PREVIOUS BAR QUESTIONS AND JUSTICE LEONEN CASES: Generally, it is punishable under special laws
BOOK 1, RPC
Doctrine of Pro Reo in relation to Article 48 (Penalty for complex crimes) of the
RPC (2010 BAR) Following the Doctrine of Pro Reo, crimes under Art. 48 of the
RPC are complexed and punished with a single penalty (that prescribed for the
most serious crime and to be imposed in its maximum period). The rationale
being that the accused who commits two crimes with a single criminal impulse
demonstrates lesser perversity than when the crimes are committed by
different acts and several criminal resolutions. (People v. Comadre, G.R. No.
153559, June 8, 2004)
Mala in se vis-à-vis mala prohibita (1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2010, 2017 BAR)
MALA IN SE
There must be a criminal intent
Wrong from its very nature
Criminal intent governs
Generally, it is punishabl e under the RPC
Mitigating and aggravatin g circumsta nces are appreciate d in imposing the
penalties
Good faith; lack of criminal intent; or negligence are valid defenses.
Criminal liability is incurred even when the crime is attempted or frustrated
The penalty is computed on the basis of whether he is a principal offender,
accomplice, or accessory.
MALA PROHIBITA
It is sufficient that the prohibited act was done
Wrong merely because it is prohibited by statute
Criminal intent is not necessary
NOTE: Not all violations of special laws are mala prohibita. Even if the
crime is punished under a special law, if the act punished is one which is
inherently wrong, the same is malum in se, and, therefore, good faith and lack
of criminal intent are valid defenses unless they are the products of criminal
negligence or culpa.
Such circumstance s are not appreciated unless the special law has adopted
the scheme or scale of penalties under the RPC
(a) Good faith; or (b) lack of criminal intent are not valid defenses. It is enough
that the prohibition was voluntarily violated.
Criminal liability is generally incurred only when the crime is consummated
The penalty of the offender is the same as they are all deemed principals
NOTE: The crime of technical malversation, punished under Art. 220 of the
RPC, was held to be a crime that is malum prohibitum. The law punishes the
act of diverting public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular
public purpose for another public purpose. The prohibited act is not inherently
immoral, but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its
commission on considerations of public policy, order, and convenience.
Therefore, good faith and lack of criminal intent are not valid defenses.
(Ysidoro v. People, G.R. No. 192330, November 14, 2012) (2015 BAR)
Three cardinal features or main characteristics of Philippine criminal law (1998
BAR)
1. Generality
GR: Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory
upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principles
of international law and to treaty stipulations. (Art. 14, Civil Code of the
Philippines) (2015 BAR)
XPNs:
1. Treaty stipulations and international agreements, e.g. PH-US Visiting
Forces Agreement and Asian DevelopmentPhilippines Agreement (1966);

