Guthrie - Complete Works of Plotinus, (En), t.2, 1918

PLOTINOS
Complete Works
In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods;
With
BIOGRAPHY by Porphy Ry, EUNAPius, & SUIDAs,

COMMENTARY by Porphyry,
ILLUSTRATIONS by JAMBlichus & AMMonius,
STUDIES in Sources, Development, Influence;
INDEX of Subjects, Thoughts and Words.
by
KennETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE,

Professor in Extension, University of the South, Sewanee;
A.M.. Sewanee, and Harvard; Ph.D., Tulane, and Columbia.
M.D., Medico-Chirurgical College, Philadelphia.
Vol. II
Amelio-Porphyrian Books, 22-33.
COMPARATIVE LI'I’ERATURE PRESS
ALPIN N.J., U.S.A.

F.,
P. O. Box 12,
J.
C
ANDOVER-Farward
Theological LBRARY
APR 28 1919
HARVARD
NITY SCHOOL
Copyright, 1918, by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie.

All Rights, including that of Translation, Reserved.
Entered at Stationers' Hall, by
George Bell and Sons, Portugal Street, Lincoln's Inn, London.
{3
ØQ3
ºf
//*\s
tº
V,
\, W.2. J. H.
vi.4] ESSENCE IS EVERYWHERE PRESENT 285
SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR.

The One Identical Essence is Everywhere Entirely
Present.
WHY THE WORLD-SOUL IS EVERYWHERE ENTIRE

IN THE WORLD-BODY.
1. Is it because the body of the universe is so
great that the Soul is everywhere present in the uni
verse, though being naturally divisible in (human)
bodies? Or it is by herself, that she is everywhere
present? In the latter case, she has not been drawn
away everywhere by the body, but the body found her
it;
everywhere in existence before thus, whatever

in
place may be, found the Soul present before

it
it
itself was part the universe, and the total body of it

of
the universe was located the Soul that existed

in
already.
HOW COULD THE SOUL HAVE No MAGNITUDE, IF

SHE ALREADY FILLED ALL SPACE:
But the Soul had such an extension before the
if
all
body approached her, she already filled space,

if
how can she have no magnitude? Besides, how could

she have been present the universe when the latter
in
did not yet exist? Last, being considered indivisible

.
and non-extended, she everywhere present without

is
having any magnitude that she ex

of be
the answer
If
2
tended herself throughout the body the universe

without herself being corporeal, the question not yet
is
286 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [22
resolved by thus accidentally attributing magnitude to

the Soul; for it would then be reasonable to ask how
she grew great by accident. The Soul could not extend
herself in the entire body in the same manner as qual
ity, as for instance, sweetness or color; for these are
passive modifications of the bodies, so that one must
not be astonished to see a modification spread all over
the modified body, being nothing by itself, inhering
it;
in the body, and existing only within that why
is
the soul necessarily has the same magnitude
as
the
body. Besides, the whiteness one part the body
of
of
does not share the experience” (or, “passion”) ex
perienced by the whiteness another part; the white
of
one part identical, respect species,
of
in
to
to
ness
is
another part; but

of
the whiteness not identical
is
it
respect number; on the contrary, the
to
therewith
in
part present
of
the soul which the foot identical

in
is
is
with the portion
as
the soul present the hand, may
of
in
be seen the percepts thereof. Last, what identical

in
is is
the qualities divisible, while that which identical
in in
is
indivisible; divide,
be
to
the soul said
in
is
is
if
it
it
this sense that present everywhere.
is
it
THE SOUL WAS CAPABLE OF EXTENSION BEFORE

THE EXISTENCE OF THE BODY.
these facts, let us, starting from the very
of
In
view
beginning, explain clear and plausible manner,
in
a
how the soul, being incorporeal and extended, could,

an
nevertheless, have assumed such extension, either

before the bodies,
or
the bodies. indeed one see

of in
If
that she was capable assuming extension before the

be
bodies existed, will easily understood that she

it
could have done so within the bodies.
DESCRIPTION OF THE UNIVERSAL BEING.

There exists genuinely universal (Being).
2.
no
its
The world that we see more than image. This

is
veritably universal (Being) is in nothing; for nothing
its
has proceeded from existence. What posterior
is
this universal (Being) must,
be
it,
it to
exist,
to
since
in
it,
would depend on and without could neither
it
subsist nor move. Do not therefore place our world
this genuinely universal (being) by
as
place,
in
in
if
a
place you understand the limit the body containing
of
or
so
as
far contains, space which before had, and

it
a
which still has emptiness for nature. Conceive
of
the
foundation on which our world rests existing
as
it. in
the (Being) which exists everywhere, and contains
Conceive their relation exclusively by the mind, setting
all
aside local nomenclature. Indeed, when one speaks

only relation with our visible world;
of
place,
in
is
it
but the universal (being), being the First, and possess

ing genuine existence, has no need being place,
of
in
a
nor anything whatever. Being universal, could
in
it
not fail support itself, for fills itself, equals itself,
to
it
and where the universal because this itself.

is
is
is
it
What has been built on the universal, being other

it,
it,
it,
than participates and approaches receives

byin
|
dividing
it,
it, it,
“strength from not but because finds

it
itself, because approaches since the universal

in
it
it
(“being”) itself; for impossible

of
not outside
it
is
is
for the essence non-essence; on the contrary,

to
be
in
it
non-essence that must subsist essence, and conse

in
is
quently unite entirely with the whole essence. We

repeat, the universal could not separate itself from
itself; and we say that everywhere, only
is in
is
is
it
it
if
is,
this sense that essence, that itself.

in
in
is
It
it
not surprising that what everywhere essence

in
is
is
itself; for that which everywhere

in
and the
in
is
is
unity. We, however, positing that the (Being)

in
question sense-(existence), believe that every

is
is
it
where here below; and,

as
the sense- (existence)

is
the intelligible
is,
great, we wonder how nature (that

mag
so
that which has great

in
essence) can extend

a
nitude. In reality, the (Being) which is called great

is small; the (Being) which is regarded as small is
great, since the whole of it penetrates in every part
of all; or rather, our world, by
its
parts everywhere
approaching the universal (Being), finds everywhere
it
as
entire, and greater than itself. Consequently,
it
would receive nothing more by greater extension
a
(for, were possible, would thereby exclude itself
if
it
it
from the universal Being), circles around this
it
it,
Being. Not being able pierce
to
to
embrace nor
into its innermost, contented itself with occupying
it
place, and with having place where might pre
it
a
a
serve existence while approaching the universal
(Being), which
it,
present
in in
to
one sense and
in
is
another, not present; for the universal (Being)
is
is
itself, even when something else wishes unite itself
to
it,
Therefore, approaching the uni

to
the body
of
it.
verse finds the universal “Being”; having no need
of
going any farther, turns around the same thing be
it
cause the thing around which turns the veritably

is
all it
universal (Being),
its
so
parts enjoys the

in
that
it
presence this whole entire Being.

of
the universal
If
.
(Being) were place, our world should (instead
of
in
a
having circular motion), rush towards straight

in
it
a
a
by
line, touching different parts this Being

of
different
own, and find itself on one side distant from
its
parts
of
it,
But
as
it.
and on the other side near the universal

(Being) neither near one place, nor distant from
it is
as
as
another, necessarily entirely present soon

is
to it
g
all present. Consequently, entirely present

at
is
is
it
these things from which

is of
each neither near nor

l
is
it
far; present
to
the things that are able

it.
to
receive
it
THE UNIVERSAL BEING IS INDIVISIBLE,

the universal (Being) by itself present every
3.
Is
where? Or does remain within itself, while from

it
all
on
its
its
innermost powers descend things, and

is
| f
it in this sense that it is regarded as everywhere pres
ent? Yes, doubtless. That is why it is said that souls
are the rays of this universal (Being), that it is built
it,
on itself, and that from souls descend into various
its
animals. The things which participate unity,
in
as
incapable they are possessing complete nature
of
a
nature, enjoy the presence
its
to
of
conformed the
universal (Being) this sense that they enjoy the
of in
They are not, how
of
presence some powers. its

ever, entirely separated from not sepa
it it,
because
is
it
rated from the power which
to
communicates each
only because
do
of
them. they not have more,

If
is
it
they are not capable receiving more from the pres
of
the entire whole (Being). Evidently

of
ence
it
is
always entirely present there where
its
powers are
present. however remains separated, for be
if
It
it
any one particular being,
of
came the form would
in it
be universal, subsist everywhere itself,
to
to
cease
some other “being.”
be
of
and would the accident

it
Therefore, since belongs these things,

of
to
none
it
it, it,
those that aspire
of
to
even unite themselves with

makes them enjoy
its
presence when they desire

it
and the measure which they are capable thereof;

it in
in
does not belong any particular.

of
but
in
to
them
in It
in be
not surprising, therefore, that should present

is
it
all things, since not present any manner

is in
to is
it
a
as
belong
to
to
such alone. also reasonable

It
it
assert that, the soul share the passions the bodies,

of
byif
only accident, that she dwells herself, and

in
is
it
belongs neither
to
matter nor body, that the whole

to
her illuminates the whole world-body.

of
not
is
It
say that the (Being) which not

to
contradiction
is
present any place present all things each

of
in in
to
is
place. What, indeed, would

be
which surprising
is
that the universal (Being)

be
and impossible would

at be
could, while occupying determinate place, present

a
all
things which are place, and could

to
be
in
a
present in the sense in which we have explained
it.
Reason forces us, therefore,
to
admit that the universal
(Being) must, precisely because does not occupy
it
be
any place, entirely present the things which
to
to
present; and, since present the universe,
to
is
is
it
it
be entirely present each thing; otherwise, one part
to
be
here, and another there; consequently,
it of
would
it
be
would divisible, would be body. How otherwise

could one divide the (“Being”) it
its
life that shall
Is
it
2
the totality
it be
of
within be divided? the
If
it
it
(being) that life,

no
part Or
be
of
would that.
is
In so
will somebody try divide the Intelligence,
to
that
its parts be here, and the other there?
of
one this
case, neither the two parts would intelligence.
be
of
Or will the (Being) itself be divided? But the totality
if
be the (Being), no one part
be
of
would
It
that.
of it
be
might objected that the parts the bodies are still

bodies themselves. But that which divided not
is
is
the body (as such), but certain body
of
certain
a
a
its
extent; now each parts possesses the form that

of
named body; while the form not only

be
to
causes
it
does not have some particular extension, but even any

kind of extension at all.
THE UNITY OF BEING DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE
EXISTENCE OF OTHER BEINGS.
-
-
plurality
be
essences, intel
of
How can there

4.
be
ligences and Soul, essence one? The essence

is
if
its
one everywhere; but unity does not exclude the

other (beings), which may
be
con
of
to
existence said
also with the unity
so
of of
form thereto. the

It
is
intelligence, and the soul, although the Soul

of
the
different from the particular souls.
be
universe
ESSENCE IS DIVISIBLE IF THEREBY NOT
DIMINISHED.
would seem be
as
there were contradiction

It
if
tween the present assertions

of
and other statements

ours; and perhaps our demonstration imposes rather

than convinces. It is impossible to believe that the
essence which is one be also everywhere identical; it
would seem preferable to admit that essence, considered
in its totality, is Susceptible of division, so long as this
it;
or,
to
division does not diminish use more careful
terms, that begets all things while remaining with
it
itself; and that the souls that are born
it,
of
and are
be
its
parts, fill up everything. But admitted
it
if
that the One essence remains Himself because
in
in be it
seems incredible that principle could everywhere
a
present entire, the same difficulty would hinder
us
regard souls; for them will
of
will result that each
to
it
no longer be entire the whole body, but will be

in
divided therein, or, each individual soul remain

if
entire, that by remaining one part the body,
to of
in
is
it
that the soul will communicate her power These
it.
same questions about the soul could be raised about
be
the powers the soul, and we might ask they
of
if
be
be
all entire everywhere. Last, one could

to
led
lieve that the soul was one member, while her power
in
was another.
in
THE SOUL, AS COMPRISING MANY SOULS, IS

INFINITE.
plurality
be
us
first explain how there can

of
Let
a
intelligences, souls, and essences. we consider the

If
things that proceed from the first principles, they

as
are numbers and not magnitudes, we shall also have

to
ask ourselves how they fill the universe. This plu

rality which thus arises from the first principles does
any way help
us
not solve our question, since we

in
to
have granted that essence multiple because

of
the
is
difference (of the beings that proceed from it), and

by
be
not place; for though multiple, simul

is
it
it
taneously entire; “essence everywhere touches es

| sence,” and it is everywhere entirely present. Intelli
gence likewise is manifold by the difference (of the
intelligences that proceed therefrom), and not by
Space; it is entire everywhere. It is so also with souls;
even their part which is divisible in the bodies is in
its
divisible by nature. But the bodies possess exten
present with them; rather,
or
Sion because the Soul
is
because there are bodies the sense-world;
in
is
is
it
it
because the power
of
the Soul (that universal)
is
all
which them manifests itself their parts, that
in
in
is
the Soul herself seems have parts. What proves

as to
that she not divided they are, and with them,

is
entirely present everywhere, that by nature

that she
is
is
she essentially one and indivisible. Thus, the unity
is
the Soul does not exclude the plurality souls,

of
of
any more than the unity essence excludes the plur
of
ality (beings), that the plurality intelligibles

of
of
or
does not disagree with the existence

of
the One.
to It
not necessary admit that the Soul imparts life
to
is
the bodies by the plurality souls, nor that that

of
plurality derives from the extension the body (of

of
the world). Before there ever were any bodies, there

was already one (universal) Soul and several (indi
vidual) souls. The individual souls existed already
in
the universal Soul, not potentially, but each actu

in
ality. The unity

of
the universal Soul does not hinder

the multitude of the individual souls contained within
her; the multitude
of
the individual souls does not

hinder the unity They are dis
of
the universal Soul.

tinct without being separated by any interval; they are
present being foreign
of
to
to
each other instead each

other; for they are not separated from each other by
any limits, any more than different sciences are within
single soul. The Soul such that her unity she
in
is
a
is,
contains all the souls. Such nature therefore,

a
infinite.
THE GREATNESS OF THE SOUL HAS NOTHING TO

DO WITH THE SIZE OF THE BODY.
5. The magnitude of the Soul does not consist in

being a corporeal maSS; for every corporeal mass is
Small, and reduces to nothing, if it be made to undergo
a diminution. As to the magnitude of the Soul, nothing
something were re
it;
can be removed from and
if
moved, she would not lose anything. Since, therefore,
she cannot lose anything, why fear that she should
be
be
far from something? How could she far
from something since she loses nothing, since she pos
sesses an eternal nature, and subject no leakage?
to
is
she were subject some leakage, she would advance

to
If
till where she could leak; but

or as
all
at
she cannot leak
no
(for there place where into which she could

is
leak), she has embraced the universe, rather, she or
be
herself the universe, and she too great judged to
is
is
according physical magnitude. We may say that

to
she gives little the universe; but she gives all

to
it
it
can receive. Do not consider the universal Being
as
as
being smaller, having

or
(Essence) smaller
a
mass (than our universe); otherwise, you would be

ask yourself how that which
to
led smaller can

is
unite with that which greater. Besides, one should

is
not predicate comparative smallness

of
the universal
Essence, nor compare, regard mass, that which
to
in
be
as
has no mass with that which has; that would

if
somebody said that the science called medicine

is
smaller than the body

of
the doctor. Neither attribute

of to
the universal Essence an extent greater (than that

our universe); for not extension that the
in
is
it
soul greater than the body. What shows the

is
veritable magnitude the soul, that, when the body

of
is
increases, the same soul which formerly existed

in
a
smaller mass present this whole mass that has

in
is
become greater; now would be ridiculous suppose

to
it
that the soul increases in the same manner as a cor
poreal mass.
THE SOULS WILL DIFFER AS WILL THE SENSATIONS.
6. , Why (if
the universal Soul possess the magni
her), does she not approach
to
tude here attributed
some other body (than that which she animates; that
be
is,
some individual body) would this body's
It
(privilege duty) approach the universal Soul,
to or
to
if
do so; on approaching
be
her,
to
able receives
it
it
Something, and appropriates But would this body,
that would approach the universal Soul, not already it.
possess her simultaneously with the soul proper
to
itself, since these souls (the universal Soul, and the
individual soul) do not appear differ from each
to
is,
as
so
other? The fact that their sensations differ,
must the passions that they experience likewise differ.
be
The things are judged different, but the judge

to
of is
the same principle successively placed presence
hein
different passions, although who experi

be
not
it
ences them, but the body disposed some particular

in
us
judges both
of
as
manner. when some one

It
is
if
the pleasure experienced by the finger, and the pain

by
felt the head. But why does not our soul perceive
judgments made by the universal Soul? Because this
judgment, and not passion. Besides, the faculty
is
a
that judged the passion does not say, have judged,”

“I
limits itself judging. Thus, ourselves,

to
but
in
is
it
it
its
not the sight which communicates judgment

to
the
hearing, although both these senses made separate
of
judgments; what presides over these two senses

is
reason, which constitutes different faculty. Often

a
by
reason cognizes the judgment made some other

(being), while being conscious simultaneously
of
the
passion experiences. But this question has been
it
treated elsewhere.
HOW CAN THE SAME PRINCIPLE EXIST IN ALL

THINGSP
Let us return to this question: How can the same
principle exist in all things? This question amounts
to asking how each of the sense-objects which form a
plurality and which occupy different places, can, never
theless, participate in the same principle; for it is not
allowable to divide unity into a multitude of parts; it
would be more fitting to reduce the multitude of parts
to unity, which could not approach them. But when
these parts occupy different places, they have led us to
believe that unity likewise is split up, as if the power
which dominates and which contains were divided into
as many parts as that which is contained. The hand
itself (though corporeal), may hold an entire body,
such as a piece of wood several feet in length, and
other objects. In this case, the force that holds makes
itself felt in the whole object that is felt, and does not
distribute itself in as many parts as it may contain,
though it be circumscribed by the limit of the reach of
the hand. Nevertheless, the hand is limited by its own
extension, and not by that of the body which is held
or suspended. Add to the suspended body some other
length, and admitting that the hand can carry
its
it,
force will hold the entire body without dividing into

as
many parts may contain. Now suppose that

as
it
the corporeal mass

be
annihilated, and,
of
the hand
nevertheless, allow the force which, before, existed
in
the hand and held the weight, persist; will not this
to
same force, indivisible the totality, be equally in

in
its
parts?
of
divisible each
in
LIGHT EXISTS SIMULTANEOUSLY WITHIN AND

WITHOUT.
Imagine point which
Soas
7.
luminous serves
a
centre, and imagine around transparent sphere,

it
a
the luminous point Shines

of
that the clearness the

in
whole body that surrounds it without the exterior re

ceiving any light from elsewhere; you will Surely have
to acknowledge that this interior light, by remaining
impassible, penetrates the whole Surrounding mass, and
that it embraces the whole sphere from the central
point in which it is seen to shine. The truth is that
the light did not emanate from the little body placed
in the centre; for this little body did not glow inasmuch
as it was a body, but inasmuch as it was a luminous
body; that means, by virtue of an incorporeal power.
Now in thought annihilate the mass of the little lumin
luminous power; could you
its
ous body, and preserve
still say that light equally
be
somewhere? Will not
is
it
the interior, and the whole exterior sphere? You
in
in
will no longer perceive where was fixed before, and

it it
you will no longer say whence comes, nor where is;
it
this respect you will remain uncertain and astonished;
in
you will see the light shine simultaneously the in
in
the exterior sphere. An example
of
terior and this
in
at is
the solar light that shines the air when you look
in
the body the sun, the same time that you perceive
of
at
everywhere the same light without any division; that

by
demonstrated objects that intercept the light;

is
they reflect nowhere else than the direction from

in
it
which came; they do not shatter into fragments.

it
it
incorporeal power, you could

an
But the sun were

if
not, when would radiate light, tell where the light

it
be
began, nor from where was sent; there would

it
but single light, the same everywhere, having neither

a
pro
ãº beginning, nor principle from which
of
it
CCCCIS.
UNITY IS IN THE MANIFOLD BY MANNER OF

A
EXISTENCE.
When light emanates from body easy
to
8.
is
if of it
a
tell when shines, because the location that body

it
be
known. But being immaterial, have no

is
if
it
a
need of a body, if it be anterior to all bodies, and be

founded on itself, or rather if it have no need, as has
a body, or resting on any foundation—then, a being
endowed with such a nature has no origin from which
it is derived, resides in no place, and depends on no
body. How could you then say that one of
its
parts
is
here, and another there? For thus
is would have
it
an origin from which had issued, and would depend
it
it
from something. We must, therefore, say that some
if
thing participate this being by the power
of
in
the
universe, participates this being entirely, without
or in
it
thereby being changed divided; for being
is
it
a
united body that suffers (although often that hap
it to
a
pens only accidentally), and this respect may

to
in
it
be said that passive and divisible, since some
is
is
it
it
part
to its
the body, either passion,

of
form. As
or
to
the
(being) which any body, and
to
united which the
is
body aspires be united,

of to
must no manner share

in
it
the passions the body, such; for the essential

as
If,
passion the body, such,
of
to
as
divide itself.
is
by nature inclined
be
therefore, the body divide itself,

to
then the incorporeal, by nature, indivisible. How,

is
fact, could one divide that which has no extension

If, in
therefore, the extended (being) participate

in in
the
(being) which has no extension, participates this
it
it;
(being) without dividing otherwise, this (being)

would have extension. Consequently, when you say
that the unity (of the universal essence) the mani
in
is
fold, you do not say that unity has become manifold

ness, but you refer this unity the manner
to
of
exist
the multitude, seeing
of
ence this whole multitude

in
it
simultaneously. As this Unity, will have

to
to to
be
it
no
belongs individual, nor

it to
understood that the

it
whole multitude, but that belongs

it to
itself alone,
that itself, and that, being itself, does not fail
it
is
support itself. Nor does possess magnitude such

as to
it
a
of
as
our universe, nor, let alone, such

of
that one
of the parts of the universe; for it has absolutely no
magnitude. How could it have any magnitude 2 It is
the body that should have such magnitude. As to the
(being) whose nature is entirely different from that
of the body, no magnitude should be ascribed to
it.
If
have no magnitude, nowhere; neither here
is
is
it
it
it
be
nor there; for so, would several places.
in
If
if
it
then the local division suits only the (being)
of
which
one part here, and the other there, how could the
is
(being) that
be
neither here nor there divided?
is
Consequently, the incorporeal (being) must remain

itself, although the multitude things
of
indivisible
in
they
it,
aspire
to to
to
unite itself and succeeds therein.
If
it,
so
aspire possess they aspire possess entire,
to
it
they succeed participating that (being),
in in
that
in
if
that entire (being)
so
as
they will participate far
their capacity reaches. Nevertheless, the things that
participate this (being) must participate
as
in
in
if
it it
it,
they did not participate

in
of in
this sense that does

not belong exclusively any
to
them. thus that

It
is
this (being) dwells entirely itself, and the things
in
in
which manifests; did not remain entire,

in
it
it
it
if
itself, and things would no longer

be
would no more
participate the (being) which they aspire, but
in
in
to
some other (being) which they did not aspire.

to
POTENTIALITIES ARE INSEPARABLE FROM THEIR

BEINGS.
this unity (of the universal Soul) divided
it
9.
If
parts such that each would re

of
self multitude
in
a
be
semble the total unity, there would

of
multitude
a
primary (beings); for each one these (beings)

of
be
would primary. How then could one distinguish

from each other all these primary (beings),
so
that
they might not all confusion blend into single one?
in
They would not separated by their bodies, for

be
primary (beings) could not

be
as
bodies;
of
forms
they would be similar to the primary (Being) which is

their principle. On the other hand, if the things named
parts were potentialities of the universal (Being),
(there would be two results). First, each thing would
no longer be the total unity. Then, one might wonder
how these potentialities separated from the universal
it;
(Being), and abandoned
it,
for they abandoned
if
could evidently only be go somewhere else. There
to
it
might also be reason the potentialities

to
ask oneself
if
or
which are the sense-world are still no longer
in
it in
the universal (Being).
it or be
it,
they no longer
in
If
suppose became impotent,

to
absurd diminished
is
of it
by being deprived the powers possessed before.

equally absurd suppose that the potentialities
to
is
It
which they be
be
would separated from the beings to

long. On the contrary, the potentialities exist sim
if
ultaneously the universal (Being) and elsewhere,

in
they will, here below,

of be
either wholes parts; or
if
they parts, that part them that will remain on
be
high will also form parts; they be wholes, they are

if
as
here below the same above; they are not divided

here below any way, and thus the universal (Being)
in
still the same without any division. Or again, the

is
potentialities are the particularized universal (Being),

the things
of
of
which has become the multitude which

each the total unity; and these potentialities are
is
mutually similar. this way, with each being there

In
be
will single potentiality, united Being, and

to
but
a
the other things will be no more than mere potenti

being with
of
But
to
alities. not easier conceive

is
it
out potentiality, than potentiality without being;

a
for above (among the ideas) the potentiality consists

or
hypostatic existence and being; rather,

of
some
is
it
thing greater than being. Here below there are other

lively; they emanate
or
potentialities, less energetic

from the universal (Being) from brilliant light
as
would emanate another less brilliant light; but the

beings inhere in these potentialities, as there could
be no potentiality without being.
THE UNIVERSAL SOUL IS EVERYWHERE ENTIRE,

INCLUDING SOULS SPLIT INFINITELY.
Among such potentialities, which are necessarily
conformable to each other, the universal Soul must be
the same everywhere, or, if she be not absolutely
everywhere, she must, at least, in every place, be entire
without division, as in one and the same body. In this
case, why could she not also be thus in the whole uni
verse? If we were to suppose that each particular
soul were divided into infinity, the universal Soul will
no longer be entire, and, as a result of this division, she
will become completely impotent. Then, as there will
be entirely different powers in different parts of the
world, there will be no more sympathy among Souls.
Last, the image, separated from the essence it repre
sents, and the light, separated from the source of which
it is only a weakened emanation, could no longer sub
its
sist; for in general everything that derives existence
its
from anything else and image could no longer sub

its
sist without model. Likewise, these powers which

radiate from the universal Soul would cease to be
they found themselves separated from their principle.
if
so, the Principle which begets these powers will
If
exist everywhere they are; consequently, from this

standpoint also, the universal (Being) must every
be
where present whole, without undergoing any

as
f
divisions.
THE IMAGE IS BOUND TO ITS MODEL BY RADIATION.

may objected that the image need not
be
10.
It
model; for there are

be
its
necessarily
to
attached
images that subsist
of
the absence their model from

in
which they are derived. For instance, when the fire

ceases, the heat that proceeds from does not any the
it
less remain in the warmed object. The relation be
be
its
tween this image and model should understood
image made by
an
us
as
follows. Let consider
a
painter. this case,
In
not the model who made the
is
it
image, but the painter; and even
so
not even the
is
it
real image the model, even the painter had painted
of
if
his own portrait; for this image did not arise from the
body the painter, nor from the represented form,
of
nor from the painter himself, but the product
of
is
it
complex colors arranged certain manner. We,
of
in
a
a
therefore, do not really here have the production
of
an
image, such furnished by mirrors, waters, and
as
is
shadows. Here the image really emanates from the

formed by
it,
pre-existing model, and and could not
is
exist without this manner that the inferior

it.
in
is
It
potentialities proceed from the superior ones.
SOULS ARE AS IMMORTAL AS THE ONE FROM

WHOM THEY PROCEED.
the objection drawn from the heat
us
Let proceed
to
that remains after the withdrawal of the fire. The

not the image the fire, least, we may
of
or
at
heat
is
so
deny that there always fire heat; but even heat

in
is
independent fire. Besides, when you

be
of
would not
this body
it,
withdraw from body the fire that heats

a
grows cold, not instantaneously, least gradually.

at
if
would, however, wrong say that the powers

be
to
It
that descend here below also gradually grow extinct;

for this would amount stating that only the One
to
is
immortal, while the souls and intelligences are mortal.

Besides,
to
not reasonable admit that even the

is
it
things that derive from “being” that wastes away

a
also gradually exhaust themselves; for even you

if
should immobilize the Sun, would still shed the same

it
light the same places. were objected that

in
If
it
it
be
would not the same light, the conclusion would be

(the absurdity) that the body per
of
the sun
in
is
a
petual wastage. Last we have elsewhere demonstrated
at length that what proceeds from the One does not
perish, but that all souls and intelligences are immortal.
BEINGS PARTAKE OF THE ONE DIFFERENTLY

ACCORDING TO THEIR CAPACITIES.
11. But if (the intelligible Being) be present
everywhere, why do not all (beings) participate in the
intelligible (Being) entire? Why are there several
degrees amidst these (beings), one being the first, the
other the second, and so on 2. Because the (beings)
which are capable of absorbing (intelligible Being)
are counted as present thereto. Essence exists every
where in that which is essence, thus never failing itself.
Everything that can be present to it is present in reality,
its
in the measure of capacity, not local manner, as

in
a
light modified by transparence; for participation takes
is
place differently an opaque body. we distinguish

in
It
to
several degrees among beings, we shall surely have
conceive that the first separated from the second,
is
and the second from the third, only by

its
order, its
(individual) differences, but not by loca
its
power, its
tion. the intelligible world nothing hinders different
In
soul and intel

or as
things from subsisting together, such

ligence, and all the sciences, superior inferior. Thus
also single apple the eye sees color, the nostril
in
a
smells perfume, and each other sense-organ perceives

its
individual quality. All these things subsist together

and are not separated from each other.
THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF PRESENCES.
the intelligible (Being) then varied and mani
it so
Is
fold? indeed varied, but simultaneously

is
is
it It
simple; both one and manifold; for reason (which

is
the universal Soul),

of
the essence both one and

is
is
manifold. The universal (Being) also one; though

is
any difference (in this sense, that contains dif

in
it
it
own constitution; the
its
ferent essences), results from
its
difference inheres nature, for could not belong
in
it
as
non-being.
of
The constitution
to to
Essence such
is
inseparable from unity; unity present wherever
be
is
is,
and the one Essence subsists itself.
in
essence
is
It
indeed possible that an essence which certain re
in
a
is,
spect separated from another essence, however,
is
entirely present with But there are different kinds

it.
presence; first, when sense-things are present with

of
intelligible things,
be
which they can
at
to
to
least those
present; second, when intelligible entities are present
each other; likewise, when the body present
to
to
is
the soul; another, when present the soul;
to
science
is
a
further, when science present another science, to

is
a
and both coexist the same intelligence; last, when

in
a
body present another body.
to
is
HOW VARIOUS THINGS CAN PARTICIPATE IN THE

SAME PRINCIPLE.
12. When sound resounds the air, and when
in
it
a
constitutes word, the ear that present hears and

is
a
perceives this sound and this word, especially the

if
place be quiet.
to
another ear should come be

in
If
this place, the sound and the word approach likewise,

it
rather, this ear will approach the word. Suppose

or
also that several eyes consider the same object; all are
sight, although this object occupy
its
filled with
a
determinate place. Thus the same object will impress

different organs with different perceptions, because the
one an eye, and the other an ear. Likewise, all
is
in is
the things that can participate the soul do participate

therein, but each receives different power from one
a
and the same principle. The sound everywhere

is
present the air; divided unity, but unity

in
not
is
it
a
a
present everywhere, entirely. Likewise, the air re

if
the visible object, possesses with

of
ceive the form

it
it
out division, for, whatever place the eye should

in
place itself, it perceives the form of the visible object;
at, least, according to our opinion, for not all philos
ophers agree herewith. We give these examples to
explain how several things may participate in one and
the same principle. Besides, the example of the sound
suffices to demonstrate what we here wish to explain;
namely, that the entire form is present in the entire
air; for all men would not hear the same thing, if the
word uttered by the sound were everywhere entire,
and if each ear did not likewise hear it entire. Now if in
this case the entire word spread in the entire air, with
out some definite part of the word being united
to a certain part of the air, and some other part of
the word being united with another part of the air,
how could we refuse to admit that a single Soul pene
trates everywhere without dividing herself with the
things, that she is entirely present everywhere where
she is, that she is everywhere in the world without
dividing into parts that correspond to those of the
world? When she has united with the bodies, in
whatever kind of union, she bears an analogy to the
word which has been pronounced in the air, while
before uniting with the bodies, she resembles him who
pronounces, or is about to pronounce some word.
Nevertheless, even when she has united to the bodies,
she does not really in certain respects cease resembling
him who pronounces a word, and who, while pro
it,
it,
nouncing possesses and gives

at
the same time.

it
Doubtless the word does not have nature identical

to a
by
with those things that we proposed illustrate this

ºple; nevertheless, there much analogy between
is
them.
THE BODY'S RELATION TO THE SOUL IS PASSAGE

A
INTO THE WORLD OF LIFE.

us
study)
to
of
(Let the relation the (world) Soul

different kind,
of
bodies. As this relation must

is
it
a
2
be understood that the Soul is not partly in herself and

partly in the bodies. Simultaneously she dwells entirely
within herself, and also projects her image into the
multiplicity of the bodies (which reflect her, like
mirrors). Suppose that some definite body approach
the Soul to receive life from her; it obtains life silently,
and thus possesses what already was in other bodies.
Indeed, conditions had not been arranged so that a part
of the Soul, located in a certain place, should await a
body, so as to enter into But this part
of
the Soul
it.
so
which enters into body, speak, existed already
to
a
the universe, that say, herself, and she con

to
in
in
is
herself although she seemed

to
to
tinued exist have
in
descended here below. How indeed should the Soul

descend here below Therefore, she did not descend
if
2
here below, she only manifested her actual presence,

if
without awaiting the body which was participate

to
in
her, evidently the Soul dwells herself simultaneously
in
,
with becoming present this body. Now, the Soul
to
if
dwell herself at the same time as She becomes
in
present this body (for not the Soul that came

to
is
it
into this body), the body which entered into her;

is
it
the body which, being till then outside

of
veritable
is
it
of it,
Essence, entered into and passed into the world

of
life. Now the world life was all itself, without

in
extension, and, therefore, without division. The body

has, therefore, not entered into something that
in
as
it
possesses extension. commenced by participating,

It
the parts life, but

of
If of
of
not one the world this

in
in
whole world, entirely.

an
additional body should

the same way
it,
also enter will participate

in
in
it
it
(entirely). Consequently, we said that the world

if
these bodies, similarly entire

of
life
in
entire
It in
of is
is
it
is,
each them. therefore everywhere the same,

and numerically one, without dividing, but always
present entire.
WORKS OF PLOTINOS
º
306 [22
EXTENSION IS MERELY A SIGN of PARTICIPA
TION IN THE WORLD OF LIFE.
13. Whence originates extension in our universe,
and in the animals? The world of life contains no ex
tension. Sensation, whose testimony hinders us from
believing what we are told in this respect, reveals to
us here and there the world of life. But reason tells
us that, if we see it thus, it is not that it is really ex
tended here and there, but that all that possesses ex
tension has participated in the world of life, which,
however, has no extension.
PARTICIPATION CAN BE ONLY IN THE INTELLIGIBLE.

When a being participates in something, evidently it
does not participate in itself; for thus it would really
participate in nothing, and would remain what it was.
The body that participates in something must, there
fore, not participate in corporeal nature, for it pos
sesses it already. Consequently, the body will not
participate in the corporeal nature, any more than a
magnitude would participate in a magnitude, which it
possesses already. Let us even admit that a magnitude
be increased, yet on that account alone it would not
participate in magnitude; for a two-foot object does
not become a three-foot object, but the object which
first had a certain quantity merely changes to some
other quantity; otherwise two would become three.
Thus, since that which has extension and is divided
participates in genus that is different, and even very
different, the thing in which it participates must neither
be divided, nor have extension; but have absolutely
no kind of quantity. Consequently, the (being) which
everywhere is present entire must be present, though
remaining indivisible. It is not indivisible merely be
cause it is small, which would not make it any less
divisible; only, it would no more be proportioned to the
universe, it would not spread in the corporeal mass in
the degree that it increases. Neither does it resemble a

point, but it includes an infinity of points; conse
quently what you might Suppose was a point would
include an infinity of (Separate) points, and could not
be continuous, nor, consequently, proportion itself to
the universe. If then every corporeal mass possess
the (being) which is present everywhere, it must pos
sess it entire in all the parts that compose
it.
NOTHING IN THE UNIVERSAL SOUL IS BEGOTTEN;
IT ONLY SEEMS SO.
each per
be
14. But one and the single Soul
in
if
son, how does each have his own Soul? How then
be
can one soul good, while the other evil? The

is
universal Soul communicates her life toeach, for she
contains all the souls and all the intelligences. She
possesses simultaneously unity and infinity; her
in
breast she contains all the souls, each distinct from her,
but not separated; otherwise how could the Soul possess
objected that the uni
be
the infinite? might still

It
versal Soul simultaneously contains all things, all lives,

all Souls, all the intelligences; that these are not each
circumscribed by limits, and that that the reason
is
be
they form unity. Indeed, there had

to
the
in
a
universal Soul life not only one, but infinite, and yet
a
single; this one life had

so
as
far was all

to
be one
it
lives, these did not get confused this unity, but

as
in
that they should originate there, while

at
the same
time they should remain located the place from
in
where they had started; rather, they never left the

or
the universal Soul, for they have always sub

of
womb
sisted the same state. Indeed, nothing was begotten
in
the universal Soul; she did not really divide herself,

in
she only seems divided respect what receives her;

to
in
everything within her remains what has always been.

it
But that which was begotten (namely, the body) ap

3O8 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [22
proaches the Soul, and seems to unite with her, and
depends on her.
RELATION OF MAN TO THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.

And what are we? Are we the universal Soul, or
are we what approaches her, and what is begotten in
the body)
is,
time (that No: (we are not bodies).
of 2
Before the generation the bodies had been accom
plished, we existed already on high; some
us
of
were
us
is,
men, others
of
were even divinities—that we

| were pure souls, intelligences connected with universal
Being; we formed parts of the intelligible world, parts
that were neither circumscribed nor separated, but
which belonged the entire intelligible world. Even
to
now, indeed, we are not separated from the intelligible

world; but the intelligible Man has received, andbeus
to in
joined by man who desired different from the

is
be
inde
is,
former (that
to
the sense-man desired
pendent), and finding us, for we were not outside
to of
the universe, he surrounded us, and added himself
the intelligible man who then was each one
of
us.
WE ARE NOT ALWAYS BOTH MEN, AS WE

SHOULD BE.
word; those who
or
Now suppose single sound

a
his own way;

it,
to
listen hear and receive each

in
it
it
of
hearing passes into each

of
the condition
is in
them
an
actualization, and perceives what acting on We

it.
once (the intelligible Man,

at
thus became two men

and the sense-man who added himself the former);
to
before, only one the two;

no
or
as
longer,
of
we are
rather, we are sometimes still only one them, the
of
the first. This occurs every

to
man who added himself

time that the first Man slumbers us, and not
in
is
present, certain sense (when we fail to reflect

in
a
about the conceptions intelligence).

of
vi.4] ESSENCE IS EVERYWHERE
PRESENT 309
HOW THE BODY APPROACHED THE SOUL.
15. But how did the body approach the universal
Soul? As this body had an aptitude for participation in
the Soul, it received that for which it was fit; now it
was disposed to receive a particular Soul; that is why
it did not receive the universal Soul. Although the
latter be present with this body, she does not become
it;
entirely suitable to that why plants and the non
is
human souls likewise possess only the uni
so
of
much
versal Soul, they were able receive from her.
to
as
some (per
so
Likewise, when voice challenges notice,
a
sons) grasp only the sound, others grasp also the signifi
cation. As soon the animal has been begotten,
as
it
possesses within itself the presence of
soul derived
a
by
from the universal (Being), and which remains
it
united with this (Being) because then possesses
it
a
body that neither empty nor inanimate. This body
is
was not before an inanimate place, and (when was

in
to it
begotten), only further reapproximated itself the
it
soul by aptitude (to receive life);

its
became not
it
only body, but also living body; thanks

to
the
a
neighborhood trace (of

to
the soul, received

it
the soul); and by that part

of
do not mean the

a
I
light which emanated

or
of
Soul, but kind heat

a
from the soul, and which, the body, begat de

in
sires, pleasures, and pains. The body

of
the thus
begotten animal was, therefore, not body foreign
a
(to life). The Soul, that had issued from the divine
principle, remained tranquil according
to
her own
nature, and was subsisting herself, when that part,
in
which was troubled by her own weakness, and was

spontaneously fluctuating around when assailed by
impulsions from without, first complained audibly by
herself, and then that part
of
the animal which

in
is
the soul and body, and communicated her

to
common
the entire living being. Thus when
to
disturbance
a
deliberative assembly calmly examines some question,

31 O WORKS OF PLOTINOS [22
a confused mob, driven by hunger or excited by some
passion, may come to Spread trouble and disorder in
the whole assembly. As long as such people keep
quiet, the voice of the wise man may be heard by them;
its
and as a result the crowd retains orderliness, worse
part remaining. Subordinate; otherwise the worst part
dominates, while the better part remains silent, because
the trouble hinders the crowd from listening
in to
reason.
an as
to
Thus does evil come reign city and
in in
a
sembly. Likewise evil reigns him who allows him
dominated by this disorderly crowd
be
to
fears,
of
self
desires and passions that he bears within his breast;
and that will last until he reduce that crowd to obedi
formerly was
he
he
ence, until become again the man
(before descending here below), and until
he
regulate
.
his life (according the better Man); what
he
then
to
will grant
be
as
the body will granted something
to
to
foreign. him who lives now one manner, and
to
As
in
mingled good and

he
another,
of
man
in
is
a
-
eV11.
THIS DOCTRINE EXPLAINS THE MYTHS OF ANCIENT

PHILOSOPHERS.
16. the soul could not become evil, and there

If
if
single way for the soul

to be
enter the body, and

to
but
a
it,
remain present within there would be no mean

ing the periodical “descents” and “ascents”
of
the
in
soul, the “chastisements” she undergoes, and the

“migration” into the bodies other (than human bodies,
animal ones). Such (mythological) teachings
is,
that
have indeed been handed down from the ancient
philosophers who best expounded the soul. Now
it
will be well show that our doctrine harmonizes with

to
or
that which they have taught,

at
that least there

is
no contradiction between them.

vi.4] ESSENCE
THE
We have just
º
IS EVERYWHERE
SOUL'S DESCENT INTO
that, when the body par

ticipates in the soul, the soul does not somehow go
beyond herself to enter into the body, that it is on the
contrary the body which enters into the soul, on par
ticipating in life, or evidently, when the ancient philos
ophers say that the soul comes into the body, this
THE
PRESENT
BODY.
3.11
means that the body enters into essence, and partici

pates in the life and the soul; in one word, to “come”
does not here signify passing from one place into an
other, but indicates in what way the soul enters into
dealings with the body. Therefore “to descend”
means, for the soul, to grow into a body, in the sense
it;
in which we have explained that means, give the
to
body something the soul, and not for the soul
of
to
become (the property)
ſ
the body. Consequently,
of
the soul's issuing from the body must again mean that
the body ceases participate
to
life.
in
:
PROCEDURE OF THE DESCENT OF THE SOUL.
This how this participation takes place for the
is
the bodies). Being situ

is,
of
parts this universe (that

the intelligible world,
as
of
ated were on the confines

it
the soul often gives the body something herself; for,

of
her power (or potentiality), she

by
the neighbor
of
is
the body; and finding herself close

it,
she enters into

to
dealings therewith by virtue her nature;

of
of
law
a
evil, and enfranchise her

of
to
but this intercourse

is is
self from the body good. Why? Because the

if
not the (property

be
the body
of
or
slave) this
it, in
soul
intercourse, she, nevertheless, unites herself
to
and
though she were universal, she becomes individual;
for her activity no longer exclusively confined
to
the
is
by
intelligible world, although (she still, nature) be

an
as
long thereto. someone, who was expert

in
if
It
is
whole science, confined himself single proposi

to
a
a
tion thereof; whereas a person who possesses a whole

science should naturally consider
its
entirety, and not
a
mere part Likewise the soul, which belonged en
of
it.
tirely the intelligible
to world, and which partially
blended her particular essence with the total Essence,
Essence, and became in
of
withdrew out the universal
dividual essence, because the body which she confines
to
only part
of
the
as
her activities this universe.
It
is
is
if
a
fire, endowed with the ability burning everything,
of
burn out some small object, although
to
was reduced
possessed power universal scope. Indeed, when
of
it
the particular soul separated from the body, she

is
is
(in actualization); the con
no
on
longer particular
trary, when she has separated herself from the universal
Soul, not by passing from one locality another, but
to
by applying her activity (to part this universe,
to
of
a
body), she becomes particular (in actualization),

a
though she remain universal another manner (in

in
potentiality); for when the soul presides over no body

;
truly universal, and particular only potenti

in
is
is
ality.
WHAT HELL MEANS FOR THE CAREER OF THE SOUL.

Consequently, when we say that the soul hell
in
is
(Hades), we mean by “hades” invisible place,

an
if
that means that the soul separated from the body;

is
if,
on the contrary, we understand hell lower

to
mean
a
locality, we may also offer reasonable interpretation:

a
with our body, and

it.
for now our soul located with

is
is
by
But what meant saying that the soul hell

bein
is
is
after the body no longer exists? the soul not

If
separated from her image, why should she not be

where her image is? the soul were separated from
If
by philosophy, this image will alone go

to
her image
the lower locality, while the soul lives purely the
in
intelligible world, without any emanation. This what

is
teach about the image born some par

of
to
we had
ticular individual. As to the Soul, if she concentrate

in her breast the light that radiates around her, then,
turned towards the intelligible world, she entirely re
enters into this world; she is no longer in actualization.
But this does not cause her to perish (for when she is
incarnated in a body, and is particular, she exists only
potentially; while she attains to actualization when she
becomes universal). So much for this point; now let
us return to our subject.
1 A Stoic term. 2. As says Parmenides, verse 80.

