requisites of marriage were complied with. The Court held that to permit a false
affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law.
It was further explained:

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’
affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites
were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage
license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they
should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from
the requirement of a marriage license.

NOTA BENE: Marriage between stepbrother and stepsister is not anymore

prohibited under the Family Code.

Solemnizing officer is not duty bound to investigate whether or not

a marriage license has been regularly issued by the local civil
registrar.

In cases however of marriages that are exempt from license

(Chapter 2 Family Code), the solemnizing officer must undertake
the necessary actions or steps to ascertain the ages and relationships
of the parties and lack of impediment to marry.

NAVARRO v. DUMAGTOY
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996

The judge solemnized a marriage outside the court’s jurisdiction.

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Effect: Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating person to administrative liability.

TUPAL v. JUDGE ROJO

A. M. No. MTJ-14-1842, February 24, 2014 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-2491-MTJ)

UDGES CANNOT NOTARIZE THE AFFIDAVITS OF COHABITATION OF THE

PARTIES WHOSE MARRIAGE THEY WILL SOLEMNIZE. - Based on law and the
Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary, the person who
notarized the contracting parties' affidavit of cohabitation cannot be the judge who will
solemnize the parties' marriage. As a solemnizing officer, the judge's only duty involving the
affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have indeed lived together for at
least five years without legal impediment to marry. The Guidelines do not state that the judge
can notarize the parties' affidavit of cohabitation. Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are
documents not connected with the judge's official function and duty to solemnize marriages.
Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine the parties'
requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized the affidavit of cohabitation, he
cannot objectively examine and review the affidavit's statements before performing the
marriage ceremony. Should there be any irregularity or false statements in the affidavit of
cohabitation he notarized, he cannot be expected to admit that the solemnized the marriage
despite the irregularity or false allegation. Thus, judges cannot notarize the affidavits of
cohabitation of the parties whose marriage they will solemnize. Affidavits of cohabitation are
documents not connected with their official function and duty to solemnize marriages.

NOTA BENE: Absence of witness is merely an irregularity in the formal requisite.

RONULO v. C.A.
G.R. No. 182438, July 2, 2014

Whether or not the alleged “blessing” by the petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an
“illegal marriage ceremony” which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
Whether or not the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage ceremony was illegal?

YES. The petitioner’s act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an
official church recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife. While Article
352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a “marriage ceremony” and what
constitutes its “illegal” performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these
matters. Article 6 of the Family Code particularly defines a marriage ceremony and sets the
minimum requirements: first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties
before a solemnizing officer; and second, their declaration in the presence of not less than two
witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife. Petitioner admitted that the parties
appeared before him and this fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, the

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prosecution has proven that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other
as husband and wife.

ENGRACE NIÑAL v. NORMA BAYADOG

G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000

It is true that if a man and a woman have been living together as husband and wife without the
benefit of a marriage for at least five (5) years, they are exempted from securing a marriage
license to marry. But such law requires that their act of living together must characterized by
exclusivity and continuity. It also requires that they must have had no legal impediment to
marry one another during the five-year period of cohabitation immediately before the day of
the marriage, otherwise if the five-year period is corrupted without any distinction as to whether
they were capacitated or not to marry, the law would then sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing
with those who live faithfully with their spouse. The cohabitation should be in nature of a
perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract.

The length of cohabitation should be at least five (5) years prior to the date of the marriage and
it should characterized by continuity and exclusivity. The 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity, meaning that no third party was involved at any time within the
five (5) years; and continuity, that is unbroken. If the period is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
(5) years, then, the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully
with their spouses.

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS v. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, et al.

December 16, 2008 (1st case applying A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)

A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil
Code.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed
by anyone outside of the marriage.

Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages
or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by

11
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that
they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only
inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence, can only question the validity
of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of
the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.

REMEDY: Question the validity of marriage in the petition for settlement of

estate (Enrico v. Heirs of Medinaceli, 534 SCRA 429)

LEONILO ANTONIO v. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES,

G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006
(Pathological Liar)

The Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000), that personal
examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. We deem the methodology utilized by petitioner’s witnesses as
sufficient basis for their medical conclusions.

Leonilo and Ivonne got married barely a year after their meeting. They begot three children.
Leonilo filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of
“psychological incapacity” claiming that Ivonne lied about herself, the people around her, her
occupation, income, educational attainment, and other events or things.

It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation
before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstances speak of the
degree of tolerance of Leonilo, it likewise supports the belief that Ivonne’s “psychological
incapacity” was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dutiable.

The lies attributed to her were not adopted as false pretenses to induce Leonilo into marriage
with her. They indicate a failure on her part to distinguish truth from fiction or at least abide
by the truth. A person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would be unable to
comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning and the
corresponding obligations to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality
cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.

CHI MING TSOI v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997

The senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation to
procreate children is equivalent to psychological incapacity — Evidently, one of the essential
marital obligations under the Family Code is “To procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.”

12
Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill
the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

MARCOS v. MARCOS
343 SCRA 755, October 19, 2000
(Totality of Evidence)

The personal medical psychological examination is not a requirement for a declaration of

psychological incapacity and that is not a condition sine qua non for such declaration.

NGO TE v. YU-TE
G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009
(Liberal Interpretation)

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is
not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage,
because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply
with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond; to indulge
in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a
stillborn marriage.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We
simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, 484 SCRA
353 (2006), there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being
redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be adjudged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections, or generalizations but according to its own facts.
And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals.

The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January
1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The
psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder,
and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. By the very nature
of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not
discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.

13
 DE LA FUENTE v. DE LA FUENTE
G.R. No. 188400, March 8, 2017

The non-examination of one of the parties will not automatically render as hearsay or invalidate
the findings of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist, since the totality of the behavior of
one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly
by the other. The Molina doctrine does not require a physician to examine a person and declare
him/her to be psychologically incapacitated. What matters is that the totality of evidence
presented establishes the party’s psychological condition. Dr. L’s testimony, as corroborated
by T, may sufficiently prove that R suffered from psychological incapacity.

DOCTRINE OF This doctrine provides that if the wife remains a virgin after being
TRIENNIAL together with the husband for three years, the latter is presumed
COHABITATION impotent, and will have to present evidence to overcome this
presumption. (Thompkins v. Thompkins 92 NJ13, 111 Att 599)

JULIANO-LLAVE v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011

Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be considered
as one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent between Zorayda
and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated
under both civil and Muslim laws, besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs
their personal status since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In
view, of Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their
subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the C.A. as void ab initio.

While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void
marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which
may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has property rights as an
heir, is likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed
since both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.

TENEBRO v. COURT OF APPEALS

G. R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004

There is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to
the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no
record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all the requisites for its
validity are present.

14
 IWASAWA v. GANGAN et al.
G. R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013

Public documents are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due
execution and genuineness.

There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner are all public
documents. x x x As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further
proof of their due execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said
documents on the sole ground that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the
NSO who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of
authenticity and due execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said
documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein
remain unrebutted since neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented
evidence to the contrary.

ARTICLE 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating
thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts therein contained.

LUCIO MORIGO v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004
(No Marriage Ceremony)

In this case, it was found out that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between
the parties by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that
the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. This
simply means that there was no marriage to begin with and that such declaration of nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned
from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the
celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married.

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the accused was never married. Thus, there is no
first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void
ab initio, the two were never married “from the beginning.” The contract of marriage is null
and it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes,
accused was not married to his wife at the time he contracted the second marriage with another
woman. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the
crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where
there is no first marriage to speak of. The accused must perforce be acquitted.

15
 GO-BANGAYAN v. BANGAYAN, JR.
G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013

For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites
for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. — For bigamy to exist, the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the existence
of a prior marriage. In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally
just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage
was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the
marriage between Benjamin ly did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.

Void Marriages; Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only
the properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions.

Land Registration; The words “married to” preceding the name of a spouse are merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. Such words do not prove co-ownership.

The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a
marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative
value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to
the issuance of a marriage license.

BRAZA v. CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS

OCCIDENTAL
G.R. No. 181174, December 4, 2009
(Declaration of Nullity in the Guise of Rule 108)

In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule
on legitimacy and filiation. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis Article 412 of the Civil
Code charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected.
The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling,
typographical, and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is
visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a
mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly
misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious
alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are
impleaded and due process is properly observed.

Marriages; Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; Filiation; Jurisdiction; Doctrinally, validity of

marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack; an action seeking the
declaration of marriage as void for being bigamous and one impugning a child’s legitimacy are

16
governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and Art. 171 of the Family Code,
respectively, and the petition should be filed in a Family Court. — The allegations of the
petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the marriage
between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick’s filiation in
connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.
Petitioner’s insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patrick’s birth
records and that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto. Petitioner’s position does
not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage
as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are
governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003,
and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family
Court as expressly provided in said Code. It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of
marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper part, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed
before the court a quo.

REP. OF THE PHILIPPINES v. OLAYBAR

G. R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014
(Stolen Identity)

Respondent Olaybar requested from NSO a Certificate of No Marriage as one of the

requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. However, the NSO issued a
certification that according to their records, Olaybar is already married to Ye Son Sune, a
Korean National. She denied having contracted such marriage and claimed that she did not
know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and the signature
appearing in the marriage certificate was not hers. She, then filed a petition for the cancellation
of the marriage contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. Respondent
impleaded the Local Civil Registry as well as her alleged husband.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is
clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status,
citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted
is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia in 1986, the Court has repeatedly
ruled that “even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed
under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing
themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding. “An appropriate adversary suit or
proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have
been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered.

Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence
of marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was
entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and
documentary evidence clearly established that the only “evidence” of marriage which is the

17
marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to
determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court
where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent;
the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted
and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no
marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set
forth by the evidence. Otherwise, stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of
marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the
marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO

G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018

In this case, respondent filed a petition for cancelation of entry of marriage in the civil registry
UNDER Rule 108 by virtue of judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese Court. It was the
Filipina wife who filed and initiated the divorce proceedings in Japan.

S.C. allowed the remedy under Rule 108 and further ruled that:

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.” Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute;
neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. “The legislature is presumed to
know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent
by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from
the words of a statute there should be no departure.”

TAN-ANDAL v. ANDAL
G. R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021

Molina however, is silent on what quantum of proof is required in nullity cases. While there is
opinion that a nullity case under Article 36 is like any civil case that requires preponderance of
evidence, we now hold that the plaintiff-spouse must prove his or her case with CLEAR and
CONVINCING EVIDENCE. This is a quantum of proof that requires more than preponderant
evidence but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt.

In the light of foregoing, this Court now categorically abandons the second Molina guideline.
Psychological incapacity is neither a mental capacity nor a personality disorder that must be
proven through expert opinion. There must be proof, however, of the durable or enduring
aspects of a person’s personality, called “personality structure” which manifests itself through
clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. The spouse’s personality structure

18
must make it impossible for him or her to understand and, more important, to comply with his
or her essential marital obligations.

Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted
marriage may testify on behaviors that they have consistently observed from the supposedly
incapacitated spouse.

x x x we hold that the psychological incapacity contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code
is incurable, NOT in the medical, but in the legal sense; hence, the third Molina guideline is
amended accordingly.

With respect to gravity, the requirement is retained, not in the sense that the psychological
incapacity must be shown to be a serious or dangerous illness, but that “mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outburst” are excluded. The psychological
incapacity cannot be mere “refusal, neglect, or difficulty, much less ill will.” In other words, it
must be shown that the incapacity is caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause.

To summarize, psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of dysfunctionality that show a

lack of understanding and concomitant compliance with one’s essential marital obligation due
to psychic causes. It is not a medical illness that has to be medically or clinically identified;
hence, expert opinion is not required.

Instead, the property regime of parties to a VOID marriage is governed either by Article 147
or Article 148 of the Family Code.

REPUBLIC v. GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO

G.R. No. 160258, January 19, 2005
(Declaration of Presumptive Death: Summary in Nature and Immediately Final and
Executory)

Article 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply
in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall
be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.

In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period
within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express
provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are “immediately final and executory”. It was
erroneous, therefore, on the part of the R.T.C. to give due course to the Republic’s appeal and
order the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.

19
 REP. OF THE PHILS. v. TAMPUS
G. R. No. 214243, March 16, 2016
(Presumptive Death)

Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-
founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code of
the Philippines (Family Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death: (1) that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive years,
or two (2) consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under
the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes
to remarry; (3) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
(4) that the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee. The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the foregoing
requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code exist. Since it is the present spouse who, for
purposes of declaration of presumptive death, substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue,
it stands to reason that the burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.

The “well-founded belief” in the absentee’s death requires the present spouse to prove that
his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and
that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the
absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one.

ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE

Cured By
Grounds Pres-
By Whom When? Cohabi-
(Art. 45, FC) cribe?
tation?
1.No parental a. No consent parent/ a. Before the party Yes. Yes.
consent guardian reaches the age of 21
b. No consent party b. Within 5 years after
reaching 21
2.Insanity a. Sane spouse (innocent) At any time before the Yes. Yes.
b.Guardian of the insane death of either party
c. Insane spouse after
regaining insanity
3.Fraud Injured party only w/in 5yrs from Yes. Yes.
discovery of fraud
4.Vitiated Injured party only Within 5yrs. From Yes. Yes.
consent cessation of F.V.I
5.Impotence Injured party only Within 5yrs from the No. Yes.
date of marriage
6.Sexually Injured party only w/in 5yrs. From the date No. Yes.
transmitted of marriage
disease

20
 PROPERTY RELATIONSHIP

JOCSON v. C.A.
170 SCRA 333

The slight difference between the market value and the purchase price of the properties in
question may be disregarded considering that the contracts of sale were executed between the
father and the daughter, in which case, filial love must be taken into consideration.

Conjugal Partnership: Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for
the application of the presumption in favor of conjugal partnership.

The fact that the subject properties were registered in the name of “Emilio Jocson married to
Alejandra Poblete” is no proof that said properties were acquired during the spouse’s marriage.
— It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under Article
160 he must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the marriage
of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon which
petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were registered in the name
of “Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete” is no proof that the properties were acquire
during the spouses’ coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different
acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already
existing. It may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he
was still a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which
explains why he was described in the certificates of title as married to the latter.

The words “married to” preceding the name Alejandra Poblete are merely descriptive of Emilio
Jocsons’s civil status.

AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO MAGSAJO v.

COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION CHING
G.R. No. 118305, February 12, 1998

If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the
money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract
falls within the term “x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” Here, no
actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time
of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the
family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or
profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does
not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family
business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership.

21
On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized
as falling within the context of “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” The
contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the
surety or his family.

No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or
accommodation agreement, it is “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” Proof must be
presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.

SUSAN NICDAO CARINO, (First Wife) v. SUSAN YEE CARINO, (Second Wife)
G. R. No. 132529, February 2, 2001

In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not
fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore,
was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal
that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and,
as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record
of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a
certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any
circumstances of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the Local Civil
Registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record
of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has
been sufficiently overcome.

It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one
of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.

It does ot follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death benefits” under scrutiny would now be
awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for
purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the
second marriage would also be void.

Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the
deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased
with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.

22
 JUAN SEVILLA SALAS, JR. v. EDEN VILLENA AGUILA
G.R. No. 202370, September 23, 2013
(Properties discovered after the judgment of nullity)

Barely four (4) months from the date of the decision, Eden filed a manifestation and motion
stating that she discovered that two parcels of land were registered in the name of her former
husband Juan with a description of his status “JUAN S. SALAS MARRIED TO RUBINA C.
SALAS”. R.T.C. ruled in favor of Eden declaring that even upon entry of judgment granting
the declaration of nullity, the court can proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution
of the conjugal partnership of gains if it has not been judicially adjudicated upon, as in this
case.

Rubina filed a complaint-in-intervention, claiming that the discovered properties were her
paraphernal properties but the R.T.C. denied her intervention. The R.T.C. also denied Juan’s
motion for reconsideration.

Was the ruling of the R.T.C. ordering the partition of the discovered properties proper?

The S.C. ruled that the discovered properties can be partitioned pursuant to Article 147 of the
Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Under this property regime,
property acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through
the couple’s joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership. Salas did not rebut this
presumption. The fact that the title states that the owner is “Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina
C. Salas” is merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. A Torrens title is
generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to, because there is a
strong presumption that it is valid and regularly issued. Salas did not dispute the ownership of
the discovered properties and failed to prove her title or her legal interest in said properties.
Hence, she has no right to intervene in the case.

THOMAS C. CHEESMAN v. I.A.C.

G.R. No. 74833, January 21, 1991

The fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of
the 1973 Constitution ordains that, “Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land
shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified
to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”

MANIQUE-STONE v. CATTLEYA LAND, INC., et al.

G.R. No. 195975, September 5, 2016

Aliens are disqualified from acquiring public and private lands; law was circumvented
when foreigner husband paid for a land placed under the name of his filipino wife.

23
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by
operation of law in view of petitioner’s marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided
in cases of hereditary succession, respondent’s disqualification from owning lands in the
Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchases
are made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can
result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow
circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.

In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, we find and so hold that Benjamin has no right to nullify
the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely
prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn
appeared to be the designated ‘vendee’ in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole
ownership there [of]. This is true even if we sustain Benjamin’s claim that he provided the
funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no
implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and
no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community
property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the
subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was
merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect [to] conjugal property. To sustain
such a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the
property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest
and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition.
This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.

WILLEM BEUMER v. AVELINA AMORES

G.R. No. 195670, December 3, 2012 (Art. 135)
(Alien spouse may be declared co-owner of improvements but NOT the lot)

S.C. ruled that the case is not one of first impression. Citing in Re: Petition for Separation of
Property of Elena Muller v. Muller, S.C. already denied the claim for reimbursement of a
foreigner against his former Filipina spouse because one cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the properties despite
the prohibition against foreign ownership of lands in the Philippines. Neither can Willem
invoke Article 22 on unjust enrichment. In Frenzel v. Catito, because an action for recovery of
what has been paid without just cause will not apply if as in this case, the action is proscribed
by the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine. Nor would the denial of
his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship. It is the Constitution itself
which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. The ban,
however, applies only to the land and not to the improvements built thereon. Thus, Willem and
Amores are declared to be co-owners of the improvements built on the subject lands.

24
 DIÑO v. DIÑO
G. R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011
(No need to wait for the liquidation of property before the decree of nullity be issued under
Art. 36 of the Family Code)

Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriage which are declared void ab initio
under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties. — It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code
that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or
annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50
of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article
36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of
the properties of the parties.

FAMILY HOME

TANEO, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 108532, March 9, 1999

Family home; the family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution, forced
sale, or attachment, except: (1) for nonpayment of taxes; (2) for debts incurred before the
declaration was recorded in the Registry of Property; (3) for debts secured by mortgages on the
premises before or after such record of the declarations; (4) for debts due to laborers,
mechanics, architects, builders, material men, and others who have rendered service or
furnished material for the construction of the building.

EULOGIO, et al. v. BELL et al.

G.R. No. 186322, July 8, 2015

RESPONDENT’S FAMILY HOME CANNOT BE SOLD ON EXECUTION UNDER

ARTICLE 160 OF THE FAMILY CODE. — Unquestionably, the family home is exempt from
execution as expressly provided for in Article 153 of the Family Code. It has been said that the
family home is a real right that is gratuitous, inalienable, and free from attachment. The great
controlling purpose and policy of the Constitution is the protection or the preservation or the
preservation of the homestead — the dwelling place. A houseless, homeless population is a
burden upon the energy, industry, and morals of the community to which it belongs. No greater
calamity, not tainted with crime, can befall a family than to be expelled from the roof under
which it has been gathered and sheltered. The family home cannot be seized by creditors except
in special cases. The nature and character of the property that debtors may claim to be exempt,
however, are determined by the exemption statute. The exemption is limited to the particular
kind of property or the specific articles prescribed by the statute; the exemption cannot exceed
the statutory limit.

CONDITIONS THAT MUST OBTAIN SO THAT ANY IMPROVEMENT OR

ENLARGEMENT OF THE FAMILY HOME BY PERSONS CONSTITUTING IT, ITS

25
OWNERS, OR ANY OF ITS BENEFICIARIES WILL STILL BE EXEMPT FROM
EXECUTION, FORCED SALE OR ATTACHMENT. — To summarize, the exemption of the
family home from execution, forced sale, or attachment is limited to P300,000 in urban areas
and P200,000 in rural areas, unless those maximum values are adjusted by law. If it is shown,
though, that those amounts do not match the present value of the peso because of currency
fluctuations, the amount of exemption shall be based on the value that is most favorable to the
constitution of a family home. Any amount in excess of those limits can be applied to the
payment of any of the obligations specified in Articles 155 and 160. Any subsequent
improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons constituting it, its owners, or
any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment provided
the following conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of the property at the time of its constitution
has been determined to fall below the statutory limit; and (b) the improvement or enlargement
does not result in an increase in its value exceeding the statutory limit. Otherwise, the family
home can be the subject of a forced sale, and any amount above the statutory limit is applicable
to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160. Certainly, the humane considerations for which
the law surrounds the family home with immunities from levy do not include the intent to
enable debtors to thwart the just claims of their creditors.

To warrant the execution sale of respondents’ family home under Article 160, petitioners
needed to establish these facts: (1) there was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase
resulted from voluntary improvements on the property, introduced by the persons constituting
the family home, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value
exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157.

PATERNITY & FILIATION (ARTS. 163-182)

TISON v. C.A.
276 SCRA 582, 593, July 31, 1997

Issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.

The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of Hermogenes
Dezoller cannot be properly controverted in the present action for reconveyance. This is aside,
of course, from the further consideration that private respondent is not the proper party to
impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to
operate in favor of petitioners unless and until it is rebutted.

