2/11/2018

System Hazard Analysis (SHA)

System Safety Engineering

SENG 312/674
Spring 2018

Noor Quddus

Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center

Chemical Engineering Department
Texas A&M University System

Review: PHL, PHA, SSHA

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Summary of hazard analysis

techniques
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System Hazard Analysis (SHA)

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Identify and analyze hazard of system interfaces with a focus on

TLMs/SCFs.

Verifies system compliance

Identifies and mitigates causal factors
Ensures overall systems risk to be acceptable

Uses supplemental techniques e.g., FTA (Fault Tree Analysis), CCFA

(common cause failure analysis)

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Interface ?
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An interface is a shared boundary or connection between two dissimilar

objects, devices or systems through which information is passed. The
connection can be either physical or logical.

Interface
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Control panel

Human System
Interface

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Subsystem Interrelationships
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 Compliance with specified safety design criteria

 Possible hazardous events
 Degradation in the safety of a subsystem
 Design changes
 Effects of human errors
 Degradation in the safety of the total system
 Assurance that SCF’s are adequately safe

SHA Overview
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SHA Methodology
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Process Steps for PHA and

SSHA are same
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SHA Process Steps

1. Define system: scope, mission, operation, components
2. Plan SHA: Team, worksheets, schedule, elements & functions
3. Establish safety criteria: principles, guidelines
4. Acquire data: diagrams, drawings, checklists, lessons, regulations
5. Establish TLMs, SCFs
6. Identify system interface hazards
7. Perform supporting analysis
8. Evaluate risk: mishap risk for each hazard & mitigation
9. Recommend Actions: countermeasures
10. Monitor corrective action: evaluate effect of actions
11. Track hazards: Update with hazards, causal factors, risk
12. Document SSHA: report with entire processes and worksheets and
conclusions and recommendations

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SHA Worksheet Components

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TLM: is a significant mishap, can be caused by multiple

different hazards and different causal factors.

SCF: Any function whose failure or misbehavior could result in

death/injury and/or system loss.

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SSA example: Missile system

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SCF Hazard Cause

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Performing SHA using SCF

thread
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SCF thread useful for SHA

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Example: Tedlar process

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TLMs SCFs
1 Runaway reaction Controlling temperature of the reactor
2 Inadvertent operation of flash Controlling process variable of the flash
tank tank
3 Accumulation, and explosion Monitoring concentration of VF in
of VF storage tank
4 Fire from VF leakage
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Reactor cooling system

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P & I diagram of the reactor

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http://www.controlloopfoundation.com/continuous-chemical-reactor-process.aspx

SHA: Tedlar Process

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SHA-1 Temperature Runaway reaction due Pipeline between pump

control of to insufficient flow and the reactor was
the reactor cooling water, leakage damaged due to
in pipe corrosion

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Typical causes of pipeline failure

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1. Excavation damage
2. Natural force damage
3. Outside force damage
4. Corrosion
5. Connected equipment failure
6. Material defect
7. Operation
8. Others

TLM: Runaway reaction

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Control panel

Human System
Interface

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Solenoid valve wiring

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web.cecs.pdx.edu

SHA: Tedlar Process

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Typical wire/cable failure mode

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INSTALLATION FAILURE:
* The wire or cable was not installed correctly
* Poor connector choice or incorrect connector installation

ENVIRONMENTAL FAILURE:
* Installed in electronically "noisy" areas
* Change of temperature was not considered

OPERATIONAL FAILURE:
* Overloaded
* Damaged due to excavation
* Damaged and corroded

MANUFACTURING FAILURE:
* incorrectly manufactured,
* incorrectly labeled/ incorrectly tested.

Human error
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• Set switch wrongly

• Read analogue indicator wrongly
• Leave light on
• Mate a connector wrongly
• Read graph wrongly
• Fail to reset valve
• Dial digit wrongly Operator Action may be
• Fail to notice indicator/alarm performed:
• Fail to locate correct position of • Incorrectly
the valve • Too early
• Fail to act under emergency • Too late
situation • Too long
• …………………. • Too briefly
• Not at all

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SHA Advantages
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 Identifies system interface type hazards

 Consolidates hazards to ensure that all causal factors are thoroughly
investigated and mitigated
 Identifies critical system-level hazards that must be evaluated in
more detail through the use of their analysis technique
 Provides the basis for making an assessment of overall system risk

Summary
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 The primary purpose of the SHA is to evaluate risk and safety

compliance at the system level, with a focus on interfaces.

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