2. Laws of Preferential Application, e.g. R.A. 75 penalizes acts which would
impair the proper observance by the Republic and its inhabitants of the
immunities, rights, and privileges of duly-accredited foreign diplomatic
representatives in the Philippines. (2014 BAR);
3.
3. The principles of public international law;
4. Parliamentary Immunity: Members of the Congress are not liable for
libel or slander in connection with any speech delivered on the floor of the
house during a regular or special session. (Art. IV, Sec. 11, 1987
Constitution);
5. Public vessels of foreign friendly power; or
6. Members of foreign country stationed in the Philippines with its
consent.
Examples:
a. Sovereigns and other Chiefs of States.
b. Ambassadors, ministers, plenipotentiary, ministers residents,
and charges d’ affaires.
NOTE: Only the heads of the diplomatic missions, as well as
members of the diplomatic staff, excluding the members of
administrative, technical and service staff, are accorded
diplomatic rank.
A consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an
ambassador or minister. Consuls, vice-consuls, and other
commercial representatives of foreign nation are NOT diplomatic
officers. Consuls are subject to the penal laws of the country
where they are assigned. (Minucher v. CA, G.R. No. 142396,
February 11, 2003)
2. Territoriality
GR: The penal laws of the country have force and effect only within its
territory. (1994 BAR)
XPNs: Art. 2 of the RPC (2000 BAR)
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship
(fact of registration is in the Philippines);
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the
Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the
Government of the Philippine Islands (Arts. 163 & 166);
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into
these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the
preceding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an
offense in the exercise of their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and
the law of nations. (Arts. 114-123)
Extraterritoriality - means the law will have application even outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the state. (Gapit, 2013)
Q: X went to Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in Pasay City and
boarded an airship of the Philippine Airlines destined for USA. As the airship
passes the Pacific Ocean, X killed Y, a fellow passenger. Which court can try
the case of murder committed by X: is it the Philippine Courts or the U.S.
Courts?
A: The Philippine Courts. Art. 2 of the RPC provides that its provisions shall be
applied to those who “should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or
airship.” (Gapit, 2013)
4. Prospectivity/Irretrospectivity
GR: Acts or omissions classified as crimes will be scrutinized in
accordance with relevant penal laws if committed after the effectivity of
those penal laws. The law enforced at the time of the commission of a
 certain crime should be applied. Article 366 of the RPC provides that
crimes are punished in accordance with the law in force at the time of their
commission. (Gapit, 2013)
NOTE: The maxim Lex Prospicit, Non Respicit means the law looks
forward, never backward.
XPN: Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
persons guilty of a felony, although at the time of the publication of such
laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the
same. (Art. 22, RPC)
XPNs to the XPN: The new law cannot be given retroactive effect even if
favorable to the accused:
a. When the new law is expressly made inapplicable to pending actions
or existing causes of actions. (Tavera v. Valdez, G.R. No. 922, November
8, 1902)
b. When the offender is a habitual delinquent as defined in Rule 5 in Art.
62 of RPC. (Art. 22, par. 5, RPC)
Felonies are acts or omissions punishable by the RPC.
NOTE: If it is not under the RPC, it is called an offense.
Elements of felonies (2015 BAR)
1. An act or omission;
2. Punishable by the Revised Penal Code; and
3. The act is performed or the omission incurred by means of deceit or
fault. (People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80762, March 19, 1990)
Kinds of felonies
1. Intentional felonies (Dolo) – committed with deliberate intent to cause
injury to another (with malice);
2. Culpable felonies (Culpa) – where the wrongful acts result from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill (unintentional,
without malice).
Motive as determinant of criminal liability (1999, 2013 BAR)
GR: Motive is not an element of a crime and becomes immaterial in the
determination of criminal liability.
XPNs: Motive is material when:
1. The acts bring about variant crimes; E.g. there is a need to determine
whether direct assault is present, as in offenses against persons in authority
when the assault is committed while not being in the performance of his
duties;
2. The identity of the accused is doubtful;
3. The evidence on the commission of the crime is purely
circumstantial;
4. In ascertaining the truth between two antagonistic theories or
versions of the killing; and
5. Where there are no eyewitnesses to the crime and where suspicion is
likely to fall upon a number of persons.
ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY ART. 4, RPC
Criminal liability (1997, 1999, 2001, 2004, 2009 BAR)
Criminal liability is incurred by any person:
1. Committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended (Art. 4, par. 1, RPC); and
2. Performing an act which would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. (Art. 4, par. 2,
RPC)
Requisites for the application of the Proximate Cause Doctrine (Art 4, par. 1,
RPC)
1. That an intentional felony has been committed; and
2. That the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender. (U.S. v. Brobst,
G.R. No. 4935, October 25, 1909)
When considered as the “direct, natural, and logical consequence” of
the felonious act 1. Blow was efficient cause of death; 2. Blow accelerated
death; or 3. Blow was the proximate cause of death. (Reyes, 2017)
Q: In an act to discipline his child, the father claims that the death of his
child was not intended by him. Is his contention correct?
A: NO. He is liable under Art. 4 (1) of the RPC. In order that a person
may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended to
commit, it is indispensable that: (a) a felony was committed; and (b) the wrong
done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime
committed by the perpetrator. In beating his son and inflicting upon him
physical injuries, he committed a felony. As a direct consequence of the
beating suffered by the child, the latter expired. His criminal liability for the
death of his son is, thus, clear. (People v. Sales, G.R. No. 177218, October 3,
2011)
Causes which may produce a result different from that which the offender
intended:
1. Mistake in identity (error in personae) – The offender intends the
injury on one person but the harm fell on another. In this situation, the
intended victim was not at the scene of the crime.
Example: A, wanting to kill B, killed C instead. (2003, 2015 BAR)
NOTE: There are only two (2) persons involved: (1) the actual but
unintended victim; and (2) the offender.
EFFECT: Art. 49 of RPC. It depends when the intended crime and the
crime actually committed are punished with different penalties. (Reyes, 2017)
If punished with same penalties: no effect.
GR: If punished with different penalties, the lesser penalty shall be
imposed in its maximum period. (Art. 49, pars. 1 and 2)
NOTE: It becomes a mitigating circumstance.
XPN: If the acts committed by the guilty person shall also constitute an
attempt or frustration of another crime. If the attempted or frustrated crime has
a higher penalty, that penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period. (Art. 49,
par. 3, RPC)
2. Mistake in blow (aberratio ictus) – A person directed the blow at an
intended victim, but because of poor aim, that blow landed on somebody else.
In aberratio ictus, the intended victim and the actual victim are both at
the scene of the crime.
Example: A was aiming to shoot B, but because of lack of precision, hit
C instead. (BAR 1993, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2015)
NOTE: There are three (3) persons involved: (1) the offender; (2) the
intended victim; and (3) the actual victim.
EFFECT: There are two crimes committed: a. Against the intended
victim: attempted stage of the felony; b. Against the actual victim: the
consummated or frustrated felony, as the case may be.
NOTE: It may give rise to a complex crime under Art. 48 since it results
from a single act.
3. Injurious consequences are greater than that intended (praeter
intentionem) – The injury is on the intended victim but the resulting
consequence is so grave a wrong than what was intended. It is essential that
there is a notable disparity between the means employed or the act of the
offender and the felony which resulted. This means that the resulting felony
cannot be foreseen from the acts of the offender. Example: A, without intent to
kill, struck the victim on the back causing the victim to fall and hit his head on
the pavement.
 Q: A and B went on a drinking spree. While they were drinking, they had
some arguments so A stabbed B several times. A’s defense is that he had no
intention of killing his friend and that he did not intend to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed. Is praeter intentionem properly invoked?
A: NO. Praeter intentionem is improperly invoked because it is only
mitigating if there is a notable disparity between the means employed and the
resulting felony. The fact that several wounds were inflicted on B is hardly
compatible with the idea that he did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed.
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME ART. 11, RPC
Requisites of an impossible crime (2003, 2004, 2009, 2014, 2015 BAR)
1. Act performed would be an offense against persons or property (see
list of crimes under Title 8 and Title 10, Book 2, RPC);
2. Act was done with evil intent
3. Accomplishment is inherently impossible or means employed is
either inadequate or ineffectual; and
4. Act performed should not constitute a violation of another provision
of the RPC.
NOTE: The offender must believe that he can consummate the intended crime.
A man stabbing another who he knew was already dead cannot be liable for an
impossible crime.
STAGES OF EXECUTION ART. 6, RPC
Consummated felony - A felony is consummated when all the acts necessary
for its accomplishment and execution are present. (Art. 6, RPC)
Frustrated felony - A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the
acts of execution which would produce the felony as a result, but which
nevertheless do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of
the perpetrator. (Art. 6. RPC)
Crimes without frustrated stage
1. Rape – the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge, hence, the
slightest penetration to the female organ consummates the felony.
2. Corruption of public officers – mere offer consummates the crime.
3. Physical injury – consummated at the instance the injuries are
inflicted.
4. Adultery – the essence of the crime is sexual congress.
5. Theft– the essence of the crime is the taking of property belonging to
another. Once the thing has been taken, or in the possession of another, the
crime is consummated. (2014 BAR)
Attempted felony - There is an attempt when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the
acts of execution which should produce the felony, by reason of some cause
or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. (Art. 6, RPC)
NOTE: The word directly emphasizes the requirement that the
attempted felony is that which is directly linked to the overt act performed by
the offender, not the felony he has in his mind.
Conspiracy - Exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. (1996, 1997,
1998, 2003, 2005 BAR)
GR: When conspiracy exists, the degree of participation of each
conspirator is not considered because the act of one is the act of all; thus,
they have equal criminal responsibility.
XPN: Even though there was conspiracy, if a coconspirator merely
cooperated in the commission of the crime with insignificant or minimal acts,
such that even without his cooperation, the crime could be carried out as well,
such co-conspirator should be punished as an accomplice only. (People v.
Niem, CA No. 521, December 20, 1945)
XPN to the XPN: When the act constitutes a single indivisible offense.
Requisites of conspiracy:
 1. Two or more persons came to an agreement;
2. Agreement concerned the commission of a crime; and
3. Execution of a felony was decided upon.
NOTE: Mere knowledge, acquiescence to, or approval of the act, without
cooperation or at least, agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute a
conspiracy. Except when he is the mastermind in a conspiracy, it is necessary
that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect
contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be committed.
Two kinds of conspiracy
1. Conspiracy as a crime – The mere conspiracy is the crime itself. This is
only true when the law expressly punishes the mere conspiracy.
Otherwise, the conspiracy does not bring about the commission of the
crime because conspiracy is not an overt act but a mere preparatory
act.
Conspiracy must be proven on the same quantum of evidence as the
felony subject of the agreement of the parties. It may be proved by
direct or circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct
of the alleged conspirators prior to, during, and after the commission of
the felony to achieve a common design or purpose. (Franco v. People,
G.R. No. 171328, February 16, 2011)
Examples: Conspiracy to commit treason, conspiracy to commit
rebellion, conspiracy to commit acts like sale, importation and
distribution of drugs, conspiracy to commit access devise fraud,
conspiracy to commit terrorism NOTE: If one of the traitors/rebels
actually commits treason/rebellion, conspiracy loses its juridical
personality and it becomes a mode to commit a crime.
2. Conspiracy as a basis of incurring criminal liability – When the
conspiracy is only a basis of incurring criminal liability, there must be
an overt act done before the coconspirators become criminally liable.
(1996, 1997, 1998, 2003, 2005 BAR)
GR: If he appeared in the scene of the crime, he is liable as a co-
conspirator.
XPNs: 1. If he is a mastermind, he does not have to be in the scene of
the crime to be coconspirator.
a2. If he performs an overt act in the performance of the conspiracy,
even if it is not in the scene of the crime per se (e.g. the driver of a get-
away car who planned the crime as well, or the man who pressed the
button of a remotecontrol bomb and the bomb exploded a few streets
away).
CONTINUED CRIMES Continued crime or continuous or delito continuado
(1996 BAR):
- It is a single crime consisting of a series of acts but arising from one criminal
resolution. Here, the offender is impelled by a SINGLE CRIMINAL IMPULSE but
committed a series of acts at about the same time in about the same place and
all the overt acts violate one and the same provision law (e.g. theft of 13 cows
belonging to different owners committed by the accused at the same place and
at the same time).
NOTE: A continued crime is NOT a complex crime. Continued crime is different
from Transitory crime Transitory crime, also called “moving crime”, is a
concept in criminal procedure to determine the venue. It may be instituted and
tried in the court of the municipality, city, or province where any of the
essential elements thereof took place.
COMPLEX CRIMES (ART. 48, RPC) AND COMPOSITE CRIMES (2004, 2005,
2007, 2009, 2015 BAR)
Plurality of crimes: It is the successive execution by the same individual of
different criminal acts upon any of which no conviction has yet been declared.
Kinds of plurality of crimes:
1. Formal or ideal– only one criminal liability
 a. Complex crime (Art. 48, RPC)
b. When the law specifically fixes a single penalty for 2 or more
offenses committed
c. Continued crimes (1996 BAR)
2. Real or material – there are different crimes in law and in the
conscience of the offender. In such cases, the offender shall be
punished for each and every offense that he committed.
**Complex crime Exists when two or more crimes are committed but
they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law. Here, there is only one
criminal intent; hence, only one penalty is imposed.
Kinds of complex crimes :
1. Compound crime – when a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies. (Art. 48, RPC) Requisites:
a. Only a single act is performed by the offender; and
b. The single act produces: i. Two or more grave felonies; or ii. One or
more grave and one or more less grave felonies; or iii. Two or more less
grave felonies.
Q: The single act of A in firing a shot caused the death of two persons, arising
from one bullet, who were standing on the line of the direction of the bullet. Is
A liable for two separate crimes of homicide?
A: NO. Since the deaths of the two victims were a result of one single act of
firing a shot, a complex crime was committed.
2. Complex crime proper – when an offense is the necessary means for
committing the other. (Art. 48, RPC) Requisites:
a. At least two offenses are committed;
b. One or some of the offenses must be necessary to commit the other;
and
c. Both or all the offenses must be punished under the same statute.
NOTE: Only one penalty is imposed for complex crimes because there is only
one criminal act. Thus, there should only be one information charging a
complex crime.
3. Special complex crime or composite crime – one in which the
substance is made up of more than one crime, but which, in the eyes of the
law, is only a single indivisible offense.
Examples of special complex crimes
1. Qualified piracy, when piracy is accompanied by murder, homicide, physical
injuries, or rape;
2. Rape with homicide;
3. Kidnapping with rape;
4. Kidnapping with homicide;
5. Kidnapping with physical injuries;
6. Robbery with homicide;
7. Robbery with rape;
8. Robbery with physical injuries; and
9. Robbery with arson.
Q: Enicasio Depante, his common-law spouse, his son Erickson Depante, and
his stepdaughter Jamie Rose Baya were sitting on the benches at the Calamba
Town Plaza when Palema, Palmea, and Manzanero approached Enicasio.
Suddenly, Palema threw a punch at Enicasio in an attempt to grab his phone.
Palema simultaneously pulled out a knife and tried to stab him in the abdomen,
but was warded off by Jamie, making him drop his knife. Once he retrieved his
knife, Palema stabbed Enicasio on the right thigh, causing him to fall on the
ground. Then, Grengia and Saldua arrived at the scene and joined in beating
Enicasio. Seated on the bench near Enicasio, Erickson stood and tried to help
his father, but Ladra stopped him. When he resisted, Ladra attempted to stab
him, but he was able to evade the attack and immediately look for a weapon.
Upon reaching his father, however, he saw that Enicasio had already collapsed
from the stab wounds, but later died from blood loss. Are Palema, Palmea,
Saldua, and Grengia are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with
homicide?
A: YES. Robbery with homicide is a special complex crime punished under
Article 294 of the RPC. It is perpetrated when, by reason or on the occasion of
robbery, homicide is committed. It must be stressed that in robbery with
homicide, the offender's original intent must be the commission of robbery.
The killing is merely incidental and subsidiary. It is clear that
accusedappellants' primary objective was to rob Enicasio. But, by reason or
on the occasion of the robbery, Enicasio was stabbed and died as a result.
(People v. Palema, et al., G.R. No. 228000, July 10, 2019, as penned by J.
Leonen)
Q: Jason Ivler was involved in a vehicular collision resulting to the injuries of
Evangeline Ponce and the death of her husband. He was charged of two
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries; and (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. Can
Ivler be convicted with the two offenses? (2013 BAR)
A: NO. Reckless imprudence is a single crime. Its consequences on persons
and property are material only to determine the penalty. Reckless imprudence
under Art. 365 is a single quasioffense by itself and not merely a means of
committing other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-
offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless
of its various resulting acts. (Ivler v. San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, November 17,
2010)
Complex crime of coup d’état with rebellion (BAR 2003) -There can be a
complex crime of coup d’état with rebellion if there was conspiracy between
the offender/s committing the rebellion. By conspiracy, the crime of one would
be the crime of the other and vice versa. This is possible because the offender
in coup d’état may be any person or persons belonging to the military or the
national police or a public officer, whereas rebellion does not so require.
-Moreover, the crime of coup d’état may be committed singly, whereas
rebellion requires a public uprising and taking up arms to overthrow the duly
constituted government. Since the two crimes are essentially different and
punished with distinct penalties, there is no legal impediment to the
application of Art. 48 of the RPC.
Complex crime of coup d’état with sedition (2003 BAR) Coup d'état can be
complexed with sedition because the two crimes are essentially different and
distinctly punished under the RPC. Sedition may not be directed against the
government or be non-political in objective, whereas coup d'état is always
political in objective as it is directed against the government and led by
persons or public officer holding public office belonging to the military or
national police. Art. 48 of the Code may apply under the conditions therein
provided.
SELF-DEFENSE: Requisites of self-defense (URL) (1993, 1996, 2002, 2003, 2005
BAR)
1. Unlawful aggression;
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
and
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
Test for unlawful aggression in self-defense: The test for the presence of
unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from
the victim puts in real peril the life or personal safety of the person
defendinghimself. (People v. Mapait, G.R. No. 172606, November 23, 2011)
Nature of the unlawful aggression (BAR 1993, 2004) - If there is no unlawful
aggression, there is nothing to prevent or repel. The second requisite of
defense will have no basis. (Reyes, 2017)
-For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an “actual, sudden
and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening
or intimidating attitude” and the accused must present proof of positively
strong act of real aggression. (People v. Sabella, G.R. No. 183092, May 30,
2011; People v. Campos and Acabo, G.R. No. 176061, July 4, 2011)
NOTE: Self-defense is not feasible as in case of a fight. There is no unlawful
aggression when there was an agreement to fight and the challenge to fight
has been accepted. The parties are considered aggressors as aggression is
bound to arise in the course of the fight. But aggression which is ahead of a
stipulated time and place is unlawful.
Elements of unlawful aggression:
1. There must be a physical or material attack or assault;
2. The attack or assault must be actual, or at least, imminent; and
3. The attack or assault must be unlawful. (People v. Mapait, G.R. No.
172606, November 23, 2011)
Q: Spouses Jesus and Ana Del Mundo went to sleep in their nipa hut. Upon
arriving, the spouses saw Ampong and Nora Castillo having sex. Aghast at
what he saw, Jesus shouted invectives at Ampong and Nora who both fled
away. Jesus pursued Ampong and Nora at the house of Ampong’s aunt but
neither Ampong nor Nora was there. Thereafter, he walked at home when he
was then blocked by Ampong and his fellow accused. Without provocation,
Ampong and his fellow accused hit Jesus with a stone on different parts of his
body. The accused then left Jesus on the ground, bloodied. After the x-ray
examinations, Jesus was found to have sustained a crack in his skull. Are the
evidence presented sufficient evidence: first, to prove that justifying
circumstances existed; and second, to convict the petitioners?
A: NO. Ampong and his fellow accused failed to present sufficient evidence to
prove that justifying circumstance of self-defense and defense of a relative
exist, therefore resulting to their conviction. Petitioners' entire defense rests
on proof that it was Jesus who initiated an assault by barging into the
premises of petitioners' residences, hacking Victor's door, and threatening
physical harm upon petitioners and their companions. That is, that unlawful
aggression originated from Jesus. Contrary to what a successful averment of
selfdefense or defense of a relative requires, petitioners offered nothing more
than a selfserving, uncorroborated claim that Jesus appeared out of nowhere
to go berserk in the vicinity of their homes. They failed to present independent
and credible proof to back up their assertions. The Regional Trial Court noted
that it was highly dubious that Jesus would go all the way to petitioners'
residences to initiate an attack for no apparent reason. (Velasquez v. People,
G.R. No. 195021, March 15, 2017, as penned by J. Leonen)
Requisites to satisfy the “reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it”
1. Nature and quality of the weapon used by the aggressor;
2. Physical condition, character, size, and other circumstances of both
the offender and defender; and
3. Place and occasion of the assault.
Doctrine of Rational Equivalence: The reasonable necessity of the means
employed does not imply material commensurability between the means of
attack and defense. What the law requires is rational equivalence, in the
consideration of which will enter the principal factors: the emergency, the
imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct,
more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the
proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests
upon the imminent danger of such injury. (Espinosa v. People, G.R. No.
181071, March 15, 2010)
Q: One night, Lina, a young married woman, was sound asleep in her bedroom
when she felt a man on top of her. Thinking it was her husband Tito, who came
home a day early from his business trip, Lina allowed him to have sex with her.
After the act, the man said, "I hope you enjoyed it as much as I did." Not
recognizing the voice, it dawned upon Lina that the man was not Tito, her
husband. Furious, Lina took out Tito's gun and shot the man. Charged with
homicide, Lina denies culpability on the ground of defense of honor. Is her
claim tenable? (1998, 2000 BAR)
A: NO. Lina's claim that she acted in defense of honor is not tenable because
the unlawful aggression on her honor had already ceased. Defense of honor,
as included in self-defense, must have been done to prevent or repel an
unlawful aggression. There is no defense to speak of where the unlawful
aggression no longer exists.
ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004 R.A.
9262
-BWS used as a defense (2014, 2015 BAR) - The defense should prove
all three (3) phases of cycle of violence characterizing the relationship of the
parties. (People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004)
Cycle of Violence: The battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-
called cycle of violence, which has 3 phases:
1. Tension building phase;
2. Acute battering incident; and
3. Tranquil, loving (or at least non-violent) phase
Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from
battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal or civil liability
notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of selfdefense under the RPC. (Sec. 26, R.A. 9262) In layman’s
terms, if an abused woman kills or inflicts physical injuries on her abusive
husband or live-in partner, and the trial court determines that she is suffering
from “Battered Woman Syndrome,” the court will declare her not guilty.
(People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004) The law now allows the
battered woman syndrome as a valid defense in the crime of parricide
independent of self-defense under the RPC. (Sec. 26, R.A. 9262
AVOIDANCE OF GREATER EVIL OR STATE OF NECESSITY ART. 11(4), RPC
Requisites of state of necessity (1990 BAR)
1. Evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
2. Injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
3. There be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it;
and
4. That the state of necessity or emergency was not due to the fault or
negligence of the person claiming the defense.
NOTE: The state of necessity must not have been brought about by the
negligence or imprudence by the one invoking the justifying circumstances.
(1998, 2004 BAR)
FULFILLMENT OF DUTY ART. 11(5), RPC
Requisites of fulfillment of duty:
1. Accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise
of a right or office; and
2. Injury caused or offense committed be the necessary consequence of
the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.
Q: Lucresia was robbed of her bracelet in her home. The following day,
Lucresia, while in her store, noticed her bracelet wound around the right arm
of Jun-Jun. As soon as the latter left, Lucresia went to a nearby police station
and sought the help of Pat. Willie Reyes. He went with Lucresia to the house of
Jun-Jun to confront the latter. Pat. Reyes introduced himself as a policeman
and tried to get hold of Jun-Jun who resisted and ran away. Pat. Reyes chased
him and fired two warning shots in the air but Jun-Jun continued to run. Pat.
Reyes shot him in the right leg. Jun-Jun was hit and he fell down but he
crawled towards a fence, intending to pass through an opening underneath.
When Pat. Reyes was about 5 meters away, he fired another shot at Jun-Jun
hitting him at the right lower hip. Pat. Reyes brought JunJun to the hospital,