3.14 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [23
SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE.
The One Identical Essence is Everywhere Entirely

Present.
UNITY MUST BE SOUGHT FOR IN ESSENCE.
1. It is a common conception of human thought

that a principle single in number and identical is every
its
where present in entirety; for an instinctive and

is
it
universal truism that the divinity which dwells within
us
single and identical

of
each all.” cannot be

in
is
It
expected that the men who will use this expression
be
explain how God present us, and

to
should able
in
to is
without subjecting their opinion the scrutiny of

reason; they will only affirm that such
of
the state
is
the case; and resting this conception which the

in
is
spontaneous result their understanding, they will
of
to
all hold this something that single and only, and

is
will refuse give up this unity. That the most

to
is
solid principle all, principle that our souls whisper

of
instinctively, and which not deduced from the ob

is
particular things, but which claims our

of
servation
attention far before them, even before the maxim that
everything aspires the Good. Now this principle
to
is
an
all the beings aspire unity, form unity, and

to
true
if
tend towards unity. This unity, advancing towards all

man
so
as
other things, can advance, seems

be
far
to
it
ifold, and indeed becomes so, certain respects, but

in
the Good,
of
the ancient nature which the desire

is
that belongs itself, really leads unity; and every

to
to
vi.5] ESSENCE IS PRESENT EVERYWHERE 315
nature aspires to possess this unity by turning towards

itself; for the good of the nature which is One, is to
belong to oneself, to be oneself; that unify one
is,
to
self. That why
is reasonably said that the Good
is
to it
peculiarly belongs (this nature), and must not be
sought outside
of of
How indeed could the Good have
it.
fallen outside the essence, non
or
be found
in
If be
essence? must evidently sought essence, since
in
It
itself not non-eSSence. then the Good be es

is
be
sence, and may be found essence, must in within
it
We cannot, therefore, be far from
of
itself each
in
us.
essence, but we are far from us.
it.
Neither
in
is
a it
All (beings), therefore, constitute but unity.
“BEING” IS THE BASIS OF JUDGMENT IN THINGS

PARTICIPATING IN BEING.
As the human reason which undertakes to ex
2.
amine the question here raised not one, but divided;

is
researches, by
its
corporeal nature
of
makes use
in
it
borrowing why reason, thinking

its
principles. That
is
intelligible being, similar

it,
bodies, divides doubt

to
it
ing
be
its
its
unity. could not otherwise, because
It
investigation was not founded on the proper immanent

principles. We must, therefore, our discussion about
in
the one universal Essence, choose principles capable

of
enlisting support, principles that would intellectual,

be
is,
that would connect with intelligible entities, and

veritable being. For since our sense-nature agitated
of is
by continual flux, being subject all kinds changes,

of to
all
trending towards directions space; should con

it
called not “being,” but generation,

is or
sequently
be
becoming. The eternal Essence, on the contrary,

not divided; subsists ever the same manner and
in
it
the same state, neither born, nor perishes; occupies

in
is
neither place nor space; does not reside any de

in
terminate location; neither enters, nor issues, but re

mains in itself. A discussion about the nature of bodies

begins with this (physical) nature, and the things that
(deductively) give rise
by it,
to
are related to which
probable proofs syllogisms equally prob
of
the aid
able. But when we deal with intelligible entities, our
starting-point must
be
the being con
of
the nature
sidered; principles have
be
legitimately
to
derived
therefrom; and then, without surreptitiously substi
tuting any other nature (inductively), borrow from
the intelligible Being itself the conception formed
it;
is or
about for being, whatness, everywhere taken
is
principle; and
as
its of
said that the definition an
it
object, when well made, sets forth many ac
of
cidents. Therefore, when we are dealing with things
so
where being everything, we must, much the more,
is
apply our whole attention this being; base all our

to
(arguments) thereon, and refer everything
to
it.
INTELLIGIBLE ESSENCE IS BOTH IN AND OUT OF
ITSELF.
intelligible essence
be
essential essence;
If
it
3.
be immutable; never evade itself; admit no of

if
be it
if
if
it
generation; and
is,
not any place, the result that

in
by virtue its nature, ever remains within itself,

of
it
has no parts distant from each other, located dif

in
ferent places; that does not issue from itself, which

it
would lead different subjects,

no or
to
at
inhere least
in
it
longer
to to
inhere one subject, and, consequently,

in in
itself, and no longer remain impassible;

to
dwell
for inhered something different from itself,
in
it
if
it
suffering (passion, or, experi

be
would exposed
to
ence). As, however, this impossible, can not

is
it
inhere anything other than itself. Therefore, since

in
never departs from itself, never divided,

as
as
it
it
it
is
exists within several things simultaneously without

any change,
as
Windergoing exists within itself one

it
and simultaneously entire, it must, while existing in

identical; that
is,
Several things, remain everywhere
everywhere entire both itself, and out
be
of
itself.
in
Consequently, does not (exist) within any determin
it
so it,
so
ate thing, but the other things participate far
in
in it,
as
they are capable approaching
in of
and far
as
do
they approach the measure which they are

it
capable.
THAT ENTIRE BEING IS PRESENT EVERYWHERE IS

THE ONLY SOLUTION OF THE PUZZLE.
be
Consequently, will necessary either reject
to
it
is,
the propositions set forth above, that the principles
which have been established, and deny the existence
the intelligible entities; or, impossible,
to
as
this
of
is
recognize the truth

of
what has been advanced from

the very beginning (of this discussion): the Essence
as
which one and identical indivisible, and exists
is
is
single everywhere. not distant from any

of
the
It
is
other things; and, nevertheless,

be
(to near them) of it

letting certain portions
no
spreading,
of
of
has need
essence flow.” remains entire itself, and
in
its
It
though produce something inferior, does not, on

it
it
that account, abandon itself, and does not extend itself

hither and yon
onbe
other things; otherwise, would

in
it
one side, while the things produces would

be
On
it
the other, and would occupy place, finding itself

it
As these (produced things),

to
Separated therefrom.
be
or
part.
it of
them either whole

If
each
is
it
a
a
a
as
will not preserve the nature the all,

of
part, we
if,
all, we shall have

be
have already said; however,

as it
many parts sub

as
divide that which

in
in
to
it it
it
be
sists—or,
to
will have granted that the identical

be
essence can simultaneously everywhere entire. This

demonstration drawn from the matter itself, which
is
a
contains nothing external the being that we are ex

to
amining, and which does not borrow anything from
any other nature.
GOD’S PRESENCE EVERYWHERE ENTIRE DESCRIBED

AS INFINITE.
4. Let us, therefore, contemplate this Divinity who

is not present here, and absent there, but who is every
where. All those who have any idea of the divinities
admit that they, as well as that supreme Divinity, are
present everywhere. Reason compels this admission.
Now, since the Divinity is everywhere, He is not di
vided; otherwise, He would not be present everywhere;
He would have His parts, one here, and another there.
He would no longer be a unity; He would resemble an
expanse divided into a number of parts; He would be
annihilated in this division, and all His parts would no
longer form the whole; in short, He would have become
body. If that be impossible, we shall have to admit
that to which before we refused assent, to which all
human nature testifies, namely, that the Divinity is
everywhere simultaneously present, entire, and iden
tical. If we acknowledge such a nature as infinite,
since it has no limits, this will be granting that it lacks
nothing. Now if it lack nothing, it must be present
to every essence; if it could not be essence, there would
be places, where it did not exist, and it would lack
something. The essences which exist beneath the One
exist simultaneously with Him, are posterior to Him,
refer to Him, and reattach themselves to Him as His
creatures; so that to participate in what is posterior
to Him is to participate in Himself. As, in the intel
ligible world, there is a multitude of beings which there
occupy the first, second, or third ranks, in that they
depend from that only centre of a single sphere; and
as they coexist there without any separating distance
between them, the result is that the essences which
occupy the first or second ranks are present there even
where are the beings that occupy the third rank.
EXAMPLE OF THE SUN AND THE RAYS.
5. In order to clear up this point, the following

illustration has been much used. Let us imagine a
multitude of rays, which start from a single centre; and
you will succeed in conceiving the multitude begotten
in the intelligible world. But, admitting this proposi
tion, that things begotten in the intelligible, and which
are called multitude, exist simultaneously, one observa
tion must be added: in the circle, the rays which are
not distinct may be supposed to be distinct, because
the circle is a plane. But there, where there is not
even the extension proper to a plane, where there are
only potentialities and beings without extension, all
things must be conceived as centres united together in
a single centre, as might be the rays considered before
their development in space, and considered in their
origin, where, with the centre, they form but a single
and Same point. If now you imagine developed rays,
they will depend from the points from where they
started, and every point will not be any the less a
centre, as nothing will separate it from the first centre.
Thus these centres, though united to the first centre,
will not any the less have their individual existence,
and will form a number equal to the rays of which
they are the origins. As many rays as will come to
shine in the first centre, so many centres will there
Seem to be; and, nevertheless, all together will form
but a single one. Now if we compare all intelligible
entities to centres, and I mean centres that coincide in
a single centre and unite therein, but which seem mul
tiple because of the different rays which manifest,
without begetting them, such rays could give us some
idea of the things by the contact of which intelligible

being seems to be manifold and present everywhere.
THE UNITY OF MANIFOLDNESS.

6. Intelligible entities, indeed, though they form a
manifold, nevertheless, form an unity. On the other
hand, though they form an unity, yet by virtue of their
infinite nature they also form a manifold. They are
the multitude in unity, and unity in multitude; they all
subsist together. They direct their actualization to
wards the whole, with the whole, and it is still with
the whole, that they apply themselves to the part.
The part receives within itself the first action, as if it
were that of only a part; but, nevertheless, it is the
whole that acts. It is as if a Man-in-himself, on de
scending into a certain man, became this man without,
however, ceasing being the Man-in-himself. The
material man, proceeding from the ideal Man, who is
single, has produced a multitude of men, who are the
same because one and the same thing has impressed
its seal on a multitude. Thus the Man-in-himself, and
every intelligible entity in itself, and then the whole
entire universal Essence is not in the multitude, but the
multitude is in the universal Essence, or rather, refers
it;
to for whiteness be everywhere present the

in
if
body,
of
an
as
not the same manner the soul

in
is
it
individual present and identical all the organs.

in
It
is
this latter manner that the essence present

in
is
is
everywhere.
º
PARABLE OF THE HEAD WITH FACES ALL AROUND.
Our nature and we ourselves all depend on

7.
principle,
it,
(cosmic) being; we aspire

to
as
we use
it
from the very beginning. We think the intelligible

(entities contained in essence) without having either

images or impressions thereof. Consequently, when
we think the intelligible (entities), the truth is that
we are these very intelligible entities themselves. Since
we thus participate in the genuine knowledge, we are
the intelligible entities, not because we receive them
in us, but because we are in them. However, as beings
other than we constitute intelligible entities, as well as
we, we are all the intelligibles. We are intelligible
entities so far as they subsist simultaneously with all
essences; consequently, all of us together form but a
single unity. When we turn our gaze outside of Him
from whom we depend, we no longer recognize that
we are an unity; we then resemble a multitude of faces
which (being disposed in a circle) would, as seen from
the exterior, form a plurality, but which in the interior
would form but a single head. If one of these faces
could turn around, either spontaneously, or by the aid
of Minerva, it would see that itself is the divinity, that
it is the universal Essence. No doubt, it would not at
first see itself as universal, but later, not being able to
find any landmarks by which to determine
to it its
own
limits, and which ex
to
to
determine the distance

tends, would have give up the attempt dis
to
it
tinguish itself from the universal (Essence), and

it
would become the universal (Essence) without ever

by
changing location, and remaining the very founda

in
of
tion the universal (Essence).
THIS IS PROVED BY THE PARTICIPATION OF

MATTER IN IDEAS.
Whoever will consider the participation mat

of
8.
be
ideas will impressed with the above theory,

in
ter
no
will declare not impossible, and express further

it
necessary admit the impossibility

of
to
doubts.
is
It
conception such the following: on one hand, the

as
ideas separate from matter; on the other hand, matter

at a distance from them, and then an irradiation from
on high descending on matter. Such a conception
lie
would be senseless. What meaning would this
in
separation the ideas, and this distance
of
of
matter?
very difficult explain and
to
be
Would not then
to
it
called the participation
of
understand what matter
is
ideas? Only by examples can we make our mean
in
irradiation,
an
ing clear. Doubtless, when we speak
of
we do not, however, mean anything similar
to
the
some visible object.
of
irradiation
as
But the material
forms are images, and they have ideas,
as arche
as
types, we say that they are “illuminated by the ideas,”
to is so
as
convey the idea that that which illuminated

to
is
different from that which illumines. Now, however,
express ourselves more exactly, we shall have
to
enforce that the idea not locally separated from
is
as
matter, and does not reflect itself therein some
object does water. On the contrary, matter sur
in
rounds the idea on all sides; touches somehow with

it
it;
its
out touching then, entirety, receives what

in
it
vicinity (to the idea),

its
capable receiving from

of
is
it
without any intermediary, without the idea penetrating

hovering above
it,
through the whole matter,
of
or
without ceasing remain within itself.

to
THE SOUL, AS ENTIRE, FASHIONED THE WHOLE AND

THE INDIVIDUALS.
fire, for instance, matter,
of
Since the idea not

in
is
subject for the ele

us
as
let imagine matter serving

fire, without itself descending into
of
ments. The idea

matter, will give the form
of
the fire the whole

to
fiery matter, while the fire, first mingled with matter,

will constitute multiple mass. The same conception
a
may be applied in
to
the other elements. then the

If
telligible fire appear everything producing therein

as
in
an
image itself, does not produce this image

of
in
it
matter as if it had separated itself therefrom locally,

as would have occurred in the irradiation of a visible
object; otherwise it would be somewhere, and it would
fall under the Senses. Since the universal Fire is mul
tiple, we must conclude that, while its idea remains in
itself outside of all place, it itself has begotten the
localities; otherwise we would have to think that,
having become multiple (by parts), would ex
its
it
tend, by withdrawing from itself, become multiple
to
this manner, and participate several times
in
in
to
the
same principle. Now, being indivisible, the idea has
matter; nevertheless,
it its
not given part being

of
to
a
its
spite unity,
its to
of
form
in
has communicated
a
unity;
its
what was not contained granted

in
it
presence the universe without fashioning this by
to
parts, and that by some other part.

its
of
one was
It
as an entire whole that fashioned the whole and the
it
be
suppose
to
individuals. would indeed ridiculous
It
fire,
so
of
of
that there was multitude the ideas that

a
own particular idea;

be
its
each fire might formed by

that were the case, the ideas would be innumerable.
if
Further, how would we divide the things that have

been generated by the Fire, since single, and con
is
it
tinuous? we augment the material fire by adding

If
to
another fire, evidently the same idea which

is
it
it
will produce this portion matter the same things

of
in
the remainder; for

be
as
could not another idea.

in
it
THE UNITY OF THE SOUL PROVES THAT OF THE

SUPREME.
all the elements, when begotten, were

to
9.
be
If
gathered into one sphere, (there would an oppor

be
tunity observing and comparing them. The re

of
be
sult would conclusion that) this sphere does not

a
plurality diversity authors, one

of
of
whom
or
have
a
would have created one part, and another author,
-
another. The production of this sphere will imply a

single Author, who created it by acting, as a whole;
not producing one part of creation by one part of Him
self, and another part of creation, by another part of
Himself. In the latter case, the sphere might still have
several authors, if the production of the totality were
not traced to a single, indivisible Principle. Though
this single and indivisible Principle be the author of
the entire sphere, it does not interpenetrate the sphere;
its
for it is the entire Sphere which depends on author.
One only and single Life contains the entire Sphere,
because this located single Life. All the things
in
is
a
the sphere may, therefore, be reduced
is in a is is to
that are
in
single Life, and all the souls form Soul which

a
a
single, but which simultaneously infinite. That
is
why certain philosophers have said that the soul
is
number;8 others, that the number produces increase
the soul, no doubt meaning by that, that nothing
deficient soul, that she everywhere without ceas
in
is
ing the expression, “to produce

be
As
to
to
herself.
the soul,” this must not be taken literally,
to
increase
so
as
mean that the soul, spite her unity,

of
to
but
is of in
absent nowhere; for the unity the soul not

is
is
of a
unity that can
be
measured; that the peculiarity

another being which falsely claims unity for itself, and
gaining the appearance unity
of
which succeeds
in
only by participating therein. The Essence which

really unity composed several things;
of
one not
is
is
them would destroy the

it of
of
for the withdrawal one

total unity. Nor separated from the other things
is
by limits; for the other things were assimilated

if
thereto, would become smaller the case where

in
it
would split itself up

be
these would greater; either

it
into fragments by seeking penetrate all, and instead

as to
being present all, an entirety,

of
would be
to
it
touching their parts by

its
own parts.
to
reduced
If
then this Essence may justly unity may

be
called one,
if
its
be predicated of being, must, certain manner,
in
it
to a
its own; that
is,
contain the nature opposed
to
Seem
the manifold; must not attract this manifoldness
it
from without, but must, from and by itself, possess
it
this manifold;
be
its
must veritably one, and by own
it
is as
unity be infinite and manifold. Being such, seems
it
were everywhere being), which
It (a
Reason
if
it
single, and which contains itself. a

itself that which
it is
contains; and thus containing itself, no where dis
is
tant from itself; everywhere itself. not
in
It
is
is
it
separated from any other being by local distance; for
a
existed before all the things which are locality;
in
a
it it
them; they, on the contrary,

beof
had no need
is
it
Even though they

to to
it,it.
which need founded on

should come be founded on would not, on that
as it
on
account, cease resting itself foundation.
If
a
be
this foundation were shaken, immediately, all

to
other things would perish, since they would have lost

on
the base which they rested. Now this Essence

the point dissolving itself
of
to
could not lose reason

withdrawing from itself; and
be
by
to
to
about trust
the deceptive nature space which needs
of
to
itself
it
for preservation.
THE BEING LOVES ESSENCE AS ENTIRE.

10. Animated by wisdom, this Essence dwells
is it, is in
itself, and could never inhere other things.

in
It
it
these, on the contrary, that come depend from

to
with passion seeking where may be. That

as
of it
if
the love that watches the door the beloved, which

at
remains ever near the beautiful, agitated with the de

it,
possessing and esteeming itself happy

to
its of
sire share
gifts. Indeed, the lover the celestial beauty
of
in
he
as
does not receive Beauty itself, but, stands near

its favors, while the latter remains
he
shares
in
it,
immovable itself. There are, therefore, many beings

in
which love one only and same thing, who love it
it,
entire, and who, when they possess possess entire
it
which they are capable doing so;
of
the measure
in
to in
for they desire possess entire. Why then should
to it
not this Essence suffice all by remaining within
itself? suffices precisely because remains within
It
it
itself;
as
present all an
to
beautiful because
is
is
it
it
entire whole.
REASON ALSO IS WHOLE.
A
whole; all
us
For
Wisdom also
to
commonis
is
it
us, because a
different places;
of
not different
it in
is
it
it
would, indeed, be ridiculous for
to
need existence
some locality. Besides, wisdom does not resemble
in
whiteness; for (whiteness the quality body,
of
at is
a
while) Wisdom does not all belong the body.
to
we really participate Wisdom, we necessarily aspire
in
as to If
some thing single and identical, which exists itself,
in
whole, simultaneously. When we participate
in
a
this Wisdom, we
do
not receive fragments, but

in
it
entire; and the Wisdom which you possess entire
is
not different from that which myself possess. We
I
this unity
an
image
of
of
find Wisdom the assem

in
all
blies and meetings men, where those present

of
help making up single Wisdom.

to
seem seems
in
It
a
that each one, isolated from the others, would be

powerless find wisdom; but when the same person
to
meeting, where all the minds agree together,

in
in
is
applying themselves
he
single object, would

to
a
produce, rather discover, Wisdom. What indeed

or
hinders different minds from being united within one

same and single Intelligence? Although Intelligence
us
other men, we do not notice

to
to
be common and
if,
this community. touching single object

as
is
It
with several fingers, one should later imagine having

or
touched several objects; single

as
one had struck

if
the lyre without seeing (and thinking that

of
chord
it
one had struck different chords).

BY THE INTELLIGIBLE PARTS OF THEIR BEING, ALL
MEN SHARE THE SAME INTELLIGIBLE.
Let us return to our subject. We were seeking how
we might attain the Good with our souls. The Good
that you attain is not different from the one that I
myself attain; it is the same. And when I say that it
is the same, I do not mean that from the Good de
scended upon us both different things, so that the
Good would remain somewhere on high, while His
gifts descended down here; on the contrary, I mean
that He who gives is present to those who receive,
so that these may veritably receive; I mean besides
that He gives His gifts to beings who are intimately
united with Him, and not to beings who might be
foreign to Him; for intellectual gifts cannot be com
municated in a local manner. One even sees different
bodies, in spite of the distance that separates them,
receiving the same gifts, because the gift granted, and
the effect produced tend to the same result; much
more, all the actions and passions which produce them
selves in the body of the universe are contained within
and nothing comes from without. Now
it,
to
if
it
a
body, which by
its
as
nature were scatters itself

it
perpetual flowing wastage), never

in
(because
it
is
theless, receives nothing from without, how would

a
extension retain nothing from with

a no
being that has

no
out, how would being that has extension retain

something from without? Consequently, all are
as
contained one and the same Principle, we see the

in
good, and we altogether touch by the intelligible

it
part
of
our nature.
THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD HAS MUCH MORE UNITY
THAN THE SENSE—WORLD.
Besides, the intelligible world has much more unity
than the sense-world; otherwise, there would be two
sense-worlds, since the intelligible sphere would not
differ from the sense-sphere if the former did not have

more unity than the latter. In respect to unity, there
fore, the intelligible world would surpass the sense
sphere. It would indeed be ridiculous to admit that
one of the two spheres would have an extension suit
able to its nature; while the other, without any neces
its
sity, would extend, and would withdraw from
centre. Why would not all things conspire together
unity, the intelligible world? There, indeed, no
in
to
one thing hinders another by impenetrability, any more

than the conception that you have
of
of
notion
or
in a
a
proposition
no
wise hinders the one that have

in
I
myself, any more than different notions mutually
hinder each other the same soul. To the objection
in
that such union could not take place for (separate)

a
given, but only

be
an
beings, affirmative answer may

suppose that veritable beings are cor
to
one dare
if
poreal masses.
HOW THE INTELLIGIBLE MAY REMAIN UNMOVED

AND YET PENETRATE IN THE WORLD.
How can the intelligible, which has no ex

1.
A
tension, penetrate into the whole body the universe,

of
which has no Such extension How does remain

it
?
single and identical, and how does not split up

it
This question has been raised several times, and we

it,
leave no uncertainty. We
so
as
sought
to
to
answer
have often demonstrated that the things are thus;
give some further con
be
nevertheless, will well

to
it
vincing proofs, although we have already given the

strongest demonstration, and the most evident one, by
teaching the quality the intelligible,
of
of
the nature
explaining that not vast mass, some enormous
is
it
occupy
be
stone which, located space, might

to
said
in
an extension determined by its own magnitude, and

limits; for its
be
its
incapable going beyond

of
would
be
its
its
mass and power would measured by own
stone. (The intelligible Es
of
nature, which that
is
a
Sence, on the contrary,) being the primary nature, has
or
measured, because
no
extension that limited
is
it
the sense-nature; and because
of
itself the measure
is
the universal power without any determinate mag

is
it
nitude. Nor within time, because the time con

is
it
is
tinually divided into intervals, while eternity dwells
its in
own identity, dominating and surpassing time by
its
perpetual power, though this seemed have an un
to
Time may compared be line
to
limited course.
a
which, while extending indefinitely, ever depends from
it;
point, and turns around so, that, into whatever

a
place advances, always reveals the immovable

it
it it
If,
point around which moves circle. by nature,
in
a
time be the same relation (as this line with its

in
is
be
its
centre), and the identical Essence infinite by
if
by
its
its
it as
as
power eternity, by virute

of
well infinite
power will have produce nature which would
to
in
a
Some way be parallel this infinite power, which rises

to
and which finally, by the

it,
it,
with and depends from

time, tries equal this power which
of
to
movable course
remains movable itself.” But then even this power
in
the intelligible Essence remains superior the uni

to
of
verse, because the former determines the extension

of the latter.
HOW THE INFERIOR NATURE CAN PARTICIPATE IN

THE INTELLIGIBLE.
How could then the inferior nature participate
in
its
the intelligible, capacity?

of
at
to
least the extent

Because the intelligible en
its
everywhere present
in
is
tirety, although, by the impotence the things that

of
be
of
its
it,
receive not perceived entirety each

in
in
it
these things. The identical essence present every

is
as
where, not indeed the material triangle, which

is
multiple in respect to number in several subjects, al
though it be identical therein in respect to being; but
as the immaterial triangle from which depend material
triangles.
Why then is the material triangle not everywhere,
like the immaterial triangle? Because matter does
not entirely participate in the immaterial triangle, as
it also receives other forms, and since it does not apply
itself entirely to every intelligible entity. Indeed, the
primary Nature does not give itself as an entirety to
every thing; but it communicates itself first to the
primary genera (of essences;) then, through these, it
communicates itself to the other essences; besides, it
is not any the less from the very beginning present to
the entire universe.
LIFE INTERPENETRATES ALL; AND KNOWS NO

LIMITS.
12. But how does this (primary Nature) make

itself present to the whole universe? It is present to
the universe because it is the one Life. Indeed, in the
world considered as a living being, the life does not
extend to certain limits, beyond which it cannot spread;
for it is present everywhere.
But how can it be everywhere? Remember, the
if,
power of life is not a determinate quantity; by

infinitely divided, still
be
its
thought, never alters

it
it
infinity. This Life does

of
fundamental characteristic
not contain any matter; consequently, cannot be
it
up
split mass, and end being reduced

to
like
in
a
nothing. When you have succeeded gaining con

in
ception the inexhaustible and infinite power

of
of
the
its
intelligible Essence; unceasing,

of
nature that
is
indefatigable; that suffices itself completely,

to
the
point that speak, overflows, whatever
be
its
so
life,
to
the place on which you fix your gaze, direct your

or
attention; where will you find absence of that intel

ligible Essence? On the contrary, you can neither
anything infinitely
its
surpass greatness, nor arrive
at
the intelligible Essence had nothing further
as
small,
if
were gradually becoming exhausted.

as
give, and
to
it
if
YOU SEE ANYTHING BEYOND IT, YOU DEPART

IF
FROM IT.
When, therefore, you will have embraced the uni
it,
versal Essence and will be resting within you must
be
not seek anything beyond Otherwise, you will
it.
it;
withdrawing from and, directing your glance on

Something foreign, you will fail
to
see what near
is
If,
on the contrary, you seek nothing beyond
it,
you.
be be
you will similar How?

to
universal Essence.
a
entirely united you will not
be
it,
You will
to
held
back by any parts, and you will not even be
its
is of
saying, “This what am!” By forgetting the par

I
ticular being that you are, you will

be
becoming the
universal Being. You had, indeed, already been the
universal Essence, but you were something besides;
you were inferior by that very circumstance; because
that which you possessed beyond the universal Essence
did not proceed from the universal Essence, for nothing
can be added thereto; but rather had come from that
which not universal. When you become de
is
termined being, because you borrow something from

non-essence, you cease being universal. But you
if
abandon non-essence, you will

be
increasing yourself.
by setting aside all the rest that the universal Es
is
It
be
sence may discovered; for essence does not reveal

long
so
as
itself one remains with the rest. does

It
not approach you make you enjoy

it its
presence;
to
be is
it
it,
you who are straying from

to
when ceases
present. Besides, when you stray away, you are not
be
it,
actually straying away from

to
as
continues
it
it,
present; you are not distant from but, though being
near Essence, you have turned away from Thus
it.
be
even the other divinities, though they present
to to
many human beings, often reveal themselves only
some one person, because he alone able (or, knows
is
how) contemplate them. These divinities (accord
to
ing Homer)," assume many different forms, and

to
the supreme Divinity that
to
haunt the cities. But
is
it
all the cities, all the earth, and all the heavens turn;
for the universe subsists by Him, and Him. From
in
Him also do all real essences derive their existence;
it
from Him that all depend, even the (universal)
is
Soul, and the universal Life; His infinite unity
a to
is
that they all turn their goal; it
unity which in
to
as
is
finite precisely because has no extension.
it
Cicero, Tusc. 16; Nat. 12, 22. As said Numenius,

i.
1
Maxim. Tyr. xvii.

1;
Deor. fr. 46. See Plato's Timaeus

in as 5.
4
i.
As wastage, see 64, 10; Od. xvii. 486.

2.
37.
5
Numenius might have said

v.6] SUPERESSENTIAL DOES NOT THINK 333
FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK SIXTH.

The Superessential Principle Does Not Think; Which
is the First Thinking Principle, and Which is
the Second?
BY THINKING, INTELLIGENCE PASSES FROM UNITY

TO DUALITY.
1. One may think oneself, or some other object.

What thinks itself falls least into the duality (inherent
to thought). That which thinks some other object
approaches identity less; for though it contain what it
contemplates, it nevertheless differs therefrom (by
its
nature). On the contrary, the principle that thinks
nature, separated from the object
its
itself not, by
is
thought. contemplates itself, because intimately

is
It
it
itself; the thinking subject, and the object

to
united
thought form but single being within it,” or, thus
it
a
becomes two, while only one.

in
thinks
It
is
it
Superior manner, because possesses what thinks;

it
it
thinking principle, because

as
occupies the first rank

it
the thinking principle must simultaneously unity

be
and duality. were not unity, would think some

If
it
it
object other than itself; would no longer be the first

it
thinking principle. Indeed, that which thinks an object

the first thinking prin
be
other than itself could not

its
ciple, since does not think the object

of
it
its
as
thought belonging essence; and, conse

to
If,
quently, does not think itself. on the contrary,

it
the thinking principle possess the object,

be
if
it
“being” (or nature), then
its
thought as belonging to
the thought (the object and the
of
the two terms
subject), will The thinking principle,
be
identical.
therefore, implies unity and duality simultaneously;
for unless join duality unity, will have nothing
to
it
it
to
think, and, consequently, will not think. must,
It
it
be
therefore, simple, and not simple simultaneously.”
We better understand the necessity this double con
of
dition when, starting from the Soul, we rise intelli
to
gence, for within the latter distinguish
to
easier
is
it
its
the subject from the object, and grasp duality.”
to
We may imagine two lights which the one, the soul
of
herself, less brilliant, and me may then posit equal
as
is
the light that sees and the light that
of
seen. Both
is
them, having nothing further that distinguishes them,
single thing, which thinks by virtue
of
will form but
a
by
its
its
duality, and which sees unity. Here
of
virtue
by reason (which the characteristic faculty
of
the
is
Soul), we have passed from duality unity. But, to

while thinking, intelligence passes from unity duality;
to
thinks; and
or
is,
becomes, rather duality, because

is it
it
one, because thinks itself.

it
SUPRA-THINKING PRINCIPLE IS NECESSARY TO

A
THE WORKING OF INTELLIGENCE.

Since we have distinguished two principles, the
2.
one which the first thinking principle (the Intelli

is
gence), and the other which the second (the Soul),

is
the Principle Superior the first thinking principle

to
think,
be In
would have
to
must itself not think. order

it
Intelligence; Intelligence,
it to
be
would have
to
to
it
object; the first thinking principle,

be
an
think
to
would have contain this object. Now not

to
is
it
necessary that every intelligible entity should possess

intelligence, and should think; otherwise would not
it
only
be
intelligible, but even Intelligence; being thus

dual, it would not be the first. On the other hand,

intelligence cannot subsist, if there be not a purely
intelligible nature (“being”), which is intelligible for
Intelligence, but which in itself should be neither in
telligence nor intelligible. , Indeed, that which is in
telligible must be intelligible for something else. As
to Intelligence, power
its
quite vain, does not
is
if
it
perceive and does not grasp the intelligible that
to it
thinks; for cannot think, have no object
if
it it
it
think; and perfect only when possesses this.
it
is
Now, before thinking, perfect by
be
must by itself
it
nature (“being”). Therefore, the principle through

which intelligence perfect must itself
be
what
is
is
it
thinks; consequently,
to
before has no need think,
it
it
since, before thinking, suffices itself. will, to
It
it
therefore, not think.4
THE FIRST THINKING PRINCIPLE IS THE SECOND

PRINCIPLE.
Therefore, the First principle (the One) does not
think; the second (Intelligence) the first thinking
is
principle; the third (the Soul) the second thinking

is
principle. the first Principle thought, would pos

If
of it
an
sess attribute; consequently, instead occupying

the first rank, would occupy only the Second; in
it
being One, manifold, and would

be
of
stead would
it
thought; for
be
all the things that would already

it
to it
be manifold, even limited itself thinking itself.

if
it
THE FIRST MUST BE ONE EXCLUSIVELY, WHICH

WOULD MAKE THOUGHT IMPOSSIBLE.
be
might objected that nothing (in all this)

3.
It
would hinder the first Principle from being both single

and manifold. We will answer that the manifold needs
single subject. The manifold cannot exist without
a
the One from which comes, and which is; with

in
it
it
out the One which is counted the first outside of other
things, and which must be considered only in itself.
Even on the supposition that it co-exists with other
things, it must, none the less, while being taken with
the other things with which it is s ºpposed to co-exist,
be considered as different from them. Consequently,
it must not be considered as co-existing with other
things, but be considered as their subject (or, Sub
strate), and as existing in itself, instead of co-existing
with the other things of which it is the subject.
WITHOUT SOMETHING SIMPLE, NOTHING MANI

FOLD COULD EXIST.
Indeed, that which is identical in things other than
the One, may no doubt be similar to the One, but
cannot be the One. The One must exist alone in
itself, thus to be grasped in other things, unless we
its
should claim that (nature) consists subsisting

with other things. Under this hypothesis, there will in
not exist either anything absolutely simple, nor any
thing composite. Nothing absolutely simple will exist,
since that which simple could not subsist by itself;
is
neither could anything composite exist, since nothing

simple will exist. For no simple thing possess exist
if
no simple unity, subsisting by itself,

be
ence, there
if
which could serve support the composite, none

to
as
if
by
to be
these things capable existing itself, let alone

of
of
communcating others, since does not exist; we

it
must conclude that that which, all these things,

of
be
composite, could not exist, since would made

is
it
up out elements that do not exist, and which are

of
absolutely nothing. Therefore, we insist on the

if
the manifold, we are implying the exist

of
existence
ence of the One before the manifold. Now since that
which thinks multiple, the principle that not mani
is
is is
fold will not think. this Principle the first,

as
But
then Intelligence and thought are entities later than

the first.
GOOD, INTELLIGENCE AND SOUL ARE LIKE LIGHT,

SUN AND MOON.
4. As the Good must be simple, and self-sufficient,
it has no need to think. Now that which it does not
dif
it,
need could not be within since nothing (that
is
it;
consequently, thought does
ferent from it) exists
in
not exist (because essentially simple"). Be

in
is
it
it
sides, the Good one thing, and Intelligence another;

is
by
thinking, Intelligence takes on the form
to of
Good.
Besides, when two objects unity joined some
in
is
thing other than itself, not possible that this unity,
is
it
Unity
be
joined something else, should
to
which
is
itself. Unity itself should exist itself before this

in
in
unity was joined anything else. For the same

to
reason, unity joined Something else presupposes

to
absolutely simple Unity, which subsists itself, and

in
has nothing unity joined

of
what found
in
to
other
is
things. How could one thing subsist another the

in
if
principle, from which this other thing derived, did

is
not have an existence that was independent, and prior

the rest? What simple cannot derive anything
to
is
from any other Source; but what manifold,

or
at
is
least indicates plurality,

to of
derivative (nature). The

is
be
Good may compared light, Intelligence

to
the
sun, and the Soul the moon that derives her light
to
from the sun. The Soul's intelligence only bor

is
by
rowed, which intellectualizes her coloring her with

light. On the contrary, Intelligence, itself, pos
its
in
light; only
its
sesses own not light, but es

is
is
it
it
sentially luminous. The Principle that illuminates

Intelligence and which nothing but light, absolutely
is
is
simple light, and supplies Intelligence with the power

be what How could need anything else?
is.
to
it
it
not similar what exists anything else; for

to
in
is
It
what subsists in itself is very different from what sub

sists in something else.
AS THOUGHT IS INSPIRATION TO THE GOOD,

INTELLIGENCE IMPLIES THE LATTER.
5. What is manifold needs to seek itself, and
naturally desires to embrace itself, and to grasp itself
by Self-consciousness. But that which is absolutely
One could not reflect on itself, and need self-con
sciousness. The absolutely identical principle is su
perior to consciousness and thought. Intelligence is
not the first; it is not the first either by
It its
essence,
nor by the majestic value
its
occupies
of
existence.
only the second rank. existed only when the Good
It
as
already existed; and existed,

as
soon turned
it
it
towards the Good. turning towards the Good, In
In
telligence cognized the latter; for thought consists
of
conversion towards the Good, and aspiration thereto.
Aspiration towards the Good, therefore, produced
thought, which identifies itself with the Good; for
vision presupposes the desire see. The Good, there
to
fore, cannot think; for has no good other than itself.

it
Besides, when something other than the Good thinks

the Good, thinks the Good because takes the form
it
it
the Good, and resembles the Good. thinks, be

of
It
cause itself becomes for itself good and desirable

an a
object, and because possesses image

of
the Good.
it
this thing always remain the same disposition,

in
If
it
will always retain this image By think

of
the Good.
ing itself, Intelligence simultaneously thinks the Good;
for does not think itself being actualized; yet
as
it
its
every actualization has the Good goal.

as
THE GOOD AS SUPRA-COGITATIVE IS ALSO SUPRA

ACTIVE.
be
arguments worth while, the

6.
the above
If
Good has no place for thought. What thinks must

good outside The Good, therefore,
its
of
have itself.
not active; for what need actualize would actual
to
is
ization have? To say that actualization actualizes,
is
be
tautology. we may
to
Even allowed attribute
if
Something some prin
to
actualizations which relate
to
ciple other than themselves, least the first actualiza
at
to
tion which all other actualizations refer, must be

simply what This actualization not thought;
is.
is
it
.
.
nºthing
as
think, the First. Besides, that
to
has it
is
it
which thinks not thought, but what possesses thought.

is is
Thus there duality what thinks; but there no

in
is
duality the First.
in
PRIMARY EXISTENCE WILL CONTAIN THOUGHT,

EXISTENCE AND LIFE.
This may be seen still more clearly by considering

how this double nature shows itself all that thinks
in
as
clearer manner. We assert that all essences,
in
a
such, that all things that are by themselves, and that

possess true existence, are located the intelligible
in
world. This happens not only because they always

remain the same, while Sense-objects are perpetual
in
a
flow and change"—although, indeed, there are sense

the stars"), that remain the same—
as
objects (such
but rather because they, by themselves, possess the
perfection The so-called primary
of
their existence.
“being” must possess an existence which more than
is
existence, and which complete

an
of
adumbration
is
existence. Now existence complete when its form

is
thought and life. Primary “being,” therefore, will

is
simultaneously contain thought, existence and life.

essence will imply that in
of
of
Thus the existence

telligence; and that intelligence, that essence;
of
of
that thought inseparable from existence, and

so
is
is
being one.
of
manifold instead That which not

In is
manifold (the One), cannot, therefore, think. the

intelligible world, we find Man, and the thought of
man, Horse and the thought of horse, the Just Man
and the thought of the just man; everything in it is
duality; even the unity within it is duality, and in it
duality passes into unity. The First is neither all
things that imply duality, nor any of them; it contains
no duality whatever. -
THE FIRST, THEREFORE, BEING SUPRA-COGITATIVE,

DOES NOT KNOW ITSELF.
Elsewhere we shall study how duality issues from

unity. Here we merely insist that as the One is su
perior to “being,” it must also be superior to thought.
is,
It therefore, reasonable does not

to
insist that
it
know itself, that does not contain anything
to
be
it
known, because simple. Still less will know

is
it
it
other beings. supplies them with something greater
It
and more precious than knowledge beings, since

of
is it
all
beings; from they derive what

of
the Good
is
it
more important (than mere cogitation), the faculty

so
identifying themselves with possible.

of
far
as
it
4 6,
See 3.5, See

ii.
See 3.10. See 5.13. 1.2.
v.
v.
v.
1
7 5
3.8, See
9.
See 3.12-17. 1.1.

v.
v.
ii
8
ii.5] ACTUALITY AND POTENTIALITY 344
SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE.
Of the Aristotelian Distinction Between Actuality and

Potentiality.
QUESTIONS TO BE DISCUSSED.
1. (Aristotle) spoke of (things) existing “poten

tially,” and “actually”; and actuality is spoken of as
a “being.” We shall, however, have to examine this
potential and actual existence; and whether this actual
existence be the same as actuality, and whether this
potential existence be identical with potentiality; also,
whether these conceptions differ so that what exists
actually be not necessarily actuality. It is evident that
among sense-objects there exist things potentially.
Are there also such among the intelligibles? This then
is the problem: whether the intelligibles exist only
actually; and on the hypothesis of the existence among
intelligibles of something existing potentially, whether,
its
because of eternity, this always remains there

in
potentiality; and, because time, never

of
outside
is
it
actuality.
to
arrives
DEFINITION OF POTENTIALITY.
us
Let first define potentiality. When thing said

is
a
exist potentially, this means that does not exist

to
it
absolutely. Necessarily, what exists potentially

is
potential only something else; for ex

to
relation
in
-
ample, metal is the statue potentially. Of course, if
it,
nothing were to be done with this thing, or within
become something beyond itself,
to
were not
if
if
it
its
there were no possibility becoming anything else,
of
would only
be
what was already. How could
it
it
it
then become something different from what was?
it
did not, therefore, exist potentially. Consequently,
if,It
on considering what thing that exists potentially,
is
a
and one that exists actually, we say that exists poten
it
tially, we must mean that might become different
it
is,
from what whether, after having produced this

it
is,
different thing, remain what whether, on
or
it
it
becoming this different thing, which potentially,
is
it
ceases being what itself. Indeed, metal be
is
if
a it
it
statue potentially, this relation different from

is
a
water being metal potentially, potentially fire.”

as
air
is
DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXISTING POTENTIALITY

AND POTENTIALITY.
Shall we say that what thus exists potentially
is
potentiality respect be; as, for instance,
of
of to
what
in
is
that the metal the potentiality statue? Not so,

is
the producing potentiality; for the pro

to
we refer
if
ducing potentiality cannot exist potentially.

be
to
said
then, we identified existing potentially not only
If,
with existing actually, but also with actuality, then

potentiality would coincide with potential existence.
would be better and clearer, therefore, contrast
to
It
potential existence with actual existence, and poten

tiality with actuality. The thing which thus exists
potentially the substance underlying the reactions,
is
shapes and forms which naturally fitted receive,

to
is
it
deterioration,
or
to
which aspires for their betterment

it
of
and for the destruction those whose actualization

constitutes differentiation.
MATTER IS NOTHING ACTUALLY.
2. AS to matter, we shall have to examine whether

it be something actually, while simultaneously it
potentially is the shapes it receives; or whether it be
nothing at all actually. Everything else of which we
predicate potentiality passes on to actuality on re
form, and remaining the same. We may
its
ceiving
an
call statue actual statue, thus contrasting with
it
a
a
potential statue; but an actual statue will not be im

plied by the metal which we called the potential statue.
Consequently, what exists potentially does not be
come what exists actually; but from what was pre
viously potential (statue) proceeds what later an
is
a
actual (statue). Indeed, what exists actually the
is
compound, and not the matter; the form added
to
is is
it
matter; this occurs when there produced another

being; when, for example, from the metal made
statue; for the statue exists by this very being someis
a
thing other than the metal; namely, the compound."
IN PERMANENT THINGS, POTENTIALITY AND

ACTUALITY MAY COINCIDE.
non-permanent things, what exists potentially
In
is is
evidently something quite different (from what

exist actually). But when the potential gram
to
said
why should
an
marian becomes actual grammarian,

not the potential and actual coincide? The potential
wise Socrates the same as the actual Socrates.
Is
is
the ignorant man, who was potentially learned, the

No: only accident makes
as
of
same the learned? the

ignorant man learned one; for was not his ignor
it
a
ance that made him potentially wise; with him, ignor

ance was only accident; but his soul, being by her
an
actually learned), still remains

be
self disposed (to

so
as
potentially learned, far she was actually so,

in
and still keeps what is called potential existence; thus

the actual grammarian does not cease being a potential
grammarian.* Nothing hinders these two different things
(of being a potential and actual grammarian) from
coinciding; in the first case, the man is no more than
a potential grammarian; in the latter, the man is still
a potential grammarian, but this potentiality has ac
is,
its
quired form (that has become actual").
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GENERAL AND PARTICULAR

ACTUALITY.
be
however what potential the substrate, while
If
is
both (potential and actual)
at
the actual the same
is
time, the (complete) statue, what then shall we

as
in
call the form the metal? We might well call the

in
actuality by which some object exists actually, and not

merely potentially, the form and shape; therefore not
merely actuality, but the actuality
of
this individual
thing.
THE FORM ADDED TO MATTER IS THE SPECIFIC

ACTUALITY.
The name actuality would better suit the (general)

actuality rather (than the actuality some one thing);
of
the actuality corresponding the potentiality which

to
brings thing actuality. Indeed, when that which

to
a
to
was potential arrives actuality,

at
owes the latter

it
something else."
WHAT IN THE BODY IS PASSIVE CAPACITY, IN

A
THE SOUL IS AN ACTIVE FACULTY.

is, by
As the potentiality which itself produces that

to
potentiality, that which produces the

of
which
is
it
actuality (corresponding this potentiality),

to
is
a
it
(Stoic) “habituation;” while the actuality (which
º
name thereto;
its
corresponds to this habituation) owes
for instance, the “habituation” courageousness;
is
the actuality being brave." But enough
of
is
this!
INTELLIGIBLE MATTER IS NOT POTENTIAL.

