RST 5 PRE SIM STUDY - Ryan Air

RYANAIR RST5
FLIGHT TRAINING DEPARTMENT REV 0.1
PRE-SIMULATOR STUDY GUIDE 1st May 2015 to 30th Oct 2015
FOREWORD
This document contains essential RST 5 pre-SIM study material. ALL pilots must complete the RST 5
specific pre-course preparation material and modules available on the Ryanair eLearning RST 5
section. Access to this site is available through Crewdock > My Crewdock >Ryanair eLearning system.
On completion all pilots must print the course completion certificate and present it to the examiner
conducting your simulator check.
NB: Any changes made to a new revision of this document will be indicated by red change bars.
It is important that you arrive to the check well prepared.
The purpose of this study guide is to give an overview of the training day and OPC. It contains key
learning objectives, an overview of the OPC and training material.
A separate document with recommended study is also available in the Ryanair eLearning RST 5 section
containing OPC specific preparation, including common errors.
These two guides apply to the RST 5 period (1stMay 2015 to 31st Oct 2015) which will consist of one
day simulator training and checking as indicated in the table below:
Briefing OPC LOS DEBRIEF
1:45 Including:
CRM - Workload Management and SOPs
BREAK Volcanic Ash

1.5 hrs 2:55 1 hour
(20min) High Energy Approach Prevention
Go Around Not In The Landing Configuration
Fuel Systems
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Contents
How to Study Using eLearning ................................................................................................................... 4
What to Study? .......................................................................................................................................... 4
Technical and Procedural ....................................................................................................................... 5
Note: FCOM Vol 1, Rev 24, Operating Limitations Chapter ................................................................... 6
Simulator Study Guide ........................................................................................................................... 6
Evidence Based Training & Core Competencies ........................................................................................ 7
KORA – (Key Operational Risk Areas)......................................................................................................... 9
Safety Management System (SMS) ........................................................................................................ 9
Key Operational Risk Areas (KORA) ....................................................................................................... 9
Key Learning Objectives ............................................................................................................................. 9
Communications ...................................................................................................................................... 10
Communicating with ATC..................................................................................................................... 10
Communicating with Passengers ......................................................................................................... 10
Prolonged Loss of Communication ...................................................................................................... 12
Volcanic Ash ............................................................................................................................................. 13
Threat and Error Management (TEM) ................................................................................................. 13
Recognising a Volcanic Ash Encounter ................................................................................................ 14
Visible or Discernible Ash ................................................................................................................. 14
Low and Medium Levels of VA ......................................................................................................... 14
Active Ash Cloud .............................................................................................................................. 15
VA Encounter ....................................................................................................................................... 15
Commence the Manoeuvre (PF) .......................................................................................................... 15
Communicate (PM) .............................................................................................................................. 15
Pan or Mayday ..................................................................................................................................... 15
Heading and Flight Level ...................................................................................................................... 16
QRH Volcanic Ash Checklist ................................................................................................................. 16
Engine Limit Surge or Stall ................................................................................................................... 18
High Energy Approach Management ....................................................................................................... 19
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VSD ........................................................................................................................................................... 25
Go Arounds .............................................................................................................................................. 29
Problems Encountered during a Go Around ........................................................................................ 29
The Instrument Scan ............................................................................................................................ 29
Go Around in a Non Standard Configuration ....................................................................................... 31
Performing Safer Go Arounds .............................................................................................................. 32
Summary .............................................................................................................................................. 32
Landing Without Clearance...................................................................................................................... 33
Fuel Systems ............................................................................................................................................ 33
Fuel System General ............................................................................................................................ 33
Fuel System Non Normals .................................................................................................................... 35
IMBAL NNC ....................................................................................................................................... 35
CROSSFEED SELECTOR INOPERATIVE NNC....................................................................................... 38
Fuel Leak Engine NNC ...................................................................................................................... 41
QRH and Non Normal Management ........................................................................................................ 43
Appendix .................................................................................................................................................. 44
CASE STUDIES ........................................................................................................................................... 45
Stall on Final Approach ........................................................................................................................ 45
High Energy Approach FMM ................................................................................................................ 48
High Energy Approach ACE .................................................................................................................. 50
AIRPROX: Loss of Separation during Go Around.................................................................................. 53
AIRPROX: Loss of Separation ............................................................................................................... 55
Core Competencies, Behavioural Markers and Word Pictures ............................................................... 56
LOS PREPARATION ............................................................................................................................... 58
Weather ........................................................................................................................................... 58
Notams ............................................................................................................................................. 58
Flight Plan…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..60
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How to Study Using eLearning
The course can be completed in modules, at your own pace and over an extended period of time
rather than in one go. It is possible to complete it in a shorter time, but this is not optimum. Leaving it
until shortly before your check is not recommended. Plan ahead and complete it in stages.
The quizzes can be completed over any length of time so long as the quiz is not “SUBMITTED”. The
quiz will remain open and any answers will be saved, over an indefinite period, allowing multiple visits
to the quiz before final submission.
Pilots are encouraged to use the eLearning website as a resource. Please note that there are other
training presentations available that may be viewed at any time such as Performance, Winter Ops,
CRM (All previous CRM topics covered in RSTs) and various videos.
What to Study?
E-Learning presentations:
CRM presentation and notes Workload management and SOPs.

Technical Refresher presentations.
Manuals:
Pre Simulator Study Guide.

Pre Simulator recommended reading.
FCOM 1 and 2.
QRH.
Operations manual part 8 Chapter 8.
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Technical and Procedural

Manual Rev. 24 Reference Complete
(unless otherwise (Optional
stated) Revision Aid)
eLearning Review all eLearning presentations for RST 5 and
complete Technical and SOP exam. Print certificate.
FCOM 1 Review Normal Procedures/SOPs and callouts.
FCIs Review all current FCIs, in particular those relating to

OPT.
FCOM 1 Limitations Limitations are now considered memory items
therefore review and refresh.
FCOM 2 Chapter 15 Warning Systems
FCOM 2 Chapter 12 Fuel
QRH Learn all memory items/manoeuvres.
Be familiar with:
Engine Limit Surge/Stall checklist

Engine Failure and Shutdown
Engine Inflight Start
Engine Severe Damage
Volcanic Ash
General familiarity with all checklists.
QRH Checklist Instructions/Boeing QRH familiarisation doc.

Volcanic Ash Review Air Operations Manual Part A Volcanic Ash
section.
A review of the RST 4 eLearning presentation on

volcanic ash is available and recommended.
Simulator study guide Review relevant parts.

FCTM Review chapter 7 and 8.
Line Training Student Descent Planning and Energy Management.

Notes
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Note: FCOM Vol 1, Rev 24, Operating Limitations Chapter

Limitations are memory items. Operational information listed in this chapter that are memory items
are marked with a (#) symbol. These must be memorised because flight crew access to reference
documents cannot assure timely compliance, e.g. maximum flap extension altitude. They need only be
memorised to the extent that compliance is assured. Knowing the exact wording of the limitation is
not required.
Simulator Study Guide

The Ryanair Simulator Study Guide can be found on Crewdock under TRAINING  TRAINEE NOTES.
This document was originally called the Type Rating Simulator Study Guide. This document contains
excellent guidance on various topic areas and should be used as a reference for all pilots to improve
their knowledge.
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Evidence Based Training & Core Competencies
To continually improve standards and stay in line with industry best practice the Training Department
has introduced a Competency Based Assessment System. This is as part of a phased transition
towards Evidence Based Training.
Core competencies have been developed

by ICAO, IATA and aircraft manufacturers.
They are designed to decrease repetitive
manoeuvers as the sole determinant of
competence. The training department
want to move away from training and
assessing particular events, to providing
pilots with the knowledge, skills and
attitude required to deal with any
unexpected or unforeseen circumstances.
The core competencies are related

behaviours, based on job requirements
which describe how to effectively
perform a job and what proficient
performance looks like. The structure
includes the name of the competency, a
description, and a list of behavioural
indicators.
This is not just a new grading scheme; CRM is integral to all competencies and will not be graded
individually. Exercises are seen as a means to train a competency, not to train a specific exercise. For
pilots this grading system provides great awareness of strengths and weaknesses, so individual
competencies can be targeted as areas to improve, not just for the pilot community for the training
department.
A fundamental concept behind this is the requirement to teach an exercise until the student displays
competency. This requires the instructor to diagnose the weakness and provide guidance on how to
resolve the problem. One particular exercise may give the opportunity for a pilot to develop their
skills in a number of competency areas. Instructors will be aware of these competencies and address
any weak areas. Competent flight crew members should be able to complete tasks reasonably
expected of them under achievable conditions. Competency based training is about assisting pilots
improve from a minimum standard of performance.
Students will no longer be assessed in training and checking using an overall grade for Technical and
Non-technical skills. Performance will be graded in the 9 Core Competencies shown below:
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Each competency will be assessed and graded with use of the behavioural indicators to help with
assessment, and the word picture to assist in determining the grade.
The 9 core competencies with behavioural Indicators and word picture can be found at the end of this
document.
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KORA – (Key Operational Risk Areas)

The Ryanair Corporate Safety Strategy for 2013 – 2016
focuses around two concepts:
Safety Management System (SMS)

The SMS enables a flow of information from the line
operation and training process to managers who can
then identify any trends that need to be addressed. The
main sources of information are OFDM, SAIR, CSR, LASG
and statistics from Training and Checking.
Key Operational Risk Areas (KORA)

A number of KORAs have been identified in the strategy
as areas where Ryanair considers that extra vigilance and
focus is needed to ensure the continuation of our
excellent safety record.
Where you see the or

logo in this document it indicates this training or
checking has been included as a result of an analysis of our SMS by training managers or has been
identified as a KORA in the strategy. Certain elements of this training relate specifically to KORA and
SMS will be emphasized during training. (For example; training exercises for VSD and False Glideslope
capture prevention provide a control or preventative barrier to CFIT and Loss of Control Inflight) The
instructor will explore crew’s understanding of these important risk areas and educate where
necessary. Safety in Ryanair is achieved through a systematic, proactive and documented approach.
Key Learning Objectives

RST 5 focuses on a number of Key Learning Objectives. Achieving these objectives will be a focal point
for instructors and examiners, however, our training and checking is not limited to the Key Objectives.
The RST 5 Key Learning Objectives are related to:
Workload Management and SOPs