but because of profuse bleeding, he eventually died. Pat. Reyes was
subsequently charged with homicide. During the trial, Pat. Reyes raised the
defense, by way of exoneration, that he acted in the fulfillment of a duty. Is the
defense tenable?
A: NO. The defense of having acted in the fulfillment of a duty requires as a
condition, inter alia, that the injury or offense committed be the unavoidable or
necessary consequence of the due performance of the duty. (People v. Oanis,
G.R. No. L-47722, July 27, 1943).
It is not enough that the accused acted in fulfillment of a duty. After Jun-Jun
was shot in the right leg and was already crawling, there was no need for Pat.
Reyes to shoot him any further. Clearly, he acted beyond the call of duty,
which brought about the cause of death of the victim. (2000 BAR)
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES ART. 12, RPC
1. Insanity/Imbecility
2. Minority
3. Accident without fault or intention of causing it
4. Compulsion of irresistible force
5. Uncontrollable fear
6. Prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause
Exempting circumstances (non-imputability) These are grounds for exemption
from punishment because there is wanting in the agent of the crime any of the
conditions which make the act voluntary or negligent. (Reyes, 2017)
GR: No criminal liability, but there is civil liability
XPN: Par. 4 and Par. 7 are exempted from both criminal and civil liability The
following are exempted from criminal liability (IF-SAC-IF)
1. An Imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid
interval;
2. A child Fifteen years of age or under is exempt from criminal liability under
R.A. 9344; (1998 BAR)
3. A person who is Sixteen to seventeen years old, unless has acted with
discernment, in which case, such child shall be subject to appropriate
proceedings in accordance with R.A. 9344; (2000 BAR)
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an
injury by mere Accident without the fault or intention of causing it; (1992, 2000
BAR)
5. Any person who acts under the Compulsion of an irresistible force;
6. Any person who acts under the Impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal
or greater injury; and
7. Any person who Fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by
some lawful or insuperable cause. (1994 BAR)
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES ART. 13, RPC:
Mitigating Circumstances- Those which, if present in the commission of the
crime, do not entirely free the actor from criminal liability but serve only to
reduce the penalty. One single act cannot be made the basis of more than one
mitigating circumstance. Hence, a mitigating circumstance arising from a
single act absorbs all the other mitigating circumstances arising from the
same act.
Basis of mitigating circumstances: The basis is diminution of either freedom of
action, intelligence, or intent or on the lesser perversity of the offender.
NOTE: It is not considered in Art. 365.
Circumstances which can mitigate criminal liability:
1. Incomplete justifying or exempting circumstance (Privileged Mitigating
circumstance); (1990, 1996 BAR)
2. The offender is under 18 or over 70 years old;
3. No intention to commit so grave a wrong (praeter intentionem); (2000, 2001
BAR)
4. Sufficient threat or provocation;
5. Vindication of a grave offense; (1993, 2000, 2003 BAR)
6. Passion or obfuscation;
7. Voluntary surrender; (1992, 1996, 1997, 1999 BAR)
8. Physical defect;
9. Illness of the offender;
10. Similar and analogous circumstances; and
11. Humanitarian reasons. (Jarillo v. People, G.R. No. 164435, September 29,
2009)
NOTE: Mitigating circumstances must be present prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the offense, except voluntary surrender or confession
of guilt by the accused. (Art. 13, par. 7, RPC)
Effects of mitigating circumstances in the nature of the crime: They reduce the
penalty but do not change the nature of the crime.
Classes of mitigating circumstances:
1. Ordinary mitigating
2. Privileged mitigating
Privileged mitigating circumstances under the RPC
1. When the offender is a minor under 18 years of age (Art. 68, RPC); ( 2013,
2014 BAR)
2. When the crime committed is not wholly excusable (Art. 69, RPC);
3. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed
by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the number and
nature of such circumstances (Art. 64, par. 5, RPC); (1997 BAR)
4. Voluntary release of the person illegally detained within 3 days without the
offender attaining his purpose and before the institution of the criminal action
(Art. 268, par. 3, RPC);
5. Abandonment without justification of the spouse who commited adultery
(Art. 333, par. 3, RPC); and
6. Concealing dishonor in case of infanticide. (Art. 255, par. 2, RPC)
PASSION OR OBFUSCATION ART. 13(6), RPC
Basis: Loss of reasoning and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of
his will power.
Passion or obfuscation (2013 BAR) -Refers to emotional feeling which
produces excitement so powerful as to overcome reason and self-control. It
must come from prior unjust or improper acts. The passion and obfuscation
must emanate from legitimate sentiments. Passion and obfuscation as a
mitigating circumstance need not be felt only in the seconds before the
commission of the crime. It may build up and strengthen over time until it can
no longer be repressed and will ultimately motivate the commission of the
crime. (People v. Oloverio, G.R. No. 211159, March 18, 2015)
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AND CONFESSION OF GUILT ART. 13(7), RPC
Requisites of voluntary surrender:
1. Offender had not been actually arrested;
2. Surrender was made to a person in authority or to the latter’s agent; and 3.
Surrender was voluntary.
Requisites of confession of guilt (1999 BAR)
1. The offender spontaneously confessed his guilt;
2. It was made in open court (that is, before the competent court that is to try
the case); and
3. It was made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution.
NOTE: Qualified plea/plea of guilty to lesser offense than that charged is not
mitigating.
For voluntary confession to be appreciated, the confession must not only be
made unconditionally but the accused must admit the offense charged. Plea of
guilty not applicable to all crimes A plea of guilty is not mitigating in culpable
felonies, and in crimes punished by special laws.
Q: Upon learning that the police wanted him for the killing of Polistico, Jeprox
decided to visit the police station to make inquiries. On his way, he met a
policeman who immediately served upon him the warrant for his arrest. During
the trial, in the course of the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence,
Jeprox withdrew his plea of not guilty. Can he invoke the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty? (1992 BAR)
A: NO. Jeprox is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender as his going to the police station is only for the purpose of
verification of the news that he is wanted by the authorities. In order to be
mitigating, surrender must be spontaneous and that he acknowledges his
guilt. Neither is plea of guilty a mitigating circumstance because it was a
qualified plea. Besides, Art. 13(7) provides that confession of guilt must be
done before the prosecution had started to present evidence.
NOTE: Where in the original information the accused pleaded not guilty but he
pleaded guilty to the amended information, it is considered as a voluntary plea
of guilty and considered a mitigating circumstance. (People v. Ortiz, G.R. No L-
19585, Nov. 29, 1965)
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES ART. 14, RPC:
Kinds of aggravating circumstances (1999 BAR)
1. Generic – those that can generally appy to almost all crimes.
Examples:
a. Taking advantage of public position
b. Contempt or insult to public authorities
c. Dwelling
d. Abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness
e. Palace and places of commission of offenses
f. Nighttime, uninhabited place, or band
g. Recidivism
h. Reiteracion
i. Craft, fraud, or disguise
j. Unlawful entry
k. Breaking wall
l. Aid of minor or by means of motor vehicle
2. Specific – those that apply only to particular crimes Examples:
a. Cruelty in crimes against persons (Art. 14, RPC)
b. Treachery in crimes against persons (Art. 14, RPC)
c. The victim is the offender’s parents, ascendants, guardians, curators,
teachers, or persons in authority, in less serious physical injures (Art.
265, par. 3, RPC)
d. Unlicensed firearms in robbery in band (Art. 296, RPC)
e. Abuse of authority or confidential relations by guardians or curators
in seduction, rape, acts of lasciviousness, white slavery and corruption
of minors (Art. 346, RPC)
f. Positive finding in the use of dangerous drugs for crimes punishable
under R.A. 9165 (Dela Cruz v. People, GR 200748, July 23, 2014)
3. Qualifying – those that change the nature of the crime. Examples:
a. By means of poison
b. With the aid of armed men
c. Treachery, in killing persons
d. Grave abuse of confidence which makes stealing as qualified theft
4. Inherent – those that must of necessity accompany the commission of the
crime. Examples:
a. Abuse of public office in bribery;
b. Breaking of a wall or unlawful entry into a house in robbery with the
use of force upon things;
c. Fraud in estafa;
d. Deceit in simple seduction;
e. Ignominy in rape;
f. Evident premeditation in robbery and estafa;
 g. Disregard of respect due the offended party on account of rank in
direct assault;
h. Superior strength in treason; and
i. Cruelty in mutilation.
5. Special – those that cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance
and has the result of imposing the penalty in the maximum period. Examples:
a. Quasi-recidivism (Art. 160, RPC);
b. Complex crime (Art. 48, RPC);
c. Taking advantage of public position and membership in an organized
or syndicated crime group (Art. 62, par. 1[a , RPC)
d. The use of a loose firearm when inherent in the commission of a
crime (Sec. 29, R.A. 10591)
e. Organized or syndicated crime group (Art. 62, RPC)
Circumstances which aggravate criminal liability
1. Advantage taken of public position;
2. Contempt or insult to public authorities;
3. Disregard of age, sex, or dwelling of the offended party; (1996, 2009 BAR)
4. Abuse of confidence and obvious ungratefulness;
5. Palace and places of commission of offense;
6. Nighttime, uninhabited place or band; (1994, 1997, 2009 BAR)
7. On occasion of calamity or misfortune;
8. Aid of armed men, or persons who insure or afford impunity;
9. Recidivist ; (1993, 2009, 2014 BAR)
10. Reiteracion;
11. Price, reward, or promise;
12. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, stranding of a vessel or
intentional damage thereto, derailment of a locomotive, or by the use of any
other artifice involving great waste or ruin.;
13. Evident premeditation; (1991, 2009 BAR)
14. Craft, fraud or disguise; (1995 BAR)
15. Superior strength or means to weaken the defense;
16. Treachery;
17. Ignominy;
18. Unlawful entry;
19. Breaking wall;
20. Aid of minor or by means of motor vehicle or other similar means; and
21. Cruelty. (1994 BAR)
USE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER R.A. 9165 AS QUALIFYING
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCEl Notwithstanding the provisions of any law
to the contrary, a positive finding for the use of dangerous drugs shall be a
qualifying aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime by an
offender, and the application of the penalty provided for in the Revised Penal
Code shall be applicable. (Sec. 25, R.A. 9165) (2005, 2009 BAR
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION ART. 14 (13), RPC
The ways of committing the crime. Essence The execution of the criminal act
must be preceded by cool thought and upon reflection to carry out the criminal
intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. NOTE:
Evident premeditation is appreciated only in crimes against persons.
Requisites 1. Determination – the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime; 2. Preparation – an act manifestly indicating that the culprit
has clung to his determination; and 3. Time – a sufficient lapse of time
between the determination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the
resolution of his will. Reason for requiring sufficient time The offender must
have an opportunity to coolly and serenely think and deliberate on the
meaning and the consequences of what he planned to do, an interval long
enough for his conscience and better judgment to overcome his evil desire.
NOTE: Evident premeditation is absorbed in treachery.
Q: Samuel and his wife, Marissa, were talking at the doorway of their house
when they saw Ordona loitering by the corner of their house who appeared to
be waiting for someone. After some time, Ordona left but returned five (5)
minutes later. Meanwhile, Hubay emerged from the house, holding some food.
Ordona approached Hubay with a stainless knife, called his attention by saying
"Pare," and suddenly stabbed him in the left shoulder. Hubay managed to run
away but Ordona gave chase and eventually caught up with him. Ordona
stabbed him in the left torso. Hubay immediately died when he was brought to
the hospital. Was the killing attended with the qualifying circumstance of
evident premeditation?
A: NO. The killing was not attended with the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation. It is indispensable for the prosecution to establish "how and
when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was
carried out." It must be based on external facts which are evident, not merely
suspected, which indicate deliberate planning. There must be direct evidence
showing a plan or preparation to kill, or proof that the accused meditated and
reflected upon his decision to kill the victim. Criminal intent must be evidenced
by notorious outward acts evidencing a determination to commit the crime. In
order to be considered an aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must
not merely be "premeditation" but must be "evident premeditation." The date
and, if possible, the time when the malefactor determined to commit the crime
is essential, because the lapse of time for the purpose of the third requisite is
computed from such date and time. (People v. Ordona, G.R. No. 227863,
September 20, 2017, as penned by J. Leonen)
TREACHERY ART. 14 (16), RPC
Essence of treachery: The suddenness, surprise and the lack of expectation
that the attack will take place, thus, deprives the victim of any real opportunity
for self-defense while ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the
aggressor.
Q: Seven members of the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch in UP Diliman
when they were suddenly attacked by several masked men who were armed
with baseball bats and lead pipes. Some sustained injuries which required
hospitalization. One of them, Venturina, died due to traumatic head injuries.
Informations for murder for Venturina’s death, as well as the attempted murder
and frustrated murder of some Sigma Rho members were filed against
members of Scintilla Juris fraternity (Feliciano, et al.) and seven others. The
RTC convicted Feliciano, et al. of murder and attempted murder, and acquitted
the other co-accused, holding that Feliciano, et al. were positively identified by
witnesses as the attackers. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling, but modified their
criminal liabilities and ruled out the presence of treachery. Is treachery
attendant in the present case?
A: YES. Treachery attended the attack against private complainants. The
essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift,
deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be
considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of
execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend
themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted. The victims in this case were eating lunch on campus.
They were not at a place where they would be reasonably expected to be on
guard for any sudden attack by rival fraternity men. The victims, who were
unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes and baseball bats. The swiftness
and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the victims to
retaliate or even to defend themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in
this case. (People v. Feliciano, G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014, as penned by J.
Leonen)
People v. Orozco,: The circumstances proved by the prosecution amply show
that treachery attended the killing of Mata. Mata was completely helpless. His
hands were held by two other persons while he was stabbed. To make matters
worse, four persons, who were armed with knives, ganged-up on Mata.
Certainly, Mata was completely deprived of any prerogative to defend himself
or to retaliate. Mata was helpless against a group of persons with knives, who
ganged up on him and held his hands while stabbing him. (People v. Orozco,
G.R. No. 211053, December 29, 2017, as penned by J. Leonen)
KILLING NOT ATTENDED BY TREACHERY:
Q: Austria was playing a lucky nine game at a wake. Cirera arrived, asking
money from Austria so he could buy liquor. Austria asked Cirera "to keep
quiet." An altercation then ensued between Naval and Cirera when Naval asked
Austria to go home. Thereafter, Austria stood up and felt that he was stabbed.
As he ran home, he noticed Cirera armed with a knife, this time chasing Naval,
who was also stabbed on the back. Austria and Naval were hospitalized and
were confined for more than a month, and for six days, respectively. Two
informations for frustrated murder were filed against Cirera. RTC found him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged, and ruled that there
was treachery on Cirera’s end, considering the length of time it took private
complainants to realize that they were stabbed. CA affirmed the finding of the
RTC that there was treachery because “the attack was so sudden and
unexpected, that self-defense was not possible.” Is treachery present in this
case?
A: NO. Treachery did not exist and, hence, petitioner may only be convicted of
two counts of frustrated homicide. The unexpectedness of an attack cannot be
the sole basis of a finding of treachery even if the attack was intended to kill
another as long as the victim’s position was merely accidental. The means
adopted must have been a result of a determination to ensure success in
committing the crime. Petitioner’s action was an impulsive reaction to being
dismissed by Austria, his altercation with Naval, and Naval’s attempt to
summon Austria home. Generally, this type of provocation negates the
existence of treachery. There was no evidence of a modicum of premeditation
indicating the possibility of choice and planning fundamental to achieve the
elements of treachery. (Cirera v. People, G.R. No. 181843, July 14, 2014, as
penned by J. Leonen)
ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES ART. 15, RPC
Intoxication considered mitigating (2000, 2002 BAR) If intoxication is: 1. Not
habitual; 2. Not subsequent to the plan to commit a felony; or 3. At the time of
the commission of the crime, the accused has taken such quantity of alcoholic
drinks as to blur his reason and deprive him of certain degree of control.
-To be mitigating, the state of intoxication of the accused must be proved.
Once intoxication is established by satisfactory evidence, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, it is presumed to be non-habitual or unintentional.
Entrapment vis-à-vis Instigation (1990, 1995, 2003 BAR)
ENTRAPMENT:
The criminal design originates from and is already in the mind of the
lawbreaker even before entrapment.
The law enforcers resort to ways and means for the purpose of capturing the
lawbreaker in flagrante delicto.
The circumstance is no bar to prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker.
INSTIGATION:
The idea and design to bring about the commission of the crime originated and
developed in the mind of the law enforcers.
The law enforcers induce, lure, or incite a person who is not minded to commit
a crime and would not otherwise commit it, into committing the crime.
This circumstance absolves the accused from criminal liability. (People v.
Dante Marcos, G.R. No. 83325, May 8, 1990).
PERSONS LIABLE AND DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION:
A. For grave and less grave felonies: 1. Principals; 2. Accomplices; and 3.
Accessories.
B. For light felonies: 1. Principals; and 2. Accomplices
Principals by direct participation - are those who materially execute the crime.
They appear at the crime scene and perform acts necessary for the
commission of the crime.
Principal by inducement - Those who directly force or induce another to
commit a crime. To be a principal by inducement, it is necessary that the
inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by the
principal by direct participation that is, without such, the crime would not have
been committed:
 Q: A asked B to kill C because of grave injustice done to A by C. A
promised B a reward. B was willing to kill C, not so much because of the
reward promised to him but because he also had his own long-standing
grudge against C, who had wronged him in the past. If C is killed by B, would A
be liable as a principal by inducement? (2002 BAR)
A: NO. A would not be liable as principal by inducement because the
reward he promised B is not the sole impelling reason which made B to kill C.
To bring the about criminal liability of a coprincipal, the inducement made by
the inducer must be the sole consideration which caused the person induced
to commit the crime and without which the crime would not have been
committed. The facts of the case indicate that B, the killer supposedly induced
by A, had his own reason to kill C out of a long-standing grudge.
Principal by indispensable cooperation are those who: 1. Participated directly
in the criminal resolution; or 2. Cooperated in the commission of the crime by
performing an act, without which it would not have been accomplished.
Accomplice (2007, 2009 BAR) One who, not being included in Art. 17 as
principal, cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts which are not indispensable to the commission of the
crime.
Accessories (1992, 1998, 2004, 2008 BAR)- Those who do not participate in the
criminal design, nor cooperate in the commission of the felony, but with
knowledge of the commission of the crime, he subsequently takes part in three
ways by:
1. Profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the
crime;
2. Concealing or destroying the body of the crime or the effects thereof in
order to prevent its discovery; and
NOTE: Where the accused misleads the authorities by giving them false
information, such act is equivalent to concealment and he should be held as
an accessory.
2. Harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal of the
crime. (2008 BAR)
**The accessory comes into the picture when the crime is already
consummated, not before the consummation of the crime.
NOTE: One cannot be an accessory unless he knew of the commission of
the crime; however, he must not have participated in its commission. If the
offender has already involved himself as a principal or an accomplice, he
cannot be held as an accessory any further even if he performed acts
pertaining to an accessory.
Instances when accessories are not criminally liable:
1. When the felony committed is a light felony.
2. When the accessory is related to the principal as spouse, or as an
ascendant, or descendant or as brother or sister whether legitimate, natural or
adopted or where the accessory is a relative by affinity within the same degree,
unless the accessory himself profited from the effects or proceeds of the crime
or assisted the offender to profit therefrom. (Art. 20, RPC)
Reason: The ties of blood and the preservation of the cleanliness of
one’s name compels one to conceal crimes committed by relatives.
ACCESSORIES WHO ARE EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY ART. 20, RPC
Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability (1998, 2004, 2010 BAR)
GR: An accessory is exempt from criminal liability, when the principal is his:
1. Spouse
2. Ascendant
3. Descendant
4. Legitimate, natural, or adopted brother, sister, or relative by affinity
within the same degree.
XPN: Accessory is not exempt from criminal liability even if the principal is
related to him, if such accessory:
1. Profited by the effects of the crime; or
2. Assisted the offender to profit from the effects of the crime.
The exemption provided in this article is based on the ties of blood and
the preservation of the cleanliness of one’s name, which compels one to
conceal crimes committed by relatives so near as those mentioned in this
article. Nephew and niece are not included.
 A public officer contemplated under par. 3 of Art. 19 is exempt by
reason of relationship to the principal, even such public officer acted with
abuse of his public functions.
Q1: DCB, the daughter of MSB, stole the earrings of a stranger. MCB pawned
the earrings with TBI Pawnshop as a pledge for Php500 loan. During the trial,
MCB raised the defense that being the mother of DCB, she cannot be held
liable as an accessory. Will MCB’s defense prosper? (2004 BAR)
A1: NO. MCB’s defense will not prosper because the exemption from criminal
liability of an accessory by virtue of relationship with the principal does not
cover accessories who themselves profited from or assisted the offender to
profit by the effects or proceeds of the crime. This non-exemption of an
accessory, though related to the principal of the crime, is expressly provided
in Art. 20 of the RPC.
Q2: Immediately after murdering Bob, Jake went to his mother to seek refuge.
His mother told him to hide in the maid’s quarter until she finds a better place
for him to hide. After two days, Jake transferred to his aunt’s house. A week
later, Jake was apprehended by the police. Can Jake’s mother and aunt be
made criminally liable as accessories to the crime of murder? (2010 BAR)
A2: The mother is exempt from criminal liability under Art. 20 of the RPC as a
result of her relationship to her son; however, the aunt is liable as an
accessory under Art. 19 paragraph 3 of the RPC if the author of the crime is
guilty of murder. The relationship between an aunt and a nephew does not fall
within the classification for exemption
MULTIPLE OFFENDERS (DIFFERENCES, RULES, AND EFFECTS)
1. Recidivism – the offender at the time of his trial for one crime shall have
been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the
same title of the RPC.
2. Reiteracion – the offender has been previously punished for an offense
which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to
which it attaches a lighter penalty.
3. Habitual delinquency — the offender within the period of 10 years from the
date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious
physical injuries, robbery, theft, estafa or falsification, is found guilty of any of
the said crimes a third time or oftener. (Art. 62, RPC)
NOTE: It is important that the previous convictions refer to the felonies
enumerated in Art. 62 of the RPC. If, for example, the accused was convicted
for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, he cannot be considered a habitual
delinquent. (People v. Dalawis, G.R. No. 197925, November 9, 2015)
4. Quasi-recidivism — Any person who shall commit a felony after having
been convicted by final judgment before beginning to serve such sentence or
while serving such sentence shall be punished by the maximum period
prescribed by law for the new felony. (Art. 160, RPC)
NOTE! Recidivism and Reiteracion are generic aggravating circumstances
which can be offset by mitigating circumstances. Habitual delinquency and
Quasi-Recidivism, on the other hand, are special aggravating circumstances
which cannot be offset.
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE (P.D. 1829)
PUNISHABLE ACTS: Any person, who knowingly or willfully obstructs,
impedes, frustrates, or delays the apprehension of suspects and the
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the
following acts:
1. Preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or
from reporting the commission of any offense or the identity of any offender/s
by means of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force, or threats;
2. Altering, destroying, suppressing, or concealing any paper, record,
document, or object, with intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility,
availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official
proceedings in criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or official
proceedings in criminal cases; (2005 BAR)
3. Harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he
knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any
offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution
and conviction;
4. Publicly using a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a
crime, evading prosecution or the execution of a judgment, or concealing his
true name and other personal circumstances for the same purpose or
purposes;
 5. Delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service
of process or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscal's offices, in
Tanodbayan, or in the courts;
6. Making, presenting, or using any record, document, paper or object
with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of
the investigation of, or official proceedings in criminal cases;
7. Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit in
consideration of abstaining from, discounting, or impeding the prosecution of
a criminal offender;
8. Threatening directly or indirectly another with the infliction of any
wrong upon his person, honor or property or that of any immediate member or
members of his family in order to prevent such person from appearing in the
investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a
condition, whether lawful or unlawful, in order to prevent a person from