The purpose the preceding considerations was
of
3.
determine the meaning the statement that intel

of
to
ligibles are actual; decide whether every intelligible

or to
exist only actually, only
be
an
whether actuality;
and third, how even up there in it
the intelligible, where
things are actualities, there can also exist some
all
If,
thing potentially. then, the intelligible world,

in
be
there no matter which might be called potential,
is, is,if
no being become something which not yet
to
is
nor transform itself, nor, while remaining what it
it
beget something else, nor by altering, cause any sub
stitution, then there could not anything potential
be
in
this World of eternal essence outside of time. Let
now address the following question
us
in to
those who
matter, even intelligible
of
admit the existence

things: “How can we speak the intelligible
of
matter
in
by
world, this matter nothing exists poten

if of
virute
if
tially? For even the intelligible world matter

it in
existed otherwise than does the sense-world, still

in
every being would be the matter, the form and the

in
compound which constitutes it.” They would answer

intelligible things, what plays the part
of
that
in
matter
form, and that the soul, by herself, form; but,
in is
is
a
something else,
to
relation matter. the soul

Is
is
then potential respect this other thing? Hardly,

of
in
for the soul possesses the form, and possesses

at
it
present, without regard the future, and she divis

to
is
ible form and matter only for reason; she contain

in
if
only because thought conceives

as
matter,
in of
her
it
is
double (by distinguishing form and matter her).

But these two things form a single nature, as Aristotle

also says that his “quintessence” is immaterial.
THE SOUL IS THE PRODUCING POTENTIALITY; NOT

THE POTENTIALITY OF BECOMING.
What shall we say? Potentially, she is the animal,
when it is unborn, though to be born. Potentially she
is the music, and all the things that become, be
cause they are transient. Thus in the intelligible world
there are things which exist, or do not exist potentially.
But the soul is the potentiality of these things.”
IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD EVERYTHING IS
ACTUAL.
How might one apply actual existence to intelligible
things? Each of them exists actually because it has
received form, as the statue (the compound) exists
actually, or rather, because it is a form, and because
its
essence perfect form. The intelligence does

is
a
not pass from the potentiality thinking

of
the
to
actuality thinking.” Otherwise, would imply an
of
it
anterior intelligence which would not pass from poten

tiality actuality, which would possess everything by
to
itself; for what exists potentially implies another prin

is so
ciple whose intervention brings actuality, as

to
it
be
something existing actually. being an

to
by itself. There
is,
actuality when always what

is
it
it
fore, all first principles are actualities; for they possess

all they should possess by themselves, eternally. Such
matter, but
of
the state the soul which not the

in
is in
is
is
intelligible world. The soul which matter an

in
is
other actuality; she for instance, the vegetative soul;

is,
for she actuality what she We shall, therefore,

is.
in
is
admit that (in the intelligible world) every

to
have
thing exists actually, and that thus everything
is
actuality, because has rightly been said” that in

it
telligible nature always awake, that life, an

is
is
it
a
excellent life, and that there on high all actualities are

perfect. Therefore, in the intelligible world, every
thing exists actually, and everything is actuality and
life. The place of intelligible things is the place of
life, the principle and source of the veritable soul, and
of intelligence.
MATTER IS NON-BEING, AND CAN NOT BE ANYTHING

ACTUAL.
4. All the other objects (the sense-objects), which

are something potentially, are also actually something
else, which, in regard to the First, may be said to be
potential existence. As to matter, which exists poten
tially in all beings, how could it actually be some of
these beings? Evidently, it would then no longer be
all beings potentially. If matter be none of the beings,
it necessarily is not a being. If it be none of the beings,
how could it actually be something? Consequently,
matter is none of the beings that in it “become.” But
all
might it not be something else, since things are not

be
the beings which are

of
matter? matter none

in
if If
therein, and these really are beings, matter must be

as
non-being. Since, by imagination, conceived

a it
is
something formless, form; being,

be
as
could not
it
counted among the forms; which

be
could not an
it
is
additional reason why

be
non
as
should considered
it
being. As matter, therefore, no “being” neither

in
is
respect beings, nor forms, matter non-being

of
of
is
the highest degree. Since matter does not possess

in
veritable beings, and since

of
the nature cannot even

it
claim place among the objects falsely called beings

a
reason),
an
(for not even like these matter image

of
is
be
being could matter

of
what kind included

it in
be If
?
be
cannot included any, can evidently not

in
it
something actually.
ARISTOTLE SAID, MATTER IS NOTHING REAL
ACTUALLY, BUT ONLY POTENTIALLY.
5. If this be so, what opinion shall we form of
matter? How can it be the matter of beings? Be
cause matter potentially constitutes the beings. But,
since matter already exists potentially, may we not
already say that it exists, when we consider what it is
to be 2 The being of matter is only what is to be;
it consists of what is going to be; therefore matter
exists potentially; but it is potentially not any de
terminate thing, but all things. Therefore, being
is,
nothing by itself, and being what it namely, matter,
nothing actually. were something actually,
beIf
is
it
it
matter; con
be
what would actually would not
it
absolutely
be
sequently, matter would no longer
matter; would be matter only relatively, like metal.
is, it
Matter therefore, non-being; not something

is
it
which merely differs from being, like movement, which
proceeds from matter, and
to
relates matter because

it
of
operates denuded and despoiled all
it it.
Matter
in
is
properties; can not transform itself, remains ever

it
what the beginning, non-being. From the

at
was
it
very being actually was no being, since had with

it
it
drawn from all beings, and had never even become

any them; for never was
to
keep
of
able reflection
to it it
the beings whose forms ever aspired

Its of
to
assume.
permanent condition trend towards something
is
else, exist potentially respect the things that

of
to
in
appears where ends the order

of
follow. As
to
are
it
intelligible beings, and

as
contained by the sense

is
it
it,
beings which are begotten after their last degree.

is
it
Being contained both intelligible and sense-things,

in
does not actually exist respect

of
it of
either these
in
it
beings. exists only potentially;

of
classes limits
It
itself being feeble and obscure image, which can

to
not assume any form. May we not thence conclude

that matter the image actually; and consequently,
is
is actually deception? Yes, it truly is deception, that

essentially non-being. then matter actually
be is,
is
If
it
non-being, the highest degree non-being,
of
is
and thus again essentially
it Since non
non-being.
is, is
its
being real nature, therefore, far removed

is
it
from actually being any kind being.
of
at
must
If
it
a
be
all
so
be, must actually non-being, that, far from
it
“being” (so
its
real-being, speak) consists non
to
in
being. To remove the deception deceptive beings,
of
remove their “being.” To introduce actuality
to
in is
the things which possess being and essence poten

tially, annihilate their reason for being, because
to
is
their being consists existing potentially.

in
ETERNAL MATTER EXISTS ONLY POTENTIALLY.

Therefore, un
to
as
matter were be retained
if
it it as
changeable, first necessary
be
would
to
retain
it
it
matter; evidently, necessary

be
will
to
insist that
it
exists only potentially,

so
that may remain what

it
is;
essentially the only alternative would

be
to
refute
the arguments we have advanced.
Aristotle, Met. and not the potentiality

2. as of
Aris-
4.
v.
1
totle, Met. xii. Aristotle, becoming things,

2,
these
8
Met. vii. Aristotle, de An- thought Aristotle. Met. ix.

8.
4
ima, Aristotle, Met. xii. As thought Aristotle, Soul,

ii.
5.
5
Met. xii.
7;
Aristotle, Met. ix. By Plato

10
Aris-
8,
iii.
in
5.
6
is,
totle, Met. ix. That the Timaeus 52.

5.
their producing potentiality,

THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK SIXTH.

Of the Impassibility of Incorporeal Entities (Soul and
and Matter).
A. OF THE SOUL.
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PASSIBILITY OF JUDGMENT
AND THE SOUL
1. Sensations are not affections,” but actualiza

tions, and judgments, relative to passions. The af
fections occur in what is other (than the soul);
the organized body, and the judgment
is,
in
it in
that
the judgment were
an
the soul. For affection,
if
would itself presuppose another judgment, and
so
on
infinity.” Though accepting this statement, we
to
must, nevertheless, examine whether the judgment
is of it
as
self, such, nowise participates

in
if in
the nature
object; for
its
receive the impression thereof,”

it
it
passive. Besides, the “images derived from the senses”

—to use the popular language—are formed man
in
a
ner entirely different from what generally believed.

is
They are the intellectual concep

as
in
the same case

tions, which are actualizations, and through which,
without being affected, we know objects. general,
In
neither our reason nor our will permit us, any way,
in
to as to
the soul modifications and changes such

to
attribute
the heating cooling
or
Further, we have
of
bodies.
consider whether that part the soul, that
of
called
is
the passive (or affective, irrational), must also be

or
be
or
as
unalterable, being affectible.

as
considered
iii.6] IMPASSIBILITY OF INCORPOREALS 351
But we will take up this question later; we must begin

by solving our earlier problems.
HOW CAN THE SOUL REMAIN IMPASSIBLE, THOUGH

GIVEN UP TO EMOTION ?
How could that part of the soul that is superior to
sensation remain unalterable, while ad
and passion
mittting vice, false opinions, and ignorance (or folly);
when it has desires or aversions; when it yields itself
to joy or pain, to hate, jealousy, and appetite; when,
in one word, it never remains calm, but when all the
things that happen to it agitate it,
and produce changes
within it?
ON THE STOIC HYPOTHESIS OF CORPOREITY THE

SOUL CANNOT REMAIN IMPASSIBLE; AS IT IS
IMPASSIBLE ALL TERMS TO THE CONTRARY
ARE ONLY FIGURATIVE.
If,
(on the Stoic hypothesis) the soul were extended,
.
and corporeal), difficult, rather impos
be
or
would
it
sible for her remain impassible and unalterable

to
when the above-mentioned occurrences take place

If,
“being” that
be
within her. on the contrary, she

a
unextended, and incorruptible, we must take care

is
not her affections that might imply that

is to
to
attribute
If,
the contrary, her “being”

be
on
she perishable.
or
a as
number” reason," we usually say, how could

a
an affection occur within number or reason We

a
must therefore attribute the soul only irrational

to
is,
reasons, passions without passivity; that we must

no more than metaphors drawn
as
consider these terms

bodies, taking them an opposite
of
from the nature

in
so
sense, seeing them no more than mere analogies,

in
that we may say that the soul experiences them with

out experiencing them, and that she passive without
is
really being such (as are the bodies). Let

us
examine
how all this occurs.
VIRTUE AS A HARMONY; WICE AS A DISHARMONY.
2. What occurs in the soul when she contains a
vice? We ask this because it is usual to say, “to
snatch a vice from the soul;” “to introduce virtue into
her,” “to adorn her,” “to replace ugliness by beauty
in her.” Let us also premiss, following the opinions
of the ancients," that virtue is a harmony, and wicked
ness the opposite. That is the best means to solve the
problem at issue. Indeed, when the parts of the soul
(the rational part, the irascible part, and the part of
appetite), harmonize with each other, we shall have
virtue;" and, in the contrary case, vice. Still, in both
cases, nothing foreign to the soul enters into her; each
of her parts remain what they are, while contributing
to harmony. On the other hand, when there is dis
sonance, they could not play the same parts as the
personnel of a choric ballet, who dance and sing in
harmony, though not all of them fill the same func
tions; though one sings while the remainder are silent;
and though each sings his own part; for it does not
suffice that they all sing in tune, they must each
properly sing his own part. In the soul we therefore
have harmony when each part fulfils
its
functions.
Still each must have its own virtue before the existence
harmony;
its
vice, before there disharmony.

of
or
is
a
What then the thing whose presence makes each

is
evil? Evidently the presence

or
part the soul good

of
The mere statement that, for the

of
or
virtue vice.
rational part (of the soul) vice consists ignorance,”
in
no
more than simple negation, and predicates

is
nothing positive about reason.
THIS DEFINITION SUFFICES TO EXPLAIN THE

FACTS OF EVIL IN THE SOUL.
But when the Soul contains some of those false
opinions which are the principal cause vice, must we
of
not acknowledge that something positive occurs in her,

and that one of her parts undergoes an alteration? Is
not the disposition of the soul's irascible part different
according to
its
or
courage cowardliness? And the
be
Soul’s appetitive-part, according tem
to
whether
it
perate intemperate? part
of
We answer that
or
the
a
conformity with
its
Soul virtuous, when acts
in
is
it
“being,” obeys reason; for reason com
or
when of it
mands all the parts the soul, and herself subjected
to is
to
intelligence. Now obey reason see;

to
is
is
it
to
not receive an impression, but have an intuition,
to
carry out the act Sight
to
of
of
vision.” the same
is
(nature) when potentiality, actualization; or
in
in
is
it
not altered passing from potentiality actualiza
to
in
tion,” she only applies herself do what

to
her
is
it
see and know, wthout being af
to
(nature) do,
to
fected. Her rational part the same relation with

in
is
intelligence; she has the intuition thereof.11 The

intelligence receive an impression
to of
nature not
to
is
similar that made by seal, but
to
one sense
in
a
possess what possess another;

to
sees, and not

in
it
it
it;
intelligence possesses by cognizing but intelligence

in it
does not possess this sense that while seeing

to it
it
intelligence does not receive from shape similar

it
a
that impressed on wax by seal. Again, we must not

a
forget that memory does not consist keeping im

in
pressions, but the soul's faculty recalling and

of
is
representing herself the things that are not present

to
Some objector might say that the soul dif

to
her.
is
ferent before reawakening memory, and after having

a
be
She may indeed different, but she

it.
reawakened
not altered, unless indeed, we call the passing from
is
potentiality
an
any case,
In
to
actualization alteration.
nothing extraneous enters into her, she only acts ac
cording
to
her own nature.

ONLY THE PHYSICAL ORGANS, NOT THE IM
MATERIAL NATURES, COULD BE AFFECTED.
In general, the actualizations of immaterial (natures)
do not in any way imply that these (natures) were
altered—which would imply their destruction—but,
on the contrary, they remain what they were. Only
material things are affected, while active. If an im
material principle were exposed to undergo affections,
it would no longer remain what it Thus the act
is.
in
vision, the sight acts, but the eye that af
of
is
is
it
As opinions, they are actualizations ana
to
fected.
logous sight.
to
PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF ANGER-PART'S

COURAGE OR COWARDLINESS.
But how can the soul's irascible-part” be one
at
time courageous, and the other cowardly? When
at
cowardly, does not consider reason,

or
considers
is
it
it
having already become evil;

or
as
reason because the

its
weak
is,
deficiency instruments, that

of
the lack of
feeling
its
or
organs, hinders from acting,
of
ness
it
emotion, being irritated. the contrary condition

or
In
courageous. either case, the Soul undergoes

In
it
is
no alteration, nor affected.

is
PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF VIRTUE OR VICE

OF APPETITE.
Further, the soul's appetite intemperate when
it
is
active; for then, the prin

of
alone the absence

in
is
or
ciples that ought

to
command direct her, alone

it
does everything. Besides, the rational part, whose

see (by considering the notions re
to
function
is
it
it
ceives from intelligence), occupied with something

is
else, for does not do everything simultaneously,

it
being busy with some other action; considers other

it
so
than corporeal things, far can.** Perhaps also

as
it
the virtue or vice of the appetite depend considerably

on the good or evil condition of the organs; so that, in
either case, nothing is added to the soul.
THE SOUL ORIGINATES MOVEMENTS, BUT IS NOT

ALTERED (AGAINST STOICS). POLEMIC AGAINST
THE STOIC THEORY OF PASSIONS.
3. There are desires and aversions in the soul,
which demand consideration. It is impossible to deny
that pain, anger, joy, appetite and fear are changes
and affections which occur in the soul, and that move
her.” We must here draw a distinction, for it would
be denying the evidence to insist that there are in us
no changes or perception of these changes. We can
not attribute them to the soul, which would amount to
the admission” that she blushes, or grows pale, with
out reflecting that these “passions,” though produced
by the Soul, occur in a different substance. For the
Soul, Shame consists in the opinion that something is
improper; and as the soul contains the body, or, to
speak more exactly, as the body is a dependency of the
animating soul, the blood, which is very mobile, rushes
to the face. Likewise, the principle of fear is in the
Soul; paleness occurs in the body because the blood
concentrates within the interior parts. In joy, the
noticeable dilation belongs to the body also; what the
body feels is not a “passion.” Likewise with pain and
appetite; their principle is in the soul, where it remains
in a latent condition; what proceeds therefrom is per
ceived by sensation. When we call desires, opinions
and reasonings “movements of the Soul,” we do not
mean that the soul becomes excited in the production
of these movements,” but that they originate within
her. When we call life a movement, we do not by
this word mean an alteration; for to act according to
one’s nature is the simple and indivisible life of each
part of the soul.
VIRTUE AND VICE AFFECT THE SOUL DIFFERENTLY
FROM ALL THE OTHER PASSIONS.
In short, we insist that action, life and desire are
not alterations, that memories are not forms impressed
on the soul, and that actualizations of the imagination
are not impressions similar to those of a seal on wax. 17
Consequently in all that we call “passions” or “move
ments,” the Soul undergoes no change in her substance
(substrate) or “being” (nature); virtue and vice in
the Soul are not similar to what heat, cold, whiteness
or blackness are in bodies; and the soul’s relation to
vice and virtue is entirely different, as has been ex
plained.
PASSIONAL CHANGES OCCUR IN THE BODY, NOT

EVEN TO THE PASSIONAL PART OF THE
SOUL.
4. Let us now pass to that part of the soul that is

called the “passional” (or, affective). We have
already mentioned it,” when treating of all the “pas
affections), which were related
is,
sions” (that
to
the
irascible-part and appetitive part the soul; but we
of
are going study this part, and explain

of
to
to
return
a
name, the “passional” (or, affective) part.

its
so
is
It
be
the part affected by the

to
called because seems

it
“passions;” that by
is,
experiences accompanied
pain.” Amidst these affections, some are
or
pleasure
opinion; thus, we feel fear joy, according
or
of
born
attain some good;
in as
we expect die, we hope

is or
to
to
as
then the “opinion” the soul, and the “affection”

the body. On the contrary, other passions, occur
in
ring an unforeseen way, give rise opinion

to
that
of in
in
do
part which this function belongs, but

to
the soul
as
not cause any alteration within her, we have already

if,
explained. Nevertheless,
on
examining unexpected
fear, we follow up higher, we discover that still
it
it
contains opinion as origin, implying some appre
of its
hension that part
in the soul that experiences fear,
as
result which occur the trouble and stupor which

of
a
accompany the expectation
of
Now
to
evil. the
is
it
soul that belongs imagination, both the primary imag
ination that we call opinion, and the (secondary)
imagination that proceeds from the former; for the
latter no longer genuine opinion, but an inferior
is
power, obscure opinion,

an
confused imagination
a
nature,
of
which resembles the action characteristic
and by which this power produces each thing,
as
we
say, unimaginatively.” Its resulting sense-agitation
occurs within the body. To relate trembling, pal
it
pitation, paleness, and inability speak. Such mod
to
ifications, indeed, could not be referred any part
be of
to
the soul; otherwise, such part
of of
the soul would

physical. Further, such part the soul underwent
if
such affections these modifications would not reach the

body; for that affected part longer no
of
the soul would

functions, being dominated by
be
its
to
able exercise
passion, and thus incapacitated.
THE SOUL’S AFFECTIVE PART MAY BE THE CAUSE

OF AFFECTIONS; BUT IS INCORPOREAL.
part the soul, therefore,
of
The affective not

is
corporeal; form indeed, but form engaged

in
as is
it
matter, such the appetite, the power growth, both

of
nutritive and generative, power which the root

is
a
and principle appetite, and the affective part

of
of
the
an
or
soul. Now form cannot undergo affection

a
a
passion, but must remain what

is.
the matter
It
is
of it
(of body) which capable being affected by

is
a
a
“passion” (an affection), when this affection pro

its is
duced by the presence the power which prin

of
is
ciple. neither the power growth that

of
Indeed
is
it
grows, nor the nutritive power that is fed; in general,
the principle that produces a motion is not itself
moved by the movement it produces; in case it were
its
moved in any way, movement and action would be
an entirely different nature.” Now the nature of
of
mere presence pro
by
an
its
form actualization,
is
a
ducing (something), just the harmony alone could
as
if
the strings lyre. Thus the
of
of
cause the vibration
a
affective part (of the soul, without itself being af
the affections, whether the
of
fected) the cause
is
it,from sense-imagina
is,
movement proceed from that
whether they occur without (distinct) imagina
or
tion,
tion.
THE AFFECTIONS OF THE SOUL COMPARED TO
A
MUSICIAN PLAYING THE LYRE.
as
We might further consider whether, inasmuch
opinion originates higher principle (of the soul),
in
a
this principle does not remain immovable because
it
harmony, while the cause the move
of
of
the form
is
ment plays the role the musician, and the parts

of
vibrate by the affection, that the strings;

of
to
caused
for not the harmony, but the string that experi
is
it
ences the affection; and even the musician desired

it,
if
the string would not vibrate unless were prescribed

it
by the harmony.
PASSIONS ARE PRODUCED BY EXTERNAL IMAGES;

AND THEIR AVOIDANCE IS THE TASK OF
PHILOSOPHY.
then, from the very start, the soul undergo
5.
If
no affections, what then trying

of
render
to
the use
is
her impassible by means philosophy? The reason

of
that when an image produced the soul by the

in
is
is
affective part, there results the body an affection

in
movement; and this agitation related the

to
and
is
a
image of the evil which is foreseen by opinion. It

is this affection that reason commands us to annihilate,
and whose occurrence even we are to forestall, because
when this affection occurs, the soul is sick, and healthy
when it does not occur. In the latter case, none of
these images, which are the causes of affections, form
within the soul. That is why, to free oneself from the
images that obsess one during dreams, the soul that
occupies herself therewith is to be wakened.” Again,
that is why we can say that affections are produced
by representations of exterior entities, considering
these representations as affections of the soul.
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESS INVOLVED IN PURIFYING
THE SOUL, AND SEPARATING SOUL FROM
BODY.
But what do we mean by “purifying the soul,” in
asmuch as she could not possibly be stained 2 What
do we mean by separating (or, weaning) the soul
from the body? To purify the soul is to isolate her,
preventing her from attaching herself to other things,
from considering them, from receiving opinions alien
to her, whatever these (alien) opinions or affections
might be, as we have said; it consequently means
hindering her from consideration of these phantoms,
and from the production of their related affections.
To “purify the soul,” therefore, consists in raising her
from the things here below to intelligible entities; also,
it is to wean her from the body; for, in that case, she
is no longer sufficiently attached to the body to be
light which
it,
enslaved to resembling not absorbed

is
a
the whirlwind (of matter**), though even

in
this
in
case that part submerged does

of
the soul which

is
not,
on
that account alone, cease being impassible.

To purify the affective part
of
to
the soul turn her

is
deceitful images; separate her from

of
from
to
vision
a
the body, hinder her from inclining towards lower

to
is
things, or from representing their images to herself;
it means annihilating the things from which she thus
is separated, so that she is no longer choked by the
whirlwind of the spirit which breaks loose whenever
the body is allowed to grow too strong; the latter
must be weakened so as to govern it more easily.
B. OF MATTER.
INTRODUCTION TO THE ESCOREAL NUMENIAN
FRAGMENT.
6. We have sufficiently demonstrated the im
passibility of intelligible “being” which is entirely com
prised within the genus of form. But as matter also,
though in another manner, is an incorporeal entity,
we must examine its nature also. We must see whether
it may be affected, and undergo every kind of modi
fication, as is the common opinion; or whether, on the
contrary, it be impassible; and in this case, what is
its
the nature of impassibility.
NONENTITY WILL HAVE INTELLIGENT LIFE ONLY

AS BENEATH “BEING.”
matter,
of
of
to
Since we are thus led treat the nature

we must first premiss that the nature existence,
of
“being” and essence” are not what they are thought

is;
by people generally.
be
“is” the
in
to
Existence
it it
is,
genuine meaning that word; that

of
“is” essen
tially; absolutely, lacking nothing
of
existence.
is
it
Fully being existence,

its
existence and preservation are

so
not dependent on anything else; much the more,

if
other things seem be, they owe this thereto. this be

to
If
true, existence must possess life, perfect life—for

otherwise would not be existence any more than
it
non-existence. Now perfect life intelligence and

is
perfect wisdom. Existence therefore determinate

is
Nothing outside exists even poten

of
and definite.
it
tially; otherwise would not fully satisfy itself.

It
is
it
therefore eternal, immutable, incapable of receiving

anything, or of adding anything to itself; for what it
would receive would have to be foreign to
it,
and con
sequently be nonentity. exist by itself, ex
In
to
order
istence must therefore possess all things within itself;
it
must be all things simultaneously,
at
must the same
of it
time be one and all, since this what we consider
is
consist; emanating
of
to
existence otherwise instead

from existence, intelligence and life would be in
cidental thereto. Therefore they could not originate
from nonentity; and, on its
side, existence could not
be deprived intelligence and life. True nonentity,
of
therefore, will have intelligence and life only they
as
objects inferior and posterior exist
to
must exist
in
The principle superior existence (the One),

to
ence.
on the other hand, gives intelligence and life exist
to
ence, without itself needing possess them.**
to
MATERIALISTS CANNOT UNDERSTAND HOW SOLID

EARTH IS NEAREST NONENTITY; AND WHY
GREATEST EXISTENCE IS LEAST MATERIAL.
existence,
of
such be the nature could be neither

Is
it
body, nor the substrate bodies; for their existence

of
nonentity. (Materialists, however, object), How

is
attribute “being”
of
could we refuse
to
to to
the nature
as
bodies, such these cliffs and rocks, the solid earth,

and short, all these impenetrable objects? When
to
in
am struck, am not by the shock forced acknowl

to
I
I
(real) “being”? On
as
edge that these objects exist

the other hand, how does happen that entities that
it
are not impenetrable, which can neither shock others

shocked by them, which are completely invis
be
nor
ible, like soul and intelligence, are genuine beings?”
Our answer that the earth, which possesses corporeal
is
nature the highest degree, inert; the element that

in
is
less gross (the air) already more mobile, and

is
is
resides in a higher region; while fire withdraws still

more from corporeal nature. The things which best
suffice themselves least agitate and trouble the others;
those that are heavier and more terrestrial, by the
mere fact that they are incomplete, subject to falling,
and incapable of rising, fall by weakness, and shock
the others by virtue of their inertia, and their weight.
Thus inanimate bodies fall more heavily, and shock
and wound others more powerfully. On the contrary,
animated bodies, by the mere fact of greater participa
tion in existence, strike with less harshness. That is
why movement, which is a kind of life, or at least an
image of life, exists in a higher degree in things that
are less corporeal.
CORPOREITY IS NONENTITY BECAUSE OF LACK OF

UNITY.
It is therefore an “eclipse of existence” which ren
ders an object more corporeal. While studying those
psychoses called affections, we discover that the more
likely
be
af
is,
corporeal an object
to
the more
is
it
so
fected; the earth more than other elements, and

is
on. Indeed, when other elements are divided, they

so
immediately reunite their parts, unless there be some

opposition; but when we separate parts earth, they
of
do not come together again. They thus seem have

to
no natural earth; since, after light blow, they remain

a
the state where they are left by the blow that struck
is, or in
broke them. Therefore the more corporeal thing

to a
the more approaches nonentity, returning unity

it
with the greater difficulty. The heavy and violent

blows by which bodies act on each other are followed
by destruction. When even weak thing falls on
a
relatively powerful;
be
something weak, may still

it
nonentity hitting nonentity.

as
is
SENSATION AS THE DREAM OF THE SOUL FROM
WHICH WE MUST WAKE.
Such are the objections that may be raised against
those who consider all beings as corporeal; who wish
to judge of their existence only by impressions they
receive therefrom, and who try to found the certitude
of truth on the images of sensation.” They resemble
sleeping men who take as realities the visions they
have in their dreams. Sensation is the dream of the
soul;* so long as the soul is in the body, she dreams;
the real awakening of the soul consists in genuine
separation from the body, and not in rising along with
the body. To rise with the body is to pass from one
sleep into another kind; from one bed to another;
really to awake is to separate oneself completely from
the body. The body, whose nature is contrary to that
of the soul, consequently has a nature contrary to that
of “being.” This is proved by the generation, flux,
and decay of bodies, all processes contrary to the
nature of “being.”
MATTER COMPARED TO A MIRROR WHICH RE

FLECTS EVERYTHING THOUGH REALLY EMPTY.
7. Let us return to matter as a substrate, and then
to what is said to exist within it. This will lead us to
see that it consists of nonentity, and that it is impass
ible. Matter is incorporeal because the body exists
only as posterior thereto, because it is a composite of
which it constitutes an element. It is called incorporeal
because existence and matter are two things equally
distinct from the body. Not being soul, matter is
neither intelligence, nor life, nor (“seminal) reason,”
nor limit. It is a kind of infinity.” Neither is it an
(active) power;89 for what could it produce? Since
matter is none of the above-mentioned things, it could
not be called existence. It deserves only the name
“nonentity” yet not even in the sense in which we may
say that movement or rest are not existence;81
matter is real nonentity. It is an image and phan
tom of extension, it is aspiration to a form of
hypostatic existence. Its perseverance is not in rest
(but in change). By itself, it is invisible, it escapes
whoever wishes to see present when you do
it.
It
is
it,
at
not look escapes the eye that seeks
it.
It
it
contain all the contraries: the large and small,
to
seems
the more and the less, the lack and excess.”
It
is
a
or
phantom equally incapable remaining escaping;
of
for matter does not even have the strength avoiding
of
(form), because in
no
has received strength from
is it
telligence, and the lack all existence. Conse

of
it
its
quently, all appearances are deceptions. we
If
represent matter being greatness, immediately
as
it it
as
appears smallness; we represent the more,
as
if
as
we are forced recognize the less. When we

to
it
try
its
nonen
as
existence, appears
of
to
conceive
it
tity; like all the things contains, fugitive

is
it
it
a
in an
shadow, and fleeting game, image within an

a
image. resembles mirror, which one might

It
it;
objects external
of
the mirror
to
see the reflections

filled, and possess everything, though
be
to
to
seems
really containing nothing.
AS OBJECTS ARE MERELY REFLECTIONS IN

A
MIRROR, MATTER IS NO MORE AFFECTED BY

THEM THAN WOULD BE MIRROR.
A
Thus matter shapeless image, into which enter,

is
a
which issue the images beings.

of
of
and out These

appear precisely because matter has no shape,
in
it
they
it,
though they seem produce something

to
in
really produce nothing it.* They have no consist

in
ence, strength, nor solidity;

as
matter has none either,

without dividing
it,
as
they enter into they would

if
it
penetrate water, or as shapes might move in empti

ness. If
the images that appear in matter had the
same nature as the objects they represent and from
which they emanate, then, if we attribute to the images
a little of the power of the objects that project them,
we might be right in considering them able to affect
matter. But as the things that we see in matter do not
have the same nature as the objects of which they are
the images, it is not true that matter suffers when re
ceiving them; they are no more than false appearances
without any resemblance to what produces them.
Feeble and false by themselves, they enter into a thing
that is equally false.** They must therefore leave it
as impassible as a mirror, or water; producing on it no
more effect than does a dream on the Soul. These
comparisons, however, are yet imperfect, because in
these cases there is still some resemblance between the
images and the objects.
SINCE MATTER CANNOT BE DESTROYED, IT CANNOT

BE AFFECTED.
8. (According to Aristotle”), it is absolutely
necessary that what can be affected must have powers
it,
and qualities opposed to the things that approach

Thus,
it.
and affect the cold that alters the heat

is
it
an
its
object, and humidity that alters dryness, and

of
we say that the substrate altered, when ceases

is
is be it
being hot, and grows cold; and ceasing dry, be

to
Another proof the de

of
comes humid. this truth

the fire that, by changing, becomes another
of
struction
element. Then we say that the fire, but not the
is
it
matter that has been destroyed. What affected

is
a is
therefore that which destroyed; for always

is
is
it
passive modification that occasions destruction. Con

sequently being destroyed and being affected are in
separable notions. Now impossible for matter
is
it
to be destroyed; for how could it be destroyed, and in
what would it change?
OBJECTION THAT MATTER MUST BE PASSIBLE IF
ITS QUALITIES CHANGE AS THEY DO.
It may be objected that matter receives heat, cold,
and numerous, or even innumerable qualities; it is
characterized by them, it possesses them as Somehow
inherent in its nature, and mingled with each other, as
they do not exist in isolated condition. How could
nature avoid being affected along with them,” serving
as it does as a medium for the mutual action of these
qualities by their mixture?” If matter is to be con
sidered impassible, we shall have to consider it as
somehow outside of these qualities. But every quality
which is present in a subject cannot be present in it
without communicating to it something of itself.
DIFFERENT SENSES OF “PARTICIPATION” WILL
ALLOW FOR MATTER TO REMAIN IMPASSIBLE.
9. It must be noticed that the expressions: “such
a thing is present to such a thing” and “such a thing is
in such other thing” have several meanings. Some
times one thing improves or deteriorates some other
change; as
its
thing by presence, making undergo

it
living beings.
be
may bodies, especially those

of
seen
in
Again, one thing improves deteriorates another with

or
it;
out affecting this occurs with the soul, we have

as
Again,
as
already seen.* when one impresses

a
is
it
figure wax; the presence the figure

on
piece
of
of
a
de
its
adds nothing the wax, and

of
the (nature)
to
struction makes lose nothing. Likewise, light does

it
not change the figure the object which enlightens

of
it
in
its
with rays. cooled stone participates little

A
it;
the thing that cools but

of
the nature characteristic

none the less remains stone. What suffering can light
surface?” One might perhaps
on
inflict
or
line
a
a
say that in this case corporeal substance is affected;
but how can it suffer (or be affected) by the action
of light? Suffering, in fact, is not to enjoy the pres
ence of something, nor to receive something. Mirrors,
and, in general, transparent things, do not suffer (or
are not affected) by the effect of images that form
in them, and they offer a striking example of the truth
we are here presenting. Indeed, qualities inhere in
matter like simple images, and matter itself is more
impassible than a mirror. Heat and cold occur in it
it;
without warming or cooling for heating and cooling
that one quality the substrate gives place
of
consist
in
another. passing, we might notice that

In
would
to
it
not be without interest to examine whether cold not
is
merely absence On entering into matter,
of
heat.
qualities mostly react on each other only when they
be
are opposite. What action, indeed, could exercised
by
smell on sweet taste? By color on figure?

a
How, general, could things that belong one genus

to
in
act on another? This shows how one quality can give

place same subject, how one thing
in
or
to
another
a
its
can be another, without presence causing any

in
modification the subject for which

or
which
in
in
is
it
Just
as
present. thing not altered by the first

is
a
comer, likewise that which affected and which

is
changes does not receive passive modification,

or
a
an
change, from any kind object.

of
Qualities are
affected only by the action Things
of
contraries.
which are simply different cause no change each
in
other. Those which have no contraries could evidently

be
modified by the action any contrary.

of
not That
affected, therefore, can not matter;
be
which must
is
it
composite (of form and matter), Something

be
or
a
or
multiple. But that which isolated separated from

is
the rest, what quite simple must remain impassible

allis
on as
respect things, and remain

of
of
kind
in
medium which other things may act each other.

in
Likewise, within a house, several objects can shock
each other without the house itself or the air within
it being affected. It is therefore qualities gathered in
matter that act on each other, so far as it belongs to
their nature. Matter itself, however, is still far more
impassible than the qualities are among each other,
when they do not find themselves opposite.
IF FORM BE UNCHANGEABLE, SO IS MATTER.
10. If matter could be affected, it would have to

preserve some of the affection, retaining either the
affection itself, or remain in a state different from the
one in which it was before it was affected. But when
one quality appears after another quality, it is no
it,
longer matter that receives determined
as
but matter
by quality. even this quality should evanesce,
If
a
though leaving some trace itself by the action

of
it
altered;
be
has exercised, the substrate will still more
something entirely
be
proceeding thus will come

to
it
something mul
be
different from pure matter, will

it
tiple by
its
its
forms and by
of
It
manners existence.
all
things,
be
will no longer the common receptacle

of
will contain an obstacle many things that

to
since
it
it;
could happen matter would no longer Subsist

to
and would no longer be incorruptible. Now

it,
within
by definition, matter always remains what was
if,
it
origin, namely “matter,” then,

its
since we insist
if
longer
be
is no
that altered, evident that matter

is
it
it
remains such. Moreover, everything that altered

if
changed
be
so
must remain unchanged kind,

to
as
not
in
itself, though changed accidents; one word,

if
in
in
in
that
be
that which changed must permanent, and

is
if
affected, we
be
which permanent not that which

to is
is
come dilemma; either matter altered, and

is
a
nature,
its
its
If or
abandons nature; does not abandon

it
and not changed. we say that matter changed,

is
is
but not in so far as it is matter, it will, to begin with,

be impossible to state in what it is changed; and further,
we would thereby be forced to insist it was not changed.
Indeed, just as other things, which are forms, cannot
be changed in their “being” (or, nature), because it
is this very unalterability which constitutes their
“being” (or, nature), likewise, as the “being” (or,
nature) of matter is to exist in so far as it is matter,
it cannot be altered in so far as it is matter, and it
must necessarily be permanent in this respect. There
fore if form be unalterable, matter must be equally
unalterable.
MATTER PARTICIPATES IN THE INTELLIGIBLE

ONLY BY APPEARANCE.
11. This was no doubt the thought present to
Plato when 40 he rightly said, “These imitations of the
eternal beings which enter into matter, and which issue
therefrom.” Not without good reason did he employ
the terms “enter” and “issue”; he wanted us carefully
to scrutinize the manner in which matter participates
in ideas. When Plato thus tries to clear up how
matter participates in ideas, his object is to show, not
how ideas enter into matter, as before so many have
believed, but their condition within Doubtless,
it.
it
does seem astonishing that matter remains impass

respect the ideas that are present therein,
in
to
ible
while the things that enter are affected by each
in
to it
other. We nevertheless have acknowledge that the

things which enter into matter expel their predecessors,
and that only the composite that affected.
it is
is
it
not every kind composite that

of
Nevertheless
is
is
affected, but only that composite that happens

to
need
the thing that was introduced
its
so
expelled,
or
that
constitution becomes defective by the absence
of
that
by
(quality), Nothing
its
or
more complete presence.

matter, however, by the in
of
to
added the nature

is
troduction of anything; the presence of that thing does

and matter loses nothing
is,
not make matter what it
by its
absence; matter remains what was since its
it
be
origin. To some
of
to
ornamented the interest
or is
thing that admits ornament;
of
order can receive
it
that ornament without being changed, when only
it
so
puts on, speak. this ornament penetrate
to
But
if
it it
something that forms part
its
as
nature,
of
into
it
then cannot receive without being altered, without
it it
be
as
ceasing was before, for instance,
to to
what
ugly; without, by that very fact, chang
be
ceasing
ing; without, for instance, becoming beautiful, though
ugly before. Therefore matter become beautiful,
if
though before ugly, be what was before;
to
ceases
it
it
namely, ugly;
so
that on being adorned loses its
it
was ugly only acci
so
nature,
as
much the more

to it
dentally. Being ugly enough ugliness itself, be
to it
could not participate beauty; being bad enough
in
be
badness itself, could not participate goodness.

in
it
Therefore matter participates the ideas without

in
being affected; and consequently, this participation

must operate another manner; and, for instance,
in
appearance.** participation
of
consist This kind

in
us
solves the problem we had set ourselves; enables
it
of to to
understand how, while being evil, matter can aspire

be
the Good without ceasing was, spite

in
to
what
it
this par
its
participation the Good. Indeed

as a in
if
ticipation operate manner such that matter remains

in
without alteration, we say, and always continue

if
it
be
be
what was, there surprised

if, to
in to
no reason
is
it
though being evil, can participate the Good;

it
it
does not swerve from its manner of existence. On

as
one hand, for her, this participation unavoidable,

is
long
on
as
as
participates endures; the other hand,

as it
beit
by virtue
is,
of
what
to
matter continues the

it
participation which does not interfere with its

of
kind
no
on
nature, undergoes the part

of
alteration the
it
principle which gives it something; it always remains
its
as bad as it was, because nature persists. matter
If
really participated the Good, matter were really
its in
if
is be
modified thereby, nature would no longer evil.
Therefore, the statement that matter evil true
it is
imply that
be
enough impassible
to
considered
if
is
it
respect Good; and this really amounts saying

to
to
in
that entirely impassible.

is
it
SENSE-OBJECTS ARE UNREAL AND ARE CHIEFLY

MADE UP OF APPEARANCE.
12. Plato” agreed with this, and being per
suaded that, by participation, matter does not receive
form and shape, would some substrate that should
as
composite things intimately united by

of
constitute
a
their transformation, their mixture, and their common
.
affections; the opposite,
to
order demonstrate
in
namely, that matter remains impassible while receiving

forms, invented most apposite illustration par
of
a
a
ticipation that operates without anything being af
fected (namely, that engravers, before using dies on
the soft wax, clean them carefully). Almost any other
of
illustration would fail explain how the sub

to
kind
the presence
of
in
strate can remain the same forms.

While trying achieve his purpose, Plato has raised
to
many questions;
he
has besides applied himself

to
demonstrate that sense-objects are devoid reality,

of
large part their hypostatic substance

of
and that
is
a
constituted by appearance. Plato demonstrates the

permanence and identity matter by showing that
of
by the figures with which endued that matter

is
it
is
it
affects animated bodies, without itself suffering any

of their affections. He wishes to convince us that
in
being endued with these figures, matter undergoes

neither affection nor alteration. Indeed, the bodies
in
that successively assume different figures, we may,

relying on analogy, call the change figures alter
an
of
ation; but since matter has neither figure nor exist
ence, ** how could we, even by analogy, call the pres
ence of a figure an alteration? The only sure way of
avoiding a misunderstanding in expression is to say
that the substrate possesses nothing in the manner it
is usually supposed to possess How then could
it.
it
possess the things contains, unless figure
is as
it
?
Plato's illustration means that matter impassible,
contains the apparent presence images
of
and that
it
which are not really present therein.

PLATO'S FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE MIGHT LEAD TO
ERRORS ABOUT HIS REAL OPINIONS.
We must still further preliminarily insist on the im
passibility matter; for by using the usual terms we
of
might misled into wrongly thinking that matter

be
Thus Plato speaks”
of
could be affected. matter
being set on fire, being wetted, and forth, so
as
it
if
received the shapes However, Plato
of
air
or
water.
modifies the statement that “matter receives the shapes
by
of
air and water” the statement that matter “is set

on fire and wetted,” and he demonstrates that by re
ceiving these shapes nevertheless has none its of
it
own, and that forms do not more than enter into it.
This expression “matter set on fire” must not be
is
taken literally; means only that matter becomes fire.

it
Now become fire not the same thing being set

to
as
is
on fire; be set on fire can achieve no more than

to
what different from fire, than what can be affected;

is
be
part
of
for that which itself fire could not set

is
a
on fire. To insist on the opposite would amount to

that fire
or
saying that metal itself formed statue,

a
itself spread into matter and set on fire. The theory

it
that (“seminal) reason” had approached matter,

a
us
question how this reason could have set

to
forces
matter on fire. The theory that figure had ap
a
proached matter would imply that that which

is
set on fire is already composed of two things (matter

and a figure), and that these two entities form a single
one. Although these two things would form a single
one, they would not affect each other, and would act
only on other entities. Nor would they even in this
case act jointly; for one would effect no more than to
hinder the other from avoiding (form). The theory
that when the body is divided matter also must be
divided, would have to answer the question, How
could matter on being divided, escape the affection
undergone by the composite (of form and matter) 2
On such a theory, one might even assert that matter
was destroyed, and ask, Since the body is destroyed,
why should not matter also be destroyed? What is
affected and divided must be a quantity or magnitude.
What is not a magnitude cannot experience the same
modifications as a body. Therefore those who con
sider matter affectible would be forced to call it a body.
MATTER AS THE ETERNAL LOCATION OR RESI
DENCE OF GENERATION.
13. They would further have to explain in what
sense they say that matter seeks to elude form. How
can it be said to Seek to elude the stones and the Solid
objects which contain it? For it would be irrational
to say that it seeks to elude form at certain times, but
not at others. If matter seeks to elude form volun
tarily, why does it not elude form continuously? If
necessity keep matter (within form), there can be no
moment when it would not inhere in Some form or
other. The reason why matter is not always contained
by the same form must not be sought for within matter,
but in the forms that matter receives. In what Sense
then could it be said that matter eludes form 2 Does
it always and essentially elude form 2 This would
amount to saying that matter, never ceasing being it
self, has form without ever having Otherwise, the
it.
statement would be meaningless.” (Plato) says that

matter is the “nurse and residence of generation.” If
then matter be the nurse and residence of generation,
it is evidently distinct from the latter. Only that which
can be affected is within the domain of generation.
Now as matter, being the nurse and residence of gener
ation, exists before the latter, it must also exist before
any alteration. Therefore to say that matter is the
nurse and residence of generation is tantamount to
saying that matter is impassible. The same meaning
attaches to such other Statements as that matter is that
in which begotten things appear, and from which they
issue,” that matter is the (eternal) location, and place
(of all generation).47
MATTER AS LOCATION OF FORMS REMAINS IM

PASSIBLE.
When Plato, rightfully, calls matter “the location of

forms,” he is not thereby attributing any passion to
matter; he only indicates that matters go on in a dif
ferent manner. How 2 Since matter, however, by its
nature, cannot be any of the beings, and as it must
flee from the “being” of all beings, and be entirely
different from them—for (“seminal) reasons” are
genuine beings—it must necessarily preserve
its
nature
by virtue this very difference. must not only
of
It
contain all beings, but also not appropriate what

is
by
their image; for this that which matter differs

is
from all beings. Otherwise, the images that fill

if
mirror were not transient, and the mirror remained

if
invisible, evidently we would believe that the things

us
the mirror presents existed really. then there

to
If
something mirror, that that which sense

be
in
is
a
forms are matter. mirror there be nothing but

in
is in
If
a
appearance, then there nothing matter but appear

in
of
ance, recognizing that this appearance the cause

is
the existence of beings, an existence in which the things

that exist always really participate, and in which the
things which do not really exist do not participate; for
they could not be in the condition where they would
be they existed without the existence of existence in
itself.
THE MYTH OF POWERTY AND ABUNDANCE.
14. What! Would nothing exist (in the sense

world) if matter did not exist? Nothing! It is as
mirror; remove
it,
with a and the images disappear.

its
Indeed, that which by
in
to
nature destined exist
is
something else could not exist that thing; now the
in
every image something else.

of
to
nature exist
in
is
an
the image were

of
emanation the causes them

If
selves, could exist without being anything else;

in
it
as
so
but these causes reside themselves, that their
in
image may reflect itself elsewhere, there must be

as
something else destined

to
serve location for that

it;
which dos not really enter into something which by

tº
solicitations, and by
its
its
presence, audacity, it its

its
indigence, should were forcibly obtain (what

as
is it
desires), but which deceived because does not

it
really obtain anything; in

its
to so
that preserves
it
digence, and continues solicitate (satisfaction*).