ANDAL v. MACARAIG
89 PHIL 165, May 30, 1951

PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY UPHELD: TUBERCULOSIS DOES NOT PREVENT

CARNAL INTERCOUSE. — Although the husband was already suffering from tuberculosis
and his condition then was so serious that he could hardly move and get up from his bed, his
feet were swollen and his voice hoarse, yet that is no evidence of impotency, nor does it prevent
carnal intercourse. There are cases where persons suffering from this sickness can do the carnal

26
act even in the most crucial stage because they are more inclined to sexual intercourse. As an
author has said, “the reputation of the tuberculous towards eroticism (sexual propensity) is
probably dependent more upon confinement to bed than the consequences of the disease.”

CONCEPCION v. C.A.
G. R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005
(Presumption of Legitimacy)

Important Facts: Ma. Theresa married Mario on December 10, 1980. Ma. Theresa claimed and
admitted that she however, never lived with Mario and they had no sexual relationship.

While the first marriage was subsisting, Ma. Theresa married Gerardo on December 29, 1989.
Almost a year there after, Jose was born.

When Gerardo learned of the first Marriage, he filed an annulment of Marriage with Ma.
Theresa on the ground of bigamy which the court granted. The problem lies with the status of
Jose. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa claimed and admitted during the trial that Jose was their son.

SUPREME COURT RULING: First, the import of Ma. Theresa’s statement is that Jose is not
her legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration – an
avowal of the mother that her child is illegitimate is the very declaration that is proscribed by
Article 167 of the Family Code which states that the child shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have sentenced as an
adulteress.

Gerardo cannot invoke Article 166. He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose.
Only Mario who can contest the legitimacy of Jose born to his wife.

Only the husband can impugn the legitimacy of the child. The “husband” in the second (2nd)
bigamous marriage is not a husband who can impugn the legitimacy of the child. The mother’s
statement that her son is not her legitimate son but an illegitimate son is the very declaration
that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. Between the certificate of birth which is
prima facie evidence of the son’s illegitimacy and the quasi-conclusive presumption (rebuttable
only by proof beyond reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail.

JAO v. C.A.
152 SCRA 359

Blood grouping test conclusive ONLY as to non-paternity but inconclusive as to paternity.

27
 ILANO v. C.A.,
February 23, 1994

The putative father supplied the facts appearing on the birth certificate but failed to sign the
same. Supreme Court ruled that the father recognized the child based on estoppel. This is an
exception to the general rule.

TAN v. TROCIO
191 SCRA 764

Standing alone, unusual closeness to a child, and physical likeness to each other are not
convincing proof of filiation.

BABIERA v. CATOTAL
G. R. No. 138493, June 15, 2000

The mother (X) put the names of her rich employers (H & W) on the Birth Certificate of her
own child as father (H) and mother (W). After H died W filed a case to annul the birth certificate
since she did not give birth to the child.

A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof that it is fictitious. Thus, void
is a certificate which shows that the mother was already fifty-four years old at the time of the
child’s birth and which was signed neither by the civil registrar nor by the supposed mother.
Because her inheritance rights are adversely affected, the legitimate child of such mother is a
proper party in the proceedings for the cancellation of the said certificate.

Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of this
provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his
wife’s child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring
of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to
petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate
child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter’s child at all. Verily, the
present action does not impugn petitioner’s filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena
Babiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place.

The present action involves the cancellation of petitioner’s Birth Certificate; it does not impugn
her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does
not apply.

28
 MENDOZA v. C. A.
205 SCRA 337
(Meaning of continuous possession)

“Continuous” does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but only that
it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues. The possession of such status
means that the father has treated the child as his own, DIRECTLY and not through others,
SPONTANEOUSLY and without concealment though without publicity. There must be a
showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by
continuous and CLEAR manifestation of paternal affection and care.

Thus, where the alleged father only met the respondent four (4) times to give him money, the
Court denied the claim of “continuous possession”. (Ong v. C. A., 272 SCRA 725)

NARCISO SALAS v. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM

G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013

Annabelle presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Christian Paulo Salas in which the name
of Salas appears as his father but Salas did not sign the birth certificate. Admittedly, it was only
Annabelle who filled up the entries and signed the said document though she claims it was
Salas who supplied the information she wrote therein. S.C. reiterated that a certificate of live
birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when
there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate.
(Cabatania v. Court of Appeals, 484 Phil. 42 51; 441 SCRA [Salas vs. Matusalem, 705 SCRA
560 (2013)]. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by
the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity. An unsigned
birth certificate cannot be taken as a recognition in a public instrument and it has no probative
value to establish filiation to the alleged father.

As to the Baptismal Certificate of Christian also indicating Salas as the father, S.C. ruled that
while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not
necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s
paternity. S.C. ruled that the totality of respondent’s evidence is insufficient to establish that
Salas is the father of Christian Paulo.

REYES v. COURT OF APPEALS

135 SCRA 439

Student record or other writing not signed by alleged father do not constitute evidence of
filiation.

29
 LAHOM v. SIBULO
G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003

Action for rescission of adoption by adopter filed AFTER the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552
(deleting the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption) should be dismissed for lack of
cause of action. DURA LEX SED LEX. The remedy is disinheritance.

TAMARGO v. C.A.
209 SCRA 518

Retroactivity of adoption decree with respect to liability.

CASTRO et al. v. GREGORIO et al.

G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014
(Fraudulent Adoption: Remedy is Annulment of Judgment on Adoption)

Republic act no. 8552 (domestic adoption act of 1998); joint adoption by the husband and
wife is mandatory; exception; the adoption by the husband of his own child born out of
wedlock requires the consent of his wife and his legitimate children, ten years of age or
older. — It is settled that “the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at
the time of the commencement of the action.” As Jose filed the petition for adoption on August
1, 2000, it is Republic Act No. 8552 which applies over the proceedings. The law on adoption
requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the
consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children. Under Article III, Section 7
of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must first obtain the consent of his wife if he seeks to
adopt his own children born out of wedlock x x x. The provision is mandatory. As a general
rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. x x x The law provides for
several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her
own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. However,
the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse. x x x The law
also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are10 years old or older. x x
x The consent of the adopter’s other children is necessary as it ensures harmony among the
prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other children on notice that they will have to
share their parent’s love and care, as well as their future legitimes, with another person.

When one spouse seeks to adopt his own child born out of wedlock, personal service of
summons on the other spouse and the legitimate children should be effected for the trial
court to validly acquire jurisdiction over the petition for adoption. — For the adoption to
be valid, petitioners’ consent was acquired by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of
summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that
their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this
case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive
statutory rights. Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of
the proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.

30
It failed to understand, however, that fraud is considered intrinsic when the other party was
either present at the trial or was a participant in the proceedings when such instrument or
testimony was presented in court x x x. When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent
the participation of any other interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic,
regardless of whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged documents or perjured
testimony during the trial. Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a
reasonable opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to
participate, the trial court would have hesitated to grant Jose’s petition since he failed to fulfill
the necessary requirements under the law. There can be no other conclusion than that because
of Jose’s acts, the trial court granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.
Republic Act No. 8552 also fails to provide any provision on the status of adoption decrees if
the adoption is found to have been obtained fraudulently. Petitioners also cannot invoke Article
VI, Section 19 of Republic Act No. 8552 since rescission of adoption can only be availed of
by the adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are left with no other remedy in law other than the
annulment of the judgment.

BARTOLOME v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM et al.

G. R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014

To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents
is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552), otherwise known as
the Domestic Adoption Act provides:

Section 20. Effects of Rescission. — If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the
parental authority of the adoptee’s biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the
Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal
rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
(Emphasis added)

The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of custody
is concerned. The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the
grounds for rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the
adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the
biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is no left to
fend for himself at such a tender age.

To emphasize, we can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since R.A. No. 8552 was
enacted after Cornelio’s death. Truth be told, there is a lacuna in the law as to which provision
shall govern contingencies in all fours with the factual milieu of the instant petition.
Nevertheless, we are guided by the catena of cases and the state policies behind R.A. No. 8552
wherein the paramount consideration is the best interest of the child, which we invoke to justify
this disposition.

To demonstrate, the biological parents, in some instances, are able to inherit from the adopted,
as can be gleaned from Article 190 of the Family Code.

31
Article 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the
following rules:

xxxxxxxxx

When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur
with the adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or
ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;

POE-LLAMANZARES v. COMELEC, et al.

G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016

At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor
unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on
Paternity and Filiation. That said, there is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has
Filipino parents and is therefore a natural born Filipino. x x x The factual issue is not who the
parents of the petitioner are, as their identities are unknown, but whether such parents are
Filipinos. x x x There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. All of the foregoing evidence, that a
person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where
the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more
than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more
than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner’s parents are Filipinos. That
probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence.

SUPPORT

NOTES: Uncles, aunts, nephew and nieces are not obliged to support each
other (not included in the enumeration under Article 195 of the
Family Code.

Adultery of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support.

(Quintana v. Lermaza, Phil 285)

Payment for support starts only from the time it has been judicially
or extra-judicially demanded.

The right to receive support is exempted from execution, levy or

attachment.

32
 NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO
NORJO VAN WILSEM v. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM
G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014
(Liability of Alien Spouse under R.A. 9262 despite the divorce decree. Failure to give
support: CONTINUING CRIME)

We agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the New Civil Code in
demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil
Code stresses the principle of nationality in other words, insofar as Philippine laws are
concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to
Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are
governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties.
Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the R.T.C.-Cebu
that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged
to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son
under Article 195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in
Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s
son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has
the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that
being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of
and capacity to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing
his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands
does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or
after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals, has already
enunciated that.

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized
to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law
involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the
same as our local or domestic or internal law.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or properly, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy, and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.

33
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support
his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis, to wit:

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer
be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her
marital duties and obligations, it held.

DE ASIS v. COURT OF APPEALS

G. R. No. 127578, February 15, 1999

The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person.
Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise.

PARENTAL AUTHORITY/CUSTODY

ARTICLE 210. Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or

transferred except in the cases authorized by law.

ARTICLE 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority
over the persons of their common children.

ARTICLE 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support
in conformity with this Code.

NOTES: The parents are equally bound to ensure the wholesome upbringing
of the children. This precept is in accordance with the neutral order
of life.

Each parent has an EQUAL right and duty to support and protect
the child and cannot stand passively by and refuse to do so when it
is reasonably within his power.

Maternal preference rule in custody cases is subservient to the

“Best Interest of the Child”.

No finality of custody judgment.

34
 DACASIN v. DACASIN
G.R. No. 168785, February 5, 2010

The relevant Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in law is that no
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother (tender age doctrine
according to some authors); This is mandatory grounded on sound policy of consideration;
Agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime between respondent and
petitioner over their child under seven years old contravenes Philippine Law. — At the time
the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002, two facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie
was under seven years old (having been born on 21 September 1995); and (2) petitioner and
respondent were no longer married under the laws of the United States because of the divorce
decree. The relevant Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in law
(under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) is also undisputed: “no child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother x x x.” (This statutory awarding
of sole parental custody to the mother is mandatory, grounded on sound policy consideration,
subject only to a narrow exception not alleged to obtain here). Clearly then, the Agreement’s
object to establish a post divorce joint custody regime between respondent and petitioner over
their child under seven years old contravenes Philippine law.

Indeed, the separated parents cannot contract away the provision in the Family code on the
maternal custody of children below seven years anymore than they can privately agree that a
mother who is unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane, or afflicted with a
communicable disease will have sole custody of a child under seven as these are reasons
deemed compelling to preclude the application of the exclusive maternal custody regime under
the second paragraph of Article 213.

PABLO-GUALBERTO v. GUALBERTO V
G. R. No. 154994, June 28, 2005

The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be separated from their mother
finds its raison d’etre in the basic need of minor children for their mother’s loving care.

The word “shall” in Article 213 of the Family Code and Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court has been held to connote a mandatory character.

The so-called “tender-age presumption” under Article 213 of the Family Code may be
overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The mother has been
declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances:
neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease.

Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to deprive
Joycelyn of custody. It has indeed been held that under certain circumstances, the mother’s
immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of custody. But sexual
preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the
fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit

35
to have custody of her minor child. To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly
establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have
distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper parental care.

It is not enough for a father to show merely that a mother is a lesbian — he must also
demonstrate that she carried on her purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the
presence of their son or under circumstances not conducive to the child’s proper moral
development.

REMINDER: In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual

engaged in child care and exercising special parental authority,
inflict corporal punishment upon the child. (Article 233 2nd par.)

VALINO v. ADRIANO, et al.

G. R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014

funerals; right of the surviving legal wife to the remains of the deceased husband,
affirmed. — [I]t is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to
Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living
separately from her husband and was in the United States when he died has no controlling
significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly,
her right and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless.
The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered
as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct
indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end.

ARTICLE 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or

exhumed without the consent of the persons mentioned in Articles
294 and 305 (Referring to the legitimate spouse and children).

SECTION 1103, Persons charged with the duty of burial. — The immediate duty of
THE REVISED burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate
ADMINISTRATIVE liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons
CODE. herein below specified:

If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the burial
shall devolve upon the surviving spouse if he or she possesses
sufficient means to pay the necessary expenses;

Should there be any doubt as to the true intent of the deceased, the
law favors the legitimate family.

36
 NOTES: WISHES OF THE DECEASED AS TO HIS FUNERAL RITES
AND PLACE OF BURIAL MUST BE ESTABLISHED BY
SOME FORM OF TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION.

THE RIGHT OF THE LEGITIMATE FAMILY OVER THE

REMAINS OF THEIR PATRIARCH IS A QUASI-PROPERTY
RIGHT; IT IS A FAMILY RIGHT.

SAGALA-ESLAO v. C.A.
January 16, 1997, G.R. No. 116773

Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced
except in cases authorized by law; when a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another;
such as a friend or godfather; even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody
and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority.

SURNAMES

TAKE NOTE OF Re: An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or
R.A. NO. 9048 the Consul General to correct a clerical or typographical error in an
entry and/or change of first name or nickname in the Civil Register
without need of a Judicial Order amending for this purpose Art. 376
and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, March 22, 2001.

TAKE NOTE OF Re: An act allowing illegitimate children to use the surname of their
R.A. NO. 9255 father. Article 176 of the Family Code as amended: Illegitimate
children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother. HOWEVER, ILLEGITIMATE children
MAY use the surname of their father IF their filiation has been
EXPRESSLY RECOGNIZED by the father through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a
public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the
father. PROVIDED, the father has the right to institute an action
before the regular courts to prove non-filiation DURING HIS
LIFETIME. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of
one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.

GRACE M. GRANDE v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO

G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014

Whether or not the putative father may compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate
children upon his recognition of their filiation.

37
NO. Article 176 as amended by R.A. No. 9255, states: Illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled for
support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children MAY use the surname of
their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of
their birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an
action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime.

The foregoing provision is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the
surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by R.A. No. 9255 is, in case his filiation
is expressly recognized by the father or when an admission contained in a public instrument is
made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.
When Patricio filed the petition, it is enough to establish the paternity of his children. However,
since parental authority is given to the mother, then the custody over the minor is also given to
the mother.

S.C. ruled that the C.A. erred in ordering the change of the surname of the children because it
will contravene Article 176 in relation to R.A. No. 9255 which gives the illegitimate children
the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father or
the mother who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
The word “may” is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.

YASIN v. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT

G.R. No. 94986, February 23, 1995, 241 SCRA 606

Whether or not a petition for resumption of maiden name after the marriage was dissolved, is
the same as a petition for change of name under Rule 103.

RULING: While it is true that under Article 376 of the New Civil Code no person may change
his name without judicial authority, the name that may be changed is the true and official name
recorded in the Civil Register.

The true and real name of a person is that given him and entered in the Civil Register. This is
the only name that may be changed under Article 376. Petitioner’s registered name is Hatima
Centi y Saul. This name was not changed when she married. She merely changed her status.
Hence, her petition does not seek to change her registered name. It seeks, merely to allow her
to resume the use of her registered name. There being no prayer for change of her registered
name, the petition is not one for change of name under Article 376.

When the marriage is dissolved as in death or divorce, the widow or divorcee need not seek
judicial authority to resume her maiden name.

When a woman marries a man, she need not apply or seek judicial authority to use her
husband’s name as no law requires it. Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum is
dissolved as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim code,
the widow or divorcee need not obtain judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in

38
order to resume the use of her maiden name as the use of her husband’s name is optional and
not obligatory for her. Hatima’s petition is, therefore, a superfluity and unnecessary.

The use by the wife of her husband’s name is merely permissive and not obligatory.

The use by the wife of the husband’s name during the marriage (Art. 370), after annulment of
marriage (Art. 341), and after the death of the husband (Art. 373) is permissive and not
obligatory except in case of legal separation (Art. 372).

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPAHANIE NATHY ASTORGA

GARCIA HONORATO B. CATINDIG
G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005

Father (Catindig) adopted his own illegitimate child STEPAHANIE NATHY ASTORGA
GARCIA (surname of the mother) when he became a widower. When the adoption was
granted, the court ordered that the adoptee shall be known as STEPAHANIE NATHY
CATINDIG. The court however disallow the use of the middle name GARCIA, the surname
of her natural mother on the ground that there is no law or jurisprudence that allows it in case
there is only one adopting parent.

Law is silent as to the use of the middle name. Even the Civil Code, Family Code, and R.A.
No. 9522 are silent on this point. Thus, though there is no law that allows it, there is also no
law that prohibits it. Since adoption is for the best interest of the child, the child was allowed
to use the surname of the natural mother as her middle name. In fact, it is a Filipino custom
that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
Moreover, it will maintain the maternal lineage of the adopted child.

ALANIS v. C. A.
February 25, 2021

Legitimate children can now use their mother’s surname.

PROPERTY

BALAIS-MABANAG vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY

G. R. No. 153142, March 29, 2010

The issue of citizenship of the registered owner of land cannot anymore be raised to forestall
the execution of a final and executory judgment where the objecting party had the opportunity
to raise the issue prior to the finality of the judgment. The time for assailing the capacity of the
winning party to acquire the land was during the trial, not during the execution of a final
decision.

39
It should also be pointed out that the petitioner was not the proper party to challenge Ramona's
qualifications to acquire land.

Under Section 7, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185, the Solicitor General or his representative shall
institute escheat proceedings against its violators. Although the law does not categorically state
that only the Government, through the Solicitor General, may attack the title of an alien
transferee of land, it is nonetheless correct to hold that only the Government, through the
Solicitor General, has the personality to file a case challenging the capacity of a person to
acquire or to own land based on non-citizenship. This limitation is based on the fact that the
violation is committed against the State, not against any individual; and that in the event that
the transferee is adjudged to be not a Filipino citizen, the affected property reverts to the State,
not to the previous owner or any other individual.

Herein, even assuming that Ramona was legally disqualified from owning the subject property,
the decision that voids or annuls their right of ownership over the subject land will not inure to
the benefit of the petitioner. Instead, the subject property will be escheated in favor of the State
in accordance with Batas Pambansa Blg. 185.

RAMIREZ v. Vda. De Ramirez

G.R. No. L-27952, February 15, 1982

We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private
lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for
naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying
money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land.

This opinion notwithstanding. We uphold the usufruct in favor of alien because a usufruct,
albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title
to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. BASA, JR.

G. R. No. 149121, April 20, 2010

When is the annotation decreed effective with Registry of Deeds?

The main issue before us is whether the annotation of the sheriff's certificate of sale on the
owner's duplicate certificate of titles is sufficient registration considering that the inscription
on the original certificates could not be made as the same got burned.

Jurisprudence is replete with analogous cases. Of foremost importance is Development Bank

of the Philippines v. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija” where the Court listed cases
where the transaction or instrument was annotated not on the original certificate but somewhere
else. In that case, DBP following the extrajudicial foreclosure sale where it emerged as the
highest bidder, registered with the Register of Deeds the sheriff's certificate of sale in its favor.
After it had paid the required fees, said transaction was entered in the primary entry book.

40
However, the annotation of the said transaction to the originals of the certificates of title could
not be done because the same titles were missing from the files of the Registry. This prompted
DBP to commence reconstitution proceedings of the lost titles. Four years had passed before
the missing certificates of title were reconstituted. When DBP sought the inscription of the
four-year old sale transaction on the reconstituted titles, the Acting Register of
Deeds, being in doubt of the proper action to take, referred the matter to the Commissioner of
the Land Registration Authority by consulta the latter resolved against the annotation of the
sale transaction and opined that said entry was “ineffective due to the impossibility of
accomplishing registration at the time the document was entered because of the non-availability
of the certificate (sic) of title involved. In other words, annotation on the primary book was
deemed insufficient registration. The Court disagreed with this posture. Considering that DBP
had paid all the fees and complied with all the requirements for purposes of both primary entry
and annotation of the certificate of sale, the Court declared that mere entry in the primary book
was considered sufficient registration since “DBP” cannot be blamed that annotation could not
be made contemporaneously with the entry because the originals of the subject certificates of
title were missing and could not be found, since it had nothing to do with their safekeeping. If
anyone was responsible for failure of annotation, it was the Register of Deeds who was
chargeable with the keeping and custody of those documents. To buttress its conclusion, the
Court reviewed the relevant jurisprudence starting from 1934. The Court noted that before the
Second World War, particularly in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Aballe, the
prevailing doctrine was an inscription in the book of entry even without the notation on the
certificate of title was considered as satisfactory and produced all the effects which the law
gave to its registration. During the war, however, the Court observed that there was apparent
departure from said ruling since in Bass v. De la Rama, the holding was that entry of an
instrument in the primary entry book does not confer any legal effect without a memorandum
thereof inscribed on the certificate of title. DBP noted that Bass v. De la Rama, however,,
survived only for a little while since “later cases appear to have applied the Aballe ruling that
entry in the day book, even without the corresponding annotation on the certificate of title, is
equivalent to, or produces the effect of, registration to voluntary transactions, provided the
requisites fees are paid and the owner's duplicates of the certificates of title affected are
presented.

