Electrical Power and Energy Systems 144 (2023) 108599

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International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijepes

Distributed fault-tolerant secondary control for DC microgrids against false

data injection attacks
Zongkui Xie , Zhongqiang Wu *
Key Lab of Industrial Computer Control Engineering of Hebei Province, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao 066004, China

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: This paper focuses on the issue of unknown false data injection attacks (FDIA) of controllers in DC microgrid, and
DC microgrids proposes a distributed fault-tolerant secondary controller for DC microgrid to ensure that the control objectives
Distributed secondary control of voltage regulation and current sharing can be achieved when the system is subject to FDIA. Firstly, the sec­
Fault-tolerant control
ondary control problem in DC microgrid with FDIA is transformed into a first-order leader-following multi-agent
Cyber-attacks
Extended state observer
system fault-tolerant consensus problem, and the impact of FDIA signals on the microgrid system is analyzed.
Then, a distributed extended state observer (DESO) is designed based on the derived multi-agent system, which
observes the injected FDIA signals using the relative output error of each distributed generators and its neigh­
bours. Further, based on the observed FDIA signals, a fault-tolerant secondary controller is designed to eliminate
the adverse effects of the attack signals on the system. Particularly, the stability analyses for the designed DESO
and secondary controller prove that the control system is global asymptotically stable. Finally, the effectiveness
and superiority of the proposed fault-tolerant secondary control method are verified by simulation analyses of
five cases.

1. Introduction information is not required, employing a sparse communication

Microgrid is a small power system that integrates distributed gen­
erators (DGs), energy storage systems (ESS) and loads [1–3]. Due to the
high penetration of power units with DC characteristics in microgrids,
such as photovoltaic systems [4] and ESSs, DC microgrids have received
extensive attention from researchers in recent years and have achieved
rapid development [5].
In DC microgrid, two control objectives, voltage regulation and
current sharing, are generally to be achieved [6]. Droop control is
usually employed to coordinate the local output voltage of each DG and
realize the current sharing function [7]. However, due to the existence of
line impedance, droop control alone often cannot achieve accurate
current sharing and may cause voltage drift. Therefore, it is necessary to
introduce secondary control to compensate the droop control. Second­
ary control is mainly applied in centralized or distributed control
methods [8–10]. The centralized control method requires system in­
formation from all DGs using global communication network to achieve
these control objectives, which may lead to a large communication
burden and the faulty operation in case of communication interruptions
[11]. Distributed secondary control has been widely studied as global
network, which can reduces the communication burden and make the
system more robust [12]. Nasirian et al. [13] proposed a cooperative
control strategy for DC microgrid. The control method uses dynamic
consensus algorithm to estimate the average voltage of the microgrid,
and voltage regulator and current regulator are adopted to generate
voltage regulation term and current regulation term for achieving the
voltage regulation and current sharing. Liu et al. [14] proposed a
distributed supervisory secondary control method to implement voltage
regulation and current sharing for DC microgrid. In the method, a su­
pervisor is designed for coordinating the switching between two
candidate controllers based on the system environment, and the two
candidate controllers refer to the current sharing configuring and DC bus
voltage regulation, respectively. Cucuzzella et al. [15] proposed a robust
consensus algorithm for DC microgrid, which considered the effects of
unknown load demand and modeling uncertainty, using consensus-like
algorithm to achieve the load sharing and voltage regulation functions.
Zhang et al. [16] proposed a predictive voltage hierarchical controller
for islanded microgrid under limited bandwidth. In this method, a pre­
dictive controller is designed to provide neighbor and local predictions,
thereby improving data integrity through accurate predictive

* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: mewzq@163.com (Z. Wu).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2022.108599
Received 28 March 2022; Received in revised form 21 June 2022; Accepted 30 August 2022
Available online 12 September 2022
0142-0615/© 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Z. Xie and Z. Wu
compensation in case of bidirectional data loss. However, for the cyber-
physical system consisting of the microgrid system and communication
layers, distributed control relies on the exchange of local information
among DGs, leaving the system at the risk of malicious cyber attacks.
When the system suffers cyber attacks, these control methods may fail to
achieve the intended voltage regulation and current sharing objectives.
According to the current research against cyber attacks, cyber attacks
are mainly classified into the following types: false data injection attacks
(FDIA), denial of service (DoS) attacks, replay attacks [17–19]. In actual
projects related to cyber-physical systems, malicious cyber-attacks can
disrupt the original stability of the control system, leading to system
paralysis and serious security accidents [20,21]. Among these attacks,
FDIA has the greatest impact on DC microgrid system. It can destabilize
the bus voltage and output current by injecting false data in the hijacked
controller, leading to erroneous current sharing and even threatening
the security of the power system [22,23]. Therefore, in order to secure
the stable operation of microgrid system and achieve voltage regulation
and load sharing accurately under FDIA, how to suppress and mitigate
the impact of FDIA signals on microgrid system has been a critical
research subject currently.
In the existing literatures, detection and isolation of attack signals is
one of the main approaches to mitigate the impact of cyber attacks on
control systems [24–26]. Abhinav et al. [27] proposed a trust-based
distributed secondary control method, which detects and isolates the
error messages in the system using a dynamic trust assessment mecha­
nism to minimize the impact of FDIA in communication link on the
microgrid system. Sahoo et al. [28] designed an attack detection method
based on uncoordinated elements and proposed an evaluation theory to
distinguish the cyber attacks and system failures. However, these
methods, suppressing FDIA signals by detecting and isolating attack
signals, often disrupt the connectivity of the communication network
and affect the consistency of the system, thereby causing control devi­
ation [29]. Besides, resilient control is an important approach to tackle
FDIA, which mitigates the impact of FDIA on the system by adaptively
adjusting the control input. In recent years, many researchers have
investigated the FDIA issues with resilient control methods [30,31]. Guo
et al. [32] proposed a distributed resilient secondary voltage control
method for FDIA of bus voltage, adopting an intermediate observer to
estimate and compensate the attack signal. Liu et al. [33] proposed a
resilient controller for DC microgrid to implement voltage regulation
and current sharing under FDIA and DoS attacks. In this method, a
switching secondary controller is designed combined voltage and cur­
rent errors, and an adaptive gain-based control scheme is proposed that
relaxes the requirement for knowledge of network attacks in the design
of control parameters. Jiang et al. [34] proposed a distributed sliding
mode observer-based secondary control method for DC microgrid. They
designed a distributed sliding mode observer to estimate the attack
signal, which was used to compensate the control input for eliminating
the adverse effects of FDIA signals on the system. Zuo et al. [35]
considered unknown unbounded FDIA in actuators and proposed a
distributed resilient secondary control method against FDIA. The
method restrains the unbounded attacks by designing an adaptive con­
trol framework, ensuring the resilience of local control inputs to attack
signals. However, since the location, size and number of FDIA signals are
unknown, it is virtually impractical to eliminate all potential attack
signals in microgrid system [35], and further analysis and research is
required for compensating the attack signals to the maximum extent and
reducing the adverse effects of FDIA on the system.
To address the above issues, based on previous research, a fault-
tolerant secondary control strategy based on distributed extended
state observer (DESO) is proposed in this paper. The main contributions
are summarized as follows.
(1) Firstly, a standard distributed secondary control method is
reviewed, based on which the control problem of the DC micro­
grid with FDIA is transformed into a first-order multi-agent
2
International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 144 (2023) 108599
system (MAS) fault-tolerant consensus problem by designing a
new state variable. On this basis, the adverse effect of FDIA on the
microgrid system is analyzed.
(2) Based on the constructed MAS, a DESO is designed to estimate the
attack signals of each DG with relative state errors between DG
and its neighbors, and the global error system of the DESO is
proved to be asymptotically stable.
(3) A DESO-based fault-tolerant secondary controller is designed
using the observed attack signals. Based on the designed sec­
ondary controller, a virtual fault-tolerant consensus protocol can
be constructed, and the stability analysis of the global system
demonstrates that the global system can achieve fault-tolerant
consensus with the control protocol. Thus, it is theoretically
demonstrated that the microgrid system can operate smoothly
with the action of the designed controller.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section II re­
views a distributed secondary control method for DC microgrids and
analyzes the effect of the FDIA on the stability of the microgrid system.
Section III systematically describes the proposed distributed fault-
tolerant secondary control method and gives a global stability proof.
Section IV verifies the effectiveness and superiority of the proposed
control method in DC microgrid through the simulation analysis of five
cases. Finally, Section V summarizes the conclusions of this paper.
2. System analysis of DC microgrid with FDIA
To facilitate the illustration for the proposed control method, this
section first reviews a standard distributed secondary control method
and establishes a mathematical model of the FDIA. Then the impact of
FDIA on the DC microgrid is analyzed.
2.1. Standard secondary control method and FDIA model
Distributed secondary control of microgrids is a control method
based on consensus theory, which maps the physical DC microgrid
system to the communication topology in cyber layer, thus information
can be exchanged between DGs. The cyber layer is defined as follows:
each DG in the microgrid is defined as a communication node, and the
communication network composed of n nodes is represented by a
directed graphG = {V, E, A}, where V = {1, ⋯, n} denotes the set of the
[ ]
nodes, E⊂V × V represents the edges of the nodes, A = aij denotes the
weighted adjacency matrix, aij is the connection weight of ith node and
jth node. Defineaii = 0, if jth node transmits information to ith node,
thenaij ∕
= 0, and otherwiseaij = 0. The set composed of all neighbors of
ith node isNi = {j ∈ V|(j, i) ∈ E }, and the weighted degree of ith node is
∑
defined asdi = nj=1 aij , then the degree matrix isD = diag{d1 , d2 , ⋯, dn }.
The Laplacian matrix of directed graph G can be described asL = D − A.
Suppose G is a bivariate network, i.e.,aij = aji , then L is a symmetric
matrix.
In DC microgrid, ideally, the output voltage of each DG should be
regulated to a nominal value and current sharing should be achieved
according to the capacity of each DG. However, due to the presence of
line impedance, there is a conflict between voltage regulation and cur­
rent sharing, the voltage drop in the line will cause inaccurate current
sharing. Herein, the average output voltage of each DG can be regulated
to the nominal value to achieve accurate current sharing and increase
the bus voltage level [8], i.e.,
Ioi Ki
Vavg = Vnom , = (1)
Ioj Kj
∑
where Vavg = 1/n n1 Voi denotes the average output voltage of each
DG, Vnom denotes the nominal voltage, Ioi denotes the output current of
DGi, Ki is the current sharing ratio of DGi,i, j ∈ {1, ⋯, n}.
To achieve the control objectives in Eq. (1), droop control is adopted
Z. Xie and Z. Wu International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 144 (2023) 108599

δ̇i = u*i = ui + ηi , (7)

where denotes the incorrect control input under attack signal, ηi is

u*i
the attack signal injected in ith actuator, which can be modeled as the
summation of finite step, ramp or sinusoidal signals [37].
The injected attack signals may destabilize the distributed system
and thus destroy the microgrid system. The impact of the attack signals
on the system will be theoretically analyzed in detail in the following
subsection.

