Standing Army Master

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NCFL PF – Standing Army
PRO.................................................................................................................................................4
General Deterrence/Diplomacy.................................................................................................5
Multilateral Intervention Best..................................................................................................10
Rapid Deployment....................................................................................................................11
Multiple Conflicts.....................................................................................................................40
Genocide..................................................................................................................................42
Standing Army Stops Genocide............................................................................................43
Genocide Impacts................................................................................................................45
UN Peacekeeping Generally Good............................................................................................52
Multilateralism.........................................................................................................................60
Standing Army Promotes Multilateralism............................................................................61
Multilateralism Good...........................................................................................................62
Human Rights...........................................................................................................................69
Standing Army Strengthens Human Rights..........................................................................70
Human Rights Decreasing Globally......................................................................................71
Human Rights Impacts.........................................................................................................73
Answers to Con Arguments......................................................................................................85
Answers to: US Intervention Bad.........................................................................................86
Answers to: Peacekeeping Fails...........................................................................................87
Answers to: Costs.................................................................................................................90
Answers to: Sexual Assault...................................................................................................92
Answers to: Diplomacy Better..............................................................................................93
Answers to: Need Economic Development, Not Military Activity........................................94
Answers to: Local Public Opposition....................................................................................95
Answers to: Militarism.........................................................................................................96
CON..............................................................................................................................................97
Standing Army Generally Fails..................................................................................................99
Foreign Military Intervention Fails.........................................................................................109
Foreign Military Intervention Generally Fails.....................................................................110
Human Rights.....................................................................................................................116
Africa..................................................................................................................................119
Terrorism, Millions Dead....................................................................................................121
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Answers to: Arguments Don’t Apply to UN Intervention...................................................132

UN Specific.........................................................................................................................133
Impartiality Impact.............................................................................................................135
UN Offensive Military Operations Undermine Humanitarianism.......................................137
Undermines Support for Peacekeeping.............................................................................138
A2: Offensive PKOs Necessary to Stop Rebel Groups.........................................................140
A2: Necessary to Defeat Rebels.........................................................................................141
Kritik Links..............................................................................................................................142
Militarism...........................................................................................................................143
International Law Links......................................................................................................152
Imperialism.............................................................................................................................155
R2P = Genocide (Sudan/Syria)............................................................................................156
R2p Bad: Drone Strikes.......................................................................................................159
R2P = Imperialism..............................................................................................................161
R2P = imperialism: Africa...................................................................................................162
Disadvantages........................................................................................................................165
Spending/Debt Links..........................................................................................................166
Answers to: Peacekeeping is Cheap(er).............................................................................169
Escalation/Great Power War..................................................................................................170
Korea/Middle Force Trade-Off...............................................................................................171
Korea War Risk...................................................................................................................176
Sovereignty.............................................................................................................................177
Standing Army Threatens Sovereignty...............................................................................178
Sovereignty Stops War.......................................................................................................181
Attacking Sovereignty Undermines Human Rights.............................................................184
“Right to Protect (R2P) Generally Bad....................................................................................187
Right to Protect Bad Link....................................................................................................188
R2P Bad: Sovereignty.........................................................................................................189
A2: “R2P Expands Sovereignty”..........................................................................................194
A2: “R2P Doesn’t kill Sovereignty - it’s Preventive”...........................................................195
A2: “Safeguards Protect Sovereignty”................................................................................196
Sovereignty Impact............................................................................................................197
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Answers to Pro Arguments.....................................................................................................198

Multilateralism Answers....................................................................................................199
Answers to: Peacekeeping is Cheap(er).............................................................................200
Answers to: Human Rights Violations Bad.........................................................................201
Answers to: Human Rights as a Value/Criterion................................................................205
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PRO
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General Deterrence/Diplomacy
Growing risk of civil war globally
Walter et al, November 20, 2021, BARBARA F. WALTER is Rohr Professor of International Affairs at the
School of Global Policy & Strategy at the University of California, San Diego. She is the author of How Civil
Wars Start, and How to Stop Them. LISE MORJÉ HOWARD is Professor of Government and Foreign Service
at Georgetown University and President of the Academic Council on the United Nations System. She is the
author of Power in Peacekeeping. V. PAGE FORTNA is Harold Brown Professor of U.S. Foreign and Security
Policy in the Political Science Department at Columbia University. She is the author of Does Peacekeeping
Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices After Civil War., The Astonishing Success of Peacekeeping The UN
Program Deserves More Support—and Less Scorn—From America,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2021-11-29/astonishing-success-peacekeeping
After decades of counterinsurgencies, Americans are wary of military commitments abroad. The
United States, after all, has not had a lot of success in ending many of the conflicts in which it
has intervened. That said, the number of civil wars around the planet is increasing, and like it
or not, the international community will need to become more engaged in trying to stop
internecine conflicts. Thankfully, in United Nations peacekeeping, leaders have a collaborative
and cost-effective tool they can deploy to resolve these conflicts and protect civilians. But to
meet the world’s needs, U.S. policymakers have to provide the UN with more support and
funding. That means they—and the people they represent—must first understand just how
valuable peacekeeping has been.
Lack of a Standing Army slows deployment
Global Governance Monitor, 2015, https://www.cfr.org/global-governance-monitor/#!/armed-

conflict?printId=4342, Issue Brief
Scope of the Challenge
Second, because the United Nations does not maintain its own standing army, it must rely on
prospective troop-contributing countries to supply forces and equipment. Generating a full-
fledged peacekeeping force takes nine to twelve months on average, although deployment
times vary substantially based on political will. For example, upon receiving an expanded
mandate, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon grew fourfold in two months, whereas the UN/AU
Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) took more than three years to reach full deployment. In
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recent years, DPKO has led a campaign to enhance the United Nations’ rapid-deployment
capability, but it has received little support even among those member states with the most
relevant capabilities.
A Standing Army is needed to deter conflicts and force diplomacy
Rothstein, Laurence I. (1993) "PROTECTING THE NEW WORLD ORDER: IT IS TIME TO CREATE A
UNITED NATIONS ARMY," NYLS Journal of International and Comparative Law: Vol. 14 : No. 1 ,
Article 5. Available at:
https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_international_and_comparative_law/vol14/iss1/
It is time to create a United Nations army that can confront present and future crises."' The
provisions already exist in the United Nations Charter for the formation of such an army;
however, the reluctance of the United States continues to prevent such a formation. Yet,
without a United Nations army, the United States quite possibly will be forced to act as the
world's police officer in order to resolve international conflicts, an idea that does not appeal
to most Americans.27 Furthermore, the existence of a United Nations army would allow the
United States to maintain its international commitments at a fraction of the material, energy,
and monetary costs to do it alone.
A truly integrated fighting force capable of projecting United Nations power worldwide cannot
be created overnight. However, NATO represents a successful model to emulate; moreover,
militarily adept nations, such as the United States, could provide equipment, bases, and training
for United Nations forces. While financial, military, and political problems remain to be solved if
a United Nations army is to become an effective tool for preventing and resolving international
conflicts, such concerns should not prevent the formation of such an army. Members should
focus on how a United Nations force should be structured, not on whether it should be created.
A United Nations army will not be a panacea for the world's problems. Some situations may
be unsuitable for United Nations intervention; however, an army would provide the United
Nations with enhanced ability to offer solutions to international crises. By itself, the threat of
armed United Nations intervention may be sufficient to deter aggression or spur efforts to find
diplomatic solutions. The old ways of doing business will not work in the new world order; the
formation of a United Nations army is the next logical step in the evolution of collective
security. For the United Nations to serve as an effective forum for peaceful cooperation among
nations, it must also be the world's police officer when the situation dictates.
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A quickly deployed force is needed to prevent conflict
Gideo Rachman, July 20, 2009, Why the world needs a United Nations army,
https://www.ft.com/content/325b3c42-7558-11de-9ed5-00144feabdc0
Ronald Reagan once asked Mikhail Gorbachev to imagine that there was “suddenly a
threat to this world from some other species, from another planet”. The late American
president speculated that this would ensure “we would forget all the little local differences that
we have between our countries”.
We are still waiting for the Martian invasion that will test Reagan’s theory. But, in the absence of
little green men, it has fallen to Somali pirates to provide the common enemy that unites the
nations of the world. An extraordinary international flotilla is patrolling the waters off Somalia,
in an effort to stop attacks on the 30,000 ships that pass through the Gulf of Aden every year.
Warships from countries as diverse and mutually suspicious as the US, China, Iran and Japan are
policing this crucial international waterway. The largest of three international taskforces is run
by the European Union and commanded by a British admiral operating from a headquarters in
nearby north London. All the various navies, except the Iranians’, co-ordinate their operations at
regular meetings.
But while there really is something like an “international community” at work in the seas off
Somalia, the picture is a lot less impressive on dry land. In the capital, Mogadishu, a 4,600 strong
African Union force is struggling to hold off Islamist insurgents who recently got within half a
mile of the presidential palace.
Both the land and sea operations in Somalia show the need to do some urgent thinking about
international peacekeeping. The naval operation is impressive, but also disjointed. The land
operation is simply inadequate.
In both Somali operations, it would make obvious sense to give the United Nations a bigger role
as the co-ordinator and mobiliser of peacekeeping efforts.
Over the longer term, the growing demand for international peacekeeping forces means that it
is time finally to bite the bullet and give the UN a permanent, standing military capacity.
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The idea of a “UN army” remains deeply controversial. Critics can point to some horrendous
peacekeeping failures. In the 1990s UN forces failed to prevent the Rwandan genocide and the
Srebrenica massacre. More recently, UN-mandated troops were involved in sex crimes in the
Congo. Like many international bureaucracies, the UN is often not a pretty sight when viewed
from close quarters.
Many nations also have understandable qualms about a permanent, multinational military
force, intervening all over the world. The Americans do not put their forces under UN
commanders. It often falls to poorer countries, such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and Indonesia, to
provide most of the troops for UN operations. But they worry that setting up a permanent force
would mean that they would lose the ability to pick and choose which missions they take part in.
Yet the demand for UN peacekeeping forces keeps going up. There are currently 116,000 UN
peacekeepers deployed around the world in 17 different operations – an eightfold increase since
1999. Only the US has more troops deployed around the world than the UN.
Alongside the well-publicised UN peacekeeping failures, there have been many quiet
successes – Cambodia, Namibia, Sierra Leone and Nepal, to name a few. For the west’s over-
stretched armies, international peacekeepers often look like a cheap and attractive option.
Susan Rice, the US ambassador to the UN, says that for every dollar the US spends on an
equivalent military deployment, the UN spends 12 cents. The UN flag also brings a global
legitimacy that a Nato or EU operation cannot muster.
But every time the Security Council votes to deploy peacekeepers, the UN has to appeal for
troops and equipment from scratch. So it usually takes between three months and a year to
deploy a UN force – far too slow, in an emergency such as Somalia.
All of this points to the need to create a proper UN force on permanent stand-by. Such a force
need not be a conventional army, with its own barracks and personnel. It would be better to get
countries to give the UN first call on a certain number of their troops, for a specific period of
time. National sovereignty could still be respected by allowing countries to opt out of missions,
if they inflame national sensitivities.
Creating a permanent UN capability would mean that the UN could intervene much more
quickly. It would also make it more likely that forces assigned to the UN follow the same
military doctrines. It would also help address chronic shortages of equipment. As things stand,
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UN forces often lack the kit they need. The peacekeeping operation in Darfur is hamstrung by
its lack of helicopters, for example.
A shortage of helicopters is particularly ironic, given the chatter in the more paranoid bits of
right-wing America about “black helicopters” from the UN, hovering with intent over the US.
Even perfectly sane American conservatives regard the idea of a permanent UN force with
horror. They might be surprised and enlightened to learn that the hero of the conservative
movement, Ronald Reagan, once spoke approvingly of the idea of “a standing UN force – an
army of conscience – that is fully equipped and prepared to carve out human sanctuaries
through force”. And, of course, to take on the Martians, whenever they finally invade.
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Multilateral Intervention Best

Multilateral interventions avoid backlash
BRYAN FREDERICK, JENNIFER KAVANAGH, STEPHANIE PEZARD, ALEXANDRA STARK, NATHAN

CHANDLER, JAMES HOOBLER, JOOEUN KIM, RAND, 2021, Assessing Trade-Offs in U.S. Military
Intervention Decisions, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4293.html
Interventions taken without international legitimacy can affect U.S. relations with allies and
the U.S. reputation more broadly. Legitimacy can also be vital for avoiding a backlash in the
host nation; such a backlash could undermine the ability of the intervention to achieve its
goals. This concern is most acute for interventions with large numbers of U.S. forces. In other
cases (most notably, those involving humanitarian concerns for which a U.S. or multilateral
intervention might be increasingly expected), it could be that a failure to intervene to prevent
civilian suffering could sap the legitimacy of the United States as a global leader.
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Rapid Deployment
Current deployment authorization takes too long
Once a peacekeeping operation is approved, the campaign to convince members to commit

troops begins." ° It can take between four and six weeks of difficult negotiations before the
United Nations obtains just 700 soldiers.1 °1 Furthermore, the Council must achieve a
consensus as to which nation will command the force. 1 " Logistical and communications
equipment must then be purchased.1 °3 Not surprisingly, it can take between three and six
months to deploy forces, 1 because the United Nations is required to engage in this preliminary
logistical exercise each time it undertakes a new peacekeeping operation." 5 Recently, the UN
forces deployed along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border were delayed for several weeks while awaiting
military observers and vehicles."
Rapid deployment needed to solve conflicts and sustain UN legitimacy
Magnus Lundgren, Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, 2020, Journal of Peace
Research, Only as fast as its troop contributors: Incentives, capabilities, and constraints in the
UN’s peacekeeping response, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022343320940763
The speed with which the UN deploys peacekeepers is critical for the effectiveness and
legitimacy of its peacekeeping operations. Once the Security Council establishes a
peacekeeping operation, every day that passes before troops are fully deployed weighs on the
prospects of success. In cases like Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and Chad, the delayed arrival of UN
peacekeepers undermined, and sometimes derailed, the peace process. The UN’s credibility
and authority suffered, both locally and globally. In other instances, the UN managed to put a
meaningful military presence on the ground within days, increasing its ability to shape the
tactical and political environment. How can we account for this variation in the UN’s response
time? In particular, since any UN peacekeeping force is a composite of troop contributions by
member states, why do some countries deploy their troops faster than others?
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Extant literature does not provide satisfying answers. While the importance of timely
peacekeeping deployment is undisputed, its determinants remain poorly understood. To fill this
gap, we engage in the first systematic, large-N analysis of the factors that affect deployment
speed in UN peacekeeping. We develop a theoretical argument that accounts for variation
across troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and test its observable implications against new data
on the deployment speed of TCCs across 28 UN peacekeeping operations established between
1991 and 2015.
Rapid deployment: Crucial for effectiveness and legitimacy, but poorly understood
While the ultimate success of a UN peacekeeping operation depends on many factors,

including its mandate, resources, and local dynamics (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2008;
Howard, 2008), the speed with which it deploys is a decisive element. Rapidly deployed forces
allow the UN to ‘shape the tactical environment on the ground at the most important, most
fluid moment – that when peace deals have just been struck, or missions just authorized’ (Jones
et al., 2009: 24). The 2015 UN High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations identified
slow deployment as a major problem: ‘When a mission trickles into a highly demanding
environment, it is dangerously exposed on the ground and initial high expectations turn to
disappointment, frustration and anger’ (UN, 2015: 63).
Beyond the success of individual missions, rapid deployment matters for UN legitimacy.
Indifference to a crisis can be blamed on the Security Council, and a resumption of violence may
reflect a myriad of factors over which the UN has little control. By contrast, deployment delays
after the Security Council mandates a mission expose the UN as unable to deliver on its own
objectives. Yet it is not purely the fault of the UN Secretariat. As long as they lack standing
military capacities, international organizations engaged in peacekeeping, including the UN, are
critically dependent on member states contributing troops.
…
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In terms of policy, we suggest that the UN should focus on those TCC characteristics that it can
realistically influence. The UN can do little to change the extent of parliamentary control over
international deployments, which is a matter of domestic jurisdiction. While the UN can engage
with national parliaments to increase awareness of peacekeeping’s importance, its ability to
help governments overcome this domestic constraint is limited. Likewise, it cannot do anything
to affect most mission conditions. By contrast, the organization can enhance TCC incentives for
rapid deployment, including financial ones. While further research would be needed to fully
understand how TCC governments and militaries perceive – and react to – financial incentives,
our results indicate that they are a policy lever available to the UN which may have a real
impact. We recognize the ethical debates surrounding the current division of labor in UN
peacekeeping, where developed countries provide most of the funding but developing states
bear the risk of personnel deployments. Yet as long as this arrangement remains in place, the
UN should pursue solutions to the problem of rapid deployment. When peacekeepers – from
both developed and developing countries – deploy slowly, they are dangerously exposed
during the start-up and may need to stay longer if they miss the initial window of opportunity
to cement peace.
Rapid deployment of forces is needed
Australian Deparmet of Defense, 2000,

https://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_com
mittees?url=jfadt/u_nations/unchap4.pdf, Chapter 4: A United Nations Standing Army
In circumstances of ongoing tension or outright conflict, there is sometimes a need for the UN
to deploy troops rapidly which can be difficult to achieve due to the political, material and
organisational constraints placed on the UN. One reason for this slowness of response is the way
in which the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council is used to prevent
peace operations. But even when the political will exists within the Security Council, it has
proven difficult for 68 the UN to marshal sufficient numbers of troops from willing member
states to conduct peace operations. 4.4 The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade outlines
the need for rapid deployment in the following way: The slow speed of response by both
member states and the United Nations itself in the organisation and deployment of operations
led to a recognised need for a system of rapid deployment for peacekeeping operations. Rapid
deployment includes the "rapid deployment of all resources required in order to sustain UN
operations in the field as well as the means by which they are deployed".1
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Rapid deployment needed to prevent war
H. Peter Langille, MA, PhD, 2000, Conflict Prevention: Options for Rapid Deployment and UN
Standing Forces, https://archive.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/reform/canada2.htm
Fifty-five years after the United Nations was formed, we continue to explore ways to empower
the Organisation. On balance, its record in preventing and resolving violent conflict is
characterised by modest progress; not what it could or should be. Recent efforts to enhance a
UN rapid deployment capability parallel that assessment. One defining moment and opportunity
has already passed in this decade, but in exposing our collective limitations, another arises.
Finally, there is agreement that preventive action, through a combination of conflict
resolution, diplomacy and even prompt deployments, is far more cost-effective than later,
larger efforts. Similarly, many recognise that one essential mechanism for conflict prevention
is a reliable and effective UN rapid deployment capability. Whether these will be lessons
learned and institutionalised or spurned may depend on the extent to which 'we the people'
organise, inform and democratise further efforts. It is time to consider a more inclusive
approach; one that draws on new partnerships to encourage the ideas and approaches essential
for effective political, military and humanitarian responses to complex emergencies.
The rationale underlying recent initiatives to enhance UN rapid deployment capabilities was
very compelling. Frequent delays, vast human suffering and death, diminished credibility,
opportunities lost, escalating costs – just some of the tragic consequences of slow and
inappropriate responses. Unprecedented demand for prompt UN assistance highlighted the
deficiencies of existing arrangements, challenging the Organisation, as well as member states.
Most recognise the UN was denied sufficient resources, as well as appropriate mechanisms with
which to respond. Fortunately, an array of complementary reforms have combined to expand
the options. As expected, there are limitations and competing alternatives, but few easy or
immediate remedies.
International efforts in this endeavour focused primarily on improving peacekeeping. The larger
process involves measures to organise the contributions of member states, as well as the
establishment of basic mechanisms within the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO). Several initiatives are quite promising.
Approximately twenty-seven member states, designated "Friends of Rapid Deployment," co-

operated with the DPKO to secure support for developing a rapidly deployable mission
headquarters (RDMHQ). As well, since 1994 a DPKO team has organised the UN Stand-by
Arrangement System (UNSAS) to expand the quality and quantity of resources that member
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states might provide. To complement this arrangement, the Danish government, in co-operation
with thirteen regular troop contributors, has organised a multinational Stand-by High
Readiness brigade (SHIRBRIG).
SHIRBRIG is improving the tactical foundation by promoting further co-operation in

multilateral planning, establishing training and readiness standards, and furthering the pursuit
of inter-operability. By years end, the void at the operational level within the Secretariat may be
partially filled by a permanent, albeit skeletal, UN rapid deployment mission headquarters. Once
funded and staffed, it will simply enable the prompt co-ordination and control of diverse
missions authorised by the Security Council. At the strategic level, the Security Council has
agreed to provide further consultation with troop contributors [3].
Thus, as the tactical, operational, and strategic foundation is strengthened, participants look for
a corresponding response at the political level. Hopefully, these arrangements will combine to
inspire a higher degree of confidence and commitment among member states. In short, these
various "building blocks" are gradually forming the institutional foundation for future
peacekeeping. Initially, they are likely to circumscribe activity to Chapter VI, albeit, within a
flexible interpretation of peace support operations for complex political emergencies [4].
The efforts of the UN Secretariat, the 'Friends' and member states such as Denmark, Canada,
and the Netherlands were laudable and deserve support. There remain a number of issues,
however, that warrant further effort and scrutiny. This paper explores several initiatives to
enhance a UN rapid deployment capability. It provides an overview of recent proposals,
considers the progress within DPKO and the related efforts of Friends of Rapid Deployment, and
it identifies the potential limitations of the new arrangements. To activate and revitalise support
for further measures, it points to the need for a new 'soft power' approach. Finally, a vision-
oriented, cumulative development process is proposed as a means to expand on this
foundation.
How are we to assess such initiatives? Within the Secretariat, one focus is on reducing response
times [5]. Other considerations must address whether these measures, when combined,
contribute to:
providing a widely-valued service;
increasing confidence in the UN's capacity to plan, manage, deploy, and support at short notice;
alleviating the primary worries of potential troop contributors and other member states;
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generating wider political will and adequate financing;
encouraging broad participation;
ensuring sufficient multidimensional and multifunctional elements for modern conflict

prevention and management;
enhancing the training, preparation, and overall competence of potential participants; and
instilling a unity of purpose and effort among the various participants.[6]
We must also ask whether the measures under way are sufficient to build an effective and
reliable UN capability. Are these initial efforts likely to build a solid foundation with the capacity
for modernisation and expansion? Alternatively, is there a risk of being locked into another ad
hoc, conditional system requiring last-minute political approval and improvisation prior to each
mission? Can we identify national defence reforms that would complement UN rapid
deployment and conflict prevention? At the dawn of a new millennium, the question also arises
as to what additional measures will be necessary to institutionalise and consolidate a dedicated
UN standing capability?
BACKGROUND
Since the release in 1992 of former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's An Agenda for Peace,
there has been a wide-ranging discussion of the UN's options for responding to violent conflict
[7]. Among the various catalysts for the debate were the Secretary-General's call for peace
enforcement units and Article 43-type arrangements, as well as Sir Brian Urquhart's efforts to
revive Trygvie Lie's proposal for a UN Legion [8]. As these ideas began to attract a constituency,
they also generated apprehension and a search for less ambitious options in many national
capitals.
Opinion on the subject of any UN capability is always mixed. The debate here tended to follow
two perspectives: the "practitioners" who favoured strengthening current arrangements, and
the "visionaries" who desired a dedicated UN standing force or standing emergency capability
[9]. With notable exceptions, the official preference focused on pragmatic, incremental reform
within the structure of the UN Secretariat and available resources [10]. The latter was also
assumed to entail fewer risks, fewer obligations and more control.
In the early years of the decade, there were promising indications of support for some form of
UN rapid reaction force [11]. The need for a new instrument was widely recognised in the
aftermath of Bosnia, Somalia and the failure to avert the Rwandan genocide. Regrettably, few
governments were willing to back their rhetoric with meaningful reform. Prior commitments
tended to be followed by carefully nuanced retractions [12]. There were exceptions, notably
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among middle-power, regular UN troop contributors. Yet, even supportive governments were
worried about moving ahead of public opinion, fellow member states, the international defence
community and their own capacity to secure more ambitious reforms.
National Studies
Prior to the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, the Netherlands, Canada, and Denmark
commenced studies and consultative processes to develop options for a UN rapid reaction
capability. These studies were followed by concerted diplomatic efforts to organise a wider
coalition of member states and secure the co-operation of the UN Secretariat. These initiatives
were instrumental, first, in narrowing the range of short-term options - allaying official fears of a
potentially large and expensive supra-national intervention force - and second, in informing
others as to how they might best contribute to the process.
The Netherlands Study
In 1994, the Netherlands began to explore the possibility of creating a permanent, rapidly
deployable brigade at the service of the United Nations Security Council. A team of experts
conducted the study, and an international conference was convened to review their initial
report. They then released The Netherlands Non-Paper, "A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade: A
Preliminary Study," which identified a critical void in the UN peacekeeping system. If a crisis
were not to escalate into widespread violence, they argued it could only be met by dedicated
units that were instantly deployable: "the sooner an international 'fire brigade' can turn out, the
better the chance that the situation can be contained" [13].
The focus, the Dutch stressed, should not be on the further development of the UN Standby
Arrangements System[14] so much as a military force along the lines advocated by Robert
Johansen[15] and Brian Urquhart[16] - a permanent, rapidly deployable brigade that would
guarantee the immediate availability of troops when they were urgently needed. The brigade
would complement existing components in the field of peacekeeping and crisis management. Its
chief value would be as a 'stop-gap' measure when a crisis was imminent[17], and its
deployments would be of strictly limited duration. The brigade's tasks would include preventive
action, peacekeeping during the interval between a Security Council decision and the arrival of
an international peacekeeping force, and deployment in emergency humanitarian
situations[18]. The annual cost of a 5,000-person brigade was projected at approximately $300
million US, the initial procurement of its equipment at $500-550 million [19]. "Adoption" of the
brigade by one or more member states or by an existing organisation such as NATO was
recommended as a means of reducing the expenses of basing, transportation, and equipment
acquisition.[20]
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The non-paper succeeded in stimulating an international exchange of views. It was clear,

however, that only a less binding, less ambitious arrangement would be acceptable, at least for
the immediate future. A few member states were supportive of the Dutch initiative, but the
majority were opposed to any standing UN force, and even the modest expenditures outlined.
The Canadian Study
In September 1995, the Government of Canada presented the UN with a study entitled, Towards
a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations[21], with twenty-one recommendations to
close the UN's capability gap in the short to mid term [22]. The report also offered five
recommendations to stimulate further research and development over the long term.[23]
After establishing the need for a rapid reaction capability [24], the report examined a number of
principles such as reliability, quality, and cost-effectiveness[25] before identifying the primary
components of such forces in France, the United States, and NATO [26]. Among the elements
deemed necessary were an early warning mechanism, an effective decision-making process,
reliable transportation and infrastructure, logistical support, sufficient finances, and well-trained
and equipped personnel. The UN system was then evaluated with respect to these
requirements.[27]
A range of problems spanning the political[28], strategic[29], operational, and tactical levels
were identified and addressed. The intent was to "create an integrated model for rapid reaction
from decision-making at the highest level to the deployment of tactical levels in the field"[30].
The report made a case for building on existing arrangements to improve the broader range of
peacekeeping activities.
At the operational level, however, the UN suffered a dearth of related capabilities. Several new
mechanisms were imperative, including a permanent operational-level rapid reaction
headquarters.[31] This multinational group of thirty to fifty personnel, augmented in times of
crisis, would conduct contingency planning and rapid deployment as authorised by the Security
Council. The headquarters would have a civil affairs branch and links to related agencies, non-
governmental and regional organisations.[32] Aside from liaison and planning, it was to be
tasked to an array of training objectives.
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The vanguard concept was highlighted as "the most crucial innovation in the UN's peace support
operations over the next few years."[33] It would "link the operational level headquarters with
tactical elements provided by Member States to the Secretary-General through the standby
arrangements system."[34] It entailed identifying national 'vanguard component groups' that
might be called upon as needed by the operational-level headquarters.[35] These forces would
remain in their home countries under the command of national authorities until they were
notified by the Secretary-General and authorised to deploy by their own national government.
The Canadian study reaffirmed "broad support for the general directions of the Secretary-
General and the UN Secretariat in building its peace operations capability for the future."[36]
Recommendations were refined to appeal to a broad range of supportive member states. This
would be an inclusive, co-operative building process with the objective of developing a unity of
both purpose and effort. Charter reform would be unnecessary, nor would there be additional
expenses for the organisation. In many respects, it was a compelling case for pragmatic,
realisable change within the short to medium term. "Clearly, " the report cautioned, "the first
step is to implement these ideas before embarking upon more far-reaching schemes which may
in the end prove unnecessary."[37]
The Danish-led Multinational Study
In January 1995, the Danish government announced that it would be approaching a number of
nations for support in establishing a working group to develop a UN Stand-by Forces High
Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG).[38] Thirteen member states with extensive experience in
peacekeeping agreed to explore the option of a rapid deployment force within the framework of
the UN's Stand-by Arrangement System.[39]
The guiding assumption of the study was that a number of countries could, "by forming an
affiliation between appropriate contributions to the [UNSAS], make a pre-established,
multinational UN Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade available to the United Nations,
thus providing a rapid deployment capability for deployments of a limited duration."[40] It
noted that the brigade should be reserved solely for providing an effective presence at short
notice, and solely for peacekeeping operations, including humanitarian tasks.[41] National units
would be required on fifteen to thirty days notice and be sustainable for 180 days. Standardised
training and operating procedures, familiar equipment, and joint exercises, it was felt, would
speed up national decision-making processes in times of crisis, as would the fact that the
operating conditions for troop contributors would be understood in advance. Moreover, with an
agreed focus on being "first in" and "first out," participants would have some assurance of the
limited duration of their deployment.
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Agreement would still be required from individual participating nations. To address the concerns
of countries that might have reservations over a particular operation, a relatively broad pool of
participants would provide sufficient redundancy among units.[42] States could, therefore,
abstain from an operation without jeopardising the brigade's deployment.
As proposed, SHIRBRIG was to provide the United Nations with immediate access to a versatile
force comprising a balance of peacekeeping capabilities, thus overcoming a primary impediment
to rapid reaction. The proposal soon attracted a supportive constituency within the UN
Secretariat and among regular troop contributors, including Canada and the Netherlands. The
Canadian study, similarly, generated considerable enthusiasm among member states.[43] Owing
to its comprehensive approach, the UN MILAD, Major-General Frank van Kappen, referred to
the Canadian study as the "red wine that linked the other studies together."[44]
It is noteworthy that these three national studies were not viewed as mutually exclusive but as
compatible by their respective Foreign Ministers.[45] In 1995, UN Under Secretary-General for
Peacekeeping, Ismail Kittani, categorised them under "(a) what the UN can do now, (b) what
member states can do, and (c) what is still in the future."[46]
Corresponding Developments
The Friends of Rapid Deployment (FORD)
On the occasion of the United Nations' fiftieth anniversary, Canadian Foreign Minister, Andre'
Ouellet and his counterpart from the Netherlands, Hans Van Mierlo, organised a Ministerial
meeting to generate political support for enhancing UN rapid deployment capabilities.[47] To
promote the initiative, especially among the major powers, Canada and the Netherlands
announced the creation of an informal group called the "Friends of Rapid Reaction", co-chaired
by the Canadian and Dutch Permanent representatives in New York. Although they used the
Canadian study as a baseline for their discussions, they agreed that this would henceforth be a
multinational effort.[48] As a Canadian briefing paper on the status of the initiative
acknowledges, "...the recommendations that are being implemented are, therefore, no longer
just Canadian, but part of discussions and input from many different nations world-wide."[49]
Indeed, by the fall of 1996, the group had expanded to include Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan,
Jordan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Senegal, South
Korea, Sweden, Ukraine, and Zambia. The Friends also succeeded in attracting the co-operation
of the UN Secretariat, particularly officials in DPKO.
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Initially, they concentrated on building the base of support for an operational-level

headquarters, expanding standby arrangements and explaining the vanguard concept. As it
became apparent that the Danish proposal included many of the objectives of the vanguard
concept, and the technical details had already been researched and agreed upon through an
extensive multinational study, interest in the vanguard concept was superseded by a wider
interest in the SHIRBRIG model.[50]
The Friend's efforts in 1996 continued to focus on improving the Stand-by Arrangements
System, but they also began to assist DPKO in implementing the Rapidly Deployable Mission
Headquarters. A number of technical working groups were established to refine plans and
proposals to improve logistics, administration, financing, sustainability and strategic lift.[51]
Despite having secured a relatively broad base of international support, it is apparent that the
consultative process of the 'Friends' could have been more thorough. Several representatives of
the non-aligned movement, including a few of the larger troop-contributing member states,
were annoyed at having been excluded. In October 1996, for example, Pakistani ambassador
Ahmad Kamal said that he "supported the concept of a rapid deployment headquarters team
but was concerned at the action of a self-appointed group of 'Friends of Rapid Reaction'
operating without legitimacy, and having half-baked ideas developed without broad
consultations with the countries most concerned".[52] In turn, the Friends' agenda would be
delayed as some members of the non-aligned movement (NAM) challenged specific
arrangements. As the NAM included 132 member states, they had the potential to stem further
progress.
However, efforts to develop a UN rapid deployment capability were not confined solely to the
'Friends'. Britain, France and the United States were working on improving the peacekeeping
capabilities of numerous African member states. Italy and Argentina were promoting the
creation of a rapid response capability for humanitarian purposes.
The United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, otherwise known as the
Committee of 34, also continued to meet each spring to consider new requirements and
forward related recommendations to the wider membership through the General Assembly. In
1996, the Committee was composed of 36 member states with 57 additional member states
attending in observer status. Although the Committee hardly represents a vanguard of new
thinking on peacekeeping, it provides an important consultative forum for discussing proposals
and generating the base of consensus necessary to implement changes.[53] Rapid deployment
featured prominently in their recent reports with strong endorsements of both standby
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arrangements and the rapid deployment mission headquarters.[54] Concerns would

subsequently arise over equitable representation in the RDMHQ and the wider use of gratis
personnel within DPKO. Some member states were also initially reluctant to support the
SHIRBRIG on the grounds that it appeared to be an exclusive coalition that had no authority to
present their arrangement as a 'UN' brigade.[55]
Senior officials from within the Secretariat participate in the discussions of the Special
Committee on Peacekeeping, as well as in the former meetings of the Friends of Rapid
Deployment. These were co-operative endeavours. After the first meeting of Foreign Ministers
to establish the 'Friends', it was reported that "what was most important to Kofi Annan was an
implementation plan, where the proposals of various countries could be structured into
achievable pieces and pushed to a useful conclusion."[56] The UN Secretariat, particularly the
DPKO, were already committed to the process of implementing related measures and they
needed help.
DPKO and the UN Secretariat
Despite a persistent shortage of personnel and funds, there have been numerous heartening
changes within the UN Secretariat over the past eight years.[57] In 1992, for example, the office
responsible for peacekeeping was reorganised as the Department for Peace-keeping Operations
(DPKO) in order to improve the capacity to plan, conduct and manage operations. This
restructuring served to co-locate, and co-ordinate, within one department, the political,
operational, logistics, civil police, de-mining, training, personnel and administrative aspects of
peace-keeping operations. A Situation Centre was established within DPKO in May 1993, to
maintain round-the-clock communications with the field and provide information necessary to
missions and troop contributors. At the same time, a Civilian Police Unit was developed in
DPKO's Office of Planning and Support, assuming responsibility for all matters affecting civilian
police in peacekeeping operations.
A Training Unit was established in DPKO in June 1993 to increase the availability of trained
military and civilian personnel for timely deployment.[58] In 1994, the DPKO established the
Mission Planning Service (MPS) for the detailed planning and co-ordination of complex
operations.[59] To enhance analysis, evaluation and institutional memory, the Lessons Learned
Unit was instituted in early 1995. To improve logistics, especially in the start-up phase of an
operation, the Field Administrative and Logistics Division was incorporated into DPKO. Approval
was given to utilise the Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy as a centre for the management of
peacekeeping assets. Aside from maintaining an inventory of UN material, it is to oversee the
stockpiling and delivery of supplies and equipment for missions. Mission Start-up Kits will also
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be assembled at the Logistics Base. Despite limited financial and personnel resources, DPKO
achieved a professional level of planning and co-ordination across a challenging spectrum of
tasks.
The development of a rapid deployment mission headquarters and the expansion of the UN
Standby Arrangement System are themselves part of a larger process to improve the UN's
capacity to promptly manage increasingly complex operations. Rapid reaction was a prominent
theme within the former UN Secretary-General's 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace.[60]
He cautioned that problems had become steadily more serious with respect to the availability of
troops and equipment.[61] Although Boutros-Ghali repeated his support for a UN rapid reaction
force, he did not endorse the development of a permanent UN standing force. On several
occasions he stipulated that the answer was not to create a UN standing force, which he
described as being "impractical and inappropriate."[62] This hesitancy should, however, be
understood within the context of his having received little support for his earlier attempt to
generate peace enforcement units and even less enthusiasm for negotiating Article 43 type
agreements. In response to the 1995 "Supplement", the President of the Security Council
indicated that, "all interested Member States were invited by the Council to present further
reflections on United Nations peace-keeping operations, and in particular on ways and means to
improve the capacity of the United Nations for rapid deployment."[63] The Security Council also
narrowed the range of options, expressing its concern that the first priority in improving the
capacity for rapid deployment should be the further enhancement of the existing standby
arrangements.[64] Nothing was explicitly rejected, but the short-term priority was clearly stand-
by rather than a standing force.[65] In December, UN Secretary-General Elect, Kofi Annan,
reflected these concerns stating that:
I don't think we can have a standing United Nations army. The membership is not ready for that.
There are financial questions and great legal issues as to which laws would apply and where it
would be stationed. But short of having a standing United Nations army, we have taken
initiatives that will perhaps help us achieve what we were hoping to get out of a standing army.
The real problem has been rapidity of deployment. We are now encouraging governments to set
up rapidly deployable brigades and battalions that could be moved into a theater very quickly,
should the governments decide to participate in peacekeeping operations.[66]
In the short term, it appeared the UN Standby Arrangement System was to be the foundation,
upon which much of the potential for rapid deployment would depend.
United Nations Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS)

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In 1993, Boutros-Ghali identified the need for a system of Standby Arrangements to secure the
personnel and material resources required for peacekeeping.[67] This system was specifically
intended to improve the capability for rapid deployment. The Standby Arrangements system
(UNSAS) is based on conditional commitments from Member States of specified resources that
could be made available within agreed response times. The resources range from military units,
individual civilian, military and police personnel to specialised services, equipment and other
capabilities.[68]
UNSAS serves several objectives. First, it provides the UN with a precise understanding of the
forces and other capabilities a member state will have available at an agreed state of readiness.
Second, it facilitates planning, training and preparation for both participating Member states
and the UN. Third, it provides the UN not only with foreknowledge of a range of national assets,
but also a list of potential options if a member or members refrain from participating in an
operation. Finally, although the arrangements are only conditional, it is hoped that those
members who have confirmed their willingness to provide standby resources will be more
forthcoming and committed than might otherwise be the case. In short, UNSAS provides an
initial commitment to service, and a better advance understanding of the requirements, but is in
no way a binding obligation.
In 1994, a Standby Arrangements Management Team was established within DPKO to identify
the UN requirements in peacekeeping operations, establish readiness standards, negotiate with
potential participants, establish a data base of resources, and assist in mission planning. They
also reformed procedures for determining re-imbursement of member's contingent-owned
equipment. Progress to date is encouraging.
By September of 1999, eighty-six member states had confirmed their willingness to provide
standby resources, representing a total of 147,500 personnel that could, in principle, be called
on.[69] The majority of states also provided detailed information on their specific capabilities.
[70] Response times were registered according to the declared national capabilities. Resources
were divided into four groups on the basis of their potential. Earlier reports suggested the
majority (58%) of the overall pool fall into the first two categories of (1) up to 30 days, and (2)
between 30 and 60 days.[71] In other words, the UN has a conditional commitment of over
50,000 personnel on standby assumed to be capable of rapid deployment. While UNSAS cannot
guarantee reliable response, UN planners now have the option of developing contingency and
'fall-back' strategies when they anticipate delays. Member states are also more familiar with the
system and with what they are expected to contribute. This has increased confidence and, as
the numbers infer, a willingness to participate. In the words of one senior DPKO official, "this is
now the maximum feasible option."
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Some mission success has been partially attributed to UNSAS.[72] The former Secretary-General
wisely cautioned, however, that while national readiness is a necessary pre-requisite, it does not
in itself, give the UN a capacity for rapid deployment.[73] Several limitations remain. For
example, many participants lack a capacity to provide their own support functions. The
Organisation is still confronted with shortages in a number of critical areas, including
headquarters support, communications, and both sea and air transport.
United Nations Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters (RDMHQ)
As a complement to the UN Standby Arrangement System, the Secretary-General decided to

pursue the Canadian proposal to create a rapidly deployable mission headquarters (RDMHQ).
[74] This is a multidimensional core headquarters unit of military and civilian personnel tasked
to assist rapid deployment and manage the initial phases of a peacekeeping operation.[75] The
RDMHQ is designed as an operational unit with a tactical planning function.[76]
Owing to budgetary constraints, the RDMHQ is officially described as the 'skeleton' of a mission
headquarters. Once financing is approved, eight individuals are to be assigned to the RDMHQ on
a full-time basis including its Chief of Staff and specialists in fields such as operations, logistics,
engineering and civilian police. They are to be based in New York. The UN has received approval
for their deployment into a mission area without further authorisation at the national level.
Aside from the 8 full-time staff, an additional 24 personnel are to remain earmarked in their
home countries until required for training or deployment. Twenty-nine personnel in the
Secretariat are also to be double-tasked and assigned to the RDMHQ, but will continue with
their regular assignments until needed.[77] This initial team of 61 personnel is to co-ordinate
rapid deployment and manage an operational-level headquarters, even in missions with the
broadest, multidisciplinary mandates. Once deployed this headquarters is to be in a mission
area for three to six months pending the arrival of and transition to a normal headquarters.
Major-General Frank Van Kappen, has detailed the five primary tasks of the RDMHQ:
translating the concept of operations prepared by the mission planning service into tactical sub-
plans;
developing and implementing RDMHQ preparedness and training activities; providing advice to
the Head of Mission for decision-making and co-ordination purposes;
establishing an administrative infrastructure for the mission;

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providing, during the early stages of the operation, essential liaison with the parties;
working with incoming mission headquarters personnel to ensure that, as the operation grows
to its full size and complexity, unity of effort to implement the Security Council mandate is
maintained.[78]
The Friends Group has stipulated that the RDMHQ will require the following capabilities:
a. It must be deployable at very short notice.
b. It should be able to deploy for up to six months.
c. It should provide initially the nucleus of a headquarters for a new PKO.
d. It must be integrated into DPKO as a core function in order to retain its interoperability with
the UN headquarters in New York.
e. It must be capable of undertaking technical reconnaissance missions prior to deployment.
f. It must have undertaken operational deployment preparations prior to its commitment. This
must include such things as the production of Standard Operating Procedures and the
completion of pre-deployment training.[79]
When the RDMHQ was initially proposed, it attracted broad support in the UN Secretariat. In
welcoming the proposal, Boutros-Ghali stated that the idea fostered a "culture of prevention"
and that, "even if it will not be used it is a kind of dissuasion."[80] However, recruitment and
staffing of this headquarters was far more controversial than initially anticipated. Only 2 posts
have been established to date.[81] The remaining six positions were approved in the fall of
1999, but without the additional funding required. The RDMHQ is not operational but there are
hopes it will be within the year.
SHIRBRIG
The Danish-led initiative to develop a Multinational United Nations Standby Forces High
Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) will complement the UNSAS with a complete, integrated unit that
has a projected response time of 15-30 days. As proposed, the SHIRBRIG is to consist of 4,000-
5,000 troops, comprising a headquarters unit, infantry battalions, and reconnaissance units, as
well as engineering and logistical support. The brigade is to be self-sustaining in deployments of
up to six months' duration and capable of self-defence.[82]
On December 15, 1996, seven countries signed a letter of intent to co-operate in establishing
and maintaining this high readiness brigade.[83] This initial group has expanded, as have the
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number of members providing a commitment to the actual brigade pool.[84] A steering

committee and a permanent planning element are in place, as are arrangements for its
operational headquarters and logistics. SHIRBRIG has been declared 'available'. The objective,
and the basis for co-operation, is to provide the UN with a well-trained, cohesive
multinational force to be deployed in Chapter VI operations mandated by the Security Council
and with the consent of the parties."[85] Participants would thus have a mutual understanding
of their combined capabilities, as well as their specific roles and requirements:
This would enhance the efficiency of a possible deployment and would enhance the safety of
the troops when deployed. Common procedures and interoperability would be developed to
allow for better operational planning, to insure common assessment of the operational
requirements, optimise movement planning and reduce costs.[86]
Co-operation is clearly more cost-effective as participants have the option to pursue functional
role specialisation in a coherent division of labour and resources. For example, rather than
carrying a long independent national logistics train, such a task can be either shared or selected
by one participant as their contribution.
SHIRBRIG also offers a cost-efficient model that is likely to be emulated elsewhere. As Danish
officials informed the Friends Group, "the conceptual work done so far on the establishment of
a multinational UN [SHIRBRIG] carries a relevance far beyond the group of nations participating
in the present project. The concept could inspire other groups of nations to take a similar
initiative."
Current Status: Modest Success In The Short Term
In five years, efforts to develop a UN rapid deployment capability have initiated changes at the
political, strategic, operational and tactical levels. More countries are participating in the UNSAS,
a significant proportion at a high level of readiness. The SHIRBRIG attracted additional
participants and a sufficient brigade pool. As noted, it is now declared to be available. It has also
attracted wider interest and a variation on the model is being considered in several other
regions.[87] With relatively modest funding, the UNRDMHQ could provide the nucleus of an
operational-level headquarters to assist in the planning and establishment of operations world-
wide. Contingency planning is underway. Plans have reflected the need for diverse
multidimensional participation in both the headquarters and among field-deployable elements.
Training is gradually improving with the support of DPKO and national peacekeeping training
centres. Participants have developed a better understanding of the various requirements, and
many are increasingly confident of their ability to contribute. Partnership agreements are being
encouraged to help ensure wider regional representation and competence. Improving the wider
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unity of effort and purpose is on the agenda of national civilian and military elements, NGOs,
and the UN. Some member states and their defence establishments acknowledge marked
progress in DPKO's planning and management of recent operations. This new level of
professionalism may gradually inspire wider hopes and confidence.
In hindsight, one could argue there were good reasons for developing this UN capability in the
context of prevailing practices, resources and structures. Considering the impediments of
limited political will, insufficient funding, and overworked personnel answerable to 185 bosses
with divergent interests, the progress to date should not be under-estimated. Moreover, it was
attained in the absence of powerful national champions, and most observers recognise that the
larger UN system is not altogether amenable to rapid modernisation. Some officials assume that
the task is well underway, with seventy-three per cent of the recommendations either
accomplished or in the process of being implemented. As early as 1996 a Canadian briefing
paper noted that, "between the Group of Friends and the initiative of the Secretariat, 19 of the
26 recommendations have been acted upon in the past nine months.[88] In the same year, Kofi
Annan claimed that the lead-time of the UN's rapid deployment capabilities would be reduced
by 50 per cent during the next two years.[89]
Nevertheless, one might argue that these arrangements reflect the pursuit of agreement only
slightly above the level of the lowest common denominator. The context placed a priority on
modest short-to-mid term changes that could be promoted among diverse states without major
controversy, major funding or major national contributions. Few can be heralded as visionary,
courageous gestures that correspond to the wider human and global security challenges of the
next millennium. It remains to be seen whether these arrangements will attract a broad
constituency of support. Few efforts were made, moreover, to build a coalition among NGOs,
related agencies and the interested public, effectively limiting the leverage and political pressure
that would be needed to launch further reforms.
Hans van Merlo, co-chair of the Friends of Rapid Deployment, acknowledged that progress has
been modest; "that given the complexities, this is going to be an incremental process, but one
where we cannot afford to let up."[90] Regrettably, some initiatives were deliberately stymied.
For example, despite the Secretary-General's authorisation to establish the RDMHQ, Pakistan
succeeded in mobilising wider resistance to this development.[91] In 1998, Cuba denied
approval of the necessary funding for RDMHQ staff in the accounts and budgetary committee
(ACABQ). Unfortunately, controversy and political opposition have also diminished the
momentum of the 'Friends' and, to a lesser extent, the Secretariat. The 'Friends' have yet to
decide whether they will re-convene. They did not meet in 1998 or 1999. There are concerns
that ideas emanating from this group will be actively opposed. In response, some diplomats
believe that the only remaining option is to leave rapid deployment to the UN Secretariat; that a
restructuring from within may gradually occur on the basis of pragmatic evaluations and lessons
learned. However, due to budgetary constraints and the elimination of all gratis personnel,
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DPKO suffered the loss of numerous professionals and numerous key positions.[92] With fewer
staff and fewer resources, DPKO claims it has retained a critical mass, but it may now be
incapable of managing additional responsibilities. Moreover, given the recent intransigence of
the Security Council, Secretary-General Kofi Annan has had insufficient support to encourage the
process. Clearly, the wider initiative has reached a political impasse. There is little indication that
further initiatives, or even incremental steps, are being actively pursued. Yet the larger task is
far from finished.
Potential Limitations
If rapid reaction is a demanding concept, it is an even more difficult reality to achieve. The
Organisation must be sure of each critical element in the process. Missing components and
conditional agreements can only lead to delays. It may be wise, therefore, to temper our
expectations by acknowledging some inherent problems.
Standby arrangements for nationally-based units do not provide an assurance of their