appearing in the investigation of or in official proceedings in, criminal cases;
and
9. Giving of false or fabricated information to mislead or prevent the law
enforcement agencies from apprehending the offender or from protecting the
life or property of the victim; or fabricating information from the data gathered
in confidence by investigating authorities for purposes of background
information and not for publication and publishing or disseminating the same
to mislead the investigator or the court. (P.D. 1829, Sec. 1)
NOTE: If any of the foregoing acts is committed by a public official or
employees, he shall, in addition to the penalties provided thereunder, suffer
perpetual disqualification from holding public office. (Sec. 2, P.D. 1829)
FINE ART. 26, RPC As amended by R.A. 10951
Q: E and M are convicted of a penal law that imposes a penalty of fine or
imprisonment or both fine and imprisonment. The judge sentenced them to
pay the fine, jointly and severally, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. (BAR 2005) 1. Is the penalty proper? Explain.
A: NO. Imposing the penalty of fine jointly and severally on E and M is not
proper. The penalty should be imposed individually on every person accused
of the crime. Any of the convicted accused who is insolvent and unable to pay
the fine, shall serve the subsidiary imprisonment.
Penalty of reclusion perpetua vis-à-vis Life imprisonment (1994, 2001, 2009
BAR)
RECLUSION PERPETUA
Pertains to the penalty imposed for violation of the RPC
It has fixed duration
It carries with it accessory penalties
LIFE IMPRISONMENT
Pertains to the penalty imposed for violation of special laws
It has no fixed duration
It does not carry with it accessory penalty
NOTE: Although reclusion perpetua has been given a fixed duration, it has
remained to be an indivisible penalty. Indivisible penalties have no durations.
(Mercado v. People, G.R. No. 149375, November 26, 2002)
PARDON, ITS EFFECTS ART. 36, RPC
Effects of pardon by the president:
GR: A pardon shall not restore the right to hold public office or the right of
suffrage. (2015 BAR)
XPN: When any or both such rights is/are expressly restored by the terms of
the pardon; or if it is an absolute pardon
NOTE: Pardon shall not exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil
liability.
Limitations upon the exercise of the pardoning power:
1. That the power can be exercised only after conviction “by final judgment”;
2. That such power does not extend to cases of impeachment;
3. No pardon, amnesty, parole or suspension of sentence for violation of
election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without
the favorable recommendation of the COMELEC; and
4. It cannot exempt the offender from the payment of civil indemnity.
GR: When the principal penalty is remitted by pardon, only the effect of that
principal penalty is extinguished, but not the accessory penalties attached to
it.
XPN: When an absolute pardon is granted after the term of imprisonment has
expired, it removes what is left of the consequences of conviction.
APPLICATION OF PENALTIES ART. 46-77, RPC
Penalties are applied based on:
1. The stages of commission of the felony: a. Consummated b. Frustrated c.
Attempted
2. The offenders and their participation: a. Principal b. Accomplice c.
Accessory
3. Aggravating and mitigating circumstances:
What are the privileged mitigating circumstances under the RPC?
1. When the offender is a minor under 18 years of age (Art. 68, RPC)
(2013, 2014 BAR);
2. When the crime committed is not wholly excusable (Art. 69, RPC);
3. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according the
number and nature of such circumstances (Art. 64, par. 5, RPC) (1997 BAR)
NOTE! When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the
court shall allow them to offset one another. (1995 BAR)
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW (R.A. 4103, AS AMENDED BY ACT NO.
4225)
APPLICATION ON THE IMPOSED SENTENCE
An indeterminate sentence- is a sentence with a minimum term and a
maximum term which the court is mandated to impose for the benefit of the
guilty person who is not disqualified to avail thereof. The maximum
imprisonment of the guilty person must exceed 1 year.
Purpose: To avoid prolonged imprisonment because it is proven to be more
destructive than constructive to offenders.
In imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the RPC or special
penal laws, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence,
which has a maximum and a minimum term based on the penalty actually
imposed.
Imposition of minimum or maximum term: The term minimum refers to the
duration of the sentence which the convict shall serve as a minimum to be
eligible for parole. The term maximum refers to the maximum limit of the
duration that the convict may be held in jail. For special laws, it is anything
within the inclusive range of prescribed penalty. Courts are given discretion in
the imposition of the indeterminate penalty.
Application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law must be considered when
required to solve penalties under Article 64 (Rules for the application of
penalties which contain three periods). (2014 BAR)
Rules in imposing a penalty under the indeterminate sentence law (1999, 2005,
2009, 2010, 2013 BAR)
When penalty is imposed by RPC:
1. The Maximum Term – is that which in view of the attending circumstances
could be properly imposed under the RPC.
2. The Minimum Term – is within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the RPC. Prescribed penalty is what the penalty is without
looking at the circumstances. As opposed to imposed penalty which takes into
account the circumstances.
GR: The Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory in all cases.
XPN: (NON-APPLICABILITY) If the accused fall in any of the following
exceptions:
1. If sentenced with a penalty of death or life imprisonment;
2. If convicted of treason, conspiracy, proposal to commit treason;
3. If convicted of misprision of treason, sedition, rebellion or espionage;
4. If convicted of piracy;
 5. If the offender is a habitual delinquent;
6. Those who escaped from prison or evaded sentence;
7. Those who violated the terms of conditional pardon of the chief
executive;
8. Where the maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed 1 year;
9. If convicted by final judgement at the time of the effectivity of Act No.
4103; and
10. If penalized with suspension or destierro.
Q: X was convicted of a complex crime of direct assault with homicide
aggravated by the commission of the crime in a place where public authorities
are engaged in the discharge of their duties. The penalty for direct assault is
prision correccional in its medium and maximum period. What is the correct
indeterminate penalty? (2012 BAR)
A: 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years & 4 months of reclusion
temporal as maximum. Reason: 17 years and 4 months is the commencement
of the duration of the maximum period of reclusion temporal while 10 years is
part of prision mayor, the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal.
NOTE: In determining penalties for a complex crime, the graver penalty shall
be considered thus direct assault is there to confuse the examiner. What
should be considered is the penalty for homicide since it is graver.
The maximum should not exceed what is prescribed by the penalty. The
minimum should be a period less than what is prescribed as a minimum for the
penalty.
When penalty is imposed by Special Penal Law (1994 BAR)
1. Maximum Term – must not exceed the maximum term fixed by said law.
2. Minimum Term – must not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same. (2003 BAR)
Q: Bruno was charged with homicide for killing the 75-year old owner of his
rooming house. The prosecution proved that Bruno stabbed the owner
causing his death, and that the killing happened at 10 in the evening in the
house where the victim and Bruno lived. Bruno, on the other hand,
successfully proved that he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities; that he
pleaded guilty to the crime charged; that it was the victim who first attacked
and did so without any provocation on his (Bruno's) part, but he prevailed
because he managed to draw his knife with which he stabbed the victim. The
penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. Assuming a judgment of conviction
and after considering the attendant circumstances, what penalty should the
judge impose? (BAR 2013)
A: Bruno should be sentenced to an indeterminate sentence penalty of arresto
mayor in any of its period as minimum to prision correccional in its medium
period as maximum. Bruno was entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstances of incomplete selfdefense and the presence of at least two
ordinary mitigating circumstances (voluntary surrender and plea of guilt)
without any aggravating circumstance under Art. 69 and 64 (5) of the RPC
respectively, which lowers the prescribed penalty for homicide which is
reclusion temporal to prision correccional.
Q: An agonizing and protracted trial having come to a close, the judge found A
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and imposed on him a straight
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor. The public prosecutor
objected to the sentence on the ground that the proper penalty should have
been twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal. The defense
counsel chimed in, contending that application of the indeterminate sentence
law should lead to the imposition of a straight penalty of six (6) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional only. Who among the three is on the right
track? (2010 BAR)
A: None of the contentions is correct because the Indeterminate Sentence Law
(Act 4103, as amended) has not been followed. The imposition of penalty for
the crime of homicide, which is penalized by imprisonment exceeding one (1)
year and is divisible, is covered by the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The said
law requires that the sentence in this case should reflect a minimum term for
purposes of parole, and a maximum term fixing the limit of the imprisonment.
Imposing a straight penalty is incorrect.
THREE-FOLD RULE ART. 70, RPC - means that the maximum duration of a
convict’s sentence shall NOT be more than three times the length of time
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him but in no
case exceed 40 years.
NOTE: It is the Director of Prisons that shall compute and apply the Three-Fold
Rule, NOT the judge.
Application of the Three-Fold Rule The rule applies if a convict has to serve at
least four sentences, continuously.
NOTE: All the penalties, even if by different courts at different times, cannot
exceed threefold of the most severe penalty.
PECUNIARY LIABILITIES ART. 38, RPC (2005 BAR)
1. Reparation of damage caused
2. Indemnification of the consequential damages
3. Fine
4. Costs of proceedings
This article applies when the property of the offender is not sufficient to pay
for all of his pecuniary liabilities.
The court CANNOT disregard the order of payment, pecuniary liabilities in this
article must be observed.
SUBSIDIARY PENALTY ART. 39, RPC (2005 BAR)
Subsidiary personal liability is to be suffered by the convict who has no
property with which to meet the fine, at the rate of one day for each amount
equivalent to the highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at
the time of the rendition of judgment of conviction by the trial court. (R.A.
10159 approved on April 10, 2012)
Instances when subsidiary penalty is NOT imposed:
1. There is no subsidiary penalty if the penalty imposed by the court is prision
mayor, reclusion temporal, or reclusion perpetua. (2013 BAR)
2. No subsidiary penalty for nonpayment of: a. Reparation of the damage
caused; b. Indemnification of the consequential damages; c. The cost of the
proceedings.
3. When there is no fixed duration
4. Nonpayment of income tax
5. If not stated in the decision
EXECUTION AND SERVICE OF PENALTIES ART. 78-88, RPC
Instances or situations in criminal cases wherein the accused, either as an
adult or as a minor, can apply for and/or be granted a suspended sentence
(2006 BAR)
1. Where the accused became insane before sentence could be promulgated
under Art. 79.
2. Where the offender, upon conviction by the trial court, filed an application
for probation which has been granted. (Baclayon v. Mutia, G.R. No. L-59298,
April 30, 1984
3. Where the offender needs to be confined in a rehabilitation center because
of drug dependency although convicted of the crime charged.
4. Where the offender is a youthful offender under Art. 192 of P.D. 603.
5. Where the crime was committed when the offender is under 18 years of age
and he is found guilty thereof in accordance with R.A. 9344, but the trial court
subjects him to appropriate disposition measures as prescribed by the
Supreme Court in the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
6. Under R.A. 9165: a. First time minor offender - an accused is over 15 at the
time of the commission of the offense but not more than 18 years of age at the
time when judgment should have been promulgated after having been found
guilty of said offense if he has not been previously convicted of violating any
provision of R.A. 9165; b. He has not been previously committed to a Center or
to the care of a DOHaccredited physician; c. The Board favorably recommends
that his sentence be suspended.
7. When the sentence is death, its execution may be suspended or postponed
by the Supreme Court, through the issuance of T.R.O. upon the ground of
supervening events. (Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601,
January 19, 1999)
PROBATION LAW P.D. 968, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 10707
Availing the benefits of probation - The Trial Court may, after it shall have
convicted and sentenced a defendant upon application by said defendant
within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the
sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, that no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an
appeal from the judgment of conviction. (2014 BAR)
NOTE: The accused cannot avail probation if he appeals his conviction
irrespective of the purpose of the appeal even if it is only to question the
propriety of the penalty imposed.
DISQUALIFIED OFFENDERS to avail the benefits of the probation law (2004
BAR)
1. Sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6)
years; (1990, 1995, 2002 BAR)
2. Convicted of any crime against national security;
3. Have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of more than six (6) months and one (1) day and/or fine of more
than one thousand pesos (P1,000);
4. Have been once on probation under the provision of this Decree;
5. Already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this
Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof;
6. If he appeals the judgment or conviction. XPN: Sec. 1, R.A. 10707 and People
v. Colinares, G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011. (2013 BAR)
7. Convicted of violation of Election offenses;
8. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, regardless of the penalty
imposed by the Court.
NOTE: Under Sec. 66, R.A. 9165, first-time minor offender who is over fifteen
(15) years of age, but not more than eighteen (18) years of age at the time of
the commission of the Sec. 11, R.A. 1965 punishing possession of dangerous
drugs, shall be given the benefits of a suspended sentence subject to
conditions. However, under Sec. 69, if the minor violates any of the conditions
of his/her suspended sentence, the court shall pronounce judgment of
conviction and he/she shall serve sentence as any other convicted person.
(2010 BAR) NOTE: In multiple prison terms, those imposed against the
accused found guilty of several offenses should not be added up, and their
sum total should not be determinative of his disqualification from probation
since the law uses the word “maximum” not “total” term of imprisonment.
(Francisco v. CA, et.al, G.R. No. 108747, April 6, 1995)
Q: Arnel Colinares was found guilty of frustrated homicide by the RTC. It was
affirmed by the CA on appeal. On petition for review, SC ruled that he was only
guilty of attempted homicide, which penalty is “probationable”. Is Colinares
now entitled to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the lower court,
even after he has perfected his appeal to a previous conviction (frustrated
homicide) which was not “probationable”?
A: YES. What is clear is that had the RTC done what was right and imposed on
Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would
have had the right to apply for probation. Arnel did not appeal from a judgment
that would have allowed him to apply for probation. He did not have a choice
between appeal and probation. While it is true that probation is a mere
privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the right to such privilege; he certainly
does not have. What he has is the right to apply for that privilege. If the Court
allows him to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up
to the trial judge to decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of
probation, taking into account the full circumstances of his case. (Colinares v.
People, G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011)
PERIOD OF PROBATION:
1. The period of probation of a defendant sentenced to a term of imprisonment
of not more than one year shall not exceed two years, and in all other cases,
said period shall not exceed six years.
2. When the sentence imposes a fine only and the offender is made to serve
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the period of probation shall
not be less than nor be more than twice the total number of days of subsidiary
imprisonment. (2005 BAR)
TERMINATION OF PROBATION; EXCEPTION
Termination of probation (2005 BAR) The court may order the final discharge
of the probationer upon finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions
of probation.
NOTE: The mere expiration of the period for probation does not ipso facto
terminate the probation. Probation is not co-terminus with its period. There
must be an order from the Court of final discharge terminating the probation. If
the accused violates the condition of the probation before the issuance of said
order, the probation may be revoked by the Court (Manuel Bala v. Martinez, 181
SCRA 459).
Effects of termination of probation:
1. Case is deemed terminated.
2. Restoration of all civil rights lost or suspended.
3. Totally extinguishes his criminal liability as to the offense for which
probation was granted.
MODIFICATION AND EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY:
Total extinguishment of criminal liability (Art. 89, RPC) (1990, 1992, 2000, 2004,
2009 BAR)
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment; (2013 BAR)
2. By service of sentence;
3. By prescription of the crime;
4. By prescription of the penalty;
5. By marriage of the offended woman in cases of seduction, abduction, rape
and acts of lasciviousness, as provided in Art. 344 of the RPC.
6. By absolute pardon; and
7. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
Extinction of criminal liability does not necessarily mean that civil liability is
also extinguished. (Petralba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81337, August 16,
1991) 8. As an effect of final discharge of probation
Prescription of crimes (Art. 90, RPC) (1994, 1997, 2004, 2010 BAR) Those
punishable by:
1. Death, reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal in twenty (20) years;
2. Other afflictive penalties (prision mayor) in fifteen (15) years;
3. Correctional penalty (prision correccional) in ten (10) years;
4. Arresto mayor in five (5) years;
5. Light offenses in two (2) months; and
6. Oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.
**When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall
be made the basis of the application of prescription. (Art. 90, RPC)
Rule where the last day of the prescriptive period falls on a Sunday or a legal
holiday In Yapdiangco v. Buencamino, the Court said that the information may
no longer be filed the next day as the crime has already prescribed. (G.R. No.
L-28841, June 24, 1983)
Prescription of the crimes of oral defamation and slander (1994, 1997, 2004,
2010 BAR)
-Distinction should be made between simple and grave slander:
Grave slander prescribes in six (6) months while simple slander
prescribes in two (2) months.
Prescription of the crimes punishable by destierro Classified as a correctional
penalty under Art.25, and according to Art. 90, ten (10) years should be the
prescription period. (Dalao v. Geronimo, G.R. No. L-5969, April 29, 1953)
Prescription of the crimes punishable by fines: Fines are also classified as
afflictive, correctional, or light penalties under Art. 26, that is, in 15 years, 10
years, and 2 months, respectively.
The subsidiary penalty for non-payment of the fine should not be
considered in determining the period of prescription of such crimes (People v.
Basalo, 101 Phil. 57). In addition, in light felonies when a fine of P200 is also
provided, such fine should not be considered correctional.
Rules in prescription of penalties (Art. 93, RPC)
1. The period of prescription of penalties commences to run from the date
when the culprit evaded the service of his sentence. (2015 BAR)
2. It is interrupted if the convict— a. Gives himself up; b. Be captured; c. Goes
to a foreign country with which we have no extradition treaty (2015 BAR); or d.
Commits another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription.
Q1: One fateful night in January 1990, while 5- year old Albert was urinating at
the back of their house, he heard a strange noise coming from the kitchen of
their neighbor and playmate, Ara. When he peeped inside, he saw Mina, Ara’s
stepmother, very angry and strangling the 5-year old Ara to death. Albert saw
Mina carry the dead body of Ara, place it inside the trunk of the car and drive
away. The dead body of Ara was never found. Mina spread the news in the
neighborhood that Ara went to live with her grandparents in Ormoc City. For
fear of his life, Albert did not tell anyone, even his parents and relatives, about
what he witnessed. Twenty and a half (20 & ½) years after the incident, and
right after his graduation in Criminology, Albert reported the crime to NBI
authorities. The crime of homicide prescribes in 20 years. Can the State still
prosecute Mina for the death of Ara despite the lapse of 20 and 1/2 years?
(2000 BAR)
A1: YES. The State can still prosecute Mina for the death of Ara despite the
lapse of 20 and ½ years. Under Article 91 of the RPC, the period of prescription
commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities or their agents. In the case at bar, the
commission of the crime was known only to Albert, who was not the offended
party nor an authority or an agent of an authority. It was discovered by the NBI
authorities only when Albert revealed to them the commission of the crime.
Hence, the period of prescription of 20 years for homicide commenced to run
only from the time Albert revealed the same to the NBI authorities.
Q2: A killed his wife and buried her in the backyard. He immediately went into
hiding in the mountains. Three years later, the bones of A’s wife were
discovered by X, the gardener. Since X had a standing warrant of arrest, he hid
the bones in an old clay jar and kept quiet about it. After two years, Z, the
caretaker, found the bones and reported the matter to the police. After 15 years
of hiding, A left the country but returned 3 years later to take care of his ailing
sibling. Six years thereafter, he was charged with parricide, but he raised the
defense of prescription.
A2:
a. Under the Revised Penal Code, when does the period of prescription of a
crime commence to run?
a. Under Art. 91 of the RPC, the period of prescription commences to
run upon discovery of the crime by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agent.
b. When is it interrupted?
b. It is interrupted upon filing of the complaint or information in court.
c. Is A’s defense tenable? Explain. (2010 BAR)
c. NO, parricide prescribes in 20 years. The period of prescription
started only when Z reported the matter to the police, which is equivalent to 10
years of hiding from the time of reporting to Z. The period of three years shall
not be counted since he is absent from the Philippines. The filing of the charge
6 years thereafter is well within the prescriptive period.
PARDON BY THE OFFENDED PARTY
GR: Pardon by the offended party does not result in the extinguishment of
criminal action. A crime committed is an offense against the State. In criminal
cases, the intervention of the aggrieved parties is limited to being witnesses
for prosecution.
XPN: Pardon by an offended party in the crimes of adultery and concubinage
will be a bar to criminal prosecution, provided, they pardoned both offenders.
Provided further, it must be made before the institution of criminal
prosecution. Pardon here may be implied. (Art. 344, RPC)
In the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, there
shall be no criminal prosecution if the offender has been pardoned by the
offended party or her parents, grandparents or guardian. Provided, the pardon
in such cases must be express.
NOTE: Pardon by the wife in favor of the husband found guilty of raping her
extinguishes the penalty
Pardon vis-à-vis Amnesty (2006, 2015 BAR)
PARDON
The convict is excused from serving the sentence but the effects of conviction
remain unless expressly remitted by the pardon; hence, for pardon to be valid,
there must be a sentence already final and executory at the time the same is
granted.
The grant is in favor of individual convicted offenders, not to a class of
convicted offenders.
The crimes involved are generally political offenses not common crimes.
The grant is a private act of the Chief Executive which does not require the
concurrence of any other public officer.
AMNESTY.
The criminal complexion of the act constituting the crime is erased, as though
such act was innocent when committed; hence the effects of the conviction
are obliterated.
Amnesty is granted in favor of a class of convicted offenders, not to individual
convicted offenders.
The crimes subject of the grant may be common crimes or political crimes.
It is a public act that requires concurrence of the Philippine Senate.
BOOK II, ARTICLES 114-365, REVISED PENAL CODE
MISPRISION OF TREASON ART. 116.
RPC Elements (2010 BAR)
1. That the offender who is not a foreigner must be owing allegiance to
the Government; and
2. That he has knowledge of any conspiracy to commit treason against
the Government; and that he conceals or does not disclose or make known the
same as soon as possible to the Governor or Fiscal of the province or Mayor
or Fiscal of the city in which he resides.
This crime is an exception to the rule that mere silence does not make a
person criminally liable. It is a crime of omission.
NOTE: ART. 116 does not apply when the crime of treason is already commited
by someone and the accused does not report its commission to the proper
authority.
Misprision of treason cannot be committed by a resident alien.
The offender must be owing allegiance to the Government without being a
foreigner.
Penalty (2010 BAR)
Art. 116 does not provide for a penalty, but the offender is punished as an
accessory to the crime of treason. Therefore, the penalty is two degrees lower
than that provided for treason.
NOTE: The offender in Art. 116 is considered a principal in the crime of
misprision of treason, not as an accessory to the crime of treason. The term
accessory refers only to the penalty to be imposed, not to the person who
acted subsequent to the commission of the offense.
Q: X, a Filipino citizen, has knowledge of treason committed by someone and
does not report its commission to the proper authorities. Can he be held liable
for Misprision of Treason?
A: NO. Art. 116 does not apply when the crime of treason is already committed.
This is so because Art. 116 speaks of “knowledge of any conspiracy against”
the Government of the Philippines, not knowledge of treason actually
committed by another.
PIRACY IN GENERAL AND MUTINY IN THE HIGH SEAS OR IN PHILIPPINE
WATERS ART. 122, RPC
Piracy - is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful
authority and done with animo furandi (intent to steal) and in the spirit and
intention of universal hostility.
Modes of committing piracy:
1. By attacking or seizing a vessel on the high seas; or
2. By seizing the vessel while on the high seas or the whole or part of its
cargo, its equipment or personal belongings of its complement or passengers,
by nonpassengers or non-members of the crew.
Elements (2006 BAR)
1. That a vessel is on the high seas or in the Philippine waters;
2. That the offenders are not members of its complement or passengers of the
vessel; and
3. That the offenders either:
a. Attack or seize that vessel, or
b. Seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment or
personal belongings of its complement or passengers.
PIRACY UNDER P.D. 532
-Can be committed only when the vessel is in Philippine waters.
-Can be committed by any persons, including the vessel’s complement, or the 4. Expulsion (Art. 127, RPC);
passengers of the vessel
5. Violation of domicile (Art. 128, RPC);
NOTE: There is, thus, no piracy when members of the vessel’s complement or
its passengers attack or seize the vessel or its cargo on high seas. The offense 6. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those
would then be theft or robbery cognizable by Philippine courts, if the crime is legally obtained (Art. 129, RPC);
committed on a Philippine ship, pursuant to par. 1, Art. 2 of the RPC.
7. Searching domicile without witnesses (Art. 130, RPC);
Mutiny is the unlawful resistance to a superior officer, or the raising of
commotions and disturbances on board a ship against the authority of its 8. Prohibition, interruption, and dissolution of peaceful meetings (Art. 131,
commander. RPC);