2.2. System analysis under FDIA

First, it can be deduced from Eq. (3) that.

δ̇i = V̇ refi + R*i I˙oi − V̇ nom . (8)

The local voltage controller regulates the output voltage of converter

Fig. 1. A standard distributed secondary control method of DC microgrids. to the reference voltage generated by the droop control, the voltage
tracking error isφi = Vrefi − Vi . ThenVrefi = Vi + φi , the time derivative of
to generate the local reference voltage of each DG, Vrefi is.

Vrefi = Vnom − R*i Ioi (2) V̇ refi = V̇ i + φ̇i . (9)

where R*i denotes the droop coefficient and Vrefi denotes the refer­ Substituting Eq. (7) and Eq. (9) into Eq. (8) yields.
ence voltage generated by the droop control. V̇ i + R*i I˙oi − V̇ nom + φ̇i = ui + ηi . (10)
Since the droop control may pull down the bus voltage level of the
∑ ) (
system, and the presence of line impedance can cause inaccurate current It can be obtained from Eq. (5) thatV̇ i = V̇ i + ki j∈Ni aij V i − V j , and
sharing, the secondary control is introduced to compensate for the droop substituting this equation and Eq. (4) into Eq. (10) yields.
control. Fig. 1 describes a standard distributed secondary control ∑ (( ) ( ))
method for DC microgrid [35]. V˙ i + R*i I˙oi − V̇ nom = − ki aij V i + R*i Ioi − Vnom − V j + R*j Ioj − Vnom
As shown in Fig. 1, in order to address the voltage drift problem, the j∈Ni
( ( ))
average voltage of the DGs can be observed by an average consensus +ki bi R*i Ioi − V j + R*j Ioj − Vnom − φ̇i + ηi .
algorithm-based voltage observer, and the difference between the
average voltage and the nominal voltage is acted as one of the (11)
compensation terms to adjust the average voltage of the DGs to the In steady state, R*i Ioi
converges to a constant Iss [13]. LetXi = V i +
nominal voltage. Besides, the consensus error of the current among DGs R*i Ioi − Vnom ,Xref = Iss , then Eq. (11) can be rewritten as.
is taken as one of the compensation terms to achieve accurate current ∑ ( ) ( )
sharing. Eq. (3) gives the expression of the standard distributed sec­ Ẋ i = − ki aij Xi − Xj + ki bi Xref − Xi − φ̇i + ηi . (12)
ondary control structure for DGi. j∈Ni

∑ ( ) ( )
Vrefi = Vnom − R*i Ioi + δi , (3) Next, let υi = − j∈Ni aij Xi − Xj +bi Xref − Xi as the virtual
∫ consensus protocol, then Eq. (12) can be expressed as.
where δi = ui dt is the compensation term of the secondary control,
and ui is the control input. Ẋ i = ki υi − φ̇i + ηi . (13)
[ ]
∑ ( ) So far, the model of DC microgrid system with FDIA is transformed
ui = ki − * *
aij Ri Ioi − Rj Ioj + bi (Vnom − V i ) , (4) into a first-order MAS with unknown disturbance.
j∈Ni
Remark 1. The distributed secondary control method proposed in this
where ki > 0, bi > 0 denote the gains and V i denotes the average paper is designed based on the first-order MAS in Eq. (13). The reason is that
voltage observed by Eq. (5) (average voltage observer). each DGs needs to exchange its respective voltage and current information in
V˙ i = − ki
∑ ( )
aij V i − V j + V̇ i , (5) secondary control, where V i is easily observable and R*i Ioi is hardly observ­
j∈Ni able. In this paper, we design a new state variableXi , transforming the
exchanged information (V i and R*i Ioi ) into V i andXi , and the DC microgrid
where V̇ i is the derivative of the output voltage of DGi. model with FDIA can thus be derived as a first-order MAS model. Then the
Moreover, the power flow of DC microgrid subjects to an algebraic MAS model is employed for analyzing and designing the controller. In this
equation as follow [14], way, Xi as well as the attack signal can be observed and further suppression
⎧ for the attack can be achieved. Besides, in microgrid systems, the output
⎨ n Ri Ioi = Vi m− Vbus ,
∑ ∑( ) (6) voltage and output current for each DG usually satisfyVmin < Vi < Vmax ,
⎩ Ioi = Vbus 1/Rloadj . Imin < Ioi < Imax , Vmax and Vmin for the maximum and minimum values of the
output voltage, respectively, and Imax , Imin for the minimum value of the output
i=1 j=1

where Vbus denotes the bus voltage, Ri denotes the line impedance of current respectively. Therefore, the constraint for state variable Xi is pre­
DGi, Rloadj represents the jth load of DGi, and m is the number of loads. sented as follow,
For this cyber-physical system, attackers can inject unknown
external signals to the actuators during the communication process, Xmin < Xi < Xmax , (14)
which will disrupt the control inputs of each DG. The control inputs with ( )
whereXmax = Vmax + max R*i
⋅Imax − Vnom ,Xmin = Vmin +
cyber attack can be modeled in the following form [34 36]. ( )
min R*i ⋅Imin − Vnom . The detailed process of designing and analyzing for

3
Z. Xie and Z. Wu International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 144 (2023) 108599

the proposed controller will be presented in Section III. follows.