Poverty exists, ceaselessly “begs,”
as
as
As soon
it
(well-known Platonic) myth tells us;49 that shows

a
clearly enough that naturally denuded all good.

of
is
it
all
that the giver possesses;

to
does not ask obtain

It
it
thus re
it,
satisfied with the possession

of
of
some
is
us
vealing how much the images that appear

in
to
matter are different from real beings. Even the very

Poverty, which given matter, indicates
is of
to
name
is
When Poverty
to
that insatiable. said unite

it
is
with Abundance, we do not mean that unites with

it
or
Fulness, but with

of
Existence work wonderful

a
skill, namely, a thing that is nothing but specious ap
pearance.”9, 74
THE MIRACLE IS THAT MATTER PARTICIPATES IN

EXISTENCE WITHOUT PARTICIPATING IN IT.
It is indeed impossible that that which is outside of
it;
existence should be completely deprived of for the
produce beings. On the other
of
to
nature existence
is
hand, absolute nonentity cannot mingle with existence.
The result something miraculous: matter participates
is
existence without really participating and by
it,
in
in
approaching obtains something, though by its

to
it
nature matter cannot unite with existence. there
It
fore reflects what receives from an alien nature as
it
echo reflects sound places that are symmetrical and

in
That how things that do not reside
in
continuous.
is
it,
come from
to
to
it.
matter seem reside and
in
GENERATION ILLUSTRATED BY LIGHTING FIRE BY

REFRACTION.
matter participated genuine

of
in
the existence
If
it as
beings and received them within itself, might easily

would pene
be
thought, that which would enter into

trate deeply into matter; but evidently matter not
is
penetrated thereby, remaining unreceptive any

of
of
On the contrary, matter arrests their “procession,”

as it.
echo arrests and reflects sound-waves, matter being

only the “residence” (or, “jar” the things
or
of
vase)
it,
that enter within and there mingle with each other.

Everything takes place there persons
of
as
the case
in
who, wishing light fire from the rays the sun,

of
to
should place these rays polished jars filled

of
front
in
so
with water, that the flame, arrested by the obstacles

met within, should not be able penetrate, and should
to
concentrate on their outside. That how matter be

is
comes the cause of generation; that is how things occur

within it.
THE RELATION OF MATTER TO REASON ILLUS

TRATED BY THAT OF OPINION AND IMAGIN
ATION.
15. The objects that concentrate the rays of the
sun, are themselves visible, by receiving from the fire
of sensation what takes fire in their hearth. They
appear because the images that form themselves are
around and near them, and touch each other, and
finally because there are two limits in these objects.
But when the (“seminal) reason” is in matter, it re
mains exterior to matter in an entirely different man
ner; it has a different nature. Here it is not necessary
that there be two limits; matter and reason are strang
ers to each other by difference of nature, and by the
difference between their natures that makes any mix
ture of them impossible. The cause that each remains
in itself is that what enters into matter does not possess
any more than matter possesses what enters into
it,
it.
That how opinion and imagination do not mingle
is
our soul,” and each remains what was, without

in
it
leaving anything, because no mingling can

or
entailing
These powers are foreign each other, not
to
occur.
in
that there mere juxtaposition, but because between

is
a
them obtains difference that grasped by reason,

is
a
being seen by sight. Here imagination

of
instead
is
a
no phan
be
phantom, though the soul herself

of
kind
tom, and though she seem accomplish, and though
to
she really accomplish many deeds

to
as
she desires
accomplish them.
Thus imagination stands
to
the soul about the same

in
Nevertheless (imagin
as
lation (form) with matter.

ation) does not hide the soul, whose operations often
disarrange and disturb Never, could imagination
it.
hide the soul entirely, even imagination shoul pene

if
trate the soul entirely, and should seem to veil it com
pletely. Indeed, the soul contains operations and
reasons contrary (to imagination), by which she suc
ceeds in putting aside the phantoms that besiege her.”
But matter, being infinitely feebler than the soul, pos
sesses none of the beings, either of the true or false,
which characteristically belong to Matter has
it.
nothing that could show off, being absolutely denuded
it
all things. appear
of
of
no more than cause
It
is
a
ance for other things; could never say, am here,
“I
it
If,
there!” starting from other beings,” profound

or
reasoning should succeed discovering matter,
in
it
ultimately declares that matter something completely
is
abandoned by true beings; but the things that are
as
posterior true beings themselves seem exist,
to
to
be
be
so
matter might, speak,
in
to
to
said extended
all
these things, seeming both follow them, and not

to
to follow them.
THE MAGNITUDE OF MATTER IS REALLY DERIVED

FROM THE SEMINAL REASON.
16. The (“seminal) reason,” on approaching mat

ter, and giving desired, made
of
the extension
it
it
it
a
magnitude. The “reason” drew from itself the magni
it,
give the matter, which did not possess
to
to
tude
it
and which did not, merely on that account, acquire

size; otherwise the magnitude occurring within would
it
be
magnitude itself. we remove form from matter,

If
the Substrate that then remains neither Seems nor

is is
large (since magnitude part form).

of
what
If
is
in
be
produced certain magnitude, for

as
matter
in
a
or
stance man horse, the magnitude characteristic

a
the horse disappears with the form

If of
of
the horse.**
be
we say that produced except

in
horse cannot
a
a
determined size, and that this magnitude re

of
mass
mained (when the form of the horse disappeared), we

woud answer that what would then remain would not
be the magnitude characteristic of the horse, but the
magnitude of mass. Besides, if this mass were fire
or earth, when the form of fire or that of earth disap
peared, the magnitude of the fire or of the earth would
simultaneously disappear. Matter therefore possesses
neither figure nor quantity; otherwise, it would not
have ceased being fire to become something else, but,
remaining fire, would never “become” fire.85 Now
that it seems to have become as great as this universe,
if the heavens, with all they contain were annihilated,
quantity would simultaneously
all
disappear out
of
matter, and with quantity also the other insepar
able qualities will disappear. Matter would then re
main what originally was by itself; would keep
it
it
the things that exist within Indeed, the
of
it.
none
objects that can be affected by the presence con
trary objects can, when the latter withdraw,
of
keep
them; but that which impassible
of
some trace
is
retains nothing; for instance, the air, when pene

trated by the light, retains none dis
of
when
it
it
magnitude can be
no
appears. That that which has

come great not any more surprising than that which
is
has no heat can become hot. Indeed, for matter

to
be
its
matter something entirely different from being

is
Of
as
magnitude; magnitude figure.

as
immaterial
is
really
as
matter such we should say that all

is
is
it
it
things by participation. Now magnitude forms part

of
what we call all things. As the bodies are composite,

magnitude there among the other qualities, without
is
however being determinate therein. Indeed, the

the body also contains magnitude.”
of
“reason” On
the contrary, matter does not even contain indetermin
ate magnitude, because not body.
is
it
a
MAGNITUDE IS AN IMAGE FORMED BY THE UNI

VERSAL REFLECTION OF UNIVERSAL BEINGS.
17. Neither is matter magnitude itself; for magni
tude is a form, and not a residence; it exists by itself”
(for matter cannot even appropriate the images of
beings). Not even in this respect, therefore, is matter
magnitude. But as that which exists in intelligence or
in the soul desired to acquire magnitude, it imparted to
the things that desired to imitate magnitude by their
aspiration or movement, the power to impress on Some
other object a modification analogous to their own.
Thus magnitude, by developing in the procession of
imagination, dragged along with itself the smallness of
matter, made it seem large by extending it along with
itself, without becoming filled by that extension. The
magnitude of matter is a false magnitude, since matter
does not by itself possess magnitude, and by extending
itself along with magnitude, has shared the extension
of the latter. Indeed as all intelligible beings are re
flected, either in other things in general, or in one of
them in particular, as each of them was large, the
totality also this manner, great (?).
is,
Thus the
in
magnitude particular mag

of
each reason constituted

a
nitude, as, for instance, horse, some other being.”

or
a
The image formed by the universal reflection in

it it of
telligible beings became magnitude, because was

a
by
magnitude itself. Every part be

of
illuminated
all
came special magnitude; and things together

a
seemed great by virtue

of
the universal form which

to
of
magnitude belongs. Thus occurred the extension

each thing towards each the others, and towards
of
their totality.
of
The amount form

in
this extension
and mass necessarily depended on the power, that
in
appear
an
reality was nothing

to
transformed what
in
being all things. the same manner color,

of
In
ance
not color, and quality, that
of
that arose out what

is
arose out of what is not quality, here below were re

ferred to by the same name as the intelligible entities
(of which they are the images). The case is similar
for magnitude, which arose out of that which has none,
or at least out of that magnitude that bears the same
name (as intelligible magnitude).
SENSE-OBJECTS APPEAR, AND ARE INTERMEDIARY

BETWEEN FORM AND MATTER.
Sense-objects, therefore, occupy a rank intermediary
between matter and form itself.” They no doubt ap
pear, because they are derived from intelligible entities;
but they are deceptive, because the matter in which
they apear does not really exist.” Each of them be
comes a magnitude, because it is extended through the
power of the entities that appear here below, and which
locate themselves here. Thus we have, in every direc
tion, the production of an extension; and that without
matter undergoing any violence, because (potentially)
all
Everything produces
its
it is things. own extension

by the power derives from the intelligible entities.
it
What imparts magnitude the appearance

to
matter
is
of
magnitude, and this appearance that forms our

is
it
earthly magnitude. Matter yields itself everywhere

entirely thus, by the universal ap
to
the extension
it
pearance magnitude, Indeed,

of
to
forced take on.

is
by
its
nature, matter everything, and

of
the matter
is
consequently nothing determinate. Now that which

is
nothing determinate by itself could become op

its
is
posite (df what is), and even after thus having be

it
not yet really this opposite;

its
come own opposite,

is
it
be
its
otherwise this opposite would nature.”

IS
MAGNITUDE ONLY APPEARANCE.

mag
us
now suppose that conception

of
18. Let
a
nitude were possessed by some being which would have

the power not only
be
itself, but also produce

to
to
in
itself externally; and that it should meet a nature (such

as matter) that was incapable of existing within in
telligence, of having a form, of revealing any trace of
real magnitude, or any quality. What would such a
being do with such a power? It would create neither
a horse nor an ox; for other causes (the “seminal)
reasons” would produce them.” Indeed, that which
proceeds from magnitude itself cannot be real magni
tude; it must therefore be apparent magnitude.” Thus,
since matter has not received real magnitude, all it can
nature will permit; that
its
is,
do is to be as great as
to
seem great. To accomplish that, must not fail any
it
where; and, be extended, cannot be discrete
it
if
it
a
its
quantity, but all parts must be united, and absent

no place. Indeed, was impossible for small
in
it
a
contain an image magnitude that would
of
to
mass
only
an
equal the real magnitude, since image
of of
is
it
magnitude; but, carried away with the hope

achieving the magnitude which aspired, this image
to
it
limit, along with matter, which shared

its
to
extended
its extension because matter could not follow That
it.
how this image magnitude magnified what was
of
is
not great, without however making seem really

it
its
great, and produced the magnitude that appears
in
mass. None the less does matter preserve its nature,

veiled by this apparent magnitude,
be
though
as
if
it
by garment with which covered itself when fol

it
it
a
its
lowed the magnitude that involved extension.

of in
it
this garment,
be
matter ever happened stripped

to
If
would nevertheless remain what itself was before;

it
possesses magnitude only form by

so
for far
as
in
it
its
presence makes great.**

A it
IF MATTER WERE PRIMARY PRINCIPLE, IT WOULD

BE THE FORM OF THE UNIVERSE, SUCH AS
SOUL IS.
as
possesses beings, and

of
As the soul the forms

she herself form, she possesses all things simul
is
a
taneously.” Containing all the forms, and besides

seeing the forms of sense-objects turning towards her,
and approaching her, she is not willing to accept them,
along with their manifoldness. She considers them
only after making abstractions of their mass; for the
soul could not become other than she is.” But as
matter does not have the strength to resist, possessing
as it does no special characteristic activity, and being
no more than an adumbration, matter yields to every
thing that active power proposes to inflict on
sides, that which proceeds from intelligible (nature)
Be it.
possesses already a trace of what is to be produced in
matter. That is how discursive reason which moves
within the sphere of representative imagination, or the
movement produced by reason, implies division; for
if reason remained within unity and identity, it would
not move, but remain at rest. Besides, not as the
all
soul does, can matter receive forms simultaneously;

otherwise would be form. As must contain all
it
it
a
in
an
things, without however containing them
as in
divisible manner, necessary that, serving does

is
it
it
location for all things, should extend towards all

of as
it
them, everywhere offering itself them,

of
all
is to
avoiding no part space, because

of
not restricted
it
within any boundary space, and because always

of
is
it
ready
to
receive what How then does

to
be.
is
it
happen that one thing, on entering into matter, does

other things, which, how
of
not hinder the entrance

ever, cannot co-exist with the former thing? The
reason that matter not first principle. Other
is
is
a
be
wise, the very form

of
would the universe. Such

it
all
form, indeed, would

be
both things simultane

a
ously, and each thing particular. Indeed the matter

in
the living being are the very parts

of
of
as
divided
is
the living being; otherwise nothing but reason" would

exist.
MATTER AS MOTHER, NURSE, RESIDENCE, AND

“OTHER” NATURE.
19. When things enter into the matter that plays
it,
the part of mother to them, they neither hurt nor
give pleasure. Their blows are not felt by matter;
it
they direct their blows only against each other, because

the powers act upon their opposites, and not on their
as
substrates, unless indeed we consider the substrates
the things they contain. Heat makes cold
to
united
disappear,98 whiteness affects blackness; or, they
as
if
mingle, they produce new quality by their mixture.”
a
What affected the things that mingle, and their

is
is
be
being affected consists ceasing what they were.
to
in
Among animate beings, the body that affected

is
is
it
by the alteration the qualities, and

of
of
the forces
possesed. When the qualities constitutive
or of
these
beings are destroyed, when they combine, when
or
they undergo some change contrary their nature,

to
the body, the perceptions do

to
as
the affections relate

to the soul. The latter indeed knows all the affections
that produce lively impression. Matter, however, re
a
mains what is; could not be affected when

it
it
it
cold, since neither

of
or
to
ceases contain heat these

or
qualities either characteristic foreign. The name

is
that best characterizes matter, therefore, nurse or

is
residence.79 But what sense could matter, that

in
be
begets nothing, called “mother”? Those who call

as
playing the part

of
such consider mother mere

it
matter, towards her child, merely receiving the germ,

without contributing anything itself, because the
of
body
its
growth
of
the child owes

to
nourishment.
If
however the mother does contribute anything (to the

the child) she then plays the part form,
of
of
formation
the part
of
to
and does not restrict herself matter.

Indeed, the form alone fruitful, while the “other
is
matter),
is,
nature” (that unfruitful.

is
THE MYTH OF THE ITHYPHALLIC HERMES.

That no doubt was the meaning of those ancient
sages who in mysteries and initiations symbolically
º
represented the “ancient Hermes”71 with the gener
ative organ in erection, to teach that it is intelligible
reason that begets sense-objects. On the other hand,
these same sages the sterility of matter, con
demned to perpetual self-identity, by the eunuchs who
surround Rhea,” making of it the mother of all things,
to use the expression they employ in designating the
principle that plays the part of substrate.
THE STERILITY OF NATURE INDICATED BY

CASTRATION.
That name indicates the difference between matter
and a mother. To those who, refusing to be satisfied
with superficialities, insist on thoroughness, they thus
signified in as precise a manner as possible (without
lifting the yeil of) obscurity, that matter was sterile,
although feminine also to extent at least that matter
receives, without contributing to, the act of generation.
They indicated it by this, that the (Galli) who sur
round Cybele are not women, but neither are they men,
possessing no power of generation; for by castration
they have lost a faculty that is characteristic only of a
man whose virility is intact,
iv.
1 See polemic 2.1, the Socratic definition.

de A
6.
9 i.
against Aristotle,
12 10
Anima See See

ii.
ii.
1.2.4. 5.2.
i.
5,
and the Stoics, Cleanthes,

of
11
See 24. term

A
i.
Sextus Empiricus, adv. Math. Stoic psychology. See,

18
i.
vii. 288, and Chrysippus, Diog. 2.4. 14. These are the so-called
As thought “passions” the Stoic Chry
of
Laert. vii. 50.

2
Chrysippus, Diog. Laert. vii. sippus, Diog. Laert. vii. 111.

15 Of the contention,
6,
111. See iv. See vi. 6.16. Stoic

8
Plato, Tert. de Anima,

16
See his See

8 in
ii.
5.
6.2.
i.
5
17.
Phaedo 127. See 2.1. See 1.13. As was taught by

7
i.
386 WORKS OF PLOTINOS ..[26
Cleanthes, Sext. Empir. adv. Timaeus 52. 48 See
ii.
8.14.
Math. vii. 288. 18 See iii. 6.3. The myth
49
50
See iii. 5.9.
,
19 Or, “affections,” of Pandora, see iv. 3.14.
51
as we See
52
shall in the future call them, iii. 6.4. See iii. 6.5,
6.
in English. By “bastard” reasoning,”
58
20 See i. 8.15.
a
21 Or, blindly, see iii. 8.1-3;
ii.
ii.
see 4.10. 54 See 4.9-12.
b5 See iii. 6.12.
it. ii. ii.

iv. 4.13, 14. 22 See iii. 6.3, and 56 See 7.2.
i. 1.13. 28 See iii. 6.6. 24 See 57 See 6.13. ii. 5.8 See 4.8.
i. 4.8. 25 Notice this Numen 59 See 60 See
it.
6.3. 4.5.
ian name for the divinity used 61 See ili. 4.6. would
It
62
at the beginning of the Es create the magnitude that ex
is,
coreal Numenius fragment. ists matter; that apparent
in
26 See iii. 8.9. 27 As Plato magnitude. 4.11; against
68
ii.
asked in his Sophist 246; Cxi. Moderatus of Gades. 64 See
28 As thought Philo in 65 See iv. 6.3. 66 See
ii. ii.
252. 4.11.
is,
Leg. Alleg. i. 29 See intelli
67
That
ii.
4.15. 4.12.
81 See vi.
ii. in ii. ii.
gible “being.”
2.
68
80 See 5.3–5. See iii. 6.8.
As thought T0 As was sug
32
88
ii.
See 4.11. 69 See 7.1.
the Tim
by by
Plato the Timaeus 49-52.
in
gested Plato
As was sug
86 85
71
et
84 See 5.5. de Gen. aeus 49-52.

Corr. As objected Herodotus,
2,
ii.
gested 51,
3.
ii.
Aristotle,
ii. de
Corr. and Cicero,

de
Nat. Deor. iii.
in
et
Gen.
88 iii. 6.2. That is, Cybele, see
7.
87 See 7.1.
v.
22.
i.
2
T
As asked Aristotle, 73 The Stoics. 74 We

89
de
Gen. 1.7.
40 In his Timaeus have here another internal
7.
50.
i.
In
proof the rightness

of
of
6.12, 13. our
iii
41 See 42 his
Timaeus 51. 48 See present chronological order of
il.
4.11.
44. In his Timaeus 51. 45 In Plotinos's Enneads. The myth
his Timaeus 49. 46 See iii. of Pandora occurs iv. 3.14,
in
As said Plato, which follows this book.

47
his
in
6.11.
iv.3] PSYCHOLOGICAL QUESTIONS 387
FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK THREE.

Psychological Questions.
A. ARE NOT ALL SOULS PARTS OR EMANA

TIONS OF A SINGLE SOULP 1
PSYCHOLOGY OBEYS THE PRECEPT “KNOW THY
SELF,” AND SHOWS HOW WE ARE TEMPLES OF
THE DIVINITY.
1. Among the questions raised about the soul, we
purpose to solve here not only such as may be solved
with some degree of assurance, but also such as may
be considered matters of doubt, considering our re
searches rewarded by even only a definition of this
doubt. This should prove an interesting study. What
indeed better deserves careful examination and close
scrutiny than what refers to the soul? Among other
advantages, the study of the soul has that of making
known to us two order of things, those of which she is
the principle, and those from which she herself pro
ceeds. This examination will be in line with the divine
precept to “know ourselves.” Before seeking to dis
cover and understand the remainder, it is no more than
right first to apply ourselves to finding out the nature
of the principle that embarks in these researches"; and
as we are seeking what is lovable, we will do well to
contemplate the most beautiful of spectacles (that of
our own intellectual nature); for if there be a duality,
in the universal (Soul), so much more likely will there
|
be a duality in individual intelligences. We should

also examine the sense in which it may be said that
souls are sanctuaries of the divinity; but this question
will not admit of Solution till after we have determined
how the soul descends into the body.
ARE INDIVIDUAL SOULS EMANATIONS OF THE

UNIVERSAL SOULP
Now we must consider whether our souls themselves

are (emanations) from the universal Soul. It may be
insisted that, to demonstrate that our souls are not
particles of the universal Soul, it does not suffice to
show that our souls go as far (in their procession) as
the universal Soul, nor that they resemble (the uni
in
versal Soul) in their intellectual faculties, granting
deed that such a resemblance be admitted; for we
might say that parts conform to the whole they com
pose. We might invoke Plato's authority, and insist
that he teaches this opinion in that (part of the Phile
bus") where he affirms that the universe is animate:
“As our body is a part of the universe, our soul is a
part of the Soul of the universe.” We might add that
(Plato) states and clearly demonstrates that we fol
low the circular movement of heaven, that from it we
receive our moral habits and condition; that as we
were begotten in the universe, our soul must be derived
from the surrounding universe"; and as each part of
us participates in our soul, we ourselves should par
ticipate in the Soul of the universe, of which we are
parts in the same way as our members are parts of
ourselves. Last, we might quote the following words:
“The universal Soul takes care of all that is inani
mate.” This sentence seems to mean that there is no
soul outside of the universal Soul; for it is the latter
that cares for all that is inanimate.
CONFORMITY TO THE UNIVERSAL SOUL IMPLIES

THAT THEY ARE NOT PARTS OF HER.
2. Consider the following answers. To begin with,
the assertion that souls conform (to each other), be
cause they attain the same objects, and the reduction
of them to a single kind, implicitly denies that they
are parts (of the universal Soul). We might better
say that the universal Soul is one and identical, and
is,
that each soul is universal (that that she conforms
the universal Soul, because she possesses all the
to
latter’s powers). Now, assertion the unity
of
of
the
as
universal Soul defines her being something different

(from individual souls); namely, principle which, a
specially belonging neither one nor the other, neither
to
an individual, nor world, nor

to
anything else,
to
to
is is a
itself carries out what carried out by the world and

every living being. right enough
to
say that the

It
universal Soul does not belong any individual being,

to
(pure) being; right enough that

as
inasmuch she
is
is
it
there should be Soul which not owned by any being,

is
a
and that only individual souls should belong indi

to
vidual beings.
LIMITATIONS TO THE USE OF THE TERM “PARTS,”

IN PHYSICAL THINGS.
But we shall have explain more clearly the sense
to
which the word “parts” must here

be
taken. To
in
or no
begin with, there question parts body,

of
of
here
is
whether homogeneous heterogeneous. We shall

make but single observation, namely, that when
a
treating homogeneous bodies, parts refer

to
mass,
to of
and not form. For instance, take whiteness. The

one part the milk, part
of of
of
of
whiteness not the

is
is a
whiteness all the milk existence; the white

in
it
part, and not the part whiteness; for, taken

of
of
ness
a
in general, whiteness has neither size nor quantity.
Only with these restrictions can we say that there are
parts in the forms suitable to corporeal things.
WHEN APPLIED TO INCORPOREAL THINGS, “PARTS”

HAVE DIFFERENT SENSES.
Further, treating of incorporeal things, “parts” is
taken in several senses. Speaking of numbers, we may
say that two is a part of ten (referring exclusively to
abstract numbers). We may also say that a certain
extension is a part of a circle or line. Further, a
notion is said to be a part of Science.
SUCH MATHEMATICAL SENSES CANNOT BE

APPLIED TO THE SOUL.
When dealing with numbers and geometrical figures,
as well as with bodies, it is evident that the whole is
its
necessarily diminished by division into parts, and

that each part smaller than the whole. Rightly,
is
be
diminu
or
these things should susceptible
to
increase
as
tion, definite quantities, not

of
their nature that

is
quantity surely not this sense that,

in
itself.
in
It
is
when referring the soul, we speak quantities.

of
a to
quantity such “dozen,” which

as
The soul not

is
forms whole divisible into unities; otherwise, we

a
of
absurdities, since group

of
would end host

in
a
genuine unity.
of
ten not Either each one the

is
unities would have be soul, the Soul herself result

or
to
from sum of inanimate unities.

a
ACTUAL DIVISION INTO PARTS WOULD BE TANTA

MOUNT TO DENIAL OF THE WHOLE.
A
Besides, our opponents have granted that every part

Now,
to
of
the universal Soul conforms the whole.

in
continuous quantities, it is by no means necessary that

the part should resemble the whole. Thus, in the
circle and the quadrilateral (the parts are not circles
or quadrilaterals). All the parts of the divided object
(from which a part is taken) are not even similar to
each other, but vary in manifold ways, such as the dif
ferent triangles of which a single triangle might be
composed. Our opponents also acknowledge that the
universal Soul is composed of parts that conform to
the whole. Now, in a line, one part might also be a
line, while differing from the whole in magnitude.
But when we speak of the soul, if the difference of
the part from the whole consisted in a difference of
size, the Soul would be a magnitude and a body; for
then she would differentiate in quantity by psychic
characteristics. But this would be impossible if all
souls be considered similar and universal. It is evi
dent that the soul cannot, like magnitudes, be further
divided; and even our opponents would not claim that
the universal Soul is thus divided into parts. This
would amount to destroying the universal Soul, and
reducing her to a mere name, if indeed in this system
a prior universal (Soul) can at all be said to exist.
This would place her in the position of wine, which
might be distributed in several jars, saying that the part
of the wine contained in each of them is a portion of
the whole."
NOR IS THE SOUL. A PART IN THE SENSE THAT ONE

PROPOSITION IS A PART OF A SCIENCE.
Nor should we (apply to the soul), the word “part”

in the sense that some single proposition is a part of
the total Science. In this case the total Science does
not remain any less the same (when it is divided), and
its division is only as it were the production and actual
its
ization of each of component parts. Here each
proposition potentially contains the total science, and
division), the total science remains
its
(in spite
of
whole.
THE DIFFERENCE OF FUNCTIONS OF THE WORLD

SOUL AND INDIVIDUAL SOULS MAKES ENTIRE
DIVISION BETWEEN THEM IMPOSSIBLE,
Such be the relation of the universal Soul to the

lf
other souls, the universal Soul, whose parts are such,

will not belong any particular being, but will subsist
to
No longer will she

be
of
herself. the soul the world.
in
She will even rank with the number of Souls con

sidered parts. As all souls would conform
to
each
other, they would, on the same grounds,
be
of
parts
the Soul that single and identical. Then would
is
it
be
be
of
inexplicable that some one soul should Soul
the world, while some other soul should be one
of
the
parts
of
the world.
ARE INDIVIDUAL SOULS PART OF THE WORLD-SOUL

AS IS THE LOCAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF SOME
PART OF THE BODY TO THE WHOLE
CONSCIOUSNESSP
Are individual souls parts

of
the universal Soul

3.
any living organism, the Soul that animates (or

in
as,
vivifies) the finger part
of
the entire soul back

is
a
us
This hypothesis would force

of to of
the whole animal?

the conclusion either that there no Soul outside
is
a or
the body, that the whole universal Soul exists

entire, not body, but outside the body
of
of
the
in
us
world. This question deserves consideration. Let

so
do by an illustration.
STUDY OF THE QUESTION BY OBSERVATION OF

THE HUMAN ORGANISM.
If the universal Soul communicate herself to all
individual animals, and if it be in this sense that each
Soul is a part of the universal Soul—for as soon as she
would be divided, the universal Soul could not commu
nicate herself to every part—the universal must be en
tire everywhere, and she must simultaneously be one
and the same in different beings. Now this hypothesis
no longer permits us to distinguish on one hand the uni
versal Soul, and on the other the parts of this soul, so
much the more as these parts have the same power
(as the universal Soul); for even for organs whose
functions are different, as the eyes and ears, it will not
be claimed that there is one part of the soul in the
eyes, and another in the ears—such a division would
suit only things that have no relation with the soul.
We should insist that it is the same part of the soul
which animates these two different organs, exercising
in each of them a different faculty. Indeed, all the
powers of the soul are present in these two senses (of
sight and hearing), and the only cause of the difference
of their perceptions is the differences of the organs. .
is,
Nevertheless all perceptions belong to forms (that

the soul), and reduce
to
of
form (the
to
faculties
a
soul) which can become all things(?)." This further

is
proved by the fact that the impressions are forced

to
only centre.
an
come and centre

of in
Doubtless the
organs by means which we perceive cannot make
us
perceive all things, and consequently the impressions

differ with the organs. Nevertheless the judgment
of
these impressions belongs one and the same prin

to
ciple, which resembles judge attentive

to
the words
a
We have,
to
and acts submitted his consideration.”

however, said above that one and the same prin
is
it
ciple which produces acts belonging different func

to
tions (as are sight and hearing). If these functions be
like the Senses, it is not possible that each of them
should think; for the universal alone would be capable
of this. If thought be a special independent function,
every intelligence subsists by itself. Further, when the
Soul is reasonable, and when she is so in a way such as
to be called reasonable in her entirety, that which is
called a part conforms to the whole, and consequently
is not a part of the whole.
INTELLECTUAL DIFFICULTY OF THE SOUL BEING

ONE AND YET IN ALL BEINGS.
4. If the universal Soul be one in this manner, what
about consequences of this (conception) Might we
not well doubt the possibility of the universal Soul's
simultaneously being one, yet present in all beings?
How does it happen that some souls are in a body,
while others are discarnate 2 It would seem more
logical to admit that every soul is always in some body,
especially the universal Soul. For it is not claimed,
for the universal Soul, as it is for ours, that she ever
abandons her body, and though it be by some asserted
that the universal Soul may one day leave her body, it
is never claimed that she would ever be outside of any
body. Even admitting that some day she should be
divided from all body, how does it happen that a Soul
could thus separate, while some other could not, if at
bottom both are of the same nature? As to Intelli
gence, such a question would be impossible; the parts
into which it is divided are not distinguished from each
other by their individual difference, and they all exist
together eternally, for Intelligence is not divisible. On
the contrary, as the universal Soul is divisible within
the bodies, as has been said, it is difficult to under
stand how all the souls proceed from the unitary
(pure) Being.
THE HEALTHY SOUL CAN WORK, THE SICK SOUL IS

DEVOTED TO HER BODY.
This question may be answered as follows. The

unitary Being (that is Intelligence), subsists in itself
without descending into the bodies. From unitary
Being proceed the universal Soul and the other souls,
which, up to a certain point, exist all together, and
form but a single soul so far as they do not belong to
any particular individual (contained in the sense
If,
world). however, by their superior extremities

they attach themselves Unity, within they
to
if
it
coincide, they later diverge (by their actualization),
on the earth light
as
just divided between the various

is
dwellings men, nevertheless remaining one and in

of
In
divisible. this case, the universal Soul ever
is
elevated above the others because she not capable
is
descending, falling, inclining towards the

of
of
of
sense-world. Our souls, on the contrary, descend here

below, because special place assigned
to
them this
in
to is
world, and they are obliged occupy themselves with

body which demands sustained attention. By her
a
lower part, the universal Soul resembles the vital prin

ciple which animates great plant, and which there
a
manages everything peaceably and noiselessly. By

their lower part our souls are similar those animal
to
the decaying parts plants.

of
of
culae born That the

is
image the living body The higher

of
of
the universe.
of
part our soul, which the higher part

of
to
similar
is
universal Soul, might

be
compared farmer
to
the
a
who, having noticed the worms by which the plant

is
being devoured, should apply himself destroying

to
them, and should solicitously care for the plant. So

we might say that the man good health, and sur
is in
rounded by healthy people, entirely devoted

is to
his
en
or
duties studies; the sick man, on the contrary,

tirely devoted to his body, and becomes dependent
thereon.
SOULS RETAIN BOTH THEIR UNITY AND DIFFER

ENCES ON DIFFERENT LEVELS.
5. How could the universal Soul simultaneously
be the soul of yourself and of other persons? Might
she be the soul of one person by her lower strata, and
that of somebody else by her higher strata ? To teach
such a doctrine would be equivalent to asserting that
the soul of Socrates would be alive while being in a
certain body, while she would be annihilated (by
losing herself within the universal Soul) at the very
moment when (as a result of separation of the
body) she had come into what was best (in the in
telligible world). No, none of the true beings perishes.
Not even the intelligences lose themselves up there
(in the divine Intellignce), because they are not
divided as are bodies, and each subsists in her own
characteristics, to their differences joining that identity
which constitutes “being.” Being located below the
individual intelligences to which they are attached,
individual souls are the “reasons” (born) of the in
telligences, or more developed intelligences; from
being but slightly manifold, they become very much
so, while remaining in communion with the slightly
manifold beings. As however they tend to introduce
in
is,
separation in these less divisible beings (that

telligences), and
as
nevertheless they cannot attain

division, they simultaneously preserve
of
the last limits

both their identity and difference. Each one remains
single, and all together form unity.
a
SOULS DEVELOP MANIFOLDNESS JUST AS INTELLI

GENCE DOES.
We have thus succeeded establishing the most
in
important point the discussion, namely, that all

of
souls proceed from a single Soul, that from being one

they become manifold, as is the case with the intelli
gences, divided in the same way, and similarly un
divided. The Soul that dwells in the intelligible world
is the one and indivisible reason (born) of intelligence,
and from this Soul proceed the particular immaterial
“reasons,” in the same manner as on high (the in
dividual intelligences proceed from the one and ab
solute Intelligence).
WHY SHOULD CREATION BE PREDICATED OF THE

UNIVERSAL SOUL AND NOT OF THE HUMAN ?
6. If there be similarity between the universal
Soul and the individual souls, how does it happen that
the former created the world, while the others did
all
not do so, though each of them also contain things
within herself, and since we have already shown that
the productive power can exist simultaneously
in
By explaining
its
several beings? “reason” we can

thus examine and discover how the Same nature
(“being”) can act act and experi
or
or
experience,
ence, different manner different beings.
in
in
a
THE WORLD-SOUL. ALONE CREATES BECAUSE SHE

REMAINS NEAREST THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.
How and why did the universal Soul make the uni
verse, while the individual souls only manage part
to a
thereof That not more surprising than See,

is
*
among men who possess the same knowledge, some

command greater number, and others lesser. This
a
the case because there great difference between

is
is
a
Some, instead separating from the universal

of
souls.
Soul, have remained the intelligible world, and still
in
contain the body (of the universal), while others,

when the body (of the universe) already existed, and
Soul, their sister, governed ac
it,
while the universal
cepted destinies assigned them by fate, (the uni
as
if
versal Soul) had prepared for them dwellings re
to
ceive them.* Besides, the universal Soul contemplates
universal Intelligence, and the individual souls rather
contemplate individual intelligences. These souls
might indeed possibly have also been capable
it, to of
making the universe; but that no longer possible
is
them now that the universal Soul has already done
and has preceeded them. Besides, the very same
entirely different
an
question would have arisen even
if
soul had first made the universe. Perhaps better
is
it
to state that the universal Soul has created the uni
if
verse, chiefly because she more closely related

is
is
it
intelligible entities, for the souls that are nearest

to
thereto are the most powerful. Maintaining them

this quiet region, they act with greater
in
selves
facility; for act without suffering the sign
of
to
is
a
greater power. Thus the power depending on the
by
intelligible world abides within itself, and abiding
within itself, produces. The other souls, descending
towards the body, withdraw from the intelligible world,
and fall into the abyss (of matter). Perhaps also the
within them, finding itself
of
element manifoldness
drawn towards the lower regions, along with dragged
it
the conceptions those souls, and made them descend

of
hither. Indeed the distinction of the second or third

rank for Souls must be understood this Sense that
in
some are nearer, and some further from the intelligible

world. Likewise, among us, all souls are not equally
disposed regard this world.
to
Some succeed
in
in
by their aspirations;
it,
uniting with others approach

it
do
do
others not quite succeed, because they not all

use the same faculties, and some use the first, others
the second, and some the third,- though they all equally
possess all faculties.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND UNI

VERSAL SOULS.
7. That is what seems true to us. As to the
Philebus passage (quoted in the first section), it might
mean that all souls were parts of the universal Soul.
That, however, is not held by
its
to as
true meaning,
only means what Plato desired
in
some. assert
It
this place, namely, that heaven animate. Plato
is
proves this by saying that
be
would
is to
absurd insist
it only
that heaven has no soul, when our body, which
part the body the universe, nevertheless has
of
of
a
a
soul; but how could

be
part animate, unless the whole

is a
so
especially
in
was also? the Timaeus” that
It
Plato clearly expresses his thought. After having de

the universal Soul, he shows the
of
scribed the birth

other souls born later from the mixture made the
in
Same vase from which the universal Soul was drawn.
He asserts that they are similar the universal Soul,
is in to
and that their difference consists that they occupy

the second or third rank. That further confirmed
by
this passage
of
the Phaedrus+9: “The universal Soul

cares for what the Soul,
of
inanimate.” Outside
is
indeed, what power would manage, fashion, ordain

at
be
and produce the body?

to
would nonsense
It
tribute this power one soul, and not

to
to
another.
(Plato) adds (in substance): “The Perfect Soul, the
the universe, hovering the ethereal region,
of
Soul
in
it,
acts on the earth without entering into being borne

above him as chariot. The other Souls that are
in
a
perfect share with

of
the administration the world.”

it
When Plato speaks having lost her

of
as
the soul
he
wings, evidently distinguishing individual souls

is
from the universal Soul. One might also conclude

that our souls are part
of
the universal Soul from his

statement that the souls follow the circular movement
the universe, that from they derive their char
of
it
4OO WORKS OF PLOTINOS [27
In
its
acteristics, and that they undergo influence.
deed, they might very easily undergo the influence
exercised by the nature the special localities,
of
of
the
the towns they inhabit, and the
of
waters and the air
temperament which they are joined.
of
to
the bodies
We have indeed acknowledged that, being contained
the universe, we possess something the life
of
in
characteristic of the universal Soul, and that we

undergo the influence
of
of
the circular movement the
heavens. But we have also shown that there within
of is
us
another (rational) soul, which capable resist
is
these influences, and which manifests its dif
to
ance
ferent character precisely by the resistance she offers
them. The objection that we are begotten within the
be
universe may answered by the fact that the child

its
likewise begotten within mother's womb, and that

is
nevertheless the soul that enters into its body distinct
is
from that of its mother. Such our Solution of the
is
problem.
SYMPATHY BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND UNIVERSAL

SOUL COMES FROM COMMON SOURCE.
The sympathy existing between souls forms no
8.
objection. For this sympathy might be explained by

the fact that all souls are derived from the same prin
ciple from which the universal Soul also derived.
is
We have already shown that there one Soul (the

is
universal) and several Souls (human souls); and we

have also defined the difference between the parts and
Last, we have also spoken the differ
of
the whole.
us
ence existing between Souls. Let the

to
now return
latter point.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SOULS.

This difference between souls caused principally
is
by
the bodies they animate; also by

of
the constitution
the moral habits, the activities, the thoughts and be

havior of these souls in earlier existence. According
to Plato” the choice of the souls’ condition depends
on their anterior existence. On observing the nature
of souls in general, we find that Plato recognizes dif
ferences between them by saying that some souls oc
cupy the second or third ranks.” Now we have said
that all souls are (potentially) all things,” that each
is characterized by the faculty principally exercised
that some souls unite with the intel
is,
thereby, that
ligible world by actualization, while others
do
so
in
thought
or
desire.” Souls, thus contemplating different

all
objects, are and become that they contemplate.

Fulness and perfection also belong soul, but
to this
in
respect they are not all identical, because variety
is
the law that directs their co-ordination. Indeed, the
universal" reason on the one hand manifold, and on
is
the other varied, like being that animate, and

is
a
which possesses manifold forms.”

In
this case, there

co-ordination; beings are not entirely separated from
is
each other, and there no place for chance either

in
is
real beings, nor bodies; consequently the number

in
be
of
beings definite. To individual, beings must

is
first be stable, then they must remain identical, and

last, they must numerically be one
to
order achieve
in
individuality. Bodies which by nature perpetually

ooze away, because for them form something in
is
cidental, never possess formal existence but by their

participation (and imitation of), genuine “Beings.”
in
On the contrary, for the latter, that are not composite,

them being numerically
of
existence consists each

in
single, possessing this unity which dates from the

in
beginning, which does not become what was not, and

it
which will never cease being what indeed they

is.
If
it
cannot exist without some producing principle, that

principle will not derive them from matter. will
It
its
them something from own being.

to
to
have add
.
But if intelligible entities thus have at times more, and

at times less, perfection, they will change; which would
contradict their (nature, or) “being,” which is to re
main identical. Why indeed should they become such as
they are now, and why should they not always have
been such as they now are 2 . Further, if they be at
times more or less perfect, if they “become,” they are
not eternal. But it is granted that the Soul (as an
intelligible being) is eternal.
LIKE THE DIVINITY, THE SOUL IS ALWAYS ONE.

(It might still be asked) whether what is stable can
be called infinite? That which is stable is potentially
power infinite without being
its
infinite, because
is
also infinitely divided; for the divinity too in
is
finite.” Thus each soul what the divinity's nature
is
is,
or
without receiving from any other either limit
determinate quantity. The soul extends far as
as
she
go further, but every
to
wishes. She never forced

is
where she descends towards bodies and penetrates into

them, according Besides, she never
to
her nature.
separates from herself, though present finger
in
or
in
foot. Not otherwise with the universe: wherever

is
it
as
the Soul penetrates, she ever remains indivisible,
when she penetrates into the different parts plant.
of
a
Then, you cut certain part, the principle which

if
communicates life remains present both

to
the
in
it
plant and the part detached therefrom. The body

in
single, and the Soul everywhere

in of
the universe
is
is
her unity.
SOUL POWERS REMAIN THE SAME THROUGHOUT

ALL CHANGES OF BODY.
the putre
of
When numberless vermin arise out

do
body, they
of
faction not derive their life from

a
the soul of the entire animal; the latter has abandoned

the body of the animal, and, being dead, no longer
dwells in the body. But the matter derived from putre
faction, being well suited for the generation of vermin,
each receives a different soul, because the (universal)
Soul is not lacking anywhere. Nevertheless, as one
part of the body is capable of receiving her, while
another is not, the parts that thus become animated
do not increase the number of souls; for each of these
little beings depends, as far as she remains one, on the
is,
single Soul (that on the universal Soul). This

of
state affairs resembles that When some parts

in
us.
our bodies are cut off, and when others grow
in
of
their place, our soul abandons the former, and unites

so
as
with the latter, far she remains one. Now the

in
the universe ever remains one; and though

of
Soul
amidst things contained within this universe, some are
animate, while others are inanimate, the soul-powers
nevertheless remain the same.
WHY AND HOW DO SOULS DESCEND

B.
INTO BODIES
2
TWO KINDS OF TRANSMIGRATION.
happens that the

9.
Let
us
now examine how

in it
soul descends into the body, and what manner this

occurs; for sufficiently astonishing and remark
is
it
soul, there are two kinds

of
able. For entrance into

a
body. The first occurs when the soul, already dwell

a
is,
ing body, undergoes transmigration; that

in
a
igneous body into

is an
or
passes from aerial terrestrial

a
body. This not usually called transmigration, be

a
cause the condition from which the soul comes not

is
visible. The other kind occurs when the soul passes

an
incorporeal condition into any kind body,

of
from
a
and thus for the first time enters into relations with a
body.18
STUDY OF FIRST INCARNATION.
We must here examine what, in the latter case, is

experienced by the soul which, till then pure from all
dealings with the body, for the first time surrounds
herself with that kind of a substance. Besides, it is
not only just but even necessary for us to begin by
a consideration of (this event in) the universal Soul.
To say that the Soul enters the body of the universe
it,
and comes to animate no more than
is statement
a
clarify our thoughts; for the succession her
to
made
in
actions thus established purely verbal. There never
is
was moment when the universe was not animated,

a
body existed without the Soul,

its
or
when when
matter existed without form.” But these things can
as
as
be separated thought and speech, since Soon
in
an
object formed, always possible analyse to
it
is
it
is
by thought and speech. That the truth.

is
HOW THE UNIVERSE IS ANIMATED BY THE WORLD

SOUL.
there were no body, the soul could not have any

If
procession, since the body the natural locality

of
her
is
development. As the soul must extend, she will beget

receiving locality, and will, consequently, produce
a
the body. The soul’s rest based, and depends for

is
growth on (the intellectual category of) rest itself.