These later cases are Levin v. Bass and Potenciano v. Dineros, both of which involve the issue
of whether entry in the day book of a deed of sale, payment of the fees, and presentation of the
owner's duplicate certificate of title constitute a complete act of registration.

LUZ S. NICOLAS v. LEONORA C. MARIANO

G. R. No. 201070, August 1, 2016

Land registration; Torrens system; the Torrens system of land registration merely confirms
ownership and does not create it.

Obligations and contracts; when both parties are in pari delicto neither one may expect positive
relief from courts of justice in the interpretation of their contract.

41
 HEIRS OF ALEJANDRA DELFIN v. RABADON, et al.
G. R. No. 165014, July 31, 2013

The probative value of petitioners’ evidence, which consist of tax declarations and tax receipts,
pales in comparison to that of respondents’ evidence which consists of a decree of ownership,
i.e., Decree No. 98992, under the name of their predecessor-in-interest, Emiliana. While the
actual copy of the said decree was lost, the existence of the said decree was actually proven by
the LRA certification and the daybook entry. Likewise, the R.T.C. itself observed that it is
undisputable that the subject property has been issued Decree No. 98992, for which an original
certificate of title was issued to Emiliana. It is an elemental rule that a decree of registration
bars all claims and rights which arose or may have existed prior to the decree of registration.
By the issuance of the decree, the land is bound and title thereto quieted, subject only to certain
exceptions under the property registration decree. In the case of Ferrer-Lopez v. CA, the Court
ruled that as against an array of proofs consisting of tax declarations and/or tax receipts which
are not conclusive evidence of ownership nor proof of the area covered therein, an original
certificate of title, which indicates true and legal ownership by the registered owners over the
disputed premises, must prevail. Accordingly, respondents’ Decree No. 98992 for which an
original certificte of title was issued should be accorded greater weight as against the tax
declarations and tax receipts presented by petitioners in this case. Besides, tax declarations and
tax receipts may only become the basis of a claim for ownership when they are coupled with
proof of actual possession of the property. In this case, records are bereft of any showing that
petitioners, or any of their predecessors-in-interest, have been in actual possession of the
subject property prior to 1989 as they claim.

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G. R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009

We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable
title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.

Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since June 12, 1945 and does not require that
the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the
possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared
alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land
Act.

The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed
by Section 14(1)of the Property Registration Decree.

42
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under
the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial
property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that the property is already patrimonial AND no longer retained for public service
or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code.

Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person who acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure
registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one
ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires
ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith
and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted
adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith
or just title, ripens into ownership.

We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired
ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no
substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The earliest that
petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence-the Tax
Declarations they presented in particular-is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail
themselves or registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the
subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent
evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national
wealth, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject
property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as
property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible
to acquisition by prescription.

BILAG, et al. v. AY-AY, et al.

G.R. No. 189950, April 24, 2017

JURISDICTION: WHEN A COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT

MATTER, THE ONLY POWER IT HAS IS TO DISMISS THE ACTION: THUS, A COURT
OR TRIBUNAL SHOULD FIRST DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT IT HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER PRESENTED BEFORE IT,
CONSIDERING THAT ANY ACT THAT IT PERFORMS WITHOUT JURISDICTION
SHALL BE NULL AND VOID, AND WITHOUT ANY BINDING LEGAL EFFECTS.

43
QUIETING OF TITLE; THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT LACKS POWER OR
AUTHORITY TO HEAR AND RESOLVE A PARTY’S ACTION FOR QUIETING OF
TITLE WHERE THE DISPUTED PROPERTIES ARE STILL PART OF PUBLIC DOMAIN.
— [S]ince the subject lands are untitled and unregistered public lands, then petitioners correctly
argued that it is the Director of Lands who has the authority to award their ownership. Thus,
the R.T.C. Br. 61 correctly recognized its lack of power or authority to hear and resolve
respondent’s action for quieting of title. In Heirs of Pocdo v. Avila, the Court ruled that the
trial court therein correctly dismissed an action to quiet title on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
for lack of authority to determine who among the parties have better right over the disputed
property, which is admittedly still part of public domain for being within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation.

CHAVEZ v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY

G. R. No. 133250, July 29, 2002

The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may
lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell nor transfer ownership of these lands
to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the
ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of
the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and
declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification
and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands
qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the
government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are
inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

Since the amended, JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.

Since the Amended, JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of
still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other
than agricultural lands of the domain.

REPUBLIC v. NAGUIAT
G. R. No. 134209, January 24, 2006

Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by positive act of the
government so that they may form part of disposable agricultural lands of public domain, ARE
NOT CAPABLE OF PRIVATE APPROPRIATION.

44
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. x x x . The classification
is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what
the land actually looks like.

All lands of the public domain belong to the State (Regalian Doctrine).

LAUREL v. GARCIA
G. R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990

The nature of Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out by the
Reparation Agreement between The Philippines and Japan. It is a public dominion. The fact
that it has not been used for a long time for actual embassy service does not automatically
convert it to patrimonial property x x x until there is formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from such. x x x. It is not for the President to convey on his or her
will. It must be authorized by law.

SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF BATAAN v. CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE

T. GARCIA JR., Members of the faculty, Concerned Students and the Board of
Trustees of the BATAAN POLYTECHNIC STATE COLLEGE
G.R. No. 174964, October 5, 2016

Two (2) lots were registered in the name of Bataan Provincial, being occupied by Bataan
Community College and MLLSAT (both state run school). Congress passed a law converting
the same into Bataan Polytechnic State College. Province of Bataan argued that it cannot be
deprived of its property without just compensation.

National economy and patrimony: Regalian Doctrine: all lands of the public domain are
under the absolute control and ownership of the state.

The court classified the properties of the local governments as either properties for public
use or patrimonial properties, and that the capacity in which the property is held by a
local government is dependent on the use to which it is intended and for which it is
devoted.

If the property is owned by the municipal corporation in its public and governmental capacity,
it is public and Congress has absolute control over it; but if the property is owned in its private
or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control, in which
case, the municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just
compensation.

Since the lands are being used for public service, Congress has absolute control of the same.

45
 PASIÑO v. MONTERROYO
G.R. No. 159494, July 31, 2008, 560 SCRA 739

Petitioners filed an action for recovery of possession and damages against respondents. They
alleged that the subject land was occupied, cultivated, and cleared by Laureano Pasiño in 1933;
that after Laureano died, the Director Of Lands issued an Order for the issuance of a homestead
patent in his favor. However, the heirs of Laureano failed to receive the order. Consequently,
the land was not registered. In their answer, respondents claimed that they had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject lot for over thirty (30) years.

The Court ruled in favor of the respondents. In Director of Lands vs. IAC [46 SCRA 509
(1986)], the Court held that alienable public land held by a possessor, continuously or through
his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously, and exclusively for the prescribed statutory
period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by
the mere lapse or completion of the period, ipso jure.

Furthermore, the Court stated that once a homestead patent in accordance with law is
registered, the certificate of title issued by virtue of the patent has the force and effect of a
Torrens title issued under the land registration law. In this case, the issuance of a homestead
patent in 1952 mandates the registration of patents since it is the operative act to convey the
land to the patentee. Non-registration of patent with Register of Deeds, the deed as a contract
between the Government and the patentee rendered it functus officious.

REGISTRY OF DEEDS v. CBC

4 SCRA 1146

A foreign corporation cannot even be the transferee of a land in the Philippines even
temporarily.

NOTA BENE: The transfer of a land to an alien is validated when property is sold
to a Filipino Citizen. (Halili vs. C.A., 287 SCRA 465)

Take note however of R.A. No. 8179 approved on March 28, 1996
entitled “An Act to Further Liberalize Foreign Investments
Amending R.A. 7042” allowing foreigners who were former
Filipino Citizens to acquire lands in the Philippines subject to area
limitations under Section 10 of the said law.

46
 OWNERSHIP

ANECO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. LANDEX DEVELOPMENT

CORP.
G. R. No. 165952, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 182

Petitioner Aneco filed a complaint for injunction against respondent Landex. Prior thereto,
FHDI sold 22 lots to petitioner and 17 lots to respondent. The dispute arose when Landex
started the construction of a concrete wall on one of its lots. To restrain the construction of the
wall, petitioner filed the said case.

The Court held that the complaint for injunction should be dismissed for lack of merit. Article
430 of the Civil Code gives every owner the right to enclose or fence his land or tenement by
means of walls, ditches, hedges, or any other means. The right to fence flows from the right of
ownership. As owner of the land, Landex may fence his property subject only to the limitations
and restrictions provided by law. Absent a clear legal and enforceable right, as in this case, the
Court will not interfere with the exercise of an essential attribute of ownership.

ACTIONS TO There are three usual actions to recover the possession of real
RECOVER property:
1. Forcible entry or unlawful detainer (either action was formerly
referred to as accion interdictal).
2. Accion Publiciana (or the plenary action to recover the better
right of possession).
3. Accion Reinvindicatoria (or a reinvindicatory action)

MORALIDAD v. PERNES
G. R. No. 152809, August 3, 2006

Termination of usufruct may also be a valid ground for unlawful detainer case

ARBIZO v. SANTILLAN
G. R. No. 171315, February 26, 2008, 546 SCRA 610

HELD: As to whether respondents were deprived of possession by force, intimidation, strategy,

or stealth, the acts of the petitioner in unlawfully entering the subject properties, erecting a
structure thereon and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would necessarily imply the use
of force. In order to constitute force, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war.

47
 UNION BANK OF THE PHILS. v. PHIL. RABBIT BUS LINES, INC.,
G. R. No. 205951, July 4, 2016
(Contract to Sell: Remedy is Ejectment)

It must have escaped the attention of the MTCC, the R.T.C., and the C.A. that an ejectment
case is not limited to lease agreements or deprivations of possession by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth. It is as well available against one who withholds possession after the
expiration or termination of his right of possession under an express or implied contract, such
as a contract to sell. Under Section I, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules, “a x x x vendor, vendee, or
other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after
the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express
or implied, or the legal representatives or assign of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possessio[n], or any person or persons claiming under
them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.”

It was plainly erroneous for the lower courts to require a demand to pay prior to filing of the
ejectment case. This is not one of the requisites in an ejectment case based on petitioner’s
contract to sell with respondent. As correctly argued by petitioner, the full payment of the
purchase price in a contract to sell is a positive suspensive condition whose non-fulfillment is
not a breach of contract, but merely an event that prevents the seller from conveying title to the
purchaser. In other words, the non-payment of the purchase price renders the contract to sell
ineffective and without force and effect. Respondent’s failure and refusal to pay the monthly
amortizations as agreed rendered the contract to sell without force and effect. It therefore lost
its right to continue occupying the subject property, and should vacate the same.

ENDAYA v. VILLAOS
G. R. No. 202426, January 27, 2016

In resolving the issue of possession in an ejectment case, the registered owner of the
property is preferred over the transferee under an unregistered deed of sale, for a
certificate of title has a superior probative value as against that of an unregistered deed
of sale.

When the execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case would result in the
demolition of the premises, such that the result of enforcement would be permanent,
unjust, and probably irreparable, then the unlawful detainer case should at least be
suspended, if not abated or dismissed, in order to await final judgment in the more
substantive case involving legal possession or ownership.

48
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by TOLL REGULATORY BOARD
v. HOLY TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 172410, April 14, 2008

Under R.A. 8974, upon the filing of complaint for expropriation and after due notice to
defendants, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property the
amount equivalent of the sum of 100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant
zonal valuation of B.I.R. and the value of the improvements.

In this case, the said value was deposited under the expropriation account of the DPWH with
the Land Bank.

The Supreme Court ruled that the earned interest of the said deposit belongs to the owners of
the expropriated land based on accession under Article 440 of the Civil Code.

BASIC o To the owner of the principal must belong also the accessions,
PRINCIPLES OF in accordance with the principle that “the accessory follows the
ACCESSION principal.”

o The union or incorporation must, with certain exceptions, be

effected in such a manner that to separate the principal from the
accessory would result in substantially injury to either.

o He who in good faith may be held responsible but he should not

be penalized.

o He who is in bad faith may be penalized.

o No one should enrich himself unjustly at the expense of

another.

o Bad faith of one party neutralizes the bad faith of the other so
both should be considered in good faith.

o Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad
faith rests the burden of proof. (See Art. 527)

o Since the choice given the landowner is confined to either an

appropriation of the house or to a compulsory selling of the
land, he has no right of removal or demolition, UNLESS after
having selected a compulsory sale, the builder fails to pay for
the land. (Ignacio v. Hilario, 43 O.G. 140, 76 Phil. 605)

o It is the owner of the land who has the choice or option, not the
builder. Hence, the builder cannot compel the owner of the land
to sell such land to him. Thus, the right of the builder in good
faith is the right to reimbursement for the improvements, that

49
 is, if said improvements are appropriated by the owner of the
land.

o Mere promise to sell or donate CANNOT be a basis of GOOD

FAITH. (Hilario vs. C.A., January 19, 2000). If the “promisor”
however will give consent to the improvements, the “promisee”
will be considered in good faith based on the principle of
extended good faith.

EXTENDED GOOD However, in some special cases, this Court has used Article 448 by
FAITH PRINCIPLE recognizing good faith beyond this limited definition. Thus, in Del
Campo v. Abesia, this provision was applied to one whose house
— despite having been built at the time he was still co-owner —
overlapped with the land of another. This article was also applied
to cases wherein a builder had constructed improvements with the
consent of the owner. The Court ruled that the law deemed the
builder to be in good faith. In Sarmiento v. Agana, the builders
were found to be in good faith despite their reliance on the consent
of another, whom they had mistakenly believed to be the owner of
the land.

The Court likewise applied Article 448 in Spouses Macasaet v.

Spouses Macasaet not withstanding the fact that the builders
therein knew they were not the owners of the land. In said case, the
parents who owned the land allowed their son and his wife to build
their residence and business thereon. As found by this Court, their
occupation was not by mere tolerance but “upon the invitation of
and with the complete approval of (their parents), who desired that
their children would occupy the premises. It arose from familial
love and a desire for family solidarity x x x. Soon after, conflict
between the parties arose, the parents demanded their son and his
wife to vacate the premises. The Court thus ruled that as owners of
the property, the parents have the right to possession over it.
However, they must reimburse their son and his wife for the
improvements they had introduced on the property because they
were considered builders in good faith even if they knew for a fact
that they did not own the property. (Communities Cagayan, Inc. v.
Spouses Arsenio and Angeles Nanol, G.R. No. 176791, November
14, 2012)

50
 QUIETING OF TITLE

SALIGUMBA v. PALANOG
G. R. No. 143365, December 4, 2008

An action for quieting of land title is not extinguished by the death of the parties. It is an action
that survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Revised Rules of Court.

When does the action to quiet title prescribe?

It depends. If the plaintiff is in possession of the property, the action DOES NOT PRESCRIBE.
If the plaintiff is NOT in possession of the property, the action MAY PRESCRIBE.

LUCASAN v. PDIC
G. R. No. 176929, July 4, 2008

Note must be taken of the fact that under the Rules of Court the expiration of that one-year
period forecloses the owner’s right to redeem, thus making the sheriff’s sale absolute. The
issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale becomes a mere formality, an act merely confirmatory
of the title that is already in the purchaser and constituting official evidence of that fact.

Certainly, Lucasan no longer possess any legal or equitable title to or interest over the subject
parcels of land; hence, he cannot validly maintain an action for quieting of title.

“The right to redeem becomes functus officio on the date of its expiry, and its exercise after
the period is not really one of redemption but a repurchase. Distinction must be made because
redemption is by force of law; the purchaser at public auction is bound to accept redemption.
Repurchase however of foreclosed property, after redemption period, imposes no such
obligation. After expiry, the purchaser may or may not re-sell the property but no law will
compel him to do so. And, he is not bound by the bid price; it is entirely within his discretion
to set a higher price, for after all, the property already belongs to him as owner.”

CO-OWNERSHIP

WEE v. DE CASTRO, G.R. No. 176405

August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 695

In this case, the Court reiterated the rule that a co-owner may bring an action for the recovery
of possession without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs. The
reason is that the action is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. The Court also stated
that Article 487 any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment,” covers all kinds
of action for the recovery of possession, i.e., forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion
interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de
reinvicatoria).

51
Giving consent to a third person to construct a house on the co-owned property without the
consent of the other co-owners is tantamount to devoting the common property to his/her
exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership. This is in violation of Article 486 and
Article 491 of the Civil Code.

CRUZ v. CATAPANG
G.R. No. 164110, February 12, 2008, 544 SCRA 512
(Encroachment through Strategy or Stealth)

Leonor Cruz, Luz Cruz, and Norma Maligaya are the co-owners of a 1435 sq. m. parcel of land
in Taal, Batangas. With the consent of Norma, respondent Teofila Catapang built a house on a
lot adjacent to the subject parcel of land in 1992. The house intruded, however, on a portion of
the co-owned property. In 1995, petitioner Leonor Cruz visited the property and was surprised
to see a part of respondent’s house intruding unto a portion of the co-owned property. She then
made several demands upon respondent to demolish the intruding structure and to vacate the
portion encroaching on their property, to no avail. Petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry
against respondent. At issue before the Court is whether the consent given by a co-owner of a
parcel of land to a person to construct a house on the co-owned property warrants the dismissal
of a forcible entry case filed by another co-owner against that person.

The Court held that a co-owner cannot devote common property to his/her exclusive use to the
prejudice of the co-ownership, in violation of Articles 486 and 491 of the Civil Code. The
consent given by Norma Maligaya in the absence of the unanimous consent of the other co-
owners did not vest upon respondent any right to enter into the co-owned property.
Respondent’s entry into the property still fell under the classification “through strategy or
stealth.” Entry into the land effected clandestinely without the knowledge of the other co-
owners could be categorized as possession by stealth. Moreover, respondent’s act of getting
only the consent of one co-owner, her sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing the latter to stay in
the constructed house, can in fact be considered as a strategy which she utilized in order to
enter into the co-owned property.

HEIRS OF JOHNNY AOAS v. AS-IL

G. R. No. 219558, October 19, 2016
(Boundary Dispute: Ejectment Not Proper Remedy)

Settled is the rule that a boundary dispute, as in this case, can only be resolved in the context
of an accion reivindicatoria, and not in an ejectment case. In Manalang v. Bacani, the Court
held that boundary dispute cannot be resolved in ejectment proceedings as it involves different
issues, to wit: The boundary dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is, whether
the property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A boundary
dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under
which are limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the defendant
unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon the expiration or termination of his
right to hold such possession under any contract, express or implied. The defendant’s
possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the expiration or

52
termination of his right of possession. In forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal
from the very beginning, and the issue centers on which between the plaintiff and the defendant
had the prior possession de facto. Given the foregoing, the C.A. erred in affirming the ejectment
of the Heirs of Aoas considering that the issue raised cannot be properly ventilated in a forcible
entry case as the main contention of the parties deal with encroachment. In other words, the
MTC in passing upon the case, acted without authority as the case was beyond the ambit of a
summary proceeding.

QUIMPO, Sr. v. ABAD Vda. De BELTRAN

G. R. No. 16095, February 13, 2008 545 SCRA 174

Partition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support the presumption.
Thus, after a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition may be presumed.

Furthermore, in Hernandez v. Andal, 78 Phil 196 (1947), the Court explained that:

“...parol partitions may be sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights
of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition to which possession in
severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised.”

A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced
in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with
respect thereto. Or otherwise, recognizing the existence of the partition.

HEIRS OF PANFILO F. ABALOS v. BUCAL

G. R. No. 156224, February 19, 2008, 546 SCRA 252

In an action for partition, all other persons interested in the property shall be joined as
defendants, as an action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and
for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved.

HEIRS OF FRANCISCO I. NARVASA, SR. et al. v. IMBORNAL, et al.

G. R. No. 182908, August 6 2014

Land titles; reconveyance; an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust

prescribes in ten (10) years, reckoned from the date of registration of the deed or the date
of issuance of the certificate of title over the property, if the plaintiff is not in possession;
however, if the plaintiff is in possession of the property, the action is imprescriptible. —
An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by
another, to its rightful and legal owner. Thus, reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the
owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled in another’s name, x x x. When property
is registered in another’s name, an implied or constructive trust is created by law in favor of
the true owner. Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property
through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the

53
real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in
ten (10) years, reckoned from the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the
certificate of title over the property, if the plaintiff is not in possession. However, if the plaintiff
is in possession of the property, the action is imprescriptible.

POSSESSION

PRESUMPTIONS Good faith — “Good faith is always presumed.” (Art. 527 Civil
Code)

Continuity of character of possession — (whether in good faith

o bad faith — “It is presumed that possession continues to be
enjoyed in the same character in which it was acquired, until the
contrary is proved.” (Art. 529,Civil Code)

Non-interruption of possession — “The possession of hereditary

property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption, and
from the moment of the death of the decedent, in case the
inheritance is accepted. One who validly renounces an inheritance
is deemed never to have possessed the same.” (Art. 533, Civil
Code)

Presumption of just title — “A possessor in the concept of owner

has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with just
title, and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it.” (Art. 541)

Non-interruption of possession of property unjustly lost but

legally recovered — “One who recovers, according to law,
possession unjustly lost, shall be deemed for all purposes which
may redound to his benefit, to have enjoyed it without
interruption.(Art. 561 Civil Code)”

Possession during intervening period — “It is presumed, that the

present possessor who was also the possessor at previous time, has
continued to be in possession during the intervening time, unless
there is proof to the contrary.” (Art. 1138 {2}Civil Code)

Exclusive possession of common property — “Each one of the

participants of a thing possessed in common shall be deemed to
have exclusively possessed the part which may be allotted to him
upon the division thereof, for the entire period during which the co-
possession lasted.” (Art. 543 Civil Code)

Possession of movables with real property — “The possession

of real property presumes that of the movables therein, so long as
it is not shown that they should be excluded”. (Art. 542, Civil
Code)

54
 PRINCIPLE OF It is the principle wherein in computing the time necessary for
TACKING OF prescription, the present possessor may complete the period
POSSESSION necessary for prescription by adding his possession to that of his
grantor or predecessor in interest. (Art. 1138, Civil Code)

SPS. FAHRENBACH v. PANGILINAN

G.R. No. 224549, August 7, 2017

Tacking of possession only applies to possession de jure, or that possession which has for
its purpose the claim of ownership. — [T]he Court finds it proper to dispel petitioners’
mistaken notion that their possession should be tacked onto that of Alvarez who allegedly
occupied the property since 1974. In Nenita Quality Foods Corporation v. Galabo, the Court
clarified that tacking of possession only applies to possession de jure, or that possession which
has for its purpose the claim of ownership, viz.: True, the law allows a present possessor to
tack his possession to that of his predecessor-in-interest to be deemed in possession of the
property for the period required by law. Possession in this regard, however, pertains to
possession de jure and the tacking is made for the purpose of completing the time required for
acquiring or losing ownership through prescription. We reiterate — possession in forcible entry
suits refers to nothing more than physical possession, not legal possession.