Define the state variable error asei = Xi − Xref , the time derivative of ⎧
ei is. ⎪
⎪
⎪ ̂˙ i = ki υ*i + ̂
X η i − λρi
⎪
⎪
∑ ( ) ⎪
⎨ ˙̂
ėi = − ki aij ei − ej − ki bi ei − φ̇i + ηi . (15) η i = − ωρi (19)
j∈Ni ⎪
⎪
⎪ ∑ ( )
⎪
⎪ ρ = a X ̃ − X ̃i,
̃ j + bi X
⎪
⎩ i j∈N ij i
Lete = [e1 , e2 , ⋯, en ]T , then the global form of Eq. (15) can be i

expressed as.
where X ̂ i and ̂
η i denote the observed values of the state variable and
ė = − K(L + B)e − ψ + η. (16)
attack signal for DGi, respectively. X ̃i = X
̂ i − Xi is the observation error
[ ]T ofXi . ρi represents the consensus error of the observer, λ and ω are
whereK = diag(ki ),ψ = φ̇1 , φ̇2 , ⋯, φ̇n ,η = [η1 , η2 , ⋯, ηn ]T ,B observer gains. υ*i is a fault-tolerant consensus protocol constructed by
= diag(bi ). Then the dynamic expression for e can be deduced from Eq. the designed secondary controller, which will be described in the next
(16) as. subsection.
∫t The time derivative of X ̃ i is.
e(t) = exp( − K(L + B)t )⋅e(t0 ) + exp( − K(L + B)(t − τ) )⋅(η(τ)
t0 X ̂˙ i − Ẋ i ,
̃˙ i = X (20)
− ψ (τ) )dτ (17)
Substituting Eq. (13) and Eq. (19) into Eq. (20), we can get.
Without loss of generality, the attack signal is assumed to be pos­
̃˙ i = ̃ (21)
itive,η(τ) > η0 > 0. Suppose that the system can converge to the refer­ X ηi + φ̇i − λρi ,
ence voltage using the local voltage controller, i.e.,lim φ(t) = 0. Besides, where ̃ηi = ̂η i − ηi denotes the error of the real attack signal and the
t→∞
since K(L + B) is a positive-definite invertible matrix, exp( − estimated attack signal. Further, according to Eq. (19), the derivative of
K(L + B)t )⋅e(t0 ) can converge to zero. Therefore, it can be obtained that. ηi can be calculated as.
̃
∫t
η˙ i = − ωρi − η̇i .
̃ (22)
lim e(t) = lim exp(− K(L+B)(t − τ))⋅η(τ)dτ
t→∞ t→∞ t [ ]T [ ]T
0

> exp(− K(L+B)t)⋅[exp(K(L+B)t)− exp(K(L+B)t0 )]⋅[K(L+B)]− 1 η0 LetΘi = X ηi ,Γi = φ̇i , η̇i , then the augmented error system can
̃i , ̃
= [K(L+B)]− 1 η0 ⩾0. be constructed based on Eqs. (21) and (22) as.
(18)
Θ̇i = MΘi − PΓi − Λρi , (23)
It is concluded from Eq. (18) that the state error of the system fails to
converge to zero under the influence of the attack signal, i.e., the [ ] [ ] [ ]
0 1 − 1 0 λ
intended voltage regulation and current sharing objectives cannot be M=
0 0
P=
0 1
Λ=
ω
achieved.
DefineΘ = [Θ1 , ⋯, Θn ]T ,Γ = [Γ1 , ⋯, Γn ]T , substituting
( )
3. The proposed fault-tolerant control method ∑
ρi = j∈Ni aij X ̃ j +bi X
̃i − X ̃ i into Eq. (23), the global augmented error

This section elaborates the proposed fault-tolerant secondary control system can be described as.
method. Based on the system analysis in Section 2.2, the control problem
for DC microgrid is transformed into a first-order MAS fault-tolerant Θ̇ = (In ⊗ M − (L + B) ⊗ (ΛC) )Θ − (In ⊗ P)Γ (24)
consensus problem in this paper. First, a DESO is designed to estimate
the FDIA signal. Then a distributed fault-tolerant controller based on C = [1, 0]T
DESO is proposed using the estimated attack signal for compensating Thus far, the global error system of the designed DESO is con­
and suppressing the attack signals. Finally, the stability of the designed structed.
DESO and the fault-tolerant controller is proved.
Theorem 1. Suppose the Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold, for given
constantα > 0, the global error system of the designed DESO is asymptotically
3.1. Designed distributed expanded state observer (DESO)
stable if there exists a positive definite matrix Q and a positive constant γ
satisfying Eq. (25).
This subsection describes the DESO designed for observing the attack
signal, and the stability proof of the observer is performed. ⎡ ⎤〈
Ξ − In ⊗ QP I
Assumption 1. The directed graph G is a strongly connected graph. ⎣∗ − γI 0 ⎦ 0, (25)
⃒ ⃒
⃒ ⃒ ∗ ∗ − γI
Assumption 2. is bounded,⃒⃒φ̇i ⃒⃒⩽α, α is the upper bound ofφ̇i .
( ) ( )
Lemma 1. Suppose H11 and H22 are symmetric matrices, and if there Ξ = In ⊗ QM + MT Q − (L + B) ⊗ QΛC − (L + B)T ⊗ CT ΛT Q
[ ]〈
H11 H12 Proof: Consider the following Lyapunov function.
exists a linear matrix inequality satisfying 0,
HT12 H22
1
thenH11 < 0,H22 − HT12 H−111 H12 < 0. V = ΘT (In ⊗ Q)Θ (26)
2
Based on expanded state technique [38], the DESO is designed as