The soul thus resembles an immense light which
as
weakens becomes more distant from its Source, so

it
its
the extremity radiation,

of
has become
at
that
it
no more than an adumbration. However, the Soul

evidently gave form this adumbration from the
to
of a
by
no
very beginning things. was, indeed, means

It
suitable that what approached the soul should in no way

participate in reason”; consequently there came to be
an adumbration of reason in (matter), this adumbra
tion being the soul. The universe thus became a
beautiful and varied dwelling, which was not deprived
of the presence” of the universal Soul by her not
totally incorporating within She judged that the
of it.
whole universe was worthy her care, and she thus
much “being” and beauty
as
as
gave
to
was able
it
it, it
receive, without herself losing any
of
because she
manages the world while herself remaining above
in
it
the intelligible sphere. By
its it,
so
animating she thus
grants her presence, without becoming property;
it
it,
she dominates and possesses without being, it,

thereby, dominated possessed. The universe, in
or
deed, the containing Soul, and participates therein

in
is
entirely.
is)
as
(The universe the Soul net
in
in
is
a
sides penetrated and enveloped by life,
all
the sea, on
without ever being able appropriate So far
to
as
it.
of it
can, this net extends along with the sea, for none
By nature the
its
parts could
is.
is be
elsewhere than
it
universal Soul immense, because her magnitude is

not definite; that by one and the same power she
so
embraces the entire body the world, and present

of
is
throughout the whole extension.

it,
Without the
world-Soul would make no effort proceed into ex
to
tension, for by herself she all that her nature

is
is
it
to
The magnitude
of
be. the universe therefore

is
determined by that the Soul; and the

of
of
the location
its
the space within which

of
of
limits extent are those

animated by her. The extension
of
the adumbra
is
it
therefore determined by that

of
of
tion the Soul the

is
light; and
of
“reason” which radiates from this focus

on the other hand, this “reason” was produce such
to
produce.”
an
its
nature urged
to
as
extension
it
THE WORLD-SOUL PROGRESSIVELY INFORMS ALL

THINGS.
Now let us return to that which has always been

10.
what it Let us,
is. thought, embrace all beings: air,
in
light, Sun, and moon. Let then consider the Sun,
us
forth,
so
the light, and being all things, without ever
as
forgetting that there are things that occupy the first
or
rank, others the second, Let us, the
at
the third.
beings, conceive the uni
of
of
of
summit this series
then posit
us
as
versal Soul subsisting eternally. Let

that which holds the first rank after her, and thus con
tinue till we arrive the things that occupy the last
it at
rank, and which, were, are the last glimmerings

as
the light shed by the soul.
us
represent these
of
Let
extension first dark, and then later illu
an
as
things
minated by the form which comes impress itself onto
originally dark background.
an
This background
is
embellished by reason
of
the entire universal

in
virtue
Soul's independent power embellishing matter by
of
reasons, just the “seminal reasons” them

as
of
means
selves fashion and form animals as microcosms. Ac
every
its
cording
to
nature, the Soul gives

to
form
a
thing she touches. She produces without casual con

ception, without the delays deliberation,
of
of
those
or
voluntary determination. Otherwise, she would not

of
be acting according her nature, but according the

to
to
precepts Art, indeed, posterior

of
borrowed art.
is
a
Art imitates by producing obscure and

to
nature.
nature's works, toys without value
of
feeble imitations
merit; and besides, art makes use great battery
of or
of
a
apparatus produce these images. On the con

to
trary, the universal Soul, dominating bodies by virtue

her nature (“being”) makes them become and be
of
what she desires; for the things themselves that exist

since the beginning cannot raise resistance her will.
to
inferior things, mutual obstruction,

of
In
as
the result
matter does not receive the exact form that the

(“seminal), reason” contains in germ. But as the uni
vedsal Soul produces the universal form, and as all
things are therein co-ordinated, the work is beautiful
because it is realized without trouble or obstacle. In
the universe there are temples for the divinities, houses
for men, and other objects adapted to the needs of
other beings. What indeed could the Soul create if
not what she has the power to create? As fire warms,
as snow cools, the soul acts now within herself, and
then outside of herself, and on other objects. The
action which inanimate beings elicit from themselves
slumbers, as it were, within them; and that which they
exert on others consists in assimilating to themselves
that which is capable of an experience. To render the
rest similar to itself, is indeed the common character
istic of every being. The soul's power of acting on
herself and on others is a vigilant faculty. It com
municates life to beings who do not have it in them
selves, and the life communicated to them is similar
to the life of the Soul herself. Now as the Soul lives
in reason, she imparts a reason to the body, which
reason is an image of the one she herself possesses.
Indeed, what she communicates to the bodies is an
image of life. She also imparts to them the shapes
whose reasons she contains. Now as she possesses the
reasons of all things, even of the divinities, the world
contains all things.
THE UNIVERSAL SOUL AS MODEL OF REASON, AS

INTERMEDIARY AND INTERPRETER.
11. The ancient sages, who wished to materialize

the divinities by making statues of them, seem to me
to have well judged the nature of the universe. They
understood that the being of the universal Soul was
easy to attract anywhere, that her presence can easily
be summoned in everything suited to receive her

action, and thus to participate somewhat in her power.
Now anything is suited to undergo the action of the
Soul when it lends itself like a mirror to the reflection
of any kind of an image. In the universe nature most
artistically forms all beings in the image of the reasons
it contains. In each of (nature's) works the (“sem
inal) reason” that is united to matter, being the image
of the reason superior to the matter (of the idea),
reattaches itself to divinity (to Intelligence), accord
ing to which it was begotten, and which the universal
Soul contemplated while creating.” It was therefore
equally impossible that there should be here below
anything which did not participate in the divinity, and
which the latter brought down here below; for (the
divinity) is Intelligence, the sun that shines there on
high. Let us consider (the universal Soul), as the
model of reason. Below the Intelligence is the Soul,
which subsists by and with
it,
which depends on
it.
The Soul holds this sun (of Intelligence); the Soul
to
the intermediary by which the beings here below are

is
intelligible beings; she the interpreter

to
reattached
is
things which descend from the intelligible world into

of
the sense-world, and the things

of
of
the sense-world
which return into the intelligible world. Indeed, in
telligible things are not separated from each other;
they are distinguished only by their difference and
them remains within itself,
of
their constitution. Each

without any relation locality; they are simultaneously
to
united and separate. The beings that we call divinities

be
considered such because they never

to
deserve
Swerve from intelligible entities, because they depend on
the universal Soul considered her principle, the
at
in
very moment the Soul's issuing from Intelligence.

of
Thus these beings are divinities by virtue the very

of
principle which they owe their existence, and because

to
they devote themselves the contemplation Intel

of
to
ligence, from which the universal Soul herself does not
distract her gaze.
SOULS ARE NOT CUT OFF FROM INTELLIGENCE

DURING THEIR DESCENT AND ASCENT.
12. Human souls rush down here below because
they have gazed at their images (in matter) as in the
mirror of Bacchus. Nevertheless, they are not separ
ated from their principle, Intelligence. Their intel
ligence does not descend along with them, so that even
if by their feet they touch the earth, their head rises
above the sky.** They descend all the lower as the
body, over which their intermediary part is to watch,
has more need of care. But their father Jupiter, pity
ing their troubles, made their bonds mortal. At certain
intervals, he grants them rest, delivering them from
the body, so that they may return to inhabit the region
where the universal Soul ever dwells, without inclining
towards things here below.” Indeed what the universe
at present possesses suffices it both now and in the
future, since regulated by eternal and
its
duration
is
immutable reasons, and because, when one period

is
finished, again begins run through another where

to
it
all the lives are determined accordance with the

in
ideas.” that way all things here below are sub

In
all
jected intelligible things, and similarly sub

to
is
or
ordinated single reason, either

to
the descent
in
a
souls, general.
of
in
in
or
the ascension their activities

in
This proved by the agreement between the universal

is
the souls which by de

of
order and the movements

scending here below, conform this order without
to
it;
depending on and perfectly harmonize with the

Thus the actions, for
of
circular movement heaven.

tunes and destinies ever are prefigured the figures
in
formed by the stars.” That the symphony whose

is
so
sound melodious that the ancients expressed

is
it
4 4O WORKS OF PLOTINOS [27
symbolically by musical harmony.” Now this could
not be the case unless all the actions and experiences
of the universe were (well) regulated by reasons which
its
periods, the ranks Souls, their exist
of
determine
ences, the careers that they accomplish the intel
in
ligible world, heaven, The uni
or
or
on the earth.
in
versal Intelligence ever remains above the heaven,
and dwelling there entirely, without ever issuing from
itself; radiates into the sense-world by the inter
it
to it,
the Soul which, placed beside
of
mediation receives
the impression the idea, and transmits
of
inferior
it
things, now immutably, and then changeably, but
nevertheless regulated manner.
in
a
WHY SOULS TAKE ON DIFFERENT KINDS OF

BODIES.
not always descend equally; they descend

do
Souls
sometimes lower, sometimes less low, but always
in
beings (among living beings).
of
the same kind Each

soul enters into the body prepared receive her,
to
which corresponds which the soul has

to
to
the nature
by
disposition; for, according

its
become assimilated
as the soul has become similar to the nature of man
a
brute, she enters into corresponding body.

of
or
HOW SOULS COME TO DESCEND.

13. What called inevitable necessity and divine
is
justice consists the sway

of
nature which causes

in
orderly manner into the

an
proceed
to
each soul
in
bodily image which has become the object af

of
her
fection, and her predominating disposition. Conse
of
quently the soul, by her form, entirely approaches the

object towards which her interior disposition bears her.
Thus she go;
to
led and introduced where she

is
is
any particular
to
at
not that she forced descend

is
moment into any particular body; but, fixed

at
a
moment, she descends as it were spontaneously where

she ought to enter. Each (soul) has her own hour.
When this hour arrives, the soul descends as if a herald
was calling her, and she penetrates into the body pre
pared to receive her, as if she had been mastered and
set in motion by forces and powerful attractions exerted
by magic.” Similarly in an animal, nature administers
its
all
the organs, solves or

begts everything own
in
time, grows the beard the horns, gives special in
to or
clinations and powers the being, whenever they
become necessary. Similarly, plants, (nature) pro
in
or
duces flowers fruits the proper season. The

at
neither voluntary
of
descent souls into the bodies is

nor forced; not voluntary, since not chosen
is
is
it
by souls. not compulsory, it

or
to
consented the
in
is
It
sense that the latter obey only natural impulsion,

a
be
or
as
just one might marriage, the accom

to
to
led
plishment various honest actions, rather by instinct
of
than by reasoning. Nevertheless, there always some

is
thing fatal for each soul. One accomplishes her

at
destiny Some one moment; the other soul

at
some
other moment. Likewise, the intelligence that to its is
Superior the world also has something fatal
to
is in
its
existence, since itself has own destiny, which

the intelligible world, and light
its
to
dwell make
in
radiate therefrom. Thus individuals come here below

by
which they are sub

of
virtue the common law

to
jected. Each one, indeed, bears within himself this

power
its
common law, law which does not derive

a
from outside, but which depends on the nature

of
those
it,
who are subject

in
to
because innate them.

is
it
all
voluntarily carry out

its
Consequently
at
decrees the
predestined time, because this law impels them
to
their
its
goal; and because, deriving force from those whom

commands, presses and stimulates them and in
it
it
spires them with the desire go whither their interior

to
vocation calls them.

BY A PUN ON “WORLD" AND “ADORNMENT,”

PLOTINOS SHOWS MEN ADD TO THE BEAUTY
OF THE WORLD.
14. That is how this world, which already contains

many lights, and which is illuminated by souls, finds
itself still further adorned by the various beauties de
rived from different beings. It receives beauties from
the intelligible divinities and from the other intelligences
which furnish it with souls. This is probably the alle
gorical intent of the following myth.
By A PUN ON “PROMETHEUS." AND “PROVIDENCE,”

PLOTINOS EMPLOYS THE MYTH OF PANDORA.
(Following both Hesiod and the Gnostics, Plotinos
relates that) a woman was formed by Prometheus, and
adorned by the other divinities. This piece of clay,
after having been kneaded with water, was endowed
with a human voice, and received a form similar to the
deities. Then Venus, the Graces and the other deities
each gave her a gift. That is why this woman was
called Pandora, because (as her name implies, in
Greek) she had received gifts, which had been given
by all the divinities. All, in fact, made some present
to this piece of clay already fashioned by some kind of
providence (“Prometheia,” or “Prometheus”). When
Epimetheus rejects the gift of Prometheus, it only
indicates that it is better to live in the intelligible
world.” The creator of Pandora, however, is bound
because he seems attached to his work. But this bond
is entirely exterior, and it is broken by Hercules, be
cause the latter possesses a liberating power. What
ever other interpretation the myth of Pandora may
receive, it must still signify gifts received by the world,
import must agree with our teaching.
its
and
iv.3] SYCHOLOGICAL QUESTIONS 413
WHY MANY SOULS SUCCUMB TO THE LAW OF THE

ORDER OF THE UNIVERSE.
15. On descending from the intelligible world,

souls first come into heaven, and they there take a body
by means of which they pass even into terrestrial
bodies, according as they more or less advance (out
side of the intelligible world). There are some who
issue from heaven into the bodies of an inferior nature;
there are some also who pass from one body into
another. The latter no longer have the power to
reascend into the intelligible world because they have
forgotten; they are weighted down by the burden they
carry along with themselves. Now souls differ either
by the bodies to which they are united, or by their
different destinies, or by their kind of life, or by their
primitive nature. Thus differing from each other in
only some, the souls here below
all
or
these relations,
in
or
fate, are alternately subjected

to
to
either succumb
and liberated; or, while supporting what necessary,
it,
is
preserve the liberty devoting themselves

of
to
actions
them, and live according
to
of
that are characteristic

some other law, following the order that rules the
whole universe. This order embraces all the (“sem
inal) reasons,” and all the causes, the movements
of
the souls, and the divine laws. agrees with these

It
laws, borrows from them its principles, and relates

it
pre
its
thereto all things that are consequences.

It
all
to an
serves imperishable condition the beings which

in
preserve themselves conformably

to
are able the

the intelligible world.
of
constitution leads the other

It
that whither
so
beings whither their nature calls them,

soever they may descend, there cause which assigns
is
a
or
them some particular position condition.

to
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MISFORTUNES AND PUNISH

MENTS.
16. The punishments which justly overtake the
evil must therefore be derived from that Order which
rules all things with propriety. The unjust evils, ac
cidents, misery and diseases which seem to overwhelm
the good, may all be said to be consequences of anterior
faults. These evils are intimately related to the course
of events, and are even represented therein by their
signs, so that they seem to happen according to the
Reason (of the universe). We must however ac
knowledge that they are not produced by natural
“reasons,” that they are not within the purview of
Providence, and that they are only accidental con
its
sequences. house happens fall,
to
Thus when
to it
a
it,
buries anybody below whoever he may happen

be;
or
again, whether some regular movement drives

or
on some one thing, even several things, breaks
it
its
or
crushes anything that happens

to
lie path.
in
These accidents which seem unjust, are not evils for
those who suffer them, you consider how they take
if
their place within the legitimate order the universe;

of
perhaps even they constitute just chastisements and

are the expiations in
of
earlier faults. would be

It
beings
of
credible that one series the universe should

in
obey subject
be
its
order, while another series should

everything happen through
or
to
chance caprice.
If
causes and natural consequences, conformity with

in
single “reason,” and single order, the smallest

of to
a
things must form part that order, and agree with

it.
Injustice practiced against somebody else injustice

a an
is
punish
it,
for him who commits and must attract

him; by place which the
to
ment but the holds

in
it
universal order, not an injustice, even for him who

is
it
the victim of this

to
it.
Suffers had be thus.

If
It
can have only

an
injustice was honest man, for him

it
iv.3] PSYCHOLOGICAL QUESTIONS 4.15
a happy ending. This universal order must not be

accused of being undivine and unjust, but we should
insist that distributive justice exercises itself with per
fect propriety. If certain things seem worthy of blame,
it is because they are due to secret causes that escape
our knowledge.
FROM THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD, SOULS FIRST GO

INTO HEAVEN.
17. From the intelligible world souls first descend

into the heaven. For if the heaven is the best part of
the sense-world, it must be nearest to the limits of the
intelligible world. The celestial bodies are therefore
the first that receive the souls, being most fitted to
receive them. The terrestrial body is animated the
last, and it is suited to the reception of an inferior soul
only, because it is more distant from the incorporeal
nature. All souls first illuminate the sky, and radiate
from it their first and purest rays; the remainder is
lit
up
by inferior powers. There are souls which, de

scending lower, illuminate inferior things; but they do
so
not gain anything getting far from their origin.

in
THE DESCENDING GRADUATIONS OF EXISTENCE.

We must imagine centre, and around this centre
a
a
luminous sphere that radiates from (Intelligence).

Then, around this sphere, lies second one that also
a
luminous, but only light from another light

lit
as
is
Then, beyond and outside

(i.
is of
universal Soul).
these spherers lies further one, which no more
a
by
illuminated only
an
light, but which alien light,

is
light peculiar
of of
of
for lack (this world ours).

to
a
Outside those two spheres there indeed rhom

is
light
its
or
boid, rather another sphere, that receives

from the second sphere, and which receives the more
it
intensely, the closer it is thereto. The great light
(Intelligence) sheds light though remaining within
its
itself, and the brilliancy that radiates around (on
to
it
the soul) “reason.” Other souls radiate also, some
is
by
remaining united the universal Soul, others by
to
descending lower
in
to
order better illuminate the
which they devote their care; but these cares
to
bodies
are troublous. As the pilot who steers his ship over
the troubled waves forgets himself
of
the effort his
in
work,” the point forgetting that exposes him
he
of
to
perish with the ship the shipwreck, likewise
in
to
self
souls are dragged down (into the abyss matter) by
of
the attention they devote the bodies that they
to
as
govern. Then they are chained their destiny,
to
fascinated by magic attraction, but really retained
if
a
by
as
the potent bonds every body were
of
nature.
If
as
perfect the universe, would completely suffice

it
itself, would have no danger fear, and the soul

to
it
it,
present within this, could com

of
that instead
is
ºte without leaving the intelligible

to
life
it
WOrlOl.
C. DOES THE SOUL EMPLOY DISCURSIVE

REASON WHILE DISCARNATE
2
THE SOUL DOES NOT USE DISCURSIVE REASON EX

CEPT WHILE HINDERED BY THE OBSTACLES
OF THE BODY.
18. Does the soul ratiocinate before entering upon

the body, and after having left it? No: she reasons
only while body, because she uncertain, em
in
is
a
barrassed and weakened. To need to reason order

in
complete knowledge always betrays weak

to
at
arrive
ening the arts reasoning occurs only
of
In
intellect.
when the artist hesitates before Some obstacle. Where
iv.3] PSYCHOLOGICAL QUESTIONS 4.17
there is no difficulty in the matter, art masters
it,
and
its
produces work instantly.
THE SOUL CAN REASON INTUITIONALLY WITHOUT
RATIOCINATION.
objected), that
be
on
do
(It might the souls high
if
They
be
not reason, they will no longer reasonable.
remain reasonable, however, because they are well
penetrate into the essence something, when
of
to
able
ever the occasion demands it. Ratiocination should be
as
considered follows. consist disposition
in
If
it
a
im
an
that always derived from Intelligence,
in
is
manent act, this power souls, these

of
reflection
in
a
must also reason the intelligible world; but then

in
they have no further need language. Likewise,

of
when they inhabit heaven, neither do they need
to
speech, do the souls here below,
to
as
take recourse
They act
of
in as
result their needs and uncertainties.

a
an orderly manner, and conformity with nature,

in
without premeditation They know

or
deliberation.
each other by simple intuition, even here below
as
a
we know our like without their talking us, by

to
mere
a
glance. On high every body pure and transparent.

is
is,
eye. Nothing
an
Each person there, were,

as
is
it
Before you have spoken, your

is or
hidden simulated.
thought already known. probable that speech
It
is
used by the guardians and other living inhabitants

of is
the air, for they are living beings.
D. HOW CAN THE SOUL SIMULTANEOUSLY

BE DIVISIBLE AND INDIVISIBLE
2
DECISION WILL DEPEND ON THE MEANING OF

A
THE TERMS.
19. Must we consider that (in the soul), the in
as
divisible and the divisible are identical, they were

if
mingled together? Or should we consider the dis
tinction between the indivisible and the divisible from
Some other point of view 2 Should the first be con
sidered as the higher part of the soul, and the latter
as the lower, just exactly as we say that one part of
the soul is rational, and the other part is irrational?
Such questions can be answered only by a close scrutiny
Of
*
SOUll.
nature of the divisibility and indivisibility of the
THE BODY NEEDS THE SOUL FOR LIFE.

When Plato” says that the soul is indivisible, he
speaks absolutely. When he insists that she is divisible,
it is always relatively (to the body). He does indeed
say that she becomes divisible in the bodies, but not
that she has become such. Let us now examine how,
by her nature, the body needs the soul to live, and
what necessity there is for the soul to be present in
the entire body.
SENSE, GROWTH AND EMOTION TEND TOWARDS

DIVISIBILITY.
By the mere fact that it feels by means of the entire
body, every sense-power undergoes division. Since
it is present everywhere, it may be said to be divided.
But as, on the other hand, it manifests itself every
where as a whole, it cannot really be considered as
divided. We cannot go further than the statement
that it becomes divisible in bodies. Some might object
that it was divided only in the sense of touch. It is
however also divided in the other senses, since it is
but only less So.
it,
always the same body that receives

the same with the power growth and
of
The case
is
nutrition; and the liver, and

its
appetite have seat

in
if
be
anger the heart, these appetites must subject

to
in
the same conditions. Besides, possible that the

is
it
body does not receive those appetites in a mixture,

or that it receives them in some other manner, so that
they result from some of the things that the body de
rives from the soul by participations. Reason and
intelligence, however, are not communicated to the
body because they stand in no need of any organs to
fulfil their functions. On the contrary, they find in
them only an obstacle to their operations.
THE SOUL AS A WHOLE OF TWO DISTINCT DIVISIBLE

AND INDIVISIBLE PARTS.
Thus the indivisible and the divisible are in the Soul
two distinct parts, and not two things mingled together
so as to constitute but a single one. They form a
single whole composed of two parts, each of which
its
is pure and separable from the other by character
istic power. then the part which the body be
in
If
comes divisible receives from the superior part the

power being indivisible, this same part might
of
be
simultaneously divisible and indivisible, mix

as
a
the (indivisible) power
of
of
ture divisible nature and

by
received from the higher part.

it
E. RELATIONS BETWEEN SOUL AND BODY.

IF FUNCTIONS ARE NOT LOCALIZED THE SOUL WILL
NOT SEEM ENTIRELY WITHIN US.
Are the above-mentioned and other parts

of
20.
or
the soul localized the body, are some localized,

in
and others not? This must be considered, because

if
the parts the soul are localized, and

of
of
none we
of if
or
assert that they are nowhere either out the

in
body, the latter will remain inanimate, and we will not

explain the manner the operations oc
If, of
byto
be able
curring
on
help the organs. the other hand,

of
we assign a location in the body to certain parts of the
soul, without localizing other parts, the unlocalized
parts will seem not to be within us, and consequently
not the whole of our soul will seem to be in the body.
SPACE IS CORPOREAL; THE BODY IS WITHIN THE

SOUL.
Of the soul neither a part nor the whole is in the

body as a locality. The property of space is to con
tain some body. Where everything is divided it is
impossible for the whole to be in every part. But the
soul is not body, and the soul contains the body rather
than the body contains the soul.
NOR IS THE BODY A VASE, FOR PROXIMATE TRANS

MISSION OF THE SOUL.
Nor is the soul in the body as in a vase. In this case,

the body would be inanimate, and would contain the
soul as in a vase or locality. If the Soul be considered
as concentrated in herself and as communicating to the
body something of herself by “close transmission” (as
the Stoics would say), that which the soul will transmit
to this vase would for her become something lost.
MANY METAPHYSICAL OBJECTIONS TO THE CON

CEPTION OF SOUL AS LOCALIZED.
Considering location in the strict sense of the word,
it is incorporeal, and consequently cannot be a body.
It would no longer need the soul. Besides (if the soul
be in the body as if in a locality) the body will ap
surface, and not by itself. Many
its
proach the soul by

the theory that local
be
other objections can

to
raised
izes the soul the body. Under this hypothesis, in
in
deed, place would have carried around along with

be
to
the thing which will locate. But that which would

in
it
iv.3] PSYCHOLOGICAL QUESTIONS 421.
carry place around with it (would be a monstrosity).

Moreover, if the body be defined as being an interval,
it will be still less true to say that the soul is in the
body as a locality; for an interval should be empty;
but the body is not empty, being within emptiness.
NOR IS THE SOUL IN THE BODY AS A QUALITY IN

A SUBSTRATE.
Nor will the soul be in the body as (a quality) is

in a substrate. The attribute of being a substrate is a
mere affection, like a color, or a figure; but the soul
is separable from the body.
NOR IS THE SOUL IN THE BODY AS A PART IN THE

WHOLE.
Nor will the soul be in the body as a part in the

whole; for the soul is not a part of the body. Nor is it
a part of the living whole; for this would still demand
explanation of the manner of this being within She
it.
jar, one jar
be
will not
or
as
within
as
wine
in
in
it
another, nor one thing within itself (as the Mani

as
is
cheans thought).
NOR IS THE SOUL IN THE BODY AS WHOLE IN

A
PART.
be
its
as
Nor will the soul the body whole

in
in
is
a
parts; for would

be
whole,
to
ridiculous call the soul

it
and the body the parts

of
that whole.
NOR WILL THE SOUL BE IN THE BODY AS FORM IN

MATTER.
be
Nor will the soul the body form matter;

as
in
in
is
forthe form that engaged matter not separable.

in
is
is
Moreover, that form descends upon matter implies the

preliminary existence of matter; but it is the soul that
produces form in matter; and therefore the soul must
be distinct from form. Though the soul be not form
begotten in matter, the soul might be a separable form;
but this theory would still have to explain how this
form inheres in the body, since the soul is separable
from the body.
THE SOUL IS SAID TO BE IN THE BODY BECAUSE

THE BODY ALONE IS VISIBLE.
All men say that the soul is in the body, however,

because the soul is not visible, while the body Ob
is.
Serving the body, and judging that animated be
is
it it
cause moves and feels, we say that has soul, and
it
a
we are thereby led suppose that the soul the
to
if in
is
body. But we could see and feel the soul, and we
if
could realize that she surrounds the whole body by the

life she possesses, and that she extends around equally
it
is all
on sides till the extremities, we would say that the

soul no way the body, but that on the contrary
in
in
its
the accessory within principle, the contained within

is
the container, what flows within the immovable.
THIS LEAVES THE QUESTION OF THE MANNER OF

THE SOUL’S PRESENCE.
21. How would we answer person who, without
in a
himself making any statements regard the matter,

to to
the body;
us
should ask how the soul present

is
whether the whole soul present the body the

to
in
is
same manner, her parts present

of
whether one
or
is
one way, and another some other way?

in
in
THE SOUL IN BODY AS PILOT IN SHIP.

A
the comparisons
of
Since none that we have

formerly examined
of
express the relation

to
seems
the soul to the body, properly we might say that the

soul is in the body as the pilot is in the ship.” This
illustration is satisfactory in that it emphasizes the
soul's being separable from the body; but it does not
properly indicate the presence of the soul in the body.
If the soul be present in the body as a passenger in a
ship, it would be there only by accident, and the illus
tration is not yet satisfactory if changed to the pilot's
presence in the ship he is steering; for the pilot is not
present to the whole of the ship as the whole soul is
in the body.** One might illustrate the soul's presence
in the body as an art inheres in its instruments; as, for
instance, in the helm, which might be supposed to be
alive, containing the power of steering the ship skil
fully. This is still unsatisfactory, because such an art
comes from without. The soul might indeed be com
pared to a pilot who should be incarnated in his helm;
and the soul might be in the body as in some natural
instrument,” so that the soul would move it at pleasure.
This however might still fail to explain the manner in
which the Soul would exist in her instrument. There
fore, though the latter illustration is an improvement
on the former, we must still seek one which closer
approaches reality.
THE SOUL PRESENT IN THE BODY AS LIGHT IN AIR.

22. This is the better illustration: the soul is pres
ent in the body as light is present in air. Light is indeed
it;
is,
present in air without being present to that light

the whole air without mingling with
it,
present
to
is
and light remains within itself while the air escapes.

When the air, within which light radiates, withdraws
from the light, the air keeps none the light; but
of
is
it
long
so
as
illuminated the air. remains subject

to
the
light. Air, therefore, light, rather than
in of
action
in
is
light air. While explaining the generation

of
the
is
universe,89 therefore, Plato properly locates the body
(of the world) in the soul, and not the soul in the
body.” He also states that there is a part of the soul
that contains the body, and another in which there is
no body, in this sense, that there are soul-powers of
which the body has no need. The case is similar with
the other souls. Their powers in general are not
present to bodies, and only those powers of which the
body stands in need are present to These however
it.
are present the body without being built up either
to
upon the body

or
on the members, whole. For
as
a
sensation, the faculty feeling entirely present
of
to to
is
the whole organ which feeling (as, for instance,
is
the whole brain); likewise for the other functions, the

different faculties are each present
to
different organ.
a
shall explain myself.
I
WHILE THE SOUL-POWER IS EVERYWHERE, THE

PRINCIPLE OF ACTION IS LOCALIZED IN THE
SPECIAL ORGAN.
23. Since, for the body, being animated amounts

by
being penetrated by the light shed the soul, every

to
part the body participates therein some particular

of
its in
Each organ, according fitness, receives

to
manner.
the power suitable the function fulfils. Thus we
to
it
may say that the power sight resides the eyes;

of
in
hearing the ears; that the tongue;

of of
of of
in
that taste
in
that smell the nose; that touch the whole

in
in
body, since, for the latter sense, the whole body the
is
organ
of
Now the instruments for touch

as
the soul.
are the first nerves, which also possess the power
of
moving the organism,

as
they are the seat

of
this
power; as, besides, the nerves originate the brain,
in
the brain has been localized the principle sen

of of
in
sation and appetite—in short, the principle the

no
whole organism; doubt because was thought that

it
the power which uses the organs is present in that part

of the body where are the origins of these organs. It
would have been better to say that it is the action of
the power that makes use of the organs that originates
in the brain; for that part of the body from which
starts the movement impressed on the organ had to
serve somewhat as a foundation for the power of the
workman, a power whose nature is in harmony with
that of the organ (it sets in motion); or rather, this
part of the body does not serve as foundation for this
power, for this power is everywhere, but the principle
of the action is in that part of the body in which is the
very principle of that organ.
REASON IS IN THE HEAD, BUT NOT IN THE BRAIN,

WHICH IS THE SEAT OF THE INTERMEDIARY.
THE POWER OF SENSATION.
On the other hand, as the power of sensation and
the power of appetite, which belong to the sensible
and imaginative soul, are beneath reason, because they
are related to what is inferior, while reason is above,”
the result was that the ancients localized reason in the
highest part of the animal, in the head; not that reason
is in the brain,89 but because reason is seated in the
sense-power, by the intermediation of which, only,
reason may be said to reside in the brain. The sense
power, Surely, had to be attributed to the body, and,
within the body, to the organs most capable of lending
its
themselves to action. Reason, which has no

be
(direct) dealing with the body, had however

in
to
relation with the sense-power, which

of
form the
is
a
soul, and can participate reason. The sense-power,

in
does, certain extent, judge; and the power

of
to
a
imagination has something intellectual. Last, the ap

petite, and the desire somehow connect with imagina
tion and reason. Reason, therefore, the head,
in
is
not as in a locality, but because it is in relation with
the Sense-power which resides in that organ, as has
been shown above.
GROWTH IS LOCALIZED IN THE LIVER, ANGER IN

THE HEART.
As the power of growth, nutrition, and generation
operates all through the entire body; and as it is by
the blood that the body is nourished; as the blood is
contained in the veins; and as the veins, as well as, the
blood, originate in the liver; this organ has been as
signed as the seat of that part of the soul called ap
petite; for appetite is involved in the power of be
getting, of feeding and increasing the body. Further
as the blood (purified by respiration) is subtle, light,
mobile and pure, the heart becomes a suitable instru
ment for the power of anger, for the blood that pos
sesses these qualities starts from the heart. Therefore,
with good reason, the heart is assigned as the seat of
the turbulent convulsions of the power of anger.
F. WHERE GOES THE SOUL AFTER DEATH 2
THE SOUL AFTER DEATH GOES TO THE PLACE

SUITED TO IT BY RETRIBUTION.
24. Whither will the soul pass when she shall have
left the body? She will not go where there is nothing
suitable to receive her. She could not pass into what
is not naturally disposed to receive her, unless there be
something that would attract a soul that had lost her
prudence. In this case, the Soul remains in whatever
is capable of receiving her, and follows it whither that
(receptive matter) can exist and beget. Now as there
are different places, it is necessary that the difference
(of the dwellings in which the souls come to dwell)
should be derived from the disposition of each soul, and

of justice which reigns above beings. No one indeed
could escape the punishment which unjust actions de
serve. The divine law49 is inevitable, and possesses
the power of carrying out the judgments (according
to its decrees). The man who is destined to undergo
is,
a punishment spite himself, dragged towards
of
in
that punishment, and driven around” by movement

is
of a
that never stops. Then, struggling
as
wearied
if
against things
to
which he desired offer resistance,
is to
he betakes himself the place that him,
to
to
suitable
and thus by voluntary movement undergoes involun
a
tary suffering. The law prescribes the greatness and

the punishment. Later,
of
of
duration
as
result the
a
harmony that directs everything the universe, the
in
the punishment endured by the soul coincides

of
end
with the soul's receiving strength leave those places.
to
PURE INCORPOREAL SOULS DWELL WITHIN INTEL

LIGENCE IN DIVINITY.
The souls that have body thereby feel the cor
a
poreal punishments they are undergoing. Pure Souls,

not carry-along with them anything
do
however, that
corporeal, necessarily enjoy the privilege abiding
of
the incorporeal. Being free from having dwell

to
in in
no
anything corporeal they have bodies, they

as
reside where being and essence, and the divine; that

is
There, the divinity, with the

is,
the divinity.
in
in
intelligible beings, dwells the pure Soul. you wish

If
locate the Soul still more exactly, go

to
to
where are
the intelligible entities; and you are looking for
if
as
them, do not look for them with the eyes, they

if
were (physical) bodies.

G. WHAT ARE THE CONDITIONS OF THE

OPERATION OF MEMORY AND IMAGINA
TION?
COSMIC QUESTIONS ABOUT MEMORY DEPEND ON
EXACT DEFINITION OF WHAT MEMORY IS.
25. Memory raises the following questions. Does
memory generally remain with the bodies that have
issued from here below 2 Does it subsist only in some
of them? In this case is memory general or special,
durable or transitory? These questions cannot be
answered until we define that interior principle in us
is,
to which memory belongs. That
of to
we shall have
determine, not what memory, but what kind
in
is
its
beings must exist by virtue nature, for else
of
it
memory
of
where we have often defined and treated
itself. We must therefore exactly define that principle
within which memory natural.”
us
to
is
MEMORY INAPPLICABLE EXCEPT TO BEINGS SUB

-
JECT TO LIMITATIONS OF TIME.
As memory presupposes knowledge casual ex
or
bea
perience, memory cannot beings that

to
attributed
are impassible, and outside
of
of
the limitations time.

Memory therefore inapplicable the Divinity,
to
to
is
Essence, and Intelligence, all

of
to
whom exist outside

time, eternal and immutable, without concep
of
as
priority subsequentness, who ever abide

of
tion
or
the
in
same condition, without ever experiencing any change.

How could that which identical and immutable make
is
memory, since could neither acquire nor keep

of
use
it
disposition differing from the preceding one, nor

a
have successive thoughts

of
which the one would be

present, while the other had passed into the condition
of
being remembered?
THERE IS A TIMELESS MEMORY CONSISTING OF

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.
It (may be objected) that nothing hinders Intelli

gence from knowing the changes of other beings, such
as, for instance, the periodical revolutions of the world,
without itself undergoing any change. But then it
would have to follow the changes of the moving object,
as it would think first of one thing, and then of an
other. Besides, thought is something else than mem
ory, and we must not apply to self-consciousness the
name of memory. Indeed, intelligence does not busy
its
itself with retaining thoughts, and with hindering

them from escaping; otherwise might also fear lest
it
own nature (“Being”). For the soul herself,

its
lose
it
as
remembering not the same recalling innate notions.

is
When the soul has descended here below, she may

possess these notions without thinking them, es
of
pecially only recently that she entered into the

be
if
it
body.” The ancient philosophers seem have ap

to
plied the terms memory and reminiscence the actual

to
ization by which the soul thinks

of
the entities she

possesses; that, (however) quite special kind
of
is
of a
memory, entirely independent time.*

DEFINITION OF MEMORY DEPENDS ON WHETHER
IT BELONGS TO THE SOUL OR ORGANISM.
But perhaps our solution seems Superficial, and ap
an
pears analysis. might

to
rest on insufficient
It
asked whether memory and reminiscence,

of be
indeed
belonging the rational soul, might not
to
instead
or
characterize the lower soul, the composite

of
Soul
and body that we call the organism? indeed they
If
belong the lower soul, from where does the latter

to
derive them, and how does she possess them? The

be
same question may further

of
asked the case the

in
organism. To answer all this, we shall, as said above,
have to study our own interior principle to which
memory belongs. If it be the soul that possesses mem
ory, we shall have to ask what faculty or part thereof
If,
is constituted by memory. has been urged by
as
be
Some, the organism
to
which memory belongs,
it
and considering the organism the sentient principle,
as
how could this faculty operate within it? Besides,
what that we should call the organism? Further,
is
it
the same power that perceives sense-objects, and

is
it
intelligible entities,
or
are there two distinct powers?
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SENSATION.

26. the two elements which compose the animal
If
sensation, the sensation

of
share the act common

in
of is
the soul and the body, such piercing
or to
as
the acts
weaving.” Thus, sensation, the soul plays the
in
part the workman, and the body that his tool;

of
of
mes
as
the body undergoes the experience, and serves
senger the soul; the soul perceives the impression
to
by
the body;
or
produced the body, she forms

in
or
a
judgment about the experience she has undergone.
an
Consequently Sensation operation common

to
the
is
Soul and body.
IN ANY CASE MEMORY IS PECULIAR TO THE SOUL

AND BODY
affairs with memory,

be
of
This could not the state

by which the soul, having already through sensation
perceived the impression produced the body, pre
in
it,
might be claimed that

or
it.
serves dismisses
It
memory also the Soul and body, because

to
common
is
efficiency depends on the adjustments

its
of
the bodies.
No doubt the body can hinder
or
promote the exercise

memory, without this faculty ceasing peculiar
be
of
to
to the soul. How shall we try to prove that the mem

ory of knowledge acquired by study, belongs to the
compound, and not to the soul alone? If the organism
be the composite of Soul and body, in the sense that it
is some third object begotten by their union, it will be
absurd to say that it is neither soul nor body. Indeed,
it could not be anything different from the soul and
body, neither if the soul and body were transformed into
the composite of which they are the elements, nor if
they formed a mixture, so that the soul would be no
more than potentially in the organism. Even in this
case, it is still the soul, and the soul alone, that would
remember. Thus in a mixture of honey and wine, it is
the honey alone that should be credited with any sweet
ness that may be tasted.
THAT THE SOUL IS INCARNATE IS NOT THE CAUSE

OF HER POSSESSING MEMORY.
It may again be objected that it is indeed the soul

that remembers; but only because she is resident in the .
body, and is not pure; she must be affected in some
particular manner to be able to impress the body with
the forms of sense-objects; her seat must be in the
body to receive these forms, and to preserve them.
But to begin with, these forms could not have any
extension; then they could not be either (Stoic) seal
imprints, or impressions; for in the soul there is no
impulsion, nor any imprint similar to that of a seal on
wax, and the operation itself by which it perceives
sense-objects is a kind of thought (or intellection).
Indeed, it would be impossible to speak of an impres
sion in the act of thought. Thought has no need of
the body or a corporeal quality. It is besides necessary
for the Soul to remember her movements, as for in
stance, her desires which have not been satisfied, and
whose object the body has not attained; for what
could the body tell us of an object which the body has
not yet reached 2 *
(Speaking of thoughts), how
could the soul, conjointly with the body, remember
ab
its
things which the body, by very nature, could
solutely not know?
MEMORY BELONGS TO THE SOUL. ALONE.
Doubtless we will have acknowledge that there
to
are affections which pass from the body into the soul;
but there are also affections which belong exclusively
the soul, because the soul real being, with char
to
is
a
this case, the soul
In
acteristic nature and activities.
must have desires, and recall them, remembering that
have not been satisfied; because, by her
or
they have,
nature, she does not form part the things which are
of
(as Heraclitus said) perpetual flow. Otherwise,
in
a
the soul coenesthesia (or,

to
we could not attribute

common feeling), conscience, reflection, the intui
she did not possess them by her or
of
tion herself.
If
by
nature, she would not acquire them union with the

body. Doubtless there are activities which the soul
the organs;
of
cannot carry out without the assistance

but she herself possesses the faculties (or “powers”)
from which these activities are outgrowths. Besides,
she, by herself, possesses other faculties, whose oper
ations are derived from her alone. Among these
is
by
memory, whose exercise only hindered the body. -

is
Indeed, when the soul unites with the body, she for
gets; when she separates from the body, and purifies
herself, she often recovers memory. Since the soul
possesses memory when she alone, the body, with
is
per
its
changeable nature, that ever subject

to
is
petual flow,
of
forgetfulness,
of
cause and not

is
a
memory; the body therefore for the soul, the stream

is,
Lethe (or forgetfulness). To the soul alone, there

of
fore, belongs memory.

MEMORY BELONGS BOTH TO THE DIVINE SOUL, AND

TO THAT DERIVED FROM THE WORLD-SOUL.
27. To which soul, however, does memory belong?

To the soul whose nature is more divine, and which
constitutes us more essentially, or to the soul that we
receive from the universal Soul (the rational and
irrational souls) 2 Memory belongs to both; but in
one case it is general, and in the other particular.
When both souls are united, they together possess both
kinds of memory; if they both remain separate, each
remembers longer what concerns herself, and remem
bers less long what concerns the other. That is the
reason people talk of the image of Hercules being in
the hells.” Now this image remembers all the deeds
committed in this life; for this life particularly falls to
her lot. The other souls which (by uniting within
themselves the rational part to the irrational) together
possess both kinds of memory. They yet cannot
remember anything but the things that concern this
life, and which they have known here below, or even
the actions which have some relation with justice.
WHAT THE RATIONAL SOUL, IF SEPARATED, WOULD

REMEMBER OF LIFE.
We must still clear up what would be said by Her

is,
cules (that the man himself), alone, and separated

from his image. What then would the rational soul,
separated and isolated, say? The soul which has
if
been attracted by the body knows everything that the

man (speaking strictly), has done experienced here
or
time, death, the memories

of
of of
In
at
below. course
earlier existences are reproduced; but the soul, out
scorn, allows some escape her. Having indeed puri
to
fied herself from the body, she will remember the

things that were not present her during this life.”
to
to If,
after having entered into another body, she happen
consider the past, she will speak
of
this life which
will become foreign her, what she has recently
of
to
abandoned, and many other earlier facts. The cir
of
cumstances which happen during long period will
a
always remain buried oblivion. But we have not
in
yet discovered what the soul, when isolated from the
body will remember. To solve this question, we shall
which power the soul memory
to
to
be
of
forced decide
belongs.
MEMORY DOES NOT BELONG TO APPETITE, BECAUSE

IT MAY BE REDUCED TO SENSATION.
28. Does memory belong the powers by which
to
we feel and know? by appetite that we remember
Is
it
the things that excite our desires, and by anger that we

remember the things that irritate us? Some will think
so. indeed the same faculty which feels pleasure,
is
It
and retains remembrance thereof. Thus when, for in

stance, appetite meets an object which has already
made experience pleasure, remembers this pleasure
it
it
Why indeed should appetite not

beon
seeing this object.

similarly moved by some other object? Why
it
is
not moved some manner by the same object? Why
in
should we not thus attribute to the Sensation of

it
things Further, why should appetite

of
this kind?
be
to
the power sensation, and

of
itself not reduced

not do likewise for everything, naming each thing, by
what predominates therein’
WHAT APPETITE KEEPS IS AN AFFECTION, BUT

NOT A MEMORY.
each power, but

in
to
Must we attribute sensation

a
this case, for instance, will

In
different manner?
it
be
sight, and not appetite, which will perceive sense

objects; but appetite will be later wakened by sensation

which will be “relayed,” (as the Stoics would say);
and though it does not judge of Sensation, it will un
consciously feel the characteristic affection. The same
state of affairs will obtain with anger. It will be sight
which will show us an injustice, but it will be anger
which will resent Just so, when shepherd notices
it.
a
wolf near his flock, the dog, though have not yet
he
a
excited by the smell

be
or
observed anything, will
certainly appetite which ex
of
noise the wolf.