Communications with ATC/Cabin Crew.
Volcanic Ash is available and recommended.
Engine Limit/Surge/Stall
High Energy Approach Management
Fuel Leak
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SMS
Communications
Communicating with ATC
Communication between pilots and ATCs is vital for the safe and efficient control of air traffic. Pilots
must report their situation, intentions and requests to the controller in a clear and unambiguous way;
and the controller must respond by issuing instructions that are equally clear and unambiguous. The
process of communication is important and must be successful even in the most difficult conditions.
Good radio discipline is critical. Radio communications contribute to building the pilot’s and the
controller’s situation awareness. Flight crew and controllers may prevent misunderstandings by
providing each other with timely information, for better anticipation. At all times, pilots should build
and update a mental picture of the other traffic in the vicinity of their intended flight or ground path.
Non normal events should be reported as soon as practical to ATC, stating the nature of the eventr,
the actions taken and the flight crew’s intentions. In an emergency, the flight crew should be aware
that the controller may not be familiar with the aircraft and its performance capability. The controller
may not understand a message that is too technical; a simple message should be used to inform the
controller of the prevailing condition. Speak slowly and deliberately when dealing with non-native
English speaking ATC personnel. In an emergency, the initial message should comply with the standard
ICAO phraseology — “PANPAN, PANPAN, PANPAN” (urgency) or “MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY”
(emergency) — depending on the criticality of the prevailing condition. This will alert the controller to
the level of urgency and trigger an appropriate response. Experience has shown that a PAN call may
not be fully understood by ATC in certain parts of the world. If any doubt exists as to whether ATC fully
understands the situation you must change the call to MAYDAY and when appropriate downgrade the
status of the emergency.
Crews should use the word emergency during any PAN PAN call with caution as very often the word
emergency is associated by ATC with a MAYDAY situation. This can increase the levels of confusion.
Then, to explain the situation, simple and short messages should be used highlighting the operational
implications of the prevailing condition.
Communicating with Passengers

Communicating with passengers from the flightdeck can assist in the successful outcome of a non-
normal situation.
The PA:
Can play an important part in maintaining passenger confidence and control.
Should be made calmly, slowly and clearly.
Quality and clarity of the information will directly reflect the competence of the crew and the
company as a whole.
Must be checked during preflight procedures
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Check includes verification of system operation using the hand held microphone on the
control stand. Check audibility in the cabin to ensure information can be given clearly.
Poor quality or a lack of communication with the passengers can often exacerbate an already
stressful situation in the cabin.
Being clear and concise is significant from a commercial point of view.
Is important to identify the crew’s voice in the event of an emergency. Passengers are more
likely to follow a PA from a recognised voice in the flightdeck.
Reliability of subsequent directions from the crew will reflect passengers perception of the crew’s
professionalism. Crews can become isolated from the requirement to keep the passengers informed of
the status and progress of flights. Clear and concise emergency PAs are a vital safety tool for all pilots.
Practise and consideration during a normal PA will benefit crews greatly in the event of a non-normal
situation.
The PA handy-dandy is available in the flightdeck. Use this guidance until you are confident in giving
PA’s. If it is not possible to complete the welcome PA on stand, it should be made prior to taxi once
the “Before Taxi” Checklist is completed. Develop your skills in delivery of passenger announcements,
particularly during non-normal situations. Be sure to impart timely information.
Example
Recently we were able (through reports from positioning crew) to observe passenger anxiety levels in
the cabin following a non-normal event. The key point that raised passenger concerns was that
information passed to the passengers by the Captain indicating that “you may see some fire engines
near and around the aircraft after landing” (or words to that effect). In this example all the passengers
heard was “FIRE!!” and the concern levels shot up.
Response / Actions
Consider content, impact and effectiveness of a PA during non-normal situations including:

What message you are passing to the passengers,
Consider the negative effect of ‘over-information’,
Analyse what information is necessary and keep content to a minimum.
Instructors and examiners will insist that crews include appropriate content when making PA’s.
Ensure that the words “FIRE”, “ENGINE FAILURE”, “Lost an Engine”, “Damaged” etc are not used in any
context that may induce high levels of stress. Think about the cabin, avoid introducing discomfort and
know that your PA will almost certainly be quoted by passengers when interviewed by the press.
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SMS
Prolonged Loss of Communication
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Volcanic Ash
The ICAO International Volcanic Ash Task Force (IVATF) Airworthiness Sub-Group AIR04 team have
identified a need for operators to be clear about the actions to be taken by crews in the event that
they encounter an ash cloud.
An eLearning module about volcanic ash was available in RST 4. This can be reviewed again as part of
your pre simulator study preparation. In RST 5 we will look at a volcanic ash event in the simulator.
Threat and Error Management (TEM)
The generic threat is unintentional operations in airspace or aerodromes with known or predicted
contamination by a volcanic ash cloud with characteristics harmful to the airworthiness and operation
of the B737 800. Arising from this generic hazard are specific risks to Ryanair’s operation. These occur
in maintenance, flight planning/dispatch and flight operations. A list of assessed hazards is located in
the Hazard/Risk Identification & Assessment Register maintained by the Chief Pilot. The Ryanair
approach to managing its operations during a VA event is based on the TEM concepts of Anticipation,
Recognition and Recovery.
Anticipating potential hazards and risks associated with a future VA event builds vigilance at all levels
in the company. Recognition of the existence of a threat allows FOPS and flight crew to deploy
procedures and utilize their training to avoid the error of unintentional flight in levels of VA deemed to
be harmful to the aircraft and its occupants.
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Recognising a Volcanic Ash Encounter

Visible or Discernible Ash
Flight in visible or discernible volcanic ash must be avoided. At night and in IMC the Inboard Landing
Lights must be selected ON in all areas predicted to contain VA. Discernible ash is ash that can be
sensed by human sight or smell or other senses. Ash may not be visible during darkness or daytime
IMC. However, ash can be discerned by odour, haze, changing engine conditions, airspeed,
pressurization and static discharges.
The following table provides detailed guidance regarding visible or discernible ash in all conditions.
Low and Medium Levels of VA
Static discharges: A phenomenon similar to St. Elmo’s fire or glow can occur. In these instances, blue-
coloured sparks can appear to flow up the outside of the windshield or a white or orange glow can
appear at the leading edges of the wings or at the front of the engine inlets.
Smoke/dust/haze: Most flight crews, as well as cabin crew or passengers, see a haze develop within
the airplane. Dust can settle on surfaces.
Odour: When encountering a volcanic ash cloud, flight crews usually notice a smoky or acrid odour
that can smell like electrical smoke, burned dust, or sulphor.
Frosting of windows: This is caused by the abrasive action of the ash on the windshields.
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Active Ash Cloud

An active ash cloud will be visible from a considerable distance.
Changing engine conditions: Surging, torching from the tailpipe and flameouts can occur.
Engine temperatures can change unexpectedly, and a bright orange/white glow can appear at
the engine inlet.
Airspeed: If volcanic ash fouls the pitot tube, the indicated airspeed can decrease or fluctuate
erratically.
Pressurization: Cabin pressure can change, including possible loss of cabin pressurization.
VA Encounter
If an ash encounter is confirmed when airborne, the QRH Volcanic Ash checklist shall be completed in
its appropriate sequence. The following procedures, compatible with the B737 QRH, have been
communicated to the IAA.
Commence the Manoeuvre (PF)

1. MCP HDG: Select Reciprocal Heading
2. HDG SEL: Engage.
3. MCP ALT: Select a lower altitude.
4. LVL CHG: Engage
5. A/T: Disengage
6. THR Levers: Close
Exit the ash cloud as quickly as possible. Executing a 180-deg turn out of the ashcloud using a
descending turn is the quickest exit strategy. Many ash clouds extend for hundreds of miles, so
assuming that the encounter will end shortly can be false. Climbing out of the ash could result in
increased engine debris build up as a result of increased EGT. The increased engine build up can cause
total thrust loss.
Communicate (PM)
PM - Make a Mayday call. Inform ATC of intended heading and level.
PF - Set 7700 and select TA on the transponder mode selector.
Pan or Mayday
The least level of distress declared will be a MAYDAY call. The MAYDAY can be downgraded to a PAN
call if the aircraft’s condition or its impact on other traffic as a result of the above manoeuvre does not
endanger it or other traffic.
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Heading and Flight Level
When the encounter is momentary in nature and there are sufficient visual indications and it can be
confirmed that the aircraft has cleared the VA, the Commander may elect to continue flying a course
which is deemed to be free of VA.
The crew are directed by the QRH to consider flying 180 degrees from the heading that existed at the
time of the VA encounter. Crew will state the reciprocal heading that has been selected and activated.
A crew shall initially select a heading 180 degrees away and remain on the new heading (terrain
permitting) until it can be confirmed that the aircraft is clear of ash or other manoeuvring is required.
Crew will confirm with ATC when they are clear of the ash, their intentions and when they can accept
vectors again. Crew will state the required flight level/altitude that has been selected and activated.
ATC may treat this manoeuvre as an Emergency Descent. In this case controllers may have to initiate
emergency separation between following aircraft on the same track in order to provide separation
between these aircraft and the aircraft turning and descending away from the ash. This is a matter for
ATC to resolve and crew will proceed as described above. The rate of descent will be much less than
that associated with a pressurisation failure induced emergency descent. This is because retaining
altitude to increase time available is crucial to the success of the VA QRH checklist. Therefore the
aircraft will descend at idle thrust, and at the speed that obtained at the time of the VA encounter. In
order to reduce rate of descent and retain altitude, this speed may be reduced. This will give a variable
rate of descent and no standard rate of descent can be predicted.
QRH Volcanic Ash Checklist
Below is background information to the steps in the NNC intended to give crews a better
understanding of the required actions. The main objective is to exit the ash cloud and restart engines if
needed.
QRH Item 1: If volcanic dust fills the flight deck, the crew may need to use oxygen. Use flight deck
oxygen at the 100 per cent setting.
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QRH Item 3: Disengage the A/T. This prevents the engines from increasing thrust above idle. Ash
debris in the engine can result in reduced surge margins, and limiting the number of thrust
adjustments improves the chances of engine recovery. If conditions allow, reduce thrust to idle
immediately. By reducing thrust, engines may suffer less build-up of molten debris on turbine blades
and hot section components. This reduces possible engine damage or flameout, or both, by decreasing
EGT. Idle thrust allows engines to continue producing electrical power, bleed air for pressurization,
and hydraulic power for airplane control.
QRH Item 5: Turn ignition to FLT. In the event that the engines flame out or stall, use appropriate
procedures to restart the engines. During restart, the engines may take longer than normal to reach
idle thrust due to the combined effects of high altitude and volcanic ash ingestion. If an engine fails to
start, try restarting it again immediately.
QRH Items 7 & 8: Turn on engine and wing anti-ice and set air-conditioning packs to HIGH flow. These
actions improve the engine stall margins by increasing the flow of bleed air.
QRH Items 9: If possible, start the APU. The APU can power systems in the event of a multiple-engine
power loss. It can also be used to restart engines through the use of APU bleed air.
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QRH Item 10: Monitor engine Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT). Engines may accelerate to idle very
slowly, especially at high altitudes. Slow acceleration may be incorrectly interpreted as a hung start or
an engine malfunction. If N2 is steadily increasing, and EGT stays within limits, the start is progressing
normally.
Engine Limit Surge or Stall
What is an Engine Limit or Surge or Stall?
The condition statement for this checklist begins with one or more of the following:
1) Engine indications are abnormal.