immediate availability. As the former Secretary-General acknowledged in 1995, "a considerable
effort has been made to expand and refine standby arrangements, but these provide no
guarantee that troops will be provided for a specific operation."[93] He noted further that "the
value of the arrangement would of course depend on how far the Security Council could be sure
that the force would actually be available in an emergency."[94] With respect to UNSAS, there
are few, if any, certainties. The promptness with which national contingents are provided will
depend on the discretion of participating member states, the risks perceived, and the level of
interests at stake.[95]
Reliability will be a key determinant of rapid deployment. In the case of UNSAS, there is no
assurance that the political will exists. Critics frequently point to the refusal of member states to
provide adequate forces to avert the 1994 catastrophe in Rwanda. Not one of the nineteen
governments that had undertaken to have troops on standby for UN peacekeeping agreed to
contribute to the UNAMIR mission under these arrangements.[96] Proponents of UNSAS now
have grounds to argue that the system has been expanded and improved, but commitment to
the system will have to be far more comprehensive and binding if it is to succeed. The onus is
now clearly on member states to demonstrate the viability of this system.
Once approved for deployment, standby units will have to stage independently and assemble in-
theatre. For some, this will be their first experience working together, and it will likely occur
under conditions of extreme stress. Some military establishments are reluctant to acknowledge
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the need for prior training of their personnel beyond a general combat capability. Thus, high
standards of cohesiveness and interoperability will be difficult to assure in advance. Moreover,
the UN will continue to confront the complex task of co-ordinating lift capabilities for
participating elements across the world. This, too, can only slow deployment. Logistics and
sustainment arrangements are gradually improving, but the UN is still coming to grips with the
challenge of supplying different national contingents with a wide range of equipment.
A UN RDMHQ of some sixty-one personnel could provide the necessary impetus for developing
and co-ordinating headquarters arrangements, but there are legitimate doubts about its ability
to fulfil its five primary tasks in any period of intense activity where it may face multiple
operations. Even in its full composition, it is still only the shell of an operational mission
headquarters. As presently constituted, it is best seen as a necessary improvisation, an
arrangement that may need to be rapidly augmented.
Current plans entail a multidimensional RDMHQ of both civilian and military personnel. This is to
be encouraged, as it has grown out of the requirement to address the diverse needs of people in
desperate circumstances. SHIRBRIG, however, is a purely military force. While this facilitated the
brigade's organisation, planners would be wise to expand its composition with civilians in both
planning and deployable elements. For there are limitations to what military force alone can
achieve. To secure respect, legitimacy, and consent (i.e., host nation approval) it is increasingly
important, even in rapid deployment, to provide a broader range of incentives and services in
the initial stages of a UN operation.
In sum, while current efforts are definitely helpful, additional arrangements will be necessary to
provide reliable and effective responses to increasingly complex conflicts.
Possible Roles
There are numerous potential tasks for a UN rapid deployment capability. Roles and
responsibilities for specific missions will vary with Security Council mandates, of course, and
much will depend on what is provided and on what terms. Expectations vary considerably over
the tasks that should be incorporated into planning.
Many officials propose that any rapid deployment capability should assume responsibility for
the initial stages of a peacekeeping mission. Deployable elements will be the first in to establish
security, headquarters, and services, and then the first out, to be replaced by regular
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peacekeeping contingents within four to six months. Such a capability is also seen as the
preferred instrument for preventive deployment.[97] Moreover, as the effectiveness of any UN
rapid deployment capability will diminish once a conflict has escalated to open warfare, there is
a case to be made for restricting its early use to proactive and preventive measures. If it is to
succeed in stemming imminent crises, an enduring emphasis will have to be accorded to
flexibility and mobility. In 1995, Sir Brian Urquhart outlined the following range of potential
roles:
to provide a UN presence in the crisis area immediately after the Security Council has decided it
should be involved;
to prevent violence from escalating;
to assist, monitor, and otherwise facilitate a cease-fire;
to provide the emergency framework for UN efforts to resolve the conflict and commence
negotiations;
to secure a base, communications, and airfield for a subsequent UN force;
to provide safe areas for persons and groups whose lives are threatened by the conflict;
to secure humanitarian relief operations; and
to assess the situation and provide first-hand information for the Security Council so that an
informed decision can be made on the utility and feasibility of further UN involvement.[98]
Urquhart expressed support for a new standing UN capability in which the "rules of engagement
and for the use of force will be different from either peacekeeping or enforcement actions."
Flexibility was a prerequisite: the force "will be trained in peacekeeping and problem-solving
techniques but will also have the training, expertise and esprit de corps to pursue those tasks in
difficult, and even violent circumstances."[99] Indeed, such a mechanism can be more easily
justified if it can provide a cost-effective and timely response to an array of challenges.
The confusion emanating from discussions of what a rapid deployment capability is intended for
stems partly from two distinct but complementary objectives.[100] Initial interest in developing
a rapid-deployment capability was premised on the need to improve peacekeeping. But
expectations were also raised at the prospect of a mechanism which would be capable of
prompt, decisive responses to desperate situations; even those which necessitated
humanitarian intervention and limited enforcement. In the near term, these latter hopes may
not be fulfilled. It should be acknowledged that there are also far more ambitious objectives
similar to those outlined in the UN Charter, including the gradual development of a collective
security system that facilitates a wider process of disarmament.
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However, as we begin to understand the need for increasingly flexible options and a wider array
of instruments, the range of choice appears to have narrowed. UNSAS stipulates that the
resources are to be used exclusively for peacekeeping.[101] Similarly, the RDMHQ and SHIRBRIG
are also strictly for Chapter VI operations. While this may attract initial support, it may entail
political and operational constraints. In cases involving extreme violations of human rights,
including genocide, the UN may be unable to intervene rapidly if the situation demands a
mandate beyond peacekeeping. Strict adherence to Chapter VI, could diminish the wider
deterrent effect, as well as its capacity for dissuasion.
The prospects for preventive deployment in the critical early stages of a conflict may be
impeded by delays in arranging the consent of various factions or agreement among
contributors. The experience of the past decade suggests that even supportive member states
are inclined to "wait and watch" as they assess the risks, the costs, and the conditions for
participation. Incipient distant crises seldom present the images or the political pressure
necessary to mobilise governments into preventive action.
This dilemma may be partially resolved with the 'wider' interpretation accorded to peace
support operations. Over the past five years, this has become an increasingly sophisticated
exercise combining positive incentives with coercive inducement strategies. Kofi Annan suggests
UN operations will continue to evolve and expand with two main tasks: first, suppressing
violence with a credible coercive capacity, the purpose of which is to intimidate recalcitrants
into co-operating; and second, assisting the parties toward reconciliation with the provision of
rewards in the mission area, including what the military refers to as "civic action," as well as
broader peace incentives.[102] Expanded multidimensional operations entailed some of the
more robust tools associated with limited enforcement, as well as broader peacebuilding
services. Security Council mandates for Chapter VI operations began to acknowledge these
wider requirements and DPKO has demonstrated its capacity to provide sound guidance and
planning. An array of expanded tasks may be accommodated within Chapter VI, but these and
others that require immediate preventive action will continue to challenge both the UN and its
member states. Neither will be able to escape the need for more substantive resources, new
mechanisms, and innovative practices.[103]
Further Requirements: A Proposal to Expand the Foundation[104]
The development of a reliable and effective UN capability will take time, vision, and a coherent,
goal-oriented plan, one that is guided by a long-term sense of purpose and the prospect of
contributing to a critical mechanism for conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance. As we
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look to the long term, it is evident that there will be a need for further measures that
complement and build on the existing foundation. The prospect of immediately initiating some
form of UN standing capability is remote, but an ongoing cumulative development process
appears feasible. Several stages are envisaged in this development. As capabilities are
consolidated at each stage, one can anticipate a parallel expansion in the scope and scale of
potential activities. One assumes the UN will require a capability commensurate with the tasks it
is likely to be assigned.
There are several cost-effective options that merit consideration by the United Nations, its
member states, and interested parties. The following sequential proposals are intended to
stimulate further discussion and analysis:
Stage One
Revitalise and expand the consultative process of all supportive parties with the following
objectives:
SHIRBRIG
launch a concerted effort to promote establishment of similar arrangements in other regions;
after an initial trial in peacekeeping, negotiate new MOU facilitating deployment to operations
necessitating a mandate within Chapter VII.
integrate civilian elements to ensure provision of necessary services; and,
initiate research into the financing, administration, basing, equipment, and lift arrangements
necessary to ensure immediate responses from co-located, standing national SHIRBRIG units.
UNSAS
given the promising foundation established, promote standby political commitments whether
through expanded Memoranda of Understanding or Article 43.
UN Standing Emergency Capability
initiate a parallel inquiry into the option of dedicated UN volunteer elements with particular
emphasis on administration, financing, recruitment, terms of service, remuneration, training,
basing and command.
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Stage Two
establish a UN rapid deployment base, with consideration accorded to the use of redundant
military bases to provide existing infrastructure for training and equipment stock-piling, as well
as nearby access to air and sea lift for prompt staging;
develop a permanent, operational-level headquarters at the UN base.
Experienced officers, civilian experts, and qualified planners can be seconded to the base and
co-assigned responsibility to expand the operational and tactical foundation for future efforts.
To manage a variety of complex tasks effectively, it is in the interests of all parties to shift from a
skeletal RDMHQ within UNHQ, New York to a static, expanded operational-level headquarters at
a UN base. It would also be prudent for cost-effectiveness, as well as for the obvious benefits
from a military, doctrinal, and administrative perspective, to co-locate two field-deployable
tactical (mission) headquarters at this base.
Stage Three
assign the national elements of a SHIRBRIG group to the UN base for a one to two-year period of
duty;
The general reluctance to move quickly can be partially overcome by stationing these
multinational elements in a sound operational and tactical structure. The response times of
standing multinational elements should be considerably quicker than the projected fifteen- to
thirty-day response from home-based national SHIRBRIG elements. Tactical units and civilians
would still remain under national political control and operational command. Locating these
elements under the operational control of the permanent headquarters would improve
multinational training, exercises, lift, and logistics co-ordination. Standing co-located national
units would enhance overall effectiveness, increase the prospect of timely national approval and
lead to faster responses. Several multinational SHIRBRIG's might also fill a large void in the
current system of conflict prevention and management.
launch an ongoing process of doctrine development for the range of diverse elements likely to
be required in future multidimensional operations. Emphasise the unity of purpose and effort
necessary to co-ordinate and integrate the various elements into a cohesive team;
identify five appropriately-dispersed regional facilities to serve as UN bases for the preparation
and deployment of other SHIRBRIG groups;
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Stage Four: A Composite Standing Emergency Capability
recruit and co-locate professional UN volunteers into distinct capability component groups of
both the headquarters and field-deployable elements at the initial UN base. Integrate volunteers
into a dedicated UN Standing Emergency Capability of 5,000 personnel under one of the two
field-deployable mission headquarters. Provide personnel with advance training and two
complete, modern equipment kits (one for training and one pre-packed for immediate staging).
Ensure UN elements have a credible stand-alone strength for emergency deployments of
approximately 4,000 civilian and military personnel.
The integration of UN volunteers into this group should be viewed as a complementary and
mutually reinforcing stage in the development of an increasingly effective UN rapid deployment
capability. Its relatively small size would alleviate fears of a new supranational force. Moreover,
the use of this relatively discrete UN emergency capability could only be authorised by the UN
Security Council and directed by the UN Secretary-General or his special representative.
A standing emergency capability with dedicated UN volunteers might respond to a crisis within
twenty-four hours of a decision by the Security Council. Expanding the operational and tactical
structure of this capability to include dedicated UN personnel would also expand the range of
options at the political and strategic levels. As the Commission on Global Governance reported
in 1995, "the very existence of an immediately available and effective UN Volunteer Force could
be a deterrent in itself. It could also give important support for negotiation and the peaceful
settlement of disputes."[105] The Report of the Independent Working Group on the Future of
the United Nations expressed its preference for a standing UN Volunteer Force to enhance the
UN's performance in both time and function.[106] The Carnegie Commission report
acknowledged that "a standing force may well be necessary for effective prevention."[107] A
Canadian discussion paper on the issue acknowledges that:
It would provide the UN with a small but totally reliable, well-trained and cohesive group for
deployment by the Security Council in urgent situations. It would break one of the key log-jams
in the current UN system, namely the insistence by troop contributing nations that they
authorise the use of their national forces prior to each deployment. It would also simplify
command and control arrangements in UN peace support operations, and put an end to
conflicts between UN commanders and contingent commanders reporting to national
authorities.[108]
The case for such a capability is premised on the need not only to avert human suffering, but
also to reduce the high costs of major peacekeeping and enforcement operations, not to
mention the reconstruction of war-torn societies.[109] As Urquhart writes, it"â€¦should be seen
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as a vital investment for the future, and one which by its very nature, is designed to act at the
point where action can be most effective, thus eliminating or reducing the necessity for later,
larger, less effective, more costly options."[110]
Recurring costs for a standing UN brigade have been estimated at $253 million US per annum.
Acquiring a redundant military base capable of hosting 10,000 personnel might reduce the start-
up costs. Ultimately, the UN will also require its own equipment if the deployable elements of a
standing capability are to be interoperable. Standardisation of equipment and vehicles would
greatly reduce overall costs in terms of manpower and overhead. To acquire equipment for a
UN brigade would likely entail an expenditure of approximately $500-600 million US. Clearly,
this new UN capability would not entail a significant financial burden if shared proportionally
among 185 member states.[111]
A host of related issues will have to be addressed before any standing capability becomes a
reality. Financing is one major concern. Developing the organisational and operational capacity
of the United Nations to the point where it has the confidence of member states is another. But
these issues hardly preclude the need to design a compelling sequence of steps that will
facilitate the transition to a viable, permanent UN capability. Making the case for a more robust
force, Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens write:
There could be great benefit in getting on with dealing with these other problems â€” regardless
of the creation of a standing military force â€” but we do not believe that progress in the
analysis of the case for a standing force, and possibly its recruitment and training should be
delayed pending its resolution. We do concede the case for such a force will be much stronger
to the extent one can assume substantial progress in these other areas.[112]
The Netherlands study demonstrated that many of the technical obstacles are surmountable.
The Danish study did not rule out permanently assigning military units to the UN, but
acknowledged that it was a long-term option.[113] And the Canadian study noted that, "no
matter how difficult this goal now seems, it deserves continued study with a clear process for
assessing its feasibility over the long term."[114]
One of the initial statements of the Canadian study cautiously advised that, "any plan to operate
a standing force presupposes adjustments at the political, strategic and tactical levels, which in
many cases must be put in place on an incremental basis, starting as soon as possible."[115]
Many of these adjustments are now in place. Although no time frames were established, it
would appear we are now at the mid-term of a process that needs to be revitalised. Both the
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Security Council and other member states are likely to need powerful encouragement to resume
and expand this process. In this respect, there are several preliminary yet, critical requirements.
First, the need for a wider educational process is now evident, as is the need for a broad-based
coalition and constituency of support. A new 'soft power' approach could help to advance both
objectives.[116] Aside from the benefits of informing member states and citizens, it might
rejuvenate the 'Friends', prompt further partnerships, and activate numerous supportive NGOs
and related parties. Of equal importance, is the need to draw the initiative back from the
exclusive domain of 'high politics' between states, and what has become a relatively
dysfunctional Security Council. This would effectively entail a campaign to democratise,
politicise and publicise further discussions. By encouraging a clearer appreciation of the issues
and current arrangements, there is the prospect of increasing confidence and commitment. This
might also be a useful step toward acquiring wider political influence and leverage, as well as
attracting powerful political champions. The latter can only lead as far as their constituents are
prepared to provide support.
Second, if rapid deployment is to succeed as a legitimate and widely-valued mechanism for

conflict prevention, there will be a need to ensure a far more comprehensive and sophisticated
approach. Whereas much attention has been devoted to ensuring sufficient 'hard power'
(military forces) capable of restoring security, greater efforts will have to be devoted to ensuring
they are accompanied by 'soft power' civilian elements that can restore hope and address
human needs. Complex political emergencies will demand prompt attention from both.
Third, it is time to restore the vision that inspired these and former efforts to empower the
United Nations. Regrettably, the earlier sense of opportunity and hope has faded, replaced by
heightened cynicism and despair. Few recognise the potential to transform the wider security
environment through an expansion of these capabilities. If we hope to inspire a broader base of
support, there will be a need to demonstrate the potential benefits.[117] In the short-term, this
capability should help to prevent and resolve some violent conflicts, not all. That is progress, as
well as an indication of potential. Although there are risks in being too ambitious at the outset,
there are reasons why opponents of a UN rapid deployment capability view it as a subversive
process and a 'slippery slope'. Any demonstration of success might encourage further co-
operation toward the far more ambitious objective of a co-operative security system – a likely
pre-requisite for moving on to an era of global human security.
Progress in addressing the three preliminary requirements of revitalising wider efforts, ensuring
the inclusion of appropriate elements, and restoring the necessary vision, will likely depend on
the extent to which officials begin to recognise the potential contribution of conflict resolution
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and peace studies. These are common objectives that cannot be managed in isolation. It is time
for a far more inclusive and co-operative approach that draws on the respective strengths of all
supportive parties.
CONCLUSION
At the dawn of this new millennium, the UN will have a preliminary rapid deployment capability
for peace support operations. Three middle powers -- Canada, The Netherlands and Denmark --
were instrumental in co-ordinating related studies and broad co-operation through national and
international consultative processes, as well as the development of a supportive organisational
framework. In turn the UN Secretariat and the Friends of Rapid Deployment played a pivotal
role in both prompting and implementing supportive changes. The majority of their short-term
objectives were either achieved or are being implemented. There are substantive increases in
the quantity and quality of resources listed in the UN Standby Arrangement System. A UN rapid
deployment mission headquarters may soon be available to assist in the critical start-up phase
of new operations. A multinational Standby High-Readiness brigade is available. As previously
noted, over the past five years there has been supportive innovation at the political, strategic,
operational and tactical levels.
As Kofi Annan wrote, "the initiatives taken by these countries have been valuable both for what
they have achieved in themselves and for the way in which they have refocused the debate
among peace-keeping contributors at large." He went on to note: "in the context of that wider
group, however, a number of further actions will need to be taken if we are to intervene more
effectively in either a preventive or curative capacity."[118] Fortunately, both the UN and
member states now have a base foundation on which to take further action.
The potential for wider systemic change is evident. There are cost-effective and more reliable
options that merit serious consideration and action. In the last several years, there have been
noteworthy attempts to model the composition of viable UN standing forces.[119] Several of
these studies have demonstrated that there are few, if any, insurmountable operational or
tactical impediments. One shortcoming, that is also frequently evident in the numerous studies
cited since 1945, is the inability to address how such a dedicated UN mechanism might be
established. What approach or transition strategy might mobilise political will, attract wider
support, increase confidence and restore the necessary momentum?
Both pragmatists and visionaries are aware that the recent political environment was not
conducive to the immediate establishment of a UN standing force. Nor, in the earlier period of
unprecedented activity, was the Organisation prepared to manage additional, controversial
capabilities. As well, by 1997 the former political and diplomatic enthusiasm dissipated quickly
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when it encountered concerns related to sovereignty, risks, representation, limited support and
insufficient financing. Yet rapid changes, ongoing conflicts, and the wider challenges of
interdependence, are now altering the former context. We can anticipate a review of
contemporary approaches and mechanisms for preventing and resolving violent conflict,
including the option of a UN standing capability or force. In the earlier words of Stephen Kinloch,
"driven back, the idea will, as in the past, ineluctably re-emerge, Phoenix-like, at the most
favourable opportunity."[120]
Rather than await the next catastrophe, it is time to consider how additional SHIRBRIGs and
dedicated UN standing elements might be introduced as a complementary expansion on current
arrangements.[121] In this respect, independent analysis may still be necessary to generate the
ideas that can move events.[122] Further progress will likely depend on far wider educational
efforts directed not only at the governments of UN member states but also at global civil
society. Among the challenges that warrant consideration are:
generating a broader public and professional understanding of current UN rapid deployment

initiatives and the various options available for enhancing these efforts;
co-ordinating a 'soft power' approach not only to refocus the Security Council and revitalise the
'Friends', but also to organise a transnational coalition and constituency of support among
citizens, non-governmental organisations, related agencies and academic communities.
planning a coherent, sequence of stages or 'building blocks' to facilitate the further

development of UN and multilateral efforts; and
building the unity of effort and purpose necessary to co-ordinate national military and civilian
units, as well as the conditions for integrating volunteers into a composite standing UN
emergency capability.
Modest progress has been made since William R. Frye made the case for a planned evolution in
his seminal 1957 study, A United Nations Peace Force. We have yet to achieve Frye's objective,
but it is worth recalling his words:
Establishment of a small, permanent peace force, or the machinery for one, could be the first
step on the long road toward order and stability. Progress cannot be forced, but it can be helped
to evolve. That which is radical one year can become conservative and accepted the next.[123]
The failure to avert organised mass murder in Rwanda prompted a reappraisal, as well as a
multinational process that must now be revitalised and accelerated in the aftermath of
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Kosovo and East Timor. The phenomenon of 'too little', 'too late', 'too lame' or 'too lethal' has
simply gone on for far too long.
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Multiple Conflicts
Multiple global conflicts
The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), 2022, 10 Conflicts to Worry About in
2022, https://acleddata.com/10-conflicts-to-worry-about-in-2022/
10 Conflicts to Worry About in 2022: Foreword
Each year, ACLED identifies 10 conflicts or crisis situations around the world that are likely to
worsen or evolve in the coming months. These 10 cases are not just hotspots, but represent
areas of new directions and patterns of violence, and where there have been major shifts in
conflict dynamics.
In 2021, few conflicts ended, many continued, and some got markedly worse. In 2022, we will
be confronted with increased violence, demonstrations, and divisions. What explains this
continued decline in global stability? There is no unifying theme that links a violent insurrection
in the United States, the rise of Islamic State affiliates across Africa, demonstrations against
pandemic restrictions in Europe, the anti-coup local defense forces of Myanmar, mob violence
in India, increased gang activity in Haiti, and attacks targeting civilians in Colombia. These trends
have emerged as elites, armed groups, state forces, and civilians have grappled with volatile
domestic politics, armed competition, splintered security forces, and impunity for the
perpetrators of violence. These conflicts are directed towards local, regional, and national
challenges, not ideological poles or shared grievances. They represent a failure of political
agents, systems, and identities to create and sustain stability and to address threats. They
further expose how the international community lacks the tools, cohesion, and approach to
address the world’s longest and deadliest conflicts.
Of the 10 conflicts we address here, half appeared on our list last year, and Ethiopia, Yemen,
and the Sahel also appeared in our 2020 list. However, in each case, the conflicts took on new
dimensions in the past year and continue to devolve. In Ethiopia, we warned that the capacity of
the state would be too stretched to contend with its myriad threats: this was evident as the
TPLF/TDF and OLA/OLF-Shane insurgents threatened larger parts of the country throughout the
year. In a shocking turn of events, Ethiopian government forces, with regional militias, turned
back the rebel advancement, but many battles lie ahead as the country forges a path that will
likely entrench divisions in the short term. In Yemen, conflict has raged for seven years and it
remains the world’s largest humanitarian disaster. With no central state to speak of, several
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fronts are frozen and fatality levels are on the rise again in 2022 as the population bears the
brunt of the fighting. Meanwhile, the Sahel continues to disintegrate in new ways. Going into
2022, Burkina Faso has replaced Mali as the epicenter of the violence, and both countries saw
radical changes to their central governments through recent coups.
Nigeria is witnessing the opening of new fronts, reinvigorated latent fronts, and a state security
structure unable to contend with rapidly diversifying violence. Only 18% of Nigeria’s violence
involves Islamist militant groups, yet this conflict dominates the collective understanding of the
state’s threats. Instead, most violence involves militias proliferating across the state and
destroying public security as they go. Afghanistan and Colombia share a future where civilians
face an increase in targeted violence as state, state-affiliated, and post-conflict armed groups
continue to contest authority structures. In Lebanon, the risk of collapsing central institutions
and the economic crisis has created massive needs and volatile reactions. Hundreds of violent
riots broke out last year, and security challenges continue as governments form, and then fail, to
deal with entrenched nepotism, mismanagement, and corruption. In Haiti, responses to
government overreach and reforms, the assassination of the president, and public concerns
about gang activity rocked the small state. Gangs and government forces are now battling for
control of economic assets and territory, as the ‘deals’ and ‘truces’ between armed groups and
elites have fallen apart. Myanmar’s military coup in February 2021 was met with overwhelming
public discontent, voiced through demonstrations that were forcefully put down by the military
junta. Violence against civilians has exploded, spurring the proliferation of local defense groups
at an unprecedented rate. In Sudan, the military and senior elites of the governing council are
responsible for a retreat from the ‘road to democracy.’ A coup, an embattled and unsupported
prime minister, and a return to mass public demonstrations suggest that Sudan’s vast and
functional security sector will both control the state and suppress the protesters violently.
There is enough destabilization to be worried about the collective effects of fallen democracies,
aborted transitions, reinvigorated authoritarianism, and beyond. These current threats are very
different from a time when concerns were concentrated on the growing specter of Islamist
violence or ‘ethnic conflict’: the conflicts noted here represent competition for political,
territorial, and economic authority by those in power or recently out of power. There is no
evidence of contagion and diffusion of coups or other forms of destabilization (barring the very
purposeful contagion in the Sahel), but it is far worse to consider how states are destroying their
own governance institutions and structures with internal competition, leaving their citizens
adrift in violent chaos.
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Genocide
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Standing Army Stops Genocide
UN has a responsibility to intervene militarily to prevent genocide
Concil on Foreign Relations, no date, https://world101.cfr.org/how-world-works-and-

sometimes-doesnt/building-blocks/rise-and-fall-responsibility-protect, The Rise and Fall of the
Responsibility to Protect
For decades, the United Nations maintained that sovereignty must be respected. But after a
series of conflicts in the 1990s, including the Rwandan genocide and wars in the former
Yugoslavia, scholars and diplomats reevaluated this thinking. This led in 2005 to UN members
endorsing what became known as the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine, which states
that countries have a fundamental sovereign responsibility to protect their citizens. If they fail
to do so, that responsibility falls to the United Nations system, which may take steps to
protect those vulnerable people, violating the sovereignty of the relevant country if needed.
In other words, countries acting under UN auspices can use all means necessary— including
military intervention—to prevent large-scale loss of life.
Lack of a Standing Army responsible for the genocide in Somalia
Ioannis Dedes, June 25, 2021, The Harsh Truth about UN Peacekeepers — Fix Them or Fire
Them, https://medium.com/lessons-from-history/the-harsh-truth-about-un-peacekeepers-fix-
them-or-fire-them-83cfcfbd69e6
Rwandan Genocide (Operation UNAMIR)
The second failure came at the same period, precisely in 1994, in Rwanda (East Africa).
The UN operation named United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) had been
issued and functioning since the end of 1993, and it had the legitimacy to prevent any issue with
the two sides of the Rwandan Civil War, the armed militias and their target, the Rwandan
Patriotic Front composed by Tutsi and Hutu minority ethnic groups.
The commanders of the operation were aware of the Militias’ dominance and their mass plans
for the extermination of Tutsi; the Department of Peacekeeping operations did not permit a
raid for the illicit trade of weapons within the anti-Tutsi groups.
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Interestingly, no side wanted a ceasefire agreement since the government was composed of
Tutsi hate administrators, and the Rebels knew that the killings would not stop with an
agreement.
The operation had taken an observatory role, and this was one of the main problems that
would be avoided by a UN standing army; according to Chapter VI, there was not any
permission to armed intervention.
More accurately, the chapter states that a solution should be sought through “negotiation,
inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice”.
The most important country for providing this operation’s Blue Helmet soldiers, Belgium,
decided to withdraw the troops after losing more than ten soldiers in the conflict.
The operation’s effectiveness degraded even further, and a new reinforcement of the UNAMIR
came in June of 1994, but the genocide had ended by July. Multiple accounts show different
numbers, but most of them are within 500,000 to 700,000 Tutsis and Hutus.
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Genocide Impacts
Outweighs everything
LANG 1990 (Berel, Professor of Humanities @ Trinity College, Act and Idea in the Nazi Genocide, pg 13) When the
push of a single button can produce cataclysmic effects, we discover an order of destruction –
"omnicide" – even larger than genocide. But the opprobrium attached to the term "Genocide"
seems also to have a connotation of corporate action – as if this act or sequence of acts would
be a lesser fault, easier to understand if not to excuse if one person rather than a group were
responsible for it. A group (we suppose) would be bound by a public moral code; decisions made would have
been reached collectively; and the culpability of individual intentions would be multiplied proportionately.
Admittedly, corporate responsibility is sometimes invoked in order to diminish (or at least to obscure) individual
responsibility; so, for example, the "quagmire" effect that was appealed to retrospectively by defenders of the United
States' role in Vietnam. But for genocide, the likelihood of its corporate origins seems to accentuate
its moral enormity: a large number of individual, intentional acts would have to be committed
and the connections among them also affirmed in order to produce the extensive act. Unlike
other corporate acts that might only be decided on but carried out by a single person or small
group of persons, genocide in its scope seems necessarily to require collaboration by a
relatively large number of agents acting both collectively and individually.Preventing genocide
is the ultimate ethical obligation- culminates in extinction
Harff-Gur -82 (B. Harff-Gur, Northwestern, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AS A REMEDY FOR

GENOCIDE, 1981, p. 40)
One of the most enduring and abhorrent problems of the world is genocide, which is neither particular to a specific race, class, or
nation, nor is it rooted in any one, ethnocentric view of the world. Prohibition
of genocide and affirmation of its
opposite, the value of life, are an eternal ethical verity , one whose practical implications
necessarily outweigh possible theoretical objections and as such should lift it above prevailing ideologies or
politics. Genocide concerns and potentially effects all people. People make up a legal system, according to Kelsen.
Politics is the expression of conflict among competing groups. Those in power give the political system its character, i.e. the state.
The state, according to Kelsen, is nothing but the combined will of all its people. This abstract concept of the state may at first glance
appear meaningless, because in reality not all people have an equal voice in the formation of the characteristics of the state. But I
am not concerned with the characteristics of the state but rather the essence of the state – the people. Withouta people
there would be no state or legal system. With genocide eventually there will be no people.
Genocide is ultimately a threat to the existence of all. True, sometimes only certain groups are
targeted, as in Nazi Germany. Sometimes a large part of the total population is eradicated, as in contemporary Cambodia.
Sometimes people are eliminated regardless of national origin – the Christians in Roman times. Sometimes whole nations vanish –
the Amerindian societies after the Spanish conquest. And sometimes religious groups are persecuted – the Mohammedans by the
Crusaders. The culprit changes: sometimes it is a specific state, or those in power in a state; occasionally it is the winners vs. the
vanquished in international conflicts; and in its crudest form the stronger against the weaker. Since virtually every social
group is a potential victim, genocide is a universal concern.
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Makes extinction inevitable
Kenneth J. Campbell, assistant professor of political science and international relations at the
University of Delaware, 2001, Genocide and the Global Village, p. 15-16
Regardless of where or on how small a scale it begins, the crime of genocide is the complete ideological repudiation of, and a direct
murderous assault upon, the prevailing liberal international order. Genocide
is fundamentally incompatible with, and
destructive of an open, tolerant, democratic, free market international order. As genocide scholar
Herbert Hirsch has explained: The unwillingness of the world community to take action to end genocide
and political massacres is not only immoral but also impractical. [W]ithout some semblance of
stability, commerce, travel, and the international and intranational interchange of goods and information
are subjected to severe disruptions. Where genocide is permitted to proliferate, the liberal
international order cannot long survive. No group will be safe; every group will wonder when they will be next. Left
unchecked, genocide threatens to destroy whatever security, democracy, and prosperity exists
in the present international system. As Roger Smith notes: Even the most powerful nations—those armed with
nuclear weapons—may end up in struggles that will lead (accidentally, intentionally, insanely) to the
ultimate genocide in which they destroy not only each other, but [humankind] mankind itself,
sewing the fate of the earth forever with a final genocidal effort. In this sense, genocide is a grave
threat to the very fabric of the international system and must be stopped , even at some risk to lives and
treasure. The preservation and growth of the present liberal international order is a vital interest for all of its members—states as
well as non-states—whether or not those members recognize and accept the reality of that objective interest. Nation states, as the
principal members of the present international order, are the only authoritative holders of violent enforcement powers. Non-state
actors, though increasing in power relative to states, still do not possess the military force, or the democratic authority to use
military force, which is necessary to stop determined perpetrators of mass murder. Consequently, nation-states have
a
special responsibility to prevent, suppress, and punish all malicious assaults on the fundamental
integrity of the prevailing international order.
Genocide happens more frequently and is more destructive than traditional

warfare
Gutman, Journalist and Staff Writer, December 25th, 1999 [Roy, “Wars Without End,”
Newsday, www.newsday.com]
That it could happen in Rwanda underscores a terrifying trend that began with the end of the
Cold War and is likely to persist for decades - that civilians have become the principal targets in
conflicts throughout the world. Today, as the world puts behind it the bloodiest century in human
history, a staggering 90 civilians die for every 10 combatants. In World War I, the opposite was
true. While policy-makers remain vigilant about traditional conflicts between states that could erupt between India and Pakistan,
China and Taiwan, or the two Koreas, for example, the growing focus is on the internal conflicts in states that fail and collapse. The
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21st Century dawns with the grim reality that the greatest human toll will likely continue to be
the innocents in places such as Burundi, Indonesia, Sierra Leone, Congo and Angola. Genocide
and massive crimes against humanity have become the biggest threat to peace and stability. "If
you look at the death toll in international war versus that in internal ethnic conflict, the vast
preponderance of deaths is from the latter category," said one senior U.S. official familiar with the intelligence
data on conflicts worldwide. What's more, conventional attempts like diplomacy to head off conflicts often
don't work in these cases, because they may distract attention from the real aim of those who
go to war-to conduct a mass pogrom against their racial, tribal or ethnic opponents.
This not only causes hundreds of thousands of deaths, but it also prevents
societies from rebuilding themselves after conflicts
Newman, Academic Associate in the Peace and Governance Programme at the UN University,
2002 [Recovering from Civil Conflict, ed. Newman & Schnabel, p. 9-10]
Many recent domestic conflicts are the direct result of the collapse of the Soviet system. In Eastern and Southeastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union, the political and economic transitions experienced by most countries left many or most of them weak and
vulnerable to internal and external political and economic pressures. As previous elites began to compete for power with newly emerging
elites, many of these countries struggled through their first-ever experience with democracy and free political and economic
competition. In addition, many of them were created after the Second World War and during the Soviet reign, their demographic make-
up was reshuffled by forced population movements. After 1991, populations throughout the post-communist camp experienced a
dramatic drop in wealth, personal security and living standards. A combination
of economic collapse, political
vacuum and demands for political strongmen caused the eruption of internal conflict and war. The
former Yugoslavia, the Southern Caucasus and Ce nt ral Asi a , have suffered most from this developlement. In the meanwhile,
internal conflicts, often with significant involvement from neigbouring states, have continued to
rage in Africa, Asia and Latin America. From Somalia to Rwanda, from Cambodia to East Timor, and
from El Salvador to Haiti, internal conflicts have continued to destabilize their regions, causing
immense human suffering. The most atrocious conflicts take place in Africa. Many African conflicts are rooted in
governments' lack of respect for the rights of individuals, corruption, lack of efficient administration, poor infrastructure and weak
national coherence - ills that are in turn rooted largely in the colonial legacy of randomly drawn borders, destruction of traditional
communities and their governing and conflict management mechanisms, and economic exploitation. Democracy and politi cal
stability are sti ll distant goals in many African countries. The combination of weak states and the struggle by elites for natural
resources and wealth, the culture of looting, as is parti cularly obvious in the case of diamond mines in Angola, Congo,
Liberia and Sierra Leone, has resulted in a dangerous structural environment that fuels conflict. The patterns of conflict are
often very similar: military hostilities between rebel groups and the incumbent government. Characteristic is the use of force to
settle disputes and the fact that most conflicts in Africa take the form of ‘irregular warfare’ in which for strategic reasons civilians -
instead of professional soldiers - are targeted. Finally, almost all conflicts in Africa have been commercialized. Huge
amounts of arms have been-used to destabilize the continent. While most conflicts are fought for access and
control over resources in the absence of responsible governments, many conflicts have a decisive external dimension -
neighbouring countries that support either government or rebel groups. At least in theory these conflicts could be resolved or prevented
rather easily - certainly easier than supposed primordial and ethnic intergroup conflicts. It is usually quite apparent what caused the
conflict, and who the responsible parties are. The OAU and other subregional organizations are trying to prevent and manage
conflicts, but they can do little without the necessary resources and lack of interest in regional cooperation among member
states, who are either part of the conflict or do not care about its resolution. The North's indifference to inequality, injustice,
humanitarian plight and war-lordism in many African countries, along with poorly designed development strategies over many
Internal, often intergroup conflicts carry a
decades, have done little to prevent violence on the African continent.'
high price tag - for the populations involved in violence and for those willing to offer assistance
in settling and resolving it. The example of Mozambique's 16-year civil war is illustrative of the
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tremendous costs of conflict: 490,000

children died from war-related causes; 200,000 children were orphaned or
abandoned by adults; at least 10,000 children served as soldiers during the conflict; over 40 per cent of
schools were destroyed or forced to close; over 40 percent of health centres were destroyed;
economic losses totalled US$15 billion, equal to four times the country's 1988 GDP; and damage
to industry was so heavy that postwar producti on equalled only 20- 40 per cent of pre-war
capacity. Intergroup conflicts affect the whole of society, irrespective of age, occupation and
gender. Targeting civilians has become a deliberate strategy of warfare, with the result that an
estimated 90 per cent of the casualties of today's civil wars are civilians, mostly women and
children. T h is high rate of civilian casualties characterizes more than anything else today's
internal wars, contributing to the deep sense of hatred and hostility that make it a difficult task to
rebuild war-torn societies once a settlement has eventually been reached.
And, every time we fail to stop a genocide, it emboldens would-be genocidaires

to carry out more genocides, causing a vicious cycle of atrocities
Ronyane, Professor at the University of Virginia and the Federal Executive Institute, 2001
[Peter, Never Again? The United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide Since
the Holocaust, p.207-208]
Nonintervention also sends messages to other would-be genocidaires that they can pursue their
atrocious agendas with impunity. Roger Winter, head of the State Department's Offi ce of Refugee Resettlement
during the Carter and Reagan administrations and head of the nonprofit U.S. Committee for Refugees, expressed his fear that at
the end of the twentieth century "we actually have a greater possibility of genocide and ethnic
cleansing than we did five or six years ago because all these despots feel they can get away with it."
Such a message, however unintentional, sets a terrible precedent and ignores the moral interde-
pendence of nations that mirrors growing economic interdependen ce.
Genocide goes beyond physical death to destroy the very fabric of social
existence that makes life worth living and death bearable—social death
outweighs
Card, Emma Goldman Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin, 2003 [Claudia,
“Genocide and Social Death,” Hypatia 18.1 (2003) 63-79, project muse]
Genocide is not simply unjust (although it certainly is unjust); it is also evil. It characteristically includes
the one-sided killing of defenseless civilians—babies, children, the elderly, the sick, the disabled,
and the injured of both genders along with their usually female caretakers—simply on the basis of their national,
religious, ethnic, or other political identity. It targets people on the basis of who they are rather than on the basis of what they
have done, what they might do, even what they are capable of doing. (One commentator says genocide kills people on the basis of
Genocide is a paradigm of what Israeli philosopher Avishai Margalit
what they are, not even who they are). [End Page 72]
(1996) calls "indecent" in that it not only destroys victims but first humiliates them by deliberately
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inflicting an "utter loss of freedom and control over one's vital interests" (115). Vital interests can be
transgenerational and thus survive one's death. Before death, genocide victims are ordinarily deprived of control
over vital transgenerational interests and more immediate vital interests. They may be literally stripped naked,
robbed of their last possessions, lied to about the most vital matters, witness to the murder of
family, friends, and neighbors, made to participate in their own murder, and if female, they are
likely to be also violated sexually. 7 Victims of genocide are commonly killed with no regard for
lingering suffering or exposure. They, and their corpses, are routinely treated with utter
disrespect. These historical facts, not simply mass murder, account for much of the moral
opprobrium attaching to the concept of genocide. Yet such atrocities, it may be argued, are already war crimes,
if conducted during wartime, and they can otherwise or also be prosecuted as crimes against humanity. Why, then, add the specific
crime of genocide? What, if anything, is not already captured by laws that prohibit such things as the rape, enslavement, torture,
forced deportation, and the degradation of individuals? Is any ethically distinct harm done to members of the targeted group that
would not have been done had they been targeted simply as individuals rather than because of their group membership? This is the
question that I find central in arguing that genocide is not simply reducible to mass death, to any of the other war crimes, or to the
crimes against humanity just enumerated. I believe the answer is affirmative: the harm is ethically distinct, although on the question
of whether it is worse, I wish only to question the assumption that it is not. Specific to genocide is the harm inflicted
on its victims' social vitality. It is not just that one's group membership is the occasion for harms that are definable
independently of one's identity as a member of the group. When a group with its own cultural identity is
destroyed, its survivors lose their cultural heritage and may even lose their intergenerational
connections. To use Orlando Patterson's terminology, in that event, they may become "socially dead" and
their descendants "natally alienated," no longer able to pass along and build upon the traditions,
cultural developments (including languages), and projects of earlier generations (1982, 5-9). The
harm of social death is not necessarily less extreme than that of physical death. Social death can
even aggravate physical death by making it indecent, removing all respectful and caring ritual,
social connections, and social contexts that are capable of making dying bearable and even of
making one's death meaningful. In my view, the special evil of genocide lies in its infliction of not
just physical death (when it does that) but social death, producing a consequent
meaninglessness of one's life and even of its termination. This view, however, is controversial. Stopping
genocide is an absolute imperative—there is no reason we can justify inaction O’Donnell, Staff Writer, 2003 [Michael J,
“Genocide, the United Nations, and the Death of Absolute Rights.” Spring, 23 B.C. Third World L.J. 399, l/n] Genocide is the
most heinous crime that can be committed against a human population . 39 In the famous words of the UN
40
General Assembly, genocide "shocks the conscience of mankind." A mandate for its prevention and punishment has been
41
enshrined in a widely-ratified multilateral treaty. Genocide's status as a jus cogen, or customary norm of international
law from which no derogation is permitted under any circumstances, is broadly accepted . 42
43
Commentators have suggested that any list of absolute rights should be short and relatively abstract. It nearly
goes without saying that the right of a people to be free from wholesale slaughter would top
any such list. 44 Given the near-universal consensus that the taking of innocent life is a moral wrong, genocide stands
alone as a wrong [*407] that actually multiplies a wrong, magnifying its infamy . 45 The essence of
genocide's power is that it denies the very right to exist to entire groups of people based solely upon their identity, making it at once
selective in practice and universal in scope.
Genocide has killed more people in the twentieth century than all wars
combined
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Heidenrich, Director of the Project on Genocide Prevention at the Institute for Defense &
Disarmament Studies, 2001 [John G., How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers,
Scholars, and the Concerned Citizen, p. 7-8]
No one knows how many people in total died from genocide in the twentieth, century, but some
estimates for the years between 1900 and 1988 were compiled by Rudolph Rummel, the professor who coined the
word democide. Rummel’s chillingly comprehensive estimates, published in 1994 in a book entitled Death by Government,
generally exclude -war-related deaths unless caused by methods now considered criminal under the Geneva Conventions; therefore
his estimates include the Allies' aerial bombings of civilian populations in World War II, including the atomic bombings of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. He wrote: In total, during the first 88 years of this century, almost 170 000,000 men, women and
children have been shot, beaten, tortured, knifed, burned, starved, frozen, crushed, or worked to
death, buried alive, drowned, hanged, bombed, or killed in any other of the myriad ways regimes have inflicted
death on unarmed, helpless citizens and foreigners. The number of dead could even conceivably be near a high of
360,000,000 people. This is as though our species has been devastated by a modern Black Plague. And indeed it has, but a plague
of absolute power and not germs.
Genocide will create international instability that leads to nuclear extinction
Campbell, Assistant Professor at the University of Delaware, 2001 [Kenneth J., Genocide and
the Global Village, p. 10-11]
The Cold War came to a sudden end a decade ago and the current post- Cold War era seems to have many
decision makers, policy analysts, and scholars confused and uncertain. However, in this period of great turbulence
and complexity, we should be clear about one large, simple, but critically important fact: this transition
era is completely unique in the historical cycles of rising and falling international orders. In two
critical respects this is so: first, this transition is occurring (so far) without the general catastrophe
typically associated with such periods. Second, in no previous transition era did the prevailing
powers charge d with creat ing an improved international order possess the scientific and
technical capacity—as the leading powers now do—to destroy the entire interna tional
system along with everyone in it. This is the first time in the cycli cal creation of new
international orders that the great powers possess the power to end the "great game" for all
players, for all time! In no previous transition period from one international order to another has this been the case. In
this sense, the present cycle is truly singular. These two critical peculiarities should give pause to the architects of our new
emerging global order. For the above factors seem to indicate that our leaders maximize their efforts
to break with this cycle of "learn ing-by-catastrophe" and make a leap in institutional
learning without waiting for a breakdown of the international order and a systemic cata -
strophe from which none of us might recover. The unique characteristics of this critical transition
period seem to place a premium on state cooperation at least regarding those core problems which ,
if not managed or mitigated, threaten to unravel the entire international order. The main task in this
period of transition, in the midst of globalization, is to consolidate, reinforce, and extend the present , post-Cold
War liberal inter national order. At the heart of this effort at global governance must be the
prevention of genocide and crimes against humanity.
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Genocide means social death
Joshua Price, July 2015, Price has engaged in advocacy with and for currently and formerly
incarcerated people since 2004. For his efforts, the New York State Assembly has awarded him a
citation for Outstanding Contribution to Civil Rights of New Yorkers, and the Broome/ Tioga
(New York) NAACP has named him “Person of the Year.” He is the author of Structural Violence:
Hidden Brutality in the Lives of Women. He teaches in the Department of Sociology at the State
University of New York at Binghamton, Prison and Social Death, page number at end of the card
– Kindle Edition
People who have been sentenced to prison are not the only social dead. Immigrants facing
deportation are subject to social death (De Genova and Peutz 2010). Social death is also a
central part of genocide (Card 2003). People undergoing genocide are often first dehumanized
through social death. The connections among different forms of modern social death are
complex. This book, however, focuses on the social death of incarceration. In the case of the
United States, social death is also a racial mark. 2 Price, Joshua M. (2015-07-01). Prison and
Social Death (Critical Issues in Crime and Society) (Kindle Locations 174-178). Rutgers University
Press. Kindle Edition.
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UN Peacekeeping Generally Good