It
is
it;
periences pleasure, and which keeps
of
trace but
or a
this trace constitutes an affection disposition, and
not memory. another power which observes
It
is
a
the enjoyment pleasure, and which remembers what

of
occurred. This proved by the fact that memory

is
is
often ignorant the things which appetite has par
of
in
ticipated, though appetite still preserve traces thereof.
MEMORY DOES NOT BELONG TO THE FACULTY OF

SENSATION.
be
29. Can memory sensibility?

to
referred the
Is
faculty that feels also the one that remembers? But

the image the soul (the irrational soul) possess
as of
if
be us
the memory, we said above,49 there would be

in
two faculties that will feel. Further, sensibility

if
capable grasping notions, per

it to
of
will also have

it
or
ceive the conceptions discursive reason,

of
will
another faculty that will perceive both.
be
MEMORY DOES NOT BELONG EXCLUSIVELY TO THE

POWER OF PERCEPTION.
the power perception common

of
the reason
Is
to
the irrational soul, and will we grant

to
able soul and

possesses the memory sense-objects and
of
of
that
it
intelligible things? To recognize that one and

is
it
the same power which equally perceives both kinds of
things, is already to take one step towards the solution
of the problem. But if we divide this power into two,
there will nevertheless still be two kinds of memory;
further, if we allow two kinds of memory to each of
the two souls (the rational and the irrational), there
will be four kinds of memory.
MEMORY IS NOT IDENTICAL WITH FEELING OR

REASONING.
Are we compelled to remember sensations by sen

sibility, whether it be the same power which feels sen
sation, and which remembers sensation, or is it also
discursive reason which conceives and remembers con
ceptions. But the men who reason the best are not
those who also remember the best; and those who have
equally delicate senses, do not all, on that account,
have an equally good memory. On the contrary,
some have delicate senses, while others have a good
memory, without however being capable of perceiving
equally well. On the other hand, if feeling and re
membering be mutually independent, there will be
(outside of sensibility), another power which will re
member things formerly perceived by sensation, and
this power will have to feel what it is to remember.”
MEMORY BELONGS TO IMAGINATION.

all
be
(To solve these difficulties) may stated that

it
nothing
of
hinders the admission that the actualization

the Sensation produces memory an image, and that
in
the imagination, which differs (from sensation), pos

sesses the power preserving and recalling these
of
images. indeed imagination which sensation

in
It
is
culminates; and when sensation ceases, imagination

then this power pre
its
preserves representation.
If
serve the image of the absent object, it constitutes

memory.” According as the image remains for a
longer or shorter time, memory is or is not faithful;
and our memories last, or are effaced. Memory of
sense-objects therefore belongs to the imagination. If
this faculty of memory be possessed by different per
sons in unequal degrees, this difference depends either
on the difference of forces, or on practice (or exer
cise), or on the absence or presence of certain bodily
dispositions which may or may not influence memory,
or disturb it.” But elsewhere we shall study the ques
tion further.
INTELLECTUAL CONCEPTIONS ARE NOT ENTIRELY

PRESERVED BY IMAGINATION.
30. What about intellectual conceptions? Are

they also preserved by imagination? If imagination
it,
as
accompany every thought, and if later were,
it
preserves its image, we should thus have the memory
the known object; otherwise some other solution
of
sought. Perhaps reason, whose actual

be
will have
to
ization always accompanies thought, has the function

receiving and transmitting imagination. In
of
so to
it
it
long
as
deed, thought indivisible, and not

is
is
it
as
evoked from the depths intelligence,

of
remains
it
it,
were hidden within Reason develops

it.
and
it
making pass from the state thought

of
of
to
that
it
mirror, for our

is as
image, spreads out were

in
it
it
imagination.* That why we grasp (the thought)

only when the soul, which always desires rational
thought, has achieved thought. There differ
of is
a
ence between thought and the perception thought.

We are always thinking, but we do not always perceive
our thought. That comes from the fact that the prin
ciple that perceives the thoughts also perceives the
sensations, and occupies itself with both turn.
in
THE TWO KINDS OF MEMORY IMPLY TWO KINDS OF
IMAGINATION.
31. If theory belong to imagination, and if both
the rational and irrational souls possess memory, we
will have two kinds of imagination (intellectual and
sensual); and if both Souls are separate, each of them
will possess one kind of imagination. The theory of
two kinds of imagination within us in the same prin
ciple would not account for there being two kinds of
imagination; and it would leave unsolved the question
to which of them memory belongs. If memory belong
to both kinds of imagination, there will always be two
kinds of imagination—for it cannot be said that the
memory of intelligible things belongs to the one, and
that of sense-things to the other; otherwise we would
have two animate beings with nothing in common. If
then memory equally belong to both imaginations,
what difference is there between them? Besides, why
do we not notice this difference? Here is the cause.
OF THE TWO IMAGINATIONS ONE ALWAYS PRE

DOMINATES OR OVERSHADOWS THE OTHER.
When both kinds of imagination harmonize, they
co-operate (in the production of a single act). The
most powerful dominates, and only a single image is
produced within us. The weaker follows the stronger,
as the feeble reflection of a powerful light. On the
contrary, when both kinds of imagination disagree and
struggle, then only one of them manifests, and the
other is entirely ignored, just as we always ignore that
we have two souls"4; for both souls are melted into a
single one, and the one serves as vehicle for the other.
The one sees all, but preserves only certain memories
when she leaves the body, and leaves in oblivion
greater part of the things that relate to the other.
Likewise, after we have established relations with
friends of an inferior order, we may acquire more dis
tinguished friendships, and we remember the former

but very little, though we remember the latter very dis
tinctly.
PARTITION OF THE FUND OF MEMORY BETWEEN

THE TWO SOULS.
What about (the memory) of friends, of parents, of
a wife, of the fatherland, and of all that a virtuous
man may properly remember? In the image of the
soul (the irrational soul) these memories will be ac
companied by a passive affection; but in the man (the
rational soul) they will not be so accompanied. The
affections exist since the beginning in the inferior soul;
in the superior soul, as a result of her dealings with the
other, there are also some affections, but only proper
affections. The inferior soul may well seek to remem
ber the actions of the superior soul, especially when she
herself has been properly cultivated; for she can be
come better from her very principle up, and through
the education she receives from the other. The higher
soul must willingly forget what comes to her from the
inferior soul. When she is good, she can, besides, by
her power contain the subordinate soul. The more she
desires to approach the intelligible world, the more
she must forget the things from here below, unless the
whole life She has led here below be such that she has
entrusted to her memory none but praiseworthy things.
Even in our own world, indeed, it is a fine thing to
release oneself from human preoccupations. It would
therefore be still finer to forget them all. In this sense
we might well say that the virtuous soul should be
forgetful. She thus escapes manifoldness, reduces
manifoldness to unity, and abandons the indeterminate.
She therefore ceases to live with manifoldness, lightens
her burdens, and lives for herself. Indeed, while re
maining here below, she desires to live in the intel
all
ligible world, and neglects foreign

to
that her
is
nature. She therefore retains but few earthly things
when she has arrived to the intelligible world; she has
more of them when she inhabits the heavens. Hercules
(in heaven) may well vaunt his valor; but even this
valor seems to him trifling when he has arrived at a
region still holier than heaven, when he dwells in the
intelligible world, when he has risen over Hercules
himself by the force manifested in those struggles
which are characteristic of veritable sages.
1 Against the Manicheans. ius, 32, and Proclus. 85 As

2 See vi. 7.41. 3 See i. 1.13. thought Aristotle, Anima,
de
4. In that port of the Philebus, Timaeus, 34;
In
ii.
1.4. 86 his
29; C As thought Plato does just the op
87
in ii.
5.
345. 30.
Plato, the Phaedrus, 246 posite. Being power
88
the
248. As was taught by the which directs the animal from
6
As thought As
89
Manicheans. above,
7.
see 1.7.
in i.
Cicero, Tusculans, 20; and thought Plato the Timaeus,
i.
Aristotle, Anima, iii. 1-3. 48 As thought

de
73. 40 iv. 3.13.

9.18, 9.42; 69. 10 264; Plato the Menexenus, 248.
ii.
in
See
8
Cvi. 48. 11 Rep. C.287. 12 See 42 As Aristotle asked, de Me

x.
iv. 3.7. 13 See iv. 3.6. 14 See moria et Remin.
1.
48 See
ii. i.
iv. 3.6. 15 Generative. 16 See 44 Plato, Philebus,
C
1.11.
iii. 2.16. 17. In the sense that As thought Plato,
45
the
in
it
359.
has no limits. 18 See iv. 3.15. Philebus, 46 As
ii.
C
357.
As thought Xenocrates and thought Plato his Philebus,
19
in
Aristotle, Coelo,
de
1.12; iv.
ii.
C
10. 363. 47 See

i.
i.
20 See iv. 3.10. 21 Philo, 3.32; the irrational soul, which

de Sommis, 648, de Mon an image of the rational
M
is
archia, 217. 22.See iii.6.16, 17. soul, plunged the dark

M
in
is
As said Numenius, of sense-life. 48 As

24 28
fr.
32. ness
As did Discord, Homer's thought Plato his Philebus,
in
in
Iliad, iv. 443. Cii. 359. 49 In iv. 3.27. 50 As

25
ii. ii.
See 9.7.
thought Aristotle,
de
26 See 7.1. 27 See 3.7.

v.
Mem.
1.
51.
28 Plato, Rep. Có17; As thought Aristotle.

52
X.286. As
x.
24, 40, 43; iv. thought Aristotle.

4,
58
29 See iv. See

i.
9.3. 80 As was taught by 4.10. 54 As Numenius said,

Himerius; see also Plutarch fr. 32. 55 Another reading is:
and Themistius. 31. As Nu “All perceptions belong
to
forms
menius said, fr. 26.3. all things.”
82
In
to
which can reduce

his Timaeus, 35. Nu But this does not connect with
83
As said
menius, fr. 32. 84 See Aris the next sentence.
totle, Plato's Critias, Numen
iv.4] PSYCHOLOGICAL QUESTIONS-II 441
FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR.
Questions About the Soul.
(Second Part.)
SPEECH OF SOUL IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.
1. When the soul will have risen to the intelligible
world, what will she say, and what will she remember 2
She will contemplate the beings to which she will be
united and she will apply her whole attention thereto;
otherwise, she would not be in the intelligible world.
MEMORY OF SOUL IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.

Will she have no memory of things here below?
Will she not, for instance, remember that she devoted
herself to philosophy; and that, during her residence
on the earth, she contemplated the intelligible world?
No: for an intelligence entirely devoted to the object
its
of thought, cannot simultaneously contemplate the

intelligible and think something else.
of
The act
thought does not imply the memory having thought.
of
IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD ALL THINGS ARE

SIMULTANEOUS; HENCE NOT REMEMBERED.
But this memory posterior thought!
In
to
this
is
case, the mind which occurs has changed con

in
it
dition. therefore impossible that he who en

It
is
is
tirely devoted the pure contemplation the intel

of
to
ligible should simultaneously remember the things

If,
that formerly happened

as
him here below.

to
it
seems, thought is outisde of time, because all the intel
ligible essences, being eternal, have no relation with
time, it is evidently impossible that the intelligence
which has raised itself to the intelligible world should
have any memory of the things here below, or even
have absolutely any memory whatever; for each (of
the essences of the intelligible world) are always pres
ent to the intelligence which is not obliged to go
them successively, passing from one to the
lºsh
Other.
INTELLIGENCE UNITES AS IT RISES TO THE INTEL

LIGIBLE.
Will not the Intelligence divide itself in descending
(from the genera) to the species (or forms) 2 No:
for she reascends to the universal and the Superior
Principle.
NOT EVEN THE ASCENDED SOUL NEED BE DIVIDED.

Granting then that there is no division in the intel
ligence which possesses everything simultaneously;
will there not at least be division in the soul which has
risen to the intelligible world? Nothing however for
bids that the totality of the united intelligibles be
grasped by an intuition equally unitary and total.
THE UNITY OF APPERCEPTION IS MANIFOLD.

Is this intuition similar to the intuition of an object
by
its
grasped in entirety single glance,

or
does
it
of a
contain all the thoughts the intelligibles contem

plated simultaneously? Since the intelligibles offer
varied spectacle, the thought which grasps them must
a
equally multiple and varied, comprehend

be
evidently
ing several thoughts, like the perception single
of
a
Sense-object, face compre

of
for instance that

as
per
on
hends Several perceptions because the eye,

iv.4J PSYCHOLOGICAL QUESTIONS-II 443
ceiving the face, simultaneously sees the nose and the
other features.
IN THE INTELLIGIBLE ANTERIORITY REFERS TO

ORDER, NOT TO TIME.
It may be objected that it may happen that the
soul will divide and develop something which was
unitary. This thing must then already have been
divided in intelligence, but such a division is more like
an impression. As anteriority or posteriority in ideas
does not refer to time, so also will the mental con
ception of anteriority and posteriority not be subject
to temporal conditions, but refer to order (which pre
sides over intelligible things). For instance, on con
sidering a tree's order that extends from the roots to
the tree-top, priority and posteriority exists only under
the felation of order, inasmuch as the whole plant is
perceived at one single glance.
INTELLIGENCE IS NOT A UNITY; BUT ITS MANIFOLD

IS PRODUCED BY A UNITY.
How can things be prior or posterior, if the soul
that contemplates the One embrace all things? The
potentiality which is One is one in such a manner that it
is multiple when it is contemplated by another principle
(Intelligence), because then it is not simultaneously
all
things one single thought. Indeed, the actualiza

in
tions (of Intelligence) are not unity; but they are

a
all produced by ever permanent potentiality; they

an
therefore become multiple the other principles (the

in
intelligibles); for Intelligence, not being unity itself,

the multiple
its
of
can receive within breast the nature

which did not formerly exist (in the One).
THE SOUL DOES NOT EVEN REMEMBER HERSELF.
But does the Soul remember herself?
2.
Granted.
Probably not. He who contemplates the intelligible
world does not remember who he is; that, for instance,
he is Socrates, that he is a soul or an intelligence.
How indeed would he remember it? Entirely de
voted to the contemplation of the intelligible world,
he does not by thought reflect back upon himself; he
possesses himself, but he applies himself to the intel
ligible, and becomes the intelligible, in respect to which
he plays the part of matter. He assumes the form
of the object he is contemplating, and he then is him
self only potentially. Actually, he is himself only
when he thinks the intelligible. When he is himself
only, he is empty of all things, because he does not
think the intelligible; but if by nature he is such that
he is all things, in thinking himself, he thinks all
things. In this state, seeing himself actually by the
glance he throws on himself, he embraces all things
in this intuition; on the other hand, by the glance he
throws on all things, he embraces himself in the in
tuition of all things.
IN THE INTELLIGIBLE SELF-DIRECTION OF
THOUGHT IS NOT CHANGEABLENESS.
Under the above circumstances, the soul changes
thoughts—something that we above refused to admit.
Intelligence is indeed immutable; but the soul, situated
on the extremities of the intelligible world, may under
go some change when she reflects upon herself. In
deed, what applies to the immutable necessarily under
it,
goes some change in respect to because does not

it
always remain applied To speak exactly, there

to
it.
no change when the soul detaches herself from the

is
things that belong turn towards herself, and

to
is to
her
all
conversely; for the soul things, and the Soul

forms but one thing with the intelligible. But when
the soul the intelligible world, she becomes es
in
is
all
tranged from herself and from that belongs her;

to
then, living purely the intelligible world, she par

in
all
its
ticipates in immutability, and she becomes that
it
is; for, this superior
to
as
as
Soon she has raised herself
region, she must necessarily unite herself Intelli
to
gence, towards which she has turned, and from which
no longer Separated by
an
she intermediary. On
is
rising towards intelligence, the soul attunes herself
a to
it,
and consequently unites herself with durably,
in
it
manner Such that both are simultaneously single and
this state the soul cannot change; she
In
double.
is
immutably devoted thought, and she simultaneously
to
has Self-consciousness, because she forms unity with
a
the intelligible world.
THE SOUL BECOMES WHAT SHE REMEMBERS.
When the soul departs from the intelligible
3.
world; continuing unity

of
form
to
when instead
a
it,
with become independent,

to
to
she wishes become
distinct, and belong herself; when she inclines
to
to
towards the things here below, then she remembers

The memory intelligible things hinders her
of
herself.
from falling, that terrestrial things makes her de
of
scend here below, and that celestial things makes

of
her dwell general, the soul and be

In
in
heaven.
is
comes what she remembers. Indeed,

is to
remember
If to is
or
to
think imagine; now, imagine

it to
not indeed
possess thing, but conform
to
to
to
it.
see and
a
the Soul see sense-things, by the very act looking

of
at
them she Somehow acquires some extension. As

she things other than herself only secondarily, she
is
them perfectly.
of
none Placed and established on

is
the sense and intelligible worlds, she

of
the confines
may equally move towards either.
MEMORY IS NOT AS HIGH AS UNREFLECTIVE

IDENTIFICATION.
the intelligible world, the soul sees the Good
In
4.
by intelligence; for intelligence does not hinder her

from arriving to the Good. Between the soul and the

Good, the intermediary is not the body, which could
be no more than an obstacle; for if the bodies can
ever serve as intermediaries, it would only be in the
process of descending from the first principles to third
rank entities. When the soul occupies herself with
inferior objects, she possesses what she wished to
possess conformably to her memory and imagination.
Consequently memory, even should it apply itself to
the very best things, is not the best thing possible; for
it consists not only in feeling that one remembers, but
also in finding oneself in a disposition conformable to
the affections, to the earlier intuitions which are re
membered. Now it may happen that a soul possesses
something unconsciously, so that she possesses it better
than if she were conscious thereof. In fact, when she
is conscious thereof, she possesses it like something
foreign to her, and from which she is keeping herself
distinct; when, on the contrary, she is unconscious of
it she becomes what she possesses; and it is especially
this latter kind of memory which can most thoroughly
effect her degradation (when she conforms herself to
sense-objects, by applying her imagination thereto).
INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES ARE NOT MERELY IMAGES,

BUT POTENTIALITIES FOR MEMORY.
That the soul, on leaving the intelligible world,
brings away with her memories thereof, implies that
even in the (intelligible) world she to a certain de
gree already possessed memory; but this potentiality
was eclipsed by the thought of the intelligible entities.
It would be absurd to insist that the latter existed in
the soul in the condition of simple images; on the con
trary, they there constituted an (intellectual) poten
tiality which later passed into the condition of actuali
zation. Whenever the soul happens to cease apply
ing herself to the contemplation of intelligible entities
what she formerly saw (that
is,
she no longer sees
sense-objects).
INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES RETURN, NOT BY MEMORY,

BUT BY FURTHER VISION.
Are our notions of intellectual entities actual
5.
ized by the potentiality which constitutes memory?

not intuitions, by memory
be
these notions
If
it
is
that they become actualized; they are intuitions,
it
if
by the potentiality which has given them
us
on
to
is
us
high. This power awakes every time that we
it in
intelligible things, that which sees what
to
rise
in
is
we later talk about. We do not perceive intelligible
or
entities by imagination reasoning, which itself
is
by
its
forced principles from elsewhere;

to
draw
is
it
our faculty
us
contemplation,
of
which alone enables

to
speak
of
them while we are here below. We see

them by awaking ourselves here below the same
in
potentiality which we are
in
to
arouse when we are

the intelligible world. We resemble man who,
a
climbing the peak rock, should, by his glance,

of
a
discover objects invisible for those who have not

climbed with him.
WHEN SOULS DESCEND FROM THE INTELLIGIBLE

TO THE HEAVENS, THEY RECOGNIZE EACH OTHER.
Reasonable arguments therefore clearly demon
strate that memory manifests the Soul only when she
in
has descended from the intelligible world into the

(earthly) heavens. Likewise, would not surprise
it
if,
us
when she had risen from here below

to
the
heavens, and had dwelt there, she should remember
great number things from here below,
of
of
which
a
we have already spoken, and that she would recognize

many Souls which she had known earlier, since these
be
latter must necessarily joined bodies with similar

to
countenances. Even though the souls should change

the shapes of their bodies, making them spherical, they

would still be recognizable by their habits and indi
vidual character. There is nothing incredible in this,
for in admitting that these souls have purified them
selves from all these passions, nothing hinders them
from preserving their character. Besides, if they can
converse with each other, they have this as an ad
ditional means of recognizing each other.
TRAINING HERE BELOW WILL HELP THE SOULS TO

REMEMBER WHEN BEYOND.
What happens when souls descend from the intel
ligible world into the (earthly) heavens? They then
recover memory, but they possess it in a degree less
than the souls who have always occupied themselves
with the same objects. Besides, they have many other
things to remember, and a long space of time has
made them forget many actions.
FALL INTO GENERATION MAY BE PARTIAL; AND

MAY BE RECOVERED FROM, BEFORE RUIN.
if,
But after having descended into the sense-world

they fall (from the heavens) into generation, what
be
will the time when they will remember? not

is
It
necessary that the souls (which depart from the in

telligible world) should fall into the lowest regions.
possible that, after having descended only little
It
is
be
from the intelligible world their movement may

arrested, and nothing hinders them from returning on
high before they have become degraded the lower
in
regions generation.
of
MEMORY IS LIMITED TO SOULS THAT CHANGE

THEIR CONDITION.
be
may therefore fearlessly affirmed that the

6.
It
souls which exercise their discursive reason, and which

*
change condition, remember; for memory is the char

acteristic of things that were, but no more are.
DO THE WORLD-SOUL AND THE STAR-SOULS

EXERCISE MEMORYP
But evidently the souls which dwell in the same
state could not exercise memory; for what would they
have to remember? If (ignoring our arguments
above) human reason should wish to attribute mem
all
ory to the souls of the stars, especially
it of
to
that
the moon and the sun, there nothing
to
hinder
from doing the same with regard is
the universal Soul,
would dare Jupiter mem to
to
a to
and attribute even
it
ories which would occupy him with thousand dif

ferent things. As soon will have entered into
as
it
ideas, reason would proceed speculate

of
at of to
this order
about the conceptions and ratiocinations the star
is,
souls—that granting that they reason all. (But

that gratuitous assumption); for these Souls
is
if
a
have nothing discover, they do not doubt, they

of to
if
if
do
have no need anything, they not learn things

if
that they have ignored before, what use would they

or
reasoning, arguments, the conceptions

of
of . of
of
make
They have
no
seeking
of
of
discursive reason need

2
mechanical means governing human affairs and

events; for they enforce order the universe
in
in
a
totally different manner.
THESE SOULS DO NOT REMEMBER GOD; FOR THEY

CONTINUE To SEE HIM.
Will
these souls not even remember that they
7.
divinity? (They have doing

as no
of
have seen the need

So, for) they see Him all the time; long they
as
continue see Him they cannot say that they have

to
seen Him, because such statement would imply that

a
they see Him

no
more.
MEMORY IS IMPOSSIBLE TO THESE SOULS, FOR TO

THEM THERE IS NO TIME, BUT ONE SINGLE DAY.
Will they not even remember that they performed
their revolution yesterday, or the year before, that
they lived yesterday, and since have lived a long
while 2 They still live continuously; now, what re
mains the same, is one. To try to distinguish yester
day and last year in the movement of the stars, is to
do like a man who would divide into several parts the
movement which forms one step, who would wish to
reduce unity to multiplicity. Indeed, the movement
of the stars is one, although it is by us subjected to a
measure, as if it were multiple; so we count the days
different one from the other because the nights sepa
rate them from each other. But since there is but one
single day in the heavens, how could one count
several? How could there be a “last year”?
BUT WHY COULD THE STAR-SOULS NOT BE
CONSCIOUS OF OUR CHANGESP
It may be objected that the space transversed (by
planets) is not a unity, but contains several parts, as
notably in the zodiac. Why then could the celestial
Soul not say, “I have passed this part, I have now
arrived at another”? Besides, if the star-souls con
sider human things, how would they not see that there
are changes here below, that the men existing to-day
have succeeded others? If so, they must know that
other men have already existed, that there have been
other facts. They therefore possess memory.
MANY NEW THINGS ARE UNNOTICED; NOTHING

FORCES THE PERCEPTION OF NEW THINGS.
8. It is not necessary to remember all one sees, nor
by imagination to represent to oneself all the things
that follow fortuitously. Besides, when the mind pos
sesses a knowledge and a clear conception of certain

objects which later come to offer themselves to his
senses, nothing, forces him to abandon the knowledge
he has acquired by intelligence, to look at the partic
ular sense-object which is in front of him, unless he be
charged to administer some of the particular things
contained in the notion of the all.
MEMORY IS NOT COMPULSORY.

Now, to enter into details, let us first say that one
does not necessarily retain all one has seen. When
something is neither interesting nor important, the
senses, impressed by the diversity of objects without
our voluntary direction of consciousness, are alone
affected; the soul does not perceive the impressions
because there is no utility in them for her. When the
soul is turned towards herself, or towards other ob
jects, and when she applies herself to them entirely,
she could not remember these indifferent things, for
she does not even perceive them when they are pres
ent. Neither is it necessary that the imagination
should represent to itself what is accidental; nor, if
it does represent them to itself, that it should
retain them faithfully. It is easy to be convinced that
a sense-impression of this kind is not perceived, on the
ground of the following arguments. In the act of
walking we divide, or rather traverse the air, without
any conscious purpose; consequently we neither notice
if it,
it,
while we press forward. Likewise,

of
nor think
we had not decided take some particular road,
to
and unless we could fly through the air, we would not

the region the earth where we are, nor
of
of
of
think
the distance we have traveled. This proved by the
is
fact that when the mind possesses the general knowl

edge what occurs, and sure that the things will
as of
is
occur planned, man no longer attends

to
details.
a
do
person continues the same thing,

to
if
Besides,
a
it would be useless to continue to observe the similar
details. Consequently if the stars, while following
their courses, carry out their duties without attending to
the occurence of what goes on; and unless their chief
duty is to observe occurrences or the occurence itself;
and if their progress is nothing more than accidental,
while their attention is held by other and greater ob
jects; and if they regularly continue to pass through
the same orbit without considering the calculation of
time, even if it had already been divided (under these
four conditions); there is no need to suppose that
these stars would have a memory of the places they
pass by, or of their periods. ' Their life would be uni
form; because they always travel through the same
is,
so
places, so that their movement speak, more
to
vital than local, because produced by single
is
it
it a
living being (the universe), which, realizing within
itself, exteriorly rest and interiorly motion by
at
in
is
its eternal life.
STAR-MOTIONS COMPARED TO BALLET-CHORUS.

A
be
the stars might compared

of
The movement
to
us
suppose that
of
that choric ballet. Let had

it
a
but limited duration; its motion would be considered

a
end;
in as
perfect, totality, from beginning

beto
viewed
if
parts only, im
its
but considered would

if
beit it
perfect. Now we suppose that exists always;

if
be
then will always perfect. always perfect,

If
it
it
be
be
there will neither time nor place where

is
it
coming perfect; consequently, will not even have

it
any desire, and will measure nothing, neither by time

it
nor place; and therefore will not remember either.

STARS HAVE NO MEMORY BECAUSE THEY ARE
UNIFORMLY BLISSFUL.
Besides, the stars enjoy blissful life because they
in a
contemplate the real life their own souls; because

they all
aspire the One, and, radiating into the
to
entire heavens, like cords that vibrate unison, they
in
produce kind symphony by their natural harmony.
of
a
Last, the entire heavens revolve;
of so
also do their parts,
which, spite the diversity their motions, and
of
in
of
their positions, all gravitate towards same centre.
a
Now all these facts support the theory we have ad
vanced, since they show that the life
of
the universe
one system, and uniform.
is
is
QUESTION: DOES JUPITER'S ROYAL ADMINISTRA

TION IMPLY USE OF MEMORYP
A
Jupiter, who governs the world, and endues

9.
a it
with order and beauty, possesses from all eternity"
royal soul and intelligence; produces things by his
he
providence, and regulates them by his power; an
in
orderly manner the develop
he
disposes everything
in
the numerous periods

of
of
ment and achievement the
Do not such acts on Jupiter's part imply use
of
stars.
memory by which he may know what periods have
already been accomplished, and busy himself with the
preparation others by his combinations, his calcula
of
tions, and reasonings? His being the most skilful

administrator the world would seem imply that he
to
in
uses memory.
THE INFINITY OF JUPITER'S LIFE OPPOSES HIS USE

OF MEMORY.
We might well, respect the memory
of
to
these
in
periods, examine the number these periods, and

of
known Jupiter; for finite

to
whether be
is
if
it
it
number, the universe will have had commencement

a
within time; but be infinite, Jupiter will not have

if
it
he
know how many things

to
been able has done.

(To solve this problem) we must admit that Jupiter
ever enjoys knowledge, single and unitary life.
in
a
he
be
this sense that must infinite and possess

in
is
it
unity, not by a knowledge come to him from without,
but interiorly, by his very nature, because the infinite
ever remains entire in him, is inherent in him, is con
templated by him, and is not, for him, simply the ob
ject of an accidental knowledge. Indeed, while know
ing the infinity of his life, Jupiter simultaneously
knows that the influence he exercises on the universe
is single; but his knowledge thereof is not due to his
exercising it on the universe.
JUPITER MAY BE TAKEN IN A DOUBLE SENSE.

10. The principle which presides over the order
of the universe is double; from one point of view he is
the demiurge; from the other, the universal Soul. By
the name of Jupiter, therefore, we designate both the
demiurge, and the “Governor of the universe.” As
to the demiurge, we must dismiss all notions of past or
future, and attribute to him nothing but a life that is
uniform, immutable, and independent, of time. But
the life of the governor of the universe (which is the
universal Soul), raises the question whether she be also
free from any necessity of reasoning, and of planning
what is to be done? Surely, for the order which is to
rule has already been devised and decided, and that
without having been ordered; for that which is in order
was that which became, and the process of becoming
eventuates in order. The latter is the activity of the
Soul which depends from an abiding wisdom, a wisdom
whose image is the order existing within the soul. As
the wisdom contemplated by the soul does not change,
neither does its action. Indeed, the Soul contemplates
wisdom perpetually; if she ceased, she would lapse
into incertitude, for the soul is as unitary as her work.
This unitary principle that governs the world domin
ates perpetually, and not only occasionally; for
whence should there be several powers, to struggle
among each other, or get into uncertainties? The
principle that administers the universe is therefore

unitary, and ever wills the same. Why, indeed, should
she desire now one thing, and then another, and thus
involve herself in uncertainties? Still, even if she
altered herself under unitary conditions, she would not
be involved in difficulties. That the universe contains
a great number and kinds of parts opposed to each
other is no reason that the Soul does not with cer
tainty know how to arrange them. She does not begin
by objects of lowest rank, nor by parts; she directs
by the principles. Starting from these, she easily suc
ceeds in putting everything in order. She dominates
because she persists in a single and identical function.
What would induce her to wish first one thing, and
then another? Besides, in such a state of affairs, she
would hesitate about what she ought to do, and her
action would be weakened, and this would result in a
weakness of her activities, while deliberating about
still undecided plans.
RATIOCINATION HAS NO PLACE IN THE WORLD
SOUL.
1 1. The world is administered like a living being,
namely, partly from the outside, and from the result
ing members, and partly from within, and from the
principle. The art of the physician works from out
in,
deciding which organ fault, operating only

at
side
is
with hesitation and after groping around experi

mentally. Nature, however, starting within from the
principle, has no need The power which
to
deliberate.
administers the universe proceeds not like the phy
preserves its simplicity
so
sician, but like nature.

It
its
comprises everything breast,

as
much the better

in
it
all things are parts the living being

of
as
inasmuch
which one. Indeed, nature, which unitary, dom
is
is
it,
inates all individual natures; these proceed from but

remain attached thereto, like branches
of
an immense
tree, which is the universe. What would be the utility
of reasoning, calculation, and memory in a principle
that possesses an ever present and active wisdom, and
which, by this wisdom, dominates the world and ad
ministers it in an immutable manner? That its works
are varied and changeful, does not imply that this
principle must itself participate in their mutability. It
remains immutable even while producing different
things. Are not several stages produced successively
its
in each animal, according to various ages? Are
at
not certain parts born and increased determinate
as
periods, such the horns, the beard, and the breasts?

Does one not see each being begetting others? Thus,
without the degeneration
of
the earlier (“seminal)
reasons,” others develop their turn. This proved
in
is
by the (“seminal) reason” subsisting identical and en
tire within the same living being.
THIS UNIVERSAL WISDOM IS PERMANENT BECAUSE

TIMELESS.
We are therefore justified asserting the rule
of
in
one and the same wisdom. This wisdom universal;

it is
the permanent wisdom the world; multiple

of
is
is
it
and varied, and one, because

at
the same time

is
is it
it
the living Being which one, and

of
the wisdom
is
is
the greatest invariable, spite

of
of
all. the
in
It
it is
multiplicity its works;

of
constitutes the Reason which

one, and still all things simultaneously. were
If
is
is
it
of
not all things, would, instead being the wisdom

of
beit
the universe, only the latter and in

of
the wisdom
dividual things.
WISDOM, IN THE WORLD-SOUL DOES NOT IMPLY

REASONING AND MEMORY.
may perhaps objected that this might be
be
12.
It
nature, but that whereas the Soul-of-the-uni

of
true
verse contains wisdom, this implies also reasoning and

memory. This objecttion could be raised only by
its
persons who by “wisdom” understand that which is
absence, and mistake the search for wisdom for reason
be
able thinking. For what can reasoning but the
quest wisdom, the real reason, the intelligence
of
of
the real essence? He who exercises reason resembles
plays the lyre exercise himself, acquire
to
to
man who
a
playing
it,
and, general,
of
man who
to
the habit
in
a
know. He seeks indeed acquire
to
to
learns order
in
Science, whose possession the distinguishing char

is
sage.
of
acteristic Wisdom consists therefore
in
a
a
stable condition. This seen even the conduct of
in
is
he
he
as
the reasoner; has found what sought,

as
Soon
reason, and rests the possession
of
to
he ceases
in
wisdom.
OMNISCIENT INTUITION MAKES MEMORY AND

REASONING SUPERFLUOUS.
Therefore, the governing Power
of
the world
if
be
resemble those who learn, will necessary

to
seems
it
reasoning, reflection, and memory, so

to
to
attribute
it
or
that may compare the past with the present the

it
knowledge
be
its
if,
future. But on the contrary, such

to
have nothing more learn, and

it to
to
as
remain
in
a
perfectly stable condition, evidently possesses wisdom

by itself. know future things—a privilege that
If
it
absurdity—why
be
under penalty
to of
could not denied

it
would not also know how they are occur Know

it
of 2
ing all this, would have no further need compar

it
ing the past with the present. Besides, this knowledge

its future will not resemble the prevision the fore
of
of
tellers, but the certitude entertained by makers about

to
their handiwork. This certitude admits no hesitation,

no ambiguity; absolute;
as
as
soon has obtained

is
it
it
assent, remains immutable. Consequently, the wis

it
as
dom about the future the same about the present,

is
is,
because it is immutable; that without ratiocination.
If,
however, did not know the future things
to
was
it
it
produce,
to
would not know how produce them, and
it
would produce them without rule, accidentally, by
it
remains immutable; con

its
chance.
Inproduction,
it
as
sequently, produces without changing,
at
least
it
far permitted by the model borne within Its

as
it.
action therefore uniform, ever the same; otherwise,
is
its
the soul might err. contain differ
to
work was
ences, If
does not derive these from itself, but from
it
the (“seminal) reasons” which themselves proceed

from the creating principle. Thus the created things
depend from the series reasons, and the creating
of
principle has no need hesitate, deliberate, neither

to
to
painful work,
to
support was thought by some

as
a
philosophers who considered the task regulating the
of
universe wearisome. would indeed be tiresome
It
a
strange matter, that one which is,
to
task handle
is
a
unmanageable. But when power by itself dominates

a
forms), anything but

of
(what cannot have need

it
it
its
is,
itself and its counsel; that wisdom, for such

power the counsel identical with wisdom. in
It
is
a
therefore needs nothing for creation, since the wisdom

possesses not borrowed wisdom. needs
is
It
it
nothing (extraneous or) adventitious; consequently,

neither reasoning nor memory, which faculties yield
us
nothing but what adventitious.

is
IN THE WORLD-SOUL WISDOM IS THE HIGHEST AND

NATURE THE LOWEST.
13. How would such wisdom differ from So
a
called nature? (In the Soul) wisdom occupies the

first rank, and nature the last. Nature only the
is
image wisdom; now, nature occupy no more

of
if
than the last rank, she must also have only the last de
gree the reason that enlightens the Soul. As illus
of
tration, take which the figure im

on
piece wax,
of
a
pressed on one side penetrates to the other; and whose
well-marked traits on the upper face appear on the
lower face only in a confused manner. Such is the
condition of nature. She does not know, she only pro
duces, blindly she transmits to matter the form she pos
sesses, just as some warm object transmits to another,
buf in a lesser degree, the heat it itself possesses.
Nature does not even imagine: for the act of imagining,
inferior as it is to that of thinking, is nevertheless
superior to that of impressing a form, as nature does
Nature can neither grasp nor understand anything;
it.
while imagination seizes the adventitious object and
he
permits the one who imaging know what it to
has
is
experienced. As nature, all knows beget;

to
to
is
the active potentiality (of the
of
the actualization
is
it
universal Soul). Consequently, Intelligence possesses

intelligible forms; the (universal) Soul has received
them, and ceaselessly receives them from her; that
in is
what her life consists of; the clearness which shines
her thought.
of
her the consciousness she has The

is
reflection which (the Soul herself projects on matter

nature, which terminates the series
of
essences, and
is
occupies the last rank the intelligible world; after

in
her, there nothing but imitations (of beings). Nature,

is
on
while acting matter passive respect (to the

in
is
Soul). The (Soul), superior nature, acts without

to
suffering. Finally, the supreme (Intelligence) does

not (itself) act on the bodies
or
on matter.
THERE IS CONTINUITY BETWEEN NATURE AND THE

ELEMENTS.
by
14. The bodies begotten nature are the ele

As the animals and the plants, do they
to
ments.
the air possesses the light which
as
possess nature
when retiring does not injure the air, because never
it
it?
mingled with the air, and remained separate from

Or animals and plants the
to
is
nature's relation
same as that of the fire with a heated body, to which,

on retiring, it leaves a warmth which is different from
the heat characteristic of the fire, and which constitutes
a modification of the heated body? Surely this. To
the essence which it moulds, nature gives a shape,
which is different from the form proper to nature
herself. We might however still consider whether there
be any intermediary between nature and the essence
which she moulds. However, we have sufficiently de
termined the difference that exists between nature and
the wisdom which presides over the universe.
HOW CAN TIME BE DIVIDED WITHOUT IMPLYING

DIVISION OF THE SOUL’S ACTION?
15. We still have to solve one question bearing on
the above discussion. If eternity relate to Intelli
gence, and time to the Soul—for we have stated that
the existence of time is related to the actualization of
the Soul, and depends therefrom—how can time be
divided, and have a past, without the Soul's action
itself being divided, without her reflection on the past
constituting memory in her? Indeed, eternity implies
identity, and time implies diversity; otherwise, if we
suppose there is no change in the actualizations of the
Soul, time will have nothing to distinguish it from
eternity. Shall we say that our souls, being subject
to change and imperfection, are in time, while the
universal Soul begets time without herself being in it?
IN TIME ARE ACTIONS AND REACTIONS OF THE
SOUL.; BUT NOT THE SOUL HERSELF.
Let us admit that the universal Soul is not in time;
why should she beget time rather than eternity? Be
cause the things she begets are comprised within time,
instead of being eternal. Neither are the other souls
within time; nothing of them, except their “actions
and reactions” (Stoic terms). Indeed, the souls
themselves are eternal; and therefore time is subse
quent to them. On the other hand, what is in time
is less than time, since time must embrace all that is
it,
within Plato says, that time embraces all that -

as
is
number and place.
in
QUESTION: EVEN THE PRIORITY OF ORDER IMPLIES

TEMPORAL CONCEPTION.
A
(uni
be
16. may however objected that the
if
It
versal Soul) contain things which they

in
the order
in
were successively produced, she thereby contains
Then,
as
them earlier and later. she produce them
if
within time, she inclines towards the future, and con
Sequently, also conversely the past.
to
EARLIER AND LATER EXIST ONLY IN WHAT IS

BEGOTTEN; NOT IN THEIR SEMINAL REASON.
be
may answered that the conceptions
of
earlier
It
and later apply only things which are becoming;
in
to
the Soul, on the contrary, there no past; all the

is
(“seminal) reasons” are simultaneously present her, to

as
has already been said. On the contrary, begotten

in
things, the parts do not exist simultaneously, because

they
do
not all exist together, although they all exist

together within the (“seminal) reasons.” For in
or
stance, the feet the hands exist together the

in
(“seminal) reasons,” but the body they are separate.

in
Nevertheless, these parts are equally separated, but

the (“seminal) reason,”
as
different manner,
in
in
a
they are equally anterior different

to
each other
in
a
manner. however they be thus separate the

in
If
(“seminal) reason,” they then differ nature.

in
THINGS WHICH ARE ANTERTOR CAN BE ONLY IN

LOWER PRINCIPLES.
But how are they anterior
to
each other? must

It
be because here he who commands identical with

is
him who commanded. Now commanding he ex

in
is
all
presses one thing after another; for why are things
he
not together? (Not so). the command and who
If
commands were separate entities, the things would
have been produced they have
as
the same manner
in
been expressed (by speech); but
as
the commander
is
himself the first command, he does not express things
(by speech),
he
only produces them one after the other.
were (by speech) actually
he
he
express what
to
If
does, he would have consider the order; conse
to
be
quently, he would have separate from
to
it.
it
Is
asked, how can the commander be identical with the
command? He not simultaneously form and mat
is
ter, but form alone (that the totality is,
of
the reasons
which are simultaneously present him). Thus, the
to
Soul both the potentiality and the actualization which
is
occupy the second rank after Intelligence. To have

parts some which are prior others suits only such
to
of
be
as
objects cannot everything simultaneously.
DIAGRAM OF THE UNIVERSE.

Soul,
as
The such we are considering her here,
is is
something venerable; she resembles circle which
a
the centre, and which develops without

to
united
leaving (its base operations, the centre), thus form
of
an
ing undivided extension. To gain conception

of
a
the three principles, the Good may be

as of
the order
an immov
as
considered centre, the Intelligence

a
as
able circle, and the Soul an external movable circle

impelled by desire.
CIRCULAR MOVEMENT OF THE SOUL.

Indeed, intelligence possesses and embraces the
Good immediately; while the Soul can only aspire
to
(the Good), which located above the Intelligence.

is
The whole world-sphere possessing the Soul which thus

aspires (to the Good), moved by the promptings
of
is
Its natural aspiration, how

its
natural aspirations.
ever, is to rise in bodily aspiration to the principle on

the outside of which it is; namely, to extend around
it,
turn, and consequently
to
to
move circle.
in
a
THE INTELLECTUAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE
WORLD-SOUL, AND SOULS OF STARS, EARTH
AND MEN.
17. Why are the thoughts and rational aspirations
us
(from what they are

in
different the universal
in
Why
us
posteriority respect
to
Soul) there
in
in
is
2
time (as we conceive things Successive manner,

in
a
while the universal Soul conceives them simultane
ously) Why do we have question ourselves to
2
(about this) because several forces are active

Is
it
us, and contend for mastery, and there no single

in
is
one which alone commands? because we suc
Is
it
cessively need various things satisfy our needs, be

to
cause our present not determined by itself, but refers

is
things which vary continually, and which are out

to
Yes, that the reason why our

of
side ourselves?
is
change according the present oc

to
determinations
casion and need. Various things come from the outside
in us
as
to
offer themselves successively. Besides,

to
several forces dominate us, our imagination neces

sarily has representations that are various, transient,
modified by each other, and hindering the movements
each power
of
of
and actions characteristic the Soul.

Thus, when lust arises us, imagination represents
to
in
us
the desired object, warns us, and instructs

us
about
us
the passion born lust, and the same time begs

of
of
it. at
it,
satisfy this state, the soul

In
to
to
to
listen and
floats uncertainty, whether grant the appetite
to
in
it
to or
the desired satisfaction, Anger,

it.
whether she refuse

for instance, excites vengeance, and thereby pro
us
duces the same uncertainty. The needs and passions

the body also suggest varying actions and
of
us
to
opinions;
do
as
also the ignorance the true goods,

of
the soul's inability to give a certain judgment, while

in this hesitating condition, and the consequences
which result from the mingling of the things we have
just mentioned. Still our own highest part makes
judgments more certain than those reached by the
part common (to the soul and to the body), a part
that is very uncertain, being a prey to diversity of
Opinions.
SOULS, ACCORDING TO MORALIZATION, RESEMBLE

VARIOUS FORMS OF GOVERNMENT.
Right reason, on descending from the higher realms
of the Soul into the common part, is by this mingling
weakened, although it is not naturally weak; thus, in
the tumult of a numerous assembly, it is not the wisest
counsellor whose word carries weight; but on the con
trary, that of the most turbulent and quarrelsome, and
the tumult they make forces the wise man to stay
seated, powerless and vanquished, by the noise. In
the perverse man, it is the animal part that rules; the
diversity of influences which overcome this man repre
sents the worst of governments (the rule of the mob).
In the commonplace man, things happen as in a re
public where some good element dominates the re
mainder, which does not refsue to obey. In the
virtuous man, there is a life which resembles the
aristocracy, because he manages to withdraw from the
influence of the commonplace part, and because he
listens to what is best in himself. Finally, in the best
man, completely separated from the common part,
reigns one single principle from which proceeds the
order to which the remainder is subject. It would
seem therefore that there were two cities, the one
superior, and the other inferior, which latter derives
its order from the former. We saw that the universal
Soul was a single identical principle which commands
uniformly; but other souls, as we have just explained,

are in a very different condition. Enough of this.
THE BODY IS NOT US, BUT OURS.