2) Engine indications are rapidly approaching or exceeding limits.
3) Abnormal engine noises are heard, possibly with airframe vibration.
4) There is no response to thrust lever movement or the response is abnormal.
5) Flames in the engine inlet or exhaust are reported.
Engine Surge/Stall
Engine surge or stall is caused by a breakdown in airflow in the engine that can lead to a reversal of
the airflow through the engine. This is characterised by loud bangs and lack of efficiency in the engine.
N1 will still be rotating however it will be at a reduced value. Contaminants in the engine or a
disruption to the airflow entering the engine intake can cause a surge or stall. Memory items exist for
this checklist.
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KORA
High Energy Approach Management
High Energy approaches increase exposure to KORAs LOCI, CFIT and Runway Excursions. Thanks to a
significant effort over the last few years to increase awareness of approach and energy management,
the rate of HEA has reduced however we are still seeing high energy/unstable approaches.
TEM
Threat and error management requires crews to consider ANTICIPATION/RECOGNITION AND

RECOVERY to ensure safe flight.
Anticipate
High energy approach situations should be anticipated. There are many possible causes of high energy
approach situations. Some are listed here:
1. Shortcuts
When briefing an approach, consider potential short cuts. Is there an opportunity for track miles
to be lost and if so how many? What effect will this have on the energy of the aircraft and how can
it be compensated for?
2. Speed control:
Plan to use standard ICAO speeds including 220kts at the FAF and 180kts for base – Anticipate this
and slow to 180kts PRIOR to the base leg.
Be proactive with speed control. If using VNAV, it plans descents based on the FMC speed. If high
on profile and you dive to capture the path you are now flying faster than your target. VNAV will
show on path however you are not on the profile because you have extra energy in the form of
speed. If this situation is not dealt with, when VNAV tries to decelerate, you will end up in a high
energy situation.
3. Wind
Wind will affect your descent. Anticipation of a strong tailwind means that you can take action
prior to getting into a high energy situation. Anticipate the effect of wind throughout the descent
and approach. For example if on left hand downwind for runway 27 and you notice a tailwind from
the south, ANTICIPATE that this will have an impact on your base leg. You will need to decelerate
to 180 knots earlier.
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4. FMC Errors
Ensure that the FMC routing is correct – are there any extra track miles that are not realistic of the
actual approach expected? Is the FMC showing a procedural arrival?
5. FMC Management
The LNAV track shown in the FMC should correspond to the flight path that will be flown. If not,
identify the threat of reduced track miles available and a possible high energy approach situation.
TFS Runway 08 is a good example.
The planned arrival takes the aircraft west of the airfield before turning back towards the
approach. On many occasions ATC provide radar vectors cut and reduce the track miles.
Sensible use of the FMC and hard altitudes can help reduce this threat.
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ANTICIPATE:
During DALTA discuss the threat of a

direct routing or radar vectors on
this approach.
Discuss contingency plans and

procedures.
Start of ATC E.g. A direct routing about 20nm

vectors/direct before ARACO - create a waypoint at
routing. ARACO-20, connect this to BAMEL
but do NOT execute. The FMC will
show the altitude at this waypoint
with the expected shortcut.
Now this can be erased but put the

ARACO-20 point back into the FMC.
The FMC predicted altitude can be
inserted at ARACO-20. If cleared to
turn by ATC the profile will be
correct. This is optimum use of
VNAV.
Lost Track
Miles SEE FMC SCREENSHOTS ON NEXT
PAGE.
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Recognise
When a potential high energy approach situation presents itself, recognise it and take action.
How can a high energy approach situation be recognised?
1. Assess
During descent frequently ask yourself whether you are high, low or on profile. High energy
situations are easier to deal with earlier in the descent and more challenging, the later it occurs.
Below FL100 calculate the track miles you require every 1000ft and keep ahead of the aircraft.
Anticipate the effect of short cuts/ATC vectors.
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2. Use of VNAV
Use the VNAV path indicator appropriately. VNAV information is only useful if the LNAV track is
reflective of what is to be flown. Winds different from what was entered into the forecast page
should be taken into account. Going direct to a waypoint will update the wind.
3. Track Miles Required

Manually calculate the track miles required and compare against the track miles available.
Approximately 3 times your altitude should equate to your expected track miles. A good rule of
thumb is to add 1nm for every 10kts deceleration. To reduce from 250kts to 200kts will take 5nm.
For each 10kts of tailwind, you should add a further 1nm. Having done the calculation use the
range rings on the ND to work out your approximate track miles remaining. This will help calculate
the remaining track miles to touchdown.
Descent Profile
Plan your descent with some descent targets in mind. These are still wind figures and allowance
should be made for head and tailwinds.
I. TOD - actively monitor your descent profile every 5000ft.

II. At 35 track miles from touchdown be at FL100 and 250kts.
III. At 20 track miles from touchdown be at approx 5000ft AAL and approaching the VNAV DECEL
point or considering reducing speed from 250kts to the UP speed. ROD 800fpm or less will be
required to reduce speed.
IV. When 15 track miles from touchdown be at approx 4000ft AAL and speed approaching the UP
speed in preparation to select Flap 1 not later than 10nm.
V. Passing 10nm be approx. 3,2,1 = 3,000ft, 200kts or below and Flap 1. (10nm Rule)
VI. Flap 5, on speed and GS intercept. This should be regarded as the final target on the
approach, leaving the landing gate to retain its status as the limit; it is poor airmanship to
treat the landing gate limit as an approach target. Aim to be stabilised earlier in the
approach.
Can you turn base?
Ensure that your speed, altitude and configuration allow you to accept the turn to base. The following
speed schedule should ensure that a base turn will result in a stabilised approach.
1. At 9nm from touchdown speed should be 190kts

Descents are ideally flown in VNAV. Be aware of the difference between VNAV Path and VNAV Speed
descents.
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Numerous safe guards are built into SOPs to prevent HEA’s:

Range rings (3 x cruise level / 10nm / 4/5 nm)
250/FL100
10nm rule
500’ continue/go-around call
If in doubt slow down with flaps and add drag with speedbrake.
Recover
If you are not on profile, consider what you can do to regain it. If low on profile, you can reduce your
ROD with V/S until the correct profile has being re-established. Now re-engage VNAV and continue
monitoring the profile.
If high on profile above FL100 then increasing IAS may be necessary to regain the profile. Update your
descent speed in the FMC to recalculate your new descent profile. If still high then use the speedbrake
for additional drag.
If you are high on profile below FL100, you are limited to 250kts and speedbrake to increase your
descent rate. If you are still high on profile slow down and use the following:
Max Speed 250 Kts = 1500fpm ROD = 250’/nm
250Kts/Speed Brake = 1800fpm ROD
220kts/Flap 5/ Speed Brake = 2300fpm ROD
180kts/Flap 10/Speed Brake = 1500fpm ROD = 500’/nm
These give the best height loss per nm. If still high on profile then extended vectors, an orbit outside
10nm or joining a holding pattern may be your only options to avoid a High Energy Approach (HEA).
The FCTM, 4.22, gives good guidance on the use of the speedbrake. It states that the PF keeps their
hand on the speedbrake lever when in use. This “reminder” will prevent inadvertent speedbrake use
with thrust above idle and/or flaps greater than 10.
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RYANAIR RST5
VSD SMS KORA
Normally the Captain will have WXR selected for the descent and approach on the left hand ND and
will confirm that the intended arrival routing is clear of adverse weather and shall monitor the
approach track and go-around for thunderstorm activity. The first officer will have Terrain (TERR)
selected on the right hand ND and both crews will ensure that the arrival routing is safe with respect
to terrain clearance.
VSD is normally selected ON by the PM in descent passing MSA or FL100 whichever is higher. Verify
that all remaining altitude restrictions can be achieved. Where terrain or energy management is a
factor VSD should remain on until clear of terrain or back on profile. VSD may be selected off at this
stage but must be reselected on with the completion of the Approach Checks. Nothing in this
procedure prevents either pilot alternately selecting TERRAIN or WXR as required however, the
default selections are as described above.
Strengths of the VSD:
1) Improves situation awareness during departures and arrivals.

2) Terrain awareness
3) Profile awareness
4) Blunder Error
5) HEA Prevention
CFIT Avoidance:
The terrain profile always accurately depicts the airplane’s relative altitude above the local terrain. The
airplanes clearance above local terrain is based on geometric altitude as calculated by the (EGPWC)
Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Computer.
The terrain profile relative to aircraft is based on the terrain database.