UN peacekeeping provides international legitimacy, protects civilians, assists in
disarmament, reintegrates combatants, restores the rule of law
Better World Campaign, 2022, UN PEACEKEEPING: A FORCE FOR GLOBAL PEACE AND STABILITY,
https://betterworldcampaign.org/resources/briefing-book-2022/peacekeeping-global-peace-
stability
Helping countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace, peacekeeping has unique
strengths, including high levels of international legitimacy and an ability to deploy and sustain
troops and police from around the globe, integrating them with civilian peacekeepers to
advance multidimensional mandates. Today’s peacekeeping operations are called upon not
only to stabilize conflict zones and separate warring parties, but also to protect civilians, assist
in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, support the
organization of elections, protect and promote human rights, and assist in restoring the rule of
law.
Best, most recent evidence proves UN peacekeeping works
Many Americans believe that peacekeeping is ineffective at best and harmful at worst. They
remember peacekeepers leaving at the first sign of trouble in Rwanda or standing inert as the
Serbian army massacred Muslim civilians in Bosnia. They recall images of U.S. soldiers being
dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. Every year, the Gallup organization asks Americans
whether they think the United Nations is doing a good or bad job of trying to solve the problems
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it faces, and for the last 19 years, a majority of those sampled have given the organization a
thumbs-down. The United Nations is especially disliked by Republicans. According to Gallup’s
2020 study, only 36 percent of the party’s members view the UN positively, the lowest number
in almost 30 years.
These negative stories have been used to help justify the United States’ deep cuts to the UN’s
peacekeeping budget. From 2015 to 2018, U.S. financial support for peacekeeping fell by 40
percent. The United States is the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping, and its cuts
have reduced the overall budget from $8.3 billion to $6.4 billion, curtailing the organization’s
ability to act. Although some of the most recent retrenchment is due to former President
Donald Trump’s disdain for the UN, after nearly one year of unified Democratic control,
Washington still has not fully paid for its peacekeeping obligations and is roughly $1 billion in
arrears. As a result, there have been no newly fielded peacekeeping missions since 2014, despite
an increase in civil wars. In diplomatic efforts to end conflicts in Afghanistan, Colombia, Ethiopia,
Libya, Myanmar, Venezuela, and Yemen, third-party peacekeeping isn’t even on the table.
That is a shame, because the negative perceptions of peacekeeping are dead wrong. Decades of
academic research has demonstrated that peacekeeping not only works at stopping conflicts
but works better than anything else experts know. Peacekeeping is effective at resolving civil
wars, reducing violence during wars, preventing wars from recurring, and rebuilding state
institutions. It succeeds at protecting civilian lives and reducing sexual and gender-based
violence. And it does all this at a very low cost, especially compared to counterinsurgency
campaigns—peacekeeping’s closest cousin among forms of intervention.
To reduce violence around the world, the United States and its partners need to increase their
financial and personnel support for peacekeeping missions. They must be more willing to
greenlight campaigns, and they must invest in more training for peacekeeping forces.
Washington has a geostrategic reason to act. China is stepping in to provide more resources for
peacekeeping missions, and it appears to want to control more agencies within the United
Nations, including the Department of Peace Operations. But the United States also has a moral
imperative. A greater commitment to peacekeeping would bring more stability to the world,
saving countless lives.
COUNTING THE WAYS
Scholars have researched the connection between third-party peacekeeping and violence in
dozens of studies. As we explained in a recently published article on the effects of peacekeeping,
these studies have remarkably similar findings. Although they used different data sets and
models and examined different time periods and types of peacekeeping, the most rigorous
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studies all have found that peacekeeping has a sizable and statistically significant effect on
containing civil war, getting leaders to negotiate settlements, and establishing a lasting peace
once war has ended. Conflict zones with peacekeeping missions produce less armed conflict
and fewer deaths than zones without them. The relationship between peacekeeping and lower
levels of violence is so consistent that it has become one of the most robust findings in
international relations research during the contemporary period.
This discovery would be striking in any circumstance. But the relationship is especially
impressive given that the UN generally intervenes in the most difficult cases. Researchers have
found that the UN Security Council tends to send peacekeepers to the civil conflicts where
peace is hardest to establish and keep—that is, conflicts with more violence than average,
where levels of mistrust are highest, and where poverty and poor governance make
maintaining a stable peace least likely. Recent research has also found that UN peacekeepers
are sent not just to active war zones but to the frontlines. This suggests that, if anything,
current empirical studies have probably underestimated just how effective peacekeeping
operations can be.
Peacekeeping is also inexpensive. The United States has spent over $2.1 trillion on overseas
contingency operations and Department of Defense appropriations since September 11. By
contrast, it allocated less than $1.5 billion to the UN’s peacekeeping budget in 2021—one-fourth
of what New York City spends on its police department per year. Imagine what the UN could do
if it had more funding and the full support of its member states. A major academic study in 2019
calculated that between 2001 and 2013, the UN could have significantly cut violence in four to
five major conflicts if the world had spent more on peacekeeping and provided existing
operations with stronger mandates.
Peacekeeping is remarkably inexpensive.
Peacekeeping does not always work as efficiently and successfully as it could. There are many
well-known cases where UN missions failed, and certain ongoing operations, including those in
the Central African Republic and Mali, are not going well. Sexual exploitation and abuse are
thankfully uncommon during operations, but they still happen and are very alarming. Several
new studies have also explored the unintended consequences of peacekeeping. Missions, for
instance, can distort local economies, reproduce class and racial hierarchies, and raise the odds
that women will engage in transactional sex. And even when it is done right, peacekeeping is not
a panacea. It has not been shown to have a strong effect on establishing democracy, and it does
not guarantee that wars will end. But the overriding conclusion from the most up-to-date
studies is that peacekeeping missions play an enormous role in reducing violence and
preventing conflicts from spreading.
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One doesn’t need to be a political scientist or a statistician to appreciate this fact. Even a cursory
glance at peacekeeping’s record shows that missions are remarkably productive. Since the end
of the Cold War, the UN has attempted to end 16 civil wars by deploying complex
peacekeeping missions. Of those 16 missions, 11 successfully executed on their mandates, and
none of the 11 countries has returned to civil war. The general public tends to vividly
remember failed missions—such as when peacekeepers brought cholera to Haiti—but although
those cases are horrific and tragic, they are not the norm. Success stories, such as those in
Cambodia, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Liberia, Namibia, and Timor-Leste, are less newsworthy but
more typical. In each of these cases, peacekeepers helped stabilize a state torn apart by
violence, stayed as leaders transitioned to nonviolent politics, and then departed. Today,
none of these countries are perfect democracies, but they are not locked in civil war.
Sierra Leone provides a case in point. The country’s brutal civil conflict ended after UN
peacekeepers were sent from 1999 to 2005 to help implement a negotiated peace agreement.
The UN’s “blue helmets” helped disarm 75,000 combatants, bringing stability to the formerly
war-torn country. Timor-Leste is another good example. The country’s first elections brought
mass violence during which 70 percent of the country’s physical infrastructure was destroyed,
including the entire electric grid and almost all homes. Hundreds were killed, and more than half
the population was forced to flee. Then, in 1999, United Nations peacekeepers arrived and
began administering the territory. The UN returned the country to governmental control in
2002, but peacekeepers stayed for another decade before departing. During the United Nations’
back-to-back interventions, Timor-Leste’s Human Development Index score (which includes life
expectancy, education, and per capita income) increased by more than 25 percent. The country
remains at peace today.
SAFEKEEPING PEACEKEEPING
At least one country appears to understand the power of peacekeeping: China. As Washington
has retreated from the global peacekeeping stage, Beijing has stepped into the void, becoming
the second-largest financial contributor and the largest troop contributor to peacekeeping
efforts among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. This shift does not bode
well for the future of democracy or for human rights promotion. Moments of conflict and
instability are opportunities to shape countries’ political landscapes, and China knows that it can
use peacekeeping missions to help determine the kinds and compositions of governments that
assume power when conflicts end. Beijing also knows that peacekeeping itself can be
weaponized to promote national interests. In 1999, China used its Security Council vote to force
peacekeepers out of Macedonia after the country offered diplomatic recognition to Taiwan.
Once the UN left, the country descended into civil war. (It was eventually stabilized by NATO.)
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Given Beijing’s behavior, the United States must ask itself if it really wants to cede leadership
over this important tool.
If U.S. policymakers decide to ensure that peacekeeping receives proper funding and democratic
support—and they should—then Washington must take several critical steps. First and
foremost, the United States needs to pay what it owes. As the largest funder of the UN’s
Department of Peace Operations, the U.S. government plays an important leadership role in
authorizing and shaping UN missions. To convince other countries to contribute financially, the
United States needs to set a better example by paying its own assessed dues.
Beijing has weaponized peacekeeping to promote its interests.
Second, the United States must convince the other four permanent members of the UN Security
Council—China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom—to work together on peacekeeping.
These powers are sometimes tempted to use missions as a means to advance their own
strategic priorities. But they all have a shared interest in stopping civil wars, which breed
extremism and terrorism and fuel refugee crises. They must find common ground on
peacekeeping, especially during a time of rising interstate competition. They cannot let the kind
of rivalry that impeded peacekeeping throughout the Cold War become an insurmountable
barrier to using this effective instrument today.
Finally, the United States, along with other UN member states, should use what it knows about
successful peacekeeping to make operations even more effective. That means countries must
invest in preventive missions rather than authorizing deployments only after violence has
broken out, as is currently typical. Member states should promptly respond when asked by the
United Nations to provide critical armed capabilities, such as police units, but also when asked
to provide unarmed resources—including field hospitals, monitors, mediation teams, and
female personnel. As our own research has shown, the political and economic levers of
peacekeeping are at least as effective, if not more so, than brute military strength. The presence
of peacekeeping monitors, for example, can reduce the risk that armed groups will conduct
surprise attacks, make it easier for aid to reach conflict zones, increase diplomatic support for
peace, and often influence domestic opinion by making residents more supportive of
nonviolent discourse. Peacekeepers can also help belligerents communicate with one another
and help moderate disputes before they escalate.
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After decades of counterinsurgencies, Americans are wary of military commitments abroad. The
United States, after all, has not had a lot of success in ending many of the conflicts in which it
has intervened. That said, the number of civil wars around the planet is increasing, and like it
or not, the international community will need to become more engaged in trying to stop
internecine conflicts. Thankfully, in United Nations peacekeeping, leaders have a collaborative
and cost-effective tool they can deploy to resolve these conflicts and protect civilians. But to
meet the world’s needs, U.S. policymakers have to provide the UN with more support and
funding. That means they—and the people they represent—must first understand just how
valuable peacekeeping has been.
Peer reviewed studies show peacekeeping can work
Amanda Long, US Institute of Peace, February 18, 2021, How the Biden Administration Can
Revive U.N. Peacekeeping, https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/02/how-biden-
administration-can-revive-un-peacekeeping
Numerous peer-reviewed studies have shown that more peacekeepers in conflict areas
correlates with fewer civilian deaths, less violence, and a better chance at lasting peace. The
Effective Peace Operations Network’s (EPON) comprehensive reports on the U.N. missions in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Mali—two of its most criticized—present evidence
that U.N. peacekeeping had a positive effect on reducing levels of violence and providing some
measure of protection to civilians. Another EPON report on an African Union- (AU) led
peacekeeping operation in Somalia reached a similar conclusion.
Multiple sources prove it works
Walter, 2018, Barbara F. Walter is a professor of political science at the School of Global Policy &
Strategy at the University of California, San Diego. She can be reached at bfwalter@ucsd.edu.,
Most people think peacekeeping doesn’t work. They’re wrong,
https://blogs.worldbank.org/dev4peace/most-people-think-peacekeeping-doesn-t-work-they-
re-wrong
Since 2016, the United States budget for United Nations peacekeeping has been reduced by 40
percent. This is a reflection of how many view the United Nations and it’s record on
peacekeeping. Data on the effectiveness of UN peacekeepers, however, don’t support this
perception. In fact, they find that the opposite is true. Numerous statistical studies have
explored the role of third-party peacekeeping in reducing violence around the world. They all
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come to the same conclusion: Peacekeeping works better than almost anything else we know.
Using different datasets and statistical models, leveraging slightly different time periods, and
measuring peacekeeping in somewhat different ways, the most rigorous studies have all found
that peacekeeping has a large, positive, and statistically significant effect on containing the
spread of civil war, increasing the success of negotiated settlements to civil wars, and increasing
the duration of peace once a civil war has ended (see here, here, here, and here). More recent
statistical studies have found an equally strong relationship between large-scale peace
operations and the spread of civil wars, within and between states (see here, here, and here).
Not only that, but every study that looked at diverse types of peacekeeping missions found that
the UN was more effective in preventing and reducing violence than non-UN missions, and that
stronger mandates and larger missions increased the likelihood of any mission’s success. This
was the case whether a mission was designed to prevent the spread of civil war, the killing of
civilians, or increase the duration of peace once a ceasefire or settlement had been reached. The
more soldiers the UN was willing to send and the stronger the mandate it was willing to provide,
the more the UN was able to reduce violence.
Why, then, does the public believe just the opposite? Part of the problem has to do with media
coverage that emphasizes failed missions over successful ones. “If it bleeds, it leads,” is the fear-
based logic that drives much of the information the public receives. Everyone has heard about
the UN’s failure to stop the genocide in Rwanda, but no one has heard of how the UN averted
war in Macedonia. Add to this the fact that newspaper accounts don’t distinguish between
feeble missions and robust ones, and you have a recipe for believing that all missions are
inherently bad.
But politics is also partly to blame. Republicans have historically been reluctant to rely too
heavily on international cooperation and organizations, and for them, the UN is the poster child
for all they hope to avoid. Equating every peacekeeping mission with the most poorly executed
ones reinforces the narrative they wish to tell.
Still, we have strong empirical evidence for what works and what doesn’t. Historically,
peacekeeping missions have failed wherever the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council tried to do peacekeeping half-heartedly: when peacekeepers were sent late (as they
were in Rwanda); with too few soldiers; or with no mandate to use force. Member nations’
reluctance to avoid the costs and risks of intervention created the conditions for failure. If done
correctly, however, peacekeeping can be the best bargain in town, and is certainly more cost-
effective than continued war or conventional military intervention.
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This message needs to be amplified. If people continue to believe that peacekeeping doesn’t
work, the entire system could be mistakenly dismantled. It took the world years to figure out
that peacekeeping was critical to reducing violence, and more years to figure out how to do it
right. What we now have is “very good” and could be even better.
How do you improve the success of peacekeeping? Peacekeepers work when they have the
support and mandate necessary to enforce the peace, something that requires a willingness to
use force. If UN member countries are reluctant to place their soldiers in danger, or to risk
getting drawn into a war, then technology might solve this problem for them. Armed drones
could be used to both monitor the movements of demobilizing soldiers, verify compliance with
the terms of an agreement, and punish those who return to violence. This is exactly the type of
intervention that we know works, and one that could be pursued with less risk to peacekeepers
on the ground.
We know that peacekeeping works. The trick is to utilize advances in new technology to do it
even more effectively.
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Multilateralism
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Standing Army Promotes Multilateralism
Peacekeeping strengthens multilateralism
Alliance for Peacebuilding et al, 2021,

https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Jacobs-Peacekeeping-Bill-Letter.pdf
Peacekeeping operations are among the most visible, complex, and impactful activities
undertaken by the UN. Authorized by the UN Security Council and tasked with a range of
responsibilities—including protection of civilians; disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating
former combatants; facilitating delivery of humanitarian assistance; and assisting democratic
elections and transitions of power—UN peacekeeping is a key tool in the international
community’s toolkit for promoting stability and laying the groundwork for a more sustainable
peace in countries undergoing conflict. As a permanent, veto-wielding member of the Security
Council, the U.S. plays a central role in crafting peacekeeping mandates and ensuring that
missions have the resources and political backing necessary to fulfill them. UN peacekeeping is
by definition a collective multilateral endeavor. Every UN member state is required to finance
UN peacekeeping missions at specified rates—consistent with their ability to pay—that are
revised every three years and agreed to by consensus in the UN General Assembly.
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Multilateralism Good
Failed multilateralism goes nuclear.

Aziz 21—(MPhil Scholar at NUML Islamabad). Abdul Aziz. April 15, 2021. “Amid nuclear
treaties, is Biden a win for arms control and global security?”. Global Village Space.
https://www.globalvillagespace.com/amid-nuclear-treaties-is-biden-a-win-for-arms-control-
and-global-security/. Accessed 6/11/21.
President Joe Biden, after taking over as 46th president of the U.S. is confronted with a major
challenge of rescuing the arms control regime, besides other foreign policy issues.
Currently, tensions are rising between the nuclear states, the risk of nuclear use is growing,
billions are being spent on nuclear modernization and weapons sophistication; while in this
scenario the key arms control agreements have kept a check on most destabilizing weapons,
are in serious jeopardy.
These complications have emerged in the aftermath of President Donald Trump’s aggressive
foreign policy approach. During his tenure in the president’s office, Trump resorted to a
haphazard decision-making process without considering the sensitivity of the issues and their
implications in the longer run.
Besides this, the presence of hawkish elements in the Trump administration and the role of the
U.S. Military Industrial Complex has further deteriorated the situation, especially in the arms
control domain.
President Joe Biden has a distinguished background of realizing the sensitivity of nuclear
weapons, arms control, and issues pertaining to global security.
Contrasting with his predecessor, President Biden has a firm commitment to establish an
effective nuclear arms control mechanism and nonproliferation regime which has been
manifested in his maiden address during his oath-taking ceremony on January 20, 2021.
Biden’s commitment to arms control and disarmament dates back to his tenure as vice
president in the Obama administration and his early days in the U.S. Senate. President Joe
Biden, during his election campaign and after his win, has been continuously advocating for an
effective arms control mechanism with Russia and other nuclear-armed states.
Nuclear challenges facing Biden
Nuclear experts are of the view that currently, the Biden administration is facing the five most
important challenges related to the nuclear weapons policy which need immediate attention to
address the prevalent strategic issues.
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The five challenges include the revision and advancement of the nuclear arms control
negotiations including the extension of the New START, developing a consensus to reduce
nuclear weapons at the global level (especially that of the U.S. and Russia), and reinstate the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA).
Besides this, the issue of North Korea’s nuclear program is also due for settlement. Finally,
President Biden has to restore the role of the U.S. as a leader of multilateral nonproliferation
and disarmament.
Recently, there are two important developments in the arms control domain. Firstly, President
Biden has agreed to extend the New START for another five years till 2026, without any
preconditions or amendments to the treaty.
Secondly, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) has entered into force on
January 22, 2021. Moreover, the Biden administration has also declared to reconsider the U.S.
commitment under JCPOA.
These are the positive initiatives by the new administration in Washington that would
significantly improve the global strategic security and make the world safer from nuclear
weapons’ threat.
These initial steps would also put the administration in a better position to pursue long-lasting
and far-reaching nuclear risk reduction and elimination initiatives over the next four years.
Robust governance prevents extinction

Dr. Reinhard Mechler 20, Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Karlsruhe,, Acting Director
of the Risk & Resilience Research Program at the International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis, Anne-Sophie Stevance, Senior Science Officer at the International Science Council,
Teresa M. Deubelli, Researcher with the Risk & Resilience Research Program at the International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, JoAnne Linnerooth-Bayer, Emeritus Scholar with the Risk
& Resilience Research Program at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Anna
Scolobig, Associate with the Risk & Resilience Research Program at the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis, Jenan Irshaid, Researcher with the Water, and with the Risk &
Resilience Research Program at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, John
Handmer, Senior Science Advisor with the Risk & Resilience Research Program at the
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Stefan Hochrainer-Stigler, Senior Research
Scholar with the Risk & Resilience Research Program at the International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis, Thomas Schinko, Deputy Program Director with the Risk & Resilience Research
Program at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, “Bouncing Forward
Sustainably: Pathways to a Post-COVID World Governance for Sustainability”, International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis Background Paper, 7/1/2020, p. 5-6
Governance for Sustainability in light of (post) COVID-19 recovery
The ongoing COVID-19 crisis is

generating massive adverse health and socio-economic impacts for
societies around the globe, which require further attention for managing the pandemic as well
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as generating green, just and lasting recovery efforts. The crisis also brings many issues of
relevance for ongoing sustainability transformations into the spotlight. One such issue is the role
of governance, which we here broadly define as “the totality of actors, rules, conventions, processes and mechanisms
concerned with how relevant…information is collected, analysed and communicated, and how management decisions are taken.”
(IRGC 2005; see also Ostrom 2009).
The approaches taken to address COVID-19 bring to the fore relevant lessons – some (still to be) learnt - regarding global, national
and subnational governance and potential changes needed to inform a shift towards sustainable development pathways. They also
offer insights into opportunities and challenges for catalysing transformational change through decisive actions, e.g. as done with
social distancing measures strongly informed by scientific advice, albeit not necessarily always based on robust evidence. Yet,
COVID-19 also highlights significant gaps in the science-policy-society interface – including with regard to access to reliable,
verifiable data to better inform decision making, in the prevalence of institutional mechanisms to deal with systemic and compound
crises, and in the preparedness of global and national science communities and governance systems, among others.
It is widely recognised that the

existential challenges that humanity is facing, such as climate change,
biodiversity loss, increased prevalence of infectious diseases and others, require ‘robust’
governance structures that foster cooperation and collaboration as never before (WBGU 2014).
COVID-19 provides encouraging as well as challenging lessons for enhancing governance for sustainability. In several ‘early-mover’
countries, bold and decisive national government action coupled with clear communication initially led to containing the spread of
(the first wave of) COVID-19 (e.g. South Korea, Singapore). Globally and regionally, the fact that COVID-19 has
resulted in
amplifying geo-political divides, such as between China and the US, and the challenges to the
unity of the European Union, have been widely discussed in the media, illustrating the need for effective global
governance structures that foster needed cooperation and at the same time respect local
knowledge and democratic process.
What is more, COVID-19 is but one example in a string of health and other disasters and crises that the world has faced with
increasing frequency in the recent past. As global warming continues, it will certainly not be the last. It is thus key to address the
new set of risks and uncertainties in order to reduce risks and be prepared for other extreme events that may follow. Not all
disasters are about health. Climate
scientists are warning us about global tipping points (Lenton et al. 2019)
and local adaptation limits (Mechler et al. 2020) as well as about ‘unknown unknowns,’ which demand
capacity to take robust, nimble, yet evidence-based responses that find acceptance by affected societies.
This draft note for the IIASA-ISC COVID-19 recovery pathways initiative lays out our approach and initial thinking on the theme of
“Governance for Sustainability” in terms of identifying relevant questions to learn from COVID-19 and draw lessons towards
governance for sustainability pathways. We suggest four guiding questions (plus additional supporting questions), which we will
further refine and seek answers to as part of the online consultations and further interactions with experts and the advisory panel.
The ambition of the consultation process is to proceed towards co-generating some relevant policy
recommendations for enhanced governance that is more agile, responsive, empowering, coherent, transparent,
and adaptable in an ever more uncertain future, threatened by climate change and other stressors.
Lack of multilateralism means Extinction

Lawrence J. Gumbiner 14, Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative to the Organization of
American States, World Affairs Council of Charlotte, North Carolina, HumanRights.org, “The OAS
and the Inter-American System”, 4/4/2014, http://www.humanrights.gov/2014/04/04/the-oas-
and-the-inter-american-system/
Introduction I want to extend my appreciation to the WAC for this invitation and the opportunity to share with you the United States’ foreign policy
commitment to multilateral diplomacy through the Organization of American States and the inter-American system. In his address to an OAS General
Assembly last June in Guatemala, Secretary of State John Kerry underscored that: “Across the Americas, the OAS enjoys a unique status as the region’s
most inclusive, most respected regional organization…[I]t reflects the hard work of all of us trying to forge norms and create institutions that safeguard
our shared commitment to our citizens of democracy and human dignity.” Multilateral diplomacy is an essential, indeed a vital,
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element of U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere. Over recent decades, the Western Hemisphere has undergone
profound and positive changes. People throughout the region have made enormous sacrifices to defeat dictators and strengthen
their democracies, and generating increasing prosperity. We must now consolidate these gains in the face of very serious challenges. And the
challenges we face emanate from poverty, from social exclusion, from struggles to provide security for average citizens and from the inability, in some
societies, of democratic institutions to deliver the goods and services that people need. One fundamental debate in our hemisphere today is over how
to develop truly democratic political systems. Winning elections alone is not sufficient. Elected leaders must govern justly and democratically, and
respect for rule of law and democratic institutions must be instilled, to maintain legitimacy. Why the region matters But before I describe in more detail
the importance of the OAS and our diplomacy in the Americas, I want to emphasize with you why, despite the cacophony of significant news from the
rest of the world – from Russia to the Middle East to Asia – we should keep a keen focus on our interests in this hemisphere. With a GDP of $3.6 trillion,
the Latin American and the Caribbean economy is over three times larger than that of India or Russia, and nearly as large as China or Japan. North
America represented over 29% of our world trade in 2013, with Canada our top global trade partner and Mexico our third-largest partner. When it
comes to energy, we are understandably very concerned about developments in the Middle East. But more than one-half of U.S. oil imports originate in
this hemisphere, and this region will account for approximately 2/3 of global growth in petroleum production in the future. Venezuela has the second
largest and Canada the third largest proven oil reserves. We often talk about water becoming the most valuable
commodity of the future, with wars being fought and political stability threatened over its availability.
With this in mind, you should know that more than 45% of the world’s fresh water is in the Americas, including five of the top eight source
countries in the world — Brazil, Canada, Colombia, USA, and Peru. This hemisphere is also home to six of the top ten most
bio diverse countries in the world, with all of the economic and environmental considerations
that this richness entails. So when we talk about critical issues that impact the United States and where our key economic, political and
security interests are at play on a daily basis — we need to start here in our own hemisphere. Why the OAS matters Which brings
me back to the OAS: Why is it so important? Because it is the anchor of our engagement in the
Americas. Through some of the most tumultuous periods of our region’s history, the OAS has been a voice for democracy and human rights.
The OAS has been critical to peaceful development and the growth of democracy for over 100 years — it is the
embodiment of the Inter-American system. The precursor of the OAS was the Pan American Union, created in 1910 as an early vision of hemispheric
integration and mutual cooperation. In 1948, the OAS Charter was adopted at the Ninth Inter-American Conference in Bogota. That same year marked
the adoption of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the first international human rights instrument, and a model for the U.N.
Declaration of Human Rights. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was created by the OAS in 1959, the first of its kind, and also a model
for the UN Human Rights Commission. As the hemisphere’s premier political multilateral institution, the OAS is the forum for the 34 democratically
elected governments of the region to engage in dialogue, diplomacy, and conflict resolution. And it is for that reason that the United States is actively
working to reform and strengthen the OAS and build a stronger, more vibrant, more effective institution — both financially and politically — to address
21st Century challenges affecting the region. To do that, we need to focus on its four pillars: democracy, human rights, integral development and
hemispheric security. With this in mind, let me review with you the OAS progress on these pillars. Democracy On democracy, the United States is
committed to working through the OAS to foster democratic governance and protect fundamental rights and liberties enshrined in the Inter-American
Democratic Charter. Today, this Democratic Charter is at the core of a principled multilateralism in the Americas. With its adoption in September 2001,
no OAS member state can be a disinterested spectator to what occurs in our hemisphere. The Charter, reflects a significant hemispheric commitment
to the collective defense of regional democracy; a shared desire to lock in the democratic gains of recent decades and prevent a return to autocratic
rule. Acting under the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and in the spirit of the Charter, the OAS has helped member states where democratic
practices or institutions have been challenged. Of particular note was the OAS’ important role in Haiti, where it worked on voter registration and
distribution of over 3.4 million ID cards that was essential for that country to make the transition to a functioning democracy and the elections in 2006.
The OAS plays a critical role in Colombia through its mission for demobilization of illegal armed groups. In the event of a peace agreement with the
guerrilla organization FARC, the OAS will be ready if requested to perform a similar function. Following the 2009 coup in Honduras, the OAS stepped in
to help restore democracy. And in Venezuela, the OAS has remain engaged over the years in an effort to support and preserve democratic institutions
in that country. As you are aware, a strong and vibrant debate is presently occurring at the OAS on how to deal with Venezuela’s current crisis after
more than a month of protests. Fulfilling the promise of the Democratic Charter to proactively address threats to democracy is not an easy task among
34 sovereign states in a consensus-based organization. It is one of the key challenges facing the OAS as it adapts to hemispheric developments in the
21st century. Election Observation Missions (EOMS) Democracy starts with clean elections, and election observation is a key element in OAS efforts to
strengthen democracy in the hemisphere. This year, the OAS has fielded or will be fielding high quality election observer missions — or EOMs — in El
Salvador, Costa Rica, Colombia, Panama and Bolivia. We also expect they will assist with elections in Haiti and Antigua and Barbuda when elections
there are called. The OAS enjoys a longstanding reputation for impartiality and technical competence on elections, respected worldwide for stringent
standards in accordance with the United Nations supported “Principles for International Election Observation”. But what is particularly critical today is
the recognition that a free and fair election is more than just counting up the ballots; indeed, the biggest threats to democratic elections in the
Americas no longer come from elections that are “stolen” at the ballot box. The integrity of voter information, the politicization of electoral authorities,
a weakened media, civil society and inadequate separation of powers ― are all factors that contribute to the integrity of elections. To that end, the OAS
has developed groundbreaking new methodologies on such issues as campaign finance, media and gender. It is also working on election integrity and
security, and sub-represented groups. The organization has created the first ever electoral quality management standard for electoral processes,
officially endorsed by the International Organization for Standardization. These new approaches reflect a progressive vision of what electoral
observation and analysis should be today. It is for that reason that despite much polarization in the region, the OAS stamp of approval on elections still
represents the gold standard and is sought after by almost all electoral authorities in the hemisphere. Human Rights Furthering democracy through
human rights is one of the institution’s most significant contributions. The Inter-American Human Rights System (IAHRS) ― the “crown jewel” of the
inter-American System ― is comprised of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The United
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States is proud to be the largest financial supporter of the Commission, which is located in Washington. It is comprised of seven Commissioners, and
eight thematic rapporteurships, including an independent Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression. The Commission played an historically
significant role in helping to combat the dictatorships of the 1980s ― particularly in the Southern Cone and Central America ― and bring about the
growth of democracy that the region enjoys today. The Commission provides a critical forum for citizens — whether acting through NGOs or on their
own — to seek redress of alleged human rights abuses. One of its most important functions is to produce country reports — well documented
assessments of human rights conditions and issues in countries throughout the region, with a focus on the most egregious examples of human rights
abuses. While the United States is not a party to the American Convention on Human Rights ― we signed it in 1977 but have not ratified it ― and is
thus not subject to the jurisdiction of the Costa-Rica based Court, we are nevertheless a strong supporter of the court’s important regional role in
protecting human rights. The future of the IAHRS is one of the most politically charged debates at the OAS today. For several years the System ―
particularly the Commission and its Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression ― have come under sharp criticism from countries, led by Ecuador,
who chafe under the scrutiny that the Commission provides. They are seeking dramatic changes, including a reduction in funding and moving of the HQ
out of Washington. The United States has been and will remain a firm supporter of this important institution, and we will continue our financial
assistance as well as political backing to assure that this remains the backbone of human rights advocacy in the hemisphere. Integral Development
Integral development has been a core pillar for the OAS since the days of the Alliance for Progress, and is a critical function for many of the smaller
states in our hemisphere. It is particularly relevant for Caribbean islands who rely on the organization for many projects and activities that are not
available through the UN or multilateral development banks. One of the most significant functions the OAS provides is the forum to convene ministers
from throughout the hemisphere. These ministers would not meet under any other umbrella. The OAS sponsors ministerial meetings on labor,
education, environment, science, culture, tourism, and social development. The U.S. is a prime supporter of the development agenda in the OAS. Last
night, in conjunction with the Department of Commerce and City of Charlotte we welcomed the America’s Competitive Exchange, with some 40
entrepreneurs and government officials from throughout the hemisphere. This hands-on connection between innovators and entrepreneurs from the
U.S. and the rest of the hemisphere was an example of how the OAS can build positive, practical relationships to promote integral development. Some
of our other initiatives include Small Business Development Centers for the Caribbean, a grants program to promote sustainable cities and
communities, and the Energy & Climate Partnership of the Americas, a program launched by President Obama at the Summit of the Americas in 2009.
Hemispheric Security Hemispheric security is our final core function at the OAS. Even before the OAS was formally constituted ― mutual security was a
driver of hemispheric cooperation, and the basis of the 1947 Rio Treaty on mutual defense. Today, security threats have evolved from the risk of
foreign invasion to the question of citizen security – which polls show is the number one concern of citizens in our hemisphere – and one where the
OAS and Inter-American System play a fundamental role. We face these threats in our hemisphere today by cooperating on anti-
terrorism, counter-narcotics, anti-corruption and the fight against transnational organized crime. And we
continue to promote military cooperation and civil/military education through the Inter-American Defense Board and
its College. Even where some of our political relations are strained, we find that we can work effectively on many fronts with public
security forces where we have common interests in providing basic protection for our citizenry. The Western Hemisphere responded to the
events of 9/11 with greater resolve than any other area in the world, largely working through the OAS. Less than a year after the 9/11 attacks, the OAS
adopted the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism. As a result the
OAS has become a leader in the region in the new
realm of cyber-security and terrorist cyber attacks on government networks and critical infrastructure. One
area where the OAS has proved most effective is in de-mining. Over the past two decades we have pored tremendous
efforts into humanitarian demining, mine education, and victims’ assistance. With U.S. financial support, OAS efforts significantly contributed to the
severe reduction on elimination of mines in Central America, in Peru, Ecuador and Colombia. Summits of the Americas Closely tied to the OAS is the
pinnacle of U.S. multilateral engagement in the region, The Summit of the Americas ― the only hemispheric event that brings together all
democratically elected Heads of State and Government in the Western Hemisphere. Since its inception in 1994 under President Clinton, six summits
and two special summits have taken place from Buenos Aires to Quebec. The outcomes are too numerous to list in total here, but they have been
substantial. In addition to the Energy & Climate Partnership I referred to earlier, the Obama Administration has launched through the Summit process
“Connecting the Americas 2022” to facilitate universal access to electricity and cleaner, more reliable power for citizens across the region, and “100,000
Strong in the Americas”, a program to promote increased international student exchanges between the United States and Latin America and the
Caribbean. The last Summit in Cartagena Colombia in 2012 featured the first “CEO Summit of the Americas”, a high-level dialogue among the region’s
business and government leaders focused on pragmatic partnerships between governments and the private sector to boost economic growth. We
expect that tradition to continue at the next summit, to be held in Panama in 2015. An important issue going forward is how to more closely link the
Summits with the OAS. Presently, the OAS hosts the secretariat of the Summit of the Americas, and serves as a clearinghouse for the implementation of
Summit objectives. Part of our discussions with the U.S. Congress on OAS reform is how to create more direct linkages between these institutions. The
Challenges Ahead Over the last decades, the hemisphere and the OAS have made enormous progress, but we now face new challenges on the political,
economic and security fronts that must be addressed with leadership in bilateral as well as multilateral fora. Let me briefly touch on our overall policy in
the hemisphere. Our approach at the OAS represents the multilateral apporach to the policy. The themes are similar. We continue to fervently support
democracy, but based on good governance and respect for diversity of opinions that underpins democratic values. Several countries in the region see
threats to democratic governance and freedom of expression. We are particularly concerned by the deteriorating situation in Venezuela, where the
United States has called on the Venezuelan government to respect the human rights and the rule of law and begin a peaceful dialogue that alleviates
the current tension. We have made that case and will continue to do so forcefully in the OAS. Economic engagement lies at the
center of our strategy. Our current efforts are focused on concluding the Trans-Pacific Partnership that include several Asian countries, our
NAFTA partners plus Chile and Peru. We have a sustained economic policy dialogue with Brazil and are strengthening our ties with Pacific Alliance
members Mexico, Chile, Colombia and Peru. Prosperity cannot exist without security. That is why we continue to invest in security cooperation with
Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and Colombia. And lastly, a more vigorous energy diplomacy is a core priority. The evolving world energy map
has created huge openings for greater cooperation on energy matters in the Western Hemisphere, including collaboration to promote energy security
with responsible environmental stewardship. The OAS provides significant value-added on all of these themes and plays an important catalytic role in
advancing our shared hemispheric agenda. But the organization must be nimble to adjust to changing circumstances, one that reflects the realities of
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the Americas in the 21st Century. For that reason, we are working on a reform agenda at this venerable institution. We are building
a better,
more modern OAS, not only based on up to date management practices, but one that focusses on the key challenges of our
time.
Escalates to nuclear war

Nye and Kitfield 20 (Glenn; president of the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress and a former
member of Congress, James Kitfield; ; senior fellow at CSPC, and a three time recipient of the Gerald R. Ford Award for
Distinguished Reporting on National Defense, 12/10/2020, Biden’s First Move on Nuclear Weapons, Defense One,
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/12/bidens-first-move-nuclear-weapons/170652/, MAM)
The world is currently living through a period of great instability as it copes with the worst
global pandemic since 1918, the worst economic shock since the Great Depression, and the
worst tensions in major power relations since the early days of the Cold War. These crises come
at a time when the treaties and multilateral institutions that are the foundation of the
international order and strategic stability are visibly weakening, and in danger of collapse. In the
past such periods of deep economic distress and geopolitical tensions have given rise to dark
political forces, and are ripe for confrontation among nation-states. History will not judge kindly
American political leaders who stood idle while a nuclear arms race was added to that already
volatile mix.
Multilat solves world war three.

Rubin, 18 --- J.D. from UC Berkeley (10/19/18, Jennifer, “Why transactional foreign policy is
destined to fail,” https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/10/19/why-
transactional-foreign-policy-is-destined-to-fail/?utm_term=.46ee0d235054, accessed on
6/12/19, JMP)
Since the Iraq War, debate has raged in U.S. foreign policy circles and in public discussion about the
extent to which the United States should involve itself in the world and exert global leadership.
Critics of President George W. Bush (who said in his second inaugural address that “it is the policy of the United States to seek and
support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny
in our world”) and of President Barack Obama asserted that Bush overextended the United States while Obama “led from
behind” with unsatisfactory results. Both, however, understood
that our closest allies were democracies that
shared our values. Then along came President Trump. My colleague Robert Kagan wrote in June that Trump saw “the United
States as rogue superpower, neither isolationist nor internationalist, neither withdrawing nor in decline, but active, powerful and
entirely out for itself. In recent months, on trade, Iran, NATO defense spending and perhaps even North Korea, President Trump
has shown that a president willing to throw off the moral, ideological and strategic constraints
that limited U.S. action in the past can bend this intractable world to his will, at least for a
while.” Even worse, the less democratic and the more vicious the regime (with the exception of
Iran), the more Trump has lavished praise on it, giving the impression that our interests and
theirs are in perfect sync, while our traditional allies (with the exception of Israel) were taking advantage of us, weighing us
down. It wasn’t enough to conduct polite, self-interested diplomacy with the likes of Russian President Vladimir Putin or Turkish
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan; we had to fawn over them and act as their PR agents. Such a foreign policy was bound to
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fail for no less than three reasons. First, it’s not based in reality. Russia doesn’t share our interests in
Europe or the Middle East, and therefore cannot be our partner. North Korea does not seem to share our
interest in denuclearizing (unless it wrenches South Korea out from U.S. protection). Inevitably conflicts arise when the glowing orb
or the red carpet get put away. Second, rogue regimes are by their nature unstable and unreliable. Hosni
Mubarak’s Egypt was a case in point. In providing nondemocratic partners with undiluted praise
and support, we encourage behaviors that ultimately make them less stable, less prosperous
and more corrupt. And third, ultimately the American people won’t stand for it, as we’ve seen
with Saudi Arabia, when our supposed partners shatter international norms, commit human
rights atrocities and impinge on their neighbors’ sovereignty — which they inevitably do . As Kagan
explained, “Trump’s policies are pure realism, devoid of ideals and sentiment, pursuing a narrow
‘national interest’ defined strictly in terms of dollars and cents and defense against foreign attack.
Trump’s world is a struggle of all-against-all. There are no relationships based on common
values. There are merely transactions determined by power. It is the world that a century ago
brought us two world wars.” At present, such a foreign policy brings about continual disappointment and
visceral backlash from the American people. It diminishes our moral authority in the world,
alienates our actual democratic friends, makes us look weak and entangles us in costly and
counterproductive trade wars. Trump and his enablers are now caught: They cozied up to a
regime that acts in repugnant ways (slaughtering civilians in Yemen, killing a U.S. journalist),
triggering a backlash in Congress and the court of public opinion. In lieu of our own coherent Iran policy we
relied on a regime that acts in ways the American people find intolerable. Our “transaction” no longer works, and
we have no backup plan. This does not mean that all of our alliances must be grounded in
shared, democratic values. It does, however, require that we not outsource our foreign policy
to autocratic regimes and that we hold them accountable for their conduct. We must continue
to stand up for universal human rights. It also means we need to commit our own resources and assemble our own
coalitions to burden-share (as we did in the first Gulf War). For the sake of international comity, we must avoid
knee-jerk repudiation of international agreements. Otherwise, we wind up looking like suckers
at the mercy of corrupt, brutal regimes. This is not winning, by any definition.
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Human Rights
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Standing Army Strengthens Human Rights
Effective UN peacekeeping protects human rights
stability
Helping countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace, peacekeeping has unique
strengths, including high levels of international legitimacy and an ability to deploy and sustain
troops and police from around the globe, integrating them with civilian peacekeepers to
advance multidimensional mandates. Today’s peacekeeping operations are called upon not
only to stabilize conflict zones and separate warring parties, but also to protect civilians, assist
in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, support the
organization of elections, protect and promote human rights, and assist in restoring the rule of
law.
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Human Rights Decreasing Globally
Human rights protections decreasing globally
Missy Ryan, 4-12, 22, Washington Post, Human rights and democracy eroding worldwide, U.S.
finds, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/04/12/state-global-human-
rights-report/
Respect for human rights and democratic norms eroded around the world in 2021, as
repressive states increasingly detained opponents and struck out beyond their borders at
those seen posing a threat, the Biden administration said on Tuesday. Secretary of State Antony Blinken described
what he called a continued “recession” in basic rights and the rule of law over the past year as
he unveiled the U.S. government’s annual assessment of the global human rights situation. “Governments are growing more brazen,
reaching across borders to threaten and attack critics,” Blinken said, citing an alleged effort by Iran’s government to abduct an
Iranian American journalist from New York; efforts by the Assad regime to threaten Syrians cooperating with German steps to try
former regime officials; and Belarus’s diversion of a commercial flight to seize a journalist. Blinken
said the jailing of
political opponents had become more common in 2021, with more than a million political
prisoners detained in more than 65 countries . He singled out the imprisonment of peaceful protesters in Cuba;
activists and advocates in Russia and Egypt, including Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny and Egyptian human rights lawyer
Mohammed al-Baqr; and opposition presidential candidates in Benin. Hubris and isolation led Vladimir Putin to misjudge Ukraine
The report laid out a litany of alleged abuses by both allies and rivals, including forced disappearances
in Saudi Arabia
and what it characterized as ongoing acts of genocide and crimes against humanity against
Uyghur Muslims in China. It also cited reprisals by Taliban authorities in Afghanistan against members of the former
government and steps to limit freedoms of women and girls, as well as alleged abuses by all parties in the conflict in Ethiopia,
including government troops from Eritrea. Because the report is focused on trends in 2021, it did not explicitly address Russia’s
ongoing invasion of Ukraine. But Blinken, in remarks to reporters, said that Russian forces’ abuses had been numerous since its
offensive began on Feb. 24, including alleged executions, rape and the deprivation of civilians’ access to food, water and medicine.
“In few places have the human consequences of this decline been as stark as they are in the Russian government’s brutal war on
Ukraine,” he said, pointing to apparent atrocities revealed by the recent withdrawal of Russian forces from some parts of the
country. “We see what this receding tide is leaving in its wake — the bodies, hands bound, left on streets; the theaters, train
stations, apartment buildings reduced to rubble with civilians inside.” The Biden administration has already said it believes Russian
forces are committing war crimes in Ukraine. Last week, U.S. officials helped orchestrate an effort to suspend Russia from the United
Nations’ Human Rights Council. Blinken said the United States would not be spared scrutiny over its own human rights violations.
Since taking office, administration officials have said they would openly acknowledge chronic problems at home, including police
violence against Black Americans. “We take seriously our responsibility to address these shortcomings, and we know that the way
we do it matters,” he said. Sarah Yager, Washington director at Human Rights Watch, welcomed the report but said it failed to
highlight the U.S. role in overseas conflicts where civilians have suffered widespread harm, including in Afghanistan and Yemen. The
United States continues to provide arms and aircraft maintenance support to Saudi Arabia, which leads a coalition battling Houthi
rebels in Yemen. “Always a little odd to read about other’s human rights abuses as if US had nothing to do with them. e.g. no
mention of US support to Saudi [Arabia] in Yemen but the #HumanRightsReport discusses Iran support to Houthis,” she said on
Twitter. “No mention of US in Afghanistan or civilian harm caused in Kabul.” Asked about how the Biden administration would
balance human rights against other American interests, and how such acts would affect American partnerships with countries with
poor human rights records, Blinken said that officials sometimes chose to press foreign governments in private, and sometimes in
public, including in the annual rights report. “It doesn’t distinguish between friend and foe. We apply the same standard
everywhere,” he said. Such strains have been particularly visible in recent months between the Biden administration and key Gulf
allies like Saudi Arabia as U.S. officials seek to secure increased energy output amid the war in Ukraine and Gulf officials bristle at a
host of issues, including what they see as overstated criticism on human rights.
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Respect for human rights decreasing globally
CNN, 4-12, 22, https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-04-12-22/

index.html, Blinken: Global backsliding of human rights starkly evident in Russia's war in Ukraine
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Tuesday that the global backsliding of human rights
is starkly evident “in the Russian government's brutal war on Ukraine.” “That's especially true
in recent weeks, as Russian forces have been pushed back from towns and cities they occupied
or surrounded and evidence mounts of their widespread atrocities,” Blinken said in remarks at
the State Department while releasing the 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices “We
see what this receding tide is leaving in its wake. The bodies, hands bound, left on streets.
Theaters, train stations, apartment buildings reduced to rubble with civilians inside. We hear it
in the testimonies of women and girls who have been raped, and the beseeched civilians
starving and freezing to death. In response people and governments in every region are voicing
their condemnation and calling for those responsible to be held accountable,” the secretary of
state described. “In its disdain for human life and dignity, the Kremlin has reinvigorated a
belief in people worldwide, that there are human rights that everyone everywhere should
enjoy and underscore why these rights are worth defending,” he said. “At the same time, civil
society, governments, and people around the world are rightly pointing out that Ukraine is
tragically far from the only place where gross abuses are being perpetrated. They want the
international community to shine a spotlight on human rights abuses wherever they're being
committed, and to bring the same urgency to stopping abuses and holding perpetrators
accountable," he said.
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Human Rights Impacts
Global human rights violations create conditions where extinction is inevitable

Human Rights Web, 94 (An Introduction to the Human Rights Movement Created on July 20,
1994 / Last edited on January 25, 1997, http://www.hrweb.org/intro.html)
The United Nations Charter, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and UN Human Rights
convenants were written and implemented in the aftermath of the Holocaust, revelations
coming from the Nuremberg war crimes trials, the Bataan Death March, the atomic bomb, and
other horrors smaller in magnitude but not in impact on the individuals they affected. A whole
lot of people in a number of countries had a crisis of conscience and found they could no longer
look the other way while tyrants jailed, tortured, and killed their neighbors.
In Germany, the Nazis first came for the communists, and I did not speak up, because I was not a
Communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak up, because I was not a Jew. Then
they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak up, because I was not a trade unionist.
Then they came for the Catholics, and I did not speak up, because I was not a Catholic. Then
they came for me... and by that time, there was no one to speak up for anyone.
-- Martin Niemoeller, Pastor,
German Evangelical (Lutheran) Church
Many also realized that advances in technology and changes in social structures had rendered
war a threat to the continued existence of the human race. Large numbers of people in many
countries lived under the control of tyrants, having no recourse but war to relieve often
intolerable living conditions. Unless some way was found to relieve the lot of these people,
they could revolt and become the catalyst for another wide-scale and possibly nuclear war.
For perhaps the first time, representatives from the majority of governments in the world
came to the conclusion that basic human rights must be protected, not only for the sake of the
individuals and countries involved, but to preserve the human race.
The protection of human rights is necessary for the survival of the species
Copelon 99(Profesor of Law at NY School of Law, 3 N.Y. City L. Rev.), p. 71-2
The indivisible human rights framework survived the Cold War despite U.S. machinations to
truncate it in the international arena. The framework is there to shatter the myth of the
superiority of the U.S. version of rights, to rebuild popular expectations, and to help develop a
culture and jurisprudence of indivisible human rights. Indeed, in the face of systemic inequality
and crushing poverty, violence by official and private actors, globalization of the market
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economy, and military and environmental depredation, the human rights framework is gaining
new force and new dimensions. It is being broadened today by the movements of people in
different parts of the world, particularly in the Southern Hemisphere and significantly of women,
who understand the protection of human rights as a matter of individual and collective human
survival and betterment. Also emerging is a notion of third-generation rights, encompassing
collective rights that cannot be solved on a state-by-state basis and that call for new
mechanisms of accountability, particularly affecting Northern countries. The emerging rights
include human-centered sustainable development, environmental protection, peace, and
security. Given the poverty and inequality in the United States as well as our role in the world, it
is imperative that we bring the human rights framework to bear on both domestic and foreign
policy.
Human rights protection prevents extinction
Annas et al 2 Edward R. Utley Prof. and Chair Health Law @ Boston U. School of Public Health
and Prof. SocioMedical Sciences and Community Science @ Boston U. School of Medicine and
Prof. Law @ Boston U. School of Law [George, Lori Andrews, (Distinguished Prof. Law @
Chicago-Kent College of Law and Dir. Institute for Science, Law, and Technology @ Illinois
Institute Tech), and Rosario M. Isasa, (Health Law and Biotethics Fellow @ Health Law Dept. of
Boston U. School of Public Health), American Journal of Law & Medicine, “THE GENETICS
REVOLUTION: CONFLICTS, CHALLENGES AND CONUNDRA: ARTICLE: Protecting the Endangered
Human: Toward an International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations”, 28 Am.
J. L. and Med. 151, http://gefree.org.nz/assets/pdf/cloning.pdf DOA: 9-25-15
The development of the atomic bomb not only presented to the world for the first time the prospect of
total annihilation, but also, paradoxically, led to a renewed emphasis on the "nuclear family," complete with its personal
bomb shelter. The conclusion of World War II (with the dropping of the only two atomic bombs ever used in war)
led to the recognition that world wars were now suicidal to the entire species and to the
formation of the United Nations with the primary goal of preventing such wars. n2
Prevention, of course, must be based on the recognition that all humans are fundamentally
the same, rather than on an emphasis on our differences. In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, the
closest the world has ever come to nuclear war, President John F. Kennedy, in an address to the former
Soviet Union, underscored the necessity for recognizing similarities for our survival: ¶ [L]et us not
be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and the
means by which those differences can be resolved . . . . For, in the final analysis, our most basic
common link is that we all inhabit this small planet . We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our
children's future. And we are all mortal. n3 ¶ That we are all fundamentally the same, all human, all with the same dignity and
rights, is at the core of the most important document to come out of World War II, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
and the two treaties that followed it (together known as the "International Bill of Rights"). n4 The
recognition of
universal human rights, based on human dignity and equality as well as the principle of
nondiscrimination, is fundamental to the development of a species consciousness . As Daniel
Lev of Human Rights Watch/Asia said in 1993, shortly before the Vienna Human Rights Conference: ¶ Whatever else may
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separate them, human beings belong to a single biological species, the simplest and most
fundamental commonality before which the significance of human differences quickly
fades. . . . We are all capable, in exactly the same ways, of feeling pain, hunger, [*153] and a hundred kinds of deprivation.
Consequently, people nowhere routinely concede that those with enough power to do so ought to be able to kill, torture,
imprison, and generally abuse others. . . . The
idea of universal human rights shares the recognition of
one common humanity, and provides a minimum solution to deal with its miseries . n5 ¶
Membership in the human species is central to the meaning and enforcement of human
rights, and respect for basic human rights is essential for the survival of the human species .
The development of the concept of "crimes against humanity" was a milestone for universalizing human rights in that it
recognized that there were certain actions, such as slavery and genocide, that implicated the welfare of the entire species and
therefore merited universal condemnation. n6 Nuclear weapons were immediately seen as a technology that required
international control, as extreme genetic manipulations like cloning and inheritable genetic alterations have come to be seen
today. In fact, cloning and inheritable genetic alterations can be seen as crimes against humanity of a unique sort: they are
techniques that can alter the essence of humanity itself (and thus threaten to change the foundation of human rights) by taking
human evolution into our own hands and directing it toward the development of a new species, sometimes termed the
"posthuman." n7 It may be that species-altering techniques, like cloning and inheritable genetic modifications, could provide
benefits to the human species in extraordinary circumstances. For example, asexual genetic replication could potentially save
humans from extinction if all humans were rendered sterile by some catastrophic event. But no such necessity currently exists
or is on the horizon.
Human rights prevent torture, discrimination, domestic violence
Tara Van Ho, Rachel López and Evelyne Schmid, March 8, 2022. Deprioritizing Human Rights Will
Not Protect Territorial Sovereignty, https://www.justsecurity.org/80571/deprioritizing-human-
rights-will-not-protect-territorial-sovereignty/, Evelyne Schmid (@SchmidEvelyne) is an associate professor of international law at Université de Lausanne, Switzerland. She was
previously based at the Universität Basel, Bangor University and at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID). She also acted as the project coordinator for the International Criminal Court’s Legal Tools Project at TRIAL in Geneva. She is
the author of Taking Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Seriously in International Criminal Law (Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law, 2015; Christiane-Rajewsky award 2016) and is currently a board member of the European Society of
International Law (ESIL). Tara Van Ho (@TaraVanHo) is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Essex (U.K.). She was previously an assistant professor in Aarhus University’s Department of Law (Denmark). As Co-Director of the Essex Business and Human Rights Project,
she advises governments, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations on the impacts of investment laws and treaties on human rights, particularly in post-conflict situations. She has a J.D. from Cincinnati, and an LL.M. in international human
rights law, and a Ph.D. in Law, both from Essex. Rachel López (@Rachel_E_Lopez) is an Associate Professor of Law and was recently named as an Inaugural Dean’s Research Fellow at the Thomas R. Kline School of Law at Drexel University. She is also currently a Fellow
at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School. She has also held visiting research fellowships at the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law at the University of Cambridge, the Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights at
Yale Law School, and the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law. In 2016, Professor López researched transitional justice in Guatemala and Spain as a Fulbright Scholar. From 2015 to 2019, she served as a Commissioner on the
Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission, as an appointee of Governor Tom Wolf.
Domestic state officials, local bureaucrats, non-governmental organizations and other “law
intermediaries” regularly use human rights conventions in their day-to-day work. Invoking
human rights law is rarely a panacea, but painstaking, mundane processes built on human rights
law have led to concrete improvements for real people. By defining international legal
expectations, the United Nations has provided the foundation for advancing human rights
through domestic systems. We have witnessed the prohibition and prosecution of acts of
torture and extrajudicial killings, the provision of healthcare and education on non-
discriminatory grounds, greater access to public transportation for persons with disabilities,
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rebukes of unlawful evictions, and the creation of shelters from domestic violence, all built on
international legal claims.
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Cracking down on human rights violators in the only way to solve international
stability and leadership
Calingaert 13 Daniel Calingaert Executive Vice President, Freedom House Resisting the Global Crackdown on Civil Society July
11, 2013 https://freedomhouse.org/article/resisting-global-crackdown-civil-society#.VenKeRFViko
To curb the global crackdown, the United States needs to systematically oppose efforts by authoritarian
governments to control civic space, take vigorous political and diplomatic measures to support civil society organizations that come under
threat, and get around government restrictions designed to isolate local organizations from the international community. Effective U.S. policy to
defend civil society needs to respond comprehensively to the global nature of the crackdown and, at the same time, turn the tide in key countries
where repression of civil society has significant regional repercussions. While bipartisan collaboration is critical to make such policy effective, a
strong U.S. response to the global crackdown on civil society must begin in the White House .
Intensified Crackdown
Governments around the world are intensifying their crackdown on civil society. The pushback
against democracy, which began almost a decade ago, has grown more pervasive and pernicious. Authoritarian regimes
are becoming more assertive in constraining civic space and bold in flouting international norms protecting
freedom of association.
In Egypt, a court in June shut down a German and four American non-
Fresh examples of this crackdown abound.
governmental organizations (NGOs), including Freedom House, and convicted all of their 43 employees who were on trial for more than
a year for operating without a license. By contrast, hardly any cases against security officials involved in the deaths of protesters have resulted in
convictions. In addition, the government of President Mohamed Morsi, before it was deposed, was pushing a draft law that would tighten restrictions
on NGOs.
In Russia, authorities have inspected hundreds of NGOs following the passage of a law that
would brand NGOs as “foreign agents” if they engage in “political activity” while receiving
foreign funding. The respected election monitoring organization Golos was fined and then suspended for failing to register as a “foreign
agent.” A leading human rights group, For Human Rights, was forcibly evicted from its office and its director was beaten.
In Azerbaijan, authorities have broken up anti-government demonstrations , and seven activists from the
youth movement NIDA are currently in prison awaiting trial on trumped up charges. Moreover, new restrictions on NGOs impose crippling fines for
minor administration violations in receiving foreign funding.
Global Trends
These examples are just the latest steps in the steady deterioration in freedom of association over the past several years. The global average of
Freedom in the World ratings for freedom of association has declined every year since 2006, with the exception of 2011, when it stayed the same (see
graph below).
Freedom of association has declined more sharply than civil liberties overall and political rights (see graph below). This sharper decline suggests that
authoritarian rulers are going further to constrain civil society than to block traditional
political opposition. They are targeting groups that defend the rights of citizens, challenge abuses of power, expose electoral fraud, and
mobilize public protests. Authoritarian rulers may have drawn the lesson from the 2011 Arab uprisings that civil society is a key driver of political
change, particularly where opposition political parties are weak. Moreover, attacks on civil society at times serve to restrict
political space in anticipation of upcoming elections , as in the case of Azerbaijan, which will hold a presidential election in
mid-October.
Dozens of governmentsare misusing laws to repress civil society , particularly to hinder the creation of civil society
The misuse of laws is designed to provide a patina of
organizations, limit their activities, and constrain their funding.
legitimacy for repression.

