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Commentary: On The Problem of Universals

Keneth Gadian

Since Plato proposed his schema of explaining reality through concepts like Forms,
particulars, and universals, thinkers of Metaphysics were divided as they grappled with this
contention. So in the statement “The tree is tall”, can Tallness exist without the existence of the
tree on which it is attached? If Tallness can exist unattached from the tree, where does it
reside? Does the Tree owe Tallness or Tree-ness its existence Should we even treat Tallness like
a being or an separate object?

The realists would agree on the idea that universals exists and our knowledge of
particular things’ properties is dependent on their exemplification of these universals (which
are objectively separate from the particulars). The nominalists, on the other hand, do not
believe that universals exists and that concepts like being courageous or being good are simply
names we associate with properties of things. I find it amusing that even among the Realists,
there are divisions of various kinds : for example the Platonists who believe that the universals
exists outside and independent of the particulars (and the particulars only make sense or is
deemed true because of the existence of universals) and the Aristotelian empiricists claiming
that universals are nothing but “free floating” non-existent concepts unless they are
exemplified by any particular object, and we know them by observing how they are exemplified
by the particulars. They would even argue about the existence of unexemplified universals. And
furthermore, even among the Platonist realists, there are divisions still as to how the schema
on universals are ought to be restricted. I find it amusing because this seemingly endless
divisions among divisions among the Metaphysicists are in reverse, reflective of the very issues
that the group is wrestling with. Take for example the endless loop of particulars sharing the
same universal properties (for example, they are all pink) and yet these universal is still part of a
bigger group of universals (Colors) and still colors are related to other universals as well forming
another group. It begs the question, if universals have universals, will this process reach an end
and what may we find at the end? Aristotle’s method of categorization, on the other hand
breaks down things into divisions/ categories and these categories will then be divided into
more categories, so on and so forth until a branch cannot be divided anymore. It reminded me
of a saying from old people when trying to teach the youth of contentment: “Why bother? At
any given time, there will always be another person having less than you do and another person
having more than you do.”
TRUTH, IDENTITY, GOD (always at the end of these process) (Can he be in the middle of
the mess?)

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