It is immune to QNH Blunder Error
If the runway appears significantly above or below the terrain profile line, the crew should verify that
the baro setting is correct.
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RYANAIR RST5
HEA Avoidance
The VSD allows you to determine your vertical position relative to the desired path. The range to
speed dot indicates where the airplane will achieve the FMC or MCP target speed and will indicate
when the selected speed will be achieved.
The Range to Target Speed Dot

(RTSD) indicates where the airplane
will achieve the FMC or MCP target
speed. The dot is blanked within 5kts
of target speed. The dot reappears if
speed increases 10kts or more faster
than target.
The solid dot is replaced with an

unfilled dot at vector end if target
speed will not be achieved within
length of the vertical flight path
vector line.In this example, the
airplane will reach the target speed
(200 knots) in 6 NM.
Are we on Profile?
The VSD can provide good awareness about the aircrafts profile state. We can determine our vertical
profile and speed profile.
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RYANAIR RST5
On profile but FAST
In this example we can see that we

are on the vertical profile however
the range to target speed dot shows
that we will not achieve the desired
speed by the correct point. We are
therefore FAST.
On Speed but High
In this example we can see that we

are high on profile. Given that the
range to target speed dot is not
displayed, we must be on speed.
However we are HIGH.
High and Fast
In this situation we are high on

profile and the range to target speed
dot is showing that we will not
achieve the desired speed by the
desired point. We are therefore HIGH
and FAST.
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RYANAIR RST5
Summary
The PM should include the VSD in his/her scan whenever a configuration/speed change is actioned or
when Energy Management is in DOUBT.
 VSD is now part of the RYR SOP.
 It enhances a crew’s SA and is a valuable tool in predicting the likelihood of a successful

approach.
 Remove exposure to HEA and/or unintentional gate bust.
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RYANAIR RST5
Go Arounds SMS KORA
Unstable approaches that are continued to a landing remain an industry wide threat to safety.
According to Boeing, only 3% of unstable commercial airline approaches executed a Go Around.
Ryanair has a no blame policy regarding Go Arounds.
Problems Encountered during a Go Around
Once a decision to Go Around has been made, focus on ensuring that the manoeuvre is flown
correctly. Be aware of the difficulties that can occur and follow the appropriate procedures.
During a Go Around a significant number of actions must be performed in a short period of time, and
all of them are related to important changes of attitude, thrust, flight path, airplane configuration and
pitch trim. Each of these actions must be carefully monitored and cross checked. PM must take an
active role in supporting PF.
The available capacity of both PF and PM should prioritise their ability to AVIATE, NAVIGATE, and
COMMUNICATE. Incidents related to Go Around manoeuvres usually lead to an excessive pitch up or
pitch down attitude. Both of which can lead to dangerous situations including flap overspeed.
The Instrument Scan

A proper instrument scan is extremely important and can help recognise and recover from dangerous
situations before they develop. The advantages of this scan type are:
1) It provides a scan that originates from a central vision point.

2) It allows the focus of attention in a sequential manner.
3) It allows the pilot to properly focus and process information received from the instruments.
4) The T scan has been proven to provide accurate and reliable interpretations.
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RYANAIR RST5
T SCAN
The threat of a scan break down during a Go Around cannot be understated. Large thrust application,
low speed and the aircraft’s configuration produces many possible threats. Illusions and poor
instrument scan technique can lead to an excessive high or low pitch attitude/CFIT/overspeeds or low
speed situations.
The large pitch-up moment induced by the wing-mounted, underslung engines must be managed
carefully. Equally, retaining an inappropriately low pitch angle will cause a rapid increase in airspeed
placing structural integrity under threat.
High thrust application causes the aircraft nose to pitch up, if this is not correctly managed it can lead
to an over pitch. This can lead to a level bust, unusual attitude or low speed situation.
Insufficient thrust application when conducting a manual Go Around is also a threat. A common error
is not advancing thrust, and with no autothrottle engaged the Go Around is conducted in a low energy
state and a low speed situation develops. Crews should naturally extend thrust levers when
conducting a Go Around.
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RYANAIR RST5
Go Around in a Non Standard Configuration
A Go-Around may be commenced at any time during an approach, including before the aircraft is in
landing configuration. The FCOM, SOP Manual and QRH assume that the aircraft is in a landing
configuration prior to commencing the Go-Around. Be prepared to adapt the Go-Around manoeuvre if
the Go-Around is commenced prior to the point where the aircraft is fully configured for landing.
In non-normal situations the NNC often provides guidance on Go-Arounds and must be followed.
A situation where a crew may have to commence a go-around from a non-landing configuration
includes, ATC request, Approach Ban, high energy approaches etc.
In the event of a go-around from a high energy approach, ensure the speedbrake is retracted.
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Boeing%20757-2T7,%20G-MONK%2011-09.pdf is
an example of a go-around being conducted with the speedbrake extended. The speedbrake lever
automatically moves to the down detent and all spoiler panels retract only after an RTO or landing if
either thrust lever is advanced. In a go around with speedbrake extended that doesn’t result in a
landing, the pilot must manually move the speed brake lever to the down detent position.
Situation Awareness in relation to flap and gear configuration, aircraft speed and missed approach
altitude is important.
CAUTION
Speed/thrust control during the go around must be managed correctly to avoid flap speed
exceedances.
The missed approach altitude may not have been set on the MCP particularly during Non-
precision approaches; this can result in a level bust.
Expeditious execution of a go around is important but do not rush!
Follow the normal Go-Around procedure with the following considerations:
PUSH TOGA A climb is commanded regardless of altitude.

FLAPS If greater than 15, select 15. If less than 15, leave flaps at current
selection.
SET THRUST Set thrust appropriate to the aircraft altitude and missed
approach altitude.
GEAR UP Select Gear up when a positive ROC is indicated.
ABOVE 400FT Select a roll mode.
RETRACT FLAPS ON SCHEDULE Begin flap retraction when above 400ft.
TUNE RADIOS Tune radios as appropriate.
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RYANAIR RST5
The effect of ALT ACQ:
Conducting a Go Around close to the missed approach altitude results in the AFDS engaging in ALT ACQ. Once
ALT ACQ engages, TOGA mode is lost and the airspeed window opens at the current airspeed. PM should bug
up to enable continued flap retraction. If you do not bug up, with the Auto Throttle engaged the thrust will
reduce and a low speed situation may occur.
Performing Safer Go Arounds

Preparation for a go-around must commence during the approach briefing. Not only should the ATC
go-around procedure be reviewed but the aircraft procedure should be reviewed in detail with calls
and actions rehearsed right up to the “Flaps Up, No Lights” call. The startle factor induced by an
unprepared go-around will reduce capacity and the ability to operate accurately.
Both pilots should keep a robust instrument eye-scan pattern for the duration of the Go Around
manoeuvre until the end of the level off phase.
Both pilots should be aware of the consequences of failing to closely monitor the pitch indication of
the PFD.
Flying the pitch and monitoring the pitch during attitude changes have priority over any other tasks,
including communication with ATC. The PM could answer “stand by” while monitoring and
coordinating the manoeuvre with the PF.
Pilots must understand automation and mode changes that occur during Go Arounds. Many of these
features are designed to aid pilot performance.
Pilots should train for and understand the issues involved in Go Arounds conducted at other than
minimum approach altitudes. These present different challenges that, combined with the issues
already addressed, can be difficult.
If you do not meet stabilised approach criteria, GO AROUND.
Summary
Once a go around decision has been made, concentrate on flying the aircraft and ATC procedure
correctly. Difficulties can occur in both nose high and nose low situations. Be aware of the appropriate
procedures for those situations. A Go Around manoeuvre performed according to standard operating
procedures by crews mindful of possible hazards associated with the manoeuvre will be effective and
safe.
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RYANAIR RST5
SMS
Landing Without Clearance
See the following report from a recent base investigation:
“Crew were cleared to continue approach by tower when several miles out. Another aircraft landed
and was clearing the runway. The captain reports a conversation commenced in Spanish and continued
for some time after the other aircraft had cleared the runway and until the subject flight was almost
over the threshold.
The captain managed to get a call in to prompt the landing clearance by calling “short final”. The
response from ATC was to inform them that there was an aircraft over the threshold. The Captain
believed the controller was now confused and “out of the loop” as it was his aircraft that was over the
threshold. The captain decided to land based on the information available to him at that time.”
It is important that a landing clearance is received prior to landing. If no landing clearance has been
received, a Go Around must be conducted. It is important that crews manage their workload
appropriately and remain vigilant to whether a landing clearance has or has not been received. If
crews are unable to receive a clearance it is important to set a position at which a Go Around will be
conducted if no clearance is forth coming.
“Ryanair 123, report 4 miles”
ATC will commonly ask aircraft to report at a specific point on the approach prior to clearance being
issued. This can lead to high workload situations as this would usually coincide with our configuration
point. This workload must be managed effectively to ensure that such a call is not forgotten.
SMS
Fuel Systems
Fuel System General
The useable fuel contained in main tanks 1 and 2 is 4,876 litres (3,915kg) per tank. The centre tank can
hold 16,273 litres (13,066kg) of useable fuel giving a total possible fuel load of 26,025 litres (20,869kg).
The center tank boost pump supplies fuel at a minimum pressure of 23 psi. The wing tank boost
pumps supply fuel at a minimum pressure of 10 psi. This explains why fuel is consumed from the
center tank before the wing tanks. The wing tank fuel pump low pressure light will only come on
when the tank boost pump pressure is 6 psi or less. This explains how an imbalance between tank 1
and 2 is possible, without any low pressure indications – it is simply a difference in output pressure.
33
RYANAIR RST5
Each fuel tank uses two AC powered fuel pumps which are cooled and lubricated by fuel passing
through the pump. Individual pressure sensors monitor the output pressure of each pump.
When main tank fuel pump pressure is low, each engine can draw fuel from its corresponding main
tank through a suction fed line that bypasses the pumps.
The engine fuel manifolds are interconnected by use of the crossfeed valve. The valve is DC motor
operated from the battery bus.
Fuel pressure can be provided from a main tank with operating fuel pumps to both engines by opening
the crossfeed valve. Continued crossfeed use will result in a progressive fuel imbalance, the limit of
which is 453 kg.
The misuse or failure of the crossfeed valve can lead to very serious situations and therefore good
crew communication and monitoring of the fuel system is essential when crossfeeding is required or
planned. Crews must ensure a fuel leak does not exist prior to initiating fuel balancing procedures as
outlined in SP.12.1.
The crossfeed valve is monitored in the flight deck via the blue crossfeed VALVE OPEN light. When the
light is extinguished, the crossfeed valve is closed. When the light is illuminated bright blue the
crossfeed valve is in transit, or valve position and crossfeed selector disagree. When the light is
illuminated dim, the crossfeed is open.
During non-normal operations, e.g. single engine operation, the use of the crossfeed valve is common.
Failure of the crossfeed valve in such scenarios is extremely serious as fuel imbalance will ensue and
useable fuel is halved. Careful monitoring of the crossfeed valve open light is essential.
The FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE circuit breaker(P6-3:B7) protects both the crossfeed valve motor and the
blue VALVE OPEN light. If the C/B trips it is not possible to determine the position of the crossfeed
valve as the blue VALVE OPEN light is not powered and will be extinguished regardless of the valve
position.
The QRH CI.2.3 states: “In flight, reset of a tripped circuit breaker is not recommended unless directed
by a non-normal checklist. However, a tripped circuit breaker may be reset once, after a short cooling
period (approximately 2 minutes), if in the judgment of the captain, the situation resulting from the
circuit breaker trip has a significant adverse effect on safety. On the ground, flight crew reset of a
tripped circuit breaker should only be done after maintenance has determined that it is safe to reset
the circuit breaker.”
34
RYANAIR RST5
Fuel System Non Normals
Three fuel NNCs that are commonly mishandled by 737 flight crews are analysed below. Take your
time and do not rush. Consider and assess the meaning of each step. Some of these checklists
mention fuel leak, however it is important that crews take their time to accurately assess the problem
whilst deciding if a fuel leak does exist. It is more common to shut down engines for a mis-diagnosed
fuel leak than for actual fuel leaks. Keep an open mind to avoid confirmation bias.
It is a mandatory requirement to preserve CVR data after an incident/accident and it is the