GESMUNDO v. C.A.
117 321 SCRA 487

Although payment of land taxes is not evidence of ownership and although a mere tax
declaration or a tax assessment does not by itself give the title, and is of little value in proving
one’s ownership, STILL payment of the land tax is one of the most persuasive and positive
indicia, which shows the will of a person to possess in concepto de dueno or with claim of
ownership. And therefore prescription may eventually be had, provided that the other requisites
for prescription are present.

Otherwise put, while tax declarations and receipts are NOT conclusive evidence of ownership,
yet when coupled with proof of actual possession, tax declarations and receipts are strong
evidence of ownership.

BAR PROBLEM

Gregorio lost his ring. After a few days, he found it in the possession of Hospicio who had
loaned money to Z and received the ring from the latter in good faith as security. Discuss
the relative rights of Gregorio and Hospicio in the light of the principle that possession of
movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title.

In the light of the principle that possession of movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title as far as the possessor Hospicio is concerned, theoretically, he has

55
presumptive title sufficient to serve as a basis for acquisitive prescription. Thus, as
distinguished from prescription of real property, in which the just title must be proved, in
prescription of personal property such title need not be proved, because it is deemed to exist
when the possession is in good faith. However, in the instant case, this right has become moot
and academic, because according to the problem, the possession of Hospicio was only for “a
few days”.

On the other hand, the legitimate owner of the ring, Gregorio may recover said ring from the
possessor Hospicio provided that he had lost it or had been unduly deprived thereof. According
to the problem, he had lost the ring. Consequently, pursuant to the article cited, he can now
recover the ring from Hospicio without any obligation whatsoever. The fact that the ring was
pledged to Hospicio by Z as security for a loan and that he had received it from Z in good faith
are of no moment. It is evident that the contract of pledge cannot be the basis of any right of
Hospicio, such as the right to demand for a refund of the amount for which the ring was
pledged, because the contract is void since the pledgor is not the owner of the thing which was
pledged.

ARTICLE 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is

equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable
or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the
person in possession of the same.

If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been

unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale,
the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price
paid therefor.

SUBIC BAY LEGEND RESORTS AND CASINOS, INC. v. FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 193426, September 29, 2014

Article 559 of the civil code cannot apply where the alleged owner of the movable property
fails to prove the loss thereof or that he has been unlawfully deprived of the movable
property.

Though casino chips do not constitute legal tender, there is no law which prohibits their use or
trade outside of the casino which issues them. In any case, it is not unusual — nor is it unlikely
— that respondent could be paid by his Chinese client at the former’s car shop with the casino
chips in question; said transaction, if not common, is nonetheless not unlawful. These chips are
paid for anyway; petitioner would not have parted with the same if their corresponding
representative equivalent — in legal tender, goodwill, or otherwise — was not received by it
in return or exchange. Given this premise — that casino chips are considered to have been
exchanged with their corresponding representative value — it is with more reason that this
Court should require petitioner to prove convincingly and persuasively that the chips it
confiscated from Ludwin and Deoven were indeed stolen from it; if so, any Tom, Dick, or
Harry in possession of genuine casino chips is presumed to have paid for their representative

56
value in exchange therefore. If petitioner cannot prove its loss, then Article 559 cannot apply;
the presumption that the chips were exchanged for value.

NAGA CENTRUM, INC. v. SPS. ORZALES

G. R. No. 203576, September 14, 2016

To be entitled to an easement or right of way, the following requisites should be met: 1. An

immovable is surrounded by other immovables belonging to other persons, and is without
adequate outlet to a public highway; 2. Payment of proper indemnity by the owner of the
surrounded immovable; 3. The isolation of the immovable is not due to its owner’s acts; and 4.
The proposed easement of right of way is established at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance of the dominant estate to a
public highway may the shortest.

A party cannot be allowed to influence and manipulate the courts’ decisions by

performing acts upon the disputed property during the pendency of the case, which would
allow it to achieve the objectives it desires.

PILAR DEV’T CORP. v. DUMADAG, et al.

G. R. No. 194336, March 11, 2013
(Registered Owner vs. Squatters/Meter Strip/Zone)

While Article 630 of the Code provides for the general rule that “[t]the owner of the servient
estate retains the ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and may use
the same in such a manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement,” Article 635 thereof is
specific in saying that “[a]ll matters concerning easements established for public or communal
use shall be governed by the special laws and regulations relating thereto, and, in the absence
thereof, by the provisions of this Title [Title VII on Easements or Servitudes].” In the case at
bar, the applicability of DENR A.O. No. 99-21 dated June 11, 1999, which superseded DENR
A.O. No. 97-05 dated March 6, 1997 and prescribed the revised guidelines in the
implementation of the pertinent provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1273 and Presidential
Decree (P.D.) Nos. 705 and 1067, cannot be doubted. Inter alia, it was issued to further the
government’s program of biodiversity preservation. Certainly, in the case of residential
subdivisions, the allocation of the 3-meter strip along the banks of a stream, like the Mahabang
Ilog Creek in this case, is required and shall be considered as forming part of the open space
requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216 dated October 14, 1977. Said law is explicit: open spaces
are “for public use and are, therefore, beyond commerce of men” and that “[the] areas reserved
for parks, playgrounds and recreational use shall be non-alienable public lands, and non-
buidable.” Running in same vein is P.D. 1067 or The Water Code of the Philippines which
provides: Article 51. The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes
throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20)
meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject
to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and
salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for
recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind. Thus, the

57
above prove that petitioner’s right of ownership and possession has been limited by law with
respect to the 3-meter strip/zone along the banks of Mahabang Ilog Creek. Despite this, the
Court cannot agree with the trial court’s opinion, as to which the C.A. did not pass upon, that
respondents have a better right to posses the subject portion of the land because they are
occupying an area reserved for public easement purposes.

As to the issue of who is the proper party entitled to institute a case with respect to the 3-meter
strip/zone. We find and so hold that both the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG and
the local government of Las Piñas City, may file an action depending on the purpose sought to
be achieved. The former shall be responsible in case of action for reversion under C.A. 141,
while the latter may also bring an action to enforce the relevant provisions of Republic Act No.
7279 (otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992). Under R. A.
7279, which was enacted to uplift the living conditions in the poorer sections of the
communities in urban areas and was envisioned to be the antidote to the pernicious problem of
squatting in the metropolis, all local government units (LGUs) are mandated to evict and
demolish persons or entities occupying danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage
dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads,
parks, and playgrounds. Moreover, under pain of administrative and criminal liability in case
of non-compliance, it obliges LGU’s to strictly observe the law.

DONATION

BAR PROBLEM

In 1950, the donor donated a parcel of land to Central University on condition that the
latter must establish a medical college on the land to be named after him. In the year
2000, the heirs of the donor filed an action to annul the donation and for the reconveyance
of the property donated to them for the failure, after 50 years, of the University to
establish on the property a medical school named after their father. The University
opposed the action on the ground of prescription and also because it had not used the
property for some purpose other than that stated in the donation. Should the opposition
of the University to the action of the donor heirs be sustained?

The donation may be revoked. The non-establishement of the medical college on the donated
property was a resolutory condition imposed on the donation by the donor. Although the Deed
of Donation did not fix the time for the establishment of the medical college, the faulure of the
donee to establish the medical college after fifty (50) years from the making of the donation
should be considered as occurrence of the resolutory condition, and the donation may now be
revoked. While the general rule is that in case the period must be fixed first by the court before
the obligation may be demanded, the period of fifty (50) years was more than enough time for
the donee to comply with the condition. Hence, in this case, there is no more need for the court
to fix the period because such procedure would serve no other purpose but to delay compliance
with the condition. (Central Philippine University v. C.A., 246 SCRA 511)

Compare the BAR problem with the Dolar case:

58
 DOLAR v. BARANGAY LUBLUB
G.R. No. 152663, November 18, 2005

The donor donated a land in favor of the donee on condition that the donee must establish or
construct a building within five years. The donee failed to comply with the condition of the
donor. The five-year period to construct the building ended in September of 1986. Seventeen
(17) years from September 1986, the donor filed an action for the revocation of the donation
for failure to construct the building within five years.

SUPREME COURT RULING: The action to file revocation had prescribed pursuant to Article
764 (4 years) cited above. Even if you will apply Article 1144 (10 years prescriptive period for
written contract), the action was also barred by prescription.

NOTE: Difference between the two (2) cases: In the former there was NO
specific period to construct the building. In the latter, there was
specific period to construct a building.

SUCCESSION

SANCHEZ v. C.A.,
G. R. No. 108947, September 29, 1997

Power of the probate court.

It is a hornbook doctrine that in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of
ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality, a
pronouncement that applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding.

A probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate
or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to
belong to outside parties. All that said court could do as regards said properties is to determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the
parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a
final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court could not do so.

A court commits grave abuse of discretion when it renders a decision in disregard of the parties’
compromise agreement merely on the ground that such compromise agreement was not
approved by the court.

Being a consensual contract, a compromise agreement is perfected upon the meeting of the
minds of the parties-judicial approval is not required for its perfection.

59
There is no legal obstacle to an heir’s waiver of his/her hereditary share “even if the actual
extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.”

A party to a compromise cannot ask for a rescission after it has enjoyed its benefits.

It is a well-entrenched doctrine that “the law does not relieve a party from the effects of an
unwise, foolish, or disastrous contract, entered into with all the required formalities and with
full awareness of what he was doing” and “a compromise entered into and carried out in good
faith will not be discarded even if there was a mistake of law or fact.

Collation mandated under Article 1061 of the Civil Code contemplates properties conveyed
inter vivos by the decedent to an heir by way of donation or other gratuitous title.

FRIANELA v. BANAYAD, JR.

G. R. No. 169700, July 30, 2009

Nowhere in the petition is there a statement of the gross value of Moises’s estate. Thus, from
a reading of the original petition filed, it cannot be determined which court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings. The R.T.C. therefore committed gross error when
it had perfunctorily assumed jurisdiction despite the fact that the initiatory pleading filed before
it did not call for the exercise of its jurisdiction. The R.T.C. should have, at the outset, dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction. Be it noted that the dismissal on the said ground may be ordered
motu proprio by the courts. Further, the C.A., on appeal, should have dismissed the case on the
same ground. Settled is the doctrine that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised by any of the
parties or may be reckoned by the court, at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and
is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.

Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to
the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to
another or others either by will or by operation of law (Art. 774).

The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death (Art. 776).

Inheritance distinguished from Succession:

Inheritance refers to the universality of all the property, rights and obligations constituting the
patrimony of the decedent which are not extinguished by his death while succession is the legal
mode by which such property, rights and obligations are transmitted. In other words, the first
is the objective element of the second.

The inheritance may be more accurately defined as the universality of all property and
transmissible rights and obligations constituting the patrimony of the decedent which are not
extinguished by his death and which are available for distribution among those who are called
to succeed after settlement or liquidation.

60
The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art.
777). Consequently, after the death of the decedent anyone of the heirs may enter into a contract
with respect to his share in the inheritance even before partition has been effected. This is so
because his right with respect thereto is already in the nature of a vested right in accordance
with the principle declared in Article 777 of the Civil Code. Hence, he may sell his undivided
share in the inheritance or even donate it. Conversely, before the death of the decedent, no heir
may enter into a contract with respect to his future share in the inheritance. This is so because,
before the death of the decedent, the heirs have only a mere hope or expectancy, absolutely
inchoate in character, to their share in the inheritance.

GENATO v. BAYHON
G. R. No. 171035, August 24, 2009

The loan in this case was contracted by respondent. He died while the case was pending before
the Court of Appeals. While he may no longer be compelled to pay the loan, the debt subsists
against his estate. No property or portion of the inheritance may be transmitted to his heirs
unless the debt has first been satisfied. Notably, throughout the appellate stage of this case, the
estate has been amply represented by the heirs of the deceased, who are also his co-parties in
Civil Case No. Q-90-7012. The procedure in vindicating monetary claims involving a
defendant who dies before final judgment is governed by Rule 3, Section 20 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, to wit: When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express
or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the
action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be
allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the
plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for
prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.

DKC HOLDINGS CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS

G. R. No. 118248, April 5, 2000

The general rule, therefore, is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not
transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation, or (3) provision of law. In the case at bar, there
is neither contractual stipulation nor legal provision making the rights and obligations under
the contract intransmissible. More importantly, the nature of the rights and obligations therein
are, by their nature, transmissible.

There is privity of interest between an heir and his deceased predecessor — he only succeeds
to what rights predecessor had and what is valid and binding against the latter is also valid and
binding as against the former. — It is futile for Victor to insist that he is not a party to the
contract because of the clear provision of Article 1311 of the Civil Code. Indeed, being an heir
of Encarnacion, there is privity of interest between him and his deceased mother. He only
succeeds to what rights his mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also valid
and binding as against him.

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In the case at bar, the subject matter of the contract is likewise a lease, which is a property right.
The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property
right, and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the
deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other
party has a property interest in the subject matter of the contract.

AMADEA ANGELA K. AQUINO v. RODOLFO C. AQUINO and ABDULAH C.

AQUINO
G.R. No 208912, December 7, 2021
FACTS: Article 982 vs. Article 992 (Iron Curtain Rule: Modified)

Rodolfo alleged that his father, Miguel T. Aquino (Miguel), died intestate on July 5, 1999,
leaving personal and real properties. The estate of his first wife, Amadea C. Aquino (Amadea),
who died earlier on September 27, 1977, was already settled in 1978. Miguel was survived by:
(1) Enerie B. Aquino, his second wife; (2) Abdulah C. Aquino (Abdulah) and Rodolfo C.
(Rodolfo) Aquino, his sons with Amadea; and (3) the heirs of Wilfredo C. Aquino, his son with
Amadea who also died earlier. Miguel was also predeceased by another son with Amadea,
Arturo C. Aquino (Arturo).

On July 2, 2003, Angela moved that she be included in the distribution and partition of Miguel's
estate. She alleged that she was Arturo's only child. She presented a July 5, 2003 Certification
from the hospital, stating that she was Arturo and Susan Kuan's daughter.

According to Angela, Arturo died on January 10, 1978, before she was born on October 9,
1978. While her parents were not married, they did not suffer from any impediment to marry.
Her parents were planning to marry before Arturo died.

Angela claimed that her grandfather, Miguel, took care of her mother's expenses during her
pregnancy with her. Her mother was also attended by the Aquino's family doctor. Moreover,
Angela lived with her mother and the Aquino family at their ancestral home.

Since her birth, her father's relatives had continuously recognized her as Arturo's natural child.
Her father's brother, Abdulah, was even her godfather. In support of this, Angela presented her
baptismal certificate stating that she was Arturo's daughter.

RULING: This Court abandons the presumption in In re Grey, Corpus, Diaz, and In re Suntay,
among others, that nonmarital children are products of illicit relationships or that they are
automatically placed in a hostile environment perpetrated by the marital family. We are not
duty bound to uncritically parrot archaic prejudices and cruelties, to mirror and amplify
oppressive and regressive ideas about the status of children and family life. The best interest
of the child should prevail.

We adopt a construction of article 992 that makes children, regardless of the circumstances of
their births, qualified to inherit from their direct ascendants – such as their grandparent – by
their right of representation. Both marital and nonmarital children, whether born from a marital
or nonmarital child, are blood relatives of their parents and other ascendants. Nonmarital

62
children are removed from their parents and ascendants in the same degree as marital children.
Nonmarital children of marital children are also removed from their parents and ascendants in
the same degree as nonmarital children of nonmarital children.

This interpretation likewise makes Article 992 more consistent with the changes introduced by
the Family Code on obligations of support among and between the direct line of blood relatives.
As explained by amicus curiae Dean Del Castillo.

This interpretation of Article 992 is also supported by the Family Code. Particularly, it is
consistent with the provisions of the Family Code on support.

Article 195 of the Family Code identifies the person who are obliged to support each other. It
provides that parents and their children and the children of the latter, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, are obliged to support each other.

“Family Code. Article 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following
are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:

o The spouses;
o Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
o Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the
latter;
o Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the
latter; and legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half blood.

The mandatory nature of the support from grandparents to grandchildren, regardless of status,
is intentional. It reflects the evolution of the legal view towards illegitimate children from the
time of the Spanish Civil Code and the Civil Code to the time of the Family Code.

The deliberation of the Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted the Family Code show
the rationale behind the aforementioned paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 195;

“The illegitimate children are clearly burdened with the stigma of bastardy and there is no
reason why the committee should further inflict punishment or other disabilities on the. The
committee is trying to ameliorate as much as possible the stigma. In addition, the sentiment of
the present Civil Code of 1950 was best captured in the words: 'There are no illegitimate
children, there are only illegitimate parents.” The committee is therefore implementing this
rule. The committee has sufficiently studied the grounds for claim of support and believe that
they are sufficient.”

Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the rules on support (under the Family Code) and
succession (under the Civil Code) should be reciprocal. Grandchildren, regardless of their
status of their parents, should be able to inherit from their grandparents by right of
representation in the same way that the grandchildren, also regardless of their status, are called
upon by law to support their grandparents, if necessary. In the case of support, the
grandchildren could not even shy away from the obligation because support is considered to
be “the most sacred and important of all the obligations [.]

63
Accordingly, when a nonmarital child seeks to represent their deceased parent to succeed in
their grandparent's estate, Article 982 of the Civil Code shall apply. Article 982 provides:

The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation, and if any one
of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided
among the latter in equal portions. (Emphasis supplied)

The language of Article 982 does not make any distinctions or qualifications as to the birth
status of the “grandchildren and other descendants” granted the right of representation.
Moreover, as pointed out by Senior Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe, to allow
grandchildren and other descendants, regardless of their birth status, to inherit by right of
representation will protect the legitimate of the compulsory heir they represent; otherwise, the
legitime will be impaired, contrary to protections granted to this legitime in other areas of our
law on succession.

Applying Article 982 in situations where the grandchild's right to inherit from their grandparent
is in issue is more in accord with out State policy of protecting children's best interest and our
responsibility of complying with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.

To emphasize, this ruling will only apply when the nonmarital child has a right of
representation to their parent's share in her grandparents legitime. It is silent on collateral
relatives where the nonmarital child may inherit by themselves. We are not now ruling on the
extent of the right of a nonmarital child to inherit in their own right. Those will be the subject
of a proper case and, if so minded, may also be the subject of more enlightened and informed
future legislation.

However, the application of Article 982 here does not automatically give Angela the right to
inherit from Miguel's estate. Angela must still prove her filiation.

We must first resolve the rules concerning proof of filiation that govern this case.

The Office of the Solicitor General, Abdulah. And Rodolfo insist that Angela failed to prove
her filiation to Arturo under Article 175, in relation to Article 172, of the Family Code. Even
if the provisions under the Civil Code were applied, they say that Angela's claim will not
prosper since she did not file any action for recognition within four years from the time she
attained the age of majority, when she turned 18 years old in 1996.

They are mistaken.

Angela was born on October 9, 1978, before the Family Code was created and when the Civil
Code provisions on proving filiation applies. Meanwhile, she moved that she be included in
the distribution and partition of Miguel's estate on July 2, 2003 when the Family Code was
already in effect.

Per ruling in Bernabe, Angela, who was not yet born when the Family Code took effect, has
the right to prove that she was her father's daughter under Article 285 of the Civil Code within
four years from attaining the age of majority. Under Article 402 of the Civil Code, the age of
majority is 21 years old. Angela attained majority on October 9, 1999. She had until October

64
9, 2003 to assert her right to prove her filiation with Arturo. Thus, when she moved to be
included in the distribution and partition of Miguel's estate on July 17, 2003, she was not yet
barred from claiming her filiation.

However, there is no provision in the Civil Code that guides a child, who was born after their
father's death, in proving filiation with him.

BALUS v. BALUS
January 15, 2010, G. R. No. 168970

C and S are the children of R. R mortgaged his lot to the Bank and the same was foreclosed
and sold to the Bank. Since no redemption was made after two (2) years, Transfer Certificate
of Title was issued in the name of the Bank. C however, remained in the possession of the lot.

After the death of R, C and S executed an extra judicial settlement. Later, S repurchased the
land from the Bank and filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and damages against
C (his brother) as a new owner. C refused alleging possession of the property.

SUPREME COURT RULING: S is entitled to the land. SC said that ownership of the land was
transferred to the bank after the period of redemption had expired and in fact a new title was
issued to the bank even before R died. Hence, there is no question that the Bank acquired
exclusive ownership of the contested lot during the lifetime of R.

The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. Since R lost
ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his
death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which heirs may lay
claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their
father and never became co-owners thereof.

TESTAMENTARY Testamentary succession is what which results from the

SUCCESSION designation of an heir, made in a will executed in the form
prescribed by law.