Circumstances qualifying the crimes of piracy and mutiny (2006 BAR) 9. Interruption of religious worship (Art. 132, RPC); and

1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or firing upon the
same;
NOTE: The first qualifying circumstance does not apply to mutiny since
the offenders are already on board the ship.
2. Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without means of
saving themselves; or (2008 BAR)
3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, physical
injuries, or rape.
10. Offending the religious feelings (Art. 133, RPC).
Classes of arbitrary detention (2006 BAR)
1. Detaining a person without legal ground (Art. 124, RPC);
2. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper authorities (Art. 125,
RPC); and
3. Delaying release (Art. 126, RPC).
ARBITRARY DETENTION ART. 124, RPC

NOTE! No complex crime of piracy with murder There is only one crime Elements (1992 BAR)
committed – qualified piracy. Murder, rape, homicide, physical injuries are
mere circumstances qualifying piracy and cannot be punished as separate 1. Offender is a public officer or employee vested with the authority and
crimes, nor can they be complexed with piracy. jurisdiction to effect arrest and detain a person;

Qualified piracy is considered a special complex crime. It is punishable by 2. He detains a person; and
reclusion perpetua to death regardless of the number of victims.
3. Detention is without legal grounds. (U.S. v. Braganza, G.R. No. 3971,
CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE February 3, 1908)

Crimes against the fundamental laws of the State: Legal grounds for the detention of persons (2006 BAR)

1. Arbitrary detention (Art. 124, RPC); GR: 1. Commission of a crime;

2. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities a. Arrest with a warrant b. Warrantless arrest
(Art. 125, RPC);
NOTE: Instances of a valid warrantless arrest under Rule 113, Sec. 5 of
3. Delaying release (Art. 126, RPC); the Revised Rules of Court:
 a. Suspect is caught in flagrante delicto;
b. Suspect is caught immediately after the commission of the offense
when the officer has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested
committed it; and
c. Escaping prisoners.
2. Violent insanity or other ailment requiring compulsory confinement of
the patient in a hospital;
XPN: When the peace officers acted in good faith even if the grounds
mentioned above are not obtaining, there is no arbitrary detention.
Illustration: Two BIR secret agents, strangers in the municipality who were
spying the neighborhood of the market place and acting generally in a manner
calculated to arouse the suspicion of any one not advised as to their duty,
were arrested by policemen of the town. The Supreme Court held that the
police officers acted in good faith and cannot be held liable for arbitrary
detention. (U.S. v. Batalliones, G.R. No. 7284, August 23, 1912)
DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS TO THE PROPER
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY ART. 125, RPC
Elements (1990 BAR)
1. Offender is a public officer or employee;
2. He has detained a person for some legal ground; and
3. He fails to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities
within:
a. 12 hours for crimes/offenses punishable by light penalties or
their equivalent;
b. 18 hours for crimes/offenses punishable by correctional
penalties or their equivalent;
c. 36 hours for crimes/offenses punishable by afflictive penalties
or their equivalent.
Delivery (1990 BAR) - means the filing of correct information or complaint with
the proper judicial authorities. It does not mean physical delivery or turnover
of arrested person to the court.
VIOLATION OF DOMICILE ART. 128, RPC
Punishable acts (2002, 2009 BAR):
1. Entering any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof;
2. Searching papers or other effects found therein without the previous
consent of such owner; and
3. Refusing to leave the premises after having surreptitiously entered said
dwelling and after having been required to leave the same.
NOTE: What is punished is the refusal to leave, the entry having been made
surreptitiously.
“Against the will of the owner” It presupposes opposition or prohibition by the
owner, whether express or implied, and not merely the absence of consent.
NOTE: When one voluntarily admits to a search or consents to have it made
upon his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof.
The right to be secure from unreasonable searches may, like every right, be
waived and such waiver may be either expressly or impliedly.
Common elements
1. Offender is public officer or employee; and
2. He is not authorized by judicial order to enter the dwelling and/or to make a
search for papers and for other effects.
Trespass to dwelling- tThe crime committed when the punishable acts under
Art. 128 are committed by a private person.
Applicability of provisions under Art. 128 if the occupant of the premises is
not the owner It would be sufficient if the inhabitant is the welling, although he
is not the property owner.
Art. 128, when not applicable - If a public officer, not armed with a search
warrant or a warrant of arrest, searches a person outside his dwelling, the
crime committed is grave coercion, if violence and intimidation are used (Art.
286); or unjust vexation, if there is no violence or intimidation. (Art. 287)
Qualifying circumstances under Art. 128
1. If committed at night time; and
2. If any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime are not returned
immediately after the search is made by the offender.
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
REBELLION
-The uprising is against the government
-The purpose is to substitute the existing government with another
TERRORISM Sec. 3, R.A. 9372
-The sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and
panic among the populace.
-The purpose is to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand
COUP D’ETAT ART. 134-A, RPC
Elements:
1. Offender is a person or persons belonging to the military or police or
holding any public office or employment;
2. There be a swift attack accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth;
3. The purpose of the attack is to seize or diminish State power; and
4. The attack is directed against duly constituted authorities of the
Republic of the Philippines, or any military camp or installation,
communication networks, public utilities or other facilities needed for the
exercise and continued possession of power. (2013 BAR)
Essence of the crime of coup d’etat - is a swift attack upon the facilities
of the Philippine government, military camps and installations, communication
networks, public utilities and facilities essential to the continued possession of
governmental powers.
Objective of coup d’etat The objective of coup d’etat is to destabilize or
paralyze the government through the seizure of facilities and utilities essential
to the continued possession and exercise of governmental powers.
Principal offenders of coup d’etat: Members of the AFP or of the PNP
organization or a public officer with or without civilian support.
Q: If a group of persons belonging to the armed forces makes a swift attack,
accompanied by violence, intimidation and threat against a vital military
installation for the purpose of seizing power and taking over such installation,
what crime or crimes are they guilty of? (2002 BAR)
A: The perpetrators, being persons belonging to the Armed Forces, would be
guilty of the crime of coup d’etat, under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, because their attack was against vital military installations
which are essential to the continued possession and exercise of governmental
powers, and their purpose is to seize power by taking over such installations.
Coup d’etat vis-à-vis Rebellion (1991, 1998, 2002, 2004 BAR)
COUP D’ETAT
-Essence is a swift attack against the government, its military camp or
installations, communication network and public facilities and utilities
essential to the continued exercise of governmental powers.
-The purpose is merely to paralyze the existing government
-May be carried out singly or simultaneously.
-Principal offenders must be members of the military, national police or public
officer, with or without civilian support.
REBELLION
-Essence of the crime is public uprising and taking up arms against the
government.
-The purpose is to overthrow the existing government.
-Requires a public uprising, or multitude of people.
-Offenders need not be uniformed personnel of the military or the police.
Q1: If the attack is quelled but the leader is unknown, who shall be deemed the
leader thereof? (2002 BAR)
A1: The leader being unknown, any person who in fact directed the others,
spoke for them, signed receipts and other documents issued in their name, or
performed similar acts, on behalf of the rebels shall be deemed the leader of
such rebellion, insurrection or coup d'etat.
Q2: How is the crime of coup d’etat committed? (1991, 2012 BAR)
A2: When a person holding public employment undertakes a swift attack,
accompanied by strategy or stealth, directed against public utilities or other
facilities needed for the exercise and continued possession of power for the
purpose of diminishing state power.
CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL TO COMMIT COUP D’ETAT, REBELLION, OR
INSURRECTION ART. 136, RPC
Crimes punished
1. Conspiracy to commit coup d’etat;
2. Proposal to commit coup d’etat;
3. Conspiracy to commit rebellion or insurrection (2013 BAR); and
4. Proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection.
Conspiracy to commit rebellion : There is conspiracy to commit rebellion when
two or more persons come to an agreement to rise publicly and take arms
against the government for any of the purposes of rebellion and decide to
commit it.
Q: VC, JG, and GG conspired to overthrow the Philippine Government. VG was
recognized as the titular head of the conspiracy. Several meetings were held
and the plan was finalized. JJ, bothered by his conscience, confessed to
Father Abraham that he, VG, JG and GG have conspired to overthrow the
government. Father Abraham did not report this information to the proper
authorities. Did Father Abraham commit a crime? If so, what crime was
committed? What is his criminal liability? (1994 BAR)
A: None, Father Abraham did not commit a crime. His failure to report such
conspiracy is due to an insuperable cause, one of the exempting
circumstances under Article 12 of the RPC, as under our law, a priest cannot
be compelled to disclose any information received by him by reason of
confession made to him under his professional capacity.
NOTE: In the case of U.S. v. Vergara, the Supreme Court held that persons who
may be held criminally liable under this Article are those who actually
conspired with each other, not those who learned and failed to report the same
to the authorities.
INCITING TO SEDITION ART. 142, RPC
Acts of inciting to sedition (2007 BAR)
1. Inciting others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute
sedition by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, etc.;
2. Uttering seditious words or speeches which tend to disturb the public
peace; and
3. Writing, publishing, or circulating scurrilous libels against the Government
or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof, which tend to disturb the
public peace. In inciting to sedition, the offender must not take part in any
public or tumultuous uprising.
DISTURBANCE OF PROCEEDINGS ART. 144, RPC
Elements:
1. That there be a meeting of the National Assembly (Congress of the
Philippines) or any of its committees or subcommittees, constitutional
commissions or committees or divisions thereof, or of any provincial board or
city or municipal council or board; and
2. Offender does any of the following acts: a. Disturbs any of such meetings;
or b. Behaves while in the presence of any such bodies in such a manner as to
interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due it.
Q: What is the criminal liability, if any, of a police officer who, while Congress
was in session, arrested a member thereof for committing a crime punishable
by a penalty higher than prision mayor? (2012 BAR)
A: The police officer incurs no criminal liability because the member of
Congress has committed a crime punishable by a penalty higher than prision
mayor.
DIRECT ASSAULTS ART. 148, RPC
Ways of committing the crime of direct assault
1. Without public uprising, by employing force or intimidation for the
attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of
rebellion and sedition; and
2. Without public uprising, by attacking, by employing force or by seriously
intimidating or by seriously resisting any person in authority or any of his
agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on the occasion
of such performance. (2009, 2013, 2015 BAR)
Elements of the first form
1. Offender employs force or intimidation;
2. The aim of the offender is to attain any of the purposes of the crime
of rebellion or any of the objects of the crime of sedition; and
3. There is no public uprising. NOTE: The act of the accused in
preventing by force the holding of a popular election in certain precincts,
without public uprising, is direct assault.
Elements of the second form (1993, 1995, 2000, 2001, 2002 BAR)
1. Offender:
a. Makes an attack,
b. Employs force,
c. Makes a serious intimidation, or
d. Makes a serious resistance;
2. Person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent;
3. That, at the time of the assault, the person in authority or his agent:
a. Is engaged in the performance of official duties, or that he is
assaulted
b. On occasion of such performance;
4. The offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in
authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties; and
5. There is no public uprising.
“On occasion of the performance of official duties” It means that the assault
was made because or by reason of the past performance of official duties even
if at the very time of the assault no official duty was being discharged.
Q: Who are deemed to be persons in authority and agents of persons in
authority? (1995, 2000, 2002 BAR)
A: Persons in authority are those directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as
an individual or as a member of some court or government corporation, board,
or commission. Barrio captains and barangay chairmen are also deemed
persons in authority.
Agents of persons in authority are persons who by direct provision of law or
by election or by appointment by competent authority, are charged with
maintenance of public order, the protection and security of life and property,
such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman, barangay leader and any person
who comes to the aid of persons in authority.
NOTE! In applying the provisions of Arts. 148 and 151 of the RPC, teachers,
professors and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly
recognized private schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the
actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such
performance, shall be deemed persons in authority.
Crime of direct assault can be complexed with the material consequence of the
unlawful act.
Q: Because of the approaching town fiesta in San Miguel, Bulacan, a dance
was held in Barangay Carinias. A, the Barangay Captain, was invited to deliver
a speech to start the dance. While A was delivering his speech, B, one of the
guests, went to the middle of the dance floor making obscene dance
movements, brandishing a knife and challenging everyone present to a fight. A
approached B and admonished him to keep quiet and not to disturb the dance
and peace of the occasion. B, instead of heeding the advice of A, stabbed the
latter at his back twice when A turned his back to proceed to the microphone
to continue his speech. A fell to the ground and died. At the time of the
incident A was not armed. What crime was committed? (2000 BAR)
A: The complex crime of direct assault with murder was committed. Since A
was stabbed at the back when he was not in a position to defend himself nor
retaliate, there was treachery in the stabbing. Hence, the death caused by such
stabbing was murder. The Barangay Captain was in the act of trying to pacify
B who was making trouble in the dance hall when he was stabbed to death. He
was therefore killed while in the performance of his duties.
In the case of People v. Hecto, the Supreme Court ruled that "as the barangay
captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws and ordinances within the
barangay. If in the enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his people
who thereafter treacherously slew him, the crime committed is murder with
assault upon a person in authority.” (People v. Dollantes, G.R. No. 70639, June
30, 1987)
RESISTANCE AND DISOBEDIENCE TO A PERSON IN AUTHORITY OR HIS
AGENTS ART. 151, RPC
Elements of resistance and serious disobedience (1990, 2001 BAR)
1. A person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of
official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender;
2. The offender resists or seriously disobeys such person in authority
or his agent; and
3. That the act of the offender is not included in the provisions of Arts.
148, 149, and 150. The word seriously is not used to describe resistance,
because if the offender seriously resisted a person in authority or his agent,
the crime is direct assault. (Reyes, 2012)
As clarified in People v. Breis, if the use of physical force against
agents of persons in authority is not serious, the offense is not direct assault,
but resistance or disobedience. For this crime to be proven, the two (2) key
elements must be shown: " (1) That a person in authority or his agent is
engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to
theoffender; and (2) That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such
person or his agent." In this case, it was established that petitioner grabbed
the shirt of PO2 Navarro, then slapped and kicked him several times. Based on
the circumstances, petitioner's resistance and use of force are not so serious
to be deemed as direct assault. While she exerted force, it is not dangerous,
grave, or severe enough to warrant the penalties attached to the crime. (Mallari
v. People, G.R. No. 224679, February 12, 2020, as penned by J. Leonen)
Crimes Against Public Interest
FALSIFICATION BY PUBLIC OFFICER, EMPLOYEE OR NOTARY OR
ECCLESIASTICAL MINISTER ART. 171, RPC (2015 BAR)
Elements
1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, notary public, or an
ecclesiastical minister;
2. That he takes advantage of his official position: a. He has the duty to
make or prepare or to otherwise intervene in the preparation of the document;
or b. He has the official custody of the document which he falsifies; and
3. That he falsified a document by committing any of the following acts
(2008 BAR):
a. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or
rubric.
Elements:
i. That there be an intent to imitate, or an attempt to imitate; and
ii. That the two signatures or handwritings, the genuine and the forged,
bear some resemblance to each other.
b. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act
or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.
Elements:
i. That the offender caused it to appear in a document that a
person or persons participated in an act or a proceeding; and
ii. That such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the
act or proceeding.
In falsification of public documents under Article 171(2) of the Revised
Penal Code, the prosecution must prove that these elements exist: (1) that the
offender is a public officer, employee, notary public, or an ecclesiastical
minister; (2) that he takes advantage of his official position; (3) that he falsifies
a document by causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act
or proceeding; and (4) that such person or persons did not in fact so
participate in the proceeding.
Here, the first element has already been proven since petitioner is a
notary public. The second element is presumed when the alleged falsity
committed by the notary public pertains to the notarization. However, the third
and fourth elements are lacking. Even if Atty. Costantino falsely certified that
Dr. Asuncion was an instrumental witness to the execution of the will, one
crucial detail remains: Dr. Asuncion signed the Joint Acknowledgement after it
was notarized. Since Dr. Asuncion did not sign the Joint Acknowledgement
before it was notarized, he cannot be considered as having attested and
subscribed to its due execution at the time of its notarization. It was not
petitioner who made it appear that Dr. Asuncion participated in the execution
of the Joint Acknowledgement, but Dr. Asuncion himself. Petitioner, therefore,
must be acquitted. (Atty. Constantino v. People, G.R. No. 225696, April 8, 2019,
as penned by J. Leonen)
USURPATION OF AUTHORITY OR OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS ART. 177, RPC
Offenses contemplated in Art. 177:
1. Usurpation of Authority – by knowingly and falsely representing oneself to
be an officer, agent, or representative of any department or agency of the
Philippine Government or any foreign government. NOTE: The mere act of
knowingly and falsely representing oneself to be an officer, etc. is sufficient. It
is not necessary that he performs an act pertaining to a public officer.
2. Usurpation of Official Functions– by performing any act pertaining to any
person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or of a
foreign government or any agency thereof, under pretense of official position,
and without being lawfully entitled to do so. (2015 BAR)
NOTE: It is essential that the offender should have performed an act pertaining
to a person in authority or public officer, in addition to other requirements.
(Reyes, 2008)
Relampagos did not commit the crime of usurpation of authority or
official functions. The crime of usurpation of official functions punishes any
person who, under pretense of official position, performs any act pertaining to
any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any
foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to
do so. In this case, there was no attempt to represent the President in the
letter. It appears that Relampagos was acting on behalf of Secretary Abad,
upon the instructions of the President. Under the doctrine of qualified political
agency, department secretaries may act for and on behalf of the President on
matters where the President is required to exercise authority in their
respective departments. (Degamo v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No.
212416, December 5, 2018, as penned by J. Leonen)
ABANDONMENT OF OFFICE OR POSITION ART. 238, RPC
Elements:
1. That the offender is holding a public office;
2. That he formally resigns from his office; The final or conclusive act of
a resignation’s acceptance is the notice of acceptance. (Light Rail Transit
Authority v. Salvaña, G.R. No. 192074, June 10, 2014, as penned by J. Leonen)
3. That his resignation has not yet been accepted; and
4. That he abandons his office to the detriment of the public service.
Circumstances qualifying the offense The offense is qualified when the real
motive of resignation is to evade the discharge of duties of preventing,
prosecuting or punishing any crime Title One, and Chapter One of Title Three
of Book Two of the RPC.
ART. 183, RPC Perjury The willful and corrupt assertion of falsehood under
oath or affirmation administered by authority of law on a material matter.
Commission of perjury Perjury is committed thru:
1. Falsely testifying under oath; or
2. Making a false affidavit.
NOTE: Falsely testifying under oath should not be in a judicial
proceeding. (Reyes, 2017)
Elements (2005 BAR)
1. Accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon
a material matter (2008 BAR);
2. Statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer,
authorized to receive and administer oath;
3. In that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and
deliberate assertion of a falsehood (1996 BAR); and
4. Sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law.
(1991 BAR)
 The statement need not actually be required. It is sufficient that it was
authorized by law to be made. (People v. Angangco, G.R. No. L-47693, October
12, 1943)
NOTE: The venue in perjury, if committed by falsely testifying under
oath, is the place where he testified. If committed by making false affidavit, the
venue is the place where the affidavit was notarized. (Union Bank et al., v.
People, G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012)
FALSE TESTIMONY IN CIVIL CASES ART. 182, RPC
Elements:
1. Testimony must be given in a civil case;
2. It must be related to the issues presented in said case;
3. It must be false;
4. It must be given by the defendant knowing the same to be false; and
5. It must be malicious, and given with an intent to affect the issues
presented in said case.
NOTE: The criminal action of false testimony in civil cases must be
suspended when there is a pending determination of the falsity or truthfulness
of the subject testimonies in the civil case. (Ark Travel Express v. Judge
Abrogar, G.R. No. 137010, August 29, 2003)
Non-applicability of this article to special proceedings: False testimony
given to a special proceeding is NOT punishable under this article. Art. 182
applies only to ordinary or special civil actions and supplementary or ancillary
proceedings therein. Perjury committed in special proceedings, i.e. probate
proceeding, are covered by Art. 183- FALSE TESTIMONY IN OTHER CASES.
(Regalado, 2007 citing U.S. v. Gutierrez and People v. Hernandez)
CRIMES AGAINST PERSON
PARRICIDE ART. 246, RPC
Elements (1994, 1997, 1999, 2003, 2015 BAR)
1. That a person is killed;
2. That the deceased is killed by the accused; and
3. That the deceased is the: a. Legitimate/Illegitimate father; b.
Legitimate/Illegitimate mother; c. Legitimate/Illegitimate child; d. Other
legitimate ascendant; e. Other legitimate descendant; or f. Legitimate spouse.
The relationship, except the spouse, must be in the direct line and not in the
collateral line.
Essential element of parricide The relationship of the offender with the victim
must be: 1. Legitimate, except in the case of parent and child; 2. In the direct
line; and 3. By blood, except in the case of a legitimate spouse. This must be
alleged and proved. If not alleged, it can only be considered as an ordinary
aggravating circumstance.
Q: While Joanne was eating, she noticed that her father, Abenir, seemed
restless while he was preparing for work. Meanwhile, Jessica, Abegail, and
Delia were watching television, with Delia seated on the floor near the toilet.
Suddenly, Joanne saw Abenir hit Delia on the head with a maso. A second
blow hit the cement wall. Joanne yelled and tried to pacify Abenir, asking why
he did it. Abenir told her that she caught Delia with a man in their bathroom.
However, Joanne saw no one. Delia was rushed to the hospital but she passed
away shortly after. Is Abenir liable for the crime of Parricide?
A: YES. All the elements of the crime of parricide were sufficiently proved by
the prosecution. There was no dispute as to the relationship between the
accused-appellant and the victim. With respect to the killing by the accused of
his wife, their daughter Joanne clearly testified that she suddenly saw her
father hit the head of her mother with a small mallet. Joanne's straightforward
and candid narration of the incident is regarded as positive and credible
evidence, sufficient to convict the accused. Well settled is the rule that it is
unnatural for a relative, in this case the accused's own child, who is interested
in vindicating the crime, to accuse somebody else other than the real culprit.
For her to do so is to let the guilty go free. Where there is nothing to indicate
that witnesses were actuated by improper motives on the witness stand, their
positive declarations made under solemn oath deserve full faith and credence.
(People v. Brusola, G.R. No. 210615, July 26, 2017. as penned by J. Leonen)
MURDER ART. 248, RPC
Elements of murder:
1. That a person was killed;
2. That the accused killed him;
 3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Art. 248; and
4. That the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
Murder (1999, 2001, 2008, 2009, 2010 BAR) Murder is the unlawful killing
of any person which is not parricide or infanticide, provided that any of the
following circumstances is present: 1. With treachery, taking advantage of
superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken
the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity. (1995, 2000,
2006, 2008, 2015 BAR) If committed “by a band”, it is still murder because of
the circumstance of “with the aid of armed men.”
Q: One night, Jennifer was found dead. CCTV footage shows Jennifer and
Pemberton leaving a club together. An unequivocal testimony identified
Pemberton as the last person who was seen with Jennifer on the night she
died. The results of a general physical examination conducted on Pemberton
show abrasions and light scratches on different parts on his body, and
Pemberton’s latex print was shown on one of the condoms found at the crime
scene. Physical examinations on Jennifer’s cadaver reveal that she was
strangled from behind. Jennifer’s mother filed a complaint for Murder against
Pemberton. Pemberton opposed, stating that there is no probable cause for
murder. Is Pemberton correct?
A: NO. There is ample evidence submitted to establish probable cause that
Pemberton murdered Jennifer. First, the killing of Jennifer has been
indubitably confirmed. Second, the pieces of evidence such as the CCTV
footage, the testimonies, the latex print on the condom, the results of physical
examinations both on Pemberton and Jennifer lead to no other conclusion that
Pemberton was the perpetrator of the crime. Aside from that, the result of the
physical examination conducted on Jennifer’s cadaver demonstrates that
treachery, a qualifying circumstance, is present. Pemberton points out the lack
of any direct evidence linking him to the crime. It has been the consistent
pronouncement of the Supreme Court that in such cases, the prosecution may
resort to circumstancial evidence. If direct evidence is insisted upon under all
circumstances, the guilt of vicious felons who committed heinous crimes in
secret will be hard, if not impossible to prove. (Joseph Scott Pemberton v. De
Lima, G.R. No. 217508, April 18, 2016, as penned by J. Leonen)
ALREADY ASK IN THE BAR:
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY:
Required proof in order to convict an accused, who must be an accountable
public officer/employee, of malversation, all that is necessary to prove is that
the defendant received in his possession public funds, that he could not
account for them and did not have them in his possession when demanded
and that he could not give a reasonable excuse for the disappearance of the
same. (De Guzman v. People, G.R. No. L-54288, December 15, 1982) The return
of the money malversed is merely a mitigating circumstance. It cannot exempt
the accused from criminal liability. (People v. Velasquez, G.R. No. L-47741,
April 28, 1941)
Punishable acts (1994, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2008 BAR)
1. Appropriating public funds or property;
2. Taking or misappropriating the same;
3. Consenting, or through abandonment or negligence, permitting any other
person to take such public funds or property; and
4. Being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such
funds or property.
Malversation vis-à-vis Estafa (1999 BAR)
BASIS MALVERSATION As to persons liable Committed by an accountable
public officer. ESTAFA is committed by a private person or even a public
officer who acts in a private capacity. As to property involved, Malversation
deals with public funds or property. Estafa deals with private property.
ILLEGAL USE OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY ART. 220 or TECHNICAL
MALVERSATION
Elements (1996 BAR)
1. Offender is a public officer;
2. There is public fund or property under his administration;
3. Such public fund or property has been appropriated by law or ordinance;
and
4. He applies the same to a public use other than that for which such fund or
property has been appropriated by law or ordinance.
Illegal use of public funds or property is also known as technical malversation.
Technical Malversation In technical malversation, the public officer applies
public funds under his administration not for his or another’s personal use,
but to a public use other than that for which the fund was appropriated by law
or ordinance. Technical malversation is, therefore, not included in nor does it
necessarily include the crime of malversation of public funds charged in the
information. Thus, if the acts constituting the crime of technical malversation
were not alleged in the information, the person accused cannot be convicted
of malversation. (Parungao v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 96025, May 15, 1991)
How Technical Malversation is committed? Instead of applying it to the public
purpose for which the fund or property was already appropriated by law, the
public officer applied it to another purpose. (BAR 2015)
NOTE: In the absence of a law or ordinance appropriating the public fund
allegedly technically malversed, the use thereof for another public purpose will
not make the accused guilty of violation of Art. 220 of the RPC. (Abdulla v.
People, G.R. No. 150129, April 6, 2005)
INFIDELITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS CONNIVING WITH OR CONSENTING TO
EVASION
ART. 223, RPC Elements (BAR 1996, 2009)
1. Offender is a public officer;
2. He has in his custody or charge a prisoner, either detention prisoner or
prisoner by final judgment;
3. Such prisoner escaped from his custody;
4. That he was in connivance with the prisoner in the latter’s escape. (U.S. v.
Bandino, G.R. No. L-9964, February 11, 1915)
Q: Is there a need that the convict has actually fled for the public officer to be
liable under this Article?
A: NO. There is real and actual evasion of service of sentence when the
custodian permits the prisoner to obtain relaxation of his imprisonment and to
escape the punishment of being deprived of his liberty, thus making the
penalty ineffectual, although the convict may not have fled (U.S. v. Bandino,
ibid.). (1997 BAR)
NOTE: Releasing a prisoner for failure to comply within the time provided by
Art. 125 exculpate liability under this Article. Where the chief of police released
the detention prisoners because he could not file a complaint against them
within the time fixed by Art. 125 due to the absence of the justice of the peace,
he is not guilty of infidelity in the custody of prisoners.
REMOVAL, CONCEALMENT OR DESTRUCTION OF DOCUMENT ART. 226, RPC
This crime is also called infidelity in the custody of documents.
Elements (2005, 2015 BAR)
1. The offender is a public officer;
2. He abstracts, destroys, or conceals documents or papers;
3. Said documents or papers should have been entrusted to such public
officer by reason of his office; and
4. Damage, whether serious or not, to a third party or to the public interest
should have been caused.
MALTREATMENT OF PRISONERS ART. 235, RPC
Elements
1. Offender is a public officer or employee;
2. He has under his charge a prisoner or detention prisoner; and
3. He maltreats such prisoner either of the following manners:
a. By overdoing himself in the correction or handling of a prisoner or
detention prisoner under his charge either: i. By the imposition of
punishments not authorized by the regulations; or ii. By inflicting such
punishments (those authorized) in a cruel or humiliating manner.
b. By maltreating such prisoner to extort a confession or to obtain some
information from the prisoner. (1999 BAR)
NOTE: The maltreatment should not be due to personal grudge, otherwise,
offender is liable for physical injuries only. Illustration: Hitting a prisoner by a
latigo, even if the purpose is to instil discipline, is not authorized by law and
constitutes violation of this article. On the other hand, requiring prisoners to
dig a canal where culverts shall be placed to prevent flooding in the prison
compound is authorized by law and does not violate this article; but if the Q: If a person killed another not knowing that the latter was his son, will he be
public officer would order the prisoner to do so from morning up to late guilty of parricide? (1996 BAR)
evening without any food, then this article is involved, as he inflicted such
authorized punishment in a cruel and humiliating manner. A: YES. The law does not require knowledge of relationship between them.