responsibility of the aircraft Commander to ensure that the yellow-collared CVR circuit breaker is
pulled at the earliest opportunity on the ground. The CVR CB must never be pulled in flight.
IMBAL NNC
The objective of the checklist is to decide if a fuel leak is suspected or to balance fuel if there is no fuel
leak. Be aware of confirmation bias. There are several possible reasons for an IMBAL.
The IMBAL checklist does not provide checklist steps for engine malfunctions. Sound judgement must
be used when determining if this condition applies. Review primary and secondary engine display and
analyse engine indications before proceeding. This is an “If” statement which should be answered with
a YES or NO by the crew prior to proceeding to the next step or a different checklist that deals with the
engine malfunction.
35
RYANAIR RST5
In step 2 the crew is presented with three possible causes. Each one of these is dealt with in the
remaining IMBAL checklist. The first possible cause in the checklist is a fuel leak in steps 3 and 4:
The total fuel remaining is less than planned fuel remaining. Do not rush, this requires diligence and
accuracy. Compare the fuel onboard from the fuel gauges with the planned fuel on the PLOG, allowing
for any extra fuel uplifted prior to departure.
The very basic lesson here is: if you haven’t lost any fuel then there is no fuel leak! The fuel is in the
tanks but the fuel system is not configured correctly.
An engine has excessive fuel flow. Check the fuel flow indicators. The ‘Fuel Used’ readout on the
engine displays can provide useful information to help determine if there is a leak. It is important that
the fuel used is reset during pre-flight procedures. (FCOM Vol2, Preflight Procedures – PF)
In step 5 a fuel leak has been ruled out as the cause of the IMBAL. Step 5 and 6 will look at the next
possible cause; an inoperative crossfeed valve:
36
RYANAIR RST5
The crossfeed valve has been the cause of several fuel imbalances. The only indication to the crew of a
functioning crossfeed selector and valve is the light brightness and switch position.
Crossfeed valve failures that have caused fuel imbalance problems include:
During preflight preparation and during in-flight fuel balancing the crew checks the crossfeed
valve operation. The light did go bright blue followed by dim when opened and when
commanded closed the light went bright and then extinguished. The crew assumed that the
valve had closed when in fact the C/B had tripped leaving the crossfeed valve partially open
and the light extinguished (the light and valve is protected by the same C/B)
A valve that is in the closed position but leaking.
If the valve is open there is strong likelihood of an imbalance developing. This is due to
allowable differences in fuel pump output pressure. The tank with the highest fuel pump
pressure will supply both engines with fuel. It is not possible to predict which main tank fuel
pumps will produce the highest pressure.
Note: ensure you

differentiate between
SELECTOR and VALVE.
Crossfeed Valve Open
light
Step 7 of the IMBAL

checklist commences fuel Crossfeed Selector
balancing.
Step 8 is done when fuel

balancing is complete. The
Crossfeed Valve
crew must monitor the
correct operation of the
crossfeed valve.
37
RYANAIR RST5
CROSSFEED SELECTOR INOPERATIVE NNC
The crossfeed VALVE OPEN light stays illuminated bright blue
It stays in bright blue indicating that valve position and crossfeedselector disagree.
The CROSSFEED selector is in the open position and the crossfeed VALVE OPEN light is extinguished
The valve is closed, or;

The C/B has tripped
When the CROSSFEED selector is rotated to a new position, the crossfeed VALVE OPEN light does
not illuminate bright blue.
This could indicate a tripped C/B

It could indicate the valve is working correctly but the close and open limit micro switches
within the valve are not working. Then the valve could be fully open or fully closed as
commanded but the light will remain dim (or could be bright depending on selector position).
In this case the light is not indicating valve position correctly.
The Fuel Crossfeed Valve C/B is behind the first officers seat. This C/B also protects the valve open
light (see fuel system general above).
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RYANAIR RST5
Boeing debated if a step should be added which would direct the crew to reset a tripped fuel
crossfeed valve C/B. In the end Boeing decided that their policy on resetting C/Bs is sufficiently
covered in the QRH QRH CI.2.3.
If the C/B is tripped the checklist states that it is not possible to determine the position of the fuel
crossfeed valve. The checklist now assumes that the crossfeed is closed (worst case scenario). This
means that each tank will supply fuel to its respective engine only, with no possibility of balancing fuel
with the normal fuel balancing procedure. Of course the valve may have failed in the open or
intermediate position. This could lead to a significant fuel imbalance.
It can be very difficult to comprehend and project future outcomes in this condition.
If the crew decides to reset the C/B, and if the reset attempt is successful, the crew has regained full
use of the crossfeed valve and all fuel onboard. The condition statement no longer applies meaning
that normal flight can be resumed.
There are 3 components in the crossfeed valve: actuator, shaft and a valve body. No electrical
components come into contact with fuel since the actuator is connected with the valve body through
the shaft. It is strongly recommended that the crew consider a reset attempt of the CB if in flight. The
following engineering drawing shows the individual components of the crossfeed valve.
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RYANAIR RST5
Actuator
The actuator is a 28v dc motor
Mechanical Shaft
Valve body
Only mechanical parts
Fuel lines
Crossfeed Valve Components
If the C/B is not tripped then the crew moves on to step 3:
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RYANAIR RST5
If the crossfeed selector is closed and the valve is failed open the crew must maintain fuel balance
with selective use of fuel pumps. Do not confuse the difference between selector and valve. The
selector is located on the overhead panel in the cockpit, the valve is located on the right wing rear
spar accessible through the main wheel well.
If the crossfeed selector is open the valve is failed closed. The only way to balance fuel is through the
use of differential thrust. Note “As conditions allow”, this should not be attempted at high cruising
altitudes. Each main tank will supply its associated engine. This means the crew must manage each
engine/tank individually rather than simply total fuel onboard.
Fuel Leak Engine NNC

Two key words are used in this
checklist, suspected and confirmed.
The crew commences the Fuel Leak
Engine checklist because a leak is
suspected. Avoid confirmation bias.
There are several steps and checks that
must be completed before a fuel leak
is confirmed. The checklist only applies
to engine fuel leaks (between spar fuel
shutoff valve and engine), not to
unlikely tank leaks.
IF there is a leak it can only be stopped by shutting down the engine.
Is there a Fuel Leak?

For both IMBAL NNC and the FUEL LEAK NNC if you haven’t lost any fuel then there is no fuel
leak!!
The FUEL LEAK NNC contains an additional information section with reasons that MAY suggest
a fuel leak.
1) FUEL ONBOARD + FUEL USED = APPROX FUEL ON DEPARTURE
Eg. Fuel onboard is 4000. Fuel used is 2800. Departure fuel was 6800. NO LEAK
2) FUEL ONBOARD IS AS EXPECTED FROM THE PLOG.

Crew suspect a fuel leak approaching SAM. Plog indicates 4800 required at SAM. Fuel
onbaord is 4800. Fuel brunt since departure is as per OFP. NO LEAK
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RYANAIR RST5
Fuel Used Indication:

The fuel used indication on the ENG MFD can be extremely useful, as shown in the examples
above. However a threat with this device is that it can provide misleading information if the
fuel used is not reset prior to departure. Ensure that as part of your preflight procedure
(NP.21), you reset the fuel used indication.
Additional Information
A visual observation of fuel spray
An observer, ideally a pilot, should look for fuel spray. If at night consider turning on wing
lights and other exterior lights to make spray more visible.
The total fuel quantity is decreasing at an abnormal rate
The statement in the IMBAL checklist is a good reference to achieve this; “the total fuel
remaining is less than planned fuel remaining”.
An engine has excessive fuel flow
Check fuel flow indication.
The fuel IMBAL alert shows
An IMBAL may be caused by an engine malfunction, fuel leak, inoperative crossfeed valve or a
fuel imbalance.
The IMBAL does not show if center tank fuel is being used and the center tanks pumps are on
and operating normally.
The fuel LOW alert shows
There may be other reasons for a LOW alert than a fuel leak.
The USING RSV FUEL message shows on the FMC CDU
May also be caused by inaccurate winds in the FMC, inaccurate route modifications, speed
and altitude restrictions etc.
The INSUFFICIENT FUEL message shows on the FMC CDU
There may be other reasons for an INSUFFICIENT FUEL message other than a fuel leak.
The CHECK FMC FUEL QUANTITY message shows on the FMC CDU.
There may be other reasons for a CHECK FMC FUEL QUANTITY message other than a fuel leak.
Information may lead you to SUSPECT a fuel leak. The fuel leak
checklist from step 5 is then used to CONFIRM whether or not you
have a fuel leak. These are two independent processes.
At step 5 we record the quantity in the main tanks and the time.
At step 6 we then CONFIRM whether or not a fuel leak exists

either by observing fuel spray and/or a CHANGE in fuel imbalance
of 230kgs within 30 minutes.
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RYANAIR RST5
Take your time with step 5 and 6. Step 6 is confirmation of a fuel leak. Ensure that the crossfeed
selector is closed (step 3), if the C/B has tripped the crossfeed valve may be open with the valve open
light extinguished.
If a fuel leak is confirmed the crew is directed to complete an engine shutdown to stop the leak and
balance fuel as needed. All remaining fuel can be used for the running engine.
QRH and Non Normal Management
Correct use of the QRH when dealing with non normal situations is vital. Many training documents
have been published dealing with this situation. Review the QRH checklist instructions for excellent
guidance on how to use the QRH. The Boeing QRH familiarisation document is also available on
crewdock. This can be found under TRAININGTRAINEE NOTES.
When dealing with a non normal situation remember the key principle of AVIATE, NAVIGATE AND
COMMUNICATE.
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RYANAIR RST5
Appendix
44
RYANAIR RST5
CASE STUDIES
Stall on Final Approach