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Authoritarian governments often restrict foreign funding for civil society so that they can claim they are
protecting their country from nefarious outside influences when in reality they are choking off vital resources for indigenous groups that check their
abuses of power. In most countries outside of North America and Western Europe, civil society organizations face great difficulty in raising funds
domestically, particularly for work aimed at strengthening democracy and human rights, because domestic donors risk serious reprisals. For example,
Russia’s Federal Security Service has targeted donors of anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny in the past and when he was put on trial earlier this year.
Legal restrictions, however, are only part of the story. Civil society activists are harassed, attacked, and even murdered to stop them from carrying out
their work and to intimidate others from pursuing similar efforts to stand up for citizens’ rights or take on entrenched interests.
It is also an international
The global crackdown is more than a pattern of abuses taking place within countries in different continents.
phenomenon that crosses borders and challenges multilateral institutions . Authoritarian regimes are
exporting repression. They are replicating each other’s worst practices and working together to silence democratic
aspirations and quash dissent. They also are collaborating to water down accepted international
human rights standards and weaken international institutions that protect human rights .
U.S. Interests
The global assault on civil society adversely affects U.S. interests in several ways. First, it undermines democracy
and thereby contributes to instability . In the Arab world, for example, U.S. reliance on authoritarian rulers to
preserve stability through repression is no longer tenable. The uprisings of 2011 shattered the brittle stability of repressive rule in
several countries and put it in question elsewhere. Sharp social divisions, notably between Islamist and secular currents, have
emerged, and they are unlikely to get resolved without violence outside of an inclusive,
democratic process , which allows civil society to operate freely. Democratic systems channel political
competition and citizen grievances into nonviolent processes , while authoritarian systems are designed to block off nonviolent
avenues to express differences and consider political alternatives.
Civil society contributes directly to stability by encouraging citizens to address their concerns through democratic
political processes, including elections. It also challenges abuses of power that fuel instability . For instance,
civil society seeks to hold to account security officials who use arbitrary or excessive force against civilians, which tends to cause greater political
polarization. Civil society also exposes corruption, which undercuts economic efficiency, provokes resentment in society, and often diverts significant
portions of foreign aid from public goods to private gains.
Second, repression of civil society tends to hold back the emergence of more reliable international
partners . Most U.S. allies are democratic, because alliances are often grounded in shared values ,
while the countries that pose the greatest challenges to U.S . interests invariably are authoritarian. U.S.
relationships with authoritarian governments , even when friendly, are purely transactional; they extend only so
far as each side’s interests coincide. Authoritarian rulers often try to deflect the blame for their country’s ills to alleged foreign plots and to silence
Civil society meanwhile seeks to promote
their domestic critics by accusing civil society leaders of serving foreign interests.
constructive solutions to real problems, such as injustice and a dearth of economic opportunities, and to
encourage positive interaction with the international community .
Third, the crackdown on civil society chips away at accepted international norms and thus begins to
erode the international order , which is based to a significant extent on multilateral agreements and commitments. It
undermines international standards for the freedoms of association and expression and degrades the rule of law. Countries that
fail to uphold their international commitments to respect the freedoms of association and expression are more inclined to flout other international
commitments, for instance to protect intellectual property or prevent arbitrary seizures of assets from foreign investment.
Fourth, the crackdown impedes a core component of modern U.S. diplomacy—building U.S. relations with
the people of other countries, not just with their governments. U.S. leaders and diplomats can best serve U.S. interests
by interacting with a broad cross-section of society in other countries, explaining American

values and policies directly to people around the world, and fostering of direct links between
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different segments of U.S. society with their counterparts abroad. The tepid U.S. response to
the crackdown on civil society allows the links between American and foreign societies to get
cut off , reverts U.S. diplomacy to a focus on government-to-government relations, as was
prevalent in the last century, and leaves the impression that the U.S. government does not care
about the people in other countries and is content to deal only with foreign governments,
regardless of how badly these governments treat their citizens. This impression damages U.S.
credibility overseas .
Fifth, the brazen pushback against U.S. democracy assistance and the weak U.S. response create the perception that
the United States is unwilling or unable to stand up for its interests , and even for its citizens. Several
countries have shut down U.S. foreign assistance programs but faced little resistance from the U.S. government
and few if any consequences. This pattern began with the raids on American NGO offices in Cairo in December 2011 and continued with the closure of
U.S. and European democracy organizations in the United Arab Emirates, the expulsion of the U.S. Agency for International Development from Russia
The U.S. government’s decisions to
and later from Bolivia, and most recently the convictions of NGO workers by a court in Cairo.
largely give in to these moves in Egypt, UAE, Russia, and Bolivia make it look weak .
The U.S. government frequently declares its support for citizens of other countries to exercise their fundamental rights, including the freedom of
The tepid U.S. response to suppression of civil
association, and those citizens often look to the United States for support.
society leaves those citizens vulnerable and damages U.S. credibility in the eyes of both pro- democracy activists
abroad and authoritarian governments .
Defending Civil Society
A vigorous and effective response to the global crackdown on civil society must begin in the White House. President Obama sets the direction for U.S.
foreign policy, and the best measures to address the crackdown are in the hands of the executive. He has other foreign policy priorities, but
neglect of the crackdown will do more to hinder than promote his other priorities, and it runs the risk of leaving the world
less stable overall, more hostile to the United States, and more likely to challenge U.S. interests .
US Human Rights Leadership is key to preserving the post-WW2 world order

and preventing war.
Green, Director of Human Rights Initiative at CSIS, 2017 (Shannon, April 4, “When The US Gives
Up on Human Rights, Everyone Suffers”, Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/04/when-the-u-s-gives-up-on-human-
rights-everyone-suffers/, DOA 8/19/2017, DVOG, *NDCC WAVE ONE*)
This capitulation would have major security and economic consequences for the United States and its closest allies. In
addition to the
moral imperative, America has strong interests in supporting democracy and human rights
abroad.
First, democratic countries make the best, most stable partners. Democracies are more
likely to form alliances and cooperate with other democracies and less likely to get embroiled
in conflict. The U.S. military understands the value of having partners that respect human
rights and the rule of law, and thus invests billions a year in enhancing the professionalism of
security forces overseas. Recent research has deepened our understanding of the benefits for
American security of having broad and deep ties to other countries . In a statistical analysis of Muslim-majority
countries’ cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism, Peter S. Henne found states that received more foreign assistance were more
collaborative than those that did not. Conversely, emboldened
dictators tend to pursue foreign policy agendas
that are erratic and destructive for the United States and its allies. North Korean ruler Kim
Jong Un’s spate of nuclear tests and missile launches and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s
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annexation of Crimea and incursions into eastern Ukraine are emblematic of the kind of
aggressive behavior the international community has come to expect from autocratic leaders .
Second, contrary
to the president’s assertions, the United States has benefitted immensely from
the liberal world order that it helped create. From the ashes of World War II, America invested
in interlocking political and economic institutions, alliances, and norms — based on universal
human rights, shared values, and the rule of law — that would prevent large-scale conflict and
displacement in the future and fuel Europe’s recovery from the war. The United States has
been both the primary engine and beneficiary of this liberal international order. To be clear,
inequality has been a terrible byproduct of this system — and too many have been left
behind. But, far from being victimized by globalization, the United States has enjoyed nearly
70 years of unparalleled influence because of its investment in the promotion of democracy
and human rights.
Finally, U.S. support for democracy and human rights matters in people’s lives. It is true that the United States has been far from perfect in
championing human rights, especially where America has short-term security interests. Yet there
is no other country that can
substitute for the United States when it comes to fighting for universal freedoms. American
presidents, members of Congress, and cabinet secretaries have personally intervened to get
political prisoners released from jail, prevent genocide, and bring war criminals to justice. The
solidarity expressed by U.S. political and civil leaders has provided sustenance and hope to
human rights defenders in the grimmest conditions . An Egyptian activist once pulled a speech given by President Barack
Obama on the vital contributions of civil society out of his pocket and said to me, “When I heard these words, I knew I wasn’t alone.”
At a moment in which the forces of nationalism, authoritarianism, and hatred threaten to tear our societies apart again, the United States needs to make sure that those bravely
fighting against repression and injustice all around the world know that they have not been forgotten.
US human rights cred is key to soft power and global human rights protections
Koh 9
Harold Hongju Koh (Dean and Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law at Yale Law School). “Speech:
Repairing Our Human Rights Reputation.” Western New England Law Review. Originally delivered at the Western New England
College School of Law on Sept. 9, 2008. Lexis Nexis.
Since all of us have been alive, our country, the United States, has been the world's
acknowledged human rights leader. That is certainly why my parents came here, and probably yours as well. Since
World War II, ours was universally regarded as a nation that values human rights and the rule of law, that speaks out against
injustice and dictatorship, and that tries to practice what we preach. Of course we have never been perfect, but we have usually
When I was a diplomat for the United States government, I was always
been thought to be sincere.
struck by how seriously other countries would listen to what Americans had to say . They
listened to us because we were powerful, sure, but they thought us powerful because they
thought we were principled. Our commitments to principles of human rights and the rule of law
were seen as a major source of our soft power. [*12] But in the last few years, sadly, much of
this has changed. I travel a lot. Maybe you do too. And if you have traveled abroad in the last
few years, you cannot help but notice the steady decline of our global human rights reputation .
In the last seven years, we have gone from being viewed as the major supporter of the international human rights system to its
major target. Our
obsessive focus on the War on Terror has taken an extraordinary toll upon our
global human rights policy. Seven years of defining our human rights policy through the lens of the War on Terror has
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clouded our human rights reputation, given cover to abuses committed by our allies in that War, and blunted our ability to criticize
and deter gross violators elsewhere in the world. After September 11, 2001, we were properly viewed with universal sympathy as
victims of a brutal attack. But we have responded with a series of unnecessary, self-inflicted wounds, which have gravely diminished
America's standing as the world's human rights leader. You know the list as well as I do: the horror of Abu Ghraib; our disastrous
policy on Guantanamo; our tolerance of torture and cruel treatment for detainees; our counterproductive decision to create military
commissions; warrantless government wiretapping; our attack on the United Nations and its human rights bodies, including the
International Criminal Court; and the denial of habeas corpus for suspected terrorist detainees that, thankfully, was struck down this
past summer by a narrow majority of the United States Supreme Court. Whatever you may think of these policies, there can be little
doubt that the impact on our human rights reputation has been devastating. In
a recent Pew Global Attitudes survey,
favorable opinions of the United States had fallen in most of our fifteen closest allies - including
Spain, India, and Indonesia - even though those polled largely shared our views as to the
greatest dangers in the world. n1 And in these countries, amazingly, America's continuing presence in Iraq is cited as a
danger to world peace at least as often as the growing threat of Iran. n2 Today, a vast majority of our allies believe that our policies
on Guantanamo are illegal. And a recent foreign policy survey showed that many Americans believe that the [*13] ability of the
United States to achieve its foreign policy goals has decreased significantly over the last few years and that improving America's
standing in the world should become a major goal of U.S. foreign policy. n3 When I was Assistant Secretary for Human Rights in
1999, I told a United Nations body that the United States is "unalterably committed to a world without torture." n4 That was not a
casual statement; I had cleared that statement with every relevant agency of the United States government. But, in just a few short
years, we seem to have gone from what was a zero-tolerance policy toward torture to what now seems to be a zero-accountability
policy. Increasingly, that problem afflicts our popular culture. The New Yorker magazine reports that before September 11th, there
were only four torture scenes on television each year; after September 11th, the average rose to at least one hundred torture
scenes a year, with United States government officials regularly shown as justifiably committing crimes against humanity. n5 On the
popular television show 24, American officials are seen committing torture nearly every week. The question we should ask ourselves
is: "is torture really making us safer?" After all, 24 is widely exported by DVD to the Middle East. n6 If millions of television watchers
in that region think that Americans routinely torture detainees, why should we expect them to act differently toward their
And what impact does this have on our
detainees, who may in time come to include our own citizens and soldiers?
ability to help solve the acute problems around the world, especially in the Middle East? The
Washington Post recently noted that the United States is no longer a player "across the board"
in the Middle East. n7 More countries [*14] in the region simply do not listen to us anymore,
and openly make moves that go against our stated policies and strategy. So this is our problem: how to
repair our tarnished human rights reputation. As a nation, and as families, we face many problems - the price of gas, housing, and
food, just to name a few - but as a law dean and human rights lawyer, let me ask you not to ignore what I think is the most serious
problem facing Americans today. The reason is simple. Since
World War II, our country has been the balance
wheel of the global human rights system because our reputation for human rights principles
and commitment to law made us the engine that drove the global human rights system . In the
post-Cold War world, from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the fall of the Twin Towers, we tried to
revive the human rights system - in the Balkans, in Sierra Leone, in East Timor, in The Hague. But
since September 11th, the post-post Cold War era has seen us too often siding with Pakistan in defending torture, siding with China
in defending arbitrary detentions of Uighur Muslims, and siding with Russia in defending human rights abuses against Chechens as
part of the "War on Terror." When
our human rights system loses its balance, why should we be
surprised when the world seems to go out of whack? And so, in the last few months, we have
witnessed the constitutionalization of emergency rule in Egypt, the loss of democracy in
Pakistan, stolen elections in Zimbabwe and Burma, and United States government officials who
refuse to say that waterboarding is torture, even when it is committed by foreign countries
against our own troops. n8 As Tom Friedman of the New York Times recently noted, last year was by far the worst year for
freedom in the world since the end of the Cold War. n9 Freedom House reports that almost four times as many states declined in
their freedom scores as improved. n10 And note this: among the least democratic countries in the world are those who derive most
of their revenues from oil. So [*15] as the price of fuel rises, and with it the price of food, we must cut our reliance on fossil fuels
not just to save money, not just to protect the environment, not just to promote our national security, but to promote the rule of
law by reducing our dangerous dependence on a commodity that strengthens petro-dictators and weakens democracy worldwide.
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Human rights key to stop global war

Burke white 04
Burke-White 4 – William W., Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special
Assistant to the Dean at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs,
Princeton University and Ph.D. at Cambridge, "Human Rights and National Security: The
Strategic Correlation", The Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring, 17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 249,
Lexis
For most of the past fifty years, U.S. foreign policymakers have largely viewed the promotion of
human rights anti the protection of national security as in inherent tension. Almost without
exception, each administration has treated the two goals as mutually exclusive: promote human
rights at the expense of national security or protect national security while overlooking
international human rights. While U.S. |*)licymakers have been motivated at times by human
rights concerns, such concerns have generally been subordinate to national security. For
example, President Bushs 2(X)2 U.S. National Security Strategy speaks of a “commitment to
protecting basic human rights.” In the same document, President Bush makes it clear that
“defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the
Federal Government.”1 This subordination of human rights to national security is both
unnecessary and strategically questionable. A more effective U.S. foreign policy would view
human rights and national security as correlated and complementary goals. Better protection of
human rights around the world would make the United States safer and more secure. The
United States needs to restructure its foreign policy accordingly. This Article presents a strategic
—as opposed to ideological or normative—argument that the promotion of human rights should
be given a more prominent place in U.S. foreign policy. It does so by suggesting a correlation
between the domestic human rights practices of states and their propensity to engage in
aggressive international conduct. Among the chief threats to U.S. national security arc acts of
aggression by other states. Aggressive acts of war may directly endanger the United States, as
did the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 19dl, or they may require U.S. military action
overseas, as in Kuwait fifty years later. Evidence from the post-G)ld War period indicates that
states that systematically abuse their own citizens’ human rights are also those most likely to
engage in aggression. To the degree that improvements in various states’ human rights records
decrease the likelihood of aggressive war, a foreign policy informed by human rights can
significantly enhance U.S. and global security. Since 1990, a state’s domestic human ri ghts
policy appears to be a telling indicator of that state’s propensity to engage in international
aggression. A central element of U.S. foreign policy has long been the preservation of peace and
the prevention of such acts of aggression. 2 If the correlation discussed herein is accurate, it
provides U. S. policymakers with a powerful new tool to enhance national security through the
promotion of human rights. A strategic linkage between national s ecurity and human rights
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would result in a number of important policy modiªcat ions. First, it cha nges the prioritization of
those countries U.S. policymakers have identiªed as presenting the greatest concern. Second, it
alters so me of the policy prescriptions for such states. Third, it offers states a mean s of
signaling benign international intent through the improvement of their domestic human rights
records. Fourth, it provides a way for a current government to prevent future governments from
aggressive international behavior th rough the institutionalization of human rights protections.
Fifth, it addresses the particular threat of human rights abusing states obtaining weapons of
mass destruction (WMD). Finally, it offers a mechanism for U.S.-U.N. cooperation on human
rights issues.
Human rights framework key to solve unequal outcomes based on race, gender,
disability and other protected categories.
Yamin, Georgetown Law Professor, 2009 (Alicia Ely, Visiting Professor of Law at Georgetown University
Law Center and the Program Director of the Health and Human Rights Initiative, Adjunct lecturer on Law and Global Health at the
Harvard TH Chan School of Public Health, Global Fellow at the Center on Law and Social Transformation in Norway, “Shades of
Dignity: Exploring the Demands of Equality in Applying Human Rights Frameworks to Health”, Health and Human Rights Journal,
https://cdn2.sph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2013/07/2-Yamin1.pdf, DOA 7/30/2017, DVOG, *NDCC WAVE ONE*)
The great power of applying a human rights framework to health lies in denaturalizing the
inequalities that pervade our societies and our world, whether based on gender, caste, race,
or some other characteristic. In this article, I have argued that a human rights framework concerns itself
with ensuring that every person, by virtue of being human, enjoys a full set of rights. It also
concerns itself with defining the content of those rights, including health, to which people
with different biological and social needs are entitled, and the scope of ensuing governmental
obligations. Inequalities — and discrimination — affect all of our myriad forms of identity, but
I have emphasized here the importance of addressing social inequalities to promote the
effective enjoyment of rights to health and the social determinants of health. In a human
rights framework, health is a reflection of power relations as much as biological or behavioral
factors. The gross social inequalities — pathologies of power, to use Paul Farmer’s term — that ravage so many countries around the
world today not only create patterns of ill health and disability. They also limit the ability of people to participate fully in
their societies, and to hold their governments and other actors accountable. In thinking
through how to address situations of stark inequality, a focus on the poor — the worst off in
terms of income — seems an obvious step because they generally have the worst health
problems and because human rights calls for a special concern for the marginalized and
disadvantaged. However, as we have seen, the picture is decidedly more complex. At the same time as we attempt to ensure that policies and
programs more effectively promote the rights of the worst off (defined more broadly than merely in terms of income), we also need to
take action to reduce inequalities across the whole of society, as well as across the
international order, a focus topic for the next issue of Health and Human Rights. One key step is to treat health
systems as the core social institutions that they are, and to ensure that financing and priority-
setting processes within them facilitate greater substantive equality and inclusion. 100 Human rights
law does not magically resolve debates within the public health and development fields as to which health inequalities are necessarily inequities.
However, a
human rights framework does establish that all people, by virtue of being human,
have a claim for redress when they are treated unfairly and have a right to participate in
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determining what equity and equality require in a given context. As Thomas Pogge has suggested, the poor
and disadvantaged can thus no longer be seen merely as “shrunken wretches begging for our
help” but must be addressed as “persons with dignity who are claiming what is theirs by
right.”
Rights are an absolute good and we must act to protect them in all instances;
failure to protect rights makes war and tyranny inevitable.
Human Rights Watch 97 (“An Introduction to the Human Rights Movement,” January 25, 1997,
http://www.hrweb.org/intro.html, DOA 7/30/2017, DVOG, *NDCC WAVE ONE*)
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have
outraged the conscience of [hu]mankind , and the advent of a world in which human beings shall
enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people, Whereas it is
essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that
human rights should be protected by the rule of law... These are the second and third paragraphs of the
preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December
10, 1948 without a dissenting vote. It is the first multinational declaration mentioning human rights by name, and the human rights movement has largely adopted it as a
charter. I'm quoting them here becauseit states as well or better than anything I've read what human rights are and why they are
important. The United Nations Charter, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and UN Human Rights convenants were written
and implemented in the aftermath of the Holocaust , revelations coming from the Nuremberg war crimes trials, the Bataan Death
March, the atomic bomb, and other horrors smaller in magnitude but not in impact on the individuals they affected. A whole lot of people in a
number of countries had a crisis of conscience and found they could no longer look the other
way while tyrants jailed, tortured, and killed their neighbors. In Germany, the Nazis first came for the communists, and I did
not speak up, because I was not a Communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak up, because I was not a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did
not speak up, because I was not a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics, and I did not speak up, because I was not a Catholic. Then they came for me... and by that
Many also realized that advances in

time, there was no one to speak up for anyone. -- Martin Niemoeller, Pastor, German Evangelical (Lutheran) Church
technology and changes in social structures had rendered war a threat to the continued
existence of the human race. Large numbers of people in many countries lived under the control of
tyrants, having no recourse but war to relieve often intolerable living conditions. Unless some way
was found to relieve the lot of these people, they could revolt and become the catalyst for another
wide-scale and possibly nuclear war. For perhaps the first time, representatives from the majority of
governments in the world came to the conclusion that basic human rights must be protected , not only for the
sake of the individuals and countries involved, but to preserve the human race. Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired
signifies in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending
the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. This is not a way of life at all in any true sense. Under the clouds of war, it is humanity hanging on a
cross of iron. -- Dwight D. Eisenhower President of the United States "I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and
stones." -- Albert Einstein
Trachtman 12
Joel Trachtman (Professor of International Law). “Who Cares about International Human Rights? The Supply and Demand of
International Human Rights Law.” 2012.
It is true that human rights violations may cause significant international external effects,
including refugee crises, ethnic or other conflict, certain types of regulatory competition as in
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connection with labor rights, and more diluted external effects in terms of reduced economic
growth. Human rights violations may also certainly cause external effects through altruism: citizens of foreign states may suffer
diminished utility by knowing of human rights violations in other states. This is certainly a large motivation for international human
First, human rights
rights law: people care about the human rights circumstances in other states. A. Physical Externalities
violations may simply cause victims or those at risk to leave the perpetrating state. If this
emigration is disorderly, excessively large, or politically unappealing in other ways, it may cause
direct adverse effects outside the perpetrating state. The human rights violations may create
conditions that would result in civil war or a threat to international peace and security. Other
states may wish to avoid a situation in which they would be compelled to intervene at great cost. Security Council actions with
respect to Libya,5 Somalia,6 Haiti, 7 Rwanda8 and Kosovo9 may be understood in this way. The recently formulated “responsibility
to protect”10 may be understood as a proposal to address these types of external effects, as well as a proposal to give affected
states some power to respond. It states that “[e]ach individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” The international community may use diplomatic, humanitarian, and
other peaceful means, and if those fail, may take “collec tive action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in
accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis” when “national authorities are manifestly failing to
protect their populations” from these crimes.11 Another type of direct externality would involve mistreatment of foreigners. A state
may appropriate property of foreigners, or otherwise abuse foreigners in a way that causes a direct external effect. Of course, this
type of externality might be addressed simply by providing “better-than-national-treatment” to the foreign persons. Internalization
of these externalities would thus not necessarily require that broad human rights be accorded to residents. B. Demonstration Effects
Another type of externality is ideational. That is, if one state abuses its citizens it may make it
easier for another state to do so. International public opinion might not be so outraged, or its
outrage might be diluted, by virtue of widespread violations . Concerns about responses to the 9/11 attack by
the United States that reduce human rights protections might be understood in this way.12 Thus fear of contagion—emulation by
other states—would be one reason why citizens of one state would be concerned about human rights practices in another state.
Conversely, it might be hoped that by spreading human rights protection more broadly, it would be more difficult for one’s
government to engage in human rights abuses. This perspective supports Simmons’s argument that the reason why states adhere to
human rights treaties is because they agree with the principles, but suggests why they agree with the principles for others, and
support a treaty, as opposed to simply practicing human rights unilaterally. It is supported, to some extent, by Simmons’s empirical
finding that ratification by a particular country is often associated with ratification by other countries within that country’s region.13
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Answers to Con Arguments

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Answers to: US Intervention Bad
More US intervention without UN intervention
It is time to create a United Nations army that can confront present and future crises."' The
provisions already exist in the United Nations Charter for the formation of such an army;
however, the reluctance of the United States continues to prevent such a formation. Yet,
without a United Nations army, the United States quite possibly will be forced to act as the
world's police officer in order to resolve international conflicts, an idea that does not appeal
to most Americans.27 Furthermore, the existence of a United Nations army would allow the
United States to maintain its international commitments at a fraction of the material, energy,
and monetary costs to do it alone
A UN force would be legitimate
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Answers to: Peacekeeping Fails
Their evidence is about current UN peacekeeping efforts, not a standing army,

which would have professional training and normal military resources. Any
limitations to peacekeeping are solved by a Standing Army
Jett, 2019, Dr. Jett is a former American ambassador who joined the School of International
Affairs after a career in the US Foreign Service that spanned 28 years and three continents. His
experience and expertise focus on international relations, foreign aid administration, and
American foreign policy. Immediately prior to joining Penn State, he was dean of the
International Center at the University of Florida for eight years. He is a regular interviewee in
major media outlets and a well-published author, Why There Is No Military Solution to the
Problems of Peacekeeping,
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/JEMEAA/Journals/Volume-01_Issue-2/
JEMEAA_01_2_Jett.pdf
Protection and Stabilization Missions
The remaining six current operations are all in sub-Saharan Africa. They represent the third
stage of the evolution of UN peacekeeping—the protection and
stabilization missions. These missions are the most dangerous and difficult ones,
and they are where peacekeeping will inevitably fail because of problems with
manpower, mandates, and motivation.
Manpower
The staff of a peacekeeping operation (PKO) can be composed of five groups:
military observers, civilian expatriate staff, locally hired employees, police, and
military contingents. The last group are the soldiers wearing the light blue helmets
who are the image most people have of peacekeepers. Their task is to carry out
military functions that a PKO requires like guarding facilities and bases and, in
the case of the protection and stabilization missions in Africa, protecting civilians
and helping the government extend its control over its own territory.
Challenges
The basic problem with the military contingents stems from the fact that the
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UN has no standing army. For each PKO, the UN must go, hat in hand, around
the world to ask the member states to provide the troops required for the military
contingents. The response to this request from rich countries has increasingly
been “no,” and that has left it to an increasing number of poorer countries to supply the
manpower.
During the Cold War, peacekeeping was mainly confined to the classical variety, where the tasks
assigned were straightforward. The countries participating in
peacekeeping were often rich countries seeking to avoid a local conflict escalating
into a confrontation between the super powers. That changed dramatically as
peacekeeping evolved.
8 EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS  WINTER 2019
Jett
Prior to 1990, 33 countries had participated in three or more of the 18 PKOs
initiated.4
Of those, just over half were wealthy countries. By 1996 there were 70
countries contributing troops, of which only 22 had developed economies.5
In
mid-2018, however, there were 124 countries providing soldiers for peacekeeping.
However, only seven percent of those soldiers came from 26 of the 31 countries
the CIA Factbook lists as nations having developed economies. (The five countries with
developed economies that contributed no troops to peacekeeping were
Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg, South Korea, and Singapore.) In the operations in
Africa, the demand by some political leaders that there be African solutions to
African problems may have encouraged this trend.
With armies, one gets what one pays for. The troops from rich countries come
with a great deal of equipment that they can bring with them. They are better
equipped because their governments can afford to spend more on their armed
forces. The armies of poor countries, on the other hand, are usually equipment
deficient, especially in transportation assets. A visitor to the PKO in Mali in 2018,

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for instance, observed one contingent driving around in 1960s vintage vehicles.6
Because the UN cannot afford to turn down troops when a country is willing to
offer them, the limitations of those troops are unavoidable.
To put this situation in rough perspective, a crude measure of the amount of
logistical and other support an army has is to divide the defense budget of a
country by the number of soldiers it has. About 90 percent of peacekeepers come
from countries where the defense budget per soldier was less than USD 50,000,
with several of them falling below USD 2,000. Only four percent came from
countries wealthy enough to spend more than USD 100,000 per soldier. The
country with the highest ratio is the United States, where that figure is around
half a million dollars a year (if reserve units are not included) and steadily climbing. The United
States, however, only provides a handful of officers (26 in mid2019) to peacekeeping missions,
who serve as military observers and in staff functions. Washington refuses to provide any troops
for the military contingents
mainly because of congressional opposition to the idea of having American soldiers serving
under a UN commander.7
Many UN peacekeeping successes
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Answers to: Costs
Peacekeeping very expensive compared to other forms of intervention
Peacekeeping is also inexpensive. The United States has spent over $2.1 trillion on overseas
contingency operations and Department of Defense appropriations since September 11. By
contrast, it allocated less than $1.5 billion to the UN’s peacekeeping budget in 2021—one-
fourth of what New York City spends on its police department per year. Imagine what the UN
could do if it had more funding and the full support of its member states. A major academic
study in 2019 calculated that between 2001 and 2013, the UN could have significantly cut
violence in four to five major conflicts if the world had spent more on peacekeeping and
provided existing operations with stronger mandates.
Peacekeeping is remarkably inexpensive.
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UN peacekeeping much cheaper than NATO peacekeeping
Amanda Long, US Institute of Peace, February 18, 2021, How the Biden Administration Can
Revive U.N. Peacekeeping, https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/02/how-biden-
administration-can-revive-un-peacekeeping
The irony is that compared to the cost of a NATO or U.S. led military operation, U.N.
peacekeeping is extremely cost-effective. A 2018 Government Accountability Office review
found that it is eight times cheaper to financially support a U.N. mission than to deploy U.S.
forces. In total, the U.S. government contributes only 0.03 percent of its annual federal budget
to U.N. peacekeeping.
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Answers to: Sexual Assault
Sexual exploitation is rare and peacekeeping reduces conflict
War triggers sexual assaults

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Answers to: Diplomacy Better
Peacekeepers provide the military leverage needed for diplomacy to work
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Answers to: Need Economic Development, Not Military Activity
Peacekeepers mean aid can reach conflict zones
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Answers to: Local Public Opposition
Peacekeepers increase local public buy-in
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Answers to: Militarism
The impact of war-torn displacement and resource shortage outweighs. Even if

the US is an imperial force, the aff solves a particular instance of that violence.
Krieger 19. [Sonja Krieger, Editor and writer for Left Voice, Made in the USA: How
the U.S. Manufactures Death and Destruction in Yemen,
https://www.leftvoice.org/made-in-the-usa-how-the-u-s-manufactures-death-
and-destruction-in-yemen]
The pictures of Yemeni children with their sad eyes are gut wrenching to look at. Shocking are the images of babies that are but skin
and bones, held in the arms of desperate parents. It’s hard to stomach the sight of the human face of what is referred
to everywhere as the “the worst humanitarian crisis on earth.” Faced with a devastating famine, 22 million
people in Yemen (out of a population of 29 million) urgently need food and other aid. Seventeen million
people are suffering from hunger, and according to the UN, 14 million are on the brink of starvation
(“seriously food deficient”). According to some estimates, 85,000 people may have already starved to death,
most of them children. Only half of the population has access to clean water . Communicable diseases have
resurged, including 1.2 million cases of confirmed or suspected cholera since April 2017. Diphtheria, which was all but eradicated in
Yemen by the 1980s, has reappeared. One hundred and thirty Yemeni children die each day due to hunger or disease.
Human-made, this
famine is the product of war—a war that has been dragging on for well over three years. The
Saudi-led coalition has erected a sea, air and land blockade that is preventing import goods
and humanitarian aid from getting into the country. Prices have soared, effectively making basic
necessities unaffordable for most people. Inflation is, however, only one aspect of the country’s near total economic
devastation. Factories, farms and companies have slowed production or shut down; millions of people have no work. This war has
caused mass suffering in many ways, but the most direct, most immediate source of misery remains the world’s advanced military
technology. No amount of “precision” targeting changes the fact that this imperialist war is a giant annihilation campaign; it kills and
maims, obliterates homes, workplaces and cities. There have been 18,000 air raids since the spring of 2015, or
roughly 14 air raids each day. The New York Times reported that over 4,600 civilians have been killed as a
result of the air strikes (and 6,500 including other war-related violence). The Guardian wrote that more than 57,000
civilians and combatants have died since the beginning of 2016 , and 2 to 3 million have been
displaced. The country’s infrastructure is utterly demolished, including half the hospitals. Many people cannot pay for
transportation to the nearest medical facility because of the rising fuel prices. Eight civilians die each day as a result of the fighting
and the bombardment.
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CON
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Standing Army Generally Fails

3 reasons a standing army would fail
Brookings Institution; Associate Professor of Government and Director of the Near Eastern
Studies Program at Cornell University; PhD, Is a Standing United Nations Army
Possible? Or Desirable?, https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?

referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1372&context=cilj;Is
Beyond Capabilities: Barriers to U.N. Military Intervention
Limited resources certainly remain a serious barrier to the establishment
of a standing U.N. army. Even the typical conservative scenario for a U.N.
4. Donald Puchala, Outsiders, Insiders, and UNReform, WASH. Q., Autumn 1994, at
161.
5. Raymond Hopkins, Anomie, System Reform, and Challenges to the UN System, in
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ETHNIc CoNFIar 72 (Milton Esman & Shibley
Telhami eds., 1995).
6. Blechman, supra note 3, at 67.
Vol, 28
1995 Is a Standing U.N. Army Possible?
force of no more than 10,000 troops7 could require as many as 30,000
support staff.8 However, even if the United Nations had all of the
resources of a major superpower, it would still have serious difficulties
intervening effectively for purposes of peace enforcement, especially in
cases of ethnic conflict and civil strife.
Beyond resources, the difficulties facing effective U.N. military intervention emanate from the
nature of the U.N. objectives themselves, and
from the changing targets of U.N. intervention. It is useful to examine

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three relevant criteria in assessing these difficulties: the nature of intervention; the spatial
effectiveness of intervention, i.e., the extent to which it succeeds not only in the specific case of
intervention but also in affecting,
through reputation and deterrence, other potential areas of trouble; and
the longitudinal effectiveness of intervention, i.e., the extent to which the success provides a
long-term solution to the problem faced.
A. The Nature of Intervention
Although discussions of U.N. intervention tend to focus on difficult and
costly peace enforcement efforts which involve military force, there are
many different types of intervention available to the United Nations, ranging from humanitarian
relief to peace enforcement. When the United
Nations and other international organizations (1Os) have engaged in
peacekeeping, economic sanctions, humanitarian relief, and good offices,
IOs have been relatively more effective than in cases of peace-enforcement
and peacemaking. There are a number of reasons for the ineffectiveness
of 10 interventions in the latter cases.
B. Spatial Effectiveness of Intervention
It is useful to contrast modem U.N. interventions with the interventions by
the superpowers during the Cold War. It is generally assumed that one of
the major reasons for U.N. ineffectiveness is its limited military, economic,
and logistical capabilities, in comparison with, for example, those of the
United States. However, besides the limits imposed by the sovereignty
norm, there is a fundamental structural problem that would make it difficult for the United
Nations to intervene effectively even if all the resources
of the United States were at its disposal: the United Nations is unable to
project deterrence.
Even a dominant power like the United States lacks the ability to
intervene in every trouble spot around the globe. When the United States
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intervened during the Cold War, it did so only selectively in places such as
Korea and Vietnam where the local interests of the United States realistically did not warrant
the costs of intervention. The idea was that effective
actions in these cases would deter aggression against vital American inter7. Capt. Gregory P.
Harper, Creating a U.N. Peace Enforcement Force: A Case for U.S.
Leadership, FLETCHER F. WoRLD Arr., Winter/Spring 1994, at 49; Puchala, supra note 4,
at 161.
8. Dick Kirschten, Missions Impossible, 25 NAT'LJ. 2576 (1993).
Cornell International Law Journal
ests elsewhere, thus justifying the costs of intervention. When deterrence
worked (and there are many who argue that it did not), it was for two
primary reasons: areas of "vital" American interests were clearly defined
and limited, as were the targets of deterrence, namely the Soviet Union
and its allies. However, the United States lacked the resources to intervene in all areas of vital
interest; the logic of deterrence required effective
intervention only when necessary, thereby making it too risky for the
targets of deterrence to challenge interests elsewhere. Where intervention
failed, such as in the 1982-83 U.S. intervention in Lebanon, the Reagan
Administration learned that forces should be committed to military action
overseas only when "vital" interests are at stake, and that such commitment
should be made only with the clear intent and support needed to win.9
The potential for deterrence through U.N. intervention is much
more limited. First, if the logical prerequisite of deterrence is the potential aggressor's fear of
punishment, it is hard to know whom to punish in
most cases of ethnic conflict, where the source of the conflict is either a
collapse of central authority or a number of small internal aggressors. Second, since, in principle,
the measure of relevance in any given case of
conflict is not the vital interest of any single Member State but U.N.
norms, all violations of these norms present potential cases of intervention. From this
perspective, one cannot differentiate between civil strife in
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Sudan and civil strife in Northern Iraq. The result is a large set of potential targets of U.N.
intervention, many of which require simultaneous
responses, thus presenting the United Nations with an impossible task
even with substantially enhanced resources. At the same time, failure to
intervene in only a few of these cases undermines the very norm that the
United Nations strives to establish.
When one adds the issue of sovereignty to this deterrence problem,
additional complications emerge. The UNSC resolution authorizing intervention in Somalia, for
example, included the finding of a "threat to international peace and security" at the insistence
of China and some third
world countries who were worried that intervention in Somalia might set a
precedent for intervention in their own domestic politics. Similarly, when
the United States attempted to mobilize the UNSC to authorize military
intervention in Haiti in 1994, China and the Latin American states
expressed concerns that action in Haiti might establish a threatening precedent. Consequently,
the U.S. Ambassador explained to the United
Nations that this case was "unique." In contrast, most third world countries supported U.N.
action against Iraq following the latter's invasion of
Kuwait, even though most perceived it as action precipitated by U.S.
national interests. Furthermore, just as the Cold War was ending, it was
unlikely that weaker states would acquiesce in permitting a strong state,
Iraq, to invade its weak neighbor, Kuwait-particularly where the aggression was against the
wishes of the United States, the most powerful nation
9. RONALD REAGAN, AN AMERMCAN Lwz (1990).
Vol 28
1995 Is a Standing UN Army Possible?
in the world. In short, sovereignty and calculations of state interest complicate the effectiveness
of the United Nations.
Since enhanced resources alone cannot overcome the above structural barriers to effectiveness,
there will be a growing need to set realistic
priorities in the same way that effective states do. For example, serious
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violations of human rights, such as genocide, should be accorded substantial resources, in the
same way that states accord resources to the defense
of "vital" interests. Only by setting such priorities, even if limited in scope,
can the United Nations become incrementally more effective; otherwise,
the increasing disparity between the international expectations of the
United Nations and its ability to meet those expectations will soon diminish the organization's
influence.
C. Longitudinal Effectiveness of Intervention
Intervention by international organizations is more likely to be effective in
the short-term than to provide a long-term solution to a conflict. For
example, although international efforts have provided humanitarian relief
to the Kurds in northern Iraq, they have not solved their plight; while
addressing the immediate problem of famine in Somalia, international
intervention was unable to resolve the civil conflict that produced that
famine. U.N. peacekeeping forces in Cyprus have succeeded in minimizing the violence between
the conflicting groups but only through a longterm commitment of resources and without
evidence that the conflict has
come closer to resolution-perhaps even reducing the local parties' incentives to reach a lasting
settlement. Part of the difficulty is that ethnic conflicts remain largely a national problem whose
resolution depends upon
subnational actors. The Kurds of Iraq will have to face the consequences
of their conflict with the Iraqi state long after the international determination to provide them
with help has diminished. Effective intervention by
international organizations can take place only after achieving a fuller
understanding of the internal dynamics of conflict.
Given the substantial resource constraints facing the United Nations
as well as the escalating costs of intervention following the outbreak of
hostilities in ethnic conflicts, international organizations should invest
more resources in establishing effective mechanisms for early diplomatic
intervention. Early warning systems could be set up, and small observer
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units could be dispatched to potential trouble spots in order to enable the
United Nations to act in a preventive capacity, and to initiate good offices
and mediation procedures while there is still time to preempt the outbreak of violence.
Predicting imminent crises is very difficult, however,
and while such measures are helpful, their limitations should be noted.
Command structure infighting means a Standing Army Fails
Thomas P. Sheehy is a former Policy Analyst at The Heritage Foundation, 1993, August 16, A
U.N. Army: Unwise, Unsafe, and Unnecessary,
https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/un-army-unwise-unsafe-and-unnecessary
Confused Command. Another problem with a standing U.N. army involves command structure.
U.S. troops in a U.N. standing army eventually will find themselves at odds with a
multinational command. Would resisting orders of a multinational command be
insubordination, or merely consistent with the good order and discipline an American
commander should display? To which flag would the American commanders owe allegiance?
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the potential for this confusion, and traditionally have resisted
subordinating their services to international command.
No political support for a large Standing Army
Fletcheer School of Public Diplomacy, December 16, 2021, Why We Need an

International Standing Civilian Protection Service,
https://fletcher.tufts.edu/news-events/news/why-we-need-international-
standing-civilian-protection-service
The notion of a UN standing army (or police force) of any size bumps up against a deep
reluctance to empower the organization in that way. The principle of state sovereignty is still
clung to by most member states — from the Global North and Global South. The world is not
ready for a standing force of even 13,000 let alone 800,000.
Many practical barriers

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Australian Deparmet of Defense, 2000,

https://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_com
mittees?url=jfadt/u_nations/unchap4.pdf, Chapter 4: A United Nations Standing Army
Despite these comments, the possible creation of a standing army of the
UN was one of the most emotive issues raised by this inquiry. An
overwhelming number of submissions were firmly against the idea for
various reasons. These objections can be categorised in the following way:
technical difficulties of how such a force would be operated, and how
much it would cost to operate;
belief that Australian participation in a UN standing army would be
unconstitutional;
concern that the UN was an incompetent or inappropriate organisation
to have an independent army, or that the UN would misuse a standing
army; and
existing or other alternatives were more appropriate.
Technical Difficulties and Cost
4.24 The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade questioned the viability of a
standing army, but welcomed the opportunity to discuss the proposition
at greater length:
… I think we query the achievability of it, given the way the UN is
constituted. There is also a whole range of practical questions:
where would it be headquartered; what would be the command
structure; what would you do with the forces during downtime, if
you like; what would be the optimum size of the force? We think
it would founder on the practical difficulties.13
4.25 According to the Department of Defence, the factors militating against a

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standing army are fundamental issues of national control of ADF
12 Australian Baha'i Community. Submission No. 95, p. 980.
13 DFAT. Transcript, 19 May 2000, p. 18.
A UNITED NATIONS STANDING ARMY 73
personnel; a requirement for additional resources to fund a standing army;
and a lack of detailed information on force specification.14
4.26 The United Nations Youth Association provided some detailed analysis of
the problems associated with a standing army:
UNYA notes the unsatisfactory nature of the ad-hoc peace keeping
and peace enforcement system, however, we do not believe that a
standing army is the solution to such problems. UNYA notes in
particular the following immense difficulties associated with the
concept of a standing army and as such, urges the Australian
Government to withhold support for the proposal:
The difficulty of maintaining the independence of the UN while
retaining and armed force;
The potential problem of having Member States ignore their
individual obligations to peace and security if they come to rely
on the force;
The difficulty of resourcing and financing a standing army
which may need to be deployed in several areas
simultaneously;
The difficulty posed by rules of engagement which would need
to be developed should such a body be established;
The fact that Member States are unwilling to surrender control
of their forces;
The value of negotiating the details of peacekeeping and peace
enforcement operations through the Security Council and

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obtaining international support for the makeup of the forces to
be deployed.15
Ettore Greco,1998, STRENGTHENING THE UN CAPABILITIES IN THE FIELD
OF PEACEKEEPING: AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT PROPOSALS,

https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai9326.pdf
The proponents of a UN permanent force see it as a way to solve some key problems
connected with peacekeeping activities. First, and most important, it would ensure a
rapid-reaction capability which is increasingly perceived as essential for effective UN
intervention in some emergencies. Indeed, Boutros Ghali has repeatedly stressed the need for a
substantial reduction in the time-lag which currently passes between a SC decision to authorize
a
new operation and its actual deployment (Boutros Ghali 1993, p.69). Second, a standing force
would, by definition, be an integrated one with a more or less high level of specialization for
peacekeeping operations. This would represent a clear advantage in comparison with the units
currently serving under the UN flag. Third, the crucial problem of ensuring a unity of command
would become much more manageable.
However, the idea of a UN standing army is unrealistic for the foreseeable future, as it lacks
the political support of the five SC permanent members and is opposed by most of the other
countries, especially the developing ones. Furthermore, on a technical plane, the problems of
integrating multinational units into a single force would be difficult to overcome because of the
major differences in equipment, training and command procedures among the countries which
would be most likely to participate in such a force (this would not necessarily be limited to
Western countries). The creation and maintenance of a standing force would also entail
extremely
high costs and a further expansion of the UN bureaucracy. This would be in sharp contrast with
the current efforts at a rationalization of the UN system and a more efficient use of available
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resources. This point has been emphasized by the Secretary-General: «A standing UN force
would be too expensive, wasteful and inappropriate for the organization while it is in the
process
of a vital restructuring exercise aimed at minimising inefficiency and duplication» (Boutros Ghali
1993, p.69). It must be added that the decision-making process for the deployment of a standing
force, given the very high political meaning that its use would have, is likely to be rather
complex
and time-consuming. Therefore, the main advantage of a standing force - the rapid-reaction
capability it could give to the UN - would be lost (See also Gerlach 1993).
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Foreign Military Intervention Fails

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Foreign Military Intervention Generally Fails