DEATH OR PHYSICAL INJURIES INFLICTED UNDER EXCEPTIONAL

CIRCUMSTANCES ART. 247, RPC (BAR 2001, 2005, 2015)

Requisites:
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
1. A legally married person or a parent surprises his spouse or
PARRICIDE ART. 246, RPC daughter, the latter under 18 years of age and living with him, in the act of
committing sexual intercourse;
Elements (1994, 1997, 1999, 2003, 2015 BAR)
2. He or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of
1. That a person is killed; them any serious physical injury in the act or immediately thereafter; and
2. That the deceased is killed by the accused; and 3. He has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife or
daughter, or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other
3. That the deceased is the: spouse.
a. Legitimate/Illegitimate father; ** “Immediately thereafter” means that the discovery, escape, pursuit and the
b. Legitimate/Illegitimate mother; killing must all form part of one continuous act.

c. Legitimate/Illegitimate child; NOTE: There is no criminal liability when less serious or slight physical
injuries are inflicted. The presence of the requisites enumerated above is an
d. Other legitimate ascendant; absolutory cause. Art. 247 does not define any crime; thus, it cannot be
alleged in an Information. Murder, homicide or parricide needs to be filed first,
e. Other legitimate descendant; or with Art. 247 being raised as a defense.

f. Legitimate spouse. The relationship, except the spouse, must be in
the direct line and not in the collateral line.
Essential element of parricide The relationship of the offender with the victim
must be:
1. Legitimate, except in the case of parent and child;
2. In the direct line; and
3. By blood, except in the case of a legitimate spouse. This must be
alleged and proved. If not alleged, it can only be considered as an ordinary
aggravating circumstance.
Q1: The accused was shocked to discover his wife and their driver sleeping in
the master’s bedroom. Outraged, the accused got his gun and killed both. Can
the accused claim that he killed the two under exceptional circumstances?
(1991, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011 BAR)
A1: NO. The accused did not catch them while having sexual intercourse.
Q2: A and B are husband and wife. One night, A, a security guard, felt sick and
cold, hence, he decided to go home around midnight after getting permission
from his duty officer. Approaching the master bedroom, he was surprised to
hear sighs and giggles inside. He opened the door very carefully and peeped
inside where he saw his wife B having sexual intercourse with their neighbor
C. A rushed inside and grabbed C but the latter managed to wrest himself free
and jumped out of the window. A followed suit and managed to catch C again
and after a furious struggle, managed also to strangle him to death. A then
rushed back to their bedroom where his wife B was cowering under the bed
covers. Still enraged, A hit B with fist blows and rendered her unconscious.
The police arrived after being summoned by their neighbors and arrested A
who was detained, inquested and charged for the death of C and serious
physical injuries of B.
A. Is A liable for C’s death? Why?
YES. A is liable for C’s death but under the exceptional circumstances
in Art. 247 of the RPC where only destierro is prescribed. Art. 247
governs since A surprised his wife B in the act of having sexual
intercourse with C, and the killing of C was immediately thereafter as
the discover, escape, pursuit and killing of C form one continuous act.
(U.S. v. Vargas, G.R. No. 1053, May 7, 1903)
B. Is A liable for B’s injuries? Why? (1991, 2001, 2005, 2007 BAR)
YES. A is liable for the serious physical injuries he inflicted on his wife
but under the same exceptional circumstances in Art. 247 of the RPC
for the same reason.
MURDER ART. 248, RPC
Elements of murder:
1. That a person was killed;
2. That the accused killed him;
3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Art. 248; and
4. That the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
Murder (1999, 2001, 2008, 2009, 2010 BAR)
Murder is the unlawful killing of any person which is not parricide or
infanticide, provided that any of the following circumstances is present:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of
armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or
persons to insure or afford impunity. (1995, 2000, 2006, 2008, 2015 BAR)
If committed “by a band”, it is still murder because of the circumstance
of “with the aid of armed men.”
2. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of
a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by
motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great
waste and ruin. (1997, 2005 BAR)
a. If the primordial criminal intent is to kill, and fire was only used as a
means to do so, it is murder.
b. If the primordial intent is to destroy the property through fire and
incidentally somebody died, it is arson.
Treachery and evident premeditation are inherent in murder by poison
and, as such, cannot be considered as aggravating circumstance.
3. In consideration of a price, reward or promise. If this aggravating
circumstance is present in the commission of the crime, it affects not
only the person who received the money or reward but also the person
who gave it.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding
paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of volcano, destructive
cyclone, epidemic, or other public calamity. The offender must take
advantage of the calamity to qualify the crime to murder.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of
the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse. Outraging
means any physical act to commit an extremely vicious or deeply
insulting act while scoffing is any verbal act implying a showing of
irreverence. Outraging or scoffing at the person or corpse of the victim
is the only instance that does not fall under Art. 14 on aggravating
circumstances in general.
DEATH CAUSED IN A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY ART. 251, RPC
Tumultuous affray (1997, 2010 BAR) It means a commotion in a tumultuous
and confused manner; to such an extent that it would not be possible to
identify who the killer is if death results, or who inflicted the serious physical
injuries, but the person or persons who used violence are known.
Tumultuous affray exists when at least four persons took part therein.
Elements
1. There be several or at least 4 persons;
2. That they did not compose groups organized for the common
purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally, otherwise, they
may be held liable as coconspirators;
3. That these several persons quarreled and assaulted one another in a
confused and tumultuous manner;
4. Someone was killed in the course of the affray; NOTE: The person
killed in the course of the affray need not be one of the participants in the
affray. He could be a mere passerby.
5. It cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased. NOTE: if
the one who inflicted the fatal wound is known, the crime is not tumultuous
affray. It is a case of homicide.
6. The person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who
used violence can be identified. This article does not apply if there is
concerted fight between two organized groups.
Q: A, B and C are members of SFC Fraternity. While eating in a seaside
restaurant, they were attacked by X, Y and Z members of a rival fraternity. A
rumble ensued in which the above-named members of the two fraternities
assaulted each other in confused and tumultuous manner resulting in the
death of A. As it cannot be ascertained who actually killed A, the members of
the two fraternities took part in the rumble and were charged for death caused
in a tumultuous affray. Will the charge prosper? (2010 BAR)
A: NO. The charge of death caused in a tumultuous affray will not prosper. In
death caused by tumultuous affray under Art. 251 of the RPC, it is essential
that the persons involved did not compose groups organized for the common
purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally. In this case, there
is no tumultuous affray since the participants in the rumble belong to
organized fraternity.
GIVING ASSISTANCE TO SUICIDE ART. 253, RPC
Punishable acts
1. Assisting another to commit suicide, whether the suicide is
consummated or not; (2008 BAR) and
2. Lending assistance to another to commit suicide to the extent of
doing the killing himself
ART. 255, RPC Infanticide (2006 BAR) It is the killing of any child less than 3
days old or 72 hours of age, whether the killer is the parent or grandparent,
any relative of the child, or a stranger.
NOTE: Art. 255 does not provide a penalty for infanticide. If the killer is the
mother, or father, or a legitimate grandparent, although the crime is still
infanticide, the penalty, is that of parricide. If the offender is not so related to
the child, although the crime is still infanticide, the penalty corresponding to
murder shall be imposed. Regardless, the penalty for murder and parricide is
the same.
Elements
1. A child was killed; NOTE: The child must be born alive and fully
developed, that is, it can sustain an independent life.
2. Deceased child was less than 3 days old or less than 72 hours of age;
and
3. Accused killed the said child.
**When infanticide is not committed:
If the child is born dead, or if the child is already dead, infanticide is not
committed. Although the child is born alive, if it could not sustain an
independent life when it was killed, there is no infanticide.
INTENTIONAL ABORTION ART. 256, RPC
Abortion (1994 BAR) It is the willful killing of the fetus in the uterus, or the
violent expulsion of the fetus from the maternal womb that results in the death
of the fetus. (Guevara as cited in Reyes, 2017)
The crime of intentional abortion is committed in three ways
1. By using any violence upon the person of the pregnant woman;
2. By administering drugs or beverages upon such pregnant woman
without her consent; or
3. By administering drugs or beverages with the consent of the
pregnant woman.
Elements
1. There is a pregnant woman;
2. Violence is exerted, or drugs or beverages administered, or that the
accused otherwise acts upon such pregnant woman;
3. As a result of the use of violence or drugs or beverages upon her, or
any other act of the accused, the fetus dies, either in the womb or after having
been expelled therefrom; and
4. Abortion is intended.
NOTE: In intentional abortion, the offender should know that the woman is
pregnant because the very intention is to cause an abortion.
UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION ART. 257, RPC
Elements
1. There is a pregnant woman;
2. Violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an
abortion; Violence is intentionally exerted; and
3. As a result of the violence exerted, the fetus dies either in the womb
or after having been expelled therefrom.
(2015 BAR) Illustration: Unintentional abortion requires physical violence
inflicted deliberately and voluntarily by a third person upon the person of the
pregnant woman. Hence, if A pointed a gun at a pregnant lady, who became so
frightened, causing her abortion, he is not liable for unintentional abortion, as
there was no violence exerted. If he intended the abortion however, the crime
committed is intentional abortion. The force or violence must come from
another. Mere intimidation is not enough unless the degree of intimidation
already approximates violence.
Q1: Is the crime of unintentional abortion committed if the pregnant
woman aborted because of intimidation?
A1: NO. The crime committed is not unintentional abortion because
there is no violence. The crime committed is light threats.
NOTE: If violence was employed on the pregnant woman by a third person,
and as a result, the woman and the fetus died, there is complex crime of
homicide with unintentional abortion.
Q2: Suppose the pregnant woman employed violence to herself
specifically calculated to bring about abortion, what crime is committed? A:
The woman is liable for intentional abortion under Art. 258. Q: What is the
criminal liability, if any, of a pregnant woman who tried to commit suicide by
poison, but she did not die and the fetus in her womb was expelled instead?
(1994, 2012 BAR)
A2: The woman who tried to commit suicide incurs no criminal liability
for the result not intended. In order to incur criminal liability for the result not
intended, one must be committing a felony, and suicide is not a felony.
Unintentional abortion is not committed since it is punishable only when
caused by violence and not by poison. There is also no intentional abortion
since the intention of the woman was to commit suicide and not to abort the
fetus.
SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES ART. 263, RPC
How the crime of serious physical injuries is committed:
1. Wounding; (1993 BAR)
2. Beating; (1995 BAR)
3. Assaulting; (1993 BAR), or
4. Administering injurious substance. (1992 BAR)
Instances considered as the crime of serious physical injuries:
1. When the injured person becomes insane, imbecile, impotent, or
blind in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted. Impotence includes
inability to copulate and sterility. Blindness requires loss of vision of both
eyes. Mere weakness in vision is not contemplated.
2. When the injured person: a. Loses the use of speech or the power to
hear or to smell, or loses an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm or a leg; or b. Loses
the use of any such member; or c. Becomes incapacitated for the work in
which he was habitually engaged in as a consequence of the physical injuries
inflicted. Loss of hearing must involve both ears. Otherwise, it will be
considered as serious physical injuries under par.
3. Loss of the power to hear in the right ear is merely considered as
loss of use of some other part of the body. 3. When the injured: a. Becomes
deformed; b. Loses any other member of his body; c. Loses the use thereof; or
d. Becomes ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work in which he
was habitually engaged in for more than 90 days, as a consequence of the
physical injuries inflicted.
NOTE: In par. 2 and 3, the offended party must have a vocation or work at the
time of injury.
4. When the injured person becomes ill or incapacitated for labor for
more than 30 days (but must not be more than 90 days), as a result of the
physical injuries inflicted. When the category of the offense of serious physical
injuries depends on the period of the illness or incapacity for labor, there must
be evidence of the length of that period. Otherwise, the offense will be
considered as slight physical injuries.
LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES ART. 265, RPC
Elements (1994, 1998, 2009 BAR)
1. Offended party is incapacitated for labor for 10 days or more (but
not more than 30 days), or shall require medical attendance for the
same period of time; and
NOTE: The disjunctive “or” above means that it is either incapacity
for work for 10 days or more or the necessity of medical attendance
for an equal period which will make the crime of less serious
physical injuries. In the absence of proof as to the period of the
offended party’s incapacity for labor or required medical attendance,
the offense committed is only slight physical injuries. The phrase
“shall require” refers to the period of actual medical attendance.
2. Physical injuries must not be those described in the preceding
articles.
If a wound required medical attendance for only 2 days, yet the
injured was prevented from attending to his ordinary labor for a
period of twenty-nine days, the physical injuries are denominated as
less serious. (U.S. v. Trinidad, 4 Phil. 152)
SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES AND MALTREATMENT ART. 266
**Kinds of slight physical injuries and maltreatment (1990, 1994, 2003 BAR)
1. Physical injuries which incapacitated the offended party for labor
from 1 to 9 days, or required medical attendance during the same period;
2. Physical injuries which did not prevent the offended party from
engaging in his habitual work or which did not require medical attendance; or
3. Ill-treatment of another by deed without causing any injury. Slapping
the offended party is a form of illtreatment which is a form of slight physical
injuries.
Q: A disagreement ensued between Cindy and Carina which led to a
slapping incident. Cindy gave twin slaps on Carina’s beautiful face. What is the
crime committed by Cindy?
A: a. Slander by deed – if the slapping was done to cast dishonor to the
person slapped.
b. Slight physical injuries by ill-treatment – if the slapping was done
without the intention of casting dishonor, or to humiliate or embarrass the
offended party out of a quarrel or anger.
RAPE ARTS. 266-A, 266-B, 266-C AND 266-D, RPC AND R.A. 8353
Kinds of rape under R.A. 8353
1. The traditional concept under Art. 335 – carnal knowledge with a
woman against her will. The offended party is always a woman and the
offender is always a man.
2. Sexual assault – committed with an instrument or an object or use of
the penis with penetration of the mouth or anal orifice. The offended party or
offender can either be a man or a woman, that is, if the woman or a man uses
an instrument in the anal orifice of a male, she or he can be liable for rape.
**A violation of the body orifices by the fingers is within the expanded
definition of rape under R.A. 8353. Insertion of the finger into the female genital
is rape through sexual assault. (People v. Campuhan, G.R. No. 129433, March
30, 2000)
Elements of rape by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman
1. Offender is a man;
2. Offender had carnal knowledge of the woman; and
3. Such act is accomplished under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation; (1992 BAR)
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; or
d. When the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented,
even though none of the above circumstances mentioned above be
present. (1995 BAR)
Q: While still intoxicated and asleep, "AAA" felt someone kissing her vagina.
At first, she thought it was her boyfriend Randy who did it. She tried to push
him away but failed to stop him. Indeed, in no time at all Caga succeeded in
mounting her and in penetrating her private parts with his penis. Caga argues
that while the Information alleged that force, violence, and intimidation were
employed to consummate the alleged rape, the prosecution's evidence failed
to establish the existence thereof. He claims that "AAA" did not offer any
resistance against his sexual advances, "because she thought that it was her
boyfriend (Randy) who was then making love with her." Is Caga liable for rape?
A: YES. Caga’s contention has no merit because the case falls under the
second paragraph of rape: "when the offended party is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious." It is altogether immaterial that the prosecution's
evidence failed to establish the presence of physical force, threat, or
intimidation because, as the evidence at bar shows, Caga raped an
unconscious and extremely intoxicated woman - a fact that was duly alleged in
the Information and duly established by the prosecution's evidence during the
trial. (People v. Caga, G.R. No. 206878, August 22, 2016)
Elements of rape by sexual assault (2005 BAR)
1. Offender commits an act of sexual assault;
2. The act of sexual assault is committed by any of the following means:
a. By inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice; or
b. By inserting any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of
another person.
3. The act of sexual assault is accomplished under any of the following
circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation;
b. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; or
d. When the woman is under 12 years of age or demented. Rape by
sexual assault is not necessarily included in rape through sexual intercourse
unlike acts of lasciviousness. (People v. Bon, G.R. No. 166401, October 30,
2006)
When the offender in rape has an ascendancy or influence on the
offended party, it is not necessary that the latter put up a determined
resistance.
Old Anti-Rape Law vis-à-vis R.A. 8353
Old Anti-Rape Law
-Crime against chastity
-May be committed by a man against a woman only
- Private crime, thus, the Complaint must be filed by the woman or her parents,
grandparents or guardian if the woman was a minor or incapacitated
- Marriage of the victim with one of the offenders benefits not only the principal
but also be extended to coprincipals in case of multiple rape.
--Marital rape not recognized
R.A. 8353
-Crime against persons
-Under the 2nd type, sexual assault may be committed by any person against
any person
-Public crime, thus, May be prosecuted even if the woman does not file a
complaint
- Marriage extinguishes the penal action only as to the principal (the person
who married the victim), and cannot the accomplices and accessories.
-Marital rape recognized (1995 BAR)
No crime of frustrated rape- The slightest penetration of the penis into the
labia of the female organ consummates the crime of rape. However, mere
touching alone of the genitals and mons pubis or the pudendum can only be
considered as attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
Effects of the reclassification of rape into a crime against person (1991, 1993
BAR)
1. The procedural requirement of consent of the offended party to file
the case is no longer needed because this is now a public crime, unlike when it
was still classified as a crime against chastity; and
2. There is now an impossible crime of rape because impossible crimes
can only be committed against persons or property.
Effects of pardon on the criminal liability of the accused charged with rape
(2002 BAR)
1. The offended woman may pardon the offender through a subsequent
valid marriage, the effect of which would be the extinction of the offender’s
liability. In such case, it is the marriage that extinguishes the offender’s
liability, not because of the pardon which extinguished criminal liability only if
granted before the institution of the criminal case in court; or
2. Similarly, the legal husband may be pardoned by forgiveness of the
wife provided that the marriage is not void ab initio. (Art. 266-C, RPC) Under
the new law, the husband may be liable for rape, if his wife does not want to
have sex with him. It is enough that there is indication of any amount of
resistance as to make it rape. (People v. Jumawan, G.R. No. 187495, April 21,
2014)
Proof of hymenal laceration is not an element of rape. An intact hymen does
not negate a finding that the victim was raped. Penetration of the penis by
entry into the lips of the vagina, even without laceration of the hymen, is
enough to constitute rape, and even the briefest of contact is deemed rape.
(People v. Crisostomo, G.R. No. 183090, November 14, 2011)
Instances to consider the crime as qualified rape:
1. When by reason or on occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed. (1998,
2009 BAR)
2. When the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the victim.
NOTE: A step-brother or step-sister relationship between the offender and the
offended party cannot elevate the crime to qualified rape because they are not
related either by blood or affinity. The enumeration is exclusive. Hence, the
common law husband of the victim’s grandmother is not included.
3. If the rape is committed under certain circumstances, such as when it was
committed by two (2) or more persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape, as in
this instance. (People v. Alejandro and Angeles, G.R. No. 225608, March 13,
2017)
J. Leonen: Pablo cannot be convicted of qualified rape under Article 266-B (1).
The said crime consists of the twin circumstances of the victim's minority and
her relationship to the perpetrator, both of which must concur and must be
alleged in the information. It is immaterial whether the relationship was proven
during trial if that was not specifically pleaded for in the information. In this
case, relationship with AAA was not duly alleged in the information. Thus, his
relationship with the victim cannot qualify the crimes of rape. Ruling otherwise
would deprive him of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him. (People v. Armodia, G.R. No. 210654, Juner 7,
2017, as penned by J. Leonen)
People v. De Chavez, GR. No. 218427, 31 January, 2018: There is sufficient
basis to conclude the existence of carnal knowledge when the testimony of a
rape victim is corroborated by the medical findings of the examining physician
as "lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best physical evidence of
forcible defloration."
Identification of the offender is essential only when there is a question or
doubt on whether the one alleged to have committed the crime is the same
person who is charged in the information and subject of the trial. (People v.
Garin, GR. No. 222654, Feb. 21, 2018)
JUSTICE LEONEN: In statutory rape, force, intimidation and physical evidence
of injury are not relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the age
of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The child's consent is
immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern good from evil. In
this case, the defense did not dispute the fact that AAA was 10 years old at the
time of the incident. AAA was able to narrate in a clear and categorical manner
the ordeal that was done to her. It is well-settled that when a woman, more so
when she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
required to prove the ravishment. The accused may thus be convicted solely
on her testimony-provided it is credible, natural, convincing and consistent
with human nature and the normal course of things. (People v. Gutierez, G.R.
No. 208007, April 2, 2014, as penned by J. Leonen)
Sweetheart theory in rape- The sweetheart theory applies in acts of
lasciviousness and rape, felonies committed against or without the consent of
the victim. It operates on the theory that the sexual act was consensual. It
requires proof that the accused and the victim were lovers and that she
consented to the sexual relations. For purposes of sexual intercourse and
lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under R.A. 7610, the sweetheart
defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another
person. (People v. Udang, G.R. No. 210161, January 10, 2018, as penned by J.
Leonen)
Rape shield rule: The character of the woman is immaterial in rape. It is no
defense that the woman is of unchaste character, provided the illicit relations
were committed with force and violence.
Circumstantial Evidence In the case of People v. ZZZ, the Supreme Court ruled
that the commission of the crime of rape may be proven not only by direct
evidence, but also by circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence are
"proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the
main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience." In the
absence of direct evidence, a resort to circumstantial evidence is usually
necessary in proving the commission of rape. This is because rape "is
generally unwitnessed and very often only the victim is left to testify for [him
or] herself. It becomes even more difficult when the complex crime of rape with
homicide is committed because the victim could no longer testify. (G.R. No.
228828, July 24, 2019, as penned by J. Leonen)
Physical resistance need not be established to prove the commission of rape:
It has long been established that a victim's failure to struggle or resist an
attack on his or her person does not, in any way, deteriorate his or her
credibility. Physical resistance need not be established to prove the
commission of a rape or sexual assault, as the very nature of the crime entails
the use of intimidation and fear that may paralyze a victim and force him or her
to submit to the assailant.
In this case, the accused asserted that private complainant's lack of struggle,
resistance, or the fact that she did not cry during the rapes was
unnatural.Different people have varying reactions during moments of trauma;
more so, a six (6) year old child being attacked by people whom she believed
to be her protectors. It must be emphasized that a six-year-old child cannot be
expected to react similarly as an adult, given her limited understanding of the
evils of this world and the desires of men who have no bounds. (People v.
Sumayod, G.R. No. 230626, March 9, 2020, as penned by J. Leonen)
IF VICTIM IS 12 YEARS OLD OR ABOVE BUT UNDER 18: The offender should
be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 or rape
under Art. 266-A (except par. 1[d]) of the RPC. However, the offender cannot be
accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double
jeopardy will be prejudiced.
Under Sec. 48 of the RPC on complex crimes, a felony under the RPC (such as
rape) cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law. (People
v. Dahilig G.R. No. 187083, June 13, 2011)
RAPE BY SEXUAL ASSAULT: The gravamen of rape through sexual assault is
"the insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into another person’s genital or anal orifice.’’ (Ricalde v.
People, G.R. No. 211002, January 21, 2015, as penned by J. Leonen)
Intact hymen does not negate the commission of rape: AAA’s recollection on
how ZZZ committed the crime was detailed; her testimony, consistent.
Likewise, the absence of hymenal laceration fails to exonerate ZZZ. This Court
has consistently held that an intact hymen does not negate the commission of
rape. The absence of external signs or physical injuries on the complainant's
body does not necessarily negate the commission of rape, hymenal laceration
not being, to repeat, an element of the crime of rape. (People v. ZZZ, G.R. No.
229862, June 19, 2019, as penned by J. Leonen)
ATTEMPTED RAPE VS. ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS UNDER RA 7610:
The acts of Braulio of touching the chest and sex organ of Lulu who is under
12 years of age, are merely acts of lasciviousness and not attempted rape
because intent to have sexual intercourse is not clearly shown. (People v.
Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060, December 11, 2013)
To be held liable of attempted rape, it must be shown that the erectile penis is
in the position to penetrate or the offender actually commenced to force his
penis into the victim’s sexual organ.
Determining a victim’s credibility in rape cases: Regardless of such
preconceptions, conviction may be warranted based “solely on the testimony
of the victim, provided of course that the testimony is credible, natural,
convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things.” In this case, AAA's account of having been attacked by accused-
appellant was sufficiently corroborated by Barangay Captain Lotec's testimony
that he saw AAA "pale and trembling." Such description is based on his
personal knowledge, having actually observed and spoken to AAA regarding
her ordeal. This, taken with the prosecution's other corroborating evidence
and AAA's straightforward identification of accusedappellant as the
perpetrator, makes AAA's testimony sufficiently credible independent of her
perceived propensity for truthfulness based on gender stereotypes. (People v.
ZZZ, G.R. No. 229209, February 12, 2020, as penned by J. Leonen)
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY
KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION ART. 267, RPC
Elements (2006 BAR)
1. Offender is a private individual who is not any of the parents of the
victim;
NOTE: If the offender is a public officer who has the authority to arrest
or detain a person, the crime committed is Arbitrary Detention.
Although the crime of kidnapping can only be committed by a private
individual, the fact that the accused is a public official does not
automatically preclude the filing of an information for kidnapping
against him. A public officer who detains a person for the purpose of
extorting ransom cannot be said to be acting in an official capacity PO3
Borja’s membership in the Philippine National Police does not
automatically preclude the filing of an information for kidnapping or
serious illegal detention against him. He may be prosecuted under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code if it is shown that he committed
acts unrelated to the functions of his office. (People v. PO3 Borja) by
JUSTICE LEONEN.
2. He kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the
latter of his liberty;
3. Act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and
4. In the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances
is present: (2009 BAR)
a. Kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; (2014 BAR)
** It has been repeatedly held that if the victim is a minor, the duration
of his detention is immaterial. (People v. Jacalne, G.R. No. 168552,
October 3, 2011)
b. It is committed simulating public authority;
c. Any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped
or detained or threats to kill him are made; or
d. The person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public
officer. (1991, 2005 BAR)
NOTE: In case of a minor, the kidnapper must not be one of the parents.
NOTE: If the victim is a woman or a public officer, the detention is
always serious no matter how short the period of detention is.
Crimes that may be possibly committed when a female is transported from one
place to another:
1. Forcible abduction – If a woman is transported from one place to another by
virtue of restraining her of her liberty and that act is coupled with lewd
designs.
FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE (2014 BAR): The crime is complex
under Art. 48 since forcible abduction is a necessary means to commit
the rape.
2. Kidnapping with serious illegal detention – If a woman is transported just to
restrain her liberty. There is no lewd design or intent.
3. Grave coercion – If a woman is carried away just to break her will, to compel
her to agree to demand or request by the offender.
Effect of the voluntary release of the victim on the criminal liability of the
kidnappers (2004 BAR)
1. If it is serious illegal detention, the voluntary release has no effect on
the criminal liability of the offenders.
2. If it is slight illegal detention, the voluntary release will mitigate the
criminal liability of the offenders.
3. In kidnapping for ransom, voluntary release will not mitigate the
crime.
Demand for ransom is not necessary to consummate the crime: Neither actual
demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be
committed. It is enough if the crime was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom. (People v. Salimbago, G.R. No. 121365, September 14, 1999)
Special complex crimes that may arise in kidnapping
1. Kidnapping with murder or homicide;
2.; Kidnapping with physical injuries or
3. Kidnapping with rape:
As expounded in People v. Ramos (G.R. No. 118570, October 12, 1998),
where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention,
regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely
an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer
be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall
be punished as a special complex crime Kidnapping with rape, no
matter how many rapes had been committed, under the last paragraph
of Art. 267, as amended by R.A. 7659. (People v. Montanir, et. al, G.R.
No. 187534, April 4, 2011)
SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION ART. 268, RPC
Elements:
1. Offender is a private individual;
2. He kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives him
of his liberty;
3. Act of kidnapping or detention is illegal; and
4. Crime is committed without the attendance of any of the
circumstances enumerated in Art. 267 or KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS
ILLEGAL DETENTION.
NOTE: If there is a demand for ransom, the penalty is Reclusion Perpetua to
death just like when what was committed was serious illegal detention and a
demand for ransom was made.
Effect of the voluntary release of the victim on the criminal liability of the
kidnappers If the offender:
1. Voluntarily releases the person so kidnapped or detained within 3
days from the commencement of the detention;
2. Without having attained the purpose intended and
3. Before the institution of criminal proceedings against him, his liability
is mitigated. (1997, 2004 BAR)
It is a privileged mitigating circumstance because the penalty is lower
by one degree. But, it must show that he was in a position to prolong the
detention for more than three days and yet he released the person detained
within that time. No mitigation of the penalty is allowed when the proceedings
have already been instituted for in this case, the accused already acted
because of fear rather than repentance.
UNLAWFUL ARREST ART. 269, RPC
Elements:
1. Offender arrests or detains another person;
2. Purpose of the offender is to deliver him to the proper authorities;
and
3. Arrest or detention is not authorized by law or there is no reasonable
ground therefor.
NOTE: In unlawful arrest, the illegal detention is only incidental. However, if it
is arbitrary detention, it is the unlawful arrest which is incidental.
Essence of the crime of unlawful arrest: The arrest must be made for the
purpose of delivering the person arrested to the proper authorities but it was
made without any reasonable grounds therefor.
NOTE: If the purpose is not to deliver the person to the proper authorities, the
crime could be Illegal Detention under Art. 267 or 268 of the RPC since the
person arrested would necessarily be deprived of his liberty.
Persons liable under this article Offender is any person, whether a public
officer or a private individual. However, the public officer must not be vested
with the authority to arrest or detain a person or must not act in his official
capacity. Otherwise, Art. 124 (Arbitrary detention) is applicable and not Art.
269.
If the offender is a public officer or a law enforcer and he arrested or detained,
without legal or reasonable ground, any person within his jurisdiction for the
purpose of delivering him to the proper authorities, such officer is guilty of
Arbitrary Detention under Art. 124 of the RPC.
If the person arrested or detained is not within his jurisdiction, the officer’s act
would constitute Unlawful Arrest under this article.
Q: Duropan and Coloma were Barangay Kagawad and Barangay Tanod,
respectively, of Lincod, Maribojoc, Bohol. Duropan, Coloma, and another
barangay official saw William Pacis (Pacis), Lino Baldoza Jr., Jeremias
Moquila, Melvin Magbanua, and Ronnel Zambra harvesting nipa palm in a
plantation. Coloma approached them and asked who gave them authority to
harvest. Pacis replied that they were ALIMANGO members, cooperative duly
registered which was authorized to develop, utilize, and protect the Mangrove-
Nipa Area in Lincod, Maribojoc, Bohol. Despite their objections, Pacis' group
was brought to the Police Station of Maribojoc, Bohol. Upon investigation,
Pacis and his companions were released. The Maribojoc Chief of Police
determined that the barangay officials had no legal basis to arrest Pacis. Are
Duropan and Coloma liable for UNLAWFUL ARREST under Article 269 of the
RPC?
A: YES. Petitioner Duropan was a barangay kagawad, while petitioner Coloma
was a barangay tanod of Lincod, Maribojoc, Bohol. A barangay kagawad is a
member of the legislative council of the sangguniang barangay, which enacts
laws of local application. He or she is a person in authority, per Section 388 of
the Local Government Code. Meanwhile, a barangay tanod is deemed as an
agent of persons in authority whose duties are described in Section 388 of the
Local Government Code. While deemed as persons in authority and agents of
persons in authority, respectively, the barangay kagawad and barangay tanod
are not the public officers whose official duty is to arrest or detain persons
contemplated within the purview of Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code.
Even granting those petitioners may have had the authority to inquire into the
surrounding circumstances, and that what transpired was a stop and frisk
search, petitioners failed to cite any suspicious circumstance that warranted
Pacis' immediate arrest. Petitioners argue that due to the numerous reports of
stealing nipa leaves, it was reasonable for them to suspect that Pacis violated
the law. This argument falls short in light of three (3) things: (1) they were
aware that ALIMANGO existed, whose members were authorized to harvest
nipa; (2) they personally knew Pacis; and (3) they were uncertain that Cabalit
owns the land where they found Pacis and his group. (Duropan v. People, G.R.
No. 230825, June 10, 2020, as penned by J. Leonen)
Crimes that may be committed if a person is arrested and/or detained
1. If the arrest is made without a warrant and under circumstances not allowing
a warrantless arrest, the crime would be unlawful arrest.
2. If the person arrested is not delivered to the authorities, the private
individual making the arrest incurs criminal liability for illegal detention under
Art. 267 or 268.
3. If the offender is a public officer, the crime is arbitrary detention under
Article 124.
4. If the detention or arrest is for a legal ground, but the public officer delays
delivery of the person arrested to the proper judicial authorities, the crime is
delay in the delivery of detained persons under Article 125.
KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR ART. 270, RPC
Elements (2002 BAR)
1. Offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and
2. He deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or
guardians.
**While one of the essential elements of this crime is that the offender was
entrusted with the custody of the minor, what is actually being punished is not
the kidnapping but the deliberate failure of that person to restore the minor to
his parents or guardians. As the penalty for such an offense is so severe, the
Court further explained that “deliberate” as used in Article 270 means
something more than mere negligence - it must be premeditated, headstrong,
foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong. (People v. Marquez,
G.R. No. 181440, April 13, 2011)
Crime can be committed by the parents of the minor This happens where they
live separately and the custody of the minor is given to one of them, the other
parent kidnaps such minor from the one having the lawful custody of the child.
Absence of any of the elements of Art. 270, RPC: kidnapping of the minor will
then fall under Art. 267 (kidnapping and serious illegal detention), but if the
accused is any of the parents, Art. 267 will not apply. Arts. 270 and 271 will
apply.
EXPLOITATION OF CHILD LABOR ART. 273, RPC
Elements:
1. Offender retains a minor in his service;
2. It is against the will of the minor; and
3. It is under the pretext of reimbursing himself of a debt incurred by an
ascendant, guardian or person entrusted with the custody of such minor.
(2006, 2009 BAR)
NOTE: Indebtedness is not a ground for detention. However, if the minor
consents to render service and be retained under the pretext of reimbursing a
debt incurred, there is no crime. The debt must be that incurred by the
ascendants, guardian or custodian of the minor.
SERVICES RENDERED UNDER COMPULSION IN PAYMENT OF DEBT ART.
274, RPC
Elements:
1. Offender compels a debtor to work for him, either as household
servant or farm laborer;
2. It is against the debtor’s will; and
3. The purpose is to require or enforce the payment of a debt. (2006
BAR)
NOTE: If there is no creditor-debtor relationship between the offender and the
offended party, coercion is committed.
QUALIFIED TRESPASS TO DWELLING ART. 280, RPC
Elements:
1. Offender is a private person;