CONCEPT OF Reserva troncal or reserva lineal is an instance of delayed

RESERVA succession. It occurs when property which was acquired by a
TRONCAL descendant (propositus) from his ascendant, a brother, or a sister
(origin) by gratuitous title is inherited by operation of law by
another ascendant (resevista or reservor). The ascendant who
acquired the property by operation of law from the descendant is
obliged to reserve this property for the benefit of the relatives of
the descendant within the third degree and who belong to the line
from which the property came (reservatarios). It is considered as a
case of delayed succession because the third degree relatives for
whose benefit the reservation is made, are deemed to succeed from

65
 the propositus subject to the condition of their surviving the
reservista. The reservatarios, however, acquire the right to the
reservable property only upon the death of the ascendant reservista.

The focal event which gives rise to the reserva is not the acquisition
of the property by the propositus from the origin. It is rather the
subsequent acquisition by operation of law of the property from the
propositus by the reservista which signals the start of the reserva in
favor of the third degree relatives of the propositus. This happens
when the propositus dies without issue which would enable the
passing of the property to his ascendants by operation of law, which
means succession either to the legitime or by intestacy. It is
submitted that the propositus may dictate whether the reserva
troncal would ever arise because as absolute owner of the property
which he received from the origin, the propositus can dispose of it
during his lifetime. In such eventuality, the property will no longer
form part of his estate to be acquired by operation of law by his
ascendants.

REQUISITES OF 1. That property is acquired by gratuitous title by a descendant

RESERVA (“propositus”) from an ascendant or a brother or sister
TRONCAL (“origin”);
2. That the said descendant (“propositus”) died without an issue;
3. That the same property (“reserva”) acquired by the descendant
(propositus) passes by operation of law to another ascendant
(reservista); and
4. That third degree relatives (“reservatorio”) of the prepositus
who belong to the line from which the property originally came
survive the ascendant reservista.

BAR PROBLEM

Before his death in 1950, GF donated a parcel of land to his grandson. P, the only child
of his deceased son, F. P died intestate in 1960 without any heir in the direct descending
line, as a consequence of which the land passed to his mother, M, in accordance with the
laws of intestate succession. Is the property reservable?

It is evident that the property in this particular case is reservable because all of the requisites
for reservation are present. In the first place, M, who is the ascendant reservista, had acquired
the property by operation of law from her descendant. P; in the second place, P, who is the
descendant-propositus, had previously acquired the property by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, his grandfather, GF, who is the origin of the said property; and in the third place,
the descendant had died without any legitimate issue in the direct descending line who could
inherit from him. Consequently, from the time of the death of the descendant-propositus, P, in
1960, the ascendant, M, who acquired the property, is obliged to reserve it for the benefit of
relatives of the propositus who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from

66
which the said property came. This reservable character of the property will , as a rule,
terminate upon the death of the ascendant-reservista. Thus, if we extend the example by
presupposing that M died in 1977, A and B, uncles of the propositus , P, in the paternal line,
can claim the property as their own in accordance with the provision of Art. 891 of the Code.
Page 249 Succession by Jurado 8th Edition

INTESTATE That which effected by operation of law in default of a will. If the

SUCCESSION decedent has not made any will, or even where he has made one, if
it has not been made in accordance with the formalities prescribed
by law, his presumed will as provided by law shall govern the
distribution of his hereditary estate after his death. Consequently,
the most fundamental distinction between testamentary and instate
succession consists in the fact that, while in testate succession, it is
the expressed will of the testator manifested in his last will and
testament which is the supreme law in the succession, in intestate
succession, it is his presumed will as provided by the law itself
which governs.

Under our law, if the testator makes a will which does not dispose
all of his property, the result is what is known as mixed succession.
The succession partakes of the nature of both testamentary and
legal succession. Hence, in the distribution of the hereditary estate
of the testator after his death, testamentary succession shall take
place with respect to that part of his property which he has disposed
of his will, while legal succession shall take place with respect to
that part which he has not disposed of.

CONTRACTUAL According to Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract may be

SUCCESSION entered into regarding future inheritance except in cases expressly
authorized by law. The basis of this is that the object of a contract
must exist at the moment of its celebration.

Under Article 84 Family Code, however, the future spouses may

give or donate to each to each other in their marriage settlements
their future property to take effect upon the death of the donor and
to the extent laid down by the provisions of the Civil Code relating
to testamentary succession. It is evident that this is one of the
exceptions referred to in Article 1347. This is subject however to
the rule that the donor cannot give by way of donation more than
he can dispose of by will shall have to be complied with.

The inheritance of a person includes not only the property and the
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his
death, but also those which have accrued thereto since the opening
of the succession (Art. 781)

67
 The validity of a will as to its from depends upon the observance
of the law in force at the time it is made (Art. 795)

Hence, a will perfectly valid at the time of its execution cannot be

invalidated by a law enacted after the death of the testator; neither
can a will totally void at the time of its execution be validated by
such subsequent legislation.

ICASIANO v. ICASIANO
G.R. L18979 June 30, 1964

On the question of law, we hold that the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature
to one page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing,
is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is
assured not only by the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective
page, but also by its bearing to the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before
whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so
strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a
single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to
guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no
intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full
observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. Del Gil vs. Murciano,
“witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it in the attestation clause.

LOPEZ v. LOPEZ, et al.

G.R, No. 189984, November 12, 2012

Article 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof
by the testator himself or by the testator’s name written by some other person in his presence,
and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses
in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses
of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left
margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact
that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write
his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that
the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator
and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to
them.

68
Article 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and
influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein
shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in
substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.

The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of
one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.

While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation
clause, Richard likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion
of the subject Last Will and Testament that it “consists of 7 pages including the page on which
the ratification and acknowledgment are written” cannot be deemed substantial compliance.
The will actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot
be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence
aliunde. On this score is the comment of Justice J.B.L. Reyes regarding the application of
Article 809, to wit:

x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an
examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the
signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the
will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even
omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total
number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other
must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the
probate proceedings.

Hence, the C.A. properly sustained the disallowance of the will. Moreover, it correctly ruled
that Richard pursued the wrong mode of appeal as Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
explicitly provides that in special proceedings, as in this case, the appeal shall be made by
record on appeal.

LAW WHICH The intrinsic validity of will is governed by the NATIONAL LAW
GOVERNS of the person whose succession is under consideration. Second
INTRINSIC paragraph of Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that instate and
VALIDITY OF testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
WILLS succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

69
 ANCHETA v. GUERSEY-DALAYGON
G. R. No. 139868, June 8, 2006

It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.
During the reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among others,
that at the time of Audrey’s death, she was residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in
Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will and Testament dated August 18, 1972 was executed and
probated before the Orphan’s Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly
authenticated and certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore City and attested by the Chief
Judge of said court; the will was admitted by the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore City on
September 7, 1979; and the will was authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland and
the Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy.

Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially with regard as to
who are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as
provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where
it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that “capacity to succeed is governed by the
law of the nation of the decedent.”

In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction
is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. In this case, since the Makati
property had already passed on to respondent who is a Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that
attended the acquisition by the Guersey of the Makati property is now inconsequential, as the
objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

PROBATE

NECESSITY OF No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved
PROBATE and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. (Art. 838)

70
 LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA v. JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE
G. R. No. 157451, December 16, 2005

The law does not require that a notarial will be EXECUTED and ACKNOWLEDGED on the
same occasion/date.

ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR et al. v. LORENZO LAXA,

G. R. No. 174489, April 11, 2012
(Effect of Forgetfulness)

The state of being forgetful does not make necessarily a person mentally unsound to render
him unfit to execute a will. We agree with the position of the C.A. that the state of being
forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to
execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Article 799
of the New Civil Code states:

Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of
all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by
disease, injury or other cause.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature
of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act.

In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencias forgetfulness, there is
no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of unsound
mind at the time of the execution of the Will.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA

PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and BENJAMIN
GREGORIO PALAGANAS, Petitioner v. ERNESTO PALAGANAS
G. R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011

This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed abroad by a foreigner
although it has not been probated in its place of execution.

Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same
have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will
can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will
of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country.

71
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the
decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the R.T.C. of the province where he has an estate
may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state
that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the
estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to
have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of
California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the
reprobate of will before admitting it here. But reprobate or re-authentication of a will already
probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is
presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by
Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies only
to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local
court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction
over the matter can be established.

IMPRESCRIBILITY The statute of limitations is not applicable to the probate of wills.

OF PROBATE

PRESCRIPTION

ARTICLE 1106. By prescription, one acquires ownership and other real rights
through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions
laid down by law. In the same way, rights and actions are lost by
prescription.

PRESCRIPTION is a mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership and other real rights
through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions
laid down by law, namely that the possession should be:
o In the concept of an owner
o Public
o Peaceful
o Uninterrupted (Arts. 1106, 1118, Civil Code)
o Adverse

LACHES (or estoppel by laches) is unreasonable delay in the bringing of a

cause of action before the courts of justice. Thus, if an action
prescribes, in ten (10) years, it should be brought to court as soon
as possible, without waiting for eight or nine years, unless the delay
can be justifiably explained. Note therefore, that while an action
has not yet prescribed, it may no longer be brought to court because
of laches.

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 While prescription is concerned with the FACT of delay, laches
deals with the EFFECT of unreasonable delay.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CASIB v. ANG et al.,

Vol. 779, January 27, 2016

Laches, in a general sense, is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier;
it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declines to assert it. There is no
absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined
according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, and since laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by
equitable considerations. It cannot work to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice.

Laches is evidentiary in nature, a fact that cannot be established by mere allegations in the
pleadings. The following elements, as prescribed in the case of Go Chi Gun, et al. v. Co Cho,
et al., must be present to constitute laches: x x x (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of
one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made for which
the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant
having had knowledge or notice, of the defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that
the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice
to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be
barred.

Even if they are aware of the occupation of their property by another person, and
regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the
return of their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely
tolerated and the said right is never barred by laches.

Those who occupy the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that the occupants
will vacate the property upon demand.

Until the demand to vacate is communicated by the lawful owners to the possessor by
mere tolerance, the lawful owners are not required to do any act to recover the subject
land.

Despite being a possessor by mere tolerance, the DepEd is considered a builder in good faith,
since Cepeda permitted the construction of building and improvements to conduct classes on
his property. Hence, Article 448 may be applied in the case at bar. Article 448 in relation to
Article 546 of the Civil Code, provides for the rights of respondents as landowners as against
the DepEd, a builder in good faith.

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In the case of Ballatan v. C.A., the Court has settled that the time of taking is determinative of
just compensation in expropriation proceedings but not in a case where a landowner has been
deprived of the use of a portion of this land for years, due to the encroachment of another. In
such instances, the case of Vda. De Roxas v. Our Lady’s Foundation, Inc. is instructive. The
Court elucidated therein that the computation of the value of the property should be fixed at
the prevailing market value. The reckoning period for valuing the property in case the
landowner exercised his rights in accordance with Article 448 shall be at the time the landowner
elected his choice. Therefore, the basis for the computation of the value of the subject property
in the instant case should be its present or current fair market value.

ARTICLE 1144. The following actions must be brought ten years from the time the
right of action accrues:
o Upon a written contract
o Upon an obligation created by law
o Upon a judgment

ARTICLE 1145. The following actions must be commenced within six years:
o Upon an oral contract
o Upon a quasi-contract

ARTICLE 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:
o Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff
o Upon a quasi-delict

ARTICLE 1147. The following actions must be filed within one year:
o For forcible entry and detainer
o For defamation

ARTICLE 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in
other laws must be brought within five years from the time the right
of action accrues.

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

ARTICLE 1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do.

ARTICLE 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between
the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.

74
 ARTICLE 1305. A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one
binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to
render some service.

ARTICLE 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:

o Consent of the contracting parties;
o Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
o Cause of the obligation which is established.

ARTICLE 1319. Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the
acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the
contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute. A
qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer.

Acceptance made by letter or telegram does not bind the offerer

except from the time it came to his knowledge. The contract, in
such a case, is presumed to have been entered into the place where
the offer was made (Cognition Theory).

ABS-CBN v. C. A.
G. R. No. 128690, January 21, 1999

A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself to give
something or to render some service to another for a consideration. There is no contract unless
the following requisites concur: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which
is the subject of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligation, which is established. A contract
undergoes three states: (a) preparation, conception, or generation, which is the period of
negotiation and bargaining, ending at the moment of agreement of the parties; (b) perfection or
birth of the contract which is the moment when the parties come to agree on the terms of the
contract; and (c) consummation or death, which is the fulfillment or performance of the terms
agreed upon in the contract.

The offer must be certain. To convert the offer into a contract, the acceptance must be absolute
and must not qualify the terms of the offer; it must be pain, unequivocal, unconditional, and
without variance of any sort from the proposal. Consequently, when something is desired which
is not exactly what is proposed in the offer, such acceptance is not sufficient to generate consent
because any modification or variation from the terms of the offer annuls the offer.

The acceptance of an offer must unqualified and absolute, i.e., it must be identical in all respects
with that of the offer so as to produce or meeting of the minds.

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 FIRST PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL BANK v. COURT OF APPEALS
G. R. No. 115849, January 24, 1996

Doctrine of “Apparent Authority”; A banking corporation is liable to innocent third persons

where the representation is made in the course of its business by an agent acting within the
general scope of his authority even though, in the particular case, the agent is secretly abusing
his authority and attempting to perpetrate a fraud upon his principal or some other person, for
his own ultimate benefit.

Contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds are ratified by the failure to object to the presentation
of oral evidence to prove the same.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORP. v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 116896, May 5, 1997

It is a fundamental rule that contracts, once perfected, bind both contracting parties, and
obligations arising therefrom have the force of law between the parties and should be complied
with in good faith. But the law recognizes exceptions to the principle of the obligatory force of
contracts. One exception is laid down in Article 1266 of the Civil Code, which reads: “The
debtor in obligations to do shall also be released when the prestation becomes legally or
physically impossible without the fault of the obligor.”

Petitioner cannot, however, successfully take refuge in the said article, since it is applicable
only to obligations “to do” and not obligations “to give”. An obligation “to do” includes all
kinds of work or service, while an obligation “to give” is a prestation which consists in the
delivery or a movable or an immovable thing in order to create a real right, or for the use of the
recipient, or for its simple possession, or in order to return it to its owner.

The obligation to pay rentals or deliver the thing in a contract of lease falls within the prestation
“to give”; hence, it is covered within the scope of Article 1266. At any rate, the unforeseen
event and causes mentioned by petitioner are not the legal or physical impossibilities
contemplated in the said article. Besides, petitioner failed to state specifically the circumstances
brought about by “the abrupt change in the political climate in the country” except the alleged
prevailing, uncertainties in government policies on infrastructure projects.

NANCY GO & ALEX GO v. C.A. et al.

G. R. No. 114791, May 29, 1997, 272 SCRA 752
(Video Coverage of Wedding)

In the instant case, petitioners and private respondents entered into a contract whereby, for a
fee, the former undertook to cover the latter’s wedding and deliver to them a video copy of said
event. For whatever reason, petitioners failed to provide private respondents with their tape.
Clearly, petitioners are guilty of contravening their obligation to said private respondents and
are thus liable for damages.

76
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, it is contrary to human nature for any newly
wed couple to neglect to claim the video coverage of their wedding; the fact that private
respondents filed a case against petitioners belies such assertion. Clearly, petitioners are guilty
of actionable delay for having failed to process the video tape. Considering that private
respondents were about to leave for the United States, they took care to inform petitioners that
they would just claim the tape upo0n their return two months later. Thus, the erasure of the
tape after the lapse of thirty days was unjustified.

Moral damages, recoverable in the case at bar; award of exemplary damages by the trial court
is justified; award of attorney’s fees; and litigation expenses are proper.

ISLAMIC DIRECTORATE OF THE PHIL. v. C.A.

G. R. No. 117897, May 14, 1997
(Application of Art. 1318, Essential Elements of Contract)

Where a corporate body never gave its consent, through a legitimate governing board, to a deed
of absolute sale, the subject sale is void and produces no effect whatsoever. Premises
considered, all acts carried out by the Carpizo board, particularly the sale of the Tandang Sora
property, allegedly in the name of the IDP, have to be struck down for having been done
without the consent of the IDP thru a legitimate Board of Trustees. Article 1318 of the New
Civil Code lays down the essential requisites of contracts: There is no contract unless the
following requisites concur: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is
the subject matter of the contract; (3) cause of the obligation which is established. All these
elements must be present to constitute a valid contract. For, where even one is absent, the
contract is void. As succinctly put by Tolentino, consent is essential for the existence of a
contract, and where it is wanting, the contract is non-existent. In this case, the IDP, owner of
the subject parcels of land, never gave its consent, thru a legitimate Board of Trustees, to the
disputed Deed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of INC. This is, therefore, a case not only of
vitiated consent, but one where consent on the part of one of the supposed contracting parties
is totally wanting. Ineluctably, the subject sale is void and produces no effect whatsoever.

DOMINADOR M. APIQUE v. EVANGELINE APIQUE FAHNENSTICH

G. R. No. 205705, August 5, 2015

Dominador and Evangeline are siblings who used to live with their parents at Babak, Island
Garden City of Samal in Davao, until Evangeline left for Germany to work sometime in 1979.
On August 2, 1995, Evangeline executed General and Special Powers of Attorney constituting
Dominador as her attorney-in-fact to purchase real property for her, and to manage or supervise
her business affairs in the Philippines.

As Evangeline was always in Germany, she opened a joint savings and/or account on January
18, 1999 with Dominador at the Davao BDO Branch.

On February 11, 2002, Dominador withdrew the amount of P980,000.00 from the subject
account and, thereafter, deposited the money to his own savings account with the same bank.

77
Evangeline demanded the return of the amount withdrawn from the joint account, but to no
avail. Hence, she filed a complaint for sum of money, damages, and attorney’s fees, impleading
Davao BDO Branch as a party defendant.

In her complaint, Evangeline claimed to be the sole owner of the money deposited in the subject
account, and that Dominador has no authority to withdraw the same.

In his answer, Dominador asserted, among other, that he was authorized to withdraw funds
from the subject account to answer for the expenses of Evangeline’s project, considering that
it was a joint account.

THE COURT’S RULING: A joint account is one that is held jointly by two or more natural
persons, or by two or more juridical persons or entities. Under such setup, the depositors are
joint owners or co-owners of the said account, and their share in the deposits shall be presumed
equal, unless the contrary is proved, pursuant to Article 485 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Article 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be
proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be
void.

The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless
the contrary is proved.

The common banking practice is that regardless of who puts the money into the account, each
of the named account holder has an undivided right to the entire balance, and any of them may
deposit and/or withdraw, partially or wholly, the funds without the need or consent of the other,
during their lifetime. Nevertheless, as between the account holders, their right against each
other may depend on what they have agreed upon, and the purpose for which the account was
opened and how it will be operated.

In this case, there is no dispute that the account opened by Evangeline and Dominador under
Savings Account No. 1189-02819-5 with EPCIB was a joint “OR” account. It is also admitted
that: (a) the account was opened for a specific purpose, i.e., to facilitate the transfer of needed
funds for Evangeline’s business projects; and (b) Dominador may withdraw funds therefrom
“if” there is a need to meet Evangeline’s financial obligations arising from said projects. Hence,
while Dominador is a co-owner of the subject account as far as the bank is concerned and may,
thus, validly deposit and/or withdraw funds without the consent of his co-depositor, Evangeline
— as between him and Evangeline, his authority to withdraw, as well as the amount to be
withdrawn, is circumscribed by the purpose for which the subject account was opened.

Under the foregoing circumstances, Dominador’s right to obtain funds from the subject account
was, thus, conditioned on the necessity of funds for Evangeline’s projects.

Admittedly, at the time he withdrew the amount of ₱980,000.00 from the subject account, there
was no project being undertaken for Evangeline.

78
 IBM PHILS. INC. v. PRIME SYSTEMS PLUS, INC.
G. R. No. 203192, August 15, 2016

Obligations and contracts; for interest to become due and demandable, there must be an
express stipulation for the payment of interest, and the agreement to pay interest is
reduced in writing. — It has been a long-standing rule that for interest to become due and
demandable, two requisites must be present: (1) that there must be an express stipulation for
the payment of interest and (2) the agreement to pay interest is reduced in writing. Here,
petitioner insists that there was an express agreement for a 3% monthly interest, which
petitioner placed in writing in its letter dated December 29, 1997. x x x [T]his Court finds that
the evidence points to respondent’s lack of consent to a 3% monthly interest. Petitioner
adamantly claims that respondent’s act of requesting for a lower interest rate shows the latter’s
agreement to a 3% monthly interest. Such an askewed reasoning escapes us — especially here
where respondent’s authorized representative never assented to petitioner’s letter. To accept
petitioner’s misplaced argument that the parties mutually agreed to a 3% monthly interest when
respondent subsequently ordered ATMs despite receiving petitioner’s letter imposing a 3%
monthly interest will render the second condition — that the agreement be reduced in writing
— futile.

ROSENCOR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. INQUING

G. R. No. 140479, March 8, 2001

The statute of frauds refers to specific kinds of transactions and cannot apply to any other
transaction that is not enumerated therein.

A right of first refusal is not among those listed as unenforceable under the statute of frauds.
Furthermore, the application of Article 1403, par. 2(e) of the New Civil Code presupposes the
existence of a perfected, albeit unwritten, contract of sale. A right of first refusal, such as the
one involved in the instant case, is not by any means a perfected contract of sale of real
property. At best, it is a contractual grant, not of the sale of the real property involved, but of
the right of first refusal over the property sought to be sold. It is thus evident that the statute of
frauds does not contemplate cases involving a right of first refusal. As such a right of first
refusal need not be written to be enforceable and may be proven by oral evidence.