Foreign military interventions always fail to achieve their objectives
Powell, 2015, Nathaniel K. Powell is a Research Associate at the Pierre du Bois Foundation for
Contemporary History. His research focuses on the history of French military interventions in
Africa.. Why military interventions fail, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/why-military-
interventions-fail/
Even when narrow stabilization goals are met, such as in a number of French interventions in Chad and the former
Zaire, this often occurs at the expense of long-term stability and democratic governance. Interventions
rarely, if ever, positively contribute to improving the political environments that originally
generated the crises which sparked the interventions in the first place. While each case is clearly
different, the failure of most of these interventions to achieve the desired stability and accountable governance implies a need for a
serious rethink about how interventions are conducted. In some quarters, this has revolved around debates over the effectiveness of
counterinsurgency methods. This discussion largely misses the point. Military
effectiveness has very little bearing
on the success of interventions. Instead, inherently political factors pose nearly
insurmountable obstacles to the success of ‘stabilizing interventions’, r iIndeed, most such interventions
feature a recurring series of obstacles. Grand narratives Whether combating Islamist-inspired guerillas, communist expansion, or
regionally-backed rebellions, policymakers in intervening countries often view the conflicts of ‘host’ countries through the prism of
broader ideological struggles. While these interpretations often contain grains of truth, they can obscure more than they reveal
about the character and motivations of civil war dynamics, particularly in its local dimensions. The problem is that flawed analyses of
the politics of violence often lead to intervention strategies badly suited to the realities on the ground. During
the Vietnam
War, American policymakers minimized the role that Saigon’s corruption , repression, and bad
governance played in fuelling the Vietcong insurgency. Instead, an obsessive focus on global
communism and American credibility led to massive support for the Saigon regime, a socially
destructive counterinsurgency policy, and futile efforts to apply pressure on North Vietnam .
This logic also led to western support for a large number of other unsavoury regimes, in order to prevent the spread of communism.
However, most Third World socialist-leaning armed groups were not directed by Moscow or Beijing, despite receiving support from
Eastern Bloc patrons. Their ideology was often informed by socialist worldviews, but their politics was supremely local or national.
Today, one cannot understand the dynamics of groups like Boko Haram or ISIS without reference to the very local politics that both
drives their success and limits their possibilities for action. By not taking these kinds of factors into account, efforts
like
France’s military interventions in support of Zaire’s dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko, may save
repressive regimes, but do little else than postpone bloody civil wars and state collapse. Today,
security assistance to many undemocratic states as part of broader counterterrorism efforts may have similar results and facilitate
repression and long-term instability. The legitimacy problem Building the legitimacy of host states represents one of the essential
problems in achieving sustainable stability. Legitimacy
requires processes that cannot primarily come from
the outside. Almost by definition, external interventions are likely to impede legitimacy by
highlighting the host state’s inability to fulfil its responsibili ties. It can also prevent the host state from doing
so by providing disincentives for necessary reforms. Most ‘stabilizing interventions’ aim at strengthening host states by providing
security against internal or external threats. However, regardless of the ideology or methods adopted by insurgent elites, their
success is often predicated on real grievances suffered by their citizenries. More often than not, the governing regime bears a large
part of the blame in generating these grievances. Interveners, such as the Americans in Vietnam, the Egyptians in Yemen, and the
French in Chad, do often, at some point in their interventions, attempt to pressure host regimes to build more inclusive
constituencies to address some of the political causes of civil war. However, in each of these cases, regime elites of all stripes knew
very well that sincere overtures to other communities or the armed opposition could threaten regime survival. They had little
interest in more participatory governance. This seems to be the case today in Iraq where, despite American and other international
pressure for reform, the al-Abadi government in Baghdad is incapable of providing a credible
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commitment to safeguard critical Sunni interests. In such a situation, even a military victory
over ISIS could become a 'catastrophic success', whereby the restoration of central
government authority will be viewed as anything but a liberation by Sunni communities.
Misunderstanding influence Interveners often have rough relationships with seemingly mercurial host-regimes. American complaints
about Hamid Karzai and Nouri al-Maliki were legion, as was Soviet tension with Babrak Karmal in Afghanistan and Mengistu Haile
Mariam’s regime in Ethiopia. This stems from multiple reasons, including the fact that many host regime leaders want to assert their
independence for reasons of legitimacy. Host regimes can often buck certain kinds of pressure and get away with intransigence.
They know that policymakers in intervening countries usually cannot simply end a major public commitment or withdraw troops
without losing face. Decisions to intervene imply that the survival of the host regime becomes substantially more important to
policymakers in the intervening country than would otherwise be the case. Initial
failures and sunk cost concerns
easily lead to mission creep. This can decrease the intervener’s ability to exercise leverage
over host regime behaviour while removing immediate incentives for the implementation of
necessary political reforms. It also leaves interveners especially vulnerable to manipulation from below. While the
Vietnam War represents a classic example of these issues, one can also find them in the Soviet War in Afghanistan, the Soviet and
Cuban interventions in Ethiopia, and the American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, among others. The mere presence of a major
intervention force introduces variables into internal regime politics that are difficult to predict at the outset. The French intervention
in defence of the Hutu-dominated regime in pre-genocide Rwanda represents an extreme case of this. The presence of French forces
helped to create the political conditions which empowered hardline elements in the regime to plan a genocide of Tutsis and
moderate Hutus.By removing immediate threats to regime survival, interventions can sometimes
also facilitate regime infighting. This was a frequent feature of the Chadian political scene in the 1970s during recurring
French interventions. It also characterized South Vietnamese politics throughout the American presence in the country. Congenital
weaknesses Carl von Clausewitz, in one of his less remarked-upon observations, noted that the relationship between state and
society plays a major structuring role in the way armies fight wars. One of the issues with security assistance programs is that host
country militaries often exhibit congenital weaknesses inherent in most ‘failing’ states or those facing civil war. Truly national armies
by definition include elements representing the entire nation. In countries which are ethnically, religiously, culturally, or otherwise
fragmented politically, these fissures will seriously impede the military’s capacity to function, especially on national territory. These
problems are highlighted by the frequent inability of major military assistance programs to build robust national militaries in fragile
states. In Mali, American-trained units were largely unable to cope with the country’s rebels. While this partly resulted from the
episodic nature of the training programs, the real cause was deeply political. Although localized successes, particularly at the unit
level, are possible, larger structural deficiencies make real progress difficult. This helps to explain other failures, such as Soviet
efforts at building strong security forces in Afghanistan, or the near-collapse of the Iraqi army last year against ISIS, despite years of
American training efforts. The price for short-term stability Even
when interventions provide stability, they
rarely contribute to democracy or lasting peace. This is because intervening policymakers
often privilege stable, friendly, authoritarian, or semi-democratic regimes with questionable
human rights records. Examples include successful French interventions during the Shaba
crises in Zaire and later interventions in Chad and Rwanda . In these cases, French forces saved repressive
regimes from probable overthrow, yet these regimes’ policies proved enormously destructive for parts of their own countries’ social
fabric. Mobutu’s governing strategies ensured that when his regime finally collapsed, the ensuing conflicts were among the
bloodiest since the Second World War. Even France’s most recent intervention in Mali, which successfully liberated a large portion
of the country’s territory, allowed its former corrupt ruling elites to return to power. Over the past decade, many of America’s most
important partners in Iraq and Afghanistan have been serious human-rights abusers. Empowering criminals both at the local and
governmental level may help tip the scales of counterinsurgency on the side of the interveners, but often at a steep long-term cost
to both local communities and regional stability. Warnings for the future In
examining history, it is hard to avoid
the conclusion that a number of major ‘stabilizing interventions’ should not have occurred at
all. The American wars in Vietnam and Iraq (which became a ‘stabilizing intervention’ after the
overthrow of Saddam Hussein), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and numerous examples of
French interventions in Africa, all likely did more harm than good. Even when they did not
prove economically and politically costly to the intervening powers, the lives of communities
in the targeted countries certainly suffered.
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Lack of support kills military intervention success
Yossi Mekelberg is professor of international relations and an associate fellow of the MENA
Program at Chatham House, September 4, 2021, Why military interventions are usually doomed
to fail, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1922911
The lonely walk by US army commander Maj. Gen. Chris Donahue toward the last US transport
plane to depart Kabul airport summed up the tragic end to the longest war in American history
— tragic especially for the Afghan people left behind to face once again a menacingly uncertain
life under the rule of the Taliban.
These past 20 years since Afghanistan was invaded in the wake of the atrocities of 9/11 will go
down in history as another spectacular gravestone in the cemetery of military interventions.
Given the long list of such exploits that have failed with extremely dire consequences for the
invading forces and considerably worse outcomes for the invaded, it suggests the question: Are
all such interventions inevitably doomed to failure?
History supplies few examples of either successful or justified military interventions, let alone
both. A prime reason for this is that there is a common thread of confusion over the objectives
of these operations, whether it be regime change, or the responsibility to protect, or a matter of
security, or even peace keeping. President Biden insisted recently that the US went into
Afghanistan “for two reasons … one, to get Bin Laden, and two, to wipe out as best we could,
and we did, Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.” And when those aims were accomplished, only then did
the US transform its objective into one of nation building. George W. Bush, president at the time
of the invasion, was later to claim in his memoirs that “Afghanistan was the ultimate nation-
building mission. We had liberated the country from a primitive dictatorship, and we had a
moral obligation to leave behind something better.” At the time, Senator Biden supported this
vision on more than one occasion, when soon after the allies took over the country he called for
the world to join forces in — guess what? Correct, nation building.
In the face of the chaotic scenes at Kabul airport it would be too easy to blame the military for
the fiasco in Afghanistan, but as is always the case, such disasters are chiefly political failures,
and they start with muddled and unclear aims. Is the goal to create stability? To install
democratic-liberal style accountable governance? Or just root out enemies? Without clear
objectives and a coherent exit strategy, hasty departures such as those from Vietnam, Somalia,
Afghanistan, Lebanon and the Sahel become inevitable as involvement in foreign countries with
fragile governments and hostile insurgents is bound to fail.
One commonality of all foreign interventions is a tendency, almost a compulsion, by

policymakers in the West to paint the narrative of intervention in ideological colors, almost in
terms of a conflict between good and evil. That was so during the Cold War, when the US was
involved in both overt and covert operations to bring down governments, whether in
Southeast Asia or Latin America, depicting itself as making an existential stand against
communism, or since 9/11 as combating radical Islam and promoting democracy. In most
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cases ideology did play a part, but it was more about old-fashioned power struggles and
ensuring security than promoting liberal democracy and human rights. Was Iraq about nuclear
weapons, toppling a brutal and hostile regime, or about building democratic governance? Was
Afghanistan about pushing out Al-Qaeda and punishing Osama bin Laden and his associates who
were behind the mass killings of 9/11, or toppling the Taliban and freeing the Afghan people
from their brutal and oppressive regime? Without being clear about priorities and differentiating
between rhetoric and core intentions, those who execute such interventions on the ground are
left uncertain about the nature of their mission, and with that the tools that are required for
successfully completing it.
For a military-political intervention to stand any chance of success it must support the local
population to develop its own model of governance through a painstaking national dialogue,
one that combines universal international norms, but, crucially, one that also fits local
conditions culturally and historically.
Yossi Mekelberg
It’s not far from the truth to argue that in many cases “mission creep” is involved, whereby
operations begin with one set of objectives, and subsequently others are tacked on, either by
design or by the sheer dynamic of conflict and political pressures. Moreover, the ever-present
tension among liberal democracies between a moral aspiration to spread their values in terms
of a system of governance and human rights, and what are geopolitical interests, in a world
where competition between international powers for influence dictates their behavior,
interferes with the decision to intervene and the way in which the operation is conducted.
There is a mixture of naivety and self-deception in the West, and especially the US, in the
assumption that their model liberal-democratic system is desired by everyone and so is bound
to prevail. The myriad examples to the contrary don’t seem to have persuaded them to re-
evaluate that paradigm.
Another ingrained example of wishful thinking is that Western-trained local security forces
will be able to contain an insurgency and so allow the military aspect of an intervention to
conclude. But in typically fragmented societies, loyalty is not necessarily to the central
government, and members of the security forces are unlikely to want to risk their lives for a
nation-building project that they hardly buy into.
Between the lack of capable, in most cases corrupt, domestic leadership, and impatience and
lack of stamina on behalf of those conducting an intervention, its collapse is almost inevitable.
The notion of fighting wars on the other side of the world and expecting to shape the future of
countries with different histories, social and political structures and cultures, is questionable to
begin with. But believing that this can be done instantly, or even over the course of 20 years in
the case of Afghanistan (and Vietnam), may justifiably be regarded as delusional.
For a military-political intervention to stand any chance of success it must support the local
population to develop its own model of governance through a painstaking national dialogue,
one that combines universal international norms, but, crucially, one that also fits local
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conditions culturally and historically. It cannot be done by imposing a foreign way of life. This
also requires the development of authentic local leadership, and not dealing with those who
know how to manipulate Western decision makers and media because they have spent time
studying and working in the West.
The experience of Afghanistan will reverberate for some time across the world, and for a while
at least will deter the mere thought of overseas intervention. However, it remains to be seen
whether the US and its allies are capable of learning the right lessons on how to ensure their
security and to advocate and promote their values and norms, without messing with the lives of
millions of people before abandoning them to their fate.
The introduction of large military forces produces a backlash, counter-

alignments and fails to alter the balance of power

That said, we also find reasons for caution in the employment of larger forces. To begin with, a
blanket application of large forces in interventions could often prove to be unnecessary, adding
additional costs without realizing additional benefits, as was the case in the large U.S.
intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965. But the potential concerns with large forces
extend beyond a lack of efficiency. Our analysis indicates at least three circumstances in which
forces of a more-limited size might be preferable. First, a large U.S. force might xx Assessing
Trade-Offs in U.S. Military Intervention Decisions produce a substantial backlash among either
the local population or important regional actors, undermining the intervention’s ability to
achieve its objectives and potentially strengthening adversary forces. Second, a large U.S. force
might seem highly threatening to an adversary and prompt unwanted escalation in the
conflict or crisis. Third, a large force, particularly a large ground force, might take substantial
time to mobilize and deploy, such that policymakers might prefer to send a smaller force that
can be ready more quickly. Even beyond these conditions that might suggest a preference for a
force of a more-limited size, the introduction of large forces effectively increases the “bet” the
United States is placing on the outcome of the intervention. As noted above, large forces can
help to increase success, but in other instances, such as the post-2001 intervention in
Afghanistan, even greatly increased forces might prove unable to fundamentally alter the
dynamics of the conflict, increasing the costs of the intervention without substantially
increasing its benefits. In our focused case studies, it is notable that large interventions
encompass some of the most notable successes and the most notable failures for U.S.
interventions. Small interventions, by contrast, tend to have less effect overall on U.S. interests
and are, for the most part, associated with more-limited gains; they are also, in other
circumstances, associated with more-circumscribed losses. What determines when larger forces
are a good bet to make in an intervention? Although this determination is partly affected by the
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U.S. interests involved, how large forces would be expected to affect the local balance of power
and the degree of leverage the United States can exercise in the host nation appear to be
central. When large forces allow the United States to tip the balance of power clearly in favor of
the side it supports, it can generally expect these larger forces to help lead to better outcomes.
The United States has tremendous military capabilities, so this dynamic is often relevant. There
are, however, exceptions in which the introduction of large forces could prompt local backlash,
unwanted escalation, inadvisable delays, or third-party intervention to counterbalance U.S.
forces—such as the Chinese intervention during the Korean War—or could simply be
insufficient to decisively alter the local balance of power. The decision to intervene with
Summary xxi large forces therefore represents a higher-risk, higher-reward strategy, the
advisability of which should be carefully assessed according to the local context and the criteria
noted above
Many instances where intervention made it worse

Our analysis clearly shows that military interventions can advance U.S. national interests in
certain circumstances. But we also find suggestive evidence that, since 1945, the United States
could be over-intervening in aggregate. Instances of U.S. interventions that failed to achieve
their objectives and where U.S. interests might have been better served by not undertaking
the intervention in the first place, such as the post2003 intervention in Iraq, are often well-
known. Equally interesting, however, is that we found few cases in which the United States did
not intervene but likely would have been better off if it had, such as the 1978 Nicaraguan Civil
War. More numerous were cases in which the United States did not intervene and saw its
interests advanced partly because of its restraint, such as the 2006 Iranian nuclear crisis and
the 1948 civil wars in Costa Rica and Colombia. In general, the costs of not intervening may
have been overemphasized in analyses of U.S. intervention policy in comparison with the
potential benefits of restraint.
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Human Rights
Military intervention fails to protect human rights and increases human rights
abuses
Flamur Krasniqi Brunel University, London, 2016. Are Military Interventions Inevitably Doomed
to Backfire?, https://www.e-ir.info/2016/03/23/are-military-interventions-inevitably-doomed-
to-backfire/
There are several forms of military intervention There are several forms of military
intervention: regime change, ‘humanitarian’ intervention, and
peacekeeping, amongst others. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union
(1991), the number of military interventions doubled[1] under the
auspicious of upholding human rights, otherwise known as ‘humanitarian’
interventions. Scholars such as Kenneth Waltz, claim that this is due to the
United States’ (U.S.) hegemonic role in the ‘new world order’[2]. As a
result, U.S. liberal values of freedom, democracy and free markets,
favoured[3] notions of ‘natural law’, such as human rights, over state
sovereignty and other norms of ‘positive law’. However, following the 9/11
terrorist attacks, U.S. military interventions changed to reflect a new
foreign policy directed by national and international security concerns
under the ‘War on Terror’ rhetoric. As such, this paper shall scrutinise
various U.S. military interventions, under the basis of humanitarian and
security purposes since the end of the cold war. It will do so in order to
demonstrate how military interventions are always liable to backfire
and cause unintended harm to an intervening state on various
grounds, such as ideological, political and economic harm, than it is
in providing a ‘satisfactory’ solution to problems in a target state. The
paper shall enforce this stance through the analysis of real time examples
of U.S. military interventions such as, Kosovo (1998-99) and Iraq (2003).
Initially, before such a discussion can begin, one must have a clear
interpretation as to what constitutes as a ‘satisfactory’ solution. Naturally,
the definition varies on the nature of each problem. This is due to the
justifications of each military engagement differing on a case-by-case basis
and thus, the methods of engagement and subsequently the end result
differing also. For the purpose of the reader, this paper shall abide to Jeff
Holzegrefe’s definition of a humanitarian intervention’s ‘satisfactory’
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solution to a crisis as: “the use of force, across state borders by a state (or
group of states), which seeks to prevent or end widespread grave
violations of fundamental human rights”[4]. In addition, so to better
understand and analyse whether a ‘satisfactory’ solution has been
achieved, the outcomes of a ‘humanitarian’ intervention must be divided
upon short-term and long-term results. Equally, it is important to
understand what constitutes as harm to an intervening state. Thus, the
meaning of harm is regarded as any, direct or indirect, consequence(s)
which causes negative impacts on an intervening state as a result of its
military engagement in a target state.
Perhaps, the most controversial ‘humanitarian’ intervention is the

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) engagement during the
Kosovo conflict. The intervention was conducted in defence of
Kosovo’s Albanian population amidst Yugoslav state sponsored
ethnic violence and in order to maintain regional stability. Eventually,
the intervention forced an end to the violence under the Kumanovo
Agreement (1999) and therefore leading one to presume the U.S., which
led the intervention, achieved a ‘satisfactory’ solution to the problem in
Kosovo. This seems to be the case, at least in terms of providing a short-
term ‘satisfactory’ solution, as the intervention forced an end to the
violence and thus, satisfying Holzegrefe’s definition of ending widespread
human rights violations. Also, Holzegrefe’s focus on the use of force
across borders is also fulfilled as NATO’s use of air-strike forced the
withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and the immediate cessation
of violence.
Conversely, according to scholars such as Noam Chomsky, the

intervention achieved the contrary instead intensifying the
atrocities[5]. The intensification of crimes was a direct consequence
of foreign intervention, as it contributed to the war’s pretence of
lawlessness which enabled mass human rights violations to go
unchecked. This is evidenced by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, which reported an increase[6] of civilian
executions and refugee influx into neighbouring states immediately
following the commencement of the U.S. led intervention.
Additionally, following the war’s conclusion, an open campaign of
reverse ethnic-cleansing saw the mass evacuation[7] of Serbs from
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Kosovo, to which NATO forces remained paralyzed in preventing.

Therefore, the intervention failed provide a short-term ‘satisfactory’
solution to the human rights abuses, as the escalation of violence
during the intervention and after, were both the result of foreign
intervention. Furthermore, the U.S.A’s role in Kosovo became
synonymous with pan-Albanianism[8] as, its support for the Kosovo
Liberation Army contributed to the Albanian-led secessionist
conflicts in Serbia (2000) and Macedonia (2001), which threatened to
destabilize[9] the entire Balkans.
Conversely, the U.S.A faced a further multitude of ramifications which

harmed it in numerous ways, particularly within the ideological
dimension amongst the international community. This was especially
the case within the Third World, with many states, primarily Russia
which holds territorial integrity as a barrier from Western
invasion[10], fearing a similar intervention on their soil. Such fears
were the result of the U.S.A’s disregard for international law, as it
refused to gain explicit United Nations (UN) approval. In turn, this
harmed the U.S.A’s international image as the defender of
democracy[11] which it had achieved during the liberation of Kuwait
(1991). As such, this led to several accusations against the U.S. as
perpetrating a new imperialist agenda, attempting to pursue self-
interests under the exploits of the ‘Washington Consensus’, while
masquerading in defence of human rights[12], with Yugoslavia being
the chosen experiment. Certain scholars have equated the U.S. to
former European colonialist powers[13] during the 19th century which
pursued national interests at the expense of other states, under the
compass of ‘delivering civilization’ to the indigenous peoples of
Africa as part of the ‘Whiteman’s burden’. Therefore, the U.S.A’s
involvement in Kosovo backfired and caused the U.S. harm, as it
diminished its international image as a moral leader, with one specific
writer accusing the U.S. of being a “rogue superpower”[14].
s
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Africa
Foreign military intervention fails in Africa
Elizabeth Schmidt | March 26, 2020, LESSONS FROM AFRICA: MILITARY INTERVENTION FAILS TO
COUNTER TERRORISM, https://fpif.org/lessons-from-africa-military-intervention-fails-to-
counter-terrorism/
Establishment figures claimed that the battle against violent extremism was far from over and
that U.S. military leadership was critical to victory. They pointed to ongoing insurgencies in the
African countries of Mali and Nigeria in the Western Sahel and Somalia and Sudan in the Horn.
Other progressives countered that U.S. policies have been ill-conceived and counterproductive
— and that foreign military intervention has exacerbated the crises.
The establishment debate misses the point. Mainstream critics haggle over how many troops
are needed, which nations should supply them, and where they should be deployed. The real
question is whether present counterterrorism strategies are effective — and if not, what policies
should be implemented instead.
Evidence from Africa makes it clear that military solutions do not work, and prescriptions
imposed from above and outside often fail. Local initiatives that address underlying
grievances have been more effective. But their impact will be limited without fundamental
social, economic, and political change. To effectively counter violent extremism, the U.S. must
withdraw support for the corrupt and repressive governments that foster discontent and assist
local endeavors that address the people’s needs.
The disagreement between mainstream and progressive critics in the U.S. is rooted in
fundamentally different visions of the role of the United States in the world community. Most
establishment intellectuals embrace the notion of American exceptionalism, arguing that the
United States is a unique force for good in the world, and to fulfill its mission, it must maintain
its position at the helm of the global order.
Proponents of this view ordinarily promote military solutions, as well as economic development
and (sometimes) democracy. Progressives, in contrast, reject this sanguine characterization of
U.S. actions and denounce the policies that have led to endless war. To resolve the current
crisis, the United States and its partners must fundamentally shift their perspective and alter
their approach. Continuing on the present path will only result in greater mayhem.
Current U.S. Africa policy, developed during the Cold War, was conceived by leaders and
proponents of the U.S. military-industrial complex. Marked by militarism and
misunderstanding, it has failed to identify the factors that undermine human security and
offered wrong-headed solutions that often exacerbate the problem. The post-9/11 war on
terror has led to particularly grievous results.
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Military Solutions Don’t Work
Contrary to common misconceptions, religion and ethnicity are not the root causes of African
conflicts.
Rather, the sources are deep structural inequalities — poverty, underdevelopment, and
political repression — and the devastating impact of climate change. Governmental neglect
and the drying up of Lake Chad ignited the Boko Haram insurgency in northeastern Nigeria; the
expanding desert in western Sudan has pitted herders against farmers in the struggle for water
and usable land; and the destruction of the fishing industry by foreign trawlers led to piracy off
the coast of Somalia.
Where do we start? First, we need to determine what does not work.
Counterterrorism operations, whether conducted by the U.S. or its allies, have been
catastrophic. Intervention in the Sahel exemplifies the problem. In Mali and Nigeria,
government actions in insurgent areas, and externally directed drone and missile strikes, have
killed countless unarmed civilians. Such actions have increased local support for insurgent
forces. Military successes have generally been short-lived, as violent extremists have
regrouped and shifted their focus to unprotected civilians.
Local governments backed by the United States and its allies rarely address the structural
problems that triggered the conflicts. As a result, local populations, neglected by their
governments, have turned to extremist groups for income, basic services, and protection. Peace
agreements, imposed from above and outside, fail to give voice to affected populations and
jihadi organizations have been denied a seat at the table, even though they are critical parties to
the conflicts. Not surprisingly, most of the accords have collapsed.
Foreign intervention in the Horn of Africa has had similar results. In Somalia, the
intensification of US airstrikes has stimulated increased extremist activity and a corresponding
refocus on civilian targets. Abuses by unaccountable regimes and foreign troops have
generated a popular backlash, and externally brokered peace accords that excluded local
voices have resulted in a succession of failed governments.
What have we learned? There will be no peace if underlying grievances are not addressed,
domestic and foreign militaries continue to victimize local populations, and dysfunctional
states fail to provide basic services.
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Terrorism, Millions Dead

Middle East intervention fails, triggers terrorism, kills millions
Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr., USFS (Ret.), 2019, Failed Interventions and What They Teach,
https://mepc.org/speeches/failed-interventions-and-what-they-teach
I want to speak to you today about three things. First, why militarized U.S. policies and the
actions we are taking pursuant to them in the broader Middle East risk provoking terrorist
retaliation against the United States and its citizens. Second, why our military and quasi-
diplomatic interventions in the region have failed or are failing. And, third, how our current
policy course is changing us for the worse without changing the Arab and Islamic worlds for the
better. I will end with a thought or two on the prospects for changed policies that could produce
better results.
War is not the spectator sport that the fans who watch it here on television imagine. Nor is it
the “cakewalk” that its armchair advocates like to suggest it could be. War is traumatic for all its
participants. Recent experience suggests that 30 percent of troops develop serious mental
health problems that dog them after they leave the battlefield. But what of the peoples
soldiers seek to punish or pacify? To understand the hatreds war unleashes and its lasting
psychological and political consequences, one has only to translate foreign casualty figures into
terms we Americans can relate to. You can do this by imagining that the same percentages of
Americans might die or suffer injury as foreigners have. Then think about the impact that level
of physical and moral insult would have on us.
Consider, for example, the two sides of the Israel-Palestine struggle. So far in this century —
since September 29, 2000, when Ariel Sharon marched into Al Aqsa and ignited the Intifada of
that name — about 850 Israeli Jews have died at the hands of Palestinians, 125 or so of them
children. In proportion to population, that’s equivalent to 45,000 dead Americans, including
about 6,800 children. It’s a level of mayhem we Americans cannot begin to understand. But,
over the same period, Israeli soldiers and settlers have killed 6,600 or so Palestinians, at least
1,315 of whom were children. In American terms, that’s equivalent to 460,000 U.S. dead,
including 95,000 children. Meanwhile, the American equivalent of almost 500,000 Israelis and
2.9 million Palestinians have been injured. To put it mildly, the human experiences these figures
enumerate are not conducive to peace or goodwill among men and women in the Holy Land or
anywhere with emotional ties to them.
We all know that events in the Holy Land have an impact far beyond it. American sympathy for
Israel and kinship with Jewish settlers assure that Jewish deaths there arouse anti-Arab and anti-
Muslim passions here, even as the toll on Palestinians is seldom, if ever, mentioned. But, among
the world’s 340 million Arabs and 1.6 billion Muslims, all eyes are on the resistance of
Palestinians to continuing ethnic cleansing and the American subsidies and political support for
Israel that facilitate their suffering. The chief planner of 9/11, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,
testified under oath that a primary purpose of that criminal assault on the United States was to
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focus "the American people . . . on the atrocities that America is committing by supporting Israel
against the Palestinian people . . . .” The occupation and attempted pacification of other Muslim
lands like Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the shocking hate speech about Islam that now
pervades American politics lend credence to deepening Muslim perception of an escalating U.S.
crusade against Islam and its believers.
No one knows how many Iraqis have died as a direct or indirect result of the U.S. invasion and
the anarchy that followed it. Estimates range between a low of something over 100,000 to a
high of well over 1 million. Translated to American proportions, that equates to somewhere
between 1 and 13 million dead Americans. Over 2.25 million Iraqis fled to neighboring countries
to escape this bloodbath. Only 5 percent have returned. An equal number sought temporary
refuge inside Iraq. Most of them also remain displaced. In our terms, this equals a flight to
Canada and Mexico of 24 million Americans, with another 24 million still here but homeless. I
think you will agree that, had this kind of thing happened to Americans, religious scruples would
not deter many of us from seeking revenge and engaging in reprisal against whoever had done it
to us.
The numbers in Afghanistan aren’t quite as frightful but they make the same point. We’re
accumulating a critical mass of enemies with personal as well as religious and nationalistic
reasons to seek retribution against us. As our violence against foreign civilians has escalated,
our enemies have multiplied. The logic of this progression is best understood anecdotally.
I am grateful to Bruce Fein (whom some of you may know as a noted constitutional scholar here
in Washington) for calling attention to the colloquy of convicted Times Square car bomber Faisal
Shahzad with United States District Judge Miriam Cederbaum. She challenged Shahzad's self-
description as a ‘Muslim soldier’ because his contemplated violence targeted civilians,
"Did you look around to see who they were?," she asked.
"Well, the people select the government," Shahzad retorted. "We consider them all the same.
The drones, when they hit ..."
Judge Cedarbaum interrupted: "Including the children?"
Shahzad countered: "Well, the drone hits in Afghanistan and Iraq, they don't see children, they
don't see anybody. They kill women, children, they kill everybody. It's a war, and in war, they kill
people. They're killing all Muslims."
Later, he added: "I am part of the answer to the U.S. terrorizing the Muslim nations and the
Muslim people. And, on behalf of that, I'm avenging the attack. Living in the United States,
Americans only care about their own people, but they don't care about the people elsewhere in
the world when they die."
No amount of public diplomacy, no matter how cleverly conducted, can prevail over the
bitterness of personal and collective experience. The only way to reverse trends supporting anti-
American violence by the aggrieved is to reverse the policies that feed it.
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We are now a nation with unmatched military capabilities. Perhaps that is why we are the only
country in the world to have proclaimed that our conflict with terrorists is a “war” or to have
dismissed civilian victims of our violence as “collateral damage.” Few allies joined us in Iraq.
Those that joined us in Afghanistan did so to demonstrate their solidarity with us, not because
they see the piecemeal pacification of the Muslim world as the answer to the extremist non-
state actors in its midst. They seem to know, even if we do not, that terrorism is a tactic, not a
cause against which one can wage war. Weapons are tools with which to change men’s minds,
but the inappropriate use of them can entrench animosity and justify reprisal against the
citizens of the nations that wield them. No other people has so powerful a military
establishment that it could even begin to persuade itself, as many Americans have, that guns
can cure grudges or missiles erase militancy.
If you view the world through a bombsight, everything looks like a target. Yet the lesson of 9/11
is that if you drop bombs on enough people — even peoples with no air forces — the most
offended amongst them will do their best to bomb you back. Thus our destabilization of places
remote from our shores has already blown back to challenge our own domestic tranquility.
There is no reason to doubt that it could do so again. Then, too, one of the main lessons of Iraq
and Afghanistan is that there are some problems for which invasion and occupation are
inappropriate and ineffective responses. Far from demonstrating the irresistible might of the
United States, as their neo-conservative champions intended, these wars have revealed the
considerable limits of American power.
As a case in point, the use of force in Iraq has neither shaped that country to our will nor
vindicated our values. We have so far given 4,500 American lives, suffered the maiming of
32,000 American bodies, accepted the disordering of the minds of tens of thousands of other
young Americans, and spent at least $900 billion in Iraq. Our one clear achievement — the
removal from power of Saddam Hussein — culminated in a tragicomic trial and execution that
mocked rather than celebrated the rule of law. We will leave behind a traumatized society,
brutalized by anarchy, sectarian violence, and terrorism spawned by resentment of foreign
occupation. Iraq’s constitutional order, prospects for domestic tranquility, relations with its
neighbors, and international orientation all remain in doubt.
The Iranian-influenced, Arab Shiite-dominated regime we brought to power in Baghdad is — for

now, at least — at peace with Iraq’s Kurds. But this regime has not shown that it can coexist
peacefully with the country’s Sunni Arab minority. More than half a year after national elections,
no new government has been formed. Many in the region suspect that the army we Americans
are training and equipping may in time emerge, like its predecessors, as the principal institution
of government in Iraq as well as the violent enforcer of its national unity under Shiite Arab
majority rule. Will Iraq once again balance Iran or will it collude with it? We do not know.
What does seem clear is that neither the Iraqi nor the American people will remember Iraq’s
close encounter with the United States proudly or fondly. The years to come are more likely to
produce intermittent reminders of Iraq’s agonies and America’s witlessness as this century
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began than to furnish reasons for nostalgia about shared experience. Nor is the U.S. record in
Iraq of much value to the formulation of campaign plans for pacifying other countries.
The “surge” of more troops into Iraq is now presented by some as a model for plucking impasse
from the maw of military disgrace in Afghanistan too. But that “success,” such as it was, cannot
be translated to Afghanistan. The concentration of U.S. forces in Baghdad froze the pattern of
sectarian urban enclaves that had emerged from four years of savage confessional cleansing. It
allowed warring Iraqi religious groups to barricade the Baghdad neighborhoods into which they
had retreated. This both reduced the level of mayhem and fixed sectarian divisions in place. But
Afghanistan cannot be stabilized by such religious apartheid, which is irrelevant to it. Afghan
divisions have always been primarily rural, ethnic, and regional, rather than confessional.
In parts of Iraq, a surge of U.S. cash helped Iraq’s conservative Sunni tribesmen to recognize the
U.S. Marines as allies against the murderous, foreign jihadis in their midst. Tribes and localities
in Afghanistan are also fond of cash, but the context is very different. The foreign jihadis who
were in Afghanistan have withdrawn to neighboring Pakistan, and no one wants or expects
them to return. The Taliban are Afghans and traditionalists, not foreigners or radicals.
Afghanistan has always defined itself as a confederation of tribes and localities that cooperate
for limited purposes while resisting central or foreign control. The only alien presence in
Afghanistan at present is U.S. and NATO forces and associated aid agencies and NGOs. But they
are there to impose allegiance to Kabul and to challenge tribal customs, not to make common
cause with the tribal and local authorities on these matters. Many at the local level see their
presence as a nuisance that attracts unwanted attention from home-grown, not foreign
guerrillas, and that disturbs, not preserves, the peace.
Counterinsurgency doctrine is an implausible answer to the situation in Afghanistan. It was

developed to defend post-colonial governments in newly independent states modeled on those
of their erstwhile colonial masters. It was never intended to emulate colonialism by building
such states in traditional societies that lack and don’t much want them. It presumes that foreign
forces are assisting a national government to defeat rebels attempting to overthrow it or secede
from it. In Afghanistan, the national government is a barely established creature of foreign
intervention that is attempting to extend central authority in unprecedented ways. The Karzai
regime has been happy to leave the task of imposing its rule on the country at large to
Americans and other foreigners, while profiting as best it can from our efforts. By all accounts, it
hasn’t done at all badly at such profiteering.
Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries on earth. Its nearly thirty million people have a GDP
of about $10 billion. Over the past nine years, we have put $350 billion into making war there,
and spent another $54 billion on developing the place. Not surprisingly, some Afghans, including
not a few in positions of authority, have seen no reason to restrain their enthusiasm about the
opportunities for rake-offs this level of spending sustains.
Nine years after it began, the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan has strayed far from its original
objectives of suppressing al Qa`ida and punishing the Taliban to deter them from ever again
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accommodating anti-American “terrorists with global reach.” Our war now seems to be mostly
about suppressing reactionary Islam and securing some measure of deference for feminist
values. In practice, our primary enemy is no longer al Qa`ida but the Taliban and other Islamists
— in both Afghanistan and adjacent areas of Pakistan. Pakistan remains very wary of long-
standing Indian ties to the Northern Alliance from which the current Kabul regime emerged. For
Islamabad, the war in Afghanistan has come to be as much about forestalling Indian
encirclement and destabilization of Pakistan’s strategic rear as it is about appeasing the United
States, controlling Pashtun and Baluchi nationalism, and preventing destabilization by Islamic
militants. To Pakistanis, we now seem to be part of these problems, not part of their solutions.
Meanwhile, the growing U.S. focus on combating Muslim extremism, broadly defined, is drawing
our covert warriors and armed forces into military operations in an ever-lengthening list of
countries. The American “Dar al Harb” has already grown beyond Afghanistan, Iraq, south
Lebanon, and Palestine to embrace Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. Nowhere in the domain of
Islam are we succeeding in dividing or reducing our enemies, still less diminishing the threat
they represent to us and our homeland.
As if this were not enough, the very same people who neo-conned us into war with Iraq seven
years ago are working hard to get the United States into yet another war — this one with Iran.
Their reasoning mixes bluff with blackmail. They insist that the U.S. must risk regional or even
global catastrophe by launching our own war with Iran. Otherwise, Israel will drag us into an
even more catastrophic one. For their part, Israel’s military planners quite rationally worry
about the limits the loss of their nuclear monopoly would place on their freedom of action
against Arab neighbors like Lebanon and Syria. But they know there is nothing much they can do
to prevent this. Military frustration plus popular hysteria about Iran in Israel produces repeated
threats by Israeli politicians to bomb Iran. Their supporters here faithfully echo these threats.
This, of course, increases Iran’s perceived need to develop a nuclear deterrent to such attack.
And so it goes.
Ironically, the primary strategic effect of the policies these neo-conservative warmongers
advocated in the past was to eliminate Iran’s enemies in Afghanistan and Iraq, while greatly
enhancing Iranian influence in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine and cementing Iran’s alliance with
Syria. As a result, while the United States remains focused on Iran’s nuclear program, it is
becoming apparent to countries in the region that Iranian cooperation or acquiescence is
essential to address a lengthening list of problems of concern to them. These include issues
relating to Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as Palestine.
Th self-defeating actions and statements of both sides over the course of the 30-year impasse in
Iranian-American relations prove many basic rules of diplomacy. Unilateral suspensions of
international law and comity (whether through hostage-taking or demands that rights conferred
by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime be set aside) are quite naturally resented as
inherently illegitimate by the affected side. Neither humiliation nor invective induce reflection;
both inspire brooding about how to show unyielding determination, indirectly hurt the other
side, or retaliate directly against it. Sanctions that are not in support of a negotiating process
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constitute mindless pressure rather than leverage and invite defiance rather than compromise.
Offers of talks premised on the need to check the diplomatic box before proceeding to coercive
measures understandably meet with rebuff. (As a case in point: why should Iran cooperate in
legitimizing the use of force against it on the spurious grounds that measures short of war have
been exhausted?) And so forth. (I’m tempted to go on, but this is not the occasion for a lecture
on strategic self-frustration through diplomatic mis-maneuver.)
In sum, our military interventions in the greater Middle East have been both unproductive and
counterproductive. And we have hardly tried diplomacy. That is no less true in the context of
the Israel-Palestine conflict than with other issues. The political pantomime on the Potomac
known as the “peace process” bears the same relationship to diplomacy that Bernie Madoff’s
operations did to wealth management. The hopes invested in the transaction alter neither its
hollowness nor its cynical insincerity. It seems to serve the interests of its participants but does
not lead to anything real — just more of the same. For Israel the so-called “peace process”
provides cover for more land grabs. For the Palestinian Authority, it earns international aid to
make up for the lack of legitimacy at home. For the United States, it gives the illusion of activism
on behalf of peace while avoiding the politically costly decisions necessary actually to produce it.
Israel has yet to attempt an answer to the question Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion asked
Nahum Goldman in 1956. "Why should the Arabs make peace? If I were an Arab leader I would
never make terms with Israel. That is natural: we have taken their country. Sure, God promised
it to us, but what does that matter to them? Our God is not theirs. We come from Israel, it's
true, but two thousand years ago, and what is that to them? There has been antisemitism, the
Nazis, Hitler, Auschwitz, but was that their fault? They only see one thing: we have come here
and stolen their country. Why should they accept that?" We have no answer to that question
either. But we need one. If no peaceful path to justice and dignity is available to Palestinians,
they will see no reason not to return to violence. There is a mounting danger that many
elsewhere will support them if they do so.
Americans seem to sense the growing risk of violent blowback from the Arab world and the
broader Middle East. What else can explain our willingness to surrender the very values that
have defined us as a society and that we claim to be defending? Our violent interaction with the
Arab and Muslim worlds is clearly changing us much more than it is changing Arabs and
Muslims. Our obsession with homeland security is corroding our values at home while increasing
enmity and disregard for us abroad. If this makes us safer in the short term, it makes us both
less free and less safe in the long term. It is also a prescription for diminished international
prestige and support amidst continuing worsening of our country’s relations with Arabs and
Muslims. It neither preserves our liberties nor advances our security.
The Founding Fathers knew that acceptance of a measure of risk is the prerequisite for freedom.
The checks and balances of the American Constitution were instituted to prevent attempts by
our government to make us less free in order to make us safer. Yet, not quite 210 years after we
enacted the Bill of Rights, we Americans are setting aside the protections enshrined in it. In our
pursuit of a zero-risk security environment, we are slowly but steadily substituting the elements
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of a garrison state for constitutionally ordained freedoms. Increasingly, we seek to achieve

national security by impairing the security of individual Americans. Our citizens and foreign
residents may take comfort from the thought that foreign terrorists are under American military
pressure. But they can no longer feel secure from arbitrary and capricious actions by
government agencies and officials here.
Iraq intervention destabilized the society and increased terrorism
Flamur Krasniqi Brunel University, London, 2016. Are Military Interventions Inevitably Doomed
to Backfire?, https://www.e-ir.info/2016/03/23/are-military-interventions-inevitably-doomed-
to-backfire/
Additionally, perceptions of U.S. imperialism, in conjunction with the

dismissal of international law and the UN, also caused the U.S. political
harm. Mainly, the intervention fractured U.S.-Russo relations. Existing
Russian sentiments towards NATO’s presence in a post-cold war era,
alongside strong economic turmoil, increased Russian fears of an
imminent U.S. invasion[15] as a result of its new orientation towards
defending human rights. These fears were further antagonised amid
growing human rights concerns as Russia battled with Muslim separatists
during the Second Chechen War (1999-2009). Furthermore, the refusal to
incorporate Russian military capabilities into the Kosovo conflict harmed
the U.S. as the disregard for a multilateral intervention with non-NATO
members, in a conflict which was of greater geostrategic importance to
Russia than it was to the U.S., signified a microcosm of future U.S.
hegemony in the international system. Consequently, the fear of being
victim to future U.S. hegemonic influence was demonstrated by the
creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (2011), to which
Hessbruegge suggests as a clear response[16] to the U.S.A’s role in
Kosovo.
Theoretical arguments surrounding NATO’s intervention in Kosovo are

also extremely divided. Classical-liberals argue that grievances, such as
human rights, within a pluralist society must be settled domestically. This is
asserted by liberal philosopher James Stuart Mill who argues the
enforcement of human rights by outside forces (interventions), cannot
hold[17] legitimacy in the long-term as only domestic populations can
decide as to what suffices as a ‘satisfactory’ solution to their problems.
Writing in 1869, Mill’s perspective is exemplified by contemporary socio-
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ethnic issues in Kosovo, as witnessed during the mass riots of 2004 which
exposed the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo’s
(UNMIK) inability to prevent the mass violence that followed. Therefore,
this underlines the intervention’s inability, at least in accordance to
Holzegrefe’s definition, in providing a long-term ‘satisfactory’ solution to the
problems in Kosovo, as ethnic violence did not cease to exist in 1999. On
the contrary, cosmopolitans prescribe a notion of human commonality
which holds the defence of human rights as a duty for all states to
uphold[18]. Thus, as part of NATO, the U.S. led intervention, in
accordance to Holzegrefe’s definition, is considered as a ‘satisfactory’
solution to the problems in Kosovo, as the human rights violations of the
Kosovar Albanians were ultimately alleviated by a collective (U.S. led)
NATO force.
Meanwhile, neo-realists stipulate that states continuously pursue national

interests in order to optimize their absolute gains and as such states are
unwilling to risk their military for purely ‘humanitarian’ reasons. Naturally,
this rejects the Clinton Doctrine’s portrayal of the U.S.A’s new fixation in
upholding human rights as a purely moral obligation. This is evidenced
when addressing NATO’s method of intervention in Kosovo: air-strikes
only. This seems to suggest that the lives of NATO forces (U.S. pilots),
were of more importance than the lives of the Kosovar Albanians to who’s
persecution the intervention was justified on. As such, this has ignited the
debate of selective engagement, an argument which seems to hold weight
when one examines the U.S.A’s disregard to intervene in much larger
humanitarian crises at the same time as Kosovo, such as Darfur. Yet,
complete inaction itself can also harm a state as it did to the U.S. in its
refusal to intervene during the Rwandan genocide (1994). Ironically, this
neo-realist perspective was exemplified by the eventual French
intervention in Rwanda, to which Destexhe has accused France of only
intervening in order to deter growing Anglo-American influences in the
predominantly French speaking state[19]. Thus, the neo-realist paradigm
suggests that military interventions are more likely to backfire and harm the
intervening state as they are accused of pursuing national interests, rather
than seeking to prevent human rights violations.
Kosovo aside, since 9/11, U.S. military interventions have been less
focused on defending human rights and more on deterring national and
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international security threats, particularly, fundamental Islamism. In turn,

this has resulted into a barrage of contested military interventions, with Iraq
(2003), being the centre of focus for many scholars. Unlike ‘humanitarian’
interventions, when examining whether or not the U.S. has provided a
‘satisfactory’ solution to the problems Iraq, the definition is different. Thus,
the remainder of the paper will adhere to Robert Jacksons’ definition of a
‘satisfactory’ solution to a security concern as: the defeat/deterrence of any
foreign dangers and menaces from threat, intervention, invasion,
destruction, occupation or some other harmful interference by a hostile
foreign power or terrorist group[20]. Yet the definition of harm remains
almost identical, with the only difference being the prospect that certain
harms can disrupt national security.
Initially, the U.S. intervention in Iraq was conducted under the rhetoric of
disrupting Saddam Hussein’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)
‘programme’, which the George W. Bush administration posed as
constituting a threat to U.S. national security as Hussein allegedly had
links[21] to al-Qaeda. However, U.S. forces were unable to retrieve any
evidence of Hussein’s WMDs ‘programme’. Immediately, one is able to
identify that the U.S.’s intervention backfired and caused more harm than it
did in providing a ‘satisfactory’ solution as the intervention was conducted
on the premise of finding WMDS, which evidently did not exist. Moreover,
according to one particular writer, Rick Fawn, there is no evidence of al-
Qaeda presence in Iraq prior to the U.S. intervention, therefore refuting the
Bush administration’s claims of Hussein having links to terrorist networks.
In fact, Fawn elaborates by suggesting that the U.S. invasion was a direct
catalyst in Iraqi support for al-Qaeda. This is due to Hussein’s
capitulation[22] enabling al-Qaeda to exploit religious differences within
Iraq which had previously been suppressed under dictatorial rule. So, this
suggests the U.S. intervention not only failed in providing a ‘satisfactory’
solution to the security issues in Iraq, it in fact contributed to the rise of
Islamic extremism in the country.
Extensively, following the failure to allocate WMDs, the U.S. continued to

defend the intervention under the provisions of implementing democracy in
the Middle-East. The rhetoric of democratisation followed the assumption
that once democracy had been established in Iraq it would spread to
neighbouring states hostile towards the U.S. (Iran), therefore destroying
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the need for Islamic terrorism. However, on 1st October 2003, the U.S.
imposed Ayad Allawi, a prominent Shi’a politician as the new Iraqi Prime
minister. The imposition of Allawi backfired on the U.S. with dire
consequences. Politically, the installation of a Shi’a head of state
strengthened Iran’s regional influence as it granted Iran an ally which it had
previously not enjoyed[23]. An increase in Iranian influence within the
Middle-East has strongly harmed the U.S.A’s presence within the region,
as is the case with the ongoing Syrian civil-war (2011-), whereby U.S.
attempts to overthrow the Assad regime is strongly diminished by Iranian
(and Russian) support for pro-government forces.
Furthermore, the U.S.A’s empowerment of Iraqi Shiite’s has not, even at

the time of writing this paper, been successful in orchestrating a sufficient
political process[24]. Rather, it has contributed to its fracture by fostering
sectarian violence. Evidently, this was exemplified during the mass
sectarian violence[25] which engulfed all aspects of Iraqi life from 2006 to
2007 and continues to do so with the current conflict against ISIS.
Therefore, although the sectarian violence is a civil issue, the creation of
widespread violence is attributed to the U.S.A’s intervention. Constant
conflict has led to the imposition of various draconian-style laws,
hazardous environment and extreme living conditions which have
disenfranchised a strong proportion of Muslims, not just in Iraq but the
entire region also. As a result, it is understandable that the rise in sectarian
violence is attributed to coercive military intervention which continues to
stretch the gap between the population and the state[26]. In return, this
has significantly harmed the U.S. ideologically, as it has gained a
reputation as an anti-Islamic force intervening for the purpose to securing
Iraq’s oil supplies. As a result, this has fuelled international Islamic
extremism[27], which is conducted in retaliation for U.S. involvement in
Iraq, such as the London underground bombings (2005). Therefore, the
U.S. intervention in Iraq vindicates that military interventions are more
likely to backfire and harm the intervening state than to provide a
‘satisfactory’ solution in a target state, as the U.S. intervention in Iraq
strengthened international terrorism on the assumption that the U.S. was
anti-Islamic.
Lastly, the intervention has also posed enormous economic harm upon the
U.S., as the cost of the intervention alone is more than $2 trillion[28]. As a
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result, the U.S. economy has suffered, with an unemployment rate above
10% (2009). More so, the increase of non-state terrorism has pervasively
fuelled the militarisation of states, particularly the U.S., which had
previously been initiated during the cold war[29].This is clearly evidenced
by the U.S.A’s military expenditure that compromised 4.75%[30] of the
total U.S. GDP (2011). Furthermore the U.S.A’s withdrawal from Iraq in
2011 has left a weak security structure behind that has enabled extremist
groups, such as ISIS, to control vast amounts of territory which in turn
requires further U.S. economic (and military) support in order to restore
security. Thus, according to Robertson’s definition, the U.S. intervention in
Iraq has again failed to provide a ‘satisfactory’ solution to the security
issues in Iraq and as the economic consequences of the intervention have
exemplified, the intervention caused more harm for the U.S. than it did in
providing a ‘satisfactory’ solution to the problems in Iraq.
In conclusion, military interventions always backfire as they are liable to

create or even be subject to harmful consequences, as the U.S. has been
to Islamic extremism as a result of its intervention in Iraq. Theoretically, at
least in respect to ‘humanitarian’ interventions, classical-liberalists hold this
to be evident as foreign interventions cannot provide ‘satisfactory’ solutions
to another state’s problem and thus further issues are therefore created.
Partially, this is due to foreign interventions being viewed as a new method
of 21st century colonialism. Meanwhile, neo-realists claim, due to the
increasingly hostile international system in the ‘new world order’, states
(especially the U.S. as the world’s hegemonic power) constantly seek to
ensure their national interests through humanitarian interventions, rather
than seeking to provide an actual ‘satisfactory’ solution to problems in a
target state. This seems to be the case when one addresses the inaction
of the U.S. to intervene in humanitarian situations which hold no national
interests, such as Darfur and Rwanda. Meanwhile, according to
cosmopolitans, the duty to uphold human rights is a universal principle and
thus inaction itself is able to harm a state. Yet, the idea of intervening
militarily in order to uphold human rights is a notion in itself which suggests
that military interventions are liable to backfire and harm a state[31], than it
is in providing a ‘satisfactory’ solution to problems in a target state, as
further suffering is caused.
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Answers to: Arguments Don’t Apply to UN Intervention
Most of the Standing Army would have to be comprised of US troops, as no one

else has that many troops or modern weapons
Shibley Telhami, 1995, Visiting Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program of the Brookings
Institution; Associate Professor of Government and Director of the Near Eastern Studies
Program at Cornell University; PhD, Is a Standing United Nations Army
Possible? Or Desirable?, https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?

referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1372&context=cilj;Is
Although such a trend means that interveners inevitably will be less "neutral " than some hope, it is
nonetheless unavoidable given the resource constraints that the United Nations will likely continue to face. There are, however,
ways to reduce the impact of the partiality of regional interveners. First, it is important to avoid unilateral interventions-the broader
the regional organization, the better. Second, the United Nations should consolidate formal working relationships with regional
organizations, as suggested by the Secretary- General. Third, regional organizations must be encouraged to upgrade their own
structures to deal with the new tasks. Fourth, even when regional organizations intervene, such interventions should take place
within the context of an authorizing resolution of the UNSC which spells out specific mandates. Nevertheless,
the role of
the more powerful states, especially the United States, will remain indispensable in carrying
out some operations in a timely fashion. Even in purely humanitarian cases, as providing relief to Rwandan refugees
indicated, the logistical support for efficient and timely implementation requires the type of capability that few states other than the
United States can provide
The UN is considered a Western organization, so all of the arguments still apply
East African, April 26, 2014, Partiality dilemma: The new model of UN intervention missions
Since then, the UN has swung like a pendulum in both theory and
praxis from its traditional non-combative and "neutral"
peacekeeping model to a new militaristic approach that has seen
its forces embroiled in combat in African theatres of war. This
follows a new tendency by major global powers at the helm of the
United Nations Security Council to pursue a more militaristic
approach, which is turning UN missions into "combative
peacekeeping." This has fuelled scepticism about the neutrality
of UN missions and the behind-the-scenes role of former European
colonial powers in these missions.
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UN Specific
UN can’t solve the underlying causes of violence
East African, April 26, 2014, Partiality dilemma: The new model of UN intervention missions
But the new UN interventionism has its fierce critics. Jean-Marie

Guehenno, the United Nations peacekeeping chief from 2000 to
2008, has cautioned against the thinking that a combative mission
will resolve conflicts in Africa, particularly Congo's quagmire.
Offensive peacekeeping cannot be relied upon to resolve the
structural causes of the conflicts in Somalia, South Sudan or
eastern DRC, which often have regional dimensions and linkages in
neighbouring countries. These pundits want the UN to pursue a
solution that will involve willing heads of state from the
region. They say that it is "not a SWAT team that's going to
clean up a bad neighbourhood That requires politics."
Offensive peacekeeping kills the UN’s role as a mediator

Africa Policy Brief, April 1, 2014, Partiality dilemma: The new model of UN intervention
missions, http://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-
Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April-2014.pdf DOA: 12-7-14
Also worrying experts is that the new militarism is radically

changing the way the UN has been perceived in conflict
situations. "The bigger danger is that when the UN becomes a
combatant on the ground it loses what has been its unique role of
having been a potential mediator of being the impartial
outsider," said Mr Laurenti. Others feel that the shift to a
combative style can compromise the image of the UN peacekeeping
forces as neutral actors in conflicts. "It may compromise the
neutrality and impartiality which we find essential to the
organisation's peacekeeping. Its presence should be perceived by
all parties as that of an honest broker, and not a potential
party to the conflict," said Gert Rosenthal, the envoy of
Guatemala, a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council.
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Lack of impartiality has undermined peacekeeping in the Sudan
The impartiality dilemma Beyond Congo, UN interventionism is
facing an "impartiality" dilemma. The role of the UN mission in
South Sudan (UNMISS) has caused friction with the leaders in
Juba, who are trying to quell an insurgency led by the former
vice-president Riek Machar. Following the outbreak of violence
in December 2013, the UN Security Council approved with
unprecedented speed a request by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to
boost the strength of the UNMISS to 12,500 troops and 1,323
police, up from 7,000 troops and 900 police. The perception of
the lack of impartiality of the UN force by Juba has created
acrimony. In January, South Sudan president Salva Kiir accused
the UN peacekeeping mission of acting like a "parallel
government" in his country. It did not help matters that in
March, UN trucks that were supposedly carrying food were found to
be carrying weapons and blankets that Juba suspected to be
destined for the rebels.
Offensive peacekeeping operations undermine UN credibility needed to resolve

future crises
Austin Bay, 12-13-13, Sun Journal (Lewiston, Maine), December 13,

2013
Austin Bay: U.N. trying peacekeeping with fangs
But as for the U.N. ordering its well-equipped military units to

destroy specific combatant factions? Critics of offensive
mandates authorizing the "neutralization" of specific factions
contend, with good reason, that, when this occurs, the Security
Council has overtly chosen sides. When its peacekeepers enter a
sovereign country with the mandate to attack a rebel faction, the
U.N. loses more than credibility as a mediator. Come the next
dirty war, the critics argue, peacekeeping forces will be met as
invaders.
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Impartiality Impact
Lack of impartiality prevents peacekeeping solvency
Dr. Jeni Whalan, 2014, Partial Peace: The Politics of Taking Sides in UN
Peacekeeping, Paper prepared for International Studies Association Annual Convention, Toronto, 26-29,
https://www.academia.edu/6474185/Partial_Peace_The_Politics_of_Taking_Sides_in_UN_Peacekeeping DOA: 12-6-
14 Lecturer in International Security and Development BA (UNSW), M.Phil (Oxon), D.Phil (Oxon)
Similarly, Shashi Tharoor recognized that UN peacekeeping could not go ‘back to basics’ if it was
to respond to the new security threats it faced, but nevertheless declared impartiality to be ‘the
oxygen of peacekeeping’: the only way peacekeeping can work is by being trusted by both sides,
being clear and transparent in their dealings, and keeping the lines of communication open. The
moment they lose this trust, the moment they are seen by one side as the ‘enemy’, they
become part of the problem they were sent to solve.’
Impartiality critical to consent and sustaining peacekeeping
At the local level, similar diversity among the purposes of impartiality exists, as do tensions
among them. First, traditional impartiality has served to make peacekeeping acceptable to
relatively strong host states, sufficient that they would consent to the deployment of
peacekeepers. Ensuring the consent of the host state in one operation also had implications for
the viability of future peacekeeping; as Alan James noted, considerations of precedent were
crucial: if a peacekeeping force gets permission to enter a state to engage in impartial and non-
violent activity and then moves in the direction of partiality and violence, other prospective
hosts are going to be extremely cautious about issuing invitations. 71
Impartiality critical to mediation
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The final purpose of impartiality identified at the local level is the procedural
legitimation expected to come from a peacekeeping operation that can mediate
between warring factions as an honest broker, fairly and without bias to any side. For
example, the Force Commander of the United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC), General John Sanderson, credits this type of impartiality with
the mission’s ability to win confidence among senior members of the various
Cambodian factions, which provided UNTAC with a new means of influence to
influence their actions.76 This impartiality purpose is most often seen in conflicts among parties
who are relatively evenly matched, where there is not a strong international interest in the
victory of one side over another, and once the conflict has reached some form of
stalemate.77 Effective mediation can, in turn, be expected to produce better outcomes,
such as a negotiated ceasefire with which armed groups comply, which means this
approach may also have a substantive legitimation function.