4
Z. Xie and Z. Wu International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 144 (2023) 108599

signal from the secondary control input. Besides, due to the presence of
observation errors and internal disturbances of the system, a fault
tolerance term is added to further eliminate the adverse effects of the
attack signals as well as the disturbances on the system operation. Fig. 2
provides the structure diagram of the proposed control method.
As shown in Fig. 2, based on the standard secondary control frame­
work described in section II, the proposed fault-tolerant controller can
be expressed as.
[ ]
∑ ( )
ui = ki − aij R*i Ioi − R*j Ioj + bi (Vnom − V i ) − ̂
η i − χ sign(σ i ), (30)
j∈Ni

∑ ( ) ( )
whereσi = j∈Ni aij Xi − Xj + bi Xi − Ri Ioi , χ is a positive con­
*
∫t
stant,̂η i = 0 ( − ωρi )dτ.
Next, the stability performance of the designed controller is analyzed
below.
In the system analysis in Section 2.2, an equation of the DC microgrid
system, Eq. (10), is obtained by derivation. Substituting the designed
controller Eq. (30) into Eq. (10) yields.
∑ (( ) ( ))
V˙ i + R*i I˙oi − V̇ nom = − ki aij V i + R*i Ioi − Vnom − V j + R*j Ioj − Vnom
j∈Ni
( ( ))
+ki bi R*i Ioi − V j + R*j Ioj − Vnom − φ̇i + ηi − ̂
η i − χ sign(σi ).
(31)
SinceXi = V i + R*i Ioi
− Vnom , Eq. (31) can be rewritten as.
∑ ( ) ( )
Ẋ i = − ki η i − χ sign(σi ) − φ̇i + ηi .
aij Xi − Xj + ki bi Xref − Xi − ̂ (32)
j∈Ni
Fig. 2. Proposed fault-tolerant controller for DC microgrids.
Let.
∑ ( ) ( )
Then the derivative of V is. *
υ = −
i η i + χ sign(σi ) ),
aij Xi − Xj + bi Xref − Xi − 1/ki (̂ (33)
j∈Ni
T
V̇ = Θ (In ⊗ Q)((In ⊗ M − (L + B) ⊗ (ΛC) )Θ
− (In ⊗ P)Γ )
( ( )
= ΘT In ⊗ QM + MT Q − (L + B) ⊗ QΛC − (L + B)T where υ*i is the fault-tolerant consensus protocol. Then Eq. (32) can
( )) be expressed as.
⊗ CT ΛT Q Θ − ΘT (In ⊗ QP)Γ
Ẋ i = − ki υ*i − φ̇i + ηi . (34)
= ΘT ΞΘ − ΘT (In ⊗ QP)Γ
(27) So far, the DC microgrid system with FDIA attack adopting the
designed controller is derived as a first-order MAS. Evidently, if the
According to Lemma 1, Eq. (25) guaranteesΞ < 0, which leads
control protocol Eq. (33) can enable the consensus asymptotic stabili­
toV̇ < 0. Therefore, the global error system Eq. (24) is asymptotically
zation of the MAS system, it is proved that the microgrid system can
stable.
operate smoothly under the action of the designed controller.
Next, the convergence of X
̃ i and ̃
ηi is further described below.
Let. Theorem 2. Suppose Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold, for given
∫ t( ) constantα > 0, if χ > α holds, the MAS Eq. (34) can achieve fault-tolerant
ξ=
1 T
Θ Θ − γΓT Γ dτ, (28) consensus with the fault-tolerant consensus protocol Eq. (33).
γ
Proof: Let state error asei = Xi − Xref , then the time derivative of ei is.
0

Under zero initial condition, the following equation holds, ∑ ( )

∫t ėi = − ki ηi − χ sign(σi ).
aij ei − ej − ki bi ei − φ̇i − ̃ (35)
(29)
j∈Ni
ξ< ZT ΦZdτ,
0
Further, the global dynamics equation of the state error can be
⎡
1
⎤ expressed as.
[ ]
⎢Ξ + γ I − In ⊗ QP ⎥ Θ
Φ=⎣ ⎦Z = ė = − K(L + B)e − ψ − ̃
η − χ sign((L + B)e ), (36)
Γ
∗ − γI
[ ]T
According to Lemma 1 and Eq. (25), it can be derived thatΦ < 0. η = ̃η1 , ⋯, ̃ηn
̃
Therefore, ‖Θ‖〈γ‖Γ‖ holds, which means that the asymptotic conver­
According to Theorem 1, ̃η is asymptotically stable. Therefore, if the
gence of X
̃ i and ̃
ηi can be guaranteed withγ. following system Eq. (37) is asymptotically stable, then e can converge
asymptotically.
3.2. Designed distributed fault tolerant controller ė = − K(L + B)e − ψ − χ sign((L + B)e ), (37)

This subsection elaborates the designed distributed fault-tolerant Consider the following Lyapunov function.
secondary controller and proves the stability of the control system. 1
Based on the FDIA model attacks and the derived MAS, we first V = eT (L + B)e (38)
2
observe the injected attack signals and subtract this observed attack

5
Z. Xie and Z. Wu International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 144 (2023) 108599

Table 2
Attack signals in the four cases.
Case Attack note Attack signal tattack

Case 1 DG1 20 t = 1–3 s

DG3 40sin(2πt + π) + 40 t = 2–3 s
Case 2 DG1 20t t = 1–4.5 s
DG2 − 30 t = 2.5–4.5 s
DG4 15sin(2πt) t = 2.5–4.5 s
Case 3 DG2 10(t − 1) t = 2–4.5 s
DG5 − 25 t = 2–4 s
Case 4 DG1 20 t = 3–4.5 s
DG2 20sin(3πt) t = 1.5–4.5 s
Case 5 DG1 20 t = 1–3 s
DG3 40sin(2πt + π) + 40 t = 2–3 s

bound of φ̇i is unknown, when the disturbance of the system is large, such as a
sudden increase in load, the instantaneous voltage tracking error may be
large, resulting inα > χ . Therefore, χ should be set to a larger number to
Fig. 3. DC microgrid system consisting of 4 DGs. ensure the stability of the system.