ANG YU ASUNCION v. COURT OF APPEALS

G. R. No. 109125, December 2, 1994

In the law on sales, the so-called “right of first refusal” is an innovative juridical relation.
Needless to point out, it cannot be deemed a perfected contract of sale under Article 1458 of
the Civil Code. Neither can the right of first refusal, understood in its normal concept, per se
be brought within the purview of an option under the second paragraph of Article 1479,
aforequoted, or possibly of an offer under Article 1319 of the same Code. An option or an offer

79
would require, among other things, a clear certainty on both the object and the cause or
consideration of the envisioned contract. In a right of first refusal, while the object might be
made determinate, the exercise of the right, however, would be dependent not only on the
grantor’s eventual intention to enter into a binding juridical relation with another but also on
terms, including the price, that obviously are yet to be later firmed up. Prior thereto, it can at
best be so described as merely belonging to a class of preparatory juridical relations governed
not by contracts (since the essential elements to establish the vinculum juris would still be
indefinite and inconclusive) but by, among other laws of general application, the pertinent
scattered provisions of the Civil Code on human conduct.

Even on the premise that such right of first refusal has been decreed under a final judgment,
like here, its breach cannot justify correspondingly an issuance of a writ of execution under a
judgment that merely recognizes its existence, nor would it sanction an action for specific
performance without thereby negating the indispensable element of consensuality in the
perfection of contracts. It is not to say, however, that the right of first refusal would be
inconsequential for, such as already intimated above, an unjustified disregard thereof, given,
for instance, the circumstances expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code, can warrant a
recovery for damages. The final judgment in Civil Case No. 87-41058, it must be stressed, has
merely accorded a “right of first refusal” in favor of petitioners. The consequence of such a
declaration entails no more than what has heretofore been said. In fine, as it is here so conveyed
to us, petitioners are aggrieved by the failure of private respondents to honor the right of first
refusal, the remedy is not a writ of execution on the judgment, since there is none to execute,
but an action for damages in a proper forum for the purpose.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. CARMELITA S. SANTOS, et al.

G. R. No. 208293, December 10, 2014

The fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to exercise higher standard of diligence.
Similar to common carriers, banking is a business that is impressed with public interest. It
affects economies and plays a significant role in business and commerce. The public reposes
its faith and confidence upon banks, such that “even the humble wage-earner has not hesitated
to entrust his life’s savings to the bank of his choice, knowing that they will be safe in its
custody and will even earn some interest for him.” This is why we have recognized the
fiduciary nature of the banks’ functions, and attached a special standard of diligence for the
exercise of their functions. x x x In the Consolidated Bank and Trurst Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, this court explained the meaning of fiduciary relationship and the standard of
diligence assumed by banks: This fiduciary relationship means that the bank’s obligation to
observe “high standards of integrity and performance” is deemed written into every deposit
agreement between a bank and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to
assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a family.

Circumstances showing failure of the bank and its officer to exercise the diligence
required of them; solidary liability of the bank and its officer, upheld.

Petitioners PNB and Aguilar’s treatment of Angel C. Santos account is inconsistent with the
high standard of diligence required of banks. They accepted Manimbo’s representations despite

80
knowledge of the existence of circumstances that should have raised doubts on such
representations. As a result, Angel C. Santos’ deposit was given to a person stranger to him. x
x x Petitioners PNB and Aguilar’s negligence is not based on their failure to accept
respondents’ documents as evidence of their right to claim Angel C. Santos’ deposit. Rather, it
is based on their failure to exercise the diligence required of banks when they accepted the
fraudulent representations of Manimbo. Petitioners PNB and Aguilar disregarded their own
requirements for the release of the deposit to persons claiming to be heirs of a deceased
depositor. x x x Based on these enumerations, petitioners PNB and Aguilar either have no fixed
standards for the release of their deceased clients’ deposits or they have standards that they
disregard for convenience, favor, or upon exercise of discretion. Both are inconsistent with the
required diligence of banks. These threaten the safety of the depositors’ accounts as they
provide avenues for fraudulent practices by third persons or by bank officers themselves.

Moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees, awarded in view of the bank’s
negligence in handling the account of its depositor.

JUNTILLA v. FONTANAR
G.R. No. L-45637, May 31, 1985

Tire blow-out of a jeep, not a fortuitous event, where there exist specific acts of negligence by
the carrier consisting of the fact that the jitney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the
accident.

Accident not caused by a fortuitous event, as it was actually caused either through negligence
of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire; Common carriers, enjoined to teach
their drivers on correct measures that insure the safety of the passengers at all times.

BARZAGA v. COURT OF APPEALS,

G.R. No. 115129, February 12, 1997
(Time is of the essence)

There was a delay in the delivery of materials for the construction of the niche.

An assiduous scrutiny of the record convinces us that respondent Angelito Alviar was negligent
and incurred in delay in the performance of his contractual obligation. This sufficiently entitles
petitioner Ignacio Barzaga to be indemnified for the damage he suffered as a consequence of
delay or a contractual breach. The law expressly provides that those who in the performance of
their obligation are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay and those who in any manner
contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.

This case is clearly one of non-performance of a reciprocal obligation. In their contract of

purchase and sale, petitioner had already complied fully with what was required of him as
purchaser, i.e., the payment of the purchase price of P2,110.00. It was incumbent upon
respondent to immediately fulfill his obligation to deliver the goods otherwise delay would
attach.

81
Award of moral damages sustained.

VIL-REY PLANNERS and BUILDERS v. LEXBER, INC.

G. R. No. 189401, June 15, 2016

Breach of contract is the failure of a party, without legal reason, to comply with the terms of a
contract or perform any promise that forms either a part of the whole of it.

Nevertheless, even if we were to assume that his claim is true, it still falls short of the obligation
to finish 100% of the works. In the third contract, [i]t is clear that the next payment for Vil-
Rey would have fallen due upon completion of the works. Thus, it cannot put up the defense
that its failure to comply with its obligation was because it was not paid.

The parties clearly took on reciprocal obligations. These are obligations that arise from the
same cause, such that the obligation of one is dependent upon that of the other.

The reciprocal obligation in this case was Lexber’s payment of the 50% balance upon Vil-
Rey’s completion of the works on or before January 15, 1997. However, despite the grant of
extension until January 31, 1997, and even after the lapse of another five-day grace period. Vil-
Rey failed to finish the works under the third contract.

Delay by one of the parties begins from the moment the other fulfills the obligation.

PHILIPPINE HOME ASSURANCE CORP. v. COURT OF APPEALS

G. R. No. 106999, June 20, 1996

In our jurisprudence, fire may not be considered a natural disaster or calamity since it almost
always arises from some act of man or by human means. It cannot be an act of God unless
caused by lightning or a natural disaster or casualty not attributable to human agency.

RAMOS v. COURT OF APPEALS

G. R. No. 119872, July 7, 1997

The provision of Article 1250 of the Civil Code requires for its application a declaration of
inflation by the Central Bank — without such declaration creditors cannot demand an increase
of what is due them.

Article 1250. In case an extraordinary inflation or deflation of the currency stipulated should
supervene the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be
the basis of payment, unless there is an agreement to the contrary.

82
 BACHELOR EXPRESS, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS
G. R. No. 85691, July 31, 1990
(Running Amuck of Passengers)

The liability, if any, of the petitioners is anchored on culpa contractual or breach of contract of
carriage. The applicable provisions of law under the New Civil Code are as follows: ARTICLE
1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business
of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both by land, water, or air, for compensation,
offering their services to the public. “ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their
business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to
all the circumstances of each case. x x x” “ART 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.” “ART. 1756. In case of
death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.” There is no question that Bachelor Express, Inc. is a
common carrier. Hence, from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy
Bachelor Express, Inc. is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.

Negligence presumed for the death of passenger unless observance of extraordinary

diligence was duly proved.

The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident as it triggered off
a commotion and panic among the passengers such that the passengers started running to the
sole exit shoving each other resulting in the falling off the bus by passengers Beter and Rauraut
causing them fatal injuries. The sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in
the bus is within the context of force majeure. However, in order that a common carrier may
be absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused
by force majeure. The common carriers must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the
injuries resulting from such accident. Therefore, the next question to be determined is whether
or not the petitioner’s common carrier observed extraordinary diligence to safeguard the lives
of its passengers.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. COURT OF APPEALS

G. R. No. 116792, March 29, 1996

Legal compensation operates even against the will of the interested parties and even without
the consent of them. — More importantly, the respondent court erred when it failed to rule that
legal compensation is proper. Compensation shall take place when two persons, in their own
right, are creditors and debtors of each other. Article 1290 of the Civil Code provides that

83
“when all the requisites mentioned in Article 1279 are present, compensation takes effect by
operation of law, and extinguishes both debts to the concurrent amount even though the
creditors and debtors are not aware of the compensation.” Legal compensation operates even
against the will of the interested parties and even without the consent of them. Since this
compensation takes place ipso jure, its effects arise on the very day on which all its requisites
concur. When used as a defense, it retroacts to the date when its requisites are fulfilled.

The elements of legal compensation are all present in the case at bar. The obligors bound
principally are at the same time creditors of each other. Petitioner bank stands as a debtor of
the private respondent, a depositor. At the same time, said bank is the creditor of the private
respondent with respect to the dishonored U.S. Treasury Warrant which the latter illegally
transferred to his joint account. The debts involved consist of a sum of money. They are due,
liquidated, and demandable. They are not claimed by a third person.

To frustrate the application of legal compensation on the ground that the parties are not all
mutually obligated would result in unjust enrichment on the part of the private respondent and
his wife who herself out of honesty has not objected to the debit. The rule as to mutuality is
strictly applied at law. But not in equity, where to allow the same would defeat a clear right or
permit irremediable injustice.

CASTRO v. TAN
G. R. No. 168940, November 24, 2009 (Interest)

While we agree with petitioners that parties to a loan agreement have wide latitude to stipulate
on any interest rate in view of the Central Bank Circular No. 905s. 1982 which suspended the
Usury Law ceiling on interest effective January 1, 1983, it is also worth stressing that interest
rates whenever unconscionable may still be declared illegal. There is certainly nothing in said
circular which grants lenders carte blanche authority to raise interest rates to levels which will
either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets.

In Abe v. Foster Wheeler Corporation, 110 Phil. 198 (1960), we held that the freedom of
contract is not absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative
regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, morals, safety, and welfare. One such
legislative regulation is found in Article 1306 of the Civil Code which allows the contracting
parties to “establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy.”

The Supreme Court in the following cases declared NULL and VOID contract/agreement as to
interest imposed for being unconscionable or contrary to MORALS.

MEDEL v. C. A.
(299 SCRA 481)

Interest agreed upon was 5.5% per month.

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 RUIZ v. C. A.
(401 SCRA 410)

Interest agreed upon was 3% per month.

PASCO v. HEIRS OF FILOMENA

G. R. No. 16554, July 26, 2010

Interest agreed upon was 5% per month.

CATALINA F. ISLA, ELIZABETH ISLA, AND GILBERT FL ISLA v. GENEVIRA P.

ESTORGA,
G. R. No. 233974, July 2, 2018

Interest agreed upon was 3% per month.

BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION v. OLALIA

G. R. No. 131086, December 14, 2001

BPI Express Card Corporation (BECC) granted membership and credit accommodations to
herein respondent upon the latter’s application. The card expired and a renewal card was issued.
BECC claimed that they issued an extension card to the respondent’s wife, which was delivered
and received by the respondent. A collection case was filed by BECC against the respondent
after the latter denied incurring liability to BECC. It was found out that the liability was due to
the usage of an extension card issued in the name of the respondent’s wife. However, the
respondent claimed that he and his wife were already divorced and that his wife was staying in
the United States. He also denied applying for an extension card, much less receiving the so-
called extension card. After trial, the court ordered the respondent to pay his own liability only.
Upon motion for reconsideration, the trial court modified its decision and ordered the
respondent to pay for all the amounts due, including those which were made through the
extension card. Respondent appealed. The Court of Appeals modified the decision and limited
the liability of the respondent to the amount incurred by his own card only. Hence, BECC
appealed before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court denied the petition. According to the Court, the Court of Appeals was
correct when it held that the respondent should not be held liable for the purchase made under
the so-called extension card irregularly issued by petitioner and used for purchases made by an
unauthorized party for whose action the respondent could not be legally made answerable.
Respondent should only be held liable for purchases made under his own credit card.

85
BECC supports its allegation that Eddie C. Olalia received the extension card in the name of
his wife, by presenting the Renewal Card Acknowledgement Receipt wherein Olalia affixed
his signature. Such will not suffice to prove that the requirements for the issuance or the
extension card have been complied with, especially in the face of respondent’s firm denial.
[C]ontracts of this nature are contracts of adhesion, so-called because their terms are prepared
by only one party while the other merely affixes his signature signifying his adhesion thereto.
As such, their terms are construed strictly against the party who drafted it. In this case, it was
BECC who made the foregoing stipulation, thus, they are now tasked to show vigilance for its
compliance. BECC failed to explain why a card was issued without accomplishment of the
requirements. Moreover, BECC did not even secure the specimen signature of the purported
extension cardholder, such that it cannot now counter Eddie C. Olalia’s contention that the
signatures appearing on the charge slips of the questioned transactions were not that of his
former wife, Cristina G. Olalia.

ODIAMAR v. VALENCIA
G. R. No. 213582, June 28, 2016

[W]hile it is observed that petitioner had indeed admitted that she agreed to settle her late
parent’s debt, which was supposedly evinced by (a) the ₱2,100,000.00 check she issued
therefor, and (b) several installment payments she made to respondent from December 29, 2000
to May 31, 2003, there was no allegation, much less any proof to show, that the estates of her
deceased parents were released from liability thereby. In S.C. Megaworld Construction and
Development Corporation v. Parada, the Court held that to constitute novation by substitution
of debtor, the former debtor must be expressly released from the obligation and the third person
or new debtor must assume the former’s place in the contractual relations. Moreover, the Court
ruled that the “fact that the creditor accepts payments from a third person, who has assumed
the obligations, will result merely in the addition of debtors and not novation.” At its core,
novation is never presumed, and the animus novandi, whether totally or partially, must appear
by express agreement of the parties, or by their acts that are too clear and unequivocal to be
mistaken. Here, the intent to novate was not satisfactorily proven by respondent. At best,
petitioner only manifested her desire to shoulder the debt of her parents, which, as above
discussed, does not amount to novation. Thus, the courts a quo erred in holding petitioner liable
for the debts obtained by her deceased parents on account of novation by substitution of the
debtor.

The lack of a written stipulation to pay interest on the loaned amount bars a creditor
from charging monetary interest and the collection of interest without any stipulation
therefor in writing is prohibited by law. — It is fundamental that for monetary interest to be
due, there must be an express written agreement therefore. Article 1956 of the Civil Code
provides that “[n]o interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. “ In
this relation, case law states that the lack of a written stipulation to pay interest on the loaned
amount bars a creditor from charging monetary interest and the collection of interest without
any stipulation therefor in writing is prohibited by law. Here, respondent herself admitted that
there was no written agreement that interest would be due on the sum loaned, only that there
was an implicit understanding that the same would be subject to interest since she also
borrowed the same from banks which, as a matter of course, charged interest. Respondent also

86
testified on cross examination that the ₱2,100,000.00 corresponds only to the principal and
does not include interest.

SALES

COMMUNITIES CAGAYAN, INC. v. SPOUSES ARSENIO and ANGELES NANOL

and ANYBODY CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM
G. R. No. 176791, November 14, 2012

A party who does not appeal from a judgment can no longer seek modification or reversal
of the same.

Sales; Republic Act no. 6552 (the Maceda Law); contract to sell; when actually cancelled.
[U]nder the Maceda Law, the actual cancellation of a contract to sell takes place after 30 days
from receipt by the buyer of the notarized notice of cancellation, and upon full payment of the
case surrender value to the buyer. In other words, before a contract to sell can be validly and
effectively cancelled, the seller has (1) to send a notarized notice of cancellation to the buyer
and (2) to refund the cash surrender value. Until and unless the seller complies with these twin
mandatory requirements, the contract to sell between the parties remains valid and subsisting.
Thus, the buyer has the right to continue occupying the property subject of the contract to sell,
and may “still reinstate the contract by updating the account during the grace period and before
the actual cancellation” of the contract.

As a general rule, Article 448 on builders in good faith does not apply where there is a
contractual relation between the parties, such as in the instant case.

Article 448 of the Civil Code applies when the builder believes that he is the owner of the land
or that by some title he has the right to build thereon, or that at least, he has a claim of title
thereto. Concededly, this is not present in the instant case. The subject property is covered by
a Contract to Sell hence ownership still remains with petitioner being the seller. Nevertheless,
there were already instances where this Court applied Article 448 even if the builders do not
have a claim of title over the property.

This Court has rules that this provision covers only cases in which the builders, sowers, or
planters believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto.
It does not apply when the interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent, or
usurfructuary. From these pronouncements, good faith is identified by the belief that the land
is owned; or that — by some title — one has the right to build, plant, or sow thereon.

However, in some special cases, this Court has used Article 448 by recognizing good faith
beyond this limited definition. Thus, in Del Campo v. Abesia, this provision was applied to one
whose house — despite having been built at the time he was still co-owner — overlapped with
the land of another. This article was also applied to cases wherein a builder had constructed
improvements with the consent of the owner. The Court ruled that the law deemed the builder
to be in good faith. In Sarmiento v. Agana, the builders were found to be in good faith despite

87
their reliance on the consent of another, whom they had mistakenly believed to be the owner
of the land.

The Court likewise applied Article 448 in Spouses Macasaet v. Spouses Macasaet not
withstanding the fact that the builders therein knew they were not the owners of the land. In
said case, the parents who owned the land allowed their son and his wife to build their residence
and business thereon. As found by this Court, their occupation was not by mere tolerance but
“upon the invitation of and with the complete approval of (their parents), who desired that their
children would occupy the premises. It arose from familial love and a desire for family
solidarity x x x. Soon after, conflict between the parties arose. The parents demanded their son
and his wife to vacate the premises. The Court thus ruled that as owners of the property, the
parents have the right to possession over it. However, they must reimburse their son and his
wife for the improvements they had introduced on the property because they were considered
builders in good faith even if they knew for a fact that they did not own the property.

ARTICLE 1874. (Agency) When a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is
through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing;
otherwise, the sale shall be void.

POLICITATION is an unaccepted unilateral promise to buy or sell. Even if accepted

by the other party, it is not binding upon the promissory and may
be withdrawn at anytime.

OPTION is an accepted unilateral promise to buy or sell a determinate thing

CONTRACT for a price certain supported by a consideration distinct from the
price. The offeror is bound to comply with his undertaking but the
optionee has the right but not the obligation to buy or sell. The
optionee can sue for damages only, but he cannot sue for specific
performance on the proposed contract.

RIGHT OF FIRST is an innovative juridical relation. If such right is incorporated in a

REFUSAL contract, it is enforceable by specific performance. Otherwise, the
injured party can only sue for damages. (Equatorial Realty Inc. v.
Carmelo and Bauermann, Inc.)

EARNEST MONEY is a partial payment of the purchase price and is considered as proof
of the perfection of a sale.

MIRROR It is a settled doctrine that one who deals with property registered
DOCTRINE under the Torrens system need not go beyond the same but only
has to rely on the title. He is charged with notice only of such
burdens and claims as are annotated on the title.

88
Mirror Doctrine

EMBRADO v. C.A.
G.R. No. 51457 June 17,1994

A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard and
claim that he acted on good faith under the belief that there was no defect to the vendor’s title.
Such refusal to believe in the possibility of a defect in the vendor’s title will not make him an
innocent purchaser for value (should such title later prove to be defective). If circumstances are
such that a reasonably prudent man would have taken the necessary precautions if places in the
same situation

CELSO PUNCHA ANCHUELO v. IAC

147 SCRA 434, January 29, 1987

A formal offer to redeem is necessary. It is not sufficient for the vendor to initiate or state to
the vendee that the former desires to redeem the thing sold, but must immediately offer to pay
the price. The mere sending of letter by the vendor expressing his desire to repurchase the
property without an accompanying tender of the redemption price falls short of the
requirements of the law. If he fails to properly exercise his right, then, it is lost and the same
can no longer be revived by filing an action to compel redemption after the lapse of the period.

LEE CHUY REALTY v. C.A.

G.R. No. 104114 December 14, 1995

The exercise of the right to repurchase is a RIGHT not an obligation. Hence, the tender of a
check to compel redemption is sufficient. It is not however itself a payment that relieves the
redemptioner from his liability to pay the redemption price. In fact, there is no prescribed form
for an offer to redeem.

CLARAVAL v. C.A.
G.R. No. L-47120, October 15, 1990

The right to repurchase must be reserved in the same deed of sale. If it is reserved in a separate
instrument, then the document is not a sale with right to repurchase. The same is merely a
promise to sell which is discretionary on the part of the vendee a retro. In one case however,
although the right to repurchase was made in a separate instrument not in a contract of sale, the
Supreme Court still considered the same as right to repurchase and not promise to sell because
both documents were executed on the same day revealing the true intention of the parties at the
time of the transaction and merely an afterthought.

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 LEASE

SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY v. SALVADOR

G.R. No. L-45013, May 28, 1979

A lessee is neither a builder in good faith nor in bad faith (Albioso v. Villanueva, 7 Phil. 277).
His rights are governed not by Article 448 but by Article 1678 of the Civil Code, which reads:
It is evident from the foregoing provision that the lessee may remove the improvements should
the lessor refuse to reimburse, but the lessee does not have the right to buy the land. The tenant
cannot improve the landlord out of his property.

SULO SA NAYON, INC. v. NAYONG PILIPINO FOUNDATION

G. R. No. 170923, January 20, 2009

Lease, Ejectment; Unlawful Detainer; The word “vacate” is not a talismanic word that must be
employed in all notices to vacate — the tenants must pay rentals which are fixed and which
became payable in the past, failing which they must move out. — Petitioners’ argument that
the demand letter is “inadequate” because it contained no demand to vacate the lease premises
does not persuade. We have ruled that . . . The word “vacate” is not a talismanic word that must
be employed in all notices. The alternatives in this case are clear cut. The tenants must pay
rentals which are fixed and which became payable in the past, failing which they must move
out. There can be no other interpretation of the notice given to them. Hence, when the
petitioners demanded that he pays ₱18,000.00 in five days or a case of ejectment would be filed
against him, he was placed on notice to move out if he does not pay. There was, in effect, a
notice or demand to vacate.