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UN Offensive Military Operations Undermine Humanitarianism

UN taking on a combat role undermines humanitarianism
Criticism of UN interventionism has also come from the

humanitarian aid agencies who fear that a combative UN force
risks blurring the line between aid workers providing care and
soldiers. "You can have a helicopter one day used to deliver the
Force Intervention Brigade troops to attack a village and next
day to deliver aid to that same village," said Michiel Hofman, a
senior humanitarian specialist with Medicins sans Frontieres in
Brussels. The UN bureaucracy can only take lightly the critics
of interventionism at its own peril. In war situations,
perception is everything. Interventionism hugely impacts the
perception of the UN peacekeeping operations not just in Africa
but globally.
Offensive missions could turn aid workers into targets
Sudarsan Raghavan, November 2, 2013, Washington Post, Raghavan has been The Post's Kabul
bureau chief since 2014. He was previously based in Nairobi and Baghdad for the Post, In
Volatile Congo, A New UN Force with Teeth, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in-
volatile-congo-a-new-un-force-with-teeth/2013/11/01/0cda650c-423f-11e3-b028-
de922d7a3f47_story.html DOA: 12-5-14
But the force is also an unparalleled gamble for the United Nations that challenges the basic
principles of peacekeeping. It has orders to react offensively to enforce peace, essentially
transforming peacekeepers into combatants. And it is openly supporting Congolese government
forces, a move away from the principle of neutrality that has guided other U.N. missions. That
could affect the United Nations’ ability to negotiate peace deals with the militias and risks
deepening conflicts. Humanitarian agencies are worried that Congo’s brutal militias could see
the entire U.N. mission, which also includes aid workers, monitors and civilian experts, as non-
neutral potential targets
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Undermines Support for Peacekeeping
It is difficult to get commitments to peacekeeping involving offensive PKOs
Substantively, robust peacekeepers operating under ‘new impartiality’ are intended to deliver
on the expectations and promises implicit in peacekeeping: that they will protect populations,
keep the peace, and deter conflict. But the procedural legitimacy of ‘new’ impartiality is more
contested. First, it has been less acceptable to loose coalition of the UN’s most significant troop
contributing countries. UN peacekeepers today are supplied overwhelmingly by developing
countries; in recent years, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India have collectively contributed the lion’s
share.55 These troop contributing countries have broadly resisted calls to accept the greater risks
involved in using force in peacekeeping operations, and have regularly invoked the principle of
impartiality to question such practice of ‘taking sides’.
Third, the traditional notion of impartiality is attractive to those countries that contribute the
vast majority of UN peacekeepers, because it minimizes the risk to their security; becoming a
belligerent party also means that peacekeepers become ‘targets for retaliation’. 65 Since the
Security Council’s peacekeeping decisions rely entirely for their implementation on the
willingness of UN member states to contribute forces to a mission, it must also take into account
the perceptions of troop contributing countries regarding the acceptability and appropriateness
of the peacekeeping enterprise. For their part, member states derive a number of benefits from
their contribution of troops to UN peacekeeping, but remain ‘highly sensitive’ to the character
of these operations: Naturally, all contributing countries want to avoid casualties and hence
exhibit greater reluctance to contribute troops to missions that are thought overly dangerous.
Contributing states thus typically assess the degree of host government consent for a mission
and might be deterred from participating in operations where this is questionable... National
publics are also frequently intolerant of casualties sustained on peacekeeping operations. This
poses a particular challenge to the emerging concept of ‘robust peacekeeping. 66
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Offensive PKOs reduce support for peacekeeping
News Record, July 30, 2013, “United Nations Authorizes Offensive Operations in the Democratic
Republic of Congo,” http://www.newsrecord.co/united-nations-authorizes-offensive-
operations-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/
Furthermore, most countries that supply troops for peacekeeping

missions do so with the expectation of limiting casualties. Placing
peacekeepers in a fighting role may make supplying troops less
attractive for U.N. member states.
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A2: Offensive PKOs Necessary to Stop Rebel Groups
Defeat of M23 hasn’t deterred other groups
Dr Robert Besseling, January 1, 2014, Besseling is a Senior

Political Adviser to the IHS Country Risk and Forecasting Sub-
Saharan Africa team, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Elusive riches -
Continued threats to the DRC's minerals trade
The defeat of the M23 has not succeeded in motivating many

members of other rebel groups and community-based Maï-Maï self-
defence militias that operate within the region to surrender and
disarm. On 3 December, UN under-secretary-general for
peacekeeping operations Hervé Ladsous said that the FIB would
engage these other armed groups. The FIB is most likely to be
deployed against collaborators of the M23, including some Maï Maï
groups in North and South Kivu, and other groups that operate in
areas now effectively under FARDC control, such as the Alliance
des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain (APCLS), based in
the town of Masisi, North Kivu, and the Union des Patriotes
Congolais pour la Paix/Forces Populaires Congolaises (UPCP/FPC)
in Lubero, also in North Kivu. According to the UN Group of
Experts, both of these groups are involved in the mining of
columbite-tantalum and gold.
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A2: Necessary to Defeat Rebels
Can’t defeat all of the rebel groups in the Congo
Sudarsan Raghavan, November 2, 2013, Washington Post, Raghavan has been The Post's Kabul
bureau chief since 2014. He was previously based in Nairobi and Baghdad for the Post, In
Volatile Congo, A New UN Force with Teeth, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in-
volatile-congo-a-new-un-force-with-teeth/2013/11/01/0cda650c-423f-11e3-b028-
de922d7a3f47_story.html DOA: 12-5-14
U.N. officials say a political solution is still the best path forward, but in a phone interview last
week, Amani Kabasha, the rebels’ political spokesman, said his group had lost trust in the U.N.
mission because it was supporting Congolese forces. “Even if they kill all of the M23, another
group will rise in our place,” he warned. The intervention brigade is expected to go after more
than 40 other militias who are committing atrocities, stealing Congo’s mineral wealth and
preventing the government from functioning — a task that seems virtually impossible. There is
also the problem of perception. The Enough Project, a human-rights group, said in a report last
week that the brigade “risks being seen, or being used, as a pawn of Kinshasa,” the capital. Both
Kobler and Cruz said the brigade would not work with any Congolese army units that have
committed human-rights abuses. They also said the brigade would work at times on its own.
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Kritik Links
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Militarism
UN militarism in Africa triggers nationalism
Although Africa is unlikely to resist external players in

situations like the CAR, growing perceptions of increased UN
militarism on the continent are likely to stir residual
nationalism against external intervention. In recent decades,
the continent, through the AU, has grown increasingly assertive
of its independence vis-a-vis former colonial powers and the
West.
The impact is permanent racialized targeting and elimination of bodies to

maintain a global economy of violence, a process to which the peoples of the
Global North will only respond with a disembodied indifference
Harting 6. [Heike, prof at University of Montreal, Global Civil War and Post-colonial Studies,
globalautonomy.ca/global1/servlet/Xml2pdf?fn=RA_Harting_GlobalCivilWar]
¶ The Necropolitics of Global Civil War¶ As with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. It "tends," as Hardt and
Negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems,
negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal
incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination.
Hardt and Negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has
become "a permanent social relation" and thereby
the "primary organizing principle of society , and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). What Hardt
and Negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "War," they write, "has become a regime of
biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life"
(ibid., 13). For example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new
hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of
interaction" (ibid., 81). The ambiguity of Hardt and Negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of
social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the
revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." At the same time, they argue, that a
biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated
through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). If none of
this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with Hardt and Negri's
reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary
global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial,
neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ In fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon
on the sovereign territory of the United States of America, specifically after 11 September 2001, it is hardly news to
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"people in the former colonies, who," as Crystal Bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the
'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. For example, in Sri Lanka global civil war has been a permanent,
everyday reality since the country's Sinhala Only Movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence
as a means of politics since President Jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed
anti-Tamil pogrom in 1983. Similarly, according to Achille Mbembe, biopolitical
warfare was intrinsic to the
European imperial project in "Africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the
twentieth century" (2003, 33). In other words, although Hardt and Negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that
restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of
global civil war. Indeed, not only do Hardt and Negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of
what David Harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation
and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to
implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. As for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war
has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional association of civil war with "insurrection and resistance" (Agamben 2005,
2). Instead, it has become the effect of a diffuse new sovereignty (i.e., Hardt and Negri's Empire), a sovereignty that no longer
the
decides over but has itself become a disembodied, that is, denationalized and normalized, state of exception. Yet, to talk about
disembodiment of global war not only reinforces media-supported ideologies of high-tech
precision wars without casualties , but it also represses narratives about the ways in which the modi operandi of global
war come to be embodied differently in different sites of war. ¶ In her short story "Man Without a Mask" (1995), the Sri Lankan
writer Jean Arasanayagam describes the global dimensions of a war that is usually considered an ethnic civil war restricted to
internally competing claims to territorial, cultural, and national sovereignty between the country's Sinhalese and Tamil population.
Told by an elite mercenary who clandestinely works for the ruling members of the government and leads a group of highly trained
assassins, the story follows the thoughts of its narrator and contemplates the politicization of violence and death. As a mercenary
and possibly an ex-SAS (British Special Air Service) veteran the Sri Lankan Government hired after the failure of the Indo-Lankan
Accord, the narrator signifies the "privatization of [Sri Lanka's] war" (Tambiah 1996, 6) and, thus, the reign of a global free market
economy through which the state hands over its institutions and services to private corporations, including its army, and profits from
the unrestricted global and illegal trade in war technologies. Like a craftsman, the mercenary finds satisfaction in the precision and
methodical cleanliness of his work, in being, as he says, "a hunter. Not a predator" in his ability to leave "morality" out of "this
business" (Arasanayagam 1995, 98). He is an extreme and perverted version of what Martin Shaw describes as the " 'soldier-
scholar,'???the archetype of the new [global] officer" (1999, 60). As a self-proclaimed "scholar or scribe" (ibid., 100), the mercenary
plots maps of death. Shortly before he reaches his victim, a politician who underestimated the political ambition of his enemy, he
comments that bullet holes in a human body comprise a new kind of language: "The machine gun splutters. The body is pitted,
pricked out with an indecipherable message. They are the braille marks of the new fictions. People are still so slow to comprehend
their meaning" (ibid., 100). These new maps or fictions of global war, I suggest, describe what Etienne Balibar calls ultra-objective
and ultra-subjective violence and characterize how global civil war both generates bare life and manages and instrumentalizes
death.¶ According to Balibar, ultra-objective violence suggests the systematic "naturalization of
asymmetrical relations of power" (2001, 27) brought about, for instance, by the Sri Lankan government's prolonged
abuse of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which, in the past plunged the country into a permanent state of emergency, facilitated
the random arrest of and almost absolute rule over citizens, and thus created a culture of fear and a reversal of moral and social
values. As the story clarifies, under conditions of systematic or ultra-objective violence, "corruption" becomes "virtue" and "the most
vile" man wears the mask of the sage and "innocent householder" (Arasanayagam 1995, 102). In this milieu, the mercenary has no
need for a mask, because he bears a face of ordinary violence that is "perfectly safe" (ibid., 102) in a society structured by
habitual and systemic violence. But the logic of the "new fictions" of political violence is also ultra-subjective because it
is "intentional" and has a "determinate goal" (Balibar 2001, 25), namely the making and elimination of
what Balibar calls "disposable people" in order to generate and maintain a profitable global economy of
violence. The logic of ultra-subjective violence presents itself through the fictions of ethnicity and
identity as they are advanced and instrumentalized in the name of national sovereignty. The
mercenary perfectly symbolizes what Balibar means when he writes that "we have entered a world of the banality of objective
cruelty" (ibid.). For if the fictions of global violence are scratched into the tortured bodies of war victims, the mercenary's detached
behavior dramatizes a "will to 'de-corporation'," that is, to force disaffiliation from the other and from oneself ??? not just from
belonging to the community and the political unity, but from the human condition" (ibid.). In other words, while global
civil
war becomes embodied in those whom it negates as social beings and thereby reduces to mere "flesh," it
remains a disembodied enterprise for those who manage and orchestrate the politics of death
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of global war. It is through the dialectics of the embodiment and disembodiment of global
violence that the dehumanization of the majority of the globe's population takes on a
normative and naturalized state of existence. ¶ Arasanayagam's short story also casts light on the limitations of
Hardt and Negri's understanding of the biopolitics of global civil war, for the latter can account neither for the new fictions of
violence in former colonial spaces nor for what Mbembe calls the "necropolitics" (2003, 11) of late modernity. Mbembe's term
refers to his analysis of global warfare as the continuation of earlier and the development of new "forms of subjugation of life to the
power of death" and its attendant reconfiguration of the "the relationship between resistance, sacrifice, and terror" (2003, 39). 4
Despite the many theoretical intersections of Hardt and Negri's and Mbembe's work, Mbembe's notion of necropolitics sees
contemporary warfare as a species of such earlier "topographies of cruelty" (2003, 40) as the
plantation system and the colony. Thus, in contrast to Hardt and Negri, Mbembe argues that the ways in which
global violence and warfare produce subjectivities cannot be dissociated from the ways in
which race serves as a means of both deciding over life and death and of legitimizing and making
killing without impunity a customary practice of imperial population control. If global civil war is a
continuation of imperial forms of warfare, it must rely on strategies of embodiment, that is, of
politicizing and racializing the colonized or now "disposable" body for purposes of self-
legitimization, specifically when taking decisions over the value of human life. After all, on a global level, race propels the
ideological dynamics of ethnic and global civil war, while, on the local plane, it serves to
orchestrate the brutalization and polarization of the domestic population, reinforcing and
enacting patterns of racist exclusion and violence on the non-white body. In contrast to Hardt and
Negri, then, Mbembe invites us to articulate imperial genealogies for the necropolitics of today's global civil wars. ¶ In other words, if
imperialism was a form of perpetual low-intensity global war, the biopolitics of imperialism aimed at creating different forms of
subjectivization. For example, while in India, the imperial administration sought to create a functional class of native informants, in
Africa and the Caribbean, the British Empire created the figure of homo sacer. The latter, as Agamben argues, refers to the one who
can be killed but not sacrificed. Homo sacer, Agamben clarifies, constitutes "the originary exception in which human life is included
in the political order in being exposed to an unconditional capacity to be killed" (1998, 85). Thus,
the native is included in
the imperial order only through her exclusion, while, simultaneously her humanity is stripped
of social life and transformed into bare life, ready to be commodified on slavery's auction
blocs and foreclosed from the dominant imperial psyche. Agamben's understanding of bare life derives from
his reading of the Nazi death camps as the paradigmatic space of modernity in which the distinction between "fact and law" (ibid.,
171), "outside and inside, exception and rule, licit and illicit" (ibid., 170) dissolves and in which biopolitics takes the place of politics
and "homo sacer" replaces the "citizen" (ibid., 171). While the notion of bare life is instrumental for theorizing biopolitics and the
normalization and legalization of state violence under the pretense of, for example, protective arrests and preemptive strikes, it also
suggests that the human body can be read as pure matter or in empirical terms. What goes unnoticed is to what extent the
production of bare
life depends on ideologies of race, that is, on the racialization of bodies,
citizenship, and the concept of the human. For instance, under imperial rule, bare life is subjected to death and its
politics in ways slightly different from those suggested by Agamben. More specifically, the killing of natives or slaves as bare life ???
then and today, as Rwanda's race-based genocide clarifies ??? not only configures human life in terms of its "capacity to be killed"
(Agamben 1998, 114), that is as homicide and genocide outside of law and accountability, but also measures the
value of human life on grounds of race. The making of bare life is a racialized and racializing
process rooted within the necropolitics of colonialism. For, killing the native or slave presupposes
the remaking of the human into bare life both through ideologies of pseudo-scientific racism and by subjecting them
to what Orlando Patterson calls the "social death" (1982, 38) of the slave, that is, to a symbolic death of the human as a
communal and social being that precedes physical death. 5 Thus, imperialism's necropolitics involves the
making of disposable lives through practices of zombification and the "redefinition of death" itself (Agamben 1998,
161). In this sense, imperialism not only facilitated the extreme forms of racialized violence characteristic of global
civil war, but it also helped create the conditions for making bare life the acceptable state of being for the present majority of the
globe's population.¶ Not unlike Jean Arasanayagam's short story, Mbembe's account of the Rwandan genocide and the Palestinian
intifada suggests that the new global subjectivities are not so much the networked multitude Hardt and Negri imagine. Rather,
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emerging from the "new fictions" of global war, they are the suicide bomber, the mercenary, the martyr, the child soldier, the victim
of mass rape, the refugee, the woman dispossessed of her family and livelihood, the mutilated civilian, and the skeleton of the
disappeared and murdered victims of global civil war. What these subjectivities witness is that, on one hand, living under conditions
of global civil war means to live in "permanent???pain" (Mbembe 2003, 39) and, on the other hand, they refer back to the dialectical
mechanisms of colonial violence. For under the Manichaean pressures of colonialism, colonial violence always inaugurates a double
process of subjection and subject formation. Frantz Fanon famously argues that anti-colonial violence operates historically on both
collective and individual subject formation. For, on the one hand, "the native discovers reality [colonial alienation] and transforms it
into the pattern of this customs, into the practice of violence and into his plan for freedom" (1963, 58), and on the other, a violent
"war of liberation" instills in the individual a sense of "a collective history" (ibid., 93). Thus, as Robert Young suggests, anti-colonial
violence "functions as a kind of psychotherapy of the oppressed" (2001, 295). Yet, it seems that read through the necropolitics of
imperialism, global civil warfare no longer aims at the "pacification" of the colonial subject or the
"degradation" of the "postcolonial subject" (ibid., 293) but, as I suggested earlier, at the complete abolishment of the
human per se. We may therefore say that if global civil war produces new subjectivities, it does so through, what I have referred
to as a process of zombification. Understood as sustained acts of negation, zombification ??? a term that harks back to Fanon ???
refers to a dialectical process of the embodiment and disembodiment of global war. The former refers to the exercise of ultra-
objective violence ??? that is, the systematic "naturalization of asymmetrical relations of power" (Balibar 2001, 27) ??? in order to
regulate, racialize, and extinguish human life at will, while the latter suggests the production of narratives of "de-corporation" (ibid.,
25) and detachment by those who manage and administrate global civil war. The notion of zombification, however, connotes not
only the exercise of, but also the exorcism of, the ways in which global war is scripted on and through the racialized
body. Thus, a post-colonial understanding of global war needs to think through the necropolitics of war, including the uneven
value historically and presently assigned to human life and the politicization of death. The latter issue will be addressed in the last
section of this paper. The next section examines the cultural production and perpetuation of normative narratives of global
warfare.¶ The Rhetoric of the Archaic and Michael Ondaatje's "Anil's Ghost" ¶ Published shortly after Sri Lanka's civil war became
entangled with the global politics of the South and the rise of the Sri Lankan nation-state to one of the war's principal and most
corrupt actors, Ondaatje's novel Anil's Ghost dramatizes both the transformation of the country's civil war into a permanent state of
exception and the failure of global non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to intervene in the war's rising human rights abuses and
violent excesses. While the novel presents an extraordinary search for social justice through narrative and seeks to understand the
operative modes of violence beyond their historical and social configurations, it also tends to sublimate and aestheticize violence by
treating it as a normative element of human and, indeed, planetary life. My purpose here is to indicate that the novel's own project
of dramatizing the complicity between religious and secular, anti-colonial and nationalist agents of war, and civilians and global
actors (i.e., NGOs) remains compromised by the novel's aesthetic investment in a particular rhetoric of the archaic. The latter, I
argue, unwittingly coincides with normative
narratives of global war and facilitates the reader's
detachment from the ways in which the Global North has reconstructed global life as a
permanent state of exception.¶ Ondaatje's novel (2000) opens with an Author's Note that locates the narrative at a time
when "the antigovernment insurgents in the south and the separatist guerrillas in the north???had declared war on the
government" and "legal and illegal government squads were???sent out to hunt down" both groups. In this instance, the Hobbesian
rhetoric of a "war of all against all" is more than a clich??. In fact, it is symptomatic of the novel's ambiguous critique of the role of
the Sri Lankan nation-state and its elaborate, modernist discourse of violence. The Note foreshadows what the narrator later repeats
on several occasions, namely that Sri Lanka's war is a war fought "for the purpose of war" (ibid., 98) and for which "[t]here is no
hope of affixing blame" (ibid., 17). In short, the "reason for war was war" (ibid., 43). At first glance, the narrative's emphasis on the
war's self-perpetuating dynamics implies a Hobbesian understanding of violence as the natural state of human existence. At the
same time, it translates the actual politics of Sri Lanka's war into the Deleuzean idiom of the "war machine." For, according to
Deleuze and Guattari, armed conflict functions outside the control and accountability of the "state apparatus???prior to its laws"
(1987, 352), and beyond its initial causes. Although such an interpretation of Sri Lanka's war reflects what the political scientist
Jayadeva Uyangoda calls the "intractability of the Sri Lankan crisis" (1999, 158), its political and ethical stakes outweigh its gains. 6 ¶
To begin with, the novel's leitmotif of "perpetual war" situates Sri Lanka's conflict within a general context of global war, because, as
the narrator reports, it is fought with "modern weaponry," supported by "backers on the sidelines in safe countries," and "sponsored
by gun-and drug-runners" (Ondaajte 2000, 43). In this scenario, the rule of law has deteriorated into "a belief in???revenge" (ibid.,
56), and the state is either absent or part of the country's all-consuming anarchy of violence. This absence suggests that the state no
longer functions, in Max Weber's famous words, as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate
use of physical force within a given territory" (2002, 13). It is of course possible to argue that the novel's critique of the Sri Lankan
nation-state lies in its absence. It seems to me, however, that the
narrative's tendency to locate the dynamics of Sri
Lanka's war outside the state and within a post-national vision of a new global order generates a
normative narrative of global war. On the one hand, it resonates with the popular ??? though
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misleading ??? notion that the "appearance of 'failed states'," as Samuel Huntington argues in his controversial study
The Clash of Civilizations, intensifies "tribal, ethnic, and religious conflict" and thus "contributes to [the] image of a
world in anarchy" (1996, 35). On the other, situating Sri Lanka's war outside the institutions of the
state re-inscribes a Hobbesian notion of violence that helps legitimize and cultivate structural
violence as a permissive way of conducting politics. Such a reading of violence, however, overlooks that in a
global context violence has become "profoundly anti-Hobbesian" (Balibar 2001, xi). Balibar usefully suggests that the twentieth
century history of extreme violence has made it impossible to regard violence as "a structural
condition that precedes institutions." Instead, he maintains, "we have had to accept???that extreme violence is
not post-historical but actually post-institutional." It " arises from institutions as much as it arises
against them" (ibid., xi). Thus, in such popular post-colonial narratives of war as Anil's Ghost, the normalization of
violence figures as a forgetting of the institutional entrenchment and historical use of violence
as a state-sanctioned political practice.¶ If Ondaatje's novel presents Sri Lanka's war as an "inherently violent" event
(Das 1998), it is also an event narrated through the symbolism and logic of archaic primitivism. For example, in the novel's central
passage on the nature of human violence, the narrator observes, "The most precisely recorded moments of history lay adjacent to
the extreme actions of nature or civilisation ???Tectonic slips and brutal human violence provided random time-capsules of
unhistorical lives???A dog in Pompeii. A gardener in Hiroshima" (Ondaatje 2002, 55). The
symbolic leveling of the
arbitrariness of primordial chaos and the apparently ahistorical anarchism of violence create a rhetoric of
the archaic that is characteristic, as Nancy argues, of "anything that is properly to be called war" (2000, 128). He convincingly argues
that archaic symbolism "indicates that[war] escapes from being part of 'history' understood as the progress
of a linear/or cumulative time" and can be rearticulated as no more than a "regrettable" remnant
of an earlier age (ibid., 128). In that, Nancy's observation coincides with Hardt and Negri's that the "war on terror"
employs a medievalist rhetoric of just and unjust wars that moralizes rather than legitimizes the
use of global violence by putting it outside the realm of reason and critique . In Nancy's observation,
however, two things are at stake. First, what initially appears to be a postmodern critique of the grand narratives of history in fact
demonstrates that a non-linear account of history may lend itself to the transformation of extreme violence into exceptional events.
In this way violence
is normalized as a transhistorical category that fails to address the unequal
political and economic relations of power, which lie at the heart of global wars. ¶ Second, Nancy
rightly warns us against treating war as an archaic relic that is "tendentiously effaced in the progress and project of a global
humanity" (2000, 128). For not only does war return in the process of negotiating sovereignty on a global and local plane, but the
representation of war in terms of archaic images also repeats a primordialist explanation of what are structurally new wars. As
theorists such as Appadurai and Kaldor have argued, the primordialist hypothesis of global wars merely reinforces those mass
mediated images of global violence that dramatize ethnic wars as pre-modern, tribalist forms of strife. Huntington's notion of
civilization or "fault-line" wars as communal conflicts born out of the break-up of earlier political formations, demographic changes,
and the collision of mutually exclusive religions and civilizations presents the most prominent and politically influential version of a
primordialist and bipolar conceptualization of global war. In contrast to Huntington's approach, however, the narrative of Anil's
Ghost contends that all forms of violence "have come into their comparison" (Ondaatje 2000, 203). Notwithstanding its
universalizing impetus, the
novel thus insists on the impossibility to think the nation and a new global
order outside the technologies of violence and modernity . Indeed, in the novel's narrative it is the
suffering of all war victims that "has come into their comparison" and suggests that the new wars
breed a culture of violence that shapes everyone's life yet for which no one appears to be
accountable. On the one hand, then, the novel's self-critical humanitarian project seeks to initiate a communal and individual
process of mourning by naming, and therefore accounting for, in Anil's words, "the unhistorical dead" (ibid, 56). On the other hand,
read as its critical investment in the war's politics of complicity, the novel's humanitarian endeavor is countered by the narrator's
tendency to articulate violence in archaic and anarchistic terms. For, to revert to the symbolic language of "primitivism and anarchy"
and "to treat [the new wars] as natural disasters," as Kaldor observes (2001, 113), designates a common way of dealing with them.
Thus the rhetoric of the archaic not merely dehistoricizes violence but contributes to the making of
a normative and popular imaginary through which to make global wars thinkable and comprehensible.
Thus, their violent excesses appear to be rooted in primordialist constructions of the failed post-
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colonial nation-state rather

than a phenomenon with deep-seated roots in the global histories of
the present . Such a normative imaginary of global war is produced for the Global North so as
to dehistoricize its own position in the various colonial processes of nation formation and
global economic restructuring of the Global South. In this way, as Ondaatje's novel equally demonstrates, the
Global North can detach itself from the Global South and create the kind of historical and cultural distance
needed to accept ultra-objective violence as a normative state of existence. ¶ Conceptualizing war as a
phenomenon of criminal and anarchistic violence, however, may do more than merely conform to the popular imagination about
the chaotic and untamable nature of contemporary warfare. Indeed, anarchistic notions of violence tend to
compress the grand narratives and petite recits of history into a total, singular present of perpetual uncertainty, fear,
and political confusion and generate what the post-colonial anthropologist David Scott sees as Sri Lanka's "dehistoricized"
history. Given the important role the claiming of ancient Sinhalese and Hindu history played in the violent identity politics that
drive Sri Lanka's war, Scott suggests that devaluing or dehistoricizing history as a founding category of Sri Lanka's narrative of the
nation breaks the presumably "natural???link between past identities and the legitimacy of present political claims" (1999, 103). This
strategy seems useful because it uncouples Sri Lanka's colonially shaped and glorified Sinhalese past from its present claims to
political power. We need to note, however, that, according to Scott, dehistoricizing the past does not suggest writing from a
historical vacuum. Rather, it refers to a process of denaturalizing and, thus, de-legitimizing the normative
narratives of ethnicized and racialized narratives of national identity. ¶ Anil's Ghost engages in this process
of "dehistoricizing" by foregrounding the fictitious and fragmented, the elusive and ephemeral character of history. Indeed,
as the historian Antoinette Burton suggests, the novel offers "a reflection on the continued possibility of
History itself as an exclusively western epistemological form" (2003, 40). The latter clearly finds expression
in what Sarath's brother, Gamini, condemns as "the last two hundred years of Western political writing" (Ondaatje 2000, 285).
Steeped in the imperial project of the West, such writing is facilitated by and serves to erase the figure of the non-European cultural
Other in order to produce and maintain what Jacques Derrida famously called the "white
mythology" (1982, 207) of Western
metaphysics. The novel usefully extends its reading of violence
into a related critique of knowledge production, so
that the latter becomes legible as being complicit in the production of perpetual violence and war.
This critique is perhaps most articulated through the character of Palipana, Sarath's teacher and Sri Lanka's formerly renowned but
now fallen anthropologist. Once an agent of Sri Lanka's anti-colonial liberation movement, Palipana represents the generation of
cultural nationalist who sought history and national identity in an essentially Sinhalese culture and natural environment. Rather than
employing empirical and colonial methods of knowledge production and historiography, Palipana had left the path of scientific
objectivity, tinkered with translations of historical texts, and "approached runes???with the pragmatic awareness of locally inherited
skills" (Ondaatje 2000, 82) until "the unprovable truth emerged" (ibid., 83). Now, years after his fall from scientific grace, Palipana
lives the life of an ascetic, following the "strict principles of" a "sixth-century sect of monks" (ibid., 84). To him, history and nature
have become one, for "all history was filled with sunlight, every hollow was filled with rain" (ibid., 84). Yet, Ondaatje's construction
of Palipana and his account of the eye-painting ritual of a Buddha statue ??? a ritual that assumes a central place in the novel's
cosmopolitan vision of artisanship as a practice of cultural and religious syncretism in the service of post-conflict community building
??? are themselves built on a number of historical texts listed in the novel's "Acknowledgment" section. As Antoinette Burton
astutely observes, "the orientalism of some of the texts on Ondaatje's list is astonishing, a phenomenon which suggests the ongoing
suppleness of 'history' as an instrument of political critique and ideological intervention" (2003, 50). Rather than effectively
"dehistorizing" the character of Palipana, then, Ondaatje bases this character and the eye-painting ceremony on a central Sri Lankan
modernist text, Ananada K. Coomaraswamy's Mediaeval Sinhalese Art (1908/1956).¶ Cont ¶ For Hardt and Negri, then, the state of
exception functions as the universal condition and legitimization of global civil war, while positioning
the United States
as a global power, which transforms war "into the primary organizing principle of society" (2004,
12). They rightly observe that the state of exception blurs the boundaries between peace and war,
violence and mediation. Yet, curiously enough, Hardt and Negri's understanding of the state of exception largely
emphasizes the concept's regulatory and pragmatic politics, so that the United States emerges as a sovereign power on grounds of
its ability to decide on the state of exception. By exempting itself from international law and courts of law, protecting its military
from being subjected to international control, allowing preemptive strikes, and engaging in torture and illegal detention (ibid., 8),
the United States instrumentalizes and maintains war as a state of exception in the name of global security and thus seeks to
consolidate its hegemonic role within Empire. Although Hardt and Negri openly disagree with Agamben's reading of the state of
exception as defining "power itself as a 'monopoly of violence' " (2004, 364), it seems to me that Agamben's theory of the state of
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exception, as put forward in Homo Sacer rather than in States of Exception, might be usefully read alongside Hardt and Negri's
crucial claim that global civil war as well as resistance movements depend on the "production of subjectivity" through immaterial
labour (2000, 66). What this argument overlooks is that, according to Agamben, the state of exception constitutes an abject space or
"a zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exclusion and inclusion" (1998, 181), where subjectivity enters a political and
legal order solely on grounds of its exclusion. Moreover, the sovereign ??? albeit a nation, sovereign power, or global network of
power ??? can only transform the rule of law into the force of law by suspending the legal system from a position that is
simultaneously inside and outside the law. Through these mechanisms of exclusion and contradiction, subjectivity is not so much
created as it is deprived of its social and political relationships. Thus the
"originary activity" of global civil war is the
violent conflation of political and social relationship and thereby the "production of bare life"
(ibid., 83), of life that need not be accounted for , as is the case with the civilian casualties of the US-led
war against Iraq. The state of exception, however, also figures as a prominent concept in post-colonial theory, for it raises
questions not only about the ways in which we configure the human but also how we understand imperial or global war. ¶ In 1940,
Benjamin famously wrote, "the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of
emergency' in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of
history that is in keeping with this insight" (1968, 257). Benjamin's statement, as Homi Bhabha reminds us half a
century later in his essay "Interrogating Identity," can be usefully advanced for a critical analysis of the dialectical ??? if not
revolutionary ??? relationship between oppression, violence, and anti-colonial historiography. Indeed, "the state of emergency," as
Bhabha says, "is also always a state of emergence" (1994, 41). Read in the context of today's global state of exception, namely the
recurrence and intensification of ethnic civil wars across the globe and the coincidence of democratic and totalitarian forms of
political rule, Bhabha's statement entails a number of risks and suggestions for a post-colonial historiography of global civil war. ¶
First, Bhabha's notion of emergency/emergence reflects his critical reading of Fanon's vision of national identity and thus
reconsiders the state of emergency as a possible site of "the occult instability where the people dwell" (Fanon 1963, 227) and give
birth to popular movements of national liberation. In this context, the state of exception might be understood as both constitutive to
the alienation that is intrinsic to liberation movements and instrumental for a radical euphoria and excessive hope that create and
spectralize the post-colonial nation-state as a deferred promise of decolonization. It is through this perspective that we can critically
evaluate Hardt and Negri's endorsement of what they call "democratic violence" (2004, 344). This kind of violence, they argue,
belongs to the multitude. It is neither creative nor revolutionary but used on political rather than moral grounds. When organized
horizontally, according to democratic principles of decision making, democratic violence serves as a means of defending "the
accomplishments" of "political and social transformation" (ibid., 344). Notwithstanding the concept's romantic and utopian
inflections, democratic violence also derives from Hardt and Negri's earlier argument that "the great wars of liberation are (or should
be) oriented ultimately toward a 'war against war,' that is, an active effort to destroy the regime of violence that perpetuates our
state of war and supports the systems of inequality and oppression." This, they conclude, is "a condition necessary for realizing the
democracy of the multitude" (ibid., 67). In one quick stroke, Hardt and Negri move anti-colonial liberation wars into their post-
national paradigm of Empire and divest them of their cultural and historical particularities. Moreover, translating explicitly national
liberation movements into a universalizing narrative of global pacifism precludes a critique of violence within its particular historical
and philosophical formation. In contrast, a post-colonial analysis of global war must tease out the
intersections between the ways in which racialized violence constitutes colonial and post-colonial
processes of nation formation and helps construct an absolute enemy through which to legitimize
global war and to abdicate responsibility for the dehumanizing effects of global economic
restructuring. ¶ Second, while Bhabha's pun is symptomatic of the resisting properties that he sees as operative in the various
practices of colonial ambiguity, it also, despite Benjamin's opinion, draws attention to the possibility that oppression alters
the linear flow of Western history and challenges "the transparency of social reality, as a pre-
given image of human knowledge" (Bhabha 1994, 41). Here, Bhabha rightfully asks to what extent do states of
emergency or acts of extreme violence constitute a historical rupture and, more importantly, call into question the nature of the
human subject. It is at this point that a post-colonial reading of the state of exception fruitfully coincides with Agamben's notion of
exception. For in both cases, the focus of inquiry is the construction of disposable life through the logic of necropower and the
collapse of social and political relationships that enable the exercise of particularly racialized forms of violence, including torture and
disappearances.¶ Third, Bhabha's notion of the double movement of emergency and emergence envisions an anti-colonialist
historiography in terms of a dialectical process of perpetual transformation. It is at this point, however, that the coupling of
emergency or exception and emergence becomes problematic for at least two reasons. First, combining both terms prematurely
translates the
violence of the political event into that of metaphor and risks erasing the micro- or
quotidian narratives of violence ??? such as Arasanayagam's account of war ??? that both legitimate and are
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perpetuated by political and social states of emergency. In order to examine the relationship between global and communal forms
of violence, a critical practice of post-colonial studies, I suggest, must reassess the term "transformation" and, concurrently, the
assumption that acts of extreme global violence can be advanced in the service of "making history" (Balibar 2001, 26). In other
words, if, as Hannah Arendt argues, there has been a historical "reluctance to deal with violence as a separate phenomenon in its
own right" (2002, 25), it is time to examine the possibility of employing post-colonial studies in the service of a non-dialectical
critique of global war. This kind of critique
must ask to what extent those on whose bodies extreme
violence was exercised are a priori excluded from articulating any transformative theory of
violence. How, in other words, does bare life ??? if at all possible ??? attain the status of subjectivity within
the dehumanizing logic of exception or global civil war? ¶ Fourth, like Bhabha, we need to take
seriously Benjamin's insight into the intrinsic relationship between violence and the
conceptualization of history . Notwithstanding Bhabha's pivotal argument that the violence of a "unitary notion of
history" generates a "unitary," and therefore extremely violent, "concept of man" (1994, 42), I wish to caution, alongside
Benjamin's analysis of fascism, that what enables today's global civil war is that even "its opponents treat it as a historical norm"
(Benjamin 1968, 257). What is at stake, then, in dominant as well as critical narratives of global civil war is their representation as
natural rather than political phenomena, and the acceptance of globalization as a political fait accompli. Both of these aspects, I
believe, contribute to the proliferation of dehistoricized concepts of the global increase of
racialized violence and war. It seems to me, however, that the enormous rise of violence inflicted by
global civil wars requires a post-colonial historiography and critique of global war that questions notions of
history based on cultural fragmentation, rupture, and totalization. Instead, such a historiography must
seek out patterns of connection and connectivity. But more importantly, as I have argued in this paper, it must
trace the post-colonial moment of global civil war and begin to read contemporary war through the
interconnected necropolitics of global and imperial warfare . Thus, to understand the logic and
practice of global war we need to develop a greater understanding precisely of those civil wars and
national liberation wars that do not appear to threaten the new global order. Furthermore, a post-colonial critique of global civil war
should facilitate the decoding and rescripting of both the normalizing narratives and racialized embodiment
of global civil warfare.¶
Militarism makes environmental destruction inevitable