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/formal_reports/3_2009_g_thof.cfm
Boeing 737, G-THOF was planned to operate from Faro to Bournemouth on a scheduled night
passenger flight on 23rd September 2007.
At 2245hrs the aircraft was 11nm from Bournemouth, level at 2500ft, with an Air Speed of
180kt and flap 5 set. The autothrottle was engaged, with N1 averaging approximately 60%.
Autopilot B was engaged in CMD mode with VOR-LOC and Altitude Hold modes engaged. The
aircraft was level at 2,500ft for 90 seconds and at 7nm DME the autopilot captured the
glideslope. The PF asked for the landing gear to be lowered, flap 15 and the Commander
carried out the actions although neither pilot could recall who had moved the speedbrake
handle, which had been pulled slightly beyond the armed setting. The PF then selected a
lower speed on the mode control panel and, as expected, the autothrottle retarded the thrust
levers to idle to reduce to this speed.
The aircraft started to descend on the glideslope, and approximately 20 seconds later, with
the thrust levers still at idle, the autothrottle disconnect warning was triggered and the
autothrottle disengaged. This disengagement was not recognised by the flight crew and no
manual disconnect was recorded; the thrust levers remained at idle throughout the
remainder of the approach.
The autopilot remained engaged and continued to track both the localiser and the glideslope.
The aircraft’s speed decreased at about one knot per second. As the speed decreased below
150kt, flap 25 was selected. The autopilot tracked the glideslope accurately, gradually
increasing the pitch of the aircraft to minimise glideslope deviation and adjusting the
stabiliser angle to keep the aircraft in trim. Temporary reductions in pitch were evident
during flap position transitions.
The PF increased the illumination of his map-light to check the placard speed for the selection
of flap 40, turned his light back to its previous level and called for flap 40. The Commander
moved the flap lever and the PF then selected 135kt on the MCP. The Commander observed
the flaps move to the flap 40 position and then completed the landing checklist by calling
“flaps”. The PF checked that the flap gauge showed 40 and responded “flap 40 green light”.
Recorded data shows the flaps had reached the flap 40 position when the airspeed was 130kt
(Final Approach Speed -5kt) and the aircraft was slowing at approximately 1.5kt per second.
The Commander stowed the checklist on top of the instrument panel and when he looked
down he saw an IAS of 125 kt. He called “speed”, the PF made a small forward movement
45
RYANAIR RST5
with the thrust levers and the Commander called “I have control”. The Commander moved
the thrust levers fully forward and called “go-around flap 15 check thrust”.
Recorded data shows that, at an Airspeed Speed of 110kt and an altitude of 1,540ft, the
autothrottle manual disconnect was pressed and the thrust levers moved forward slightly.
Within 1.5 seconds the stick-shaker (stall warning) activated and in the following 2 seconds
the thrust levers were advanced to the full forward position. The autopilot mode changed
from Localiser and Glideslope to Control Wheel Steer pitch and CWS roll. The aircraft pitch
attitude which had been steadily increasing under the influence of pitch trim, reached 12º
nose-up. The automatic pitch trim stopped at 4.9º (7.9 units) of stabiliser trim. The
Commander moved the control column forward to counteract the expected pitch-up moment
from the increased thrust, thereby arresting the increase and reducing the pitch to 5º nose-
up. The stick-shaker operation stopped and the minimum airspeed was 101kt. A small,
apparently unintended, application of right aileron induced a right roll.
Four seconds after the thrust levers reached the fully forward position, with airspeed
increasing and N1 on both engines increasing through 81%, the TOGA mode became active.
The autopilot disengaged, the pitch attitude started to increase again and the stick-shaker
reactivated. A corrective roll input was made to bring the aircraft wings level, and although
the control column was positioned fully forward the nose-up pitch increased to 22º.
The airspeed increased to 118kts. The pitch attitude appeared to stabilise at 22º nose-up and
the angle of attack started to decrease. Both engines were producing 96-98% N1, which was
in excess of the rated go-around thrust of 94%. The first officer selected flaps 15 and looked
at the N1 reading which he recalls as being 95%. The stick-shaker ceased but, as the flaps
retracted past the flap 25 position, the nose of the aircraft began to pitch up at an increasing
rate and a small continuous left rudder input started a left roll. As the flaps reached flap 15
the pitch angle was increasing through 27º and left roll was increasing through 7º. The stick-
shaker reactivated, full nose-down elevator was still being applied and the airspeed began to
decay. The first officer called “high pitch” and the Commander responded “I have full forward
stick”.
The F/O, although he was now the Pilot Monitoring (PM), also held full forward stick; both
pilots reported that they had no pitch control authority. The airspeed had decreased rapidly
but neither pilot was fully aware of exactly what the airspeed was. As aircraft pitch increased
above 36º nose-up, the TOGA mode disengaged, the left roll increased beyond 13º and the
airspeed decreased below 107kt. A small sharp right rudder input recovered the roll from a
maximum of 22º left wing down to wings level as the aircraft stalled with a peak pitch of 44º
nose‑up.
46
RYANAIR RST5
With no change in elevator position the pitch rate reversed from positive to negative,
although angle of attack continued to increase as the aircraft started to descend. Despite
reducing pitch, the airspeed continued to decrease for a further 5 seconds to a minimum
recorded airspeed of 82kt when the pitch was 33º nose-up.
The pitch angle reduced to 20º over 10 seconds, airspeed began to rise rapidly and five
seconds after the minimum recorded speed, the thrust was reduced to 86%. The pitch-down
rate increased with the pitch reducing a further 15º in two seconds. The aircraft then
stabilised in a 5º nose-up attitude, the speed increased and the Commander regained control
of the aircraft. The TOGA mode was re-engaged as the airspeed reached 147kt.
The Commander initially levelled the aircraft at 3,000ft before climbing to 4,000ft and self-
positioning for a second approach. While downwind the F/O told the Commander that “the
autothrottle did not capture it”. The Commander remained PF throughout the second
approach which was conducted with the autopilot and the autothrottle engaged. Both auto
systems performed normally throughout the second approach. The autopilot and autothrottle
were manually disengaged at 1,200ft and 800ft respectively and the aircraft landed at
2301hrs.
Approximately 11 seconds after the

thrust increased, the flaps were
retracted to Flap 15 even though the
stall recovery checklist specifically
states not to change the configuration.
Once the nose-up pitch angle exceeded
25º the aircraft was outside the normal
flying regime and in an upset, as defined
by the QRH had occurred. At this stage,
regardless of their initial actions, the
crew needed to use ‘upset recovery’
techniques. Regardless of the status of the autothrottle and its warnings, both pilots appear
to have been distracted at a critical phase of flight. This lack of effective monitoring of
automated systems allowed the aircraft to enter a low energy state following disconnection
of the autothrottle. The pilots were distracted at a critical phase of fight and did not properly
monitor the airspeed. The aircraft stalled and descended in a nose-up attitude and slowed to
a minimum airspeed of 82kt. Stall recovery techniques recommended in the manufacturer’s
flight crew training manual were not fully applied. No trim was used during the stall recovery.
47
RYANAIR RST5
High Energy Approach FMM SMS
Routing form MAN to FMM. There was a 10

minute delay off stand due to the APU being
unserviceable, and 39 minutes late the crew
took off form MAN. The active runway in
FMM was 06, and the crew requested RWY
24 for arrival. This reduces taxi in time and
involved a 5kt tailwind component. The ILS
was briefed for RWY 24, and also a visual,
using the DALTA principle.
The weather was nice with clear skies, and a

light wind. The brief included Flaps one and
220kts on downwind and Flaps 5, 180kts on base. The actual configuration was Flaps 1 and
220kts commencing the base turn and descending to 4000ft. The Captain intended to turn for
a 6nm final. Flaps five and speedbrake was selected on base due to the tailwind and the
aircraft proceeded through the extended centreline.
Once on glideslope the aircraft heading was approximately 180 degrees, at 4000ft, 220kts
with LVL CHG engaged. The Captain entered 2500ft in the MCP ALT window; the airport
elevation is 2079ft. Any advisory altitude callouts were not called and the LOC and GS alive
and capture calls were also omitted. The landing gear was then selected down when just 94ft
above the approach minima with heading select engaged to try and intercept the localiser
from the south and level change still engaged.
At this point the First officer suggested to the

Captain that he should “throw it away”, to
which no response was made. The next thing
heard was a “SINK RATE” warning to which the
First Officer called Go-Around. It was 20
seconds after the “SINK RATE” warning
occurred that a Go-Around was initiated.
During this approach the OFDM shows

numerous events including, GPWS Sink Rate,
High Rate of descent in approach between 500
and 2000ft, deviation below glideslope,
approach speed high, excessive bank angle in
48
RYANAIR RST5
final approach, deviation from localizer, approach speed high, GPWS terrain warning and
finally GPWS pull up warning.
At the 500ft gate the situation was:
Full fly right indication