Introduction of valuable improvements on the leased premises does not give the lessee the right
of retention and reimbursement which rightfully belongs to a builder in good faith — the
doctrine is that a lessee is neither a builder in good faith nor in bad faith that would call for the
application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code since his rights are governed by Article
1678. — In the case at bar, petitioners have no adverse claim or title to the land. In fact, as
lessees, they recognize that the respondent is the owner of the land. What petitioners insist is
that because of the improvements, which are of substantial value, that they have introduced on
the leased premises with the permission of respondent, they should be considered builders in
good faith who have the right to retain possession of the property until reimbursement by
respondent. We affirm the ruling of the C.A. that introduction of valuable improvements on
the leased premises does not give the petitioners the right of retention and reimbursement which
rightfully belongs to a builder in good faith. Otherwise, such a situation would allow the lessee
to easily “improve” the lessor out of its property.

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 SPS. GOLEZ v. NEMEÑO
G. R. No. 178317, September 23, 2015

There is no dispute that the contract entered into by the parties is one of lease. True, it had some
modifications such that instead of paying the rent in the form of money, petitioners will
withhold such payment and will apply the accumulated rent to the cost of the building they
built on the leased property. Thereafter, at the end of the lease period or until such time the cost
of the building has been fully covered by the rent accumulated, petitioners, as lessees will
transfer the ownership of said building to respondent. Unfortunately, the subject building was
gutted down by fire. However, the destruction of the building should not in any way be made
a basis to exempt petitioners from paying rent for the period they made use of the leased
property. Otherwise, this will be a clear case of unjust enrichment.

As held in P.C. Javier & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: x x x The fundamental doctrine of
unjust doctrine or unjust enrichment is the transfer of value without just cause or consideration.
The elements of this doctrine are: enrichment on the part of the defendant; impoverishment on
the part of the plaintiff; and lack of cause. The main objective is to prevent one to enrich himself
at the expense of another. It is commonly accepted that this doctrine simply means that a person
shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at another’s expense. In the instant
case, there is no dispute that petitioners used the property for several years for their own benefit
having operated a restaurant thereon. Therefore, it would be the height of injustice to deprive
respondent of compensation due him on the use of his property by petitioners.

While we sustain the award of back rentals in favor of respondent, we do not agree with the
amount imposed by the courts a quo. Petitioners should only be liable for rent during the period
within which they were in possession of the leased property.

BAR PROBLEM

After leasing his restaurants to B, A leased the adjoining room to C knowing fully well
that C was going to put up another restaurant, which he did. Is A liable to B for the
damage he may have suffered as a result of the opening of C’s restaurant? Why?

It is submitted that A is not liable to B for the damage he may have suffered as a result of the
opening of C’s restaurant. Under the Civil Code, the lessor of a business or industrial
establishment may continue engaging in the same business or industry to which the lessee
devotes the thing leased, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. Now, if A may still open
or put up a restaurant in the room which adjoins the restaurant which had already been leased
to B despite the fact that the latter might be prejudiced, there is no reason why he cannot lease
such adjoining room to a third person, knowing fully well that such third person will open a
restaurant in said room.

IMPLIED NEW that which arises if at the end of the contract, the lessee should
LEASE (TACITA continue enjoying the thing leased for 15 days with the
RECONDUCCION)

91
 acquiescence of the lessor — unless of course a notice to the
contrary had previously been given by EITHER PARTY.

REQUISITES OF 1. That the contract of lease should have ended;

TACITA 2. That the lessee should have continued enjoying the thing leased
RECONDUCCION for 15 days;
3. That such continued enjoyment should be with the
acquiescence of the lessor;
4. That a notice to the contrary by either party should not have
been previously given;
5. That there should not have been express contract entered into
by lessor and lessee after the old contract has ended.

EFFECTS OF THE The period of the new lease is not that stated in the original
IMPLIED NEW contract, but the time in Articles 1682 and 1687 (month to month,
LEASE year to year, etc.) Other terms of the original contract are revived.

BAR PROBLEM

On January 1, 1980, Nestor leased the fishpond of Mario for a period of three years at a
monthly rental of P1,000.00 with an option to purchase the same during the period of the
lease for the price of P500,000.00. After the expiration of the three-year period, Mario
allowed Nestor to remain in the leased premises at the same rental rate. On June 15, 1983,
Nestor demanded that the latter execute a deed of absolute sale of the fishpond in his
favor. Mario refused, on the ground that Nestor no longer had an option to buy the
fishpond. Nestor filed an action for specific performance. Will the action prosper or not?
Why? (2001 bar exam)

No, the action will not prosper. The implied renewal of the lease on a month-to-month basis
did not have the effect of extending the life of the option to purchase which expired at the end
of the original lease period. The lessor is correct in refusing to sell on the ground that the option
had expired.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. LILIBETH S. CHAN

G. R. No. 206037, March 13, 2017

Requirements for consignation to be valid. — For consignation to be valid, the debtor must
comply with the following requirements under the law; 1) there was a debt due; 2) valid prior
tender of payment, unless the consignation was made because of some legal cause provided in
Article 1256; 3) previous notice of the consignation has been given to the persons interested in
the performance of the obligation; 4) the amount or thing due was placed at the disposal of the
court; and 5) after the consignation had been made, the persons interested were notified thereof.
“Failure in any of these requirements is enough ground to render a consignation ineffective.”

92
Deposit of the subject monthly rentals in a non-drawing savings account is not the
consignation contemplated by law. — Note that PNB’s deposit of the subject monthly rentals
in a non-drawing savings account is not the consignation contemplated by law, precisely
because it does not place the same at the disposal of the court. Consignation is necessarily
judicial; it is not allowed in venues other than the courts. Consequently, PNB’s obligation to
pay rent for the period of January 16, 2005 up to March 23, 2006 remained subsisting, as the
deposit of the rentals cannot be considered to have the effect of payment.

Belated consignation of the rental proceeds in court is considered default in the payment
of monthly rentals; liability to pay interest arises in view of delay in the performance of
the obligation.

AGENCY

ARTICLE 1868. By the contract of agency a person binds himself to render some
service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another,
with the consent or authority of the latter.

ARTICLE 1869. Agency may be express or implied from the acts or the principal
from his silence or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the
agency, knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without
authority. Agency may be oral, unless the law requires a specific
form.

ARTICLE 1870. Acceptance by the agent may also be express, or implied form his
acts which carry out the agency, or from his silence or inaction
according to the circumstances.

ARTICLE 1874. When a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an
agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the
sale shall be void.

NOTA BENE: In general, there are no formal requirements governing the

appointment of an agent. The agent’s authority may be oral or
written. It may be in public or private writing. An instance when
the law requires a specific form for the agency is Article 1874.

Agency may even be implied from words and conduct of the parties
and the circumstances of the particular case. (Arts. 1869-1872). But
agency cannot be inferred from mere relationship or family ties.
Thus, it has been held that a father who was unable to drive an
automobile but who purchased one for pleasure and convenience
of family was not liable for injuries inflicted by the automobile

93
 driven by an adult son with the father’s permission on trip to make
arrangements for son’s approaching marriage, as no “agency” of
son for father was created.

WILLIAM ANGHIAN SIY v. ALVIN TOMLIN

G. R. No. 205998, April 24, 2017
(Sale of Car through Dealership)

This Court is not unaware of the practice by many vehicle buyers and second-hand car traders
of not transferring registration and ownership over vehicles purchased from their original
owners, and rather instructing the latter to execute and sign in blank deeds of sale covering
these vehicles, so that these buyers and dealers may freely and readily trade or re-sell the
vehicles in the second-hand car market without difficulty. This way, multiple transfers, sales
or trades of the vehicle using these undated deeds signed in blank become possible, until the
latest purchaser decides to actually transfer the certificate or registration in his name. For many
car owners-sellers, this is an easy concession; so long as they actually receive the sale price,
they will sign sale deeds in blank and surrender them to the buyers or dealers; and for the latter,
this is convenient since they can “flip” or re-sell the vehicles to the public many times over
with ease, using these blank deeds of sale.

The basis of agency is representation and the same may be constituted expressly or impliedly.
In an implied agency the principal can be bound by the acts of the implied agent. The same is
true with an oral agency.

Acting for and in petitioner’s behalf by virtue of the implied or oral agency, Ong was thus able
to sell the vehicle to Chua, but he failed to remit the proceeds thereof to petitioner; his guarantee
checks bounced as well. This entitled petitioner to sue for estafa through abuse of confidence.
This is exactly what petitioner did: on May 18, 2011, he filed a complaint for estafa and
carnapping against Ong before the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office.

Since Ong was able to sell the subject vehicle to Chua, petitioner thus ceased to be the owner
thereof. Nor is he entitled to the possession of the vehicle; together with his ownership,
petitioner lost his right of possession over the vehicle. His argument that respondent is a buyer
in bad faith, when the latter nonetheless proceeded with the purchase and registration of the
vehicle on March 7, 2011, despite having been apprised of petitioner’s earlier November, 2010
“Failed to Return Vehicle” report filed with the PNP-HPG, is unavailing. Petitioner had no
right to file said report, as he was no longer the owner of the vehicle at the time; indeed, his
right of action is only against Ong, for collection of the proceeds of the sale.

Considering that he was no longer the owner or rightful possessor of the subject vehicle at the
time he filed Civil Case No. Q-11-69644 in July, 2011, petitioner may not seek a return of the
same through replevin. Quite the contrary, respondent, who obtained the vehicle from Chua
and registered the transfer with the Land Transportation Office, is the rightful owner thereof,
and as such, he is entitled to its possession. For this reason, the C.A. was correct in decreeing
the dismissal of Civil Case No. Q-11-69644, although it erred in ordering the return of the
vehicle to the PNP-HPG, which had no further right to hold the vehicle in its custody. As the

94
registered and rightful owner of the subject vehicle, the trial court must return the same to
respondent.

BAR PROBLEM

J appoints A, a minor 17 years of age, as his agent to sell his car. A, sells the car to M.
Soon thereafter, the price of cars went up with the floating rate of the peso, and J
promptly sought to disaffirm the sale and brought an action to recover the car on the
ground that A’s act was void since a minor cannot be an agent. May J avoid the contract
entered into by A in favor of M on the ground of his agent’s incapacity?

J cannot avoid the contract entered into by A in favor of Maria on the ground of his agent’s
incapacity. In a contract of agency, as far as their persons are concerned, what is important and
material is the legal capacity of the principal to enter into a contract. The capacity of the agent
is of no moment. The reason is evident. The agent’s personality is merely an extension of the
principal’s. If the principal has the necessary capacity, that is enough.

DOCTRINE OF 1. The real existence of an emergency.

AGENT BY 2. Inability of the agent to communicate with the principal.
NECESSITY 3. The exercise of additional authority for the principal’s own
REQUISITES protection.
4. The adoption of fairly reasonable means, premises duly
considered.
5. The ceasing of authority the moment the emergency no longer
demands the same.

DOCTRINE OF a.k.a HOLDING OUT THEORY or DOCTRINE OF

APPARENT OSTENSIBLE AGENCY
AUTHORITY
A banking corporation is liable to innocent third persons where the
representation is made in the course of its business by an agent
acting within the general scope of his authority even though, in the
particular case, the agent is secretly abusing his authority and
attempting to perpetuate a fraud upon his principal or some other
person, for his own ultimate benefit. (First Phil. International Bank
v. C.A., January 24, 1996)

PASCO v. HEIRS OF FILOMENA DE GUZMAN

G. R. No. 165554, July 26, 2010

As regards the third issue. Petitioners maintain that the S.P.A. was fatally defective because
Cresencia was not specifically authorized to enter into a compromise agreement. Here, we fully
concur with the findings of the C.A. that:

95
“x x x It is undisputed that Cresencia’s co-heirs executed a Special Power of Attorney, dated 6
April 1999, designation the former as their Attorney-in-Fact and empowering her to file cases
for collection of all the accounts due to Filomena or her estate. Consequently, Cresencia entered
into the subject Compromise Agreement in order to collect the overdue loan obtained by Pasco
from Filomena. In so doing, Cresencia was merely performing her duty as attorney-in-fact of
her co-heirs pursuant to the Special Power of Attorney given to her.”

Our ruling in Trinidad v. Court of Appeals is illuminating. In Trinidad, the heirs of Vicente
Trinidad executed a S.P.A. in favor of Nenita Trinidad (Nenita) to be their representative in
litigation involving the sale of real property covered by the decedent’s estate. As here, there
was no specific authority to enter into a Compromise Agreement. When a compromise
agreement was finally reached, the heirs later sought to invalidate it, claiming that Nenita was
not specifically authorized to enter into the compromise agreement. We held then, as we do
not, that the S.P.A. necessarily included the power of the attorney-in-fact to compromise the
case, and that Nenita’s co-heirs could not belatedly disavow their original authorization. This
ruling is even more significant here, where the co-heirs have not taken any action to invalidate
the Compromise Agreement or assail their S.P.A.

TRUST

TRUST is the legal relationship between one person having an equitable

ownership over a certain property and another having legal title
thereto.

NATURE OF Ownership by two persons at the time. The trust property is owned
OWNERSHIP OF by two persons at the same time, the relation between the two
TRUSTEE AND owners being such that one of them is under an obligation to use
BENEFICIARY his ownership for the benefit of the other. The former is called the
trustee, and his ownership is trust-ownership; the other is called the
beneficiary, and his is the beneficial ownership.

Ownership of trustee, a mere matter of form and nominal. The

trustee is destitute of any right of enjoyment of the trust property.
His ownership, therefore, is a mere matter of form rather than of
substance, and nominal rather than real. If we have to regard the
essence of the matter, a trustee is not an owner at all, but a sort of
an agent, upon whom the law has conferred the power and imposed
the duty of administering the property of another person.

In legal theory, however, the trustee is not a mere agent but an

owner. He is a person to whom the property of someone else is
fictitiously attributed by the law, to the extent that the rights and
powers thus vested in a nominal owner shall be used by him on
behalf of the real owner.

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 In order that the trustee may acquire title by acquisitive
prescription, the following requisites must be present:
1. He must repudiate the trust
2. He must communicate such repudiation to the beneficiaries.
3. The evidence thereon must be clear and conclusive.
4. There must be adverse, open, public, and continuous possession
within the period fixed by law.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. JUDGE LAIGO et al.

G. R. No. 188639, September 2, 2015

Legacy, being a pre-need provider, complied with the trust fund requirement and entered into
a trust agreement with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP).

In mid-2000, the industry collapsed for a range of reasons. Legacy, like the others, was unable
to pay its obligations to the planholders.

This resulted in Legacy being the subject of a petition for involuntary insolvency filed on
February 18, 2009 by private respondents in their capacity as planholders. Through its
manifestation filed in the R.T.C., Legacy did not object to the proceedings. Accordingly, it was
declared insolvent by the R.T.C.

In its Manifestation with Evaluation, dated June 10, 2009, the SEC opposed the inclusion of
the trust fund in the inventory of corporate assets on the ground that to do so would contravene
the New Rules which treated trust funds as principally established for the exclusive purpose of
guaranteeing the delivery of benefits due to the planholders. It was of the position that the
inclusion of the trust fund in the insolvent’s estate and its being opened to claims by non-
planholders would contravene the purpose for its establishment.

On June 26, 2009, despite the opposition of the SEC, Judge Laigo ordered the insolvency
Assignee, Gener T. Mendoza (Assignee) to take possession of the trust fund. Judge Laigo
viewed the trust fund as Legacy’s corporate assets and, for said reason, included it in the
insolvent’s estate.

Pre-need code (R.A. 9829); the trust fund is for the sole benefit of the planholders and
cannot be used to satisfy the claim of other creditors of the pre-need company; the pre-
need company has no beneficial interest in the trust fund.

First, it must be stressed that a person is considered as a beneficiary of a trust if there is a

manifest intention to give such a person the beneficial interest over the trust properties. This is
the considered opinion expressed in the Restatement of the Law of Trust (Restatement) which
Justice Vicente Abad Santos has described in his contribution to the Philippine Law Journal as
containing the more salient principles, doctrines and rules on the subject. Here, the terms of the
trust agreement plainly confer the status of beneficiary to the planholders, not to Legacy. In the
recital clauses of the said agreement, Legacy bound itself to provide for the sound, prudent and
efficient management and administration of such portion of the collection “for the benefit and

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account of the planholders,” through LBP (as the trustee). This categorical declaration
doubtless indicates that the intention of the trustor is to make the planholders the beneficiaries
of the trust properties, and not Legacy. It is clear that because the beneficial ownership is vested
in the planholders and the legal ownership in the trustee, LBP, Legacy, as trustor, is left without
any lots of interest in the trust fund. This is consistent with the nature of a trust arrangement,
whereby there is a separation of interests in the subject matter of the trust, the beneficiary
having an equitable interest, and the trustee having an interest which is normally legal interest.
Second, considering the fact that a mandated pre-need trust is one embued with public interest,
the issue on who the beneficiary is must be determined on the basis of the entire regulatory
framework. Under the New Rules, it is unmistakable that the beneficial interest over the trust
properties is with the planholders. x x x This consistently runs in accord with the legislative
intent laid down in Chapter IV of R.A. No. 8799, or the SRC, which provides for the
establishment of trust funds for the payment of benefits under such plans. x x x It is clear from
Section 16 that the underlying congressional intent is to make the planholders the exclusive
beneficiaries. It has been said that what is within the spirit is within the law even if it is not
within the letter of the law because the spirit prevails over the letter.

NOTA BENE: Jurisdiction over claims filed against the trust fund is vested
with the SEC.

GO, et al. v. THE ESTATE OF THE LATE FELISA TAMIO DE BUENAVENTURA

G. R. No. 211972, July 22, 2015

Dear Delfin,

Ipinaaabot ko sa iyo ang sulat kong ito upang malaman mo ang aking nagiging
damdamin. Hinihiling ko sa iyo at ipinakikiusap sa iyo tungkol doon sa lote at
building ng D’ lourds.

Hindi naman kaila sa iyo kung papaano ko ito naisalin sa inyong pangalan nina
Filemon C. Buenaventura Sr., Bella Alvarez Guerrero at Delfin Guerrero Sr.
Ang dahilan nito ay dahil sa pag-utang sa GSIS.

Taking the contents of the foregoing letter into consideration — the validity and due execution
of which were never put in issue, hence, indubitably established — the Court therefore differs
from the finding of the courts a quo that an implied trust was established; instead, the Court
rules than an express trust was duly proved in this case.

The words of Felisa in the above-quoted letter unequivocally and absolutely declared her
intention of transferring the title over the subject property to Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon,
Sr. in order to merely accommodate them in securing a loan from the GSIS. She likewise stated
clearly that she was retaining her ownership over the subject property and articulated her wish
to have her heirs share equally therein.

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Trusts: express or implied; determined by the intention of the trustor to create a trust.
— Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in
another. It is a fiduciary relationship that obliges the trustee to deal with the property for the
benefit of the beneficiary. Trust relations between parties may either be express or implied. An
express trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, while an implied trust
comes into being by operation of law. Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of
the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing
an intention to create a trust. Under Article 1444 of the Civil Code, “[n]o particular words are
required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended.”
It is possible to create a trust without using the word “trust” or “trustee”. Conversely, the mere
fact that these words are used does not necessarily indicate an intention to create a trust. The
question in each case is whether the trustor manifested an intention to create the kind of
relationship which to lawyers is known as trust. It is immaterial whether or not he knows that
the relationship which he intends to create is called a trust, and whether or not he knows the
precise characteristics of the relationship which is called a trust. Further, in the case of Tamayo
v. Callejo, the Court recognized that a trust may have a constructive or implied nature in the
beginning, but the registered owner’s subsequent express acknowledgement in a public
document of a previous sale of the property to another party effectively converted the same
into an express trust.

Anent the issue of prescription, the Court finds that the action for reconveyance instituted by
respondents has not yet prescribed, following the jurisprudential rule that express trusts
prescribe in ten (10) years from the time the trust is repudiated.

SPS. DE GUZMAN, et al, v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

G. R. No. 185757, March 2, 2016

Commonwealth Act No. 141 (the Public Land Act); the alienation or encumbrance of
lands acquired under free patent or homestead within the prohibited period of five years
from the date of issuance of the patent is null and void and produces no effect.

The violation shall also produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent or
permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed actually or presumptively. The violation shall
also cause the reversion of the property and its improvements to the State. The contract
executed in violation of these sections being void, it is not susceptible of ratification, and the
action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of such a contract is imprescriptible.

PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY ACT

NOTA BENE: Republic Act No. 11057 otherwise known as “Personal Property
Security Act” expressly repealed the following:
o Pledge under the Civil Code
o Chattel Mortgage Law or P. D. 1529

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 SALIENT An act strengthening the secured transactions legal framework in
FEATURES OF the Philippines, which shall provide for the creation, perfection,
REPUBLIC ACT determination of priority, establishment of a centralized notice
11057 registry, and enforcement of security interests in personal property,
and for other purposes.

CREATION OF Sec. 5 Creation of Security Interest

SECURITY
INTEREST a. A security interest shall be created by a security agreement.
b. A security agreement may provide for the creation of a security
interest in a future property, but the security interest in that
property is created only when the grantor acquires rights in it
or the power to encumber it.

Sec. 6 Security Agreement

A security agreement must be contained in a written contract

signed by the parties. It may consist of one or more writings that,
taken together, establish the intent of the parties to create a security
interest.

The security agreement shall likewise provide for the language to

be used in agreements and notices. The grantor shall be given the
option to have the agreement and notices in Filipino. The
Department of Finance (DOF) shall prepare model agreements in
plain English and Filipino.

Sec. 7 Description of Collateral

A description of collateral shall be considered sufficient, whether

it is specific or general, if it reasonably identifies the collateral. A
description such as “all personal property”, “all equipment”, “all
inventory”, or “all personal property within a generic category” of
the grantor shall be sufficient.