Bennis 18 (Phyllis Bennis -- fellow @ the Institute for Policy Studies, “A Green New Deal Needs
to Fight US Militarism”, Jacobin Magazine, https://jacobinmag.com/2019/05/green-new-deal-
fight-militarism-imperialism, 8 October 2018)
The war on terror unleashed in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attack has led to almost two decades of unchecked
militarism. We are spending more money on our military than at any time in history. Endless wars in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Syria and elsewhere are still raging, more wars are threatened against
Iran and beyond, costing the US trillions of dollars and creating humanitarian disasters. Treaties to
control nuclear arms are unraveling at the same time that conflicts with the major powers of Russia and China
are heating up.
The Green New Deal must have anti-militarism at its core. Wars
and the military render impossible the
aspirations contained in the Green New Deal. And slashing the out-of-control military budget is
crucial to provide the billions of dollars we need to create a sustainable and egalitarian
economy.
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To fund the Green New Deal, with all of its component parts, we
must transition away from the current war
economy that pollutes the planet, distorts our society, enriches only the war profiteers. An end
to US wars across the globe and massive cuts to the military budget will provide funds for green
jobs, public education, health care for all, green infrastructure development. And we will
transition our nation’s security away from failed and failing wars into a new foreign policy based
on peace and diplomacy, not war.
The Military and the Environment
The United States’ militarized war economy plays a major role in the destruction of our planet’s
vital life support systems. The military uses enormous amounts of fossil fuels and other chemicals
that poison the air, water, and land human beings depend, both within US borders and across the globe where US
forces, planes, drones and other war machines go to war. Where the US military establishes bases abroad, the
local environment always suffers. As David Vine noted in his seminal book Base Nation, the carbon footprint of
military bases is enormous. They house carbon-spewing tanks and aircrafts, and use tremendous
energy for climate control and electricity . “The military’s thirst for petroleum,” Vine writes, “is so great that on a
worldwide basis, the US armed services consume more oil every day than the entire country of Sweden.” To
make matters worse, in many countries, Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) with the host government prohibit local authorities
from investigating environmental destruction caused by US military bases.
As documented by the Institute for Policy Studies and the Poor People’s Campaign, US wars have left a toxic legacy in
their global wake, poisoning soil and water and polluting air for decades after the formal end to
hostilities. And the military sows environmental destruction within the US, as well. The IPS/PPC report notes that “the Pentagon
is directly responsible for 141 Superfund sites” — ten percent of all such sites, far exceeding any other polluter — while “760 or so
additional Superfund sites are abandoned military facilities or sites that otherwise support military needs.” The
carbon
footprint of the military industrial complex is also staggering: In 2016, the Department of Defense (DoD)
emitted 66.4 million metric tons of carbon dioxide, representing over two-thirds of the entire emissions
of the US government. Tellingly, however, the military’s overseas emissions are exempted from the
U.S. government’s carbon accounting — despite representing a majority of the DoD’s emissions.
Slash the Military Budget, Fund Green Jobs
The US military is clearly an obstacle to a safe climate — so any comprehensive climate justice policy
must confront US militarism head on. What would the Green New Deal’s peaceful foreign policy look like?
Since fifty-four cents of every discretionary federal dollar goes to the military, we must massively cut the military budget, starting
with at least a 50 percent cut. We should close most of the 800-plus US military bases around the world, which are destructive to
people’s rights, land, water, and international law. We should bring home most of the hundreds of thousands of troops deployed
overseas, including the thousands of Special Forces operating in 149 countries. We should end the air and drone wars that are
responsible for so much death and destruction, and move towards abolition of nuclear weapons. And the money
saved from
the de-militarization of our foreign policy should
be immediately redirected to fund green jobs and
infrastructure programs, health care and education for all, new diplomatic initiatives, and
significant support for reparations, reconstruction and rebuilding in the countries our wars and
economic and environmental policies have so profoundly damaged.
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International Law Links
Appeal to the law is a militaristic tactic that creates legal legitimacy to propel
deadlier interventions that ensure infrastructural violence – they actively
displace moral questions in favor of a pathologically detached question of
legality.
Smith 2 (Thomas, prof of phil @ U of South Florida, International Studies Quarterly 46, The
New Law of War: Legitimizing Hi-Tech and Infrastructural Violence)
The role of military lawyers in all this has, according to one study, “changed irrevocably” ~Keeva, 1991:59!. Although liberal theorists
point to the broad normative contours that law lends to international relations, the
Pentagon wields law with
technical precision. During the Gulf War and the Kosovo campaign, JAGs opined on the legal status of multinational forces,
the U.S. War Powers Resolution, rules of engagement and targeting, country fly-overs, maritime interceptions,
treatment of prisoners, hostages and “human shields,” and methods used to gather intelligence. Long
before the bombing began, lawyers had joined in the development and acquisition of weapons
systems, tactical planning, and troop training. In the Gulf War, the U.S. deployed approximately 430 military
lawyers, the allies far fewer, leading to some amusing but perhaps apposite observations about the legalistic culture of America
~Garratt, 1993!. Many lawyers reviewed daily Air Tasking Orders as well as land tactics. Others found themselves on the ground and
at the front. According to Colonel Rup- pert, the idea was to “put the lawyer as far forward as possible” ~Myrow, 1996–97!. During
the Kosovo campaign, lawyers based at the Combined Allied Operations Center in Vicenza, Italy, and at NATO headquarters in
Brussels approved every single targeting decision. We do not know precisely how decisions were taken in either Iraq or Kosovo or
the extent to which the lawyers reined in their masters. Some “corrections and adjustments” to the target lists were made ~Shot-
well, 1993:26!, but by all accounts the lawyers—and the law—were extremely accommodating. The exigencies of war invite
professional hazards as military lawyers seek to “find the law” and to determine their own responsibilities as legal counselors. A
1990 article in Military Law Review admonished judge advocates not to neglect their duty to point out breaches of the law, but not
to become military ombuds- men either. The article acknowledged that the JAG faces pressure to demonstrate that he can be
a “force multiplier” who can “show the tactical and political soundness of his interpretation of the law” ~Winter, 1990:8–9!.
Some tension between law and necessity is inevitable, but over the past decade the focus has
shifted visibly from restraining violence to legitimizing it. The Vietnam-era perception that law
was a drag on operations has been replaced by a zealous “client culture” among judge
advocates. Commanding officers “have come to realize that , as in the relationship of corporate counsel to
CEO, the JAG’s role is not to create obstacles, but to find legal ways to achieve his client’s goals—
even when those goals are to blow things up and kill people” ~Keeva, 1991:59!. Lt. Col. Tony
Montgomery, the JAG who approved the bombing of the Belgrade television studios, said recently
that “judges don’t lay down the law. We take guidance from our government on how much of
the consequences they are willing to accept” ~The Guardian, 2001!. Military necessity is undeterred. In a
permissive legal atmosphere, hi-tech states can meet their goals and remain within the letter of
the law. As noted, humanitarian law is firmest in areas of marginal military utility. When operational demands intrude, however,
even fundamental rules begin to erode. The Defense Department’s final report to Congress on the Gulf War ~DOD, 1992! found
nothing in the principle of noncombatant immunity to curb necessity. Heartened by the knowledge that civilian discrimination is
“one of the least codified portions” of the law of war ~p. 611!, the authors argued that “to the degree possible and consistent with
allowable risk to aircraft and aircrews,” munitions and delivery systems were chosen to reduce collateral damage ~p. 612!. “An
attacker must exercise reasonable precautions to minimize incidental or collateral injury to the civilian population or damage to
civilian objects, consistent with mission accomplishments and allowable risk to the attacking forces” ~p. 615!. The report notes that
planners targeted “specific military objects in populated areas which the law of war permits” and acknowledges the “commingling”
of civilian and military objects, yet the authors maintain that “at no time were civilian areas as such attacked” ~p. 613!. The report
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carefully constructed a precedent for future conflicts in which human shields might be deployed, noting “the presence of civilians
will not render a target immune from attack” ~p. 615!. The report insisted ~pp. 606–607! that Protocol I as well as the 1980
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons “were not legally applicable” to the Gulf
War because Iraq as well as some Coalition members had not ratified them. More to the point that law follows practice, the report
claimed that certain provisions of Protocol I “are not a codification of the customary practice of nations,” and thus “ignore the
realities of war” ~p. 616!. Nor can there be any doubt that a more elaborate legal regime has kept pace with evolving strategy and
technology. Michael Ignatieff details in Virtual War ~2000! how targets were “developed” in 72-hour cycles that involved collecting
and reviewing aerial reconnaissance, gauging military necessity, and coding anticipated collateral damage down to the directional
spray of bomb debris. A judge advocate then vetted each target in light of the Geneva Conventions and calculated whether or not
the overall advantage to be gained outweighed any expected civilian spillover. Ignatieff argues ~2000:198–199! that this elaborate
symbiosis of law and technology has given birth to a “veritable casuistry of war.” Legal fine print, hand-in-hand with
new technology, replaced deeper deliberation about the use of violence in war. The law
provided “harried decision-makers with a critical guarantee of legal coverage, turning complex
issues of morality into technical issues of legality.” Astonishingly fine discrimination also meant that
unintentional civilian casualties were assumed to have been unintentional, not foreseen tragedies to be justified
under the rule of double effect or the fog of war. The crowning irony is that NATO went to such lengths to justify its
targets and limit collateral damage, even as it assured long-term civilian harm by destroying the
country’s infrastructure. Perhaps the most powerful justification was provided by law itself. War is
often dressed up in patriotic abstractions—Periclean oratory, jingoistic newsreels, or heroic
memorials. Bellum Americanum is cloaked in the stylized language of law. The DOD report is
padded with references to treaty law , some of it obscure, that was “applicable” to the Gulf War, as if a surfeit of
legal citation would convince skeptics of the propriety of the war. Instances of humane restraint invariably were
presented as the rule of law in action. Thus the Allies did not gas Iraqi troops, torture POWs, or commit acts of perfidy. Most
striking is the use of legal language to justify the erosion of noncombatant immunity. Hewing to the
legal- isms of double effect, the Allies never intentionally targeted civilians as such. As noted, by codifying double effect the law
artificially bifurcates intentions. Har- vard theologian Bryan Hehir ~1996:7! marveled at the Coalition’s legalistic word- play, noting
that the “briefers out of Riyadh sounded like Jesuits as they sought to defend the policy from any charge of attempting to directly
attack civilians.” The Pentagon’s legal
narrative is certainly detached from the carnage on the ground, but
it also oversimplifies and even actively obscures the moral choices involved in aerial bombing.
Lawyers and tacticians made very deliberate decisions about aircraft, flight altitudes, time of day, ordnance dropped, confidence in
intelligence, and so forth. By expanding military necessity to encompass an extremely prudential reading of “force protection,” these
choices were calculated to protect pilots and planes at the expense of civilians on the ground, departing from the just war tradition
that combatants assume greater risks than civilians. While it is tempting to blame collateral damage on the fog of war, much of that
uncertainty has been lifted by technology and precision law. Similarly, in Iraq and in Yugoslavia the focus was on “degrading” military
capabilities, yet a loose view of dual use spelled the destruction of what were essentially social, economic, and political targets.
Coalition and NATO officials were quick to apologize for accidental civilian casualties, but in hi-tech war most noncombatant
suffering is by design. Does
the law of war reduce death and destruction? International law certainly has helped
to delegitimize, and in rare cases effectively criminalize, direct attacks on civilians. But in general humanitarian law
has
mirrored wartime practice. On the ad bellum side, the erosion of right authority and just cause has eased
the path toward war. Today, foreign offices rarely even bother with formal declarations of war. Under the United Nations
system it is the responsibility of the Security Council to denounce illegal war, but for a number of reasons its members have been
extremely reluctant to brand states as aggressors. If the law were less accommodating, greater effort might be devoted to diplomacy
and war might be averted. On the in bello side the ban on direct civilian strikes remains intact, but double effect and military
demands have been contrived to justify unnecessary civilian deaths. Dual use law
has been stretched to sanction new
forms of violence against civilians. Though not as spectacular as the obliteration bombing to which
it so often is favorably compared, infrastructural war is far deadlier than the rhetoric of a “clean and
legal” conflict suggests. It is true that rough estimates of the ratio of bomb tonnage to civilian deaths in air attacks show
remarkable reductions in immediate collateral damage. There were some 40.83 deaths per ton in the bombing of Guernica in 1937
and 50.33 deaths per ton in the bombing of Tokyo in 1945. In the Kosovo campaign, by contrast, there were between .077 and .084
deaths per ton. In Iraq there were a mere .034 ~Thomas, 2001:169!. According to the classical definition of collateral damage,
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civilian protection has improved dramatically, but if one takes into account the staggering long-term effects of the war in Iraq, for
example, aerial bombing looks anything but humane. For aerial bombers themselves modern war does live up to its clean and legal
image. While war and intervention have few steadfast constituents, the myth of immaculate warfare has eased
fears that intervening soldiers may come to harm, which polls in the U.S., at least, rank as being of great public concern,
and even greater military concern. A new survey of U.S. civilian and military attitudes found that soldiers were two to four times
more casualty-averse than civilians thought they should be ~Feaver and Kohn, 2001!. By
removing what is perhaps the
greatest restraint on the use of force—the possibility of soldiers dying—law and technology have
given rise to the novel moral hazards of a “postmodern, risk-free, painless war” ~Woollacott, 1999!.
“We’ve come to expect the immaculate,” notes Martin Cook, who teaches ethics at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, PA.
“Precision-guided munitions make it very much easier to go to war than it ever has been historically.” Albert
Pierce, director of the Center for the Study of Professional Military Ethics at the U.S. Naval Academy argues, “standoff precision
weapons give you the option to lower costs and risks . . . but you might be tempted to do things that you might otherwise not do”
~Belsie, 1999!. Conclusion The utility of law to legitimize modern warfare should not be
underestimated. Even in the midst of war, legal arguments retain an aura of legitimacy that is
missing in “political” justifications. The aspirations of humanitarian law are sound. Rather, it is the instrumental use of law
that has oiled the skids of hi-tech violence. Not only does the law defer to military necessity, even when very
broadly defined, but more importantly it bestows on those same military demands all the moral and
psychological trappings of legality. The result has been to legalize and thus to justify in the public
mind “inhumane military methods and their consequences,” as violence against civilians is carried
out “behind the protective veil of justice” ~af Jochnick and Normand, 1994a:50!. Hi-tech states can defend
hugely destructive, essentially unopposed, aerial bombardment by citing the authority of
seemingly secular and universal legal standards. The growing gap between hi- and low-tech means
may exacerbate inequalities in moral capital as well, as the sheer barbarism of “premodern” violence
committed by ethnic cleansers or atavistic warlords makes the methods employed by hi-tech warriors
seem all the more clean and legal by contrast. This fusion of law and technology is likely to
propel future American interventions. Despite assurances that the campaign against terrorism would differ from past
conflicts, the allied air war in Afghanistan, marked by record numbers of unmanned drones and bomber flights at up to 35,000 feet,
or nearly 7 miles aloft, rarely strayed from the hi-tech and legalistic script. While the attack on the World Trade Center confirmed a
thousand times over the illegality and inhumanity of terrorism, the U.S. response has raised further issues of legality and
inhumanity in conventional warfare. Civilian deaths in the campaign have been substantial because “military objects” have been
targeted on the basis of extremely low-confidence intelligence. In several cases targets appear to have been chosen based on
misinformation and even rank rumor. A liberal reading of dual use and the authorization of bombers to strike unvetted “targets of
opportunity” also increased collateral damage. Although 10,000 of the 18,000 bombs, missiles, and other ordnance used in
Afghanistan were precision-guided munitions, the war resulted in roughly 1000 to 4000 direct civilian deaths, and, according to the
UNHCR, produced 900,000 new refugees and displaced persons. The Pentagon has nevertheless viewed the campaign as “a more
antiseptic air war even than the one waged in Kosovo” ~Dao, 2001!. General Tommy Franks, who commanded the campaign, called
it “the most accurate war ever fought in this nation’s history” ~Schmitt, 2002!.9 No fundamental change is in sight.
Governments continue to justify collateral damage by citing the marvels of technology and the authority
of international law. One does see a widening rift between governments and independent human rights and humanitarian relief
groups over the interpretation of targeting and dual-use law. But these disputes have only underscored the ambiguities of human-
itarian law. As
long as interventionist states dominate the way that the rules of war are crafted and
construed, hopes of rescuing law from politics will be dim indeed.
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Imperialism
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R2P = Genocide (Sudan/Syria)
R2p derails effective genocide prevention – abandoning it is key to Syria and

Sudan
De Waal 12
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/10/opinion/how-to-end-mass-atrocities.html?_r=0
Alex de Waal is executive director of the World Peace Foundation at the Fletcher School, Tufts
University., How to End Mass Atrocities, New York Times, March 10, DOA: 12-7-14
High from last year’s interventions in Libya and Ivory Coast, Evans wrote triumphantly in Foreign
Policy last December that those missions brought “an end to most of the confused debates”
about humanitarian intervention. The vision he, Power and fellow idealists share is to send the
cavalry over the hill not only to stop any massacres but also to herald justice and democracy. If
only it were that simple. In the face of “evil,” the idealists tend to turn righteous and forget to
ask important questions about what they want to achieve and how. The result is a
misrepresentation of history and a misunderstanding of the measures that can most effectively
halt atrocities today. One major problem is that the idealists tend to misconstrue or overlook
the fundamental motivations of perpetrators. They typically see the killers as insatiable. This is
understandable because they are driven by the memory of the Holocaust and the Rwandan
genocide. But the Nazis and Hutus were exceptional for making the extermination of a people
essential to their politics. Most mass killers have other goals. In many cases, the perpetrators
simply stop killing when they have reached their goals, become exhausted, fallen out among
themselves or been defeated. Take the Nigerian civil war of 1967-70. Despite a blockade of the
secessionist province of Biafra and the genocidal rhetoric of some Nigerian leaders, the killing
ended when the Biafran rebels finally fell to Nigerian forces. Having achieved their military aim,
the Nigerians then began a process of reconciliation and reconstruction under the banner “no
victor, no vanquished.” In Guatemala, the perpetrators of the 1980-83 massacres of Mayan
communities suspected of supporting Communist insurgents called an end to the atrocities after
defeating the rebels. In Indonesia, the generals stopped killing the Communists in 1966 once the
group no longer posed a threat. The soldiers of President Milton Obote massacred tens of
thousands of people in Uganda’s Luwero Triangle in 1983-4 — until they were defeated on the
battlefield. Likewise, the killings in East Pakistan ended with India’s invasion in 1971 and the
Khmer Rouge’s atrocities in Cambodia with Vietnam’s intervention in 1978-79. In other words,
even once they are under way, mass atrocities do not lead inexorably to bottomless massacres.
The killers usually have political goals: They are determined to kill until they have achieved their
objectives, not until there’s no one else left standing. Their use of violence can be excessive, but
more important, it is often instrumental. This creates an opportunity for negotiating an end to
mass atrocities, through peace talks and with financial and diplomatic incentives and pressure.
In recent history such deal-making has brought to an end, albeit often an imperfect one,
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massacres in Burundi, East Timor, Kenya, Macedonia and South Sudan. Yet the idealists insist
on pursuing a more ambitious agenda: nothing short of democracy and justice, imposed by
military intervention. And this can undermine simply getting the killing to stop. For
perpetrators, the prospect of foreign intervention and prosecution rules out the possibility for
compromise. For rebels, it creates a perverse incentive to escalate ethnic violence so as to
provoke an international military response. The idealists’ blind spot about nonideal endings also
means they cannot decide what do to when the killings do subside. In September 2004,
Secretary of State Colin Powell announced that a genocide had occurred, and might be
continuing, in Darfur. But by then the level of violence had already begun to drop, and it
continued to diminish over the next few years. U.S. policy stayed stuck on trying to stop
massacres that were no longer happening. In 2009, Scott Gration, the U.S. special envoy to
Sudan, was saying there were “remnants of genocide.” But in 2010, Susan Rice, the U.S.
ambassador to the United Nations, was still insisting there was an “ongoing genocide.” Unable
to commit itself to either aggressive regime change or a program of reconstruction and
reconciliation, the U.S. government hasn’t made any progress on either approach. And its
indecision has delayed finding a workable political solution for Darfur. Western policy makers
interested in stopping mass crimes should not overlook tools that can work. Where violence is
used as an instrument for political gain, it is negotiable. Some perpetrators can be moderated
through diplomacy. Others will stop killing if they defeat a rebellion or realize they cannot. The
main aim should be to stop genocidal killing. Holding elections and prosecuting the
perpetrators of crimes, however laudable those goals, aren’t the priority. Today, with civilians in
Sudan’s Nuba Mountains threatened by mass hunger and violence, U.S. campaigners are calling
for humanitarian intervention. They should remember to keep the political solution firmly in
focus. The root of the crisis is a war between evenly matched adversaries who must recognize
that they need to live with the other. The peace talks that stalled last July should be revived.
This would require Khartoum to lift the ban against the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in
the northern sector and begin an inclusive constitutional reform process. The rebels and their
South Sudanese backers, for their part, would have to repudiate the goal of regime change.
Politics are also all-important in Syria. The crisis has evolved from a civilian uprising to a fully
fledged civil war, with each side fearing annihilation if it loses. The regime of Bashar al-Assad
needs a soft landing, and so the model for solving this crisis is the kind of patient mediation
effort that was deployed in Yemen, not aggressive intervention as in Libya. Responding to mass
atrocities, whether ongoing or imminent, is difficult enough, but the idealism of Evans and
Power makes it that much more so. They have composed a story, based on ethics rather than
evidence, that incorrectly assumes all perpetrators of mass political violence are insatiable
killers and that dictates who should respond (Western nations), how (with military intervention)
and why (for justice and democracy). It is a morality tale that undermines the best ways to deal
with the worst crimes.
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R2p Bad: Drone Strikes
R2P legitimacy key to escalating globe drone strikes

Brooks 1/14/13
http://www.globalpolicy.org/qhumanitarianq-intervention/52290-hate-obamas-drone-
war.html?itemid=id#26087
Rosa Brooks is a law professor at the Georgetown University Law Center, a columnist and
contributing editor for Foreign Policy and a Bernard L. Schwartz senior fellow at the New
America Foundation. From April 2009 to July 2011, she served as Counselor to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michele Flournoy, and in May 2010 she also became [1] Special
Coordinator for Rule of Law and Humanitarian Policy, running a new Pentagon office dedicated
to those issues. Brooks wrote a weekly column for the Los Angeles Times from 2005 to 2009,
and is an expert on national security, international law and human rights issues. At the Pentagon
her portfolio included both rule of law and human rights issues and global engagement, strategic
communication, and she received the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service
for her work.
This notion of a "responsibility to protect" was embraced by the international community --

including the United States -- with surprising rapidity. In every way, it represents a radical
assault on traditional legal concepts of sovereignty. The "responsibility to protect" doctrine --
often now referred to as R2P -- suggests that when a state fails to protect its own population, it
can no longer claim any right to be free of external intervention (including, in extreme cases,
military intervention) if intervention is needed to secure the safety of a threatened population.
And by implication, that intervention need not necessarily be authorized by the U.N. Security
Council. If the Security Council "fails to discharge its responsibility to protect in conscience-
shocking situations crying out for action...concerned states may not rule out other means to
meet the gravity and urgency of that situation," observed the 2001 ICISS report. The logic is
clear enough: If failure to protect its population delegitimizes a state's legal claim to sovereignty,
then the failure of collective security structures (such as the UNSC) to take appropriate
corrective action would similarly delegitimize those collective institutions. Put a little differently,
the Responsibility to Protect logically implies that both "the international community" and
individual states have a right and a duty to intervene -- militarily, if necessary -- when another
state is "unwilling or unable" to protect its own population. If the language justifying drone
strikes in sovereign states appears to directly parallel the language of the Responsibility to
Protect, it's no accident. Although the R2P doctrine was developed in response to genocide and
other mass atrocities, the language of R2P was easily turned to other purposes. That's not
entirely inappropriate, either: R2P's underlying logic is equally applicable to terrorism, which is
itself a form of human rights abuse (and one that can have devastating consequences for civilian
populations). As I have argued elsewhere, you "might even say that the R2P coin ought logically
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to be seen as having two sides. On one side lies a state's duty to take action inside its own
territory to protect itsown population from violence and atrocities. On the other side lies a
state's duty to take action inside its own territory to protect other states' populations from
violence. Either way, a state that fails in these duties faces the prospect that other states will
intervene in its ‘internal' affairs without its consent." In a sense, then, it was the human rights
community's critique of sovereignty that helped pave the way for drone strikes.
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R2P = Imperialism
R2p is a fig leaf for imperialism

Global Policy Forum 14
http://www.globalpolicy.org/qhumanitarianq-intervention.html
Global Policy Forum is an independent policy watchdog that monitors the work of the United
Nations and scrutinizes global policymaking. We promote accountability and citizen participation
in decisions on peace and security, social justice and international law.
What is to be done in a crisis like the genocide in Rwanda, when the international community
seeks to stop the killing? Can nations, acting through the UN Security Council, fulfill a
"responsibility to protect" innocent civilians? Or is such a doctrine just a Trojan horse for great
power abuse? When nations send their military forces into other nations' territory, it is rarely (if
ever) for "humanitarian" purposes. They are typically pursuing their narrow national interest -
grabbing territory, gaining geo-strategic advantage, or seizing control of precious natural
resources. Leaders hope to win public support by describing such actions in terms of high moral
purposes - bringing peace, justice, democracy and civilization to the affected area. In the era of
colonialism, European governments all cynically insisted that they acted to promote such higher
commitments - the "white man's burden," "la mission civilisatrice," and so on and so forth. The
appeal to higher moral purposes continues to infect the political discourse of the great powers.
Today's "humanitarian intervention" is only the latest in this long tradition of political
obfuscation. In 2003, the US-UK invasion and occupation of Iraq was labeled "humanitarian
intervention" by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair
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R2P = imperialism: Africa
Indeterminacy of R2p allows repeated interventions against Africa

Branch 11/6/12
http://www.globalpolicy.org/qhumanitarianq-intervention/52035-the-responsibility-to-protect-
what-is-the-basis-for-the-emerging-norm-of-r2p.html?itemid=id#26087
Assistant Professor of Political Science, San Diego
State University, 2008-
Research Associate, Makerere Institute of Social Re
search, 2011-
EDUCATION
Ph.D. (Political Science) Columbia University, 2007
A.B. (Social Studies) Harvard University, 1998
Africa has a long history of being 'protected' by the West. And today, with the precipitous rise of
the so-called Responsibility to Protect (R2P), it appears that intervention in the name of
protecting Africa has returned to the centre of Western concern – or regained its utility. Three-
quarters of the crises in which R2P has been invoked or applied have been in Africa and the
Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on R2P announced that “the responsibility to protect
really came from Africa and the African experience" Africa also provided the military testing
ground for R2P and following foreign military intervention in Libya in 2011, according to Ramesh
Thakur, “R2P is closer to being solidified as an actionable norm". R2P’s privileged application in
Africa bears comparison to the continent's experience with the International Criminal Court
(ICC). Critics have argued that the Court targets Africa because it can operate there in an
accountability-free zone, able to intervene in ongoing conflicts, take sides in civil wars, scuttle
amnesties and peace processes, or align itself with US military forces – all without being held
responsible for the consequences of its actions. But at least with the ICC, there is a concrete
institution – prosecutors and judges who make statements and decisions that can be critiqued
on legal, political, or moral grounds. With R2P, however, even this modicum of publicity and
formalisation is absent. And this makes its expanding use in Africa all the more dangerous. The
first problem is that no-one seems sure of what R2P even is. Its proponents have celebrated it as
a norm, a doctrine, a concept, an idea, a principle, a framework, or a lens, while its critics have
dismissed or condemned it as an excuse, an ideology, a fad, or an empty slogan. Illustrating this
uncertainty is the fact that, while most agree that R2P enjoys no legal status of its own, others
seem to give it an almost super-legal status. Take the statement by Susan Rice, current US
Ambassador to the UN, for example, who in 2007 invoked R2P to justify a threatened US ground
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and air attack against Sudan without Security Council approval. Rice cited R2P to dismiss the
possible legal problems of invading a sovereign state, asserting: “Still others insist that, without
the consent of the UN or a relevant regional body, we would be breaking international law.
Perhaps, but the Security Council last year codified a new international norm prescribing ‘the
responsibility to protect’. It commits UN members to decisive action, including enforcement,
when peaceful measures fail to halt genocide or crimes against humanity.” Not surprisingly,
there is also no consensus on what actions R2P actually legitimates, nor by whom or when. The
problem is compounded by the multiplicity of statements on R2P, from the 2001 International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report to the United Nations’ 2004 A
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, to the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document,
to the Secretary-General’s 2009 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. The original
statement of R2P in the ICISS report explains: “State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the
primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. Where a
population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state
failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-
intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.” Of course, the statement
poses more questions than it answers. What is the threshold at which responsibility is
legitimately taken up by the international community? Who makes that decision? And who is
the international community? The precise sequence of actions necessary to fulfil R2P is also left
undefined. According to ICISS, R2P comprises three “specific responsibilities”: the responsibility
to prevent, by addressing “both the root causes and direct causes” of crises; the responsibility to
react to “situations of compelling human need” by employing “appropriate measures”, up to
military intervention; and the responsibility to rebuild, which will help address “the causes of
the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert”. Given the increasingly expansive
formulations of R2P, according to which R2P action is to help prevent, react, and rebuild
countries, work with, pressure, and coerce states, and address root causes and prevent the
recurrence of conflict, there seems to be little that is not included among the instruments that
may be legitimately used in the name of R2P. This could span from development aid to
diplomatic pressure, from direct budgetary assistance to invasion and occupation, from
traditional reconciliation to international criminal prosecution. Even one of R2P’s most vocal
academic supporters, Alex Bellamy, admits that, “it is seldom – if ever – clear what R2P requires
in a given situation”. The result is a situation in which some analysts can condemn the AU-UN
intervention in Darfur as a dismal failure of R2P while others can laud it as a success; some
blame R2P as an excuse used to prevent effective intervention there while others credit it with
enabling international involvement. The same ambiguity characterises discussions of the R2P in
Kenya during the post-election violence in 2008. Some would agree with Kofi Annan that “Kenya
is a successful example of R2P at work” but others deny that R2P played a role in the unfolding
of international involvement, explaining that “the situation was only labelled a R2P situation
retrospectively”. This fundamental indeterminacy of R2P was made even clearer, as was its
danger, in the Libya intervention. The doctrine’s first full-scale deployment led to the bombing
of civilian infrastructure, the deposing and killing of Muammar Gaddafi, the installing of a rebel
government, and the arming of civilians – all in the name of protection. The last was justified by
a senior French diplomatic source as: “an operational decision taken at the time to help civilians
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who were in imminent danger. A group of civilians were about to be massacred so we took the
decision to provide self-defensive weapons to protect those civilian populations under threat…It
was entirely justifiable legally, resolution 1970 and 1973 were followed to the letter." R2P is not
only dangerous because it is flexible enough to be used to justify overthrowing governments
and arming civilians, but also because it allows those using it to refuse accountability. States can
engage in political and military intervention without having to justify those interventions on
political or military grounds, only on protection grounds. And they can refuse responsibility for
the consequences of their actions – all is fair when civilian protection is at stake. R2P can be
used to justify military intervention or non-intervention, invasion or withdrawal. Thus, it is
precisely R2P’s indeterminacy that makes it so popular today. This may suggest something about
the West’s current approach to Africa: occasional violent engagement in the name of protection
when a state has been declared to have failed in its own protection role, complemented by
military assistance to client states in the name of promoting their capacity to protect. This is
combined with disengagement when convenient in the name of allowing states to fulfil the
protection mandate themselves, all with no objective standards and no accountability.
Mahmood Mamdani has argued that one consequence of R2P is to institute a divided
international system that distinguishes African states, whose legitimacy and sovereignty are to
be judged by the “international community”, from Western states, whose sovereignty is
beyond question and that judge and intervene in Africa. R2P institutes a divided international
system in another way as well: one within Africa that distinguishes those African states that are
favoured by the West and tend to be labelled human rights protectors, responsible, and thus
deserving support, from those that are out of favour with the West and are labelled human
rights violators, failed or criminal, and meriting international coercion. This is not to say that
every Western ally will be termed a human rights protector and every adversary a human rights
violator. But, by grounding the judgment as to state legiti macy in the flexible, informal language
of R2P, giving that judgment to those who have the power to claim to speak in the name of the
international community, and stripping away the need for the state or interveners to be
accountable to African citizenries, this division remains an ever-present and dangerous
possibility.
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Disadvantages
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Spending/Debt Links
Military intervention costly and causes a massive increase in the debt
Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr., USFS (Ret.), 2019, Failed Interventions and What They Teach,
https://mepc.org/speeches/failed-interventions-and-what-they-teach
And, looming over all of our foreign policies — and our exceedingly expensive reliance on the
use of force rather than measures short of war for their execution — is the possibility of an
American fiscal heart attack. Our fiscal difficulties promise — among other things — to force
major retrenchment in the American military presence and operations abroad. The only
question is whether this will happen abruptly or with all deliberate speed. The certainty of a
forthcoming U.S. pullback from military adventurism abroad is illustrated by some simple math.
Our federal government’s revenue from all sources — like income, corporate, excise, social
security, and medicare taxes — will total $2.2 trillion this year. Outlays for transfer payments
to individuals for unemployment, social security, medicare, and the like will come to $2.4
trillion. We must borrow the $200 billion necessary to make up the shortfall. This is before we
pay for all the other functions of government, none of which is now funded by tax revenue. We
will borrow another $1.3 trillion to keep our government in business. We take in $2.2 trillion.
We spend $3.9 trillion. We are running our government entirely on credit rollovers.
The roughly $1 trillion we spend on military and related activities in the budgets for defense,
veterans affairs, intelligence, military assistance programs, homeland security, nuclear
weapons and propulsion, and the like is two-thirds of government operations. It is all — every
cent of it — borrowed from future taxpayers and current trading partners abroad. A lot of this
escalating debt for military expenditures is attributable to the Middle East. Even if our military
operations there were achieving their objectives — which they are not — they are fiscally
unsustainable in the long term. As Herb Stein’s mother famously observed, “if something can’t
go on forever, sooner or later it will stop.”
There’s a lot of unrealism out there that denies this. I wouldn’t be surprised if you heard a fair
amount of it today and tomorrow. One way or another, however, change is coming to U.S.
policies in the greater Middle East. If properly anticipated and correctly managed, change
represents an opportunity, not a setback. This, I hope, not the straight-line projection of a
spurious present into the future, will be the spirit with which attendees at this conference will
address the many issues now before Americans and Arabs.
An end to military intervention abroad except for decisive action for precise purposes and over a
limited time would go a long way toward curbing the further growth of the terrorist threat to
our country. A serious effort by our government and public intellectuals to counter and reverse
the bigotry of current discourse about Islam and the Arabs in this country could lay a basis for
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enhanced cooperation with Arab and Muslim governments against Islamist extremists who
practice violent politics. After all, they are the enemies of Americans and Muslims alike.
Link is magnified by expanded intervention
For this reason, the U.S. should not endorse the idea of a U.N. standing army. It could drag the
U.S. into deadly and expensive conflicts having little to do with American vital interests around
the world. Moreover, a standing army will only increase the U.N.'s appetite for precipitous
involvement in conflicts for which it is poorly prepared. To be sure, a standing army would be
more readily available for deployment, but that may mean an overly hasty involvement of U.S.
forces in far-away conflicts in which no U.S. interests are at stake.
Although others may contribute troops, there would be a lot more US force
deployments
Additional Burden for U.S. While a standing U.N. army may increase token international support
for a peacekeeping force, it would also surely create a temptation for the U.S. to go along with
questionable armed interventions by the U.N. With some seventy areas of conflict or potential
conflict world-wide, a U.N. standing army certainly would see much action. There are today
fourteen U.N. peacekeeping operations underway, involving some 80,000 troops from 75
countries. U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali two weeks ago suggested sending U.N.
peacekeepers to hotspots in the former Soviet Union, which would nearly double the number of
U.N. military operations around the world. Thus, while relieving the U.S. of the burden of going
it alone, a standing U.N. army would create a new burden of participating in dubious and far-
flung operations which the U.S. otherwise would avoid.
It's mostly American troops

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Once U.S. forces are thus deployed, the potential for escalation is high. American forces would
hold the key to avoiding the military failure of the U.N. peacekeeping operation. Indeed, in
Somalia, most of the firepower and command and control capability available to the U.N. force
is American; without that support the operation would have eroded long before now. This
would likely be the case in all U.N. operations involving U.S. forces. Once committed to a failing
U.N. operation, the U.S. would have to choose between saving it by unilateral escalation or
condemning the entire operation to failure by withdrawing.
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Answers to: Peacekeeping is Cheap(er)
This doesn’t assume the personnel and equipment resources needed for a
Standing Army. Their evidence is talking about deploying low-skilled forces
from developing countries in limited conflicts, not US military resources, which
our evidence says would be required
It doesn’t matter because the US isn’t involved in these operations in the status
quo and absorbing the costs. A Standing Army is just a new expense for the US.
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Escalation/Great Power War
Most of the troops would be from the US and this would increase the risk of
great power war
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Korea/Middle Force Trade-Off

A UN Standing Army would require a massive commitment of resources,
creating trade-offs in deterrence against Korea and other major powers
Additional Burden for U.S. While a standing U.N. army may increase token international
support for a peacekeeping force, it would also surely create a temptation for the U.S. to go
along with questionable armed interventions by the U.N. With some seventy areas of conflict
or potential conflict world-wide, a U.N. standing army certainly would see much action. There
are today fourteen U.N. peacekeeping operations underway, involving some 80,000 troops from
75 countries. U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali two weeks ago suggested sending
U.N. peacekeepers to hotspots in the former Soviet Union, which would nearly double the
number of U.N. military operations around the world. Thus, while relieving the U.S. of the
burden of going it alone, a standing U.N. army would create a new burden of participating in
dubious and far-flung operations which the U.S. otherwise would avoid.
The U.S. is already facing this dilemma in Somalia. The U.N. operation there is falling apart as the
U.S. tries to decide whether to escalate or withdraw. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin
L. Powell has spoken of "going after" those responsible for the recent deaths of four U.S.
servicemen in Somalia. With the Clinton defense budget in a virtual free-fall, a prolonged
military commitment to a country unimportant to America's vital interests would be the
height of folly. It would deprive the country of resources possibly needed to defend America's
interests elsewhere -- in Korea and the Persian Gulf, for example.
Failure of Middle East deterrence means war

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Helprin ’15 [Mark; January 15; Senior Fellow of the Claremont Institute for the Study of
Statesmanship and Political Philosophy; National Review, “Indefensible Defense,”
https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/06/indefensible-defense/]
Continual warfare in
the Middle East, a nuclear Iran, electromagnetic-pulse weapons, emerging
pathogens, and terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction variously threaten the United States, some
with catastrophe on a scale we have not experienced since the Civil War. Nevertheless, these are
phenomena that bloom and fade, and that, with redirection and augmentation of resources we possess, we are equipped to face,
given the wit and will to do so. But underlying the surface chaos that dominates the news cycle are the currents that lead
to
world war. In governance by tweet, these are insufficiently addressed for being insufficiently immediate. And yet, more than
anything else, how we approach the strength of the American military, the nuclear calculus, China, and Russia will
determine the security, prosperity, honor, and at long range even the sovereignty and existence of this country. THE
AMERICAN WAY OF WAR Upon our will to provide for defense, all else rests. Without it, even the most brilliant innovations and
trenchant strategies will not suffice. In one form or another, the American way of war and of the deterrence of war has always been
reliance on surplus. Even as we barely survived the winter of Valley Forge, we enjoyed immense and forgiving strategic depth, the
3,000-mile barrier of the Atlantic, and the great forests that would later give birth to the Navy. In the Civil War, the North’s
burgeoning industrial and demographic powers meshed with the infancy of America’s technological ascendance to presage
superiority in mass industrial — and then scientific — 20th-century warfare. The way we fight is that we do not stint. Subtract
the monumental preparations, cripple the defense industrial base, and we will fail to deter wars that we
will then go on to lose.
Strong deterrence needed to prevent a Korean conflict that goes nuclear and
global
Maxwell 20 – Associate Director of the Center for Security Studies and the Security Studies
Program in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University
David S. Maxwell, “The ROK-US Alliance: One American’s Perspective Now and for the Future,”
Pathways to Peace: Achieving the Stable Transformation of the Korean Peninsula, The Hudson
Institute, April 2020, https://www.hudson.org/research/15845-pathways-to-peace-achieving-
the-stable-transformation-of-the-korean-peninsula, pp. 62-63
The Value of the Alliance to the ROK and United States
It is imperative to understand the long-standing North Korean strategy. As a revolutionary

nation, as described in its constitution, North Korea seeks to complete the revolution by ridding
the peninsula of foreign military forces and unifying it under the domination of the “guerrilla dynasty and gulag
state.” which is used to describe the idea the regime rests on the myth of anti-Japanese partisan warfare and incarcerates some
120,000 political prisoners in multiple prison camps or gulags. 210 In
the calculus of the Kim family regime,
unification on its terms is the only way to ensure its survival. The regime’s strategy is built on
subverting the ROK to create political instability, using coercion and blackmail diplomacy to gain
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political and economic concessions, and, when conditions are right, using force to execute a
campaign plan to occupy the entire Korean Peninsula.
To successfully execute its strategy and accomplish its goals, the North requires is a split in the
ROK-US alliance. Specifically, it needs to drive US forces off the Korean Peninsula and end
extended deterrence and the nuclear umbrella over the ROK and Japan. The regime has been
pursuing this strategy for seven decades, and there is no evidence that it has abandoned it.
Coincidently, this is also how it views the end of the US “hostile policy.” As long as there is a
ROK-US alliance, the regime believes, the United States poses a threat.211
Due to this strategy, the ROK faces an existential threat from North Korea. The North Korean
People’s Army (NKPA) has an active force of some 1.2 million personnel, 70 percent of whom are
deployed between the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and Pyongyang. These forces are postured for
offensive operations. The NPKA annual winter training cycle runs from December through March, with
forces conducting echeloned training designed to achieve the highest state of readiness by its conclusion. March is the optimal
attack time because the ground is still frozen, and the rice fields in the South would not obstruct
a mechanized armored attack. The NKPA possesses not only nuclear weapons, but also chemical
and biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In a war, North Korea would likely use all of
its weapons, including these oft-ignored WMD.212 Therefore, the ROK depends on the alliance for
combined defensive capabilities for its survival.
The United States has a vital national interest to deter war on the Korean Peninsula. If
hostilities resume, Korea’s geostrategic location ensures that the economic effects would not
be confined to the peninsula. China and Japan are the second- and third-largest economies in the
world, respectively, and the ROK is around the eleventh. A war involving these powers will have a
direct impact on the US homeland. Furthermore, conflict is likely to escalate because of the
proximity of two nuclear powers, China and Russia, and one of the highest concentrations of
military forces anywhere in the world. The size and proximity of the forces, from North Korea,
South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan, will likely cause miscalculations and responses with
significant global repercussions. Even if the United States chooses not to support its Korean and
Japanese allies, it might not be able to avoid conflict, and it certainly will not avoid the economic
effects of war in Northeast Asia.
Therefore, deterrence is a vital interest. The question is what deters North Korea from attack. In
1997, Hwang Jong Yop, North Korea’s highest-ranking defector and the father of its juche ideology,
told interrogators from the South and the United States that it is the presence of US forces that deters the Kim
family regime. Kim Jong-il and his father Kim Il-sung before him knew the NKPA could not win a war
against the South if the United States fought on its ally’s side. Kim Jong-un likely knows this as
well. In addition, Hwang said that Kim Jong-il believed the United States would use nuclear weapons if
North Korea attacked the South.213 This helps explain why the regime has been pursuing nuclear
weapons since the 1950s. It is also an indication that US declaratory policy works. On the other hand, the
regime believes that if it possesses nuclear weapons, the United States will be deterred from using its nuclear weapons because a
nuclear power will not attack another nuclear-armed country.
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Strong US readiness deters nuclear strikes from Russia and China.
Pifer ’21 [Steven; January 22; Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin; The Hill, “As
defense spending comes under fire, don't make nuclear war more likely,”
https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/535388-as-defense-spending-comes-under-fire-
dont-make-nuclear-war-more]
During the Cold War, a Soviet “bolt from the blue” – a massive nuclear first strike aimed at destroying the bulk of U.S. strategic
forces before they could launch – was a major driver of U.S. nuclear force planning. Today, the most likely scenario for a
U.S.
nuclear conflict with Russia (or China) begins with a regional conventional war. The fewer fighters,
warships and tanks that the U.S. military has, the weaker its ability to deter that conventional conflict from
breaking out.
Once conventional war with a nuclear-armed adversary begins, nuclear arms can come into play in two ways. In
the first scenario, U.S. and allied forces begin to lose, and the president must face the agonizing choice of using
nuclear weapons first. U.S. first use of nuclear arms would open a Pandora’s box of
unpredictable and catastrophic consequences. The other side could well retaliate at the nuclear
level, raising the possibility of an escalatory cycle leading to disaster.
During the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, NATO had little confidence in its ability to defeat a Soviet and Warsaw Pact attack at the
conventional level. It thus planned explicitly for deliberate escalation to the nuclear level, but no one was
comfortable with that prospect.
In the second scenario, U.S. and allied conventional forces hold out, and the other side attempts to upset the
chessboard by escalating to the nuclear level. The president then would face the choice of whether to retaliate
with nuclear weapons.
The best answer to these potential dilemmas is to have sufficiently robust conventional forces
such that the adversary is dissuaded from attacking in the first place. Fortunately, conventional force
balances today differ greatly from during the Cold War. NATO’s overall conventional military strength compares well with that of
Russia, though the Russian military enjoys a regional advantage in the Baltic Sea region. Russia
is modernizing its
conventional capabilities, so the United States and NATO need to ensure that they are not caught
short, just as Washington and its Asian allies have to ensure that China does not out-pace them.
It deters nuclear strikes from Russia and China.

Pifer ’21 [Steven; January 22; Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin; The Hill, “As
defense spending comes under fire, don't make nuclear war more likely,”
https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/535388-as-defense-spending-comes-under-fire-
dont-make-nuclear-war-more]
During the Cold War, a Soviet “bolt from the blue” – a massive nuclear first strike aimed at destroying the bulk of U.S. strategic
forces before they could launch – was a major driver of U.S. nuclear force planning. Today, the most likely scenario for a
U.S.
nuclear conflict with Russia (or China) begins with a regional conventional war. The fewer fighters,
warships and tanks that the U.S. military has, the weaker its ability to deter that conventional conflict from
breaking out.
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Once conventional war with a nuclear-armed adversary begins, nuclear arms can come into play in two ways. In
the first scenario, U.S. and allied forces begin to lose, and the president must face the agonizing choice of using
nuclear weapons first. U.S. first use of nuclear arms would open a Pandora’s box of
unpredictable and catastrophic consequences. The other side could well retaliate at the nuclear
level, raising the possibility of an escalatory cycle leading to disaster.
During the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, NATO had little confidence in its ability to defeat a Soviet and Warsaw Pact attack at the
conventional level. It thus planned explicitly for deliberate escalation to the nuclear level, but no one was
comfortable with that prospect.
In the second scenario, U.S. and allied conventional forces hold out, and the other side attempts to upset the
chessboard by escalating to the nuclear level. The president then would face the choice of whether to retaliate
with nuclear weapons.
The best answer to these potential dilemmas is to have sufficiently robust conventional forces
such that the adversary is dissuaded from attacking in the first place. Fortunately, conventional force
balances today differ greatly from during the Cold War. NATO’s overall conventional military strength compares well with that of
Russia, though the Russian military enjoys a regional advantage in the Baltic Sea region. Russia
is modernizing its
conventional capabilities, so the United States and NATO need to ensure that they are not caught
short, just as Washington and its Asian allies have to ensure that China does not out-pace them.
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Korea War Risk
Independent, December 31, 2021, https://www.independent.co.uk/world/2022-world-conflict-

hotspots-peril-b1984918.html, ‘Something has broken’: Why 2022 is filled with potential perils
North Korea: 2022 could be the year that the simmering dynamics over the Korean peninsula
finally come to a head, with either war or the possible economic collapse of North Korea. In
either case, the consequences could be catastrophic, with missiles raining down on Seoul, or a
major humanitarian disaster. Clarke likens North Korea to a “gray rhino,” in reference to
Michele Wucker’s best-selling book about a “highly probable, high impact yet neglected threat”.
Pyongyang continues to menace both South Korea and Japan, and ramp up its weapons
programmes. Yet world leaders seem to have thrown up their arms in frustration; even China –
Kim Jong-un’s sole patron – appears flummoxed. Unlike in previous years, there’s very little
diplomatic energy spent on the problem.
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Sovereignty
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Standing Army Threatens Sovereignty
A Standing Army is inconsistent with principles of sovereignty
Fletcheer School of Public Diplomacy, December 16, 2021, Why We Need an

International Standing Civilian Protection Service,
https://fletcher.tufts.edu/news-events/news/why-we-need-international-
standing-civilian-protection-service
The notion of a UN standing army (or police force) of any size bumps up against a deep
reluctance to empower the organization in that way. The principle of state sovereignty is still
clung to by most member states — from the Global North and Global South. The world is not
ready for a standing force of even 13,000 let alone 800,000.
Intervening to protect citizens in other countries (Right to Protect (R2P) is a

violation of sovereignty
Groves 8
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/05/the-us-should-reject-the-un-responsibility-
to-protect-doctrine
Steven Groves works to protect and preserve American sovereignty, self-governance and independence as leader of
The Heritage Foundation's Freedom Project. Groves, who is the Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in
Heritage’s Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, also advocates American leadership on issues involving
international political and religious freedom, human rights and democratic institutions. He has testified before
Congress on international law, human rights, the United Nations and controversial treaties such as the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. In 2013, Groves was awarded the Dr. W. Glenn and
Rita Campbell Award for his work. The award is given annually to the Heritage employee who delivered “an
outstanding contribution to the analysis and promotion of a free society.” Before joining Heritage in 2007, Groves was
senior counsel to then-Sen. Norm Coleman (R-Minn.) on the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.
He played a lead role in the subcommittee's investigation of the U.N. "oil-for-food" scandal, the most extensive
congressional probe ever conducted of the United Nations. Groves previously was an associate at Boies, Schiller &
Flexner LLP, specializing in commercial litigation. Before that he served as assistant attorney general for the State of
Florida, where he litigated civil rights cases, constitutional law issues and criminal appeals, among other matters, in
state and federal court. Groves is a frequent guest commentator on domestic and international television and radio.
He has appeared on ABC, BBC, CNBC, CNN and CNN International, Fox News Channel, National Public Radio, Voice of
America, NHK, Al Jazeera, Alhurra and the Canadian Broadcasting Corp. His commentary and opinion pieces have
been published by journals such as National Review, The Weekly Standard and Human Events, as well as by The
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Washington Times and other major newspapers across America. Groves holds a law degree from Ohio Northern
University's College of Law and a bachelor of arts degree in history from Florida State University.
While genocide, war crimes, and other atrocities will always be incompatible with American
values, the McCain and Clinton statements raise the issue of whether preventing genocide and
ethnic cleansing would necessarily constitute a vital U.S. national interest. In some situations,
acts of large-scale ethnic cleansing in some remote nation may indeed affect U.S. national
interests. However, the real question is whether or not the United States should obligate itself
through an international compact to use its military forces as the rest of the world sees fit in
cases of genocide and ethnic cleansing. Accepting such an obligation would arguably empower
other nations to judge whether U.S. national interests or national values are at stake. That begs
the question of who will decide whether the United States must commit its limited resources --
including its military forces -- to prevent atrocities occurring in a foreign land. The R2P doctrine
is designed to take decision making on these crucial issues out of the hands of the United States
and place it in the hands of the international community, operating through the United Nations.
If the United States consented to such a doctrine, it would effectively surrender its authority to
exercise an essential, sovereign power. First Principles and National Sovereignty The United
States must not surrender its independence and sovereignty cavalierly. The Founding Fathers
and subsequent generations of Americans paid a high price to achieve America's sovereignty
and secure the unalienable rights of U.S. citizens. The government formed by the Founders to
safeguard American independence and protect individual rights derives its powers from the
consent of the governed, not from any other nation or group of nations.[42] Having achieved its
independence by fighting a costly war, America's Founders approached permanent alliances and
foreign entanglements with a fair degree of skepticism. President George Washington, in his
1796 farewell address, favored extending America's commercial relations with other nations but
warned against extensive political connections.[43] Washington well understood that legitimate
governments are formed only through gaining the consent of the people. He therefore placed a
high value on the independence that the United States had achieved and was rightfully dubious
about involvement in European intrigues. Integral to national sovereignty is the right to make
authoritative decisions on foreign policy and national resources, particularly the use of the
nation's military forces. Many of the reasons why America fought the War of Independence
against Great Britain revolved around Britain's taxation of the American people without their
consent and its practice of "declaring themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all
cases whatsoever."[44] Once America gained control of its revenue, natural resources, and
industry and had formed a government separate and apart from any other, the Founders would
not have compromised or delegated its prerogatives to any other nation or group of nations.
Washington rightly warned his countrymen to "steer clear" of such foreign influence and instead
to rely on "temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies."[45] The R2P doctrine strikes at
the heart of the Founders' notion of national sovereignty. The Founders would have deplored
the idea that the United States would cede control -- any control -- of its armed forces to the
caprice of the world community without the consent of the American people. Washington
stated that the decision to go to war is a key element of national sovereignty that should be
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exercised at the discretion of the American government: Our detached and distant situation
invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people under an efficient
government, the period is not far off...when we may choose peace or war, as our interest,
guided by justice, shall counsel.[46] The U.S. interest, guided by justice and exercised with the
consent of the American people, must remain the standard for making decisions of war and
peace. The interest of the international community, which is guided by its own collective notion
of justice and without the consent of the American people, should not serve as America's
barometer, especially when placing the lives of U.S. military men and women in jeopardy.[47]
The United States cannot rely on world opinion, as expressed through an emerging international
norm such as R2P, to set the proper criteria for the use of U.S. military force. The commitment
to use force must be made exclusively by the U.S. government acting as an independent,
sovereign nation based on its own criteria for military intervention.[48] In sum, the R2P doctrine
does not harmonize with the first principles of the United States. Adopting a doctrine that binds
the United States to scores of other nations and dictates how it must act to prevent atrocities is
the very sort of foreign entanglement against which Washington warned us. The United States
would betray the Founding Fathers' achievement of independence and sovereignty if it wholly
acceded to the R2P doctrine.
The worst human rights violators are China, North Korea, Iran, Russia [so we’d
have to violate their sovereignty to solve….]
Gerald Steinberg, 4-9, 22, Beyond Russia: Fixing the UN’s human rights farce – opinion,
https://www.jpost.com/international/article-703665
The United States led initiative to boot Russia from the UN’s Human Rights Council (UNHRC) is
an important symbolic, moral and political step, with a reasonable chance of success. But this
will not reverse the carnage and brutality in Ukraine, nor deter President Vladimir Putin and the
Russian military from more massacres. Showing Moscow the door in Geneva is also unlikely to
convince the leaders of China, Iran, Syria or North Korea, among others, from killing
opponents or committing war crimes. Instead, the US should be leading a complete overhaul of
the UN’s human rights structure, operations and agendas, from the bottom up. In the process,
the hypocrisy protecting the UNHRC, the dictatorships, and an allied network of powerful
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) would be exposed for all to see. The myth of legitimacy
and moral influence that they cultivate is based on the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the Genocide Convention, adopted in the shadow of the Holocaust. Over the years,
this moral framework has been eroded and erased by the cynical manipulation of slogans and
propaganda. The worst violators are dictators like Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, who
use their presence on the HRC to co-opt the mechanism, while protecting themselves and
their allies from investigation and criticism. Membership is based on elections held by the UN
General Assembly through five regional groupings – a structure that allows powerful autocrats,
as well major voting blocs including the 56 member Organization of Islamic Cooperation, to
control the process. The anti-democratic countries and the OIC select compliant commissioners,
oversee key staff appointments, direct the agenda and make sure that the steady flow of
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resolutions, investigations and expert reports avoid damaging their political interests and
priorities.
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Sovereignty Stops War
Protection of sovereignty and borders needed to prevent armed conflict
TANISHA M. FAZAL, is Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota and the
author of State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation,
May/June 2022, Foreign Affairs, The Return of Conquest? Why the Future of Global Order
Hinges on Ukraine, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-04-06/ukraine-russia-
war-return-conquest
Russian President Vladimir Putin has long declared that Ukraine has never existed as an independent country. The former Soviet
republic is “not even a state,” he said as early as 2008. In a speech on February 21 of this year, he elaborated, arguing that “modern
Ukraine was entirely and fully created by Russia.” Days later, he ordered Russian forces to invade Ukraine. As Russian tanks
streamed across the Ukrainian border, Putin seemed to be acting on a sinister, long-held goal: to erase Ukraine from the map of the
world. What made Russia’s invasion so shocking was its anachronistic nature. For decades, this kind of territorial conquest had
seemed to be a thing of the past. It
had been more than 30 years since one country had tried to conquer
another internationally recognized country outright (when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990). This
restraint formed the basis of the international system: borders were, by and large, sacrosanct.
Compliance with the norms of state sovereignty—including the notion that a country gets to
control what happens in its own territory—has never been perfect. But states have generally
tried to observe the sanctity of borders or at least maintain the appearance of doing so.
Countries could rest assured that of all the threats they faced, an invasion to redraw their
borders was unlikely to be one of them. With a main cause of war largely consigned to history, this particular brand
of conflict became less common. Now, with Russia’s invasion, the norm against territorial conquest has been tested in the most
threatening and vivid way since the end of World War II. The war in Ukraine is reminiscent of a previous, more violent era. If the
global community allows Russia to subsume Ukraine, states may more frequently use force to challenge borders, and wars may
break out, former empires may be reinstated, and more countries may be brought to the edge of extinction. However disturbing
Russia’s attack may be, the rest of the world can still protect the norm that Moscow has challenged. The global community can use
sanctions and international courts to impose costs on Russia for its blatant and illegal aggression. It can press for reforms at the UN
so that Security Council members, Russia included, cannot veto a referral to the International Criminal Court and thus hamstring that
institution’s ability to mete out justice. Such a response will require cooperation and sacrifices, but it is well worth the effort. At
stake is one of the bedrock principles of international law: the territorial integrity of states. “State death,” as I have called the
phenomenon, is a state’s formal loss of control over foreign policy to another state .
In other words, when a country
concedes that it can no longer act independently on the world stage, it effectively ceases to be
its own state. At the beginning of the era of the modern state, one cause of state death
predominated: blunt force trauma. From 1816 to 1945, a state disappeared from the map of
the world every three years, on average—a fact all the more alarming given that there were
about a third as many states back then as there are now. In that period, about a quarter of all
states suffered a violent death at one point or another. Their capitals were sacked by enemy
armies, their territory was annexed, and they could no longer act independently on the world
stage. Countries located between rivals were especially susceptible to being taken over. From 1772 to 1795, Poland was carved up
by Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Poland disappeared from the map of Europe completely for over a century. Paraguay suffered a
similar fate in 1870, when it lost a war against Argentina and Brazil. Early in the twentieth century, Japan annexed Korea after a
series of peninsular wars with China and Russia. Besides having an unfortunate location, the lack of strong diplomatic ties with
colonial powers was another harbinger of danger for vulnerable states. Trade relations were not enough. In the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, African and Asian countries that had inked commercial deals with imperial powers such as France and the
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United Kingdom were more likely to die than countries in Latin America and the Middle East that, having stronger and more formal
ties, hosted consulates and embassies from these same colonial powers. There was, in other words, a hierarchy of recognition that
signaled which states were seen as legitimate conquests and which were not. The United Kingdom, for example, signed treaties with
precolonial Indian states from Sindh to Nagpur to Punjab that many Indian leaders viewed as a recognition of statehood. But the
British never took the next step of establishing diplomatic missions in these states—a slight that was often a prelude to invasion.
Slowly but surely, some leaders started pushing back against the practice of conquest. In the early twentieth century, U.S. President
Woodrow Wilson emerged as a proponent of territorial integrity. The last of Wilson’s Fourteen Points, unveiled as World War I came
to a close, referred specifically to protections for states belonging to the League of Nations, which Wilson thought could offer
“mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.” To be sure, Wilson’s
commitment to self-determination was limited to European nations; he favored independence for the Poles but was unresponsive to
pleas for support from the Egyptians and the Indians. Moreover, his defense of territorial integrity was made easier by the fact that
by the time Wilson became president, the United States had completed its own territorial conquests, including its march west and
the accompanying capture of Native American lands; it no longer had clear ambitions to acquire additional territory. Nonetheless,
Wilson did help the norm against territorial conquest take root.
Norm of sovereignty necessary to prevent war
Akhilesh Pillalamarri is an international relations analyst, and a contributing editor at The