Full fly up indication
Flap 5
Flight Idle
1500fpm Rate of Descent
Vref +70kts
4 seconds later the go-around was initiated at an altitude of 470ft AGL.
The landing checklist was not completed, and neither pilot recollects any challenge at the
landing gate.
The crew completed the Go-around and re-briefed the ILS, which they landed from and
continued with their rostered duty. They completed 3 further sectors that day.
49
RYANAIR RST5
SMS
High Energy Approach ACE
The flight was from LPL to ACE. The weather report was considered in the briefing and was
not seen as anything unusual so it was decided to take flight plan fuel. The wind was
expected to increase and gust 28 later, but with the flight due in at 1700hrs well before the
PROB30 TEMPO this was not predicted to be an issue.
Initially they were cleared by

approach control on the TERTO
2P arrival for RWY03 ACE. The
airport was busy; an Aer Lingus
A320 was ahead and was given
vectors for a right downwind
approach for RW03. This was
what the crew expected and
had operated this flight before.
It was also what had been set in
the FMC and briefed in
accordance with company
procedures. The final descent
clearance was given as descend
to 2500ft altitude. Flap one
was selected at 12nm on base,
well before the 10mile fix. The
vectors then gave a heading to
intercept the localiser at 6.0nm.
Once inbound it became clear
they were high on glideslope.
The Captain instructed the FO
to increase the rate of descent
to capture the glide slope. The
Captain called localiser
established and was instructed
to contact the tower
50
RYANAIR RST5
Once contact with the tower had been established the FO had increased the rate of descent
to 2000fpm using vertical speed mode. This subsequently caused the speed to increase to
200kts with an increasing trend arrow. This was exacerbated by an unexpected tailwind of
5kts. The captain, without further communication with the FO, selected the gear down to
reduce the speed, and instructed the FO to decrease the rate of descent.
The approach was continued

to approximately 1000ft AAL
where it was still obvious that
the approach would not be
completed comfortably
within the required
parameters. A go around was
initiated and the tower was
informed.
ATC then asked for

confirmation of the last
transmission and a reason for
the go-around. After replying
they were asked to contact
the approach frequency to
continue our go around. The
approach controller told the
crew to comply with the
published procedure which
involved a climb to 5000ft.
Then ATC changed their mind
and asked for a right turn on
to a heading of 205. Passing
through 4000ft ATC asked the
crew to maintain ‘this’
altitude and make the
heading 305.
The flight maintained 4000ft

and was given vectors for
another approach to RW03.
It was whilst levelling off that
they noticed the speed brake
was still extended.
51
RYANAIR RST5
Ryanair has approximately 370 high energy approaches every year, one a day. Main problems
include the acceptance of vectors, underestimation of the consequences of tailwind, wrong
flap setting and turbulence. In a quarter of HEA occurrences the crew perceive a tailwind as a
cause.
The pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall have final authority as to the disposition of the
aircraft while in command. The guidelines of the International Civil Aviation Organization say
that an aircraft must be set up in such a way as to be flying horizontally on the final approach
track before the glide path is intercepted.
52
RYANAIR RST5
AIRPROX: Loss of Separation during Go Around SMS
Earlier in these notes we discussed Go Arounds from non standard configurations and from different
points on the approach. Another threat during Go Arounds, particularly at busy airports, is the threat
of an AIRPROX. The following data comes from two SAIR reports that were made which describe an
airprox situation that was caused by either an ATC miscommunication or a reduction in separation due
to runway occupancy times. The action and good judgement of the Ryanair crews in both situations
prevented what was a very dangerous undesired state from developing into an accident.
The following event describes an AIPROX that occurred at OTP (Buceresti) during parallel runway
operations. The Ryanair aircraft was cleared to take off RWY 26R with stop altitude of 6000ft. During
take-off 26R, a second aircraft (another operator) was making an approach for 26L. The Ryanair crew
overheard the aircraft on approach calling go-around on the tower frequency as they were setting
take-off thrust. The approach aircraft then changed frequency to approach. A short time after calling
go-around, the aircraft was instructed to turn right heading 360 degrees and stop climb 2500ft by
approach controller. They responded they were already at 3000ft. The published missed approach is
3000ft.The Ryanair aircraft remained on tower control and as such, did not hear the instruction to the
other aircraft to turn right.
During initial climb (just after raising the

gear) the captain of the Ryanair aircraft
noticed the other aircraft flying parallel and
overtaking. The aircraft was observed to be
turning right and appeared to be crossing
the flight path of the Ryanair aircraft. The
Captain, still hand flying, immediately
levelled off to avoid a possible collision.
At 1530ft (1198 rad alt) the Ryanair aircraft

received a don’t sink warning whilst
descending to 1380ft. The TCAS indicated the
other aircraft had passed overhead at 1600ft
above. This is consistent with the ATC
recording which indicates that the other
aircraft stopped climb at 3000ft.
Approximately 14 seconds after the other

aircraft was instructed to turn onto heading
360 degrees by the approach controller, the
53
RYANAIR RST5
tower controller said “RYR… ah RYR…, turn……”. At the end of the tower controllers transmission a
different voice similar to the approach controllers voice can be heard in the background on the tower
frequency saying “oh my god, oh my god”. Then 15secs later the tower controller “RYR…, contact ah,
turn right ah, stop climb 3000ft”. This last transmission was issued after the RYR had passed below the
other aircraft. During these transmissions on tower frequency, the other aircraft was instructed to
climb 4000ft by approach controller.
Once the crew of the Ryanair aircraft were confident they had passed under the other aircraft, they
resumed climb and normal communication. OTP controller was informed of the AIRPROX.
Findings:
1) No loss of separation occurred due to the see and avoid actions of the Ryanair crew.
2) The Ryanair crew were required to manoeuvre in order to avoid a loss of separation.
3) No terrain warnings were received and there was no evidence of flight towards terrain on the
OFDM. This was a visual manoeuvre by the Captain.
4) Minimum separation was estimated to be not greater than 1600ft.
5) ATC issued a non standard Go Around clearance to the other aircraft which led to a possible
loss of separation.
54
RYANAIR RST5
SMS
AIRPROX: Loss of Separation
The following incident is another example of how loss of separation can occur within the vicinity of an
aerodrome.
The flight was operating into AGP. The aircraft was established on the ILS for runway 13 and had been
configured early due to high and very variable winds on the approach causing significant turbulence. At
four miles the tower instructed another aircraft from another operator to line up, it was then cleared
for takeoff shortly after. The aircraft remained stationary on the runway despite being cleared for
takeoff. The aircraft finally began its takeoff roll as the Ryanair aircraft approached 300 foot AGL. The
Ryanair aircraft continued through minimums towards the runway. The takeoff roll of the other aircraft
appeared to be taking a long time, it was still on the runway as the Ryanair aircraft approached 50 feet
AGL. The Ryanair aircraft initiated a go-around shortly after and slightly below 50 feet. As the go-
around was initiated the tower cleared the Ryanair aircraft to land despite the other aircraft still being
on the runway. The other aircraft lifted off on the same track, the Ryanair aircraft immediately
initiated a sharp left turn away from the other aircraft so that it was possible to maintain visual
separation from it. The published missed approach procedure was not flown as it was deemed this
would have created a collision risk with the other aircraft. There was no clear information from the
tower controller. Both aircraft were in close proximity and flying on the same track. Eventually the
Ryanair aircraft was instructed to fly a heading of 360 degrees at the missed approach stop altitude of
2200ft. This would have taken the aircraft towards high terrain and therefore the crew of the Ryanair
aircraft requested a heading to follow the coast line.The other aircraft was turned onto a southerly
heading by ATC.
Findings:
1. The crew correctly executed a go around.

2. The missed approach procedure was not conducted according to the published missed approach
procedure due to the proximity of other aircraft.
3. The crew did not receive a TCAS as the loss of separation occurred below 1000’.
4. ATC were confused during the subsequent loss of separation.
55
RYANAIR RST5
Core Competencies, Behavioural Markers and Word Pictures
56
RYANAIR RST5
57
RYANAIR RST5
LOS PREPARATION
Weather
EIDW/DUB DUBLIN
SA 170550Z 010/25 1600 OVC009 5/1 QNH 0995 NOSIG=

FT 170500Z 1705/1805 010/20G30KT 9999 SCT018
PROB30 TEMPO 1720/1803 5000 -SHRA BKN010=
EGPK/PIK PRESTWICK
SA 170550Z 190/205000 OVC009 4/2 QNH 0995 NOSIG=
FT 170500Z 1705/1805 190/15KT 9999 SCT018
PROB30 TEMPO 1720/1803 220/30G40
EINN/SNN SHANNON
SA 170550Z 010/25 1600 OVC010 5/1 QNH 0993 NOSIG=
FT 170500Z 1705/1805 010/20KT 9999 SCT018
PROB30 TEMPO 1720/1803 -SHRA BKN010=
EGAA/BFS BELFAST ALDERGROVE

SA 170550Z 010/25 3500 OVC009 5/1 QNH 0993 NOSIG=
FT 170500Z 1705/1805 010/20KT 9999 SCT018
PROB30 TEMPO 1720/1803 -SHRA BKN020=
EGPH/EDI EDINBURGH
SA 170550Z 190/20 4000 OVC010 5/2 QNH 0994 NOSIG=
FT 170500Z 1705/1805 230/15KT 9999 SCT018
PROB30 TEMPO 1720/1803 220/30G40
EGPF/GLA GLASGOW
SA 170550Z 190/20 5500 OVC010 6/2 QNH 0994 NOSIG=
FT 170500Z 1705/1805 230/20KT 9999 SCT018
PROB30 TEMPO 1720/1803 230/30G40
Notams
EGPK/PIK PRESTWICK (UK)
RWY 30 PAPI UNSERVICEABLE
58
FF EUCHZMFP EUCBZMFP
EDDFRYRX
(FPL-RYR11-IS
-B738/M-SDGIRWY/SB1
-EIDW0900
-N0358F270 ROTEV1G ROTEV DCT GOTNA DCT BLACA TRN1C
-EGPK0023 EGPH
-PBN/A1B1C1D1S2 COM/TCAS DOF/150401 REG/EIEVL EET/EISN0008 EGPX0008
EGTT0016 EGPX0020 OPR/RYANAIR RVR/200 RMK/CONTACT +353 1 9451360
TCAS)
FR11 01APR2015 EIDW-EGPK B738 EIEVL RELEASE 0747 01APR15