18. Does the body, thanks to the presence of the
its it,
soul that vivifies possess something which becomes
its
is or
characteristically own, possession nothing
is
this the only thing added
its
more than nature, and

Evidently, the body which enjoys the
to
the body?
presence the soul, and nature, would not re
of
in of
corpse. the air,
be
of
semble will the condition
is It
a
not when the air penetrated by the sun-light (for

then really receives nothing), but when participates
it
it
the heat. Therefore, plant and animal bodies that
in
possess “a nature,” find that

of
consists the shadow
it
this body, thus vivified by nature, that

of
to
soul.
is
It
a
ex
us
sufferings and pleasures relate; but
to
for
is
it
perience these sufferings and pleasures without our

By
us
selves suffering. here meant the reasonable

is
soul, from which the body distinct, without however

is is
being foreign
it,
belongs
to
since ours (since to

it
it
us). Only because this, that ours, do we care

of
is
it
for We are not the body; but we are not entirely

it.
it;
separated from associated with us, depends

it
is
it
on us. When we say “we,” we mean by this word

what constitutes the principal part our being; the
of
body also “ours”: but another sense. Therefore

in
is
its
sufferings and pleasures are not indifferent us;

to
the weaker we are, the more we occupy ourselves with

it,
so
speak, plunged the most precious

of In
to
it.
is
part ourselves, which essentially constitutes the per

sonality, the man.
THE SOUL AND BODY TOGETHER FORM FUSION

A
OF BOTH.
The passions do not really belong the soul, but
to
the living body, which

or
to
the common part, the

is
fusion (of both, or the compound). The body and soul,

each taken Separately, are Self-sufficient. Isolated
and inanimate, the body does not suffer. It is not the
body that is dissolved, it is the unification of
its
parts.
Isolated, the soul impassible, indivisible, and by her
is
condition escapes all affections.
of
But the unification
or
two things less unstable, and on
to
Sure be more
is
its
occurrence, often happens that tested; hence

it
it
is
the pain. say, “two things,” not indeed two bodies,
I
because two bodies have the same nature; the present
be
being
of
to
to
case where one kind united
is
is
a
different kind, where the inferior being re

of
one
a
ceives something from the Superior being, but receives

only inability
its
that something, because
of
of
trace
a
to
receive her entirely. Then the whole comprises two

elements, but neverthelss forms only unity; which,
a
becoming something intermediary between what
it
was, and what has not been able become, becomes
to
it
seriously embarrassed, because has formed an un

it
fortunate alliance, not very solid, always drawn into

opposite directions by contrary influences. Thus
it is
it
one time elated, and another, dejected; when
it is at
its at
dejected, manifests suffering; when elated,

is
it
it
aspires communion between the body and the Soul.

to
THE SOUL FEELS THE PASSIONS WITHOUT EX

PERIENCING THEM.
19. why there

That pleasure and pain. That
is is
a is
why grief
be
perception dissolution,
of
to
said
is
when the body the image

of
threatened with the loss

is
ir
the soul (of being disorganized by losing the

of
rational soul). That why said that pleasure

is
is
is
it
perception produced the animal when the image

in
a
its
sway over the body.

of
the soul reassumes the

It
is
body which undergoes passion; but the Sense

is
it
potentiality the Soul which perceives the passion by

of
its
relation with the organs; which all the
to
she
is
it
sensations ultimately report themselves. The body
alone injured and suffers; for example, when one
is
cut, the body which cut;
of
member the mass
is
is
is
it
as
the Soul feels pain not merely mass, but
as
a
it, a
living mass. likewise with burn: the soul feels
is
It
a
as
because the sense-potentiality were receives its
it
reaction by
its
relations with the organs. The soul

entire feels the passion produced the body without
in
however herself experiencing
it.
UNLESS THE SOUL WERE IMPASSIBLE SHE COULD

NOT LOCALIZE AND MANAGE PAIN.
Indeed, the whole soul feels, she localizes the
as
passion the organ which has received the blow, and

in
which suffers. she herself experienced the suffering,
as
If
present the whole body, she could

of
the whole her

in in
is
not localize the suffering one organ; the whole

her would feel the suffering; she would not relate to of
it
all
any one part the body, but general: for she

of
to
in
present everywhere the body. The finger suffers,

in
is
and the man feels this suffering, because his

in is
it
finger. generally said that the man suffers his

is
It
finger, just
he
blond, because his eyes

as
said that
is
is
it
are blue. therefore the same entity that undergoes

is
It
passion’ and suffering, unless the word “suffering’

should not here designate both the passion, and the
of it;
sensation which follows this case no more

in
is
meant than that the state suffering accompanied

is
by sensation. The sensation itself not the suffering,

is
but the knowledge the suffering. The potentiality

of
know well, and

be
which knows must impassible

to
well perceived. For the faculty

to
indicate what
is
if
which indicate the passions itself suffer, will

to
is
it
either not indicate them, will indicate them badly.

or
it
THE APPETITES ARE LOCATED NEITHER IN BODY

NOR SOUL, BUT IN THEIR COMBINATION.
20. Consequently, it may be said that the origin
of the desires should be located in the common (com
bination) and in the physical nature. To desire and
Seek Something would not be characteristic of a body
in any state whatever (which would not be alive). On
the other hand, it is not the Soul which seeks after
sweet or bitter flavors, but the body. Now the body,
by the very fact that it is not simply a body (that it is
a living body), moves much more than the soul, and
its
is obliged to seek out a thousand objects to satisfy
needs sweet flavors, others, bitter
at
at
needs: times
it
flavors; again humidity, and later, heat; all
of
them
being things about which would not care, were
it
it
alone. As the Suffering accompanied by knowledge,
is
the soul, avoid the object which causes the suffering,

to
makes an effort which constitutes flight, because she

perceives the passion experienced by the organ, that
escape the harmful object. Thus every
to
contracts
thing that occurs the body known by sensation,
of in
is
and by that part the soul called nature, and which

gives the body On one hand,
of
trace the soul.

a
its
desire, which has origin the body, and reaches its

in
highest degree nature, attaches itself thereto. On

in
the other hand, sensation begets imagination, con

as
to or a
sequence which the soul satisfies her need, ab

of
stains, and restrains herself; without listening the

body which gave birth desire, nor the faculty which
to
later felt its reaction.
TWO KINDS OF DESIRES: OF THE BODY; AND OF

THE COMBINATION, OR NATURE.
Why therefore should we recognize two
in of
kinds
desires, instead acknowledging only one
of
kind
the living body? Because nature differs from the body
to which it gives life. Nature is anterior to the body

because it is nature that organizes the body by mould
it;
is it,
ing and shaping consequently, the origin de
of
nature, but the passions the living
of
sire not
in
in
body. the latter suffer, aspires possess things
to to
If
it it
contrary
to
those that make suffer, make pleasure

Succeed pain, and Satisfaction Succeed need. Nature,
mother, guesses the desires the body that has
of
like
a
suffered, tries it, While

to
to
direct and lure back.
it
thus trying
its
it,
Satisfy she thereby shares de

to
in
sires, and she proposes accomplish tothe same
might said that the body, by itself, pos
be
ends.
It
sesses desires and inclinations; that nature has some
it;
only result of the body, and because that,
of
as
a
finally the soul independent power which grants

an
is is
desired by the organism.

or
refuses what
DESIRES ARE PHYSICAL, BECAUSE CHANGEABLE IN

HARMONY WITH THE BODY.
the different ages shows
of
21. The observation

indeed the organism which the origin
is of
that
it
is
is
Indeed, these change according

as
desires. the man

child youth, sick Nevertheless that part
or
or
well.
a
a
of
of
the soul which the seat desires ever remains the

is
be
Consequently the variations

of
same. desire must

the organism.
is of
the variations But

to
traced back
this desiring faculty not always entirely
of
the soul
wakened by the excitation the body, although this
of
Often even before having de

to
subsists the end.

or
liberated, the soul will forbid the body drink

to
eat,
although the organism desires keenly
as
as
possible.
it
Nature herself also often forbids the satisfaction of the

bodily desire, because such desire may not seem
to
it
natural, and because she alone has the right

to
decide
its or
what things are harmonious contrary

to
to
nature.
The theory that the body, by different states Sug
gests different desires the soul's faculty desire,
of
to
does not explain how the different states of the body

can inspire different desires in the soul's faculty of
desire, since then it is not itself that it seeks to satisfy.
For it is not for itself, but for the organism, that the
soul's faculty of desire seeks foods, humidity or heat,
motion, agitation, or the Satisfaction of hunger.
RELATION OF DESIRE-FUNCTION TO THE VEGETA

TIVE POWERS.
22. It is possible, even in plant-life, to distinguish

something which is the characteristic property of their
bodies, and a power that imparts it to them. What in
us in the soul's faculty of desire, is in plant-life the
natural element (or, vegetative power).
PLATO IS IN DOUBT ABOUT THE EARTH'S SOUL;

WHETHER SHE IS LIKE THOSE OF STARS.
The earth also possesses a soul; and therefore also
such a potentiality; and it is from the earth that the
plants derive their vegetative potentiality. One might
reasonably first ask which is this soul that resides in
the earth. Does she proceed from the sphere of the
universe (to which alone Plato seems to attribute a
soul from the very first), so as to make of her an ir
radiation of this sphere upon the earth? Or should we
on the contrary, attribute to the earth a soul similar to
that of the stars, as Plato does when he calls the earth
the first and most ancient of the divinities contained
it,
within the interior of the heavens? Could this

in
case, be divinity, did not have soul?

It
is
if
it
a
therefore difficult to determine the exact state of af

of
fairs, and the very words

of
Plato here instead

diminishing our embarrassment, only increase
it.
At first, how will we manage

to
form reasonable
a
opinion on this subject? Judging from what the earth

grow, one might conjecture that possesses
to
causes
it
the vegetative potentiality. As many living beings are

seen to grow from the earth, why would it itself
not be a living being 2 Being besides a great living
being, and a considerable part of the world, why should
the earth not possess intelligence, and be a divinity?
Since we consider every star as a living being, why
would we not similarly consider the earth, which is a
part of the universal living being? It would, indeed,
be impossible to admit that it was exteriorly contained
by a foreign soul, and that interiorly it would have no
soul, as if it were the only being incapable of having an
individual soul. Why should we grant animation to
the (starry) bodies of fire, while not to the earthly body
of our earth? Indeed, bodies could as easily be of
earth as of fire. Not in the stars, any more than in
the earth, is there any nose, flesh, blood, or humours,
although the earth is more varied than the stars, and
although it be composed of all the other living bodies.
inability move, this can be said only
its
As to
to
in
(For capable
of
local motion. motion
to
reference
is
it
the respect that can feel.)

in
it
THE EARTH CAN FEEL AS WELL AS ANY OF THE

STARS.
will be asked, But how can the earth feel? We
It
shall answer turn, How can stars feel? not the

in
It
is
flesh that feels; soul not dependent for feeling on

is
a
body; but the body the soul for self

on
dependent
is
a
preservation. As the Soul possesses judgment, she

the body when
be
judge the passions

of
should
to
able
ever she applies her attention thereto.
QUESTION: WHAT PASSIONS WOULD BE SUITABLE

TO THE EARTHP
may however still asked, What are the passions
be
It
be
the earth, and which may objects

of
of
characteristic
judgment for the soul? It may besides be objected
that the plants, considered in the terrestrial element
that constitutes them, do not feel.
SENSATION WILL FIRST HAVE TO BE EXAMINED.
Let us now examine to what beings sensation be

longs, and whereby it operates. Let us see whether
Sensation can take place even without organs. Of
what use to the earth could sensation be 2 For it does
not serve the earth as means of knowledge; the knowl
edge which consists in wisdom suffices for the beings
to whom Sensation is of no use. This consideration
might however be denied, for the knowledge of sense
objects offers, besides utility, some of the charms of
is,
for example, the knowledge
of
the Muses. Such
the sun and the other stars, whose contemplation itself
agreeable. This problem will therefore demand
is
Solution.
RESTATEMENT OF PROBLEMS INVOLVED.

We must therefore first investigate the earth pos
if
what animals Sensation naturally be

to
sess senses,
be
longs, and how sensation operates. will neces
It
.
.
sary begin by discussing the doubtful points that we

to
have indicated, and general

to
examine sensation
in
if
can operate without organs, and the senses have

if
been given for utility, admitting even that they can

procure some other advantage.
CONCEPTIVE THOUGHT DEMANDS THE INTER

MEDIARY PROCESS OF SENSATION.
Conception sense-objects occurs when the
of
23.
the living being experiences perceptions by
or
soul
by
grasping the bodies’ inherent qualities, and repre

senting their forms The soul must therefore
to
itself.
without the body.
or
perceive sense-objects either with

How could the soul do so alone? Pure and isolated,

she can conceive only what she has within herself; she
can only think. But for conception of objects other
than herself, she must previously have grasped them,
either by becoming assimilated to them, or by finding
herself united to something which may have become
similar to them.
THE PURE SOUL WOULD REMAIN ISOLATED.

It is impossible for the soul to become similar to
sense-objects (in order to grasp them), by remain
ing pure. How indeed could a point become similar
to a line? The intelligible line itself could not become
conformed to the sense-line, any more than intelligible
fire to the sense-fire, or the intelligible man to the
sense-man. Nature herself which begets man could not
be identical with the begotten man. The isolated soul,
even if she could grasp sense-objects, will finish by
applying herself to the intuition of intelligible objects,
because, having nothing by which to grasp the former,
she will let them escape. Indeed, when the soul per
ceives from far a visible object, although only the form
reaches her, nevertheless what first began by being
for her indivisible, finally constitutes a subject, whether
it be
the Soul. jor or a figure, whose size is determined by
-
SENSATION DEPENDS ON THE SENSE-SHAPE,

WHICH, LIKE TOOLS, IS INTERMEDIATE.
The soul and the exterior object do not therefore
suffice (to explain sensation); for there would be
nothing that suffers. There must therefore be a third
is,
term that suffers, that which receives the sense

form, or, shape. This third term must “sympathize,”
or, share the passion object,
of
the exterior must

it
also experience the same passion, and

be
of
must the
it
same matter; and,

on
its
the other hand, passion must

be known by another principle; last, passion must
it,
keep something of the object which produces
without however being identical with The organ
it.
which suffers must therefore be of nature inter
a
mediary between the object which produces the pas
sion and the soul, between the sensible and the in
telligible, and thus play the part term intermediary
of
a
between the two extremes, being receptive on one side,
making announcements on the other, and becoming
equally similar The organ that
of to
to
both. become
is
be
the instrument knowledge must identical neither
with the subject that knows, nor with the object that
to is
them;
of
known. must become similar
to
both
It
the exterior object because suffers, and
to
the
it
cognizing soul because the passion which experiences
it
becomes form. Speaking more accurately, the sen
a
sations operate by the organs. This results from the

principle asserted above, that the soul isolated from
the body can grasp nothing the sense-world. As
in
used here, the word “organ” either refers the whole to to

or
body, some part the body fitted

in of
fulfil some
to
particular function;
as
sight.
of
or
the case touch
Likewise, easy artisans play
of
to
see that tools

is
it
a
part intermediary between the mind which judges, and
the object which judged; and that they serve dis
to
is
cover the properties For instance,

of
substances. a
(foot) rule, which equally conformed
to
the idea
is
straightness the mind, and the property

of
as of
to
in
straightness the wood, serves the artisan's mind

in
he
be
intermediary judge the wood works straight.

to
if
EXCLUSION OF OTHER SIDE ISSUES.

We have just demonstrated that sensation belongs
embodied soul, and that this implies
an
exclusively
to
do
organs. But we have nothing with the question

to
be
whether the perceived object must contact with

in
whether the sensation can take place

or
at
the organ,
a distance from the sense-object, by means of an inter
mediary; as the case of the fire which is located at a
distance from our body, without the intermediary's
suffering in any manner. It happens again where,
empty space serving as intermediary between the eye
and the color, one may well ask whether, to see, it
suffice to possess the potentiality proper to that organ.
But it is sure that sensation is some activity of the soul
in a body, or through a body.
ARE THE SENSES GIVEN US ONLY FOR THE SAKE

OF UTILITYP
24. Whether the senses were given us for the sake
of utility must be examined as follows. If the soul were
separated from the body, she would not feel; she feels
only when united to a body; therefore she feels by and
for the body. It is from the soul's intimacy with the
all
body that Sensation results, either because passions,
or
when keen enough, reach the Soul; whether the

us
senses were made for take care that no object

to
an
or
approaches too near us, exercises on our organs

action strong enough destroy them. so, the
to
If
us
senses were given utility.

of
for the sake Even

if
do
the senses acquire knowledge and informa

of to
serve
tion, they would being who possesses
be
to
no use
a
knowledge, but only one who needs

to
to
learn he has
or
being ignorant,
of
who needs
to
the misfortune
They
he
remember, because subject forgetfulness.

to
is
are therefore not found the being who has no need

in
to
learn, and who does not forget.
ARE SENSES GIVEN THE STARS FOR UTILITYP

be
us
Let consider what consequences may drawn

therefrom for the earth, the stars, and especially for
the heavens and the whole world. From what we have
seen, the parts of the world which suffer may possess
sensation in their relation with other parts. But is the
entire world, capable of feeling, as it is entirely im
its
passible in relations with itself? sensation de
If
mand on one hand an organ, and on the other the
sense-object, the world which includes everything, can
a be
have neither organ perceive, nor exterior object
to
to
perceived. We may therefore ascribe the world
to
as
intimate Sensation, such we ourselves possess,
of
sort
and deny the perception other objects.
in of
to
it
When we feel something unusual our bodies, we

perceive being external. Now we perceive
as
as
it
not only exterior objects, but even some part
of
our body through some other part the body
of
itself, similarly the world might very well perceive the
sphere the planets by means the sphere
of
of
of
the
fixed stars; and perceive the earth with all the objects
contains by means the sphere the planets?
of
of
If
it
these beings (the stars and the planets) do not feel the
passions felt by other beings, why might they not also
possess different senses? Might not the sphere
of
the
planets not only by itself, possess sight by itself, but
to in
be
the eye destined transmit what

is to
addition sees
it
the universal Soul? Since she luminous and animated,

an
she might see eye, Supposing that she did

as
does
not feel the other passions.” (Plato), however, said,
eyes.”
of of
“that the heavens have no need Doubtless

the heavens have nothing outside
to
themselves see;
and consequently, they may not have need eyes,
of
we have; but they contain something contemplate,

to
as
it be
namely, themselves. should objected that

If
is
it
it
be
uselsss for them see themselves, may

to
answered
that they were not made principally for this purpose,
and that they see themselves, only necessary
is
if
it
consequence Nothing
of
their natural constitution.

therefore hinders them from seeing, their body
as
is
diaphanous.
IF SENSATION IS A SOUL-DISTRACTION, THE STARS
WOULD NOT INDULGE THEREIN.
25. It would seem that in order to see, and in
general to feel, mere possession of the necessary organs
by the Soul, is not enough; the soul must also be dis
posed to direct her attention to things of sense. But
it is usual for the (universal) Soul to be ever applied
to the contemplation of intelligible things; and mere
possession of the faculty of sensation would not
necessarily imply
be
its
exercise, because would en
it
tirely devoted objects higher nature.
of
So when
to
we apply ourselves the contemplation intelligible
of of
to
things, we notice neither the sensation sight, nor

other senses; and, general, the attention
of
those
in
us
that we give one thing hinders from seeing the
to
per
us
Even among human beings, to
to
others. wish
our members through another, as, for
of
ceive one
instance, looking ourselves, both Superfluous and
at
is
vain, unless this has some very good purpose. More

over, an imperfect and fallible
of
characteristic
is
it to it
a
being contemplate some external thing, merely be

may therefore well
a be
cause beautiful. said

It
is
feel, hear and taste are distractions

of
to
that Soul
if
outer objects, the Sun and the

to
that attaches herself

other stars cannot see hear, except accidentally.
or
It
would however not be unreasonable admit that they

to
through the exercise

of
of
turn towards
us
the senses
Now,
or
sight hearing. they turn towards us, they

if
must be mindful of human affairs. would be absurd

It
that they should not remember the men whom they

to
much good; how indeed would they

do
do
so
good,
if
they had no memory?

THE EARTH FEELS AND DIRECTS BY THE LAWS OF
SYMPATHETIC HARMONY.
26. The stars know our desires through the agree
us
ment and sympathy established between them and

by the harmony reigning in the universe. Our desires
are granted by the same method. Likewise, magic is
founded on the harmony of the universe; it acts by
means of the forces which are interconnected by sym
pathy. If so, why should we not attribute to the earth
the faculty of sensation? Granting this, what sort of
sensations would we attribute to it? To begin with,
why should we not attribute to it touch, whether by
one part feeling the condition of another, and by the
transmission of the sensation to the governing power,
or by the whole earth feeling the fire, and other similar
things; for if the terrestrial element is inert, it certainly
is not insensible. The earth will therefore feel the
great things, and not those of minor importance. Wh
should it feel? Surely if the earth have a soul, she will
not ignore the strongest motions therein. The earth
must also be Supposed to feel, in order to dispose all
that depends on her for the benefit of humanity. All
these things she will suitably dispose by the laws of
harmony. She can hear and grant the prayers ad
dressed to her, but in a manner other than we our
Selves would do. Besides, she might exercise other
senses in her relations, either with herself, or with
foreign things; as, for example, to have the Sensations
of taste and smell perceived by other beings. Perhaps
even she has need to perceive the odors of the liquids
to fulfil her providential functions in respect to animals, -
and to take care of her own body.
THE EARTH'S SENSES MAY BE DIFFERENT FROM

OURS.
We must however not insist on her organs being the
same as ours. Not even in all animals are the Senses
similar. Thus, for instance, not all have similar ears,
and even those who have no ears at all nevertheless
will perceive sounds. How could the earth see, if light
be necessary for her vision? Nor must we claim for
her the necessity of having eyes. We have already

above granted that she possesses the vegetative power;
we should therefore thence draw the deduction that this
power is primitively by
its
spirit.
of
essence sort
a
be
What objection
to
then could there assume that this
spirit might Arguing
be
resplendent and transparent?

merely from
its
being spirit, we should
of
nature
a
(potentially least) conclude that transparent;
is at
is
it
and that actually transparent because illu
is
it
it
minated by the celestial sphere. therefore neither
It
is
impossible nor incredible that the soul
of
the earth
should possess sight. Besides, we must remember that
vile body, and that conse
of
this soul not that

is
a
be
quently, she must goddess. any case, this soul

In
a
be
must eternally good.
ANALYSIS OF THE EARTH'S PSYCHOLOGY.

plant-life the
to
27. the earth communicate

If
power begetting and growing, possesses this power

of
it
within itself, and gives only

to
of
trace the
it
a
all
plants which derive from their fruitfulness, and

it
were are the living flesh

its
to as
body. gives
of
It
it
be
them what them; this can

in
best seen the

in
is
plant growing the soil, and

of
difference between
in
a
it;
branch cut from the former real plant, the

is
a
is a
only piece
of
latter wood. What communicated

is
of a
the earth by the Soul which presides

to
the body
over it? To See this notice the dif
to
sufficient
is
it
ference between some earth resting within the soil, and

piece that detached therefrom. likewise easy
is
It
is
to a
recognize that stones increase long they

as
as
size
in
the earth, while they remain

of
in
are the bosom

in
the same state when they have been plucked out

therefrom. Everything therefore bears within itself
vegetative (power) shed
of
trace the universal

a
abroad over the whole earth, and belonging particu

larly the earth's power
its
parts.
of
As
to
to
no one
vegetative power)
its
of sensation, it is not (like
mingled with the body the earth; only hovers
of
it
above and guides Moreover, the earth possesses
it.
in
an
also, higher than the above powers, Soul and
a
telligence. They bear respectively the names
of
Ceres
and Vesta, according
be of
of
to
the revelations men
prophetic nature, who allow themselves inspired
to
by the divine.
DOES THE IRASCIBLE POWER ALSO ORIGINATE IN
THE BODY2
us
Enough the question
of
this. Let
to
28. return
from which we digressed. We granted that the de
not only
as
sires, pains and pleasures (considered
sentiments, but passions), originate the constitu
as
in
the organized and living body.
of
tion Must the same

the irascible (power)
be
origin assigned Were

to
2
this so, we would have Several questions ask: Does
to
anger belong the entire organism, only par
or
to
to
a
Is or
as as
so
ticular organ, such the heart when disposed,

the bile, long part living body?
of
to
as
is
it
anger different from the principle which gives the body

or
the soul, an individual power, which

of
trace
is
it
a
depends on no other power, whether irascible sen

or
Sitive
2
THE LIVER IS THE SEAT OF THE SOUL’S FACULTY

OF DESIRE.
The vegetative power present the whole body
a in
every part thereof

of
to to
communicates trace the Soul.

therefore the entire body that we must refer
is
It
suffering, pleasure, and the desire food. Though

of
nothing definite
of
ascertained about the seat Sexual

is
is to let
itsus
desire, grant that their seat the organs

it in
beis
destined satisfaction. Further, granted that

the soul's faculty desire, be
of
of
the liver the seat

cause that organ particularly the theatre
of
the
is
activities of the vegetative power which impresses a

trace of the soul on the body; and further, because it
is from the liver that the action it exercises starts.
;r
THE HEART IS THE SEAT OF ANGER.
its
AS to anger, we shall have to examine nature,
be
what power constitutes, whether
of
the soul
it
it
of its
anger that imparts
of
the heart to trace own
a
power; there exist another force capable pro
if
ducing the movement revealed the animal; and
in
finally,
be
anger, but anger itself

-of
not trace
if
it
which resides in the heart.
ANGER ORIGINATES IN THE VEGETATIVE AND

GENERATIVE POWER, AS TRACE OF THE SOUL.
First, what anger? We grow irri
of
the nature
is
or
person dear
of
of
at
tated maltreatment ourselves a

to
us; general, when we witness some outrage.

in
Therefore anger implies certain degree sensation,

of
a
or
even intelligence, and we should have suppose

to
that anger originates some principle other than the

in
vegetative power. Certain bodily conditions, however,

fiery dis
us
as
predispose anger; Such being

of
to
position, and being bilious; for people are far less

disposed anger cold-blooded nature. Besides,
of
to
if
by
animals grow irritated especially

of
the excitement
by
this particular part, and

of
to
threats harm their

bodily condition. Consequently we would once more
of to be
refer anger the body and

of
to
to
led the condition

the principle which presides over the constitution
organism. Since men are more irritable when sick than
when well, when they are hungry, more than when
principle should evidently
be
its
or
well satisfied, anger

the organized and living body; evidently,
of to
referred
by
anger are excited the blood the bile,

or
attacks
which are living parts
of
the animal. As Soon

as
the
body suffers, the blood
as
well the bile boils, and

as
there arises a sensation which arouses the imagination;

the latter then instructs the soul of the state of the
organism, and disposes the Soul to attack what causes
this suffering. On the other hand, when the reason
able soul judges that we have been injured, she grows
excited, even if there were no disposition to anger in
the body. This affection seems therefore to have been
given to us by nature to make us, according to the
dictates of our reasons, repel and threatens us.
(There are then two possible states of affairs)
Either the irascible power first is moved in us without
disposi
its
the aid of reason, and later communicates
reason by means the imagination; or, reason
of
to
tion
first enters into action, and then reason communicates
to its
impulse that part our being which disposed

of
In to
is
anger. either case, anger arises the vegetative
in
and generative power, which, organizing the body,
in
capable agreeable,
to
has rendered seek out what
is
it
avoid what painful; diffusing the bitter bile

to
and
is
through the organism, imparting
of
to
trace the
it
a
soul, thus communicating the faculty growing of

to
it
the presence harmful objects, and, after

of
in
irritated
having been harmed, harming other things, and
to
of
Anger
of
to
render them similar itself. trace the

is
a
soul, the soul's faculty desire,

of
of
as
the same nature

because those least seek objects agreeable the body,
to
and who even scorn the body, are least likely

to
the blind transports anger.

of
to
abandon themselves
Although plant-life possesses the vegetative power,
does not possess the faculty anger because
of
it
it
has neither blood nor bile. These are the two things
which, sensation, leads one
of
boil
to
the absence
in
with indignation. When however sensation joins these

fight against
an
two elements, there arises impulse

to
the harmful object. the irrational part

of
the soul
If
divided into the faculty desire, and that

be
of
to
were
anger, and
of
the former were be considered the

to
if
vegetative power, and the other, on the contrary, as

a trace of the vegetative power, residing in either the
heart or blood, or in both; this division would not con
sist of opposed members, because the Second would
proceed from the first. But there is an alternative:
both members of this division, the faculties of desire
and anger, might be considered two powers derived
from one and the same principle (the vegetative
power). Indeed, when the appetites are divided, it
is their nature, and not the being from which they
depend, that is considered. This essence itself, how
harmonizing
it,
ever, is not the appetite, but completes
with the actions proceeding from the appetite.
It
it
as
assign the heart
of
to
also reasonable seat the

is
the soul which constitutes anger; for the heart

of
trace
the soul, but the source
of
of
not the seat the
is
(arterially) circulating blood.
WHEN THE SOUL LEAVES THE BODY, SHE LEAVES

TRACE OF LIFE.
A
an
29. the body resemble object warmed rather

If
than illuminated, why does nothing vital remain after

the reasonable soul has abandoned it? does pre
It
serve some vital element, but only for short time; this
a
an
trace Soon disappears, object

of
as
vanishes the heat

when removed from the fire. After death, some
is
of it
trace life still remains. This proved by the growth

is
of
hair and nails on corpses; and well known that

is
it
animals, even after being cut pieces, still move for

in
Besides, the disappearance the (vege

of
some time.
tative) life simultaneously with the reasonable soul,
does not prove their identity, and that they (the reason
able soul, and the vegetative soul) are not different.
When the sun disappears, causes the disappearance
it
not only the light that surrounds immediately,

of
of it
it,
were depends from the brilliance

as
and but also

it
which these objects receive from this light, and which

completely differs from
it.
DOES THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THESE THINGS
NECESSARILY IMPLY THEIR DESTRUCTION?
or
But does that which disappears merely depart,
does perish Such the question which applies
is
to it
both the light which inheres the illuminated ob
as in
jects (and colors them),
as
well the life inherent
to
the body, and which we call the characteristically
in
bodily life. Evidently, there remains light left
no
in
the objects which were illuminated. But the question
decide whether the light that inhered them re
to
in
is
its
source, Annihilation
or
to
turns annihilated.
is
is
impossible anteriorly was something real. What

it
if
was really So-called color must depend on the

it
very bodies from which light also emanates; and when

these bodies perish, their coloring perishes with them;
nobody indeed asks after the fate
of
of
the color the
fire that has gone out any more than one troubles one
may
its
appearance.
of
self about what has become

It
only condition,”
be
objected that the appearance

or is
holding the hand open closed, while the

as
such
color, on the contrary, quality
of
the same sort

is
Now, there nothing

to
as
sweetness. hinder the

is
the fragrant body from perishing, without

or
Sweet
affecting the existence the sweetness and fragrance?
of
Could they subsist other bodies without being felt,

in
because the bodies which participate the qualities

in
as
allow the qualities they possess

to
to
are such not

be felt What would hinder the unaffected existence
2
the light after the destruction the body colored,

if of
of
it
merely ceased reflected, unless one's mind

be
to
it
should See that those qualities subsist no subject?

in
admit this opinion, we would also be

to
we were
If
obliged admit that qualities are indestructible, that

to
they are not produced the bodies,

of
the constitution
in
that their colors are not produced by the reasons in

Seed; that, as happens with the changing plumage of
certain birds, the (“seminal) reasons” not only gather
or produce the colors of the objects, but they besides
make use of those that still fill the air, and that they
remain in the air without being such as they appear to
us when in bodies. Enough of this.
THREE POSSIBLE INTERRELATIONS OF THE SOUL’S

SUPERIOR AND INFERIOR BODIES.
It may still be asked whether, if while the bodies

subsist, the light that colors them remains united to
them, and does not separate from them, why then
it,
would not both together with its immediate emana

tions, move along with the body which inheres,
in
it
although cannot be seen going away any more than
it
seen approaching? We shall therefore have
to
is
it
the second-rank powers
of
examine elsewhere the
if
Soul always remain attached the higher ones, and

to
on; them subsist by itself, and can con

so
of
or
each
if
separated from the

to
tinue subsist itself when

if, in
is
it
no part
or
as
higher ones;
of
inasmuch the Soul can

be separated from the others, all together form soul
a
which simultaneously one and manifold, but Some

in
is
still undetermined manner.
CAN THE PHYSICAL LIFE EXIST WITHOUT THE

SOULP
What becomes of this trace of life that the soul
impresses on the body, and that the latter appropriates?
belong the soul, will follow the latter, since
to
it If
is it
it
not separated from the being

of
the soul. be
If
it
the body, subject

be
of
the life
to
must the same

it
as
be of
conditions the luminous color the bodies (and

perish with them). Indeed, will well
to
examine
it
if,
or
the life can subsist without the soul, on the

if
contrary, the life exists no earlier than the Soul is
present, and acts on the body.
STARS, AS WELL AS THE SUN, HAVE PRAYERS

ADDRESSED TO THEM.
30. We have shown that memory is useless to the
stars; we have agreed that they have senses, namely,
sight and hearing, and the power to hear the prayers
addressed to the sun, and also those by many people
addressed to the other stars, because these people are
persuaded that they receive from them many benefits;
they think even that they will obtain them so easily
that these men ask the stars to co-operate in actions
not only such as are just, but even such as are unjust.
Questions raised by the latter point must still be con
sidered.
BENEFITS ARE GRANTED TO MEN THROUGH THE

WORLD-SOUL’S MEDIATION.
Here arise important questions which have been fre
quently considered especially by such as will not allow
the divinities to be regarded as the accomplices or
authors of Shameful deeds, such as love-adventures
and adulteries. For this reason, as well as on account
of what was said above about the memory of the stars,
we shall have to examine the nature of the influence
they exercise. Indeed, if they grant our petitions,
though not immediately, and give us what we ask after
a time that sometimes is very long, they must neces
Sarily exercise memory of the prayers addressed to
them; now, we have above denied that they could have
memory. As to the benefits that they grant to men, it
has been said that, it seemed as if they had been
is,
granted by Vesta, that the earth, unless indeed

it
be
should insisted that the earth alone granted benefits

to men.
STATEMENT OF THREE QUESTIONS.

We have therefore two points to examine: we first
have to explain that if we do attribute memory to the
stars, it is only in a sense agreeing with our former
statements, and not for the reason advanced by other
people; we shall later have to show that it is a mis
take to attribute evil actions to them. In view of this,
we shall try, as is the duty of the philosopher, to refute
the complaints formed against the divinities which
reside in the heavens, and against the universe which
is equally accused, in the case that any credence what
ever is to be attached to such as pretend that heaven
can be magically swayed by the arts of audacious men;
last, we shall explain the administration of the ministry
of guardians, unless the latter point have been ex
plained incidentally to the solution of the former
problems.
NATURAL ACTIONS
31.
Aºi ON W HOLES AND ON
Let us in general consider the actions and re

actions produced in the universe either by nature or by
art. In the works of nature, there is an action of the
whole on the parts, of the parts on the whole, and of
the parts on the parts. In the works of art, art either
alone accomplishes what it has undertaken, or depends
on natural forces to effect certain natural operations.
We may call actions of the universe, all that the total
its
circular expanse affects on itself or part. For

fact, the heavens by moving themselves, some
in
how effect themselves and their parts, both those

of or
its own revolutions, on the earth. The mutual

in
reactions and passions the parts

of
the universe are

the positions taken up by
as
easy recognize, such

to
the sun, and the influence the sun exercises on the other
stars, and especially regard the earth; further, the
to
in
its
as
processes in own elements,
of
as
well those
in
the other constellations, and objects on earth—all
of
which deserve separate consideration.
of
MOST OF THE ARTS ACHIEVE THEIR OWN ENDS.
Architecture and the fine arts, fulfil themselves
in
Medicine, agriculture and similar pro
an
such object.
fessions, however, are auxiliary arts, and obey the
nature, assisting their efficient production
so
of
laws
rhetoric,
as
possible. As
to
to
as
as
make them natural
music, and other arts refinement, which serve the
of
improving degrading men,

of
or
education Souls
in
it
remains an open question how many there are them,
of
and what power they possess. all these things, we
beIn
examine what may
of
will have for the
us
to
to
use
questions we are treating, and we will have discover
to
as
the facts, possible.

of
far
as
the cause
ABSURDITY OF PTOLEMEAN ASTROLOGY.

evident that the revolution of the stars ex
It
is
dif
an
ercises influence first by disposing them

in
ferent arrangement; then the things contained

spheres; then terrestrial beings, not only
its
within
body, but Soul; further, each part
of
the
in
in
heavens exercises influence on terrestrial and in

ferior things. We shall indeed inquire whether the
lower things turn exercise Some influence on the
in
superior ones. For the present, however, granting

by
majority,
or
all,
at
that the facts admitted least

to a
are what they seem be, we shall have try ex

to
to
by
plain how they are produced, following them up

to
their origins. We must indeed not say that all

things are caused exclusively by heat cold, with
or
possibly the other qualities named the “primary quali

the elements,”
of
with those that derive from

or
ties
their mixture”; neither should we assert that the sun

produces everything by the heat, or some other star
(like Saturn), by cold. For indeed what would cold
amount to in the heavens, which are a fiery body, or in
fire, which has no humidity? Moreover, in this manner
it would be impossible to recognize the difference of
the stars. Then there are many facts that could not
be traced to their influence. If the influence of the
stars is to be made to account for the differences of
human character, which are supposed to correspond to
mixtures of corporeal elements, producing a tempera
ment in which there is an excess of cold or heat, to
which such causes would one trace hate, envy, and
malice? Granting even that this were possible, how
would one then by the same causes explain good and
bad fortune, poverty and wealth, nobility of fathers
and children, and the discovery of treasures? A
thousand facts equally as foreign to the influence ex
ercised by the physical qualities of the elements on
the bodies or Souls of animals, could be cited.
NO CRIMES SHOULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE

INFLUENCE OF SUBLUNARY DIVINITIES.
Neither should the things which happen to sublunary
beings be attributed to either a voluntary decision, or
to deliberations of the universe, or the stars. It is not
permissible to imagine that the divinities sway events
in a manner such that some should become thieves,
others should enslave their fellow-beings, or capture
cities, or commit sacrilege in temples, or"be cowards,
effeminate in their conduct, or infamous in their
morals. To favor such crimes would be unworthy of
men of the most commonplace virtue, let alone divini
ties. Besides, what beings would be likely to busy
themselves favoring vices and outrages from which
they were not to reap any advantage?
HAVING CONFUTED ASTROLOGY AND DEVILTRY,

WORLD INFLUENCE IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE
WORLD-SOUL.
32. Since the influence exteriorly exercised by the
heavens on us, on animals, and on human affairs
generally has been excluded from physical causes (of
astrology) and from voluntary decisions of divinities,
it remains for us to find some cause to which it may
reasonably be attributed. First, we will have to admit
that this universe is a single living being, which contains
living beings; and that
its
within own organism all
it
single Soul, which all
in of to
contains communicated
is
a
all beings that form part

its
parts; namely, the

to
universe. Now every being that contained the

part First, and un is
of
sense-world the universe.

it is
is a
body.
its
restrictedly, part the universe by
of
a
Then, again part the universe by
its
soul, but
of
is
it
only participates (in the natural and vege

so
far
as
of it
tative power) the universal Soul. The beings which

only participate (the natural and vegetative power)
in
the universal Soul are completely parts the uni

of
of
verse. Those who participate another soul (the

in
Superior power the universal Soul), are not com

of
pletely parts the universe (because they are inde

of
by by
pendent their rational souls); but they experience

as
as
passions the other beings,

of
the actions far

by
as
they have something

of
the universe (so far their

irrational Souls, they participate the natural and
in
vegetative power the universe), and the propor

of
in
which they possess some part

of
tion the universe.

in
This universe therefore single living being that

is
is
a
Self-Sympathetic. The parts that seem distant are not

at as,
any the less near, each animal, the horns, nails,

in
fingers, the organs distance from each other, feel,

spite the interval which separates them, the af.
of
in
by
fection experienced any other one fact,

of
them.
In
as soon as the parts are similar, even when they are

separated by an interval instead of being placed by
each others’ side, they sympathize by virtue of this
their similarity, and the action of the distant one is
felt by all the others. Now in this universe which is a
single living being, and which forms a single organism,
there is nothing distant enough in place not to be near
because of the nature of this being whose unity makes
it self-sympathetic. When the suffering being re
sembles the acting one, it experiences a passion con
nature; when on the contrary
its
formable to differs,
its it
experiences passion that foreign nature,
to
it
is
beIt a
and painful. therefore not surprising that though

is
its
single, one parts can exert on
of
the universe
harmful influence, since often happens
in its to
another
it
a
our parts wounds another by

of
ourselves that one

action; for instance, that the bile, setting anger
as
motion, should crush and tear some other part
of
the
body. Now something analogous this bile which
to
excites anger, and other parts that form the human

to
body, discovered the universe. Even plants

in
to in
is
there are certain things which form obstacles others,

and even destroy them. Now the world forms not only
single animal, but also plurality animals; each
of
a
a
of
is as
them, the singleness

of
far
as
has share the

in
it
so
universe, preserved thereby; but, far

as
this
in
animal enters into the multiplicity

of
some other
animal,
he
be
it,
it,
or
can wound wounded by make

it,
it,
or
of
use feed on because differs from itself

it
resembles itself; because the natural de

as
as
much
it
self-preservation leads appropriate what

of
us
to
sire
is
its
itself, and destroy

to
to
suitable own interest

in
º
what contrary thereto. Finally, each being, fulfill
is
its
ing part the universe,

to
useful those that can

in
is
profit by
its
action, and wounds destroys those who

or
it;
cannot support thus are scorched by the

passage fire, and the little animals are dragged along
of
or trampled by the greater. This generation and this

corruption, this betterment and deterioration of things
render easy and natural the life of the universe con
sidered as a single living being. Indeed, it would not
otherwise have been possible that the particular beings
it contains should have lived as if they were alone,
should possess their ends in themselves, and should
live only for themselves; since they are only parts,
they must, as such, concur in the ends of the whole of
which they are parts; and, so far as they are different,
of its
they could not each preserve own life, because
they are contained the unity the universal life;
in
neither could they entirely remain the same state,
in
because the universe must possess permanence, and
the universe, permanence consists
of
because ever
in
remaining motion.
in
THE STARS’ MOTIONS COMPARED TO PREAR

RANGED DANCE. A
33. As the circular
movement of the world has
nothing fortuitous, produced con
as
inasmuch
is
it
formably this great animal, perfect

of
to
the reason
a
symphonic (co-operation) between what “acts” and

it;
what “reacts” must exist within and there must also

have been an order which would co-ordinate things
so
one with another, the phases

of
of
at
that each
the world there might be
of
the circular movement

correspondence between the various beings subject
to a
it,
if,
varied choric ballet the dancers formed

as
in
a
single figure. As our own modern dances,

to
is
it
a
easy explain the eternal things which contribute

to
thereto, and which differ for every motion, like the

the flute, the songs, and the other circum
of
Sounds
stances which are thereto related. not however
It
is
person who con

as
easy
of
to
conceive the motions

a
forms himself strictly each figure, who accompanies,

to
who raises one limb, or lowers another, who moves

this limb, or holds the other limb motionless in a dif:
ferent attitude. The dancer's eyes are doubtless fixed
on some further aim while his limbs are still responding
to the motions inspired by the music, by co-operating
in expressing them, and in completing them Sym
metrically. Likewise, a man learned in the art of
dancing could explain the reason that, in Such a
figure, such a limb is raised, such a limb is bent, while
others are hidden or lowered; not indeed that the
dancer deliberates about these different attitudes, but
because in the general movement of his body he con
siders such a posture suitable to such a limb to fulfil
its
proper part the dance. Likewise do the stars

in
produce certain facts, and announce other ones. The

entire world realizes its universal life by causing the
by
the greater parts comprises, ceaselessly
of
motion
it
so
changing the figures, that the different positions
of
the parts, and their mutual relations may determine
the rest, and that things may occur
as
movement
in
a
executed by single moving living organism. Thus

a
Such state produced by such an attitude, such

is
a
positions, such figures; while some other state pro

is
forth. Con
so
duced by Some other kind figures, and

of
do
sequently, the real authors occurring

of
what not
is
those who carry out the figures, but He

be
to
seem
who commands them; and He who plans the figures
do
does not one thing while busying Himself with

something dif
allon
another, because He not acting

is
ferent from Himself; He himself the things that

is
by
are done; He here the figures (formed the uni

is
versal movement), He himself there the resultant

is
by
so
passions the animal moved and constituted

in
nature, simultaneously “active” and “passive”

as
the
necessary laws.
of
result
THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNIVERSE SHOULD BE

PARTIAL ONLY.
34. Granting that men are influenced by the uni
verse through one of the elements of their being, it
must be by (their body), that which forms part of the
all
body of the universe, not by which they
of
those
.
are constituted. Consequently, the surrounding uni
them only
on
verse should exercise limited influence.
a
this respect they resemble wise servants who know
In
carry out the orders
of
their masters without
to
how
so
interfering with their own liberty, that they are
treated manner less despotic, because they are not
in
a
do
not entirely cease belong them
to
to
and
Selves.
ASTROLOGICAL INFLUENCE MERELY INDICATION.

As the difference found the figures formed by
to
in
the stars, could not be other than because the is,

it
it
stars do not advance their course with equal Swift

in
As they move according reason, of

to
ness. the laws

their relative positions constitute the different
of as as
and
this great organism (which the world),
of
attitudes
is
by
all
and the things that occur here below are, the

sympathy related those that occur on high,
to
laws
be
proper inquire whether terrestrial things

to
would
it
are the consequences the celestial things

of
to
which
or
they are similar, whether the figures possess an

all
efficacious power; and the latter case, whether

in
figures are formed by

or
figures possess this power,

if
stars only; for the same figure does not bear the same
significance, and does not exert the same action
its in
different things, because each being seems

to
have
be
own proper nature. may said that the con

It
figuration
no
certain things amounts

of
to
more than
the mere disposition things; and that the configura
of
who assumes the various poses suggested by the music,

tion of other things is the same disposition with an

other figure. If so, influence should be attributed not
to the figures, but to the prefigured realities; or rather,
to things identical by their essence, and different by
their figures; a different influence will also have to be
attributed to the object which differs from the others
only by the place it occupies.
ASTROLOGICAL INFLUENCE MAY BE PARTLY

ACTION; PARTLY MERE SIGNIFICANCE.
But of what does this influence consist? In signifi
cance, or in (genuine effective) action? In many
cases, the combination, or thing figured, may be said to
have both an action, and a significance; in other cases,
however, a significance merely. In second place,
both the figures and the things figured should be
credited with the powers suitable to each; as with
dancers, the hand exerts an influence similar to that
of the other members; and, returning to figures, these
would exert an influence far greater than a hand in
dancing. Last, the third (or lowest) degree of power
pertains to those things which follow the lead of the
figures, carrying out (their significance); just as, re
turning to the dance-illustrations, the dancer's limbs,
and the parts of those limbs, ultimately do follow the
dance-figures; or (taking a more physiological ex
ample), as when the nerves and veins of the hand
contracted by the hand's motions, and participate
#:
therein.
EARTHLY EVENTS SHOULD NOT BE ATTRIBUTED
TO THE STARS' BODY OR WILL.
35. How then do these powers exert themselves?
—for we have to retrace our steps to give a clear
explanation. What difference is exhibited by the com
parison of one triangle with another? What action
does the one exert on another, how is it exerted, and
how far does it go? Such are the questions we have

to study, since we do not refer the production of things
here below to the stars, neither to their body, nor to
their will; not to their bodies, because the things which
happen are not simple physical effects; nor to their
will, because it is absurd that divinities should by their
will produce absurd things.
THE INFLUENCE OF THE STARS CONSISTS IN THEIR

CONTEMPLATION OF THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.
Let us now recall what has already been established.