2. He enters the dwelling of another; and
3. Such entrance is against the latter’s will. (2002, 2009 BAR)
“Against the will”- The entrance is either expressly or impliedly
prohibited. NOTE: There must be an opposition on the part of the owner
of the house to the entry of the accused. Lack of permission does not
amount to prohibition. (People v. De Peralta, G.R. No. L17332, August
18, 1921)
NOTE: If the offender is a public officer or employee, the entrance into the
dwelling against the will of the occupant is violation of domicile punishable
under Art. 128.
Instances where prohibition to enter a dwelling is implied or presumed:
1. Entering a dwelling of another at late hour of the night.
2. When the entrance is made through means not intended for ingress.
3. The existence of enmity or strained relations between the accused
and the occupant.
4. The door is closed even if it is not locked.
Qualifying circumstance of the offense: If the offense is committed by means
of violence or intimidation. In fact, even if violence or intimidation took place
immediately after the offender has entered the dwelling, there is Qualified
Trespass to Dwelling.
Circumstances when the crime of trespass to dwelling is not committed (2006
BAR)
1. When the purpose of the entrance is to prevent serious harm to
himself, the occupant or third persons.
2. When the purpose of the offender in entering is to render some
service to humanity or justice.
 3. Anyone who shall enter cafes, taverns, inns and other public houses
while they are open.
Crimes that may be committed when a person trespasses a dwelling
1. If the purpose in entering the dwelling is not shown, trespass is
committed.
2. If the purpose is shown, it may be absorbed in the crime as in
robbery with force upon things, the trespass yielding to the more serious
crime.
3. But if the purpose is not shown and while inside the dwelling he was
found by the occupants, one of whom was injured by him, the crime committed
will be trespass to dwelling and frustrated homicide, physical injuries, or if
there was no injury, unjust vexation.
Q: At about 11:00 in the evening, Dante forced his way inside the house of
Mamerto. Jay, Mamerto’s son, saw Dante and accosted him. Dante pulled a
knife and stabbed Jay on his abdomen. Mamerto heard the commotion and
went out of his room. Dante, who was about to escape, assaulted Mamerto. Jay
suffered injuries which, were it not for the timely medical attendance, would
have caused his death. Mamerto sustained injuries that incapacitated him for
25 days. What crime/s did Dante commit? (1994 BAR)
A: Dante committed qualified trespass to dwelling, frustrated homicide for the
stabbing of Jay, and less serious physical injuries for the assault on Mamerto.
The crime of qualified trespass to dwelling should not be complexed with
frustrated homicide because when the trespass is committed as a means to
commit a more serious crime, trespass to dwelling is absorbed by the greater
crime and the former constitutes an aggravating circumstance of dwelling.
(People v. Abedoza, 53 Phil 788)
GRAVE COERCIONS ART. 286, RPC
Punishable acts
1. Preventing another, by means of violence, threat or intimidation, from doing
something not prohibited by law; and
2. Compelling another, by means of violence, threat or intimidation, to do
something against his will, whether it be right or wrong.
Elements: (1998, 1999, 2009 BAR)
1. A person prevented another from doing something not prohibited by
law, or that he compelled him to do something against his will, be it right or
wrong;
2. Prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, threats or
intimidation; and
NOTE: The threat must be present, clear, imminent and actual. Such
threat cannot be made in writing or through a middle man.
3. Person that restrained the will and liberty of another has no
authority of law or the right to do so.
NOTE: Coercion is consummated even if the offended party did not accede to
the purpose of the coercion. The essence of coercion is an attack on individual
liberty.
No grave coercion when a person prohibits another to do an act because the
act done is a crime, and violence and intimidation is employed
-There is no grave coercion because the act from which a person is prevented
from doing is a crime. It may only give rise to threat or physical injuries, if
some injuries are inflicted.
-However, in case of grave coercion where the offended party is being
compelled to do something against his will, whether it be wrong or not, the
crime of grave coercion is committed if violence or intimidation is employed in
order to compel him to do the act.
Example: Isagani lost his gold necklace bearing his initials. He saw Roy
wearing the said necklace. Isagani asked Roy to return to him the
necklace as it belongs to him, but Roy refused. Isagani then drew his
gun and told Roy, “If you will not give back the necklace to me, I will kill
you!” Out of fear for his life and against his will, Roy gave the necklace
to Isagani. The offense Isagani commited is GRAVE COERCION since
the Roy is being compelled to do something against his will, whether it
be right for Roy to return it or not. (1998 BAR)
Other light coercion or unjust vexation embraced in par. 2 of Art. 287, violence
is absent.
-Thus, taking possession of the thing belonging to the debtor, through
deceit and misrepresentation for the purpose of applying the same to the
payment of debt is unjust vexation under the second paragraph of Art. 287.
Otherwise, if there is violence, crime committed to apply the same to the
payment of the debt is LIGHT COERCION under par. 1 of this Article.
Unjust Vexation (1994, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010 BAR) - is any act
committed without violence but which unjustifiably annoys or vexes an
innocent person.
NOTE: In determining whether the crime of unjust vexation is committed, the
offender’s act must have caused annoyance, irritation, vexation, torment,
distress, or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed.
(People v. Gozum, 54, O.G. 7409)
COMPULSORY PURCHASE OF MERCHANDISE AND PAYMENT OF WAGES BY
MEANS OF TOKENS ART. 288, RPC
Punishable acts and their elements
1. Forcing or compelling, directly or indirectly or knowingly permitting the act
of forcing or compelling of the laborer or employee of the offender to purchase
merchandise or commodities of any kind from him. Elements:
a. Offender is any person, agent or officer of any association or
corporation;
b. He or such firm or corporation has employed laborers or employees;
and
c. He forces or compels directly or indirectly, or knowingly permits to
be forced or compelled, any of his or its laborers or employees to
purchase merchandise or commodities of any kind from him or said
firm or corporation. (2014 BAR)
2. Paying the wages due his laborer or employee by means of tokens or
objects other than the legal tender currency of the Philippines, unless
expressly requested by such laborer or employee. Elements:
a. Offender pays the wages due a laborer or employee employed by him
by means of tokens or object;
b. Those tokens or objects are other than the legal currency of the
Philippines; and
c. Such employee or laborer does not expressly request that he be paid
by means of tokens or objects.
NOTE: The use of tokens, promissory notes, vouchers, coupons, or any
other form alleged to represent legal tender is absolutely prohibited
even when expressly requested by the employee.
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
ROBBERY ART. 293, RPC
Robbery (BAR 1998) It is the taking of personal property belonging to another,
with intent to gain, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person
or using force upon anything.
NOTE: For the appellant to be guilty of consummated robbery there must be
incontrovertible proof that property was taken from the victim. The appellant is
guilty of attempted robbery only when he commences the commission of
robbery directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution
which would produce robbery by reason of some causes or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance.
Classification of robbery:
1. Robbery with violence against, or intimidation of persons (Arts. 294,
297, and 298, RPC);
2. Robbery by the use of force upon things. (Arts. 299 and 302, RPC)
Elements of robbery in general
1. There is personal property belonging to another; (BAR 1992, 1996)
2. There is unlawful taking of that property;
3. Taking must be with intent to gain; and
4. There is violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon
things. (BAR 1992, 2002, 2005)
Unlawful taking is complete when:
1. As to robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons– from
the moment the offender gains possession of the thing even if the culprit had
no opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is complete.
2. As to robbery with force upon things– the thing must be taken out of
the building/premises to consummate the crime.
ROBBERY WITH VIOLENCE AGAINST OR INTIMIDATION OF PERSONS ART.
294, RPC
Punishable acts under Art. 294, RPC (2000, 2005, 2010 BAR)
1. When by reason or on occasion of the robbery the crime of homicide
is committed;
2. When the robbery is accompanied by:
a. Rape;
b. Intentional mutilation; or
c. Arson
3. When by reason or on the occasion of such robbery, any of the
physical injuries resulting in:
a. Insanity; b. Imbecility;
c. Impotency; or d. Blindness is inflicted
4. When by reason or on the occasion of robbery, any of the physical
injuries resulting in the:
a. Loss of the use of speech;
b. Loss of the power to hear or to smell;
c. Loss of an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm or a leg;
d. Loss of the use of any of such member; or
e. Incapacity for the work in which the injured person is
theretofore habitually engaged is inflicted
5. If the violence or intimidation employed in the commission of the
robbery is carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the commission of the
crime;
6. When in the course of its execution, the offender shall have inflicted
upon any person not responsible for the commission of the robbery any of the
physical injuries in consequence of which the person injured:
a. Becomes deformed; b. Loses any other
member of his body;
c. Loses the use thereof;
d. Becomes ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work
in which he is habitually engaged for more than 90 days; or
e. Becomes ill or incapacitated for labor for more than 30 days
7. If the violence employed by the offender does not cause any of the
serious physical injuries defined in Art.263, or if the offender employs
intimidation only.
NOTE: The crime defined in this article is a special complex crime. Article 48
does not apply.
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE Robbery with homicide (2009, 2014 BAR) If death
results or even accompanies a robbery, the crime will be robbery with
homicide provided that the robbery and the homicide are consummated. The
crime of robbery with homicide is a special complex crime or a single
indivisible crime. The killings must have been perpetrated by reason or on the
occasion of robbery. As long as the homicide resulted, during, or because of
the robbery, even if the killing is by mere accident, robbery with homicide is
committed. (People v. Comiling, G.R. No. 140405, March 4, 2004)
NOTE: Even if the killing preceded or was done ahead of the robbing, whether
intentional or not, the crime is robbery with homicide. If aside from homicide,
rape or physical injuries are also committed by reason or on the occasion of
the robbery, the rape or physical injuries are considered aggravating
circumstances in the crime of robbery with homicide. Whenever homicide is
committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who
took part as principals in the commission of the crime will also be guilty as
principals in the crime of robbery with homicide.
Q: Jervis and Marlon asked their friend, Jonathan, to help them rob a bank.
Jervis and Marlon went inside the bank, but were unable to get any money
from the vault because the same was protected by a timedelay mechanism.
They contended themselves with the customer’s cellphones and a total of
P5,000 in cash. After they dashed out of the bank and rushed into the car,
Jonathan pulled the car out of the curb, hitting a pedestrian which resulted in
the latter’s death. What crime or crimes did Jervis, Marlon, and Jonathan
commit? Explain your answer. (2007 BAR)
A: Jervis and Marlon committed the crime of robbery, while Jonathan
committed the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. Jervis and
Marlon are criminally liable for the robbery only because that was the crime
conspired upon and actually committed by them, assuming that the taking of
the cellphones and the cash from the bank’s customers was effected by
intimidation. They will not incur liability for the death of the pedestrian
because they have nothing to do with it. Only Jonathan will incur liability for
the death of the pedestrian, aside from the robbery, because he alone brought
about such death. Although the death caused was not intentional but
accidental, it shall be a component of the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide because it was committed in the course of the commission of
the robbery.
No crime of robbery with multiple homicide (1995, 2007, 2009 BAR)
There is no crime of robbery with multiple homicide under the RPC. The crime
is robbery with homicide notwithstanding the number of homicides committed
on the occasion of the robbery and even if murder, physical injuries, and rape
were also committed on the same occasion. The latter crimes being absorbed.
(People v. Hijada, G.R. No. 123696, March 11, 2004)
ROBBERY WITH RAPE (1996, 1999, 2003, 2004 BAR)
The crime of robbery with rape is a crime against property which is a single
indivisible offense. The rape accompanies the robbery. In a case where rape
and not homicide is committed, there is only a crime of robbery with rape if
both the robbery and the rape are consummated.
NOTE: Although the victim was raped twice on the occasion of Robbery, the
additional rape is not considered as an aggravating circumstance in the crime
of robbery and rape. There is no law providing for the additional rape/s or
homicide/s for that matter to be considered as aggravating circumstance. It
further observed that the enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Art.
14 of the RPC is exclusive, unlike in Art. 13 of the same Code, which
enumerates the mitigating circumstances where analogous circumstances
may be considered. (People v. Regala, G.R. No. 130508, April 5, 2000; People v.
Sultan, G.R. No. 132470, April 27, 2000)
In People v. Suyu, it was ruled that once conspiracy is established between
several accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, they would all be
equally culpable for the rape committed by anyone of them on the occasion of
the robbery, unless anyone of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the
others from committing rape. (2004 BAR)
ROBBERY WITH PHYSICAL INJURIES
To be considered as such, the physical injuries must always be serious. If the
physical injuries are only less serious or slight, they are absorbed in the
robbery. The crime becomes merely robbery. But if the less serious physical
injuries were committed after the robbery was already consummated, there
would be a separate charge for the less serious physical injuries. It will only be
absorbed in the robbery if it was inflicted in the course of the execution of the
robbery. The same is true in the case of slight physical injuries.
ROBBERY WITH ARSON R.A. 7659- Commission of composite crime. The
composite crime would only be committed if the primordial intent of the
offender is to commit robbery and there is no killing, rape, or intentional
mutilation committed by the offender during the robbery. Otherwise, the crime
would be robbery with homicide, or robbery with rape, or robbery with
intentional mutilation, in that order and the arson would only be an
aggravating circumstance. Robbery must precede arson. It is essential that
robbery precede the arson, as in the case of rape and intentional mutilation,
because the amendment included arson among the rape and intentional
mutilation which have accompanied the robbery.
NOTE: Arson has been made a component only of robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons but not of robbery by the use of force upon
things. Hence, if the robbery was by the use of force upon things and therewith
arson was committed, two distinct crimes are committed.
ROBBERY COMMITTED BY A BAND ART. 296, RPC (2010 BAR)
Robbery is committed by a band when at least 4 armed malefactors take part in
the commission of a robbery.
NOTE: If any unlicensed firearm is used, the penalty imposed upon all the
malefactors shall be the maximum of the corresponding penalty provided by
law, without prejudice to the criminal liability for illegal possession of such
firearms. This is a special aggravating circumstance applicable only in a case
of robbery in band.
In Robbery by a band, all are liable for any assault committed by the band,
unless one or some attempted to prevent the assault.
ROBBERY IN AN INHABITED HOUSE OR PUBLIC BUILDING OR EDIFICE
DEVOTED TO WORSHIP ART. 299, RPC
Elements of the first kind of robbery with force upon things under Art. 299
 1. Offender entered an inhabited house, or public building, or edifice
devoted to religious worship; (1992, 2007, 2008 BAR)
2. Entrance was effected by any of the following means:
a. Through an opening not intended for entrance or egress;
b. By breaking any wall, roof, or floor, or breaking any door or
window; (2000 BAR)
c. By using false keys, picklocks, or similar tools, or
d. By using any fictitious name or pretending the exercise of
public authority.
NOTE! The whole body of culprit must be inside the building to
constitute entering.
3. Once inside the building, the offender took personal property
belonging to another with intent to gain.
ENTRY: the offender must have entered the premises where the robbery was
committed. If no entry was effected, even though force may have been
employed in the taking of the property from within the premises, the crime will
only be theft.
EXECUTION OF DEEDS BY MEANS OF VIOLENCE OR INTIMIDATION ART. 298
Elements (2001 BAR)
1. Offender has intent to defraud another;
2. Offender compels him to sign, execute, or deliver any public
instrument or document; and
3. Compulsion is by means of violence or intimidation.
NOTE! Art. 298 applies even if the document signed, executed, or delivered is a
private or commercial document.
POSSESSION OF PICKLOCKS OR SIMILAR TOOLS ART. 304, RPC
Elements (2009 BAR)
1. Offender has in his possession picklocks or similar tools;
2. Such picklocks or similar tools are specially adopted to the
commission of robbery; and
3. Offender does not have lawful cause for such possession.
THEFT: ART. 308, RPC
Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence
against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal
property of another without the latter’s consent.
Persons liable (1995, 1998, 2000, 2008, 2009 BAR)
1. Those who, with intent to gain, but without violence against or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things, take personal property of
another without the latter’s consent;
2. Those who having found lost property, fail to deliver the same to the
local authorities or to its owner; (1998, 2001 BAR)
NOTE: Lost property includes stolen property so that the accused who
found a stolen horse is liable if he fails to deliver the same to the owner
or to the authorities since the term “lost” is generic in nature and
embraces loss by stealing or by any act of a person other than the
owner as well as by the act of the owner himself through same casual
occurrence. (People v. Rodrigo, G.R. No. L‐18507, March 31, 1966)
3. Those who after having maliciously damaged the property of another,
remove or make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by them; or
4. Those who enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is
forbidden or which belongs to another and, without the consent of its owner,
hunt or fish upon the same or gather fruits, cereals or other forest or farm
products.
Q: Mario found a watch in a jeep he was riding, and since it did not belong to
him, he approached policeman P and delivered the watch with instruction to
return the same to whoever may be found to be the owner. P failed to return
the watch to the owner and, instead, sold it and appropriated for himself the
proceeds of the sale. Charged with theft, P reasoned out that he cannot be
found guilty because it was not he who found the watch. Moreover, the watch
turned out to be stolen property. Is P's defense valid? (1998 BAR)
A: NO. In a charge for theft, it is enough that the personal property subject
thereof belongs to another and not to the offender. It is irrelevant whether the
person deprived of the possession of the watch has or has no right to the
watch. Theft is committed by one who, with intent to gain, appropriates
property of another without the consent of its owner. Furthermore, the crime is
committed even when the offender receives property of another but acquires
only physical possession to hold the same. P is a finder in law liable for theft
not estafa.
QUALIFIED THEFT ART. 310, RPC (2007, 2010 BAR)
1. If theft is committed by a domestic servant;
2. If the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence;
NOTE: If the offense is to be qualified by abuse of confidence, the
abuse must be grave, like an accused who was offered food and allowed to
sleep in the house of the complainant out of the latter’s pity and charity, but
stole the latter’s money in his house when he left the place.
3. If the property stolen is a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; (2002
BAR)
4. If the property stolen consist of coconuts taken from the premises of a
plantation;
5. If the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; or
6. If property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic
eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (2006
BAR)
(2014 BAR) A: The defense of Clepto has no merit. Theft is already
consummated from the moment Clepto took possession of one of the smaller
purses inside a high-end shop, without paying for it. She took the personal
property of another, with intent to gain, without the consent of the latter.
Damage or injury to the owner is not an element of theft, hence, even if she left
her purse in lieu of the purse she took, theft is still committed.
Q: Clepto went alone to a high-end busy shop and decided to take one of the
smaller purses without paying for it. Overcame by conscience, she decided to
leave her own purse in place of the one she took. Her act was discovered and
Clepto was charged with theft. She claimed that there was no theft, as the
store suffered no injury or prejudice because she had left a purse in place of
the one she took. Comment on her defense. (2014 BAR)
A: The defense of Clepto has no merit. Theft is already consummated from the
moment Clepto took possession of one of the smaller purses inside a high-end
shop, without paying for it. She took the personal property of another, with
intent to gain, without the consent of the latter. Damage or injury to the owner
is not an element of theft, hence, even if she left her purse in lieu of the purse
she took, theft is still committed.
Q: On May 22, 2012, according to Raquel Torres, one of the household helper
of victims Spouses Gavino, Belen Mejares received a call. She hurried to the
computer room and answered the call away from Torres. When Mejares
returned, she was “pale, perspiring, and panicky.” When Torres asked about
the identity of the caller, Mejares did not answer. She told her instead that
Gavino met an accident and instructed her to get something from a drawer in
the master’s bedroom. Since it was locked, Mejares was supposedly told to
destroy it. When Mejares emerged from the bedroom, she was holding a
plastic hamper that contained black wallet and envelopes and was talking to
someone on her phone. Later on, Mejares told Torres that she was instructed
by Gavino to also take a watch and jewelry since thecash was not enough to
pay the driver in the accident who was threatening to sue. Mejares placed
everything in a green bag and tried to leave the condominium. Is Valencia
liable of the crime of qualified theft?
A: YES. Normal human experience, as well as the consistency in and
confluence of the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, lead to no other
conclusion than that Mejares, taking advantage of her being a domestic helper
of private complainant for approximately a year, committed the crime of
qualified theft. Thus, the Court has been consistent in holding that "intent to
gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful
taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. Thus, actual gain is
irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain." In this case, it is
clear from the established facts that it was Mejares who opened the drawer in
the masters' bedroom and took away the cash and valuables it contained.
(People v. Mejares, G.R. No. 2255735, January 10, 2018, as penned by J.
Leonen)
OCCUPATION OF REAL PROPERTY OR USURPATION OF REAL RIGHTS IN
PROPERTY ART. 312, RPC
Punishable acts:
 1. Taking possession of any real property belonging to another; and
2. Usurping any real rights in property belonging to another.
ELEMENTS:
1. Offender takes possession of any real property or usurps any real
rights in property;
2. Real property or real rights belongs to another;
3. Violence against or intimidation of persons is used by the offender in
occupying real property or usurping real rights in property; (1996 BAR) and
4. There is intent to gain
SWINDLING (ESTAFA) ART. 315, RPC (1999, 2003, 2009, 2010, 2013 BAR)
Elements of estafa in general:
1. Accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of
deceit – This covers the three different ways of committing estafa under
Art. 315, thus:
a. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence;
b. By means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts; or
c. Through fraudulent means
2. Damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the
offended party or third person.
a. The failure of the entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the
sale of the goods, documents, or instruments covered by a trust
receipt, to the extent of the amount owing to the entruster, or as
appearing in the trust receipt; or
b. The failure to return said goods, documents, or instruments if
they were not sold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the
trust receipt.
SWINDLING (ESTAFA) ART. 315, RPC (1999, 2003, 2009, 2010, 2013 BAR)
Elements of estafa in general
1. Accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit –
This covers the three different ways of committing estafa under Art. 315, thus:
a. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence;
b. By means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts; or
c. Through fraudulent means
2. Damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the
offended party or third person.
a. The failure of the entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of
the goods, documents, or instruments covered by a trust receipt, to the extent
of the amount owing to the entruster, or as appearing in the trust receipt; or
b. The failure to return said goods, documents, or instruments if they
were not sold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipt.
Elements of estafa with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence under Art. 315
(1)
Under paragraph (b):
a. Money, goods, or other personal property is received by the offender
in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;
b. There is misappropriation or conversion of such money or property
by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt;
c. Such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and
d. There is a demand made by the offended party to the offender.
NOTE: The fourth element is not necessary when there is evidence of
misappropriation of the goods by the defendant.
Illustration: The accused received in trust the money from the complainants
for the particular purpose of investing the same with the Philtrust Investment
Corp. with the obligation to make delivery thereof upon demand but failed to
return the same despite demands. It was admitted that she used the money for
her business. Accused is guilty of estafa through misappropriation. (Fontanilla
v. People, G.R. No. 120949, July 5, 1996) (2015 BAR)
A money market transaction, however, partakes the nature of a loan, and non‐
payment thereof would not give rise to criminal liability for estafa through
misappropriation or conversion. In money market placements, the unpaid
investor should institute against the middleman or dealer, before the ordinary
courts, a simple action for recovery of the amount he had invested, and if there
is allegation of fraud, the proper forum would be the SEC. (Sesbreno v. CA,
G.R. No. 84096, January 26, 1995)
Rosa cannot be held criminally liable for estafa. Although she received the
jewelry from Victoria under an obligation to return the same or deliver the
proceeds thereof, she did not misappropriate it. In fact, she gave them to
Aurelia specifically to be returned to Victoria. The misappropriation was done
by Aurelia, and absent the showing of any conspiracy between Aurelia and
Rosa, the latter cannot be held criminally liable for Aurelia's acts. (1999 BAR)
Elements of estafa by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts under
Article 315 (2)
Under paragraph (c) – Pretending to have bribed any government employee,
without prejudice to the action for calumny which the offended party may
deem proper to bring against the offender. (2014 BAR)
Under paragraph (d) – postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation. (2014 BAR)
Elements:
1. The postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time the check was issued;
2. Lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and
3. Damage to the payee. (People v. Montaner, G.R. No. 184053, August
31, 2011)
Application:
1. Check is drawn to enter into an obligation
2. Obligation is not pre‐existing
NOTE: The check must be genuine. If the check is falsified and is
encashed with the bank or exchanged for cash, the crime is estafa thru
falsification of a commercial document.
Illlustration: The accused must be able to obtain something from the
offended party by means of the check he issued and delivered. Thus, if
A issued a check in favor of B for a debt he has incurred a month or so
ago, the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds in the bank
does not constitute Estafa. But if A told B to deliver to him P10,000 and
he would issue in favor of B a check in the sum of P11,000 as it was a
Sunday and A needed the cash urgently, and B gave his P10,000 having
in mind the profit of P1,000 when he encashed the check on Monday
and the check bounced when deposited, A can be held liable for Estafa.
In such case, it was clear that B would have not parted with his P10,000
were it not for the issuance of A’s check.
Good faith as a defense: The payee’s knowledge that the drawer has no
sufficient funds to cover the postdated checks at the time of their
issuance negates estafa.
Separate charges of estafa and illegal recruitment:
It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal
recruitment under R.A. No. 8042, in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. We explicated in
People v. Cortez and Yabut that: In this jurisdiction, it is settled that the
offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of
the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where
the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for
offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for offenses
punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2(a) of
Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal
recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that one’s acquittal of the crime of
estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale, and vice versa. (People v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 173792,
August 31, 2011; 2015 BAR)
OTHER FORMS OF SWINDLING ART. 316, RPC
Disposing real property knowing it to be encumbered even if the encumbrance
be not recorded. (1998 BAR)
Elements:
 a. That the thing disposed of is real property;
NOTE: If the thing encumbered is a personal property, it is Art. 319
(selling or pledging personal property) which governs and not this
Article.
b. Offender knew that the real property was encumbered, whether the
encumbrance is recorded or not;
NOTE: Encumbrance includes every right or interest in the land
which exists in favor of third persons
c. There must be express representation by the offender that the real
property is free from encumbrance; and
d. Act of disposing of the real property be made to the damage of
another.
NOTE: If the loan had already been granted before the property was
offered as a security, Art. 316 (2) is not violated.
OTHER DECEITS ART. 318, RPC (2000 BAR)
1. Defrauding or damaging another by any other deceit not mentioned in
the preceding articles; and
2. Interpreting dreams, making forecasts, telling fortunes, or taking
advantage of the credulity of the public in any other similar manner, for profit
or gain. Deceits in this article include false pretenses and fraudulent acts.
Q: Osorio, an agent of Philam Life, offered Gabriel insurance policy.
During the meeting, Osorio presented her ID and calling card. Gabriel accepted
and consistently paid her premiums. Later on, Gabriel received a letter from
PMIAM thanking her for investing her money with PMIAM. Gabriel confronted
Osorio on why her investment was diverted to PMIAM. Osorio explained that
PMIAM investments would yield a higher rate of return. Displeased, Gabriel
asked for a refund of her initial investment. Consequently, Gabriel received
P13,000.00 from PMIAM. In spite of this, Gabriel insisted on the refund. PMIAM
informed Gabriel that her initial investment and unpaid interest income would
be released to her. Unfortunately, she was unable to recover it. Demands were
made to Osorio, but these remained unheeded. Osorio was charged with estafa
under Article 315(2)(e). Is Osorio guilty of estafa under Article 315(2)(e)?
A: NO. Osorio is not guilty of estafa under Article 315(2)(e), but is guilty
of other deceits under Article 318 of the RPC. Article 318 of the Revised Penal
Code is broad in application. It is intended as a catch-all provision to cover all
other kinds of deceit not falling under Articles 315, 316, and 317 of the RPC.
Osorio, in soliciting Gabriel’s money, falsely represented that it would be
invested in Philam Life and that its proceeds would be used to pay for
Gabriel's insurance premiums. This false representation is what induced
Gabriel to part with her funds and disregard the payment of her insurance
premiums. Since Osorio deviated from what was originally agreed upon by
placing the investment in another company, Gabriel's insurance policies
lapsed. Osorio must be criminally liable for misrepresenting to Gabriel that the
latter's money would be invested in Philam Life Fund Management and that its
proceeds may be utilized to pay for Gabriel's insurance premiums. (Osorio v.
People, G.R. No. 207711, July 2, 2018, as penned by J. Leonen)
DESTRUCTIVE ARSON ART. 320, RPC AS AMENDED BY R.A. 7659
NOTE: The laws on arson in force today are P.D. 1613 on Simple Arson, and
Art. 320, as amended by R.A. 7659 on Destructive Arson. (Reyes, 2017)
Commission of Destructive Arson
1. Any person who shall burn: (2000 BAR)
a. One or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of
burning, or as a result of simultaneous burnings, or committed on several or
different occasions;
b. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in
general, or where people usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose
such as, but not limited to official governmental function or business, private
transaction, commerce, trade workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely
incidental to a definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels, motels,
transient dwellings, public conveyance or stops or terminals, regardless of
whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said building or
edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of whether the building is
actually inhabited or not; (1994 BAR)
c. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to
transportation or conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or
leisure;
d. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances
thereto, which are devoted to the service of public utilities; or
 e. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or
destroying evidence of another violation of law, or for the purpose of
concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to collect from
insurance. (1995 BAR)
2. Two or more persons or by a group of persons, regardless of whether their
purpose is merely to burn or destroy the building or the burning merely
constitutes an overt act in the commission of another violation of law.
3. Any person who shall burn:
a. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks
factory, ordinance, storehouse, archives or general museum of the
Government.
b. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or
explosive materials.
NOTE: If there was intent to kill, the crime committed is not arson but murder
by means of fire.
PERSONS EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN CRIMES AGAINST
PROPERTY ART. 332, RPC
Crimes involved in this Article
1. Theft;
2. Swindling (estafa); and
3. Malicious mischief.
If any of the crimes is complexed with another crime, such as Estafa thru
Falsification, Art. 332 is not applicable.
Persons exempted under Art. 332, RPC (2000, 2008 BAR)
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the
same line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to
the deceased spouse before the same passed into the possession of
another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living
together.
NOTE: The exemption does not apply to strangers participating in the
commission of the offense. Reason for exemption. The law recognizes the
presumed co-ownership of the property between the offender and the offended
party.
Persons also included in the enumeration:
The stepfather, adopted children, natural children, concubine, and paramour.
CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
ADULTERY ART. 333, RPC
Elements (2002, 2008, 2015 BAR)
1. To convict a woman for adultery, it is necessary:
a. That she is a married woman; and
b. That she unites in sexual intercourse with a man not her husband.
2. To convict a man for adultery, it is necessary:
a. That he had actual intercourse with a married woman; and
b. That he commits the act with the knowledge that said woman is
married.
NOTE! A single intercourse consummates the crime of adultery. Each sexual
intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery, even if it involves the same man.
The sexual intercourse need not to be proved by direct evidence.
Circumstantial evidence like seeing the married woman and her paramour in
scanty dress, sleeping together, alone in a house, would suffice.
Q: Is the acquittal of one of the defendants operates as a cause of acquittal of
the other?
A: NO, because of the following reasons:
 1. There may not be a joint criminal intent, although there is joint
physical act. One of the parties may be insane and the other sane, in which
case, only the sane could be held liable criminally. (Reyes, 2017)
2. The man may not know that the woman is married, in which case, the
man is innocent.
3. Death of the woman during the pendency of the action cannot defeat
the trial and conviction of the man.
4. Even if the man had left the country and could not be apprehended,
the woman can be tried and convicted.
CONCUBINAGE ART. 334, RPC
Punishable acts under concubinage:
1. Keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling.
2. Having sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a
woman who is not his wife.
3. Cohabiting with her in any other place.
Unlike in adultery where a single sexual intercourse may constitute such a
crime, in concubinage, a married man is liable only when he had sexual
intercourse under scandalous circumstances.
Elements (1994, 2002, 2010 BAR)
1. Man must be married;
2. He committed any of the following acts:
a. Keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling;
Illustration: If the charges consist in keeping a mistress in the
conjugal dwelling, there is no need of proof of sexual intercourse. The
conjugal dwelling is the house of the spouses even if the wife happens
to be temporarily absent therefrom. The woman however must be
brought to the conjugal house by the accused as concubine to fall
under this article. Thus, if the co-accused was voluntarily taken and
sheltered by the spouses in their house, and treated as an adopted
child being a relative of the complaining wife, her illicit relations with
the accused husband does not make her a mistress.
b. Having sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances,
with a woman who is not his wife; or
Illustration: For the crime of concubinage by having sexual
intercourse under a scandalous manner to exist, it must be done
imprudently and wantonly as to offend modesty and sense of morality
and decency. Thus, where the accused and his mistress lived in the
same room of a house, comported themselves as husband and wife
publicly and privately, giving the impression to everybody that they
were married, and performed acts in sight of the community which gave
rise to criticism and general protest among neighbors, they committed
concubinage.
c. Cohabiting with her in any other place.
Illustration: If the charge is cohabiting with a woman not his wife
in any other place, proof of actual sexual intercourse may not be
necessary too. But the term “cohabit” means intercourse together as
husband or wife or living together as husband and wife. The
cohabitation must be for some period of time which may be a week, a
year or longer as distinguished from occasional or transient meetings
for unlawful sexual intercourse.
3. As regards the woman, she must know him to be married.
QUALIFIED SEDUCTION ART. 337, RPC
Acts that constitute qualified seduction:
1. Seduction of a virgin over 12 years and under 18 years of age by certain
persons, such as, a person in public authority, priest, home servant,
domestic, guardian, teacher, or any person who, in any capacity shall
be entrusted with the education or custody of the woman seduced;
Elements: (2007 BAR)
a. Offended party is a virgin which is presumed if she is unmarried and
of good reputation;
b. She is over 12 and under 18 years of age;
 c. Offender has sexual intercourse with her; and
d. There is abuse of authority, confidence, or relationship on the part of
the offender.
2. Seduction of a sister by her brother, or descendant by her ascendant,
regardless of her age or reputation.
NOTE! In this case, it is not necessary that the offended party is still a
virgin.
NOTE: If the offended party is a descendant or a sister of the offender –
no matter how old she is or whether she is a prostitute – the crime of qualified
seduction is committed.
NOTE: Virginity for purposes of qualified seduction does not mean physical
virginity. It refers to a woman of chaste character or virtuous woman of good
reputation. Virginity is not to be understood in a material sense as to exclude
the idea of abduction of a virtuous woman of a good reputation. Thus, when
the accused claims he had prior sexual intercourse with the complainant, the
latter is still to be considered a virgin.