OFP 8 DUBLIN INTL-PRESTWICK
WX PROG 0109 0112 OBS 0100 0100
ATC C/S EIDW/DUB EGPK/PIK CRZ SYS CI 6
01APR2015 EIEVL 0900/0912 0945/1000 GND DIST 158
737-800W / CFM56-7B26/FLEET B STA 1015 AIR DIST 166
CTOT:.... TOC WIND 306/109
AVG WIND 303/066
MAXIMUM TOW 75.0 LW 65.3 ZFW 61.7 AVG W/C M008
ESTIMATED TOW 51.8 LW 50.5 ZFW 48.2 TOC ISA M001
AVG FF KGS/HR 2405
FUEL BIAS P01.0
ALTN EGPH TKOF ALTN .......
FL STEPS EIDW/0270/
--------------------------------------------------------------------
DISP RMKS NIL
--------------------------------------------------------------------
PLANNED FUEL
---------------------------------
FUEL ARPT FUEL TIME
---------------------------------
TRIP PIK 1322 0033
MIN CONT 200 0005
ALTN EDI 1111 0030
FINRES 942 0030
ADD RES 0 0000
---------------------------------
PLANNED T/OFF FUEL 3575 0138
---------------------------------
T/OFF FUEL 3575 0138
TAXI DUB 156 0012
---------------------------------
BLOCK FUEL DUB 3731
PIC EXTRA .....
TOTAL FUEL .....
REASON FOR PIC EXTRA ............
--------------------------------------------------------------------
FMC INFO:
RESERVES 2053
TRIP+TAXI 1478
--------------------------------------------------------------------
NO TANKERING RECOMMENDED
--------------------------------------------------------------------
NEXT LEG DATA NOT AVAILABLE
--------------------------------------------------------------------
FLT PLAN PASSED FOR CLEARANCE / FCIS ALL READ / LICENSES VALID /
CAT B|CAT C AIRFIELD BRIEF REVIEWED
DISPATCHER: STEVE SUMM|TEL: 35 31 812 1583 |

| |
PIC CREWCODE: ........|F/O CREWCODE: ........|T/P CREWCODE: ........
| |
PIC SIGN: ............|F/O SIGN: ............|T/P SIGN: ............
ALTERNATE ROUTE TO: FINRES 942
APT TRK DST VIA FL MORA WC TIME FUEL
--------------------------------------------------------------------
C1 EGPH 050 121 DCT TLA TWEED2B 080 38 P003 0030 1111
C2 EGNT 108 147 DCT TLA DCT 190 38 P053 0028 1119
C4 EGCC 161 202 NGY1K NGY UT256 DCS 270 42 P041 0037 1448
UL612 LAKEY ROSUN2A
C3 EGGP 156 215 TRN1K TRN P600 BLACA DCT 190 31 P045 0041 1533
IOM TIPOD1B
--------------------------------------------------------------------
MEL/CDL ITEMS DESCRIPTION

------------- -----------
--------------------------------------------------------------------
ROUTING:
ROUTE ID: DEFRTE
EIDW/34 ROTEV1G ROTEV DCT GOTNA DCT BLACA TRN1C EGPK/30
--------------------------------------------------------------------
OPERATIONAL IMPACTS
-------------------
NOT AVAILABLE
--------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------
RVSM (FL290 - FL410) | NO.1 | STBY | NO.2
---------------------|---------------|---------------|--------------
TOC | | |
---------------------|---------------|---------------|--------------
TOC +1HR | | |
---------------------|---------------|---------------|--------------
TOC +2HR | | |
---------------------|---------------|---------------|--------------
TOC +3HR | | |
--------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTURE ATIS:
.
.
.
.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTURE ATC CLEARANCE:
.
.
.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
DEST ELEVATION: EGPK: 65FT ALTN ELEVATION: EGPH: 136FT
TIMES
-----
ESTIMATED SKED ACTUAL
OFF BLOCKS 0900Z/1000L 0900Z/1000L ......Z
AIRBORNE 0912Z/1012L ......Z
LANDED 0945Z/1045L ......Z
ON BLOCKS 1000Z/1100L 1015Z/1115L ......Z
FLIGHT TIME 0033 .......
BLOCK TIME 0100 0115 .. .. .
ARRIVAL ATIS / ALTERNATE ATIS

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
FLIGHT LOG
----------
MOST CRITICAL MORA 03800 FEET AT DWN29///MXSHR
--------------------------------------------------------------------
AWY FL IMT MN WIND OAT EFOB PBRN
POSITION LAT EET ETO MORA ITT TAS COMP TDV
IDENT LONG TTLT ATO DIS RDIS GS SHR TRP AFOB ABRN
FREQ
--------------------------------------------------------------------
346 3575 156
DUBLIN INTL N5325.3 ... 24 343 M024
EIDW W00616.2 0000 ... 158 160 .... ....
ROTEV1G 058 010 .78 294/037 M13 3305 426
DWN26 N5330.8 0002 ... 21 006 M042 M04
DWN26 W00619.0 0002 ... 6 152 290 374 .... ....
ROTEV1G 178 027 .78 305/090 M28 2981 750
DWN29 N5345.4 0003 ... 38 024 M024 M00
DWN29 W00616.4 0005 ... 15 137 359 373 .... ....
SHANNON UIR / KT AIRSPACE*******************************************
-EISN N5357.6 0003 ...
W00607.1 0008 ... 13 123
SCOTTISH UIR********************************************************
-EGPX N5401.7 0000 ...
W00604.0 0008 ... 5 119
ROTEV1G 263 029 .78 307/107 M39 2735 996
ROTEV N5401.7 0000 ... 38 026 M020 M01
ROTEV W00604.0 0008 ... 0 119 385 372 .... ....
DCT 270 029 .78 306/109 M40 2711 1020
T O C N5403.6 0001 ... 38 026 358 M020 M02
W00602.5 0009 ... 2 117 337 372 .... ....
DCT 270 029 .60 306/114 M37 2580 1151
T O D N5428.9 0005 ... 38 026 358 M020 M01
W00541.6 0014 ... 28 89 368 372 .... ....
SCOTTISH FIR********************************************************
-EGPX N5429.9 0000 ...
W00540.7 0014 ... 1 88
DCT 241 045 .78 307/104 M26 2543 1188
GOTNA N5435.7 0001 ... 23 041 M014 M02
GOTNA W00535.9 0015 ... 6 81 381 373 .... ....
LONDON FIR**********************************************************
-EGTT N5439.6 0001 ...
W00530.0 0016 ... 5 76
AWY FL IMT MN WIND OAT EFOB PBRN
POSITION LAT EET ETO MORA ITT TAS COMP TDV
IDENT LONG TTLT ATO DIS RDIS GS SHR TRP AFOB ABRN
FREQ
--------------------------------------------------------------------
DCT 155 030 .78 304/074 M16 2515 1216
BLACA N5453.0 0003 ... 31 026 P006 M10
BLACA W00509.5 0019 ... 18 58 298 378 .... ....
SCOTTISH FIR********************************************************
-EGPX N5500.1 0001 ...
W00503.4 0020 ... 8 50
TRN1C 060 032 .78 296/039 M01 2447 1284
TURNBERRY N5518.8 0004 ... 31 029 P005 M11
TRN W00447.0 0024 ... 21 29 204 373 .... ....
117.50
TRN1C 2253 1478
PRESTWICK N5530.6 0009 ...
EGPK W00435.7 0033 ... 29 .... ....
--------------------------------------------------------------------
WIND INFORMATION
----------------
CLIMB T O C T O D DESCENT
350 303/114 -59 310 307/116 -50 310 308/123 -50 390 304/107 -60
310 307/116 -50 290 307/113 -45 290 308/121 -45 350 306/117 -58
200 306/093 -25 270 306/109 -40 270 306/114 -40 310 308/123 -50
150 306/074 -16 250 307/104 -35 250 307/107 -36 200 306/093 -27
100 301/047 -10 230 307/099 -31 230 307/101 -32 100 296/042 -16
DWO FR11 DUB PIK 2 + 4 02/04/2015
4 2 5 2 5 6
6 1 6 8 8 6 5 3 1 7
3 6 5 0 1 4 0 0
6 5 3 3 86 6 9 9 0 6 6 7 1 7
4 6 1 7 5
1 9 1 6 3
4 2 5 2 5 6
3800 150 3 6 5 0 0
4 6 1 7 5 6
0
65 0 65 65
5 4 6 0 1
0
0 0 0
8 0 8 1 0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0
5 5 6 0 1
71 65 0
5 5 6 0 1
4 2 5 2 5 6
4 8 0 8 5 7
3 6 5 0 0
5 1 7 3 5 7
5 7
1 4 0 0
5 0 3 3 5
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RST 5 PRE SIM STUDY - Ryan Air

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RYANAIR RST5

FLIGHT TRAINING DEPARTMENT REV 0.1

PRE-SIMULATOR STUDY GUIDE 1st May 2015 to 30th Oct 2015

Briefing OPC LOS DEBRIEF

CRM - Workload Management and SOPs

BREAK Volcanic Ash

Go Around Not In The Landing Configuration

How to Study Using eLearning

CRM presentation and notes Workload management and SOPs.

Pre Simulator Study Guide.

Technical and Procedural

FCIs Review all current FCIs, in particular those relating to

Engine Limit Surge/Stall checklist

General familiarity with all checklists.

QRH Checklist Instructions/Boeing QRH familiarisation doc.

A review of the RST 4 eLearning presentation on

Simulator study guide Review relevant parts.

Line Training Student Descent Planning and Energy Management.

Note: FCOM Vol 1, Rev 24, Operating Limitations Chapter

Simulator Study Guide

Evidence Based Training & Core Competencies

Core competencies have been developed

The core competencies are related

KORA – (Key Operational Risk Areas)

Safety Management System (SMS)

Key Operational Risk Areas (KORA)

Where you see the or

Key Learning Objectives

The RST 5 Key Learning Objectives are related to:

Workload Management and SOPs

Communicating with ATC

Communicating with Passengers

Consider content, impact and effectiveness of a PA during non-normal situations including:

Threat and Error Management (TEM)

Recognising a Volcanic Ash Encounter

Low and Medium Levels of VA

Active Ash Cloud

Commence the Manoeuvre (PF)

Heading and Flight Level

QRH Volcanic Ash Checklist

Engine Limit Surge or Stall

What is an Engine Limit or Surge or Stall?

1) Engine indications are abnormal.

Threat and error management requires crews to consider ANTICIPATION/RECOGNITION AND

During DALTA discuss the threat of a

Discuss contingency plans and

Start of ATC E.g. A direct routing about 20nm

Now this can be erased but put the

How can a high energy approach situation be recognised?

3. Track Miles Required

I. TOD - actively monitor your descent profile every 5000ft.

Can you turn base?

1. At 9nm from touchdown speed should be 190kts

Numerous safe guards are built into SOPs to prevent HEA’s:

VSD SMS KORA

Strengths of the VSD:

1) Improves situation awareness during departures and arrivals.

The terrain profile relative to aircraft is based on the terrain database.

The Range to Target Speed Dot

The solid dot is replaced with an

On profile but FAST

In this example we can see that we

On Speed but High