Sec. 9 Continuity of Security Interest

A security interest shall continue in collateral notwithstanding sale,

lease, license, exchange, or other disposition of the collateral,
except as otherwise provided in Section 21 of this Act, or agreed
upon by the parties.

PERFECTION OF Sec. 11. Perfection of Security Interested

SECURITY
INTEREST

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a. A security interest shall be perfected when it has been created
and the secured creditor has taken one of the actions in
accordance with Section 12.
b. On perfection, a security interest becomes effective against
third parties.

Sec. 12. Means of Perfection

A security interest may be perfected by:

a. Registration of a notice with the Registry;
b. Possession of the collateral by the secured creditor; and
c. Control of investment property and deposit account.

A security interest in any tangible asset may be perfected by

registration or possession. A security interest in investment
property and deposit account may be perfected by registration or
control.

Sec. 14 Perfection in Proceeds

a. Upon disposition of collateral, a security interest shall extend

to proceeds of the collateral without further act and be
continuously perfected, if the proceeds are in the form of
money, accounts receivable, negotiable instruments or deposit
accounts.
b. Upon disposition of the collateral, if the proceeds are in a form
different from money, accounts receivable, negotiable
instruments or deposit accounts, the security interest in such
proceeds must be perfected by one of the means applicable to
the relevant type of collateral within fifteen (15) days after the
grantor receives such proceeds; otherwise, the security interest
in such proceeds shall not be effective against third parties.

Sec. 26 Establishment of Electronic Registry

a. The Registry shall be established in and administered by the

LRA.
b. The Registry shall provide electronic means for registration and
searching of notices.

Sec. 30 Effectiveness of Notice

A notice shall be effective at the time it is discoverable on the

records of the Registry.

Sec. 47 Expedited Repossession of the Collateral

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 The secured creditor may take possession of the collateral without
judicial process if the security agreement so stipulates: Provided,
That possession can be taken without a breach of the peace.

QUASI-DELICTS/TORTS

QUASI-DELICTS is a fault or act of negligence or omission of care which causes

damage to another, there being no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties.

There must be a causal connection between the fault or negligence

and the damage.

ARTICLE 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible. x x x

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their

employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.

REGISTERED The rule in this jurisdiction is that the person who is the registered
OWNER RULE owner of a vehicle is liable for any damages caused by the
negligent operation of the vehicle although the same was already
sold/conveyed to another person at the time of the accident. The
registered owner is liable to the injured party subject to his right of
recourse against the transferee or the buyer. Although this rule is
usually applied to common carrier, the rule had already been
extended to quasi-delict cases involving private vehicles. It has
been applied to cases involving enforcement of liability against an
employer under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code even if the
employer is not engaged in business (Aguillar v. Commercial
Savings Bank, 360 SCRA 395).

CARAVAN TRAVEL and TOURS INTERNATIONAL INC. v. ABEJAR

G. R. No. 170631, February 10, 2016
ARTICLE 2180 versus REGISTERED OWNER RULE

A person who exercised substitute parental authority over a victim of a vehicular accident
is a real party in interest in an action for damages based on quasi-delict.

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Termination of parental authority is not a bar that precludes filing of the complaint;
Article 2176 of the Civil Code is broad enough to include even plaintiffs who are not
relatives of the deceased.

Employer’s liability under Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code; it is
imperative to apply the registered-owner rule in a manner that harmonizes it with
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code; explained. — The resolution of this case must
consider two (2) rules. First, Article 2180’s specification that “[e]mployers shall be liable for
the damages caused by their employees . . . acting within the scope of their assigned tasks[.]”
Second, the operation of the registered owner rule that registered owners are liable for death or
injuries caused by the operation of their vehicles. These rules appear to be in conflict when it
comes to cases in which the employer is also the registered owner of a vehicle. Article 2180
requires proof of two things; first, an employment relationship between the driver and the
owner; and second that the driver acted within the scope of his or her assigned tasks. On the
other hand, applying the registered-owner rule only requires the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant-employer is the registered owner of the vehicle. The registered-owner rule was
articulated as early as 1957 in Erezo, et al. v. Jepte, where this court explained that the
registration of motor vehicles, as required by Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 4136, the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, was necessary “not to make said registration the operative act
by which ownership in vehicles is transferred, . . . but to permit the use and operation of the
vehicle upon any public highway[.]” Its main aim . . . is to identify the owner so that if any
accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways,
responsibility therefore can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. x x x As
acknowledged in Filcar, there is no categorical statutory pronouncement in the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code stipulating the liability of a registered owner. The source of a
registered owner’s liability is not a distinct statutory provision, but remains to be Articles 2176
and 2180 of the Civil Code: While Republic Act No. 4136 or the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code does not contain any provision on the liability of registered owners in case of
motor vehicle mishaps, Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code imposes
an obligation upon Filcar, as registered owner, to answer for the damages caused to Espinas’s
car. Thus, it is imperative to apply the registered-owner rule in a manner that harmonizes it
with Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Rules must be construed in a manner that will
harmonize them with other rules so as to form a uniform and consistent system of
jurisprudence. In light of this, the words used in Del Carmen are particularly notable. There,
this court stated that Article 2180 “should defer to” the registered-owner rule. It never stated
that Article 2180 should be totally abandoned. Therefore, the appropriate approach is that in
cases where both the registered-owner rule and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first
establish that the employer is the registered owner of the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff
successfully proves ownership, there arises a disputable presumption that the requirements of
Article 2180 have been proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant
to show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen. This disputable presumption, insofar as
the registered owner of the vehicle in relation to the actual driver is concerned, recognizes that
between the owner and the victim, it is the former that should carry the costs of moving forward
with the evidence. The victim is, in many cases, hapless pedestrian or motorist with hardly any
means to uncover the employment relationship of the owner and the driver, or any act that the
owner may have done in relation to that employment. The registration of the vehicle, on the
other hand, is accessible to the public.

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[R]espondent presented a copy of the Certificate of Registration of the van that hit Reyes. The
Certificate attests to petitioner’s ownership of the van. Petitioner itself did not dispute its
ownership of the van. Consistent with the rule we have just stated, a presumption that the
requirements of Article 2180 have been satisfied arises. It is now up to petitioner to establish
that it incurred no liability under Article 2180. This it can do by presenting proof of any of the
following: first, that it had no employment relationship with Bautista; second, that Bautista
acted outside the scope of his assigned tasks; or third, that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of Bautista. On the first, petitioner admitted
that Bautista was its employee at the time of the accident. On the second, petitioner was unable
to prove that Bautista was not acting within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the
accident. x x x On the third, petitioner likewise failed to prove that it exercised the requisite
diligence in the selection and supervision of Bautista. x x x [P]etitioner did not only fail to
exercise due diligence when it selected Bautista as service driver; it also committed an actual
violation of law. To prove that it exercised the required diligence in supervising Bautista,
petitioner presented copies of several memoranda and company rules. These, however, are
insufficient because petitioner failed to prove actual compliance. x x x For failing to overturn
the presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been satisfied, petitioner must be
held liable.

ST. LUKE’S COLLEGE OF MEDICINE-WILLIAM H. QUASHA MEMORIAL

FOUNDATION, et al. v. SPS. PEREX et al.
G.R. No. 222740, September 28, 2016

[T]he present case is one between a school and its students, with their relationship being based
on the enrollment contracts. x x x [I]nstitution of learning have the “built-in” obligation of
providing a conducive atmosphere for learning, an atmosphere where there are no constant
threats to life and limb, and one where peace and order are maintained. In the case at bar, the
Cabiao Community Clinic is to be considered as part of the campus premises of St. Luke’s. In
the course description of the clerkship program in preventive and community medicine, it is
stated that the Cabiao Community Clinic serves as the base operation of the clerkship program.
As such, petitioner had the same obligation to their students, even though they were stationed
in the Cabiao Community Clinic, and it was incumbent upon petitioners to ensure that said
Clinic was conducive for learning, that it had no constant threats to life and limb, and that peace
and order was maintained thereat. After all, although away from the main campus of St. Luke’s,
the students were still under the same protective and supervisory custody of petitioners as the
ones detailed in the main campus.

Thus, as also laid out in the PSBA case, “the school may still avoid liability by providing that
the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence, here
statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature
of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time, and place.

Petitioner additionally aver that the Clinic was built under the direction, supervision,
management, and control of the Municipality of Cabiao, and that it ensured that there was an
agreement for the Municipality of Cabiao to provide 24-hour security to the Clinic. Petitioners,

104
however, cannot escape liability based on these arguments. As held in Saludaga v. FEU, et al.,
a learning institution should not be allowed to completely relinquish or abdicate matters of
safety and security to a third party as to do so would result to contracting away its inherent
obligation of ensuring a safe learning environment for its students. x x x Similarly, we cannot
turn a blind eye on petitioners’ total reliance on the Municipality of Cabiao in ensuring the
safety and security of their students. The enrollment contract is between petitioners and the
victims, and petitioners cannot abdicate on their contractual obligation to provide their students
a safe learning environment, nor can it pass or contract away such obligation to a third party.

Emergency Rule means an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and
is required to act without much time to consider the best means that maybe adopted to avoid
the impending danger is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and
upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his
own negligence. (Valenzuela v. C.A., 253 SCRA 303)

LAST CLEAR Take note of the doctrine of last clear chance also known as
CHANCE doctrine of discovered peril, or doctrine of supervening
negligence or humanitarian doctrine.

It means that even if the injured party was originally at fault still
if the person who finally caused the accident had the last clear
opportunity to avoid striking him, he who could have prevented
the injury is still liable if he did not take advantage of such
opportunity or chance.

For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the

person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the
accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should, with
exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One cannot be
expected to avoid an accident or injury if he does not know or
could not have known the existence of the peril.

BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

206 SCRA 408 [1992]
(Business nature of banks)

The business of banks is one affected with public interest. Because of the nature of its functions,
a bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always
having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship. (Philippine Bank of Commerce v.
Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 695 [1997]). In every case, the depositor expects the bank to treat
his account with utmost fidelity, whether such account consists only of a few hundred pesos or
of millions. The bank must record every single transaction accurately, down to the last centavo,
and as promptly as time the amount of money the depositor can dispose as he sees fit, confident
that the bank will deliver it as and to whomever he directs. A blunder on the part of the bank,

105
such as failure to duly credit him his deposits as soon as they are made, can cause the depositor
not a little embarrassment if not financial loss and perhaps even civil and criminal litigation.

DOCTORS/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

REYES v. SISTERS OF MERCY HOSPITAL

341 SCRA 760, 769 (2000)

Doctors or physicians are experts, who, because of their training and the very nature of their
work, are required to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of their tasks. The duty of
the physician to bring skill and case to the amelioration of the condition of his patient has its
foundation in public consideration which is inseparable from the nature and exercise of his
calling upon which the public reposes respect and confidence; any slip or breach in the
performance of that duty, no matter how small, is corrosive of that public faith. The action
against the doctor is commonly referred to as medical malpractice. This is a particular form of
negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of
medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally
under similar conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances.

Dr. NINEVETCH CRUZ v. COURT OF APPEALS

282 SCRA 188 (1997).

Whether or not a physician committed an inexcusable lack of precaution in the treatment of his
patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the
profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of
the profession at the time treatment or the present state of medical science.

The doctor cannot blame the assisting nurse for his own omission. Thus, if a piece of gauze
was left in the abdominal cavity of the patient after an operation, the surgeon cannot excuse
himself from liability just because a nurse was present. The only effect is that the nurse may
be held jointly and solidarily liable with him if said nurse was also negligent. The surgeon is
liable because he has the duty to ascertain for himself whether there was left any foreign body
in the abdominal cavity of his patient before he surtured it.

ROGELIO RAMOS, et al. v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

G. R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999

This is especially true if the doctor is the head of the surgical team, the so-called captain of the
ship, because as such he has the responsibility to see to it that those under him perform the task
in the proper manner. Under the “captain of the ship” doctrine, the surgeon is likened to a ship
captain who must not only be responsible for the safety of the crew but also of the passengers
of the vessel. The head surgeon is made responsible for everything that goes wrong within four
corners of the operating room. It enunciates the liability of the surgeon not only for the

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wrongful acts of those who are under his physical control but also those wherein he has
extension of control. (CAPTAIN OF THE SHIP DOCTRINE)

PROOF IN CASES OF Whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite

MEDICAL degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the
MALPRACTICE generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion. The deference of
courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from
its realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills
which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently
evaluating. Expert testimony should be offered to prove that the
circumstances cited by the courts below are constitutive of
conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other
physicians in good standing when performing the same
operation.

Medical malpractice can also be established by relying on the

doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. However, this is limited to cases
where the court from its fund of common knowledge can
determine the standard of care. These are cases where an ordinary
layman can conclude that there was negligence on the part of the
doctor. It is restricted to situations where a layman is able to say,
as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the
consequences of professional care were not as such as would
ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised (Reyes
v. Sisters of Mercy Hospital) If a layman cannot or is not in a
position to say if due care has been exercised, the testimony of
an expert would then be indispensable.

The hospital itself is not liable under Article 2180 in the absence
of employer-employee relationship. Thus, the Supreme Court
explained in its Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration in
Rogelio Ramos, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (No. 124354,
April 11, 2002).

DLSMC maintains that first, a hospital does not hire or engage

the services of a consultant, but rather, accredits the latter and
grants him or her the privilege of maintaining a clinic and/or
admitting patients in the hospital upon a showing by the
consultant that he or she possesses the necessary qualifications,
such as accreditations by the appropriate board (diplomate),
evidence of fellowship and references. Second, it is not the
hospital but the patient who pays the consultant’s fee for services
rendered by the latter. Third, a hospital does not dismiss a
consultant; instead, the latter may lose his or her accreditation or
privileges granted by the hospital. Lastly, DLSMC argues that
when a doctor refers a patient for admission in a hospital, it is the
doctor who prescribes the treatment to be given to said patient.

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 The hospital’s obligation is limited to providing the patient with
the preferred room accommodation, the nutritional diet, and
medications prescribed by the doctor, the equipment and
facilities necessary for the treatment of the patient, as well as the
services of the hospital staff who perform the ministerial tasks of
ensuring that the doctor’s orders are carried out strictly.

JOSE S. AMADORA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988
Application of Article 2180 of the civil code

After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that the
provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where
the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort
committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first
part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades,
it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo
singula singuilis, “teachers” should apply to the words “pupils and students” and “heads of
establishments of arts and trades” to the word “apprentices.”

These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the academic school is to be held
answerable for the torts committed by his students, why is it the head of the school only who
is held liable where the injury is caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the case of the
academic or technical school, why not apply the rule also to the head thereof instead of
imposing the liability only on the teacher?

The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head of the school of
arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils that the head of the academic school.
The old schools of arts and trades were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their
master who personally and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft.
The head of the school of arts and trades was such a master and so was personally involved in
the task of teaching his students, who usually even boarded with him and so came under his
constant control, supervision, and influence. By contrast, the head of the academic school was
not as involved with his students and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers
who were the persons directly dealing with the students. The head of the academic school had
then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with the students. Consequently, while he could not
be directly faulted for the acts of the students, the head of the school of arts and trades, because
of his closer ties with them, could be so blamed.

It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the expansion of the
schools of arts and trades, the consequent increase in their enrollment, and the corresponding
diminution of the direct and personal contract of their heads with the students. Article 2180,
however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the provision must be interpreted by the Court
according to its clear and original mandate until the legislature, taking into account the changes
in the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary amendment.

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In view of the Court, the student is in the custody of the school and within its premises, whether
the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.

As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate
student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the
responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student
should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates
and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the
custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article
2180.

During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must answer for his
students’ torts, in practically the same way that the parents are responsible for the child when
is in their custody.

EFFECT OF THE With respect to pupils, students, and apprentices who are
FAMILY CODE MINORS, the controlling statutory provision is already Article
(Articles 218 and 219) 219 of the Family Code with all its modifications. The basis of
(Date of Effectivity: liability under Article 219 is special parental authority.
August 3, 1988)
Articles 218 and 219 of the Family code enumerates the persons
who have special parental authority and responsibility over a
MINOR CHILD, like the SCHOOL, ITS ADMINISTRATORS,
TEACHERS, and INSTITUTION or INDIVIDUALS having
supervision, instruction or custody of such minor child.

Reason for SOLIDARY liability under 2180 of the Civil Code

and Article 2180 and Article 219 of the Family Code is
NEGLIGENCE in supervision

DEFENSE: Diligence of a good father of the family.

COMPUTATION ON The Supreme Court explained in Consolidated Dairy Products

LOSS OF PROFITS that the amount of lost profits may be determined by considering
the average profit for the preceding years multiplied by the
number of years during which the business is affected by the
wrongful act or breach. In the said case, the Supreme Court ruled
that it was reasonable to award as lost profit the average of the
yearly profit for five (5) years preceding the closure of the
business multiplied by the number of remaining year of the
contract.

The Supreme Court ruled that the income of similar businesses

or activities may be considered. Thus, if the question is loss of
profit of a freight truck, the average income of other trucks can

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 be considered. (G.A. MACHINERIES, INC. vs.
YAPTINCHAY, 126 SCRA 78, 88 [1983])

It is basic that unrealized profit cannot be awarded if the basis is

too speculative and conjectural to show actual damages for a
future period. The plaintiff must therefore present reports and
documents that may show the average actual profits earned by
the business as well as other evidence of profitability which are
necessary to prove plaintiff’s claim for said amount. (BA
FINANCE CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 161 SCRA 608,
622)

MORAL DAMAGES

EXPERT TRAVEL & TOURS, INC. v . THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
RICARDO LO
G.R. No. 130030, June 25, 1999

Moral damages are not punitive in nature but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some
way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused to a
person. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages, nevertheless, must
somehow be proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted. Such damages, to
be recoverable, must be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission the factual basis for
which is satisfactorily established by the aggrieved party. An award of moral damages would
require certain conditions to be met, to wit: (1) First, there must be an injury, whether physical,
mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) second, there must be a culpable
act or omission factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant
is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant, and (4) fourth, the award of
damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219. Under the provisions of this
law, in culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered when the
defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in
wanton disregard of his contractual obligation and, exceptionally, when the act of breach of
contract itself is constitutive, of tort resulting in physical injuries. By Special rule in Article
1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code, moral damages may also be awarded in
case the death of a passenger results from a breach of carriage. In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-
delict, (a) when an act or omission causes physical injuries, or (b) where the defendant is guilty
of intentional tort, moral damages may aptly be recovered. This rule also applies, as aforestated,
to contracts when breached by tort. In culpa criminal, moral damages could be lawfully due
when the accused is found guilty of physical injuries, lasciviousness acts, adultery or
concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention, illegal arrest, illegal search, or defamation.
Malicious prosecution can also give rise to a claim for moral damages. The term “analogous
cases,” referred to in Article 2219, following the ejusdem generis rule, must be held similar to
those expressly enumerated by the law.

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 VICENTE CALALAS v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 122039, May 31, 2000

As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a
breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Article 2219 of the Civil
Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results
in the death of a passenger, as provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206(3) of the
Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided
in Article 2220.

ABS-CBN v. C.A.
G. R. No. 128690, January 21, 1999

The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation because, being an
artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no
emotions, no senses. It cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish,
which can be experienced only by one having a nervous system.

The statement in People v. Manero and Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB that a corporation may
recover moral damages if it “has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social
humiliation is an obiter dictum.” On this score alone the award for damages must be set aside,
since RBS is a corporation.

OTHERS

ANTICHRESIS

Article 2132. By the contract of antichreses the creditor acquires the right to
receive the fruits of an immovable of his debtor, with the obligation
to apply them to the payment of the interest, if owing, and
thereafter to the principal of his credit.

Article 2134. The amount of the principal and of the interest shall be specified in
writing; otherwise, the contract of antichreses shall be void.

Article 2136. The debtor cannot reacquire the enjoyment of the immovable
without first having totally paid what he owes the creditor.

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 SPS. REYES, et al. v. HEIRS OF BENJAMIN MALANCE

[A]ntichresis involves an express agreement between parties whereby: (a) the creditor will have
possession of the debtor’s real property given as security; (b) such creditor will apply the fruits
of the said property to the interest owed by the debtor, if any, then to the principal amount; (c)
the creditor retains enjoyment of such property until the debtor has totally paid what he owes;
and (d) should the obligation be duly paid, then the contract is automatically extinguished
proceeding from the accessory character of the agreement.

[T]he evidence on record shows that the parties intended to enter into a contract of antichresis.
x x x While the Kasulatan did not provide for the transfer of possession of the subject land, the
contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties show that such possession was intended to
be transferred. Atty. Navarro testified that while the Kasulatan only shows that the harvest and
the fruits shall answer for Benjamin’s indebtedness, the parties agreed among themselves that
the lenders would be the one to take possession of the subject land in order for them to get the
harvest. Indeed, such arrangement would be the most reasonable under the premises since at
that time, Benjamin’s medical condition necessitated hospitalization, hence, his physical
inability to cultivate and harvest the fruits thereon. As antichretic creditors, the Magtalas sisters
are entitled to retain enjoyment of the subject land until the debt has been totally paid.

A defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private
document.

The Court observes that the Kasulatan was irregularly notarized since it dit not reflect any
competent eivdence of Benjamin’s identity, such as an identification card (ID) issued by an
official agency bearing his photograph and signature, but merely indicated his Community Tax
Certificate Number despite the express requirement of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Consequently, having failed to sufficiently establish the regularity in the execution of the
Kasulatan, the presumption accorded by law to notarized documents does not apply and,
therefore, the said document should be examined under the parameters of Section 20, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court which provides that “[b]efore any private document offered as authentic
is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either; (a) [by]
anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) [by] evidence of the genuineness of
the signature or handwriting of the maker.” The burden falls upon petitioners to prove the
authenticity and due execution of the Kasulatan which they were, nonetheless, able to
discharge.

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