4. Simulation and result analysis

Table 1
Parameter setting. This section verifies the effectiveness and superiority of the proposed
Parameters Value Parameters Value control strategy in DC microgrid system with FDIA by simulations. Fig. 3
System (i = 1, ⋯, 4) shows the modeled DC microgrid system using MATLAB/SIMULINK. As
Li (mH) 1 RLi (Ω) 0.04 displayed in Fig. 3, the system consists of four DGs. The local bus bars of
Ci (μF) 1000 R12 , R23 , R34 , R41 (Ω) 0.5,0.3,0.4,0.6 DGs are connected by lines in a mesh form, Rij denotes the line imped­
Vnom (V) 100 R1 , R2 , R3 , R4 (Ω) 25,35,40,30 ance between DGi and DGj, Ri denotes the local load of DGi. Besides, the
vsi (V) 60
Controller (i = 1, ⋯, 4)
communication between the nodes is bidirectional. The parameter set­
ki 10 bi 1 tings of the system and the controller are detailed in Table 1.
R*i 0.5 ω 10 In order to test the ability of the proposed control method for coping
χ 300 λ 100 with cyber attacks, five different cases are simulated and analyzed in this
paper, and compared with the standard secondary control method
described in Section II and an attack-resilient secondary control pro­
The derivative of V is.
posed in ref. [35]. Case 1 analyzes the control performance of the pro­
V̇ = eT (L + B)( − K(L + B)e − ψ − χ sign((L + B)e ) ) posed control method under cyber attacks. Case 2 investigates the
= − eT (L + B)K(L + B)e − eT (L + B)ψ − χ eT (L + B)sign((L + B)e ) robustness of the proposed controller in presence of system disturbances
(39) and FDIA. Case 3 simulates and verifies the plug-and-play capability of
the proposed controller. Case 4 simulates and analyzes the performance
SincexT sign(x) = ‖x‖, according to Assumption 2, we can get. of the method when the communication is interrupted. Case 5 simulates
⃦ ⃦
∑ n ⃦∑ ( ) ⃦ the control performance of the proposed control method with different
⃦ ⃦
V̇⩽ − eT (L + B)K(L + B)e + α⃦ aij ei − ej + bi ei ⃦
⃦ ⃦ communication delays. The attack signals of each DG in different cases
i=1 j∈N i
are listed in Table 2, and the tattack in the table is the time interval of
⃦ ⃦ FDIA.
∑n ⃦∑ ( ) ⃦
⃦ ⃦
− χ ⃦ aij ei − ej + bi ei ⃦ = − eT (L + B)K(L + B)e
⃦ j∈N ⃦
i=1 i
⃦ ⃦ 4.1. Case1: Performance comparison under FDIA
∑n ⃦∑ ⃦
⃦ ( ) ⃦
+ (α − χ ) ⃦ aij ei − ej + bi ei ⃦ In this subsection, the effectiveness of the proposed controller under
⃦ ⃦
FDIA is simulated. The simulation process experiences 3 s. A step attack
i=1 j∈N i

Ifα − χ < 0, then.
V̇⩽ − eT (L + B)K(L + B)e
Since (L + B)K(L + B) is a positive definite matrix, thenV̇ < 0.
Therefore, the designed fault-tolerant controller can guarantee the fault-
tolerant consensus of the MAS, i.e., the DC microgrid system under FDIA
can maintain stable operation.
In addition, this MAS satisfies Xi = Xj in steady state, and sinceV i =
V j , thenR*i Ioi = R*j Ioj ,i, j ∈ n, i,e., the predetermined voltage regulation
and current sharing objectives can be achieved.
Remark 2. The α plays a determining role in the value ofχ . Due to the much
faster dynamic performance of the voltage control loop compared to the
secondary control loop as well as the positive control performance of the PI
controller, the constraint onφ̇i , Assumption 2, is reasonable. While the upper
(40)
signal is injected to DG1 at t = 1 s and a sinusoidal attack signal is
injected to DG3 at t = 2 s, the injected signals are shown in Table 2. In
addition, since the R*i of each DG is the same, the ratio of output current
(41)
for each DG should be 1:1:1:1. The simulation results of the three
methods are presented in Figs. 4-6.
Fig. 4 describes the response curves of the proposed fault-tolerant
secondary control method and the two compared methods, respec­
tively. Fig. 5 pictures the observed attack signals by DESO. As shown in
Fig. 4 (a), during t = 0–1 s, the output current of each DG can quickly
converge to a steady-state value, the output voltage remains stable. After
injecting attack signals into DG1 at t = 1 s and DG3 at t = 2 s, as the
observed attack signals and the error-tolerance term (χ sign(σi )) fully
compensate for the attack signals, the system remains smooth operation
without significant fluctuations. For the standard secondary control
method, as shown in Fig. 4 (b), its output current fails to achieve the
intended current sharing objective, and the output voltage of each DG
presents large fluctuations and deviates from the nominal voltage value.

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Z. Xie and Z. Wu International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 144 (2023) 108599

Fig. 4. Performances of the three control method in case 1.

Fig. 6. Average voltage of the four DGs for the three methods in case 1.