Persons liable for qualified seduction: CONSENTED ABDUCTION ART. 343, RPC Elements (2002 BAR)

1. Those who abused their authority: 1. Offended party must be a virgin;

a. Person in public authority; NOTE: The virginity mentioned in this Article should not be understood
in its material sense and does not exclude the idea of abduction of a
b. Guardian; virtuous woman of good reputation because the essence of the offense
is not the wrong done to the woman but the outrage to the family and
c. Teacher; or the alarm produced in it by the disappearance of one of its members.
(Valdepeñas v. People, G.R. No. L-20687, April 30, 1966)
d. Person who, in any capacity, is entrusted with the education or
custody of the woman seduced. 2. She must be over 12 and under 18 years of age;

NOTE: In the case of a teacher, it is not necessary that the girl be his 3. Taking away of the offended party must be with her consent, after
student. It is enough that she is enrolled in the same school. solicitation or cajolery from the offender; and

2. Those who abused the confidence reposed in them: 4. Taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs.

a. Priest; NOTE: In consented abduction, it is not necessary that the young victim
(a virgin over twelve and under 18) be personally taken from her parent’s home
b. Home servant; or by the accused; it is sufficient that she was instrumental in leaving the house.
The accused must however use solicitation, cajolery or deceit, or honeyed
c. Domestic. promises of marriage to induce the girl to escape from her home.
3. Those who abused their relationship: CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS
a. Brother who seduced his sister; or SIMULATION OF BIRTHS, SUBSTITUTION OF ONE CHILD FOR ANOTHER, AND
CONCEALMENT OR ABANDONMENT OF A LEGITIMATE CHILD ART. 347, RPC
b. Ascendant who seduced his descendant.
Punishable acts:

1. Simulation of births;
 2. Substitution of one child for another; and
3. Concealing or abandoning any legitimate child with intent to cause
such child to lose its civil status.
NOTE! The commission of any of the acts defined in this Article must have, for
its object, the creation of a false civil status. The purpose is to cause the loss
of any trace as to the filiation of the child. (Reyes, 2012)
When simulation of birth takes place (2002 BAR)
Simulation of birth takes place when the woman pretends to be
pregnant when in fact she is not, and on the day of the supposed delivery,
takes the child of another as her own. The woman is liable together with the
person who furnishes the child. (Guevara, as cited in Reyes, 2008)
NOTE: The fact that the child will be benefited by simulation of birth is not a
defense since it creates a false status detriment of members of the family to
which the child is introduced.
In People v. Sangalang (74 O.G. 5983), it was ruled that for the crime to exist, it
must be shown that the pretending parents have registered or caused the
registration of the child with the Registry of Births or that in so doing they
were motivated by a desire to cause the loss of any trace as to the child’s
filiation to his prejudice.
BIGAMY ART. 349, RPC
Elements (1996, 2004, 2008, 2012 BAR)
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity, except for the existence of the first marriage.
NOTE: The second husband or wife who knew of the first marriage is an
accomplice. The witness who falsely vouched for the capacity of either of the
contracting parties is also an accomplice. (Reyes, 2008)
**The second or subsequent marriage should be valid were it not for the first
marriage. Otherwise, the charge of Bigamy will not materialize. (People v.
Mendoza, G.R. No. L-5877, September 28, 1954)
**Bigamy is NOT a private crime. Thus, it is immaterial whether it is the first or
the second wife who initiates the action, for it is a public crime which can be
denounced not only by the person affected thereby but even by a civic-spirited
citizen who may come to know the same. (People v. Belen, C.A., 45 O.G., Supp.
5, 88)
Q: Vitangcol married Alice Eduardo and begot 3 children. After some time,
Alice began hearing rumors that her husband was previously married to
another woman named Gina Gaerlan. Such marriage was supported by a
marriage contract registered with the NSO. This prompted Alice to file a
criminal complaint for bigamy against Vitangcol. In his defense, Vitangcol
alleges that he already revealed to Alice that he had a “fake marriage” with his
college girlfriend Gina and that there is a Certification from the Office of the
Civil Registrar that there is no record of the marriage license issued to
Vitangcol and his first wife Gina which makes his first marriage as void. Is
Vitangcol liable of the crime of bigamy?
A: YES, Vitangcol is liable of the crime of bigamy. Bigamy consists of the
following elements: (1) that the offender has been legally married; (2) that the
first marriage had not yet been legally dissolved or in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the
Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that
the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
In this case, all the elements of bigamy are present, since Vitangcol was still
legally married to Gina when he married Alice. His defense of Certification
from the Office of the Civil Registrar implying that there is no record of the
marriage license issued to Vitangcol and his first wife Gina will not lie because
marriages are not dissolved through mere certifications by the civil registrar.
Hence, Vitangcol is still considered to be legally married to Gina when he
married Alice and is not exculpated from the bigamy charged. (Vitangcol v.
People, G.R. No. 207406, January 13, 2016, as penned by J. Leonen)
Effect of execution of an Affidavit of Desistance during the pendency of the
appeal in a bigamy case
Q: Prudencio married Arlene in 1994. In 2007, Prudencio abandoned his wife
and children and contracted a subsequent marriage with Basan in 2010. He
was charged for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial
court convicted him of the crime charged. During the pendency of his appeal
in the Court of Appeals, Arlene executed an Affidavit of Desistance praying
that the case be dismissed after she had reconciled with Prudencio. Is
Prudencio still guilty for bigamy despite the Affidavit of Desistance?
A: YES. Prudencio should still be convicted for bigamy. Affidavits of
desistance that were executed after judgments of conviction had been
promulgated by trial courts are generally received with extensive caution.
Arlene’s Affidavit of Desistance provides that she filed the Complaint due to a
misunderstanding, which both she and Prudencio had agreed to reconcile.
This Affidavit of Desistance cannot prove the nonexistence of all the elements
of bigamy. The trial court was able to show that the four elements were present
being: (1) the marriage between the appellant and the private complainant is
still existing; (2) the same has not been legally declared to be dissolved; (3)
appellant contracted a subsequent marriage with a certain Jean Basan while
his first marriage with the private complainant is still subsisting; and (4) the
second marriage has all the essential requisits for its validity. An admission of
misunderstanding and subsequent reconciliation does not prove the
nonexistence of any of the elements provided. Thus, Prudencio should still be
held guilty of bigamy. (De Guzman v. People, G.R. No. 224742, August 7, 2018,
as penned by J. Leonen)
MARRIAGE CONTRACTED AGAINST PROVISIONS OF LAWS ART. 350, RPC
Elements (1993, 2004 BAR)
1. Offender contracted marriage;
2. He knew at the time that the: a. Requirements of the law were not
complied with; or b. Marriage was in disregard of a legal impediment.
3. The act of the offender does not constitute bigamy.
Illustration: Where the parties secured a falsified marriage contract
complete with the supposed signature of a mayor and which they presented to
the priest who solemnized the marriage, they committed Illegal Marriage.
CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
LIBEL ART. 353, RPC - a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a
vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a
natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
Commission of libel is a defamation committed by means of writing, printing,
lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting or theatrical or
cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means.
Persons liable for libel:
1. Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or
exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means; or
2. The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business
manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, for defamation
contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.
Elements (2005, 2010 BAR)
1. There must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance;
2. Imputation must be made publicly; (2003 BAR)
3. It must be malicious;
4. It must be directed at a natural or juridical person, or one who is
dead; (2002 BAR) and
5. It must tend to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of the
person defamed.
**No necessity in naming the person accused In order to maintain a libel
suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is not necessary
that he be named. It must be shown that at least a third person could identify
him as the object of the libelous publication. (Borjal v. CA, G.R. No. 126466,
January 14, 1999)
Test to determine whether a statement is defamatory:
-the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be
taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be
understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used
and understood in another sense.”
- The intention or meaning of the writer is immaterial. It is the meaning
that the words in fact conveyed on the minds of persons of reasonable
understanding, discretion, and candor which should be considered.
REQUIREMENT FOR PUBLICITY ART. 354, RPC: Publication of the libelous
article is not necessary It is not necessary that the libelous article must be
published; communication of the defamatory matter to some third persons is
sufficient. It is not required that the person defamed has read or heard about
the libelous remark. What is material is that a third person has read or heard
the libelous statement - for a man’s reputation is the estimate in which others
hold him, not the good opinion which he has of himself.
- Writing to a person other than the person defamed is sufficient to constitute
publication for the person to whom the letter is addressed is a third person in
relation to its writer and the person defamed therein.
Malice: A term used to indicate the fact that the offender is prompted by
personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to
injure the reputation of the person defamed.
NOTE: Malice is presumed and the test is the character of the words used. The
meaning of the writer or author is immaterial.
Instances when malice is NOT presumed:
1. Private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral, or social duty.
Requisites:
a. Person who made the communication had a legal moral or
social duty to make the communication or at least, he had an interest to
be upheld;
b. Communication is addressed to an officer, or a board, or
superior, having some interest or duty in the matter; and
c. Statements in the communication are made in good faith
without malice (in fact).
2. Fair and true report made in good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are
not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered
in the exercise of their functions.
Requisites:
a. That it is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any
other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions;
b. That it is made in good faith; and
c. That it is without any comments or remarks.
NOTE: The instances when malice is not presumed are examples of
malice in fact.
Q: Do the defamatory remarks and comments on the conduct or acts of public
officers which are related to the discharge of their official duties constitute
libel?
A: NO. It will not constitute libel if the accused proves the truth of the
imputation. But any attack upon the private character of the public officers on
matters which are not related to the discharge of their official functions may
constitute libel.
Invocation of freedom of speech: Although a wide latitude is given to critical
utterances made against public officials in the performance of their official
duties, or against public figures on matters of public interest, such criticism
does not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected
speech. If the utterances are false, malicious, or unrelated to a public officer’s
performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest involving
public figures, the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability. (Fermin v.
People, G.R. No. 157643, March 28, 2008)
Doctrine of Fair Comment: While in general every discreditable imputation
publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until
his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious,
nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public
person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that
such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must
either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition.
If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it 4. Engraving;
is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might
reasonably be inferred from the facts. (Borjal v. CA, G.R. No. 126466 January 5. Radio; (2002 BAR)
14, 1999)
6. Phonograph;
Common defense in libel:
7. Painting;
That it is covered by privileged communication:
8. Theatrical exhibition;
1. Absolute – not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith:
9. Cinematographic exhibition; or
a. Statements made by members of Congress in the discharge of their
official functions; 10. Any similar means. (2005 BAR)

b. Allegations or statements made by the parties or their counsel in NOTE! Defamation through amplifiers is not libel, but oral defamation. (People
their pleadings or motions or during the hearing of judicial proceedings; v. Santiago, G.R. No. L17663, May 30, 1962)

c. Answers given by witnesses in reply to questions propounded to
them, in the course of said proceedings, provided that said allegations or
statements are relevant to the issues, and the answers are responsive or
pertinent to the questions propounded to said witnesses. (Alcantara v. Ponce,
G.R. No. 156183, February 28, 2007)
It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the
course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged. This absolute
privilege remains regardless of the defamatory tenor and the presence of
malice if the same are relevant, pertinent, or material to the cause in hand or
subject of the inquiry.
2. Conditional or qualified – like a private communication made by any person
to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty, and a fair and
true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature. Here, even if the statements are defamatory, there is no presumption of
malice. The prosecution must prove malice in fact to convict the accused.
LIBEL BY MEANS OF WRITING OR SIMILAR MEANS ART. 355, RPC
Commission of Libel may be committed by:
1. Writing;
2. Printing;
3. Lithography;
SLANDER ART. 358, RPC - Slander is a libel committed by oral (spoken)
means, instead of in writing. It is also defined as the speaking base and
defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation.
Kinds of oral defamation
1. Simple slander; and
2. Grave slander, when it is of a serious and insulting nature.
Elements of oral defamation
1. There must be an imputation of a crime, or a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstances;
2. Imputation must be made publicly;
3. The imputation must be malicious;
4. The imputation must be directed at a natural or juridical person, or one who
is dead; and
5. The imputation must tend to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the
person defamed. (People v. Maratas, April 11, 1980)
NOTE: The imputation must be verbally made or uttered. The slanderous
remarks need not to be heard by the offended party as long as they are uttered
in the presence of a third person.
Factors that determine the gravity of oral defamation
1. Expressions used;
2. Personal relations of the accused and the offended party; and
3. Circumstances surrounding the case.
NOTE: Social standing and the position of the offended party are also taken
into account.
Q: Lando and Marco are candidates in the local elections. In his speeches
Lando attacked his opponent Marco alleging that he is the son of Nanding, a
robber and a thief, who amassed his wealth through shady deals. May Marco
file a case against Lando for grave oral defamation? (1990 BAR)
A: NO. Marco cannot file a case for grave oral defamation. If at all, he may file a
case for light slander. In the case of People v. Laroga (40 O.G. 123), it was held
that defamation in political meeting, when feelings are running high and
people could not think clearly, shall only amount to light slander.
SLANDER BY DEED ART. 359, RPC
Slander by deed (1994 BAR) A crime against honor which is committed by
performing any act which casts dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon another
person.
Elements:
1. Offender performs any act not included in any other crime against honor;
2. Such act is performed in the presence of other person or persons; and
3. Such act casts dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon the offended party.
Kinds of slander by deed:
1. Simple slander by deed – performance of an act, not use of words.
2. Grave slander by deed – that is which is of a serious crime.
How to determine whether an act is slander by deed or not- depends on the
social standing of the offended party, the circumstances under which the act
was committed, the occasion, etc.
Illustration: Thus, slapping a lady in a dance not for the purpose of
hurting her but to cause her shame and humiliation for refusing to dance with
the accused is slander by deed.
This crime involves an act, while libel or slander involves words written or
uttered.
Rationale for the criminal liability of persons enumerated in Art. 360 of the RPC
(2013 BAR)
It was enunciated in U.S. v. Ocampo, that according to the legal doctrines and
jurisprudence of the United States, the printer of a publication containing
libelous matter is liable for the same by reason of his direct connection
therewith and his cognizance of the contents thereof. With regard to a
publication in which a libel is printed, not only is the publisher but also all
other persons who in any way participate in or have any connection with its
publication are liable as publishers.
The venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is
limited to only either of two places, namely:
1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense; or
2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are
used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the
Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was
printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the
address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers,
magazines, or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in
order to forestall any inclination to harass.
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to
defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be
no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit
the premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on the
website in Makati with “printing and first publication” would spawn the very
ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and
prevent. (Bonifacio et al v. RTC Makati, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010)
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE IMPRUDENCE AND NEGLIGENCE ART. 365, RPC
Punishable acts (1993, 2001, 2008, 2009 BAR)

1. Committing through reckless imprudence any act which, had it been

intentional, would constitute a grave or less grave felony or light felony;

2. Committing through simple imprudence or negligence an act which

would otherwise constitute a grave or a less serious felony;

3. Causing damage to the property of another through reckless

imprudence or simple imprudence or negligence; and

4. Causing through simple imprudence or negligence some wrong

which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

Elements of reckless imprudence:

1. Offender does or fails to do an act;

2. The doing of or the failure to do that act is voluntary;

3. It be without malice;

4. Material damage results; and

5. There is an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person

performing or failing to perform such act taken into consideration:
(2007 BAR)

a. Employment or occupation

b. Degree of intelligence

c. Physical condition

d. Other circumstances regarding persons, time and place

Elements of simple imprudence:

1. There is lack of precaution on the part of the offender; (BAR 2008)

and

2. Damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger

clearly manifested.

NOTE: Art. 64, relative to mitigating and aggravating circumstances, is not

applicable in quasi-offenses.