Diplomat, writing on foreign policy, politics, history, culture, and geography, 2019, Why
Territorial Sovereignty Should Be Flexible, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-
watch/why-territorial-sovereignty-should-be-flexible-57907
Since World War II, international law and norms have attempted to prevent conflicts between
states by removing a key driver of war—conquest—by fixing the borders between states and
promoting the inviolability of boundaries. In the first case heard by the International Court of
Justice after its foundation, the court declared that “between independent States, respect for
territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations.”
This norm has served as a break on the wholesale conquest of states and violations have been
quickly countered. For example, Iraq’s attempted annexation of Kuwait in 1990 was rightly,
quickly and emphatically reversed by a large coalition led by the United States.
Ukraine aside, sovereignty has generally worked to prevent conflict
Jack Donnelly, 2014, State Sovereignty and International Human Rights.

https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/cceia/v28i2/f_0031980_25975.pdf, Professor;
Director, Human Rights Degree. Faculty; Josef Korbel School of International Studies, Duke
Throughout most of human history, aggressive war was generally accepted as an inevitable
reality. In the late twentieth century, however, it was effectively eliminated as a practice of
international society, laying a foundation for a variety of other major structural changes
(although, as we will see in more detail below, states remained “fully sovereign” when they
lost their right of war). This normatively driven change was strongly supported by the
introduction of nuclear weapons, which dramatically increased the risks of aggressive war.
Doctrines of mutual assured destruction more or less intentionally maximized those risks,
creating a powerful status quo bias in post-World War II international society—at least with
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respect to direct conflicts by the superpowers, especially in the core of the international system.
The principal exception was decolonization. The UN Charter implicitly accepted colonialism.
During the s, however, the balance of international opinion, even among colonial
powers, shifted to favor rapid decolonization of Western overseas empires. Symbolic of the
transition is the  Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples (UN General Assembly Resolution ). In the s and s,
decolonization (often expressed as “self-determination”) was the principal exception to the
restriction of the use of force to self-defense. Wars of national liberation from colonial
domination were not considered violations of the political independence or territorial integrity
of (Western) salt-water empire-states. Decolonization created scores of weak and often fragile
states, which in earlier eras would have generated local state sovereignty and international
human rights 227 wars and foreign interventions to partition or eliminate many of them and to
create relations of hierarchical subordination. (Nineteenth-century legal manuals called these
semi-sovereign, part-sovereign, imperfectly independent, not-full sovereign, or half-sovereign
states.) Almost all of these new postcolonial states, however, retained every square inch of
territory held by the former colonial power. This was both a response to the emerging norm of
territorial integrity and a powerful force in entrenching that norm. Furthermore, formal
hierarchical inequalities between states were almost completely eliminated, again both in
response to and contributing to the strengthening of the norm of sovereign equality.
Sovereignty, in other words, was constructed as equal, territorial, and exclusive. States,
defined by an internationally agreed-upon territory, held sovereignty. Those states that
existed in , plus those entities subject to overseas colonial domination, were entitled to
recognition as sovereign states. Their jurisdiction was exclusive over (and restricted to) their
own territory. And formal legal inequalities between states were largely eliminated. 
Sovereignty thus understood precludes international implementation and enforcement of
human rights. (Human rights are largely about how a state treats its own nationals on its own
territory, which, in the postwar construction of sovereignty, is a matter of the sovereign
prerogative of states.) This understanding of sovereignty, however, is an historically
contingent feature of the postwar—and especially the postdecolonization—era. Compare, for
example, Europe at the time of the Peace of Westphalia (), which is usually taken as the
dawn of modern international relations: the holders of sovereignty were dynasts (not states);
formal distinctions between sovereigns were the norm; different sovereigns held different
rights; territory was passed freely among dynastic rulers; and overlapping jurisdictions were
common.
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Attacking Sovereignty Undermines Human Rights
Human rights norms can only succeed when sovereignty is respected. Attacks
on states undermine the goals of following human rights laws
Daria Jarczewska, University of York, 2013, Do Human Rights Challenge State Sovereignty?,
https://www.e-ir.info/2013/03/15/do-human-rights-challenge-state-sovereignty/
Non-state actors can no longer be marginalised in terms of their performance on the

international arena with regard to human rights (Clapham, 2006, p. 29). Yet it must be
acknowledged that they cannot shape customary international law, as states do, or formally
enact law (Reus-Smit, 2011, p.286). What they can do, however, is influence the normative
milieu that states operate within. Norms themselves, regardless of their enforceability,
authorise actions of human rights advocates and empower them (Donnelly, 2011, p. 499).
Despite successful ways in which international civil society shaped political agenda, their activity
must consider the state, and work with it accordingly to achieve change. Donnelly rightly argued
that ‘NGOs, no less than states and international organisations, must usually act through, rather
than around states’ (Donnelly, 2011, p. 504). Similarly, the implementation of international
human rights law, even if agreed upon on the international level, relies on national
implementation (Smith, 2009, p. 41; Donnelly, 2011, p. 496). Social change of any kind may
only be reinforced or influenced to some extent by external factors. However, it is more
probable to succeed if initiated in the domestic realm, as ‘changes that have been imposed by
forces outside a country are unlikely to last’ (Kamminga, 1992, p. 2). Establishing human rights
norms often involves identity, structural and political change (Sikkink, Risse, 1999, p.3) which no
international law can guarantee without willing cooperation of a state in question and
internal approval.
Thus, advocacy networks, despite being unable to directly shape human rights legislations, may
be crucial in terms of constructing international agenda, providing normative grounds for
domestic actors and creating conditions conducive to institutional change (ibid, p. 26), often by
means of cooperation and dialogue with state actors, not in opposition to them.
An example of a successful cooperation between domestic actors and international advocacy

forces could be the one that led to major changes in Kenya in the mid-1980s. International
actors by the policy of ‘naming and shaming’ brought international attention to the human
rights situation in Kenya, questioned its government’s moral infallibility and impunity,
empowered domestic opposition groups. That in consequence led to gradual concessions on the
government’s part and eventual enduring changes, as lifting in 1992 the ban on representation
of Amnesty International in the country (Schmitz, 1999, p.39-63). The character of change was
consensual, not imposed, and it was the effect of cooperation between transnational actors,
domestic groups and state authorities.
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There is also likelihood that NGOs and advocacy groups will provide a more uncompromising,
more politically efficacious critique of human rights violations than international human rights
legal instrumentalities. As previously argued, international human rights law is entrenched in a
state-based system, and is constructed and enforced by states. As such, it is faced with
limitations. The UN treaty bodies must attempt not to alienate politically certain states (Smith,
2009, p. 33) and often struggle for impossible compromises. NGOs, on the other hand, though
operating mainly within states, usually have independent sources of funding and may be
involved in more robust practices of ‘naming and shaming’ and have a more decisive stance
towards international organisations and governments (Palma, 2012, p. 76).
Thus, the moral force of the ideal of human rights should not be dismissed. The international
human rights encoded within international law rather than challenging state sovereignty have
to reconcile itself with it and adapt to the existing political contexts. et the ideal of human
rights that comprises the normative foundation of human rights is in itself a powerful tool,
used by non-state actors, network, movements and individuals themselves.
Conclusion
International legal human rights instrumentalities rather than challenging state sovereignty are
constrained by it; their interpretation, implementation and enforcement rely on states
(Donnelly, 2011, p. 496; Archibugi, 1995, p.126-127). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
may not yet be an international Magna Carta of all mankind, as envisaged by Eleanor Roosevelt
(Sikkink, 1999, p. 3) and the notion of sovereignty is still the cornerstone of international public
law and its practice. Still, the substantial normative foundations of the human rights ideal are
the source of its strength and its potential for generating political change. Stating that the ideal
of human rights would only be performative when congruent with the interest of powerful
states would mean undermining its moral power and how it may be used to create normative
discourse, empower human rights advocates and sustain a political milieu conducive to change.
Maybe human rights do not lay siege to national borders, but they still may exert influence on
states’ behaviour on domestic and international levels, even if only of consensual and
voluntary nature. Also, human rights groups’ working through and with national states, as
opposed to around them has significant benefits (Smith, 2009, p. 41). In the end, it is about
ensuring that states give adequate protection to its populations and respect their rights, not
undermining their authority.
Human rights depend on national implementation
Falk, 2018, Richard Falk is Alfred G. Milbank Emeritus Professor of International Law, Politics,
and International Affairs at Princeton University and the author of some 40 books and hundreds
of academic articles and essays, Human Rights, State Sovereignty, and International Law: An
Interview With Richard Falk, https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/11/09/2018/human-
rights-state-sovereignty-and-international-law-interview-richard-falk
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We can work toward a world in which there is a global rule of law that embodies human rights,
but such a world does not now exist, and in all likelihood, never existed. Sovereignty based on
territorial boundaries and international recognition, and given emotional content by nationalist
and patrioteering ideologies, tends to override human rights concerns whenever the two
sources of rights clash. Despite the use of the word ‘human’ the real perception of ‘human
rights’ remains dependent for implementation on national procedures of implementation.
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“Right to Protect (R2P) Generally Bad

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Right to Protect Bad Link
Offensive peacekeeping operation exist to protect civilians
Midwest Model United Nations, 2013, http://mmun.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/ga-4-a.pdf

DOA: 12-6-14
The UN for the first time has authorized peacekeepers to conduct targeted offensive
operations within the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Security Council Resolution 2098
established a “Force Intervention Brigade” to assist the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC) in neutralizing armed groups that have been accused of sexual and gender-based
violence, recruitment of child soldiers, violence against civilians, and other human rights
abuses.6 These offensive operations are meant to provide protection of civilians until the
DRC has created a Rapid Reaction Force that is able to take over duties from the Force
Intervention Brigade. There are many critics that view the UN’s offensive operations as
“peace enforcement” and that the UN may not be seen as an impartial party to the conflict
in the DRC.
Offensive PKOs based on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
Midwest Model United Nations, 2013, http://mmun.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/ga-4-a.pdf

DOA: 12-6-14
The new mandate for offensive operations in MONUSCO has been part of a recent trend in
strengthening peacekeeping’s ability to protect civilians. Protection of civilians is viewed as
a key factor in the success of any peacekeeping mission. This recent trend stems from the
20045 World Summit Outcome’s endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect. The
international community made a commitment to protect their own populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. In places where
civilians are subject to such atrocities, the international community agreed that the UN
should act to protect civilians.
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R2P Bad: Sovereignty
Accepting r2p destroys us sovereignty

Groves 8
to-protect-doctrine
Steven Groves works to protect and preserve American sovereignty, self-governance and independence as leader of
The Heritage Foundation's Freedom Project. Groves, who is the Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in
Heritage’s Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, also advocates American leadership on issues involving
international political and religious freedom, human rights and democratic institutions. He has testified before
Congress on international law, human rights, the United Nations and controversial treaties such as the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. In 2013, Groves was awarded the Dr. W. Glenn and
Rita Campbell Award for his work. The award is given annually to the Heritage employee who delivered “an
outstanding contribution to the analysis and promotion of a free society.” Before joining Heritage in 2007, Groves was
senior counsel to then-Sen. Norm Coleman (R-Minn.) on the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.
He played a lead role in the subcommittee's investigation of the U.N. "oil-for-food" scandal, the most extensive
congressional probe ever conducted of the United Nations. Groves previously was an associate at Boies, Schiller &
Flexner LLP, specializing in commercial litigation. Before that he served as assistant attorney general for the State of
Florida, where he litigated civil rights cases, constitutional law issues and criminal appeals, among other matters, in
state and federal court. Groves is a frequent guest commentator on domestic and international television and radio.
He has appeared on ABC, BBC, CNBC, CNN and CNN International, Fox News Channel, National Public Radio, Voice of
America, NHK, Al Jazeera, Alhurra and the Canadian Broadcasting Corp. His commentary and opinion pieces have
been published by journals such as National Review, The Weekly Standard and Human Events, as well as by The
Washington Times and other major newspapers across America. Groves holds a law degree from Ohio Northern
University's College of Law and a bachelor of arts degree in history from Florida State University.
While genocide, war crimes, and other atrocities will always be incompatible with American
values, the McCain and Clinton statements raise the issue of whether preventing genocide and
ethnic cleansing would necessarily constitute a vital U.S. national interest. In some situations,
acts of large-scale ethnic cleansing in some remote nation may indeed affect U.S. national
interests. However, the real question is whether or not the United States should obligate itself
through an international compact to use its military forces as the rest of the world sees fit in
cases of genocide and ethnic cleansing. Accepting such an obligation would arguably empower
other nations to judge whether U.S. national interests or national values are at stake. That begs
the question of who will decide whether the United States must commit its limited resources --
including its military forces -- to prevent atrocities occurring in a foreign land. The R2P doctrine
is designed to take decision making on these crucial issues out of the hands of the United States
and place it in the hands of the international community, operating through the United Nations.
If the United States consented to such a doctrine, it would effectively surrender its authority to
exercise an essential, sovereign power. First Principles and National Sovereignty The United
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States must not surrender its independence and sovereignty cavalierly. The Founding Fathers
and subsequent generations of Americans paid a high price to achieve America's sovereignty
and secure the unalienable rights of U.S. citizens. The government formed by the Founders to
safeguard American independence and protect individual rights derives its powers from the
consent of the governed, not from any other nation or group of nations.[42] Having achieved its
independence by fighting a costly war, America's Founders approached permanent alliances and
foreign entanglements with a fair degree of skepticism. President George Washington, in his
1796 farewell address, favored extending America's commercial relations with other nations but
warned against extensive political connections.[43] Washington well understood that legitimate
governments are formed only through gaining the consent of the people. He therefore placed a
high value on the independence that the United States had achieved and was rightfully dubious
about involvement in European intrigues. Integral to national sovereignty is the right to make
authoritative decisions on foreign policy and national resources, particularly the use of the
nation's military forces. Many of the reasons why America fought the War of Independence
against Great Britain revolved around Britain's taxation of the American people without their
consent and its practice of "declaring themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all
cases whatsoever."[44] Once America gained control of its revenue, natural resources, and
industry and had formed a government separate and apart from any other, the Founders would
not have compromised or delegated its prerogatives to any other nation or group of nations.
Washington rightly warned his countrymen to "steer clear" of such foreign influence and instead
to rely on "temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies."[45] The R2P doctrine strikes at
the heart of the Founders' notion of national sovereignty. The Founders would have deplored
the idea that the United States would cede control -- any control -- of its armed forces to the
caprice of the world community without the consent of the American people. Washington
stated that the decision to go to war is a key element of national sovereignty that should be
exercised at the discretion of the American government: Our detached and distant situation
invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people under an efficient
government, the period is not far off...when we may choose peace or war, as our interest,
guided by justice, shall counsel.[46] The U.S. interest, guided by justice and exercised with the
consent of the American people, must remain the standard for making decisions of war and
peace. The interest of the international community, which is guided by its own collective notion
of justice and without the consent of the American people, should not serve as America's
barometer, especially when placing the lives of U.S. military men and women in jeopardy.[47]
The United States cannot rely on world opinion, as expressed through an emerging international
norm such as R2P, to set the proper criteria for the use of U.S. military force. The commitment
to use force must be made exclusively by the U.S. government acting as an independent,
sovereign nation based on its own criteria for military intervention.[48] In sum, the R2P doctrine
does not harmonize with the first principles of the United States. Adopting a doctrine that binds
the United States to scores of other nations and dictates how it must act to prevent atrocities is
the very sort of foreign entanglement against which Washington warned us. The United States
would betray the Founding Fathers' achievement of independence and sovereignty if it wholly
acceded to the R2P doctrine.
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Actively rejecting r2p crucial to maintain sovereignty

Groves 8
to-protect-doctrine
Steven Groves works to protect and preserve American sovereignty, self-governance and
independence as leader of The Heritage Foundation's Freedom Project. Groves, who is the
Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in Heritage’s Margaret Thatcher Center for
Freedom, also advocates American leadership on issues involving international political and
religious freedom, human rights and democratic institutions. He has testified before Congress
on international law, human rights, the United Nations and controversial treaties such as the
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women. In 2013, Groves was awarded the Dr. W. Glenn and Rita Campbell Award for his work.
The award is given annually to the Heritage employee who delivered “an outstanding
contribution to the analysis and promotion of a free society.” Before joining Heritage in 2007,
Groves was senior counsel to then-Sen. Norm Coleman (R-Minn.) on the U.S. Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations. He played a lead role in the subcommittee's investigation of
the U.N. "oil-for-food" scandal, the most extensive congressional probe ever conducted of the
United Nations. Groves previously was an associate at Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, specializing
in commercial litigation. Before that he served as assistant attorney general for the State of
Florida, where he litigated civil rights cases, constitutional law issues and criminal appeals,
among other matters, in state and federal court. Groves is a frequent guest commentator on
domestic and international television and radio. He has appeared on ABC, BBC, CNBC, CNN and
CNN International, Fox News Channel, National Public Radio, Voice of America, NHK, Al Jazeera,
Alhurra and the Canadian Broadcasting Corp. His commentary and opinion pieces have been
published by journals such as National Review, The Weekly Standard and Human Events, as well
as by The Washington Times and other major newspapers across America. Groves holds a law
degree from Ohio Northern University's College of Law and a bachelor of arts degree in history
from Florida State University.
Protecting American Sovereignty
Given the recognition of the responsibility to protect doctrine in the 2005 World Summit
Outcome Document, as well as the continuing efforts by certain actors in the international
community to promote and operationalize R2P, the United States should clarify its position on
its national sovereignty and the criteria for the use of its armed forces.
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To that end, the United States should:
Maintain its current official position, as set forth in Ambassador Bolton's letter regarding the
2005 World Summit Outcome Document, that the R2P doctrine does not create a binding legal
obligation on the United States to intervene in another nation for any purpose.
Affirm that the United States need not seek authorization from the U.N. Security Council, the
U.N. General Assembly, the international community, or any other international organization to
use its military forces to prevent acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, or other atrocities occurring
in another country.
Base its decisions to intervene in the affairs of other nations -- including punitive economic,
diplomatic, political, and military measures -- on U.S. national interests, not on criteria set forth
by the R2P doctrine or any other international "test."
Scrutinize ongoing efforts by certain actors within the international community to

operationalize and otherwise promote the R2P doctrine in the United States, the United
Nations, the international NGO community, and other international forums.
Reject the notion thatthe R2P doctrine is an established international norm.
Conclusion
The United States should take no comfort from the fact that, as a party to the 2005 World
Summit Outcome Document, it has committed itself only to being "prepared to take collective
action" to end atrocities or that the ICISS report represents the obligation to prevent atrocities
as a mere "responsibility." R2P advocates are attempting to achieve worldwide consensus that
the international community has an obligation to intervene, with military force if necessary, in
another country to prevent acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other atrocities. R2P
proponents may not be satisfied with anything less than a multilateral treaty -- a United Nations
Convention on the Responsibility to Protect -- that creates binding legal obligations on its
signatories.
The United States should therefore continue to treat the responsibility to protect doctrine with
grave skepticism. The independence won by the Founders and defended by subsequent
generations of Americans should not be squandered, but rather should be safeguarded from
furtive encroachments by the international community.
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Only by maintaining a monopoly on the deployment of diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions,

political coercion, and military forces will the United States preserve its national sovereignty.
Acceding to a set of criteria such as those set forth by the R2P doctrine would be a dangerous
and unnecessary step toward bolstering the authority of the United Nations and the
international community and would compromise the consent of the American people.
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A2: “R2P Expands Sovereignty”
Defense of r2p misdefine “sovereignty” – the redefinition still erodes it

Gay 7/23/13
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-deceptive-appeal-the-responsibility-protect-8764
John Allen Gay is an assistant managing editor at The National Interest. His book (co-authored
with Geoffrey Kemp) War with Iran: Political, Military, and Economic Consequences was
released by Rowman and Littlefield in early 2013, The National Interest, July 23, The Deceptive
Appeal of the Responsibility to Protect, DOA: 12-7-14
The third pillar is where the rub is. The notion that the international community has an
obligation to become involved in a country under certain circumstances, regardless of what its
government says, appears to erode national sovereignty. Albright and Williamson charge that
this is a misperception—in fact, they say, R2P “is designed to reinforce, not undermine, national
sovereignty. It places primary emphasis on the duty of states to protect their own people and its
complementary focus on helping governments improve their capacities to fulfill their
commitments.” In other words, R2P expands the concept of sovereignty—sovereignty includes
not only rights, but also responsibilities, responsibilities which states should help each other
fulfill. Sovereignty here is so sacrosanct that states failing to exercise it fully lose their title to it
—“Only when a government fails or refuses to live up to the responsibility of sovereignty does it
run the risk of outside intervention.” Yet this is a curious way to construe sovereignty.
Sovereignty becomes not merely an empirical fact about states that is prudently respected, but
a right entrusted from on high; given that the right passes to the international community when
abused, it would seem this sovereignty sees the world as a federation. International institutions
—treated in the report as the final authorities on third-pillar actions—graciously devolve their
responsibilities to local viceroys and governors-general, whom it may relieve of their duties if
their failures are severe enough. It’s not really sovereignty, then—it’s mere administrative
convenience.
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A2: “R2P Doesn’t kill Sovereignty - it’s Preventive”
Even if it’s prevention, the doctrine still kills sovereignty

Gay 7/23/13
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-deceptive-appeal-the-responsibility-protect-8764
John Allen Gay is an assistant managing editor at The National Interest. His book (co-authored
with Geoffrey Kemp) War with Iran: Political, Military, and Economic Consequences was
released by Rowman and Littlefield in early 2013, The National Interest, July 23, The Deceptive
Appeal of the Responsibility to Protect, DOA: 12-7-14
Albright and Williamson might reply that all these worries repeat the error of assuming that R2P
is mainly about its third pillar, when in fact “R2P is at its core an instrument of prevention. It
does not mandate military action by the United States or others. The idea is to generate
preventive diplomacy, increased development aid, sanctions, and other tools to avoid the
military options that might be necessary when prevention fails and atrocities commence.” The
second pillar, for them, bears the most weight. et the way Albright and Williamson envision this
pillar working is also a threat to sovereignty. They imply this in the Politico op-ed they released
to plug the report, as they note that “Syria today presents us with a stark reminder of the high
human costs of equivocation. As Assad began to turn state organs into his own tool of
repression, R2P’s preventive underpinnings were rightfully called into question...” Indeed. No
preventive action could have kept Assad from turning the state’s institutions into tools of
repression while also respecting Syrian sovereignty, because Assad’s rule was already repressive.
As in most autocracies, the government could not become less repressive without endangering
its continued hold on power. Assad was thus likely to regard the second-pillar efforts that would
have been necessary to stabilize prewar Syria as a threat, and to refuse them. (Indeed, other
autocracies, such as Russia and Egypt, have similarly refused such “help.”) So should these
second-pillar measures be conducted over a government’s objections? If not, they’ll often be
insufficient; if so, sovereignty is further eroded. Yet Albright and Williamson pass over this
problem in silence.
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A2: “Safeguards Protect Sovereignty”
R2P safeguards AUGMENT erosion of sovereignty

Menon 6/12/13
http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2013/06/12/its-fatally-flawed/
Rajan Menon is Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor of Political Science, City College of New
York/City University of New York, and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.
R2P’s originators anticipated that any prescription perceived as proposing lax criteria for the use
of force would be dead on arrival, so the ICISS report and follow-on publications of its ilk have
bowed before the shrine of sovereignty. They affirm that the obligation to protect people rests
in the first instance with the governments that have jurisdiction over them, but they add that
when a state cannot or will not protect human rights, the responsibility shifts to the
international community, which means, ideally, the UN girded with Security Council
authorization, or in a pinch regional organizations if they promise subsequently to seek UNSCR
approval. R2P proponents take pains to explain that the concept is not a pretext for military
intervention. Force, Gareth Evans tirelessly reiterates, should be used only during human rights
emergencies and only following the failure of diplomacy, mediation, naming and shaming, and
sanctions. Even then, he stresses, feasibility, risks, proportionality and the prospects for success
must be weighed. (There is more than a dollop of just war theory in R2P; Augustine and Aquinas
would be proud.) R2P’s expositors also recommend various preventive measures: early-warning
mechanisms, pre-crisis mediation, peacekeeping, economic assistance and post-conflict
reconstruction.2 Yet the reassurances that force would be a rare, last-ditch response have not
placated critics, for several reasons. R2P’s pre-intervention prescriptions merely repeat existing
remedies and add nothing to diplomacy’s toolkit. What’s new is the casuistry of reframing and
diminishing sovereignty in order to legitimize altruistic armed intervention in defense of the
abstract rights that most political communities agree upon in theory. Given R2P’s emphasis on
feasibility and the chances for success, weak states are its most likely proving grounds; powerful
ones need not fear, no matter the magnitude of their misdeeds. Because idealism and power
are inextricably intertwined, with the latter frequently corrupting the former, R2P provides
powerful states one script for playing the Good Samaritan when intervention promotes their
interests, and another for eschewing or opposing aid when it doesn’t.
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Sovereignty Impact
Global adoption of R2P causes great power wars – denial of sovereignty.

Trombly 11
Dan Trombly, GWU IR Grad Student, 8-27-2011 The upending of sovereignty

http://slouchingcolumbia.wordpress.com/2011/08/27/the-upending-of-sovereignty/
The second dangerous element is that on the international scale, the potential for
creating serious enmity among the great powers. The importance of consensus
belies the reality of how consensus is formed , not by automatic recognition but
by a careful negotiation of interests and calculation of threats . Yet the more we
choose, falsely, to view R2P as simply a norm which automatically initiates a
series of actions to enforce itself, the more tension we are likely to provoke
when this imagined process hits against the friction of world politics as they
actually are. While I have predicted that military limitations by US allies in power projection
and the increasing ability of countries to deny the US ability to unilaterally project power itself
will make the implementation of R2P unlikely beyond Africa or certain parts of the Middle East,
even the attempts to apply it in the backyard of China or Russia could seriously destabilize the
international system. For the US to seek to implement a norm which in theory only a
UNSC veto prevents from being employed against China in that country’s
backyard would be a serious escalation of tensions and in utter denial of the type
of sovereign, qualified space China is seeking to create in its own neighborhood .
R2P is not a plot by great powers. But it is a radical denial of the historic purpose of
sovereignty, which was not to protect societies from foreign states, but to protect society from
itself. But rather than empowering a global society, it will empower the great powers of
the international system, along with those societies whose appeals suit their
perceived interests. It is built on a fundamentally untenable illusion of consensus
among great powers which will not endure a crisis in a more strategically
meaningful area of the world. Should activists succeed in convincing great powers that
societies of affected states can legitimize the actions of intervening states, and jus ad bello trump
the need for the impossible-to-enforce consensus, the results will seriously challenge the
basis of amicable great power relations in the first place.
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Answers to Pro Arguments

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Multilateralism Answers
Status quo best protects multilateralism by relying on contributions from

member states
stability
The U.S. has long advocated for the broadening of the size and scope of UN peacekeeping
missions, using its position as a permanent member of the Security Council to push for
mandates that more closely reflect current challenges. Both Republican and Democratic
presidents have recognized the value of UN peacekeeping, because:
Peacekeeping Is Effective: A November 2021 Foreign Affairs article titled the “Astonishing
Success of Peacekeeping” explains that “Decades of academic research has demonstrated that
UN peacekeeping not only works at stopping conflicts but works better than anything else
experts know. Peacekeeping is effective at resolving civil wars, reducing violence during wars,
preventing wars from recurring, and rebuilding state institutions. It succeeds at protecting
civilian lives and reducing sexual and gender-based violence. The piece also notes that “To
convince other countries to contribute financially, the United States needs to set a better
example by paying its own assessed dues.”¹
UN Missions Cost Less than Other Forms of Military Intervention: Two studies published by the
U.S. Government Accountability Office more than a decade apart (in 2006² and 2018³) found
that a UN operation is one-eighth the cost to American taxpayers of deploying a comparable
U.S. force. Overall, at a yearly cost of approximately $6.5 billion, UN peacekeeping is one half of
the state of Rhode Island’s annual budget.
Promotes Multilateral Burden-Sharing: The UN has no standing army, and therefore depends
on Member States to voluntarily contribute troops and police to its peacekeeping operations.
While the U.S., as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, plays a central role in the
decision to deploy peacekeeping missions, it provides very few uniformed personnel: currently
just several dozen out of 73,000 total uniformed personnel. A range of U.S. partners and allies—
including India, Rwanda, Tanzania, Jordan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Nepal—provide the bulk
of the rest.
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Answers to: Peacekeeping is Cheap(er)
This doesn’t assume the personnel and equipment resources needed for a
Standing Army. Their evidence is talking about deploying low-skilled forces
from developing countries in limited conflicts, not US military resources, which
our evidence says would be required
It doesn’t matter because the US isn’t involved in these operations in the status
quo and absorbing the costs. A Standing Army is just a new expense for the US.
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Answers to: Human Rights Violations Bad
War that occurs as a result of sovereignty violations result in massive human

rights violations
Justin Conlin, Yale, 2004, Sovereignty vs. Human Rights or Sovereignty and Human Rights?, Race
& Class, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0306396804045516?journalCode=racb
What, post-cold war, are the implications of so-called humanitarian interventions for
international law, the nation state and peoples’ rights? Is this a cover for imperialism or, in the
era of globalisation, an essential widening of protection for human rights? The provisions of the
UN Charter and related instruments are examined, together with the arguments in support of
such interventions. That state sovereignty protects human rights by reducing the incidence of
war and promoting self-determination and that military intervention can result in atrocities
are often overlooked. Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and the first Gulf war are among the examples
discussed.
We need to de-prioritize human rights protection to stop war
Wuerth, 2-25, 2022, Ingrid Wuerth is the Helen Strong Curry Professor of International Law at
Vanderbilt Law School, where she also directs the international legal studies program. She is a
leading scholar of foreign affairs, public international law and international litigation. She serves
on the State Department’s Advisory Committee on Public International Law, she is a Reporter on
the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Fourth) on U.S. Foreign Relations Law, and she is on
the editorial board of the American Journal of International Law. She has won Fulbright and
Alexander von Humboldt awards permitting her to spend substantial time in Germany and she is
an elected member of the German Society of International Law, International Law and the
Russian Invasion of Ukraine, https://www.lawfareblog.com/international-law-and-russian-
invasion-ukraine
Now is the time for a narrower, more focused international legal order dedicated to a strong
core of sovereignty-protecting norms that preserve the territorial status quo and promote
international peace and cooperation.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine violates Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which prohibits the use of
force against the territorial integrity of another state. Russian President Vladimir Putin cloaked
Russia’s military action in legal justifications during his speech on Feb. 24. While the
justifications were absurd, his speech highlights that international law retains some rhetorical
significance while it simultaneously underscores how weak the legal restraints are in practice.
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An examination of Russia’s legal justifications shows that well-meaning (or apparently well-
meaning) actions by the United States (and others) purportedly designed to promote
humanitarian and human rights objectives have eroded international legal norms. The point is
not to draw moral equivalents nor to justify Russia’s horrific actions against Ukraine. The point is
that the international legal rules on territorial integrity are weakening—a dangerous
development. In response, the international community should condemn the Russian invasion
as a violation of international law in no uncertain terms. But also, the international community
should promote a clear-eyed, restrained version of international law designed to generate
interstate peace through territorial settlement, one that holds even in an increasingly
dangerous world.
Article 2(4) and More: International Legal Rules and Territorial Integrity
Russia points to Kosovo, Iraq, Libya and Syria. Interventions in those countries were justified
by the United States and its allies based on humanitarian intervention, expansive claims of
individual and self-defense, the protection of human rights, and strained readings of U.N.
Security Council resolutions. Russia seems to cite these precedents to show how the West
itself has undermined the prohibition on the use of force in international law. The clearest
legal justification for Russia’s use of force in Ukraine is the self-defense of Russia and the
collective self-defense for the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic.
Having recognized the two republics as countries, Russia can rely on “intervention by invitation”
and on “collective self-defense”—justifications for the use of force that other powerful countries
have relied on, including the United States in Iraq and Syria. Russia’s self-defense arguments are
laughably weak. More generally, Russia’s reliance on all of these precedents is self-serving,
lacking in factual basis and “morally corrupt.” Russia is correct, however, to argue that other
powerful countries have undermined international law’s prohibition on the use of force and
protections of territorial integrity—even if that argument goes nowhere in terms of a legal or
moral justification for Russia’s own actions. To some extent, the prohibition on the use of force
has been undermined by efforts to pursue other objectives through international law, in
particular human rights and humanitarian ends, particularly in Kosovo and Libya, but to some
extent also in Iraq and Syria.
For a century now, a central objective of international law has been to secure interstate peace,
but the best ways of doing so are not necessarily clear and they likely extend beyond Article 2(4)
of the U.N. Charter. The “long peace” after World War II has led scholars and historians of
international law to link interstate peace to the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which outlawed
war, or (more commonly) to the prohibition on the use of force in the U.N. Charter and its roots
in the limitations on the use of force in the League of Nations. The sole focus on the early and
mid-20th century is misplaced, however. There was a long peace among great powers in Europe
following the Napoleonic Wars in the early 19th century, as described in this book-length
response to Steven Pinker’s well-known “The Better Angels of Our Nature” (which also describes
1945 as a key turning point marking the decline of interstate war). The long 19th century peace
suggests that the relationship between international law and interstate war is more complicated
(and fragile) than the standard narrative admits.
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Data from political scientists indicates that interstate conflict over territory is more likely than
other forms of conflict to escalate into full-scale war, making the invasion of Ukraine all the
more troubling. The link between territorial conflict and militarized disputes also, however,
suggests that international law may be most effective at generating interstate peace by reducing
conflict over territory. Prohibitions on the use of force, such as Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter,
do that, but so do other doctrines of international law, such as uti possidetis, pursuant to which
newly independent nations keep the borders they had as colonies.
The statement of the Kenyan U.N. ambassador condemning the recognition by Russia of the
Ukrainian republics speaks to exactly this point:
At independence, had we chosen to pursue states on the basis of ethnic, racial or religious
homogeneity, we would still be waging bloody wars these many decades later. … We chose to
follow the rules of the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations charter, not because
our borders satisfied us, but because we wanted something greater, forged in peace.
As the statement by Kenya suggests, accepting the territorial status quo has real costs—it
reinforces arbitrary and unjust borders. Those costs make uti possidetis unpopular in some
quarters.
The costs of preserving existing borders also fuel efforts to change other areas of international
law, including to create a right to self-determination that includes a right of secession for
oppressed groups. Russia has relied on remedial self-determination to justify military
intervention in Crimea; Western countries used self-determination as part of their argument
in favor of the independence of Kosovo from Serbia (a Russian ally). Marko Milanovic describes
Russian use of this argument as an example of “a ‘progressive’ theory such as remedial
secession/self-determination” being “used for decidedly non-progressive ends, such as justifying
territorial conquest.”
International Law: Stronger and More Limited
The European Society of International Law has issued a statement saying in part: “To contend
that other States—especially in the West—have no better record when it comes to respecting
international law is a morally corrupt and irrelevant distraction.” As observers look ahead to
what international law can and should do in the future, the contention is not an “irrelevant
distraction.” Instead, the international community must consider how well the norms have
worked, who has violated them, and why. Reinvigorated legal commitments to territorial
sovereignty and territorial integrity will require an acknowledgment—explicit or implicit—that
international law is not strong enough to do everything well. In a perfect world, it could
abandon uti possidetis and equitably adjust current borders, it could prevent leaders from
harming their own people by relaxing Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter for humanitarian purposes,
and it could empower secession for the truly oppressed despite the territorial integrity of
existing states. I have been arguing for years that expanding international law to focus on
human rights and humanitarian objectives at the expense of territorial integrity has created
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credibility and other problems that weaken the international legal system as a whole. Today,
the international community should reinvest in norms of territorial integrity and sovereignty
through international law, even at the occasional expense of humanitarian objectives (which
should be pursued vigorously through other avenues). The work of the United Nations should
focus on interstate peace and territorial integrity. And the international community should think
of new approaches to ensuring peace among the world’s most powerful countries. A new
“Concert of Powers” modeled after the “Concert of Europe” formed in 1815 is an intriguing idea,
one that would bring powerful countries together in an informal forum that offers more space
for real dialogue than the U.N. Security Council does. Safeguarding against interstate war is itself
an enormous task for international law and international institutions, as the current events in
Ukraine demonstrate.
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Answers to: Human Rights as a Value/Criterion
Treating human rights as absolute leads to violence, imperialism, and capitalist

globalization
Alain de Benoist, 2011, Alain de Benoist is a French academic, philosopher, a founder of the
Nouvelle Droite, and head of the French think tank GRECE. Benoist is a critic of neoliberalism,
free markets, and egalitarianism, Beyond Human Rights, Kindle edition, page number at end of
card.
One proof of this is its dogmatic character: it cannot be debated. That is why it seems today as
unsuitable, as blasphemous, as scandalous to criticise the ideology of human rights as it was
earlier to doubt the existence of God. Like every religion, the discussion of human rights seeks to
pass off its dogmas as so absolute that one could not discuss them without being extremely
stupid, dishonest or wicked. By presenting human rights as ‘human’ rights, as ‘universal’ rights,
one necessarily withdraws them from criticism — that is to say from the right to question them
— and, at the same time, one implicitly places their opponents beyond the pale of humanity,
since one cannot fight someone who speaks in the name of humanity while remaining human
oneself. Finally, just as, the believers once thought they had the duty to convert, by all means,
‘infidels’ and miscreants, the adherents of the credo of human rights consider themselves as
legitimately invested with the mission of imposing these principles on the whole world.
Theoretically founded on a principle of tolerance, the ideology of human rights thus reveals
itself to be the bearer of the most extreme intolerance, of the most absolute rejection. The
Declarations of Rights are not so much declarations of love as declarations of war. But today the
discussion of human rights does not just have as its goal the supply of a substitute ideology after
the collapse of the ‘grand narratives’. By seeking to impose a particular moral norm on all
peoples, it aims at giving the West a good conscience once again by allowing it to install itself
once more as a model and to denounce as ‘barbarian’ those who refuse this model. In history
‘rights’ have only too often been that which the masters of the dominant ideology had decided
to define in this way. Associated with the expansion of markets, the discussion of human rights
constitutes the ideological armour of globalisation. It is above all an instrument of domination,
and should be regarded as such. de Benoist, Alain (2011-09-30). Beyond Human Rights (Kindle
Locations 435-437). Arktos. Kindle Edition.
Rights are actually immoral – they place a focus on the right holder rather than
what is moral
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card.
In reality, as their theological roots demonstrate, human rights are only law contaminated by
morality. But a morality which does not have anything to do with that of the Ancients, insofar as
it no longer defines what it is good to be, but what it is right to do. Since the right precedes and
commands the good, morality is no longer interested in what has a value in itself, or in what we
should admire and love. It is henceforth interested only in that which is justifiable from the point
of view of reason. Such a morality derives from the biblical notion of ‘justice’. It proposes a
certain conception of ‘justice’ which, belonging by definition to the reign of ends, cannot
constitute the specific aim of a politically determined activity. Bertrand de Jouvenel had already
confirmed, with regard to the expression ‘modern natural law’, ‘The key word which does not
figure in the announcement is the word morality, and it is to this elided noun that the adjective
‘natural’ is related. When one speaks of natural law, one primarily understands that the
foundation of positive law is in morality’.[ 35] Human rights constitute the legal custom of a
moral demand of ‘justice’; they express a legal means of conceiving and expressing this morality.
It is in this sense that, as Arnold Gehlen[ 36] was able to say, the diffusion of the discussion of
human rights derives from the ‘tyranny of moral hypertrophy’.[ 37] The dream of a united
humanity, subject to the same norms and living under the same Law, forms the basic fabric of
this discussion. The ideology of human rights posits unified humanity at once as a given fact and
as an ideal, as something that is and something that should be; in other words, as a sort of
potential truth that cannot be verified and would appear fully only when it is realised. In such a
perspective, the only differences admitted are ‘differences within the same’ (Marcel Gauchet).
The other differences are denied or rejected for the sole reason that they cause one to doubt
the same. The key word is that men are everywhere endowed with the same rights because,
fundamentally, they are everywhere the same. In the final analysis, the ideology of human rights
aims at subjecting all of humanity to a particular moral law rehabilitating the ideology of the
Same. de Benoist, Alain (2011-09-30). Beyond Human Rights (Kindle Locations 708-710). Arktos.
Kindle Edition.
Human rights are too vague to be considered absolute
card.
Even the definition of man of which the theory of rights speaks is less evident than it appears.
The proof of this is that many ‘human rights’ have been extended only progressively to women
and to diverse other categories of human populations.[ 8] One may recall, as a symbol, that the
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two Western countries that vigorously maintained the institution of slavery for the longest time,
France and the United States, are also those that were the first to proclaim human rights. Many
of the authors of the American Declaration of Independence of 1776, which included a defence
of human rights, were, besides, themselves slave-owners. There is not any more doctrinal or
philosophical consensus as regards the definition of rights. ‘A sort of vagueness envelops the
notion itself of fundamental rights’, the jurist Jean Rivero recognises.[ 9] When one speaks of a
‘human right’, does one mean that this right possesses an intrinsic value, an absolute value or an
instrumental value? That it is of such importance that its realisation should take precedence
over all other considerations, or that it just counts among the things that are indispensable?
That it gives a power or a privilege? That it permits an immunity or that it confers an immunity?
There are as many responses as there are questions. The critiques of the theory of rights have
often underlined its vague, but also contradictory character. For example, Taine[ 10] wrote
about the Declaration of 1789, ‘most of the articles are abstract dogmas, metaphysical
definitions, more or less literary axioms, that is to say, more or less false, now vague and now
contradictory, open to various interpretations and to opposite constructions, these are good for
platform display but bad in practice, mere stage effect, a sort of pompous standard, useless and
heavy...’.[ 11] Analogous words are found in all the authors of the Counter-Revolution. That
there has always been disagreement concerning the scope and the content of human rights
cannot be contested. Article 2 of the Declaration of 1789, for example, makes the right of
‘resistance to oppression’ one of the natural and inalienable rights.[ 12] Kant, on the other hand,
denies the existence of such a right and goes so far as to advocate the duty of obedience to
dictatorships.[ 13] He justifies this denial by affirming that right cannot ever be effected except
by the law, which means that a juridical state is possible only by submission to the legislative will
of the state. (Natural law is here changed abruptly into positive law.) The Declaration of 1789
stipulates also, in the manner of Locke, that the right to property is ‘inviolable and sacred’. The
Declaration of 1948 is careful not to take this formula into account. The majority of the
defenders of the rights of peoples to self-determination dissociate people and state, which is
indispensable if one wishes to defend the rights of minorities. But Hans Kelsen,[ 14] theoretician
of the state under the rule of law, expressly refuses this distinction. The principle of the non-
retroactivity of the laws, held in 1789 as an inalienable right, has been abandoned regarding
‘crimes against humanity’. Freedom of expression, guaranteed unconditionally in the United
States as one of the human rights, is not in France, the other ‘country of human rights’, on the
pretext that certain opinions do not merit being considered as such. It is equally possible in the
United States to sell one’s blood, whereas French law renders null and void any commercial
contract related to a product of the human body. One can multiply the examples. Human rights
can also be shown to be internally self-contradictory. In a general way, it is common that rights
originating from positive freedom come into contradiction with those that originate from
negative freedom: the right to work, for example, can have as an obstacle the right to property
or the right of free initiative. French law has, since 1975, guaranteed the right to abortion, but
the text of the laws on bioethics adopted on 23 June 1994 at the National Assembly prohibits
experiments on embryos, alleging the need for ‘respect of the human being from the
commencement of life’. If one believes that the embryo is not yet a human being, one fails to
see why it would be prohibited to experiment on it. If one believes that it is, one fails to see how
213
DebateUS!
abortion can be justified. How does one untangle in these conditions the ‘true’ rights from the
‘false’? How does one prevent ‘human rights’ from becoming an all-purpose expression, a mere
flatus vocis[ 15] having only the ever-changing meaning that one attributes to it in one
circumstance or another? Jean Rivero observes for his part that the ‘major paradox of the fate
of human rights for two centuries is doubtless the contrast between the withering of their
ideological roots and the development of their content and their audience to a universal level’.
[ 16] This is another way of saying that the more the discussion of human rights extends, the
more the uncertainty regarding their nature and bases grows. de Benoist, Alain (2011-09-30).
Beyond Human Rights (Kindle Locations 973-986). Arktos. Kindle Edition.
We don’t need human rights to know that we should not treat people like
garbage
card.
Whether one alleges human nature or reason, the dignity of man or his belonging to humanity,
the difficulty of establishing the foundations of human rights thus reveals itself to be
insurmountable. But if human rights are not based upon truth, their scope is found to be
strongly limited as a consequence. They are no more than ‘consequences without premises’, as
Spinoza[ 74] would have said. In the final analysis, the theory comes back to saying that it is
preferable not to suffer oppression, that freedom is better than tyranny, that it is not good to do
bad to people, and that persons should be considered as persons rather than as objects, all
things that one could not contest. Was such a detour necessary to arrive at this point? de
Benoist, Alain (2011-09-30). Beyond Human Rights (Kindle Locations 1275-1279). Arktos.

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1

Answers to: Arguments Don’t Apply to UN Intervention...................................................132

Answers to Pro Arguments.....................................................................................................198

Lack of a Standing Army slows deployment

Global Governance Monitor, 2015, https://www.cfr.org/global-governance-monitor/#!/armed-

Scope of the Challenge

A Standing Army is needed to deter conflicts and force diplomacy

A quickly deployed force is needed to prevent conflict

Multilateral Intervention Best

BRYAN FREDERICK, JENNIFER KAVANAGH, STEPHANIE PEZARD, ALEXANDRA STARK, NATHAN

Once a peacekeeping operation is approved, the campaign to convince members to commit

Rapid deployment needed to solve conflicts and sustain UN legitimacy

While the ultimate success of a UN peacekeeping operation depends on many factors,

Rapid deployment of forces is needed

Australian Deparmet of Defense, 2000,

Rapid deployment needed to prevent war

Approximately twenty-seven member states, designated "Friends of Rapid Deployment," co-

SHIRBRIG is improving the tactical foundation by promoting further co-operation in

providing a widely-valued service;

generating wider political will and adequate financing;

encouraging broad participation;

ensuring sufficient multidimensional and multifunctional elements for modern conflict

instilling a unity of purpose and effort among the various participants.[6]

The Netherlands Study

The non-paper succeeded in stimulating an international exchange of views. It was clear,

The Canadian Study

The Danish-led Multinational Study

The Friends of Rapid Deployment (FORD)

Initially, they concentrated on building the base of support for an operational-level

arrangements and the rapid deployment mission headquarters.[54] Concerns would

DPKO and the UN Secretariat

United Nations Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS)

United Nations Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters (RDMHQ)

As a complement to the UN Standby Arrangement System, the Secretary-General decided to

establishing an administrative infrastructure for the mission;

a. It must be deployable at very short notice.

b. It should be able to deploy for up to six months.

c. It should provide initially the nucleus of a headquarters for a new PKO.

e. It must be capable of undertaking technical reconnaissance missions prior to deployment.

number of members providing a commitment to the actual brigade pool.[84] A steering

Current Status: Modest Success In The Short Term

Standby arrangements for nationally-based units do not provide an assurance of their

to prevent violence from escalating;

to assist, monitor, and otherwise facilitate a cease-fire;

to secure a base, communications, and airfield for a subsequent UN force;

to secure humanitarian relief operations; and

Further Requirements: A Proposal to Expand the Foundation[104]

launch a concerted effort to promote establishment of similar arrangements in other regions;

integrate civilian elements to ensure provision of necessary services; and,

UN Standing Emergency Capability

develop a permanent, operational-level headquarters at the UN base.

Stage Four: A Composite Standing Emergency Capability

Second, if rapid deployment is to succeed as a legitimate and widely-valued mechanism for

generating a broader public and professional understanding of current UN rapid deployment

planning a coherent, sequence of stages or 'building blocks' to facilitate the further

10 Conflicts to Worry About in 2022: Foreword

Standing Army Stops Genocide

UN has a responsibility to intervene militarily to prevent genocide

Concil on Foreign Relations, no date, https://world101.cfr.org/how-world-works-and-

Lack of a Standing Army responsible for the genocide in Somalia

Rwandan Genocide (Operation UNAMIR)

Harff-Gur -82 (B. Harff-Gur, Northwestern, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AS A REMEDY FOR

Makes extinction inevitable