Fig. 5. Observed attack signals of the proposed method in case 1.
Besides, Fig. 4 (c) shows the response curve of the attack-resilient con­
trol, from which it can be noticed that, before t = 2 s, only DG1 is
attacked and the adverse effect of the attack signal on the system can be
completely eliminated. However, as the amplitude and number of attack
signals increase during t = 2–3 s, these attack signals cannot be
completely suppressed and the output current occurs fluctuation.

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Z. Xie and Z. Wu International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 144 (2023) 108599

Fig. 7. Performances of the three control method in case 2.

Fig. 9. Average voltage of the four DGs for the three methods in case 2.

Therefore, the ability of this method for suppressing attack signals is

Fig. 8. Observed attack signals of the proposed method in case 2.
weaker than the proposed control method.
Fig. 6 illustrates the average voltage curves of the three control
methods. As seen from the figure, the average output voltage of the
system with the proposed controller is not affected by FDIA. It is ach­
ieved that regulating the average output voltage to the nominal voltage.

8
Z. Xie and Z. Wu
Fig. 10. Communication topology of DGs in case 3.
4.2. Case 2: Load change
This subsection simulates and analyzes the system response of the
proposed fault-tolerant secondary controller under load change and
FDIA. The simulation process experiences 5 s. The load of DG1 increases
from 25 Ω to 50 Ω at t = 1.5 s, and the load of DG3 decreases from 40 Ω to
20 Ω at t = 3.5 s. Besides, a ramp attack signal is injected into DG1 at t =
1 s, step and sinusoidal attack signals are injected into DG2 and DG4
respectively at t = 2.5 s, then all network attacks are removed at t = 4.5
s. The details of the injected attack signals are shown in Table 2. The
droop coefficient of each DG is set asR*1 = R*2 = 2R*3 = 2R*4 = 1,
Fig. 11. Performances of the three control method in case 3.
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International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 144 (2023) 108599
then the ratio of output current for each DG should be 1:1:2:2. The
simulation results of case 2 are presented in Figs. 7-9.
Fig. 7 (a) depicts the response curves of the output current and
output voltage of each DG with load change using the proposed
controller respectively, and Fig. 8 shows the observed attack signals by
DESO in case 2. As described in Fig. 7 (a), before t = 1 s, the output
current and voltage of each DG have converged to a steady-state value,
and the ratio of output current is 1:1:2:2. At t = 1 s, the attack signal is
injected into DG1, however, the system output has no obvious change. At
t = 1.5 s, as the local load of DG1 increases, the output current of each
DG decreases, where the dynamic and steady-state processes of DG1 and
DG2, DG3 and DG4 are consistent, and then reach a new steady state. At t
= 2.5 s, the attack signals are injected into DG2 and DG4. Under the three
attack signals, although the output current of each DG has a slight
variation, the current ratio basically remains 1:1:2:2. Fig. 7 (b) presents
the response curves of the standard secondary control with load change.
As shown in Fig. 7 (b), compared with the proposed controller, the
system output of the standard method is greatly affected by these attack
Z. Xie and Z. Wu
Fig. 12. Observed attack signals of the proposed method in case 3.
Fig. 13. Average voltage of the four DGs for the three methods in case 3.
signals and cannot maintain stability. During the period of cyber attacks,
the output current of each DG has large fluctuations, in addition, the
ability for load sharing fails. Fig. 7 (c) shows the response curves of the
attack-resilient control, from which it can be seen that these attacks
cannot be completely suppressed and the system suffers from inaccurate
current sharing and voltage fluctuations.
Fig. 9 provides the average voltage curves for the three control
methods in case 2. As shown in the figure, when the local load of the
system changes, the average voltage of the proposed controller does not
have a large sudden change and remains stable at 100 V (nominal
voltage) under multiple FDIA signals, which demonstrates the strong
robustness of the distributed fault-tolerant secondary controller.
4.3. Case 3: Plug and play
In this subsection, the plug-and-play capability of the proposed
controller is tested. The simulation process experiences 5 s. At t = 1 s, a
new DG (DG5) with the same parameters as DG4 is connected to the bus
bar of DG4 through the line and exchanges information with other DGs,
which is then removed from the system at t = 4 s. The communication
topology is shown in Fig. 10.
To better analyze the plug-and-play capability of the control method
under cyber attacks, ramp and step attack signals are injected into DG2
and DG5 at t = 2 s, which are then removed at t = 4.5 s. The injected
attack signals are detailed in Table 2. Besides, the local load of DG1
increases from 25 Ω to 40 Ω at t = 3 s. The simulation results of case 3 are
depicted in Figs. 11-13.
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International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 144 (2023) 108599
Fig. 14. Communication topology of DGs in case 4.
Fig. 11 (a) illustrates the response curves of output current and
output voltage of each DG with the proposed secondary controller, and
Fig. 12 shows the attack signals observed by DESO in case 3. As seen
from Fig. 11 (a), before t = 1 s, since DG5 is not connected to the
microgrid system and has no communication connection with other
DGs, the current sharing is only realized among the other 4 DGs. After t
= 1 s, DG5 is connected to the system and generates bidirectional
communication with DG4 to achieve precise global current sharing.
Besides, the attack signals injected to DG2 and DG5 at t = 2 s have not
caused obvious effects on the system, as well as, the system can still
maintain stable operation with smooth output after the local load
changes. In particular, there is no major fluctuation during the accessing
and removal of DG5 in the system, which proves the strong plug-and-
play capability of the proposed fault-tolerant secondary control
method. Fig. 11 (b) and (c) show the system response curves of the
standard control and attack-resilient control methods in case 3. As can
be seen from these figures that the accessing and removal of DG5 in the
system causes larger voltage and current fluctuations compared to the
proposed method. Meanwhile, the standard control method is exhausted
to maintain the stability of the system under the cyber attacks. Although
the output of the attack-resilient controller is smoother than that of the
standard control method, it fails to completely suppress these attack
signals.
Fig. 13 presents the average voltage curves for the three control
methods in case 3. As shown in Fig. 13 that, compared with the standard
method and the attack-resilient control method, the proposed control
method has smaller oscillation of average voltage when a DG is con­
nected in or removed from the system, and the average voltage can
remain stable to 100 V under cyber attacks.
4.4. Case 4: Communication interruption
This subsection simulates and analyzes the performance of the
designed fault-tolerant controller with communication interruptions.
The simulation process experiences 5 s. The communication topology
with communication interruption is shown in Fig. 14. Besides, for better
analyzing the performance of the fault-tolerant controller under
communication interruption, a sinusoidal attack signal is injected to DG2
at t = 2 s and a step attack signal is injected to DG1 at t = 3 s. The
simulation results of case 4 are depicted in Figs. 15-17.
Fig. 15 (a) depicts the output current and output voltage of the
proposed controller for each DG under communication interruption. As
seen in Fig. 15 (a), since the system has reached stability before t = 0.5 s,
the output current can maintain consistency after the communication
interruption between DG1 and DG2. At t = 1.5 s, the attack signal is
injected in DG2, since DG1 and DG2 are still communicating with other
DGs, the DESO can observe the attack signals with smaller error (see
Fig. 16). By the compensation of the observed attack signals and the
error-tolerance term, the attack signals can be completely suppressed. At
t = 2.5 s, the communication between DG2 and DG3 is interrupted, that
is, the communication of DG2 is completely disconnected from other
DGs. At this time, on one hand, for the controller of DG2, the ρ2 in Eq.
( )
∑
(19) changes from j∈N2 a2j X2 − Xj +b2 X2 tob2 X2 , resulting in an
̃ ̃ ̃ ̃
larger error between the estimated attack signal and the real attack
signal (see Fig. 16). On the other hand, the σ2 in error-tolerance term
∑ ( ) ( *
)
(Eq. (30)) changes from j∈N2 a2j X2 − Xj +b2 X2 − R2 I2
Z. Xie and Z. Wu International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 144 (2023) 108599

Fig. 15. Performances of the three control method in case 4.

Fig. 17. Average voltage of the four DGs for the three methods in case 4.

Fig. 16. Observed attack signals of the proposed method in case 4.
( )
tob2 X2 − R*2 I2 . As a result, the attack signals are not completely sup­
pressed. Nevertheless, the fault-tolerant controller plays a stronger role
in attack suppression compared to the standard control method and the
attack-resilient control method (see Fig. 15 (b) and (c)). Compared to the

11
Z. Xie and Z. Wu
Fig. 18. Performances of the proposed method with communication delays.
extremely large fluctuations shown in Fig. 15 (b) and (c), the fault-
tolerant controller presents only small fluctuations in output current,
and the attack signals cause little impact on the system. For DG1, which
can communicate with DG4, the attack signal injected to DG1 can still be
completely suppressed at t = 3 s, thus the system output remains un­
changed. After restoring the communication at t = 4 s, the attack signals
of DG2 can be completely eliminated, then the system achieves global
load sharing accurately again.
Fig. 17 provides the average voltage curves for the three control
methods in case 4. As shown in Fig. 17, the average voltage remains
stable at 100 V even when the system experiences communication in­
terruptions under FDIA, indicating that the proposed control method is
more robust to communication interruptions compared with the other
methods.
4.5. Case 5: Communication delay
This subsection presents a simulation analysis of the performance for
the proposed control method with communication delays. Case 5 is
based on case 1, in which the system has 10 ms and 20 ms communi­
cation delays, respectively, the simulation results are shown in Fig. 18.
As shown in Fig. 18, when the delay is 10 ms, the system output
differs little from that without delay (see Fig. 4 (a)). When the delay is
increased to 20 ms, the system oscillation is more obvious, and the
attack signal is still strongly suppressed despite the slight deviation of
the current sharing.
5. Conclusion
This paper proposes a DESO-based distributed fault-tolerant sec­
ondary control method for DC microgrids, which has a strong ability to
suppress cyber-attacks and can achieve voltage regulation and accurate
current sharing despite suffering cyber attacks. The control problem for
DC microgrid is transformed into a first-order MAS consensus problem.
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International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 144 (2023) 108599
Based on the MAS, a DESO is designed to estimate the attack signals in
each DG. Further, a distributed fault-tolerant secondary controller is
designed to compensate the attack signals. Moreover, the stability ana­
lyses theoretically verify the feasibility of the control method. Simula­
tion analyses of five cases indicate that the proposed control scheme can
effectively suppress cyber-attack signals compared with standard con­
trol and attack-resilient control methods, which can still achieve the
current sharing and voltage regulation objectives under different FDIA
signals. Furthermore, the controller is robust to communication inter­
ruption and communication delay, proving the effectiveness and supe­
riority of the method in DC microgrid.
The controller designed in this paper focuses on the FDIA in actua­
tors, the FDIA in sensors will be to analyzed and studied next step.
Foundation item: supported by the Natural Science Foundation of
Hebei Province (F2020203014).
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Zongkui Xie: Conceptualization, Methodology, Software, Valida­
tion, Writing – original draft. Zhongqiang Wu: Writing – review &
editing, Funding acquisition.
Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
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