The universe is a single living being by virtue of
its its
unity being sympathetic with itself. The course
of
life regulated by reason; entirely agreement
in
is
is
it
with itself; has nothing fortuitous, offers single

a it
it
a
order, and single harmony. Besides, all the (star)
figures are each conformed de
to
to
reason and
a
of a
terminate number. The parts the universal living

beings which constitute this kind
of
dance—we mean
a
it,
the figures produced the parts figured therein,

of
in
the things derived therefrom—are the very

as
well
as
actualization of the universe. Thus the universe lives

powers con
its
the manner we have determined, and

in
this state according the nature they have

to
to
tribute
received from the reason that has produced them. The
figures are, some way, the reasons
of
the universal
in
Living being, the intervals contrasts (of the parts)

to of
or
the Living being, the attitudes they take according

rhythm, and according
of
of
to
the laws the reason the

universe. The beings which by their relative distances
produce these figures are the divers members
of
this
living being. The different powers this living being
of
members, because de
its
act without deliberation,

as
process foreign them

of
to
liberation the nature

to is
a
this living being. Aspiration

or
single aim
to
selves
a
the single living being; but

of
the characteristic
is
it
iv,4] PSYCHOLOGICAL QUESTIONS-II 497
includes manifold powers. All these different wills

aspire to the same end as the single will of the organ
ism, for each part desires some one of the different ob
jects that it contains. Each wishes to possess something
of the other's possessions, and to obtain what it lacks;
each experiences a feeling of anger against another,
when it is excited against that other; each increases at
the expense of another, and begets another. The uni
its
verse produces all these actions in parts, but
at
the
seeks the Good,
or
same time rather, contemplates
it
it
always the Good that sought by the right
it.
is
is
It
will, which above passions, and thus accords with

is
Similarly, servants ascribe

of
the will the universe.

many
of
the orders received from their

of to
their actions
master; but the desire the Good carries them where
their own master carried. Consequently, the sun
is
and the other stars exert what influence they do exert

on things here below through contemplation
of
the
intelligible world.
STAR INFLUENCE IS EXPLAINED BY THEIR NATURAL

RADIATION OF GOOD.
We shall limit ourselves the above illustration,

to to
be
which may easily applied the rest. The sun does

not limit itself warming terrestrial beings.
to
makes
It
its
as
them also participate Soul, far possible; for

as
in
possesses powerful physical Soul. Likewise, the

it
other stars, involuntarily, by irradiation,

of
kind
a
inferior beings somewhat

of
transmit the (natural)

to
power they possess. Although therefore all things

(in the universe) form but single thing particular
of
a
figure, they offer manifold different dispositions; which

different figures themselves each have
H.
characteristic
in a
for each disposition results appropriate

3.CilOIl.
SPECIAL FIGURES HAVE INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS, DUE

TO THEIR CHARACTERISTICS.
Things which appear as a figure themselves possess
a characteristic influence, which changes according to
the people with which they are brought in contact.
Examples of this may be seen daily. Why do certain
figures or appearances inspire us with terror, although
they have never done us any harm, while others do not
produce the same effect on us? Why are some people
frightened by certain figures or appearances, while
others are frightened by different ones? Because the
former's constitution specially acts on the former peo
ple, and the latter on the latter; they could only pro
duce effects in harmony with their nature. One object
attracts attention by a particular appearance, and would
yet attract attention by a different constitution. If it
its
beauty that exerted the power arousing
of
was
emotion, why then would this beautiful object move
one man, while the other object would move another,
figure ap
or
there be no potency
of
the difference
be in
if
pearance? admit that

to
would unreasonable
It
colors have characteristic influence and action, yet

a
deny the same power figures appearances.

or
to
would, besides, be absurd, of It

all to
admit the existence

something, but potency. Every being,
to
refuse
it
his mere existence, must “act”

of
“suffer.”
or
because
Some indeed “act” exclusively, while others both
“act” and “Suffer.” Substances contain influences in
or
dependent their figure appearance.

of
Terrestrial
beings also possess many forces which are derived
neither from heat nor cold. The reason that these
is
beings are endowed with different qualities, that they

receive their forms from (“seminal) reasons,” and par
ticipate the powers nature; such are the peculiar
of
in
stones, and the surprising effects pro

byof
virtues natural
duced plants.
NOTHING IN THE UNIVERSE IS ENTIRELY INAN

IMATE.
36. The universe is full of variety; it contains all
the “reasons,” and an infinite number of different
powers. So, in the human body, the eye, the bones,
and the other organs each have their characteristic
power; as, the bone in the hand does not have the
same strength as the bone in the foot; and in general,
each part has a power different from that possessed by
every other part. But unless we observe very care
fully, this diversity escapes us in the case of (natural)
objects. Much more would it escape us in the
world; for the forces that we see in it are (but)
the traces of those that exist in the superior region.
There must then be in the World an inconceivable and
admirable variety of powers, especially in the stars
that wander through the heavens. The universe is not
a great and vast edifice, inanimate, and composed of
things of which it would be easy to catalogue the dif
ferent kinds, such as stones, lumber, and ornamental
structures; it is a wakeful being, living in all
its
parts,
though differently
so
each; short, includes all

in
in
it
that can ever be. This solves the problem, how inan
imate matter can exist within an animated living being.
the uni
on us
Our discussions have therefore taught that

in
verse (nothing inanimate; that, the contrary)

is
everything contains alive; but each different

in
is
it
do
manner. We deny that there life objects that we

in
is
not see moving; but nevertheless they

do
live, though
only with latent life. Those whose life visible are
is
a
composed invisible, but which

of
those whose life

is
this animal by
of
the life
to
nevertheless contribute
furnishing with admirable powers. would there
It
it
be
be
fore equally impossible that the universe should

the things
of
alive unless each contained lived with

it
of
its own life. Nevertheless the acts the universe do

not depend on choice; it acts without needing to
choose, because it precedes any choice. Thus many
its
things obey forces.
CONSCIOUSNESS DEPENDS ON CHOOSING; EVERY

THING HAS POWERS, THOUGH HIDDEN.
37. The universe therefore (contains all that
it
needs), and rejects (or wastes) nothing. Study,
therefore, the fire, and all the other things considered
capable Satisfactory investigation
of
of
action. their
action would demand recognition that these things de
rive their power from the universe, and similar ad
a
mission for all that belongs experi
of
to
the domain
But we do not usually examine the objects
to
ence.
which we are accustomed, nor raise questions about
them. We investigate the nature power only when
of
a
novelty excites our astonish
its
seems unusual, when

it
ment. Nevertheless we would not be any less as so

the objects that we see their
at
tonished often
if
us
power were explained

to
at
time when we were

a
thoroughly accustomed
so
not yet Our conclusion

to
it.
therefore that every thing has secret (sub-con

is
Scious) power inasmuch moulded by, and re

as
is
it
ceives shape the universe; participating the Soul

in
in
a
the universe, being embraced by her, being part

of of
as
this animated All; for there nothing this All

in
is is
which not part thereof. true that there are

is
in It
a
parts, both on the earth and the heavens, that act

more efficiently than do others; the heavenly things
are more potent because they enjoy better developed
a
These powers produce many things devoid

of
nature.
choice, even beings that seem act (purposively);
to
in
though they are also active beings that lack that

in
ability (Even these powers themselves act

to
choose.
unconsciously): they do not even turn (towards them
Selves) while communicating power, when some part
emanating (to that which they are
of
their own soul

is
iv.4] PSYCHOLOGICAL QUESTIONS-II 5O1
begetting). Similarly animals beget, other animals

without implying an act of choice, without any weak
ening on the part of the generator, and even without
self-consciousness. Otherwise, if this act was volun
tary, it would consist of a choice, or the choice would
not be effective. If then an animal lack the faculty
of choice, much less will it have self-consciousness.
PRODUCTION IS DUE TO SOME PHYSICAL SOUL, NOT
TO ANY ASTROLOGICAL POWER.
38. Things which arise from the universe without
the incitation of Somebody are generally caused by
the vegetative life of the universe. As to the things
whose production is due to somebody, either by simple
wishes, or by cunning enchantments, they should be
ascribed not to some star, but to the very nature of that
which is produced. 1. Of course, the necessaries of
life, or what serves some other use, should be attributed
to the goodness of the stars; it is a gift made by a
stronger part to a weaker one. Any harmful effect
on the generation of animals exercised by the stars
must depend on their substance's inability to receive
what has been given them; for the effect is not pro
duced absolutely, but relatively to some subject or con
dition, for that which “suffers” or is to “suffer” must
have a determinate nature. 2. Mixtures also exert a
great influence, because each being furnishes some
thing useful to life. Moreover, something good might
happen to a person without the assistance of beings
which by nature would seem useful. 3. The co
ordination of the universe does not always give to each
person what he desires. 4. Besides, we ourselves add
much to what has been given to us. 5. All things
are not any the less embraced in a same unity; they
form an admirable harmony; besides, they are derived
from each other, though originating from contraries;
all
things are parts single animal.

of
for indeed
If
a
any one of these begotten things is imperfect because
it is not completely formed, the fact is that matter not
being entirely subdued, the begotten thing degenerates
and falls into deformity. Thus some things are pro
duced by the stars, others are derived from the nature
of substance, while others are added by the beings
themselves.
ASTROLOGICAL SIGNS ARE ONLY CONCATENATIONS

FROM UNIVERSAL REASON.
all
39. Since things are always co-ordinated the
in
all
universe, and since one single and identical
allto
trend
aim, not surprising that (events) are indicated
is
it
j
by
(astrological) signs.
as
“Virtue has no master,”
Plato said"; she attaches herself all who honor her,
and abandons those who neglect her; God to inno
is
cent.” Nevertheless, her works are bound up with
the universal order; for all that here below depends
is
on divine and superior principle, and even the uni

a
verse participates therein. Thus all that happens
in
the universe caused not only by the (“seminal) rea
is
sons,” but by reasons higher order, far superior

of
to
a
is,
those (that the ideas). Indeed, the seminal reasons

nothing produced outside
of
of
contain the reasons
seminal reasons, neither derived from mat
of
what
is
ter, nor from the actions begotten things exercised

of
on each other. The Reason of the universe resembles

legislator who should establish order city. The
of in
a
latter, knowing the probable actions the citizens,

and what motives they would probably obey, regulates
his institutions thereupon, intimately connects his laws
with the conduct of the subject them,
to
establishes rewards and punishments for their deeds,

all
that automatically things conspire

So
mutual
in
harmony by
an
inerrant current. Each therefore

is
indicated by (astrological) signs, without this indica

only
an
tion being essential purpose nature;

of
is
it
the result of their concatenation. As all these things

form but a single one, each of them is known by an
other, the cause by the effect, the consequent by the
its
antecedent, the compound by elements.
THE GODS CANNOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR

OUR ILLS.
The above consideration would clear up the prob
the stars), cannot
is,
1em set above. The gods (that
be
held responsible for our ills because, things
1,
by
do
produced the gods not result from free choice,
as a
natural necessity; because, parts
of
but from the
a
on
universe, the gods act other parts the universe,
of
to
the universal organism.

of
and contribute the life

Terrestrial beings themselves add very much
to
2.
the
things that are derived from the stars; the things
given 3.
us
by the stars are not evil, but are altered by

being mingled; not regu
of
the life
4.
the universe
is
lated (in advance) for the individual, but only for the
totality; matter does not experience modifications
5.
completely corresponding the impressions re

to
it
ceives, and cannot entirely submit the form given
to
to it.
MAGIC OCCURS BY LOVE WORKING AS SYMPATHY.
But how shall we explain the enchantments
of
40.
magic? By the sympathy that things have for each
other, the accord those that are similar, the struggle
of
of
those that are contrary, the variety the powers

to of
of
the various beings which contribute the formation

single organism; for many things are attracted to
of
a
wards each other and are mutually enchanted, without

magician. The real magic
of
the intervention the

is
a
contrary
its
Love that reigns the universe, with

is to of
in
Hate. The first magician, him whom men consult

act by the means his philtres and enchantments,
of
Love; for
of
from the natural mutual love all

is
it
things, and from the natural power they have to com

pel each others' love, that is derived the efficacious
ness of the art of inspiring love by employing en
chantments. By this art, magicians bring together the
natures which have an innate love for each other; they
unite one Soul to another as one cross-fertilizes distant
plants; by employing (symbolic) figures which pos
sess special virtues; by themselves taking certain at
titudes, they noiselessly attract the powers of other
beings, and induce them to conspire to unity so much
the easier as they themselves are in unity. . A being
of the same disposition, but located outside of the
universe, could neither by magic attractions fascinate,
nor by his influence enchain any of the things contained
in the world; on the contrary, from the moment that
he is not a stranger to the world, he can attract to
wards himself other beings, knowing their mutual re
lations and attractions within the universal organism.
There are indeed invocations, songs, words, (symbolic)
figures, and, for instance, certain Sad attitudes and
plaintive tones which exert a natural attraction. Their
influence extends even to the soul—I mean, the ir
rational soul; for neither the will nor the reason permit
themselves to be subdued by the charms of music.
This magic of music does not arouse any astonishment;
nevertheless those who play or sing, charm and inspire
love unintentionally. Nor does the virtue of prayers
depend on their being heard by Beings that make free
decisions; for these invocations do not address them
Selves to free-will. Thus" when a man is fascinated
by a Serpent, he neither feels nor understands the in
fluence exerted on him; he perceives what he has felt
only after having experienced it—the governing part
of the Soul cannot anyway experience anything of the
kind. Consequently when an invocation is addressed
to a Being, some thing results; either for him who
makes this invocation, or for some other person.
HOW PRAYERS ARE ANSWERED.
41. Neither the sun, nor any other star hears the
prayers addressed to they are granted, only
it.
If
it
is
by the sympathy felt by each part
of
the universe for
all
every other; just
as
parts
of
allas to
cord are caused
a
by
any one part; or, just

of
vibrate excitation
causing one string lyre
of
vibrate would cause
to
of in a
unison, because they all belong

to
the others vibrate

of as to
the same system harmony. sympathy can go
If
far making one lyre respond
to
as
the harmonies
be
so
another, much the more must this sympathy

the universe, where reigns one single har
of
the law
its
mony, although register contains contraries, well
as
as
similar and analogous parts. The things which

harm men, like anger, which, together with the bile,
relate the liver, were not created for the purpose
to
of
harming men. person,
of
as
the act
in
It
is
if
a
taking fire from hearth accidentally wounded an

a
This person
of
other. doubtless the author the
is
wound because he transferred the fire from one place

another; but the wound occurred only because the
to
be
fire could not contained by the being

to
whom
it
had been transmitted.
AS THE STARS ANSWER PRAYERS UNCONSCIOUSLY,

THEY DO NOT NEED MEMORIES THEREFOR.
memory
of
42. The stars therefore have no need

to
remember our prayers, nor senses receive them;

to
thus solved the problem considered above. Nor

is
as
even, our prayers are answered, this due, some

is
if
think,
or
any free will on their part. Whether

to
not
we address prayers them, they exercise over
us
to
certain influence by the mere fact that, along with us,

they form part
of
the universe.
THE PRAYERS OF EVEN THE EVIL ARE ANSWERED,

IF MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH NATURAL LAW.
There are many forces that are exercised involun
tarily, either automatically, without any invitation, or
with the assistance of skill. Thus, in an animal, one
part is naturally favorable or harmful to another; that
is why both physician and magician, each by his char
its
acteristic arts, force one thing to communicate
power Likewise, the universe communi
to
another.
its
its
parts something own power, either
of of
to
cates
or
automatically,
as
result the attraction exercised

a
by the individual. This natural process, since he

to is
a
not foreign
be
who asks Neither should we it.
is
astonished even an evil individual obtains his re

if
quests; for do not the evil drink from the same streams
do
as
the good? this case, the granting

In
done
is
unconsciously; grants simply, and what granted
is
it
harmonizes with the order of the universe. Conse

an
quently, evil individual asks and obtains what
is
if
all, there no reason why

he
of
within reach should

is
be
punished.
THE WORLD-SOUL AND STARS ARE IMPASSIBLE.

therefore wrong sub
to
hold that the universe

to is
is
It
ject experiencing passions. the first place, the

In
governing Soul entirely impassible; then, there

in is
if
her, they are experienced only by

be
any passions
her parts; her, being unable experience any
to
to
as
thing contrary her nature, she herself remains im

to
passible. To experience passions seems suitable

to
the universe; but, con

as
parts
of
stars considered
sidered themselves, they are impassible, beecause
in
their wills are impassible, and their bodies remain

as
their nature, because their Soul loses

as
unalterable
if,
nothing, and their bodies remain the same, even by

their soul, they communicate something
of
themselves
to inferior beings. If something issues from them,
it;
they do not notice some increase happens, they
if
pay no attention.
HOW THE WISE MAN ESCAPES ALL ENCHANT

MENTS.
How will the worthy man
be
escape
to
43. able
the enchantments and the philtres em
of
the action
ployed by magic? His soul escapes them entirely; his
be
impassible, and cannot change
to
reason led
is
opinions. The worthy man, therefore, can suffer only

through the irrational part that
he
receives from the
universe; this part alone “suffers.” Nor will be sub
he
by
dued by the loves inspired philtres, because love

presupposes soul's inclination experience what
to
a
another soul experiences. As enchantments act on the

de
be
irrational part the soul, their power will
of
stroyed by fighting them; and by resisting them by

enchantments,
of
other enchantments. As result

a
therefore, possible experience sicknesses, and

to
is
it
even death; and, general, all the affections relative

in
Every part
or to
the body. subject

of
to
the universe
is
by another part
an
experiencing affection caused

in
it
by
the universe itself (with the exception

of
the
wise man, who remains impassible); without there
being anything contrary
to
nature can also feel this

it
affection only
of
at
the end some time.
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GUARDIANS.

The guardians themselves can “suffer” through their
irrational part. They must have memory and senses,
by nature they must
be
susceptible enchantments,
to
being induced commit certain acts, and

of
to
to
hear
the prayers, addressed The guardians sub
to
them.
jected this influence are those who approach men,
to
and they are the more subdued thereby as they ap

proach to men closer.
AN ACTIVE LIFE MAKES MEN MORE LIABLE TO

ENCHANTMENTS.
Every being that has some relation with another can
be bewitched by him; he is bewitched and attracted by
the being with whom he is in relations. Only the being
concentrated in himself (by the contemplation of the
intelligible world) cannot be bewitched. Magic ex
influence on every action, and on every
its
ercises
active life; for active life trends towards the things
which charm Hence the (Platonic) expression,
it.
“The subjects the magnanimous

of
Erechtheus are
by the beauty
of
remarkable their countenances.”
What indeed does one being feel his relations with
in
another? He drawn towards him, not by the art
is
magic, but by the seduction exerted by nature,

of
which harmonizes and unites two beings joining them

the other, not by locality, but by the power
to
one
the philtres employed.
of
MAGIC HAS POWER OVER MAN BY HIS AFFECTIONS

AND WEAKNESSES.
Only the man devoted contemplation can
as to
44.
be
be
defy enchantments, inasmuch none can

witched by himself. The man who contemplates has
become unified; he has become what contemplates,
he
his reason sheltered from all Seductive influences.

is
he
He does what ought to, do, he accomplishes his life

and his proper function.
of
As
to
the remainder
humanity, the soul does not fulfil her characteristic
function, nor does reason determine its action; the
irrational Soul becomes the principle action, and
of
the passions furnish men with directions. The in

magic attraction manifests the dis
of
fluence
in
a
position to marriage, in the care we take of our chil

dren, and, in general, in all that the bait of pleasure
leads us to do. Amidst our actions there are some
that are provoked by an irrational power, either
anger, or the general faculty of desire of the Soul. º
Other actions relate to political life, like the desire of
obtaining office, and they spring from a desire to com
mand. Those actions in which we propose to avoid
Some evil, are inspired by fear; while those actions in
relating to the desire to possess more than others, are
inspired by cupidity. Last, those actions relating to
utility, and to the satisfaction of our needs, show with
what force nature has attached us to life.
HONESTY ESCAPES MAGIC ONLY BECAUSE IT RE

SULTS FROM CONTEMPLATION OF THE
INTELLIGIBLE.
It may perhaps be said that the actions whose aim
is noble and honest escape the influences of magic;
otherwise contemplation itself would be subject
thereto. This is true, that the man who performs deeds
of honesty as being inevitable, with his eyes fixed on
true Beauty, could never be bewitched. He knows
duty, and the aim of his life (which would limit his
efforts) is not anything on earth or in the (universe).
It may indeed be objected that he is bewitched and at
tached here below by the magic force of human nature,
which binds him to the lives of others and of himself.
It would even be reasonable to say that we should not
separate ourselves from the body because of the at
tachment for him inspired by some magic charm. As
to the man who (to contemplation) prefers practical
activity, and who contents himself with the beauty
discovered therein, he is evidently misled by the de
ceptive traces of the Beautiful, since he seeks beauty
in inferior things. Every activity unfolded in the
domain of what has nothing but the appearance of

truth, every inclination for this kind of thing supposes
that the soul is deceived by what attracts That
it.
is
which the magic power ex
of
nature
in
the
is
Yºy
€rC1S601.
HOW TO AVOID MAGIC ENCHANTMENTS.
as
Indeed, follow what not Good was the
to
is
it
if
Good,
be
its
misled by appearance, and
to
let oneself
by irrational inclinations, that
of
the characteristic
is is
spite
of
man who himself led whither he does
in
a
go. Now does this not really amount
to
to to
not wish
yielding magic charm? He alone escapes every
a
magic charm who, though carried away by the

he
his soul, considers good none be

of
of
lower faculties the
objects that seem such these faculties, who calls
to
good only what by himself knows such, with

he
be
out being misled by any deceptive appearance; and to
he
as
who regards good not what seek, but what

to
has
he possesses veritably. Then only could he no
in
way be misled by any magic charm.
EVERY BEING THEREFORE IS SPECIALIZED ORGAN
A
OF THE UNIVERSE.
45. This discussion teaches us that each one of
the beings contained
to
the universe contributes the

in
“actions” and “passions”

its
purpose the universe by

of
its
according nature and dispositions,

to
as, an
in
organism, each organ contributes the final purpose

to
the entire body, by fulfilling the function assigned

to of
its
by nature and constitution. From this each

it
its
organ derives place and role, and besides com

municates something else the other organs, and
to
from them receives all that its nature would allow.

if all
on
Somehow, the organs feel what going the

in
is
an
others, and organism,

to of
each them became

it
organ
be
an
quite ready
of
would fulfil the function

iv.4] PSYCHOLOGICAL QUESTIONS-II 5.11
ism, which function differs from that of being merely

an organ.
HUMAN NATURE IS INTERMEDIATE,

SUFFERING
WITH THE WHOLE, BUT ALSO ACTING ON IT.
We are thus shown our condition. On the one
hand, we exercise a certain action on the whole; on
the other, we not only experience the passions that it
its
is natural for our body to experience in relations
with other bodies, but we also introduce into these
relations the soul which constitutes us, bound
as
we
us
the kindred things which surround by our
to
are
natural resemblance Indeed, by our souls and
to
them.
dispositions we become, rather, we already are
or
the inferior beings
of
similar on
to
one hand the

demonic world, and on the other, the superior to
of be
beings the intelligible world. Our nature cannot
of
all
all
us
ignored, therefore. Not receive, not

of
How indeed could we com

us
give the same thing.

others the good, we do not possess it?
it, to
municate
if
or
our nature was not capable

of
receive it?
if
BY SECRET ROAD EACH ONE IS LED TO DIVINE

A
RETRIBUTION.
by
he
he
is,
Thus the evil man shows what and his

is
nature impelled towards what already dominates him,

or
both while he here below, after he has left this

he is
place; when passes into the place towards which

his inclinations draw him. The virtuous man, on the
contrary, has, all these respects, different fate.
in
Each one thus driven by his nature, by some

as
is
occult force, towards the place whither he go.

to
is
this universe, therefore, there obtains an admirable

In
by
power and order, since, secret, and hidden path,

a
the uneScapable condition assigned

to
each one led

is
to
him by divine justice. The evil man does not know

is,
this, and spite himself, conducted the place

of
to
in
5 12 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [28
in the universe which he is to occupy. The wise man
it,
knows and himself proceeds
to
his destined abode.
Before leaving this life, knows what residence in
he
evitably awaits him, and the hope dwelling there
of
some day company with the divinities fills his life
in
with happiness.
EXISTENCE OF HEAVEN; HELL’S TORMENTS ARE

REFORMATORY.
The parts each small organism undergo changes
of
and sympathetic affections which are not much felt,

because these parts are not individual organisms (and
they exist only for some time, and
of
some kinds
in
organisms). But the universal organism, where the
in
parts are separated by great distances, where each

So
its
one follows own inclinations, where there mul
is
a
different animals, the movements and change
of
titude
be
place must Thus the sun,

of
more considerable.
the moon and the other stars are seen successively
is to
occupy different places, and revolve regularly.
to
It
suppose that souls would
to
not unreasonable therefore

as
change location, they change character, and that

they would dwell place suitable their dispo
to to
in
a
They would thus contribute

to of
sitions. the order
the universe by occupying some, place analogous
a
the head the human body; and others, place an

in
alogous
to
the human feet; for the universe admits

of
place for all degrees perfection.

of
When soul does

a
not chopse the best (actions), and yet does not attach
what worst, she would naturally pass into
to
herself
is
Some other place, which indeed pure, but yet pro

is
portioned the mediocrity she has chosen. As

to
to
the
punishments, they resemble the remedies applied by
physicians sickly organs. On some the physician
to
he
lays certain substances; some makes incisions,

in
he changes the condition some others, re

of
or
to
by
the whole system, giving

of
to
establish the health

each organ the special treatment suitable to Like
it.
wise, the health
of
the universe demands that the one
be
changed; that another taken away from
be
(Soul)
the locality where she languishes, and
be
located where
she would recover from the disease.
1According Plato Phaedrus, As thought Aristotle,
x. de
to
Gen.
4
246; vi. 40, and Philebus, 30; Corr. Rep. 617;
ii.
et
C
2-8.
5
Timaeus, 33. 287; Rep.
x.
A
ii.
X.
C
C
347. see 2.3.9.
2
6
pun on “Schéma” and “schésis.” According Aristotle.
to
7
FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE.

Psychological Questions—III.
About the Process of Vision and Hearing.

IT IS UNCERTAIN WHETHER AN INTERMEDIARY
BODY BE IMPLIED BY VISION.
1. Above" we suggested the question whether it
be possible to see without Some medium such as the
air or a diaphanous body”; we shall now try to con
has already been asserted that general
it.
sider
in
It
feel without the intermediation

or
the Soul cannot see

Some body; for, when completely separated from
of
the body (the soul dwells the intelligible world).

in
But, perception, not indeed

of
of
as
touch consists
intelligible entities, but only sense-objects,
of
the
Soul cannot see or feel without the intermediation
Some body; for when completely separated from
of
Some body, the soul dwells the intelligible world.

in
in
as
But, perception, not indeed

of
of
touch consists
telligible entities, but only sense-object, the soul
of
in
order to come contact with these sense-ob

in
or
jects, must enter into cognitive affective relation

with them by the means
of
intermediaries which must

possess an analogous nature; and that why the
is
by
be
knowledge acquired
of
of
bodies must the means

corporeal organs. Through these organs which are
so
as
unity, the Soul

of
form
to
interrelated sort
in a
as
approaches sense-objects
to
manner Such
a
establish effective communion. That contact be

be
tween the organ and the cognized object must

established evident enough for tangible objects,
is
but doubtful for visible objects. Whether contact

is
iv.5] PSYCHOLOGICAL QUESTIONS-III 5.15
be necessary for hearing is a question we shall have to

discuss later.” Here we shall first discuss whether
sight demand a medium between the eye and color.
REFUTATION OF ARISTOTLE'S INSISTENCE ON A
MEDIUM OF SIGHT.
If a medium of sight exist, it exists only by accident,
and in no way contributes to sight.* Since opaque and
earthy bodies hinder sight, and as we see so much the
better as the medium is more subtle, it may be said,
indeed, that mediums contribute to sight, or at least,
if they do not contribute such thereto, they may be
hindrances as slight (as possible); but evidently a
medium, however refined, is some sort of an obstacle,
however slight.
THOUGH THE MEDIUM EXPERIENCE AFFECTION,
THE ORGANS FEEL IT BETTER WITHOUT
THE MEDIUM.
(There is an opinion that) the medium first receives
and then transmits the affection, and impression. For
instance, if some one stand in front of us, and directs
it;
his gaze at some color, he also sees but the color

would not reach unless the medium had experienced
us
be
the affection. To this may answered that there

it
experienced by
be
no
necessity for the affections

to
is
already ex
as
the medium, inasmuch the affection

is
perienced by the eye, whose function consists precisely

being affected by color;
or
least,
in
at
the medium
if
a its
be affected, the eye.

of
affection differs from that

For instance, reed interposed between the hand and
the fish called the “torpedo,” “electric ray,” does
or
not feel the same numbness which nevertheless com

it
the holding hand; still, the hand would

to
municates
not be affected with numbness unless the reed formed
communication between the fish and the hand.”
a
However, the matter not beyond discussion, for

is
(even without any intermediary, for instance) the

if
fisher were in (direct contact) with the “ray” inside

of the net, he would also feel the electric numbness.
This communication therefore seems based on sym
That, by virtue of
its
pathetic affections. nature, one
affected by some other
be
being can sympathetically
being, does not necessarily imply that the medium,
if
different, shares that affection; least (it
at
certain
is
that)
In
not affected the same manner. such
in
is
it
case, the organ destined experience the affection
to
a
experiences far better when there no medium, even
is
it
susceptible some affection.
to
when the medium itself
is
NECESSITY OF MEDIUM IN THE THEORIES OF
A
VARIOUS PHILOSOPHERS.
vision" presupposes the union the “light
of
2.
If
the eye,” with the light interposed (between the

of
eye) and the sense-object itself, the interposed medium

the light, and this medium necessary, on this
is
is
hypothesis. (On the theory

of
Aristotle) the colored

substance produces modification the medium; but
in
a
nothing here would hinder this modification from reach

For,
no
ing the eye itself, even when there medium.

is
this case, the medium necessarily modified before

in
is
the eye (The Platonic philosophers) teach that

is.
vision operates by an effusion the light the eye.

of
of
They have no need postulate medium, unless in

to
deed they should fear that the ray the eye should
of
way; but this ray luminous, and the light

its
lose
is
straight line. (The Stoics) explain vision

in
travels
a
by the resistance experienced by the visual ray. They

cannot do without medium.” (The Atomists and)
a
“images” (such Epicurus), insist

as
the believers
in
that these images move emptiness, thereby imply

in
ing the existence free space avoid hindering

of
to
a
be
as
the images. Consequently they will hindered

medium, this
of
to
direct ratio the existence

in
a
opinion does not run counter our own hypothesis

to
(that there no medium).

is
iv.5] PSYCHOLOGICAL QUESTIONS-III 517
A COSMOLOGICAL MEDIUM IS NECESSARY, BUT IT

AFFECTS SIGHT ONLY ACCIDENTALLY.
Those who (with Plotinos himself) teach that vision
operates by sympathy, assert that vision is poorer
through a medium, because this medium hinders, fet
ters, and weakens sympathy. In this case, indeed, the
medium necessarily weakens sympathy even though
it shared the same nature (as the eye and the object),
and was affected in the same manner. (It acts like the
integument) of some body that is deeply burned by
it;
fire applied to the interior parts are less affected

because they are protected by the exterior parts. There
no doubt that the parts
of
one and the same animal

is
be
will less affected experiencing sympathy because

in
of the existence of medium. The affection will be

a
weakened according the medium,

of
to
the nature
because such medium would hinder excess of affec
a
tion, unless indeed that which transmitted (by one

as is
part another) not such fail

to
to
to
affect the
is
medium. But the universe sympathize with itself

if
because constitutes single organism, and we

it
if
a
are affected because we are contained within this

single organism, and form part why should
to it,
us of
any continuity
be
necessary for feel dis

a
tant object? The single organism, indeed, could

not be continuous without the continuity
of
some
medium; this continuous medium affected only by
is
accident; but otherwise we would have

to
admit that
by
be
all can affected all. But these two objects are

if
affected one manner, and other two objects are af

in
a be
fected another manner, there might not always

in
need of medium. Whoever asserts the need of

a
medium for vision will have very good

to
advance
a
argument, inasmuch that which traverses the air

as
does not always affect the air, and often limits itself
dividing the air. Thus when stone falls the only
to
a
thing that happens to the air is that it fails to support
the stone. As falling is part of the stone's nature, it
falling was
its
would be unreasonable to assert that
the reaction exerted by the ambient air. Other
to
due
wise we would have this same re
to
assert that
is
it
the ambient air that makes fire ascend, which
of
action
absurd; because the fire, by the rapidity
of
its
is
motion, forestalls this reaction. That, by the very

rapidity the motion, reaction accelerated, takes
of
is
place only by accident, and has no relation
to
the
upward impulsion; for trees grow from above without
receiving any (upward) impulsion. Even we, when
walking, divide the air without being pushed by the
the air; the air behind
to
of
limits itself
us
reaction
filling the void we have created. then the air allow
If
divided by bodies without being affected
be
to
itself
by them, what would hinder the air from permitting
free transit for the images reach the eye, without
to
being thereby divided?
IMAGES DO NOT REACH US BY ÉFFLUENCE,

by
us
these images do not reach
of
some sort
If
effluence, why should the air affected, and why

be
affected only
be
of
the
as
should we ourselves result

a
affection experienced by the air? we felt only be

If
cause the air had been affected before us, we would

sight not the visible ob
of
to
attribute the sensation

as
ject, but the air located near us, occurs with heat.
to
not the distant fire, but the air

In
the latter case

is
it
us
located near which, being heated, then warms us;

heat presupposes contact, which
of
for the sensation

does not occur with vision. We see, not because the
sense-object imposed on the eye (but because the
is
medium illuminated); now necessary for the

to is
is
it
illuminated because the air by itself

be
medium
is
dark. the air were not dark, would have no need

If
it
light; for (to effectuate vision) the obscurity, which

of
forms an obstacle to vision, must be overcome by light.

That is perhaps the reason why an object placed very
near the eye is not seen; for it brings with it the dark
its
ness of the air, together with own.
USELESSNESS OF AIR AS TRANSMITTING MEDIUM
PROVED FROM SIGHT OF OBJECTS AT NIGHT.
strong proof that the forms sense-objects
of
A
3.
are not seen merely because the air, on being af

fected, transmits them by relays from point point,
to
that even darkness the fire, the stars, and their
in
is
be
forms may
In
seen. this case no one would claim

the objects, being impressed on the
of
that the forms

obscure air, are transmitted the eye; otherwise,
as to
there would be no obscurity, the fire, while trans

mitting form, would illuminate.
its
Indeed, the
in
profound obscurity which the light
of
the stars
in
is
not seen, the fire signals and light-houses may be
of
of
perceived. Should any one, opposition the testi to

in
mony
of
his senses, claim that even this case the fire

in
by
having
he
be
penetrates the air, should answered

pointed out
to
him that that case human vision

in
it
should distinguish the smallest objects which are the

of in
air, instead being limited the perception

of
to
the
fire. then we see what beyond dark medium,
If
is
much better seen without any medium

be
would
it
whatever.
ABSENCE OF MEDIUM WOULD INTERFERE WITH
VISION ONLY BY DESTROYING SYMPATHY.
might indeed objected that without medium,
be
It
vision ceases. This occurs not because of the lack of

medium, but because the sympathy
of
the (universal)
organism Such case destroyed since medium
in
is
a
a
this organism to
all
presupposes that the parts

It of
gether form but single being. would indeed seem

a
be
to
general condition necessary for sensation that

a
with itself;
be
the universal organism sympathetic

52O WORKS OF PLOTINOS [29
otherwise, no one thing could participate in the power
any other thing that might happen to be very dis
t
tant.
VISION IS NOT DEPENDENT ON THE AFFECTION
OF THE MEDIUM.
Here is another important (related) question. If
there existed another world and organism which had
no relation with our world, and if on the surface of the
sky was an eye that was looking, would it perceive
this other world at a moderate distance, or would it
have no relation thereto? This question will be con
sidered later.” Now however we shall give a further
proof that the medium has nothing to do with vision.
If the air were affected, it would experience a material
affection, similar to the figure impressed on wax. . In
this case, a certain part of the object would be im
pressed on a certain part of the air; and consequently,
the part of the air nearest to the eye would receive a
part of the visible object, and this part would be of a
size equal to that of the pupil. Now a visible object is
its
seen in entirety, and all those who are the air in

from the front,
it,
equally see whether they behold

it
be
one behind the other, with

or
or
side, whether they

out however forming mutual obstacles. This proves
that every part
of
the air contains the entire visible

object. This cannot be explained by any corporeal
affection, but by higher laws, suitable the soul, and
to
the (universal) organism which everywhere re

to
sponds
to
itself.
MUTUAL RELATION OF THE EYE'S LIGHT AND THE
OBJECTIVE LIGHT.
What the mutual relation between the light
4.
is
that emanates from the eye, and the light which

is
the eye, and which extends between the eye

to
exterior
Light has no need
as
and the object?

of
air
10
to a
medium, unless indeed somebody should undertake

say that there is no light without air, in which case air
would be a medium only accidentally. Light itself,
however, is an unaffected medium, for there is no
necessity here for an affection, but only for a medium;
consequently, if light be not a body, there is no need
of a body (to act as medium). It might be objected
that sight has no need either of a foreign light nor of
a medium to see near by, but has need of them for
vision at a distance. Later11 we shall consider whether
or not light without air be possible. Now let us
consider the first point.
INTERMEDIARY LIGHT IS UNNECESSARY, PARTLY
BEING AN OBSTACLE.
If the light which is contiguous to the eye should
become animated, and if the soul should, so to speak,
it,
as
interpenetrate uniting with she unites with the

it
interior light, there would intermediary

be
of
no need
light for the perception the visible object. Sight
of
resembles touch; operates light by somehow

in
to it
transferring itself the object, without the medium

experiencing any affection. Now consider: does the
sight transfer itself the visible object because
of
to
the
or
an interval between them,

of
of
existence because
some body
of
the interval?
In
the existence the

in
latter case, vision would occur by removing this ob

of If,
on the other hand, the ex

be
of
stacle. because
it
mere interval, then the nature

of
istence the
a
visible object must seem inert and entirely inactive.

This however impossible; not only does touch an
is
nounce and experience the neighboring object but, by

the affection experiences, proclaims the differences
it
it
the tangible object, and even perceives

of
from
it
a
it;
distance, nothing oppose for we perceive the

if
as
fire
at
the same time the air that surrounds us, and

before this air has been heated by the fire. solid
A
body heats better than does the air; and consequently

it receives heat through the air, rather than by the

intermediation of air. If then the visible object have
the power to act, and if the organ have the power of ex
periencing (or Suffering), why should sight need any
intermediary (besides light) to exert power? This
its
really When the light
an
needing
be
would obstacle!
does not light up the air before
of
the sun reaches us,
it
lighting us, but lights both simultaneously; even before
has reached the eye, while still elsewhere, we
is
it
it
have already seen, just
at
as
the air was not affected
if
all; that the case, probably, because the medium has
is
modification, and because light has not

no
undergone
yet presented itself Under this hypothesis
to
our view.
(which asserts that the air receives and transmits an
explain why during
be
affection) would difficult to

it
the night we see the stars and, general, any kind in

of fire.
NOT EVEN THE LIGHT OF THE EYE IS TO BE
CONSIDERED AS MEDIUM.
On the hypothesis that the soul remains within her
self, while making use the light (emanated from the
of
eye) reach the visible object, very sharp

to
as
rod
a
a
by
the resistance experi

in be
perception would caused

as by
the light
its
enced tension” and sense-color. In

color, the light itself would possess the
So
far
is
of it
property reflecting light. this case, the contact

In
by
would take place medium. But already before

a
this the light has reached the object without any

that the later contact operated by medium
so
medium;
a
by
would produce cognition

or
memory
of
sort
a
reasoning—which not the case.

is
THE OBJECTIVE LIGHT DOES NOT TRANSMIT THE

IMAGE BY RELAYS.
The hypothesis that the light contiguous
to
the
visible object affected, and transmits this affection
is
by relays from point to point into the eye, is essentially

identical with that theory which supposes that the
medium must be preliminarily modified by the visible
object; a hypothesis that has already been discussed
above.
NEITHER FOR HEARING IS THE AIR NECESSARY

AS A MEDIUM.
5.As to hearing, there are several theories. One
is that the air is first set in motion, and that this
motion, being transmitted unaltered from point to point
from the (location of the) sound-producing air as far
as the ear, causes the Sound to arrive to the sense.
Again, another theory is that the medium is here af
fected accidentally, and only because it happens to be
interposed; so that, if the medium were annihilated,
produc
its
we would feel the sound immediately on
by
We might think
of
tion the shock two bodies.

that the air must first be set motion, but the medium
in
interposed (between the first moved air and the ear)

plays different part. The air here seems
be
to
the
a
Sovereign condition the production sound; for,

of
of of
the origin the sound, the shock

of
two bodies
at
would produce no sound the air, compressed and

if
struck by their rapid concussion did not transmit the

motion from point point far the ear.” But
to
as
as
on
the production the sound depend the impulsion

of
if
impressed on the air, the (qualitative) difference be

tween voices and (instrumental) sounds will challenge
explanation; for there great difference (of “timbre”)
is
between metal struck by metal

or
the same kind,

of
another. These differences are not merely quantita

tive, and cannot be attributed the air which (every
to
same,
of
where) nor the force

to
the the stimulus

is
(which may equal intensity). Another theory

be
in
(of Aristotle's) that the production

of
voices and
is
the air, because the impulsion im

to
sound due
is
pressed on the air is sonorous. (To this it shoud be

answered that) air, in so far as it is air, is not the cause
of sound; for it resounds only in So far as it resembles
its
some solid body, remaining in situation, before
of it
dilates, were something solid.” The (cause
as
if
it
the shock between objects, which
the sound) then
is
hearing.
of
forms the sound that reaches the Sense
demonstrated by the sounds produced the
in
This
is
animals, without the presence any air,
of
of
interior
whenever one part struck by some other. Such
is
is
by
the sound produced certain articulations when they
are bent (as, the knee); certain bones, when they
or
when they break;
or
are struck against each other,
this case air has nothing do with the production
to
of of in
the sound. These considerations compel theory
a
hearing similar our conclusions about sight. The
to
vision, therefore
of
audition, like that
of
perception
repercussion (an affection sympathetically
in
consists
a
felt) the universal organism.

in
THE RELATION OF THE AIR TO THE LIGHT.

Could light exist without air, the Sun illu
6.
if
bodies, and void

of
minated the Surface there were

if
the interval which accidentally illuminated by

in
is
its
of
virtue location (between the sun and the bodies)

}
certain that the other things were affected be

if
is
It
cause the air itself was affected, and light were

if
is,
its
an
the air, that

of
nothing more than affection

Substance; then indeed this affection could not exist
without the experiencing subject (the air). But (in
our view) light
of
not essentially characteristic air

is
all
such; for fiery and brilliant bodies, among which

as
are precious stones, possess luminous color. Could

a
that which passes from brilliant body into some other

a
light
be
body exist without that other body? but

If
every quality
an
simple quality object, and

on of
as
a
implies subject which depends, light will have

it
a
If,
to be sought in the body in which it resides. on the
contray, light only an actualization produced by
be
bebe
some other thing, and there no body contiguous
if
to
the luminous object, and entirely surrounded
it
by void, why could light not exist, and radiate up
a
wards (as well downwards, and

as every direction)
in
*
Since light radiates, why should not radiate without
it
fall, will spontane
be
its
to
hindrance? nature
If
it
ously descend; for neither the air nor any illuminated
body will make issue from the illuminating body,
to it
nor can force advance, since neither an ac
an is
it
it
cident that implies subject, nor affection that

a
implies an affected object. Otherwise, the light would

remain (in the illuminated body) when the object
from which emanates should happen withdraw;
to
it
but since the light withdraws with

it,
In
radiates.
it
what direction does light radiate? (Its radiation)
demands no more than the existence of Sufficient
its
space; otherwise the body
of
the sun would lose

actualization; that the light
is,
In
radiates. this case
it
light would not the quality

be
subject, but the

of
a
actualization that emanates from subject, but which

a
does not pass into any other subject (as kind of

a
undulation); but
be
another subject present, will

if
it
an
suffer affection. As life, which constitutes an actual

be
the soul, affects the body present, and

of
ization
if
it
does not any the less constitute an actualization the

if
body absent, likewise light constitutes

an
be
actualiza
tion subject
to
the same conditions. not the

It
is
obscurity the air that begets light, nor obscurity

of
impure light;
an
mingled with the earth which produces

otherwise one might produce something sweet by
mingling some thing with what bitter. The state
is
ment that light the air, incom

of
modification
is
is
a
plete without the addition that the air must itself be

modified by this modification, and that the obscurity
of
the air no longer obscure after having undergone

is
that change. The air itself, however, remains what it

was, just as if it had not been affected. The affection
belongs only to that which has been affected. Color
therefore does not belong to the air, but subsists in
itself; the air's only function is
its
presence. But
enough
of
this.
DOES THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE LUMINOUS

SOURCE ABANDON THE LIGHT TO DESTRUC
TION; OR DOES THE LIGHT FOLLOW IT?
be
might
of
asked whether the withdrawal the
7.
It
object from which light emanates abandons the light

does the light follow the source into
or
to
destruction,
withdrawal This question the former
to
related
is
2
the light inhere

be
one; (and may
in
said that)
if
it
the illuminated body have be
as
to
manner such
of in
it, a
the light perishes with
it.
come characteristic
The light an immanent actualization, for other
is
wise would surround the object from which eman
it
it
it,
ates, and remain within accumulating there. this
If
were so, the light could not vanish the object
so
long
as
from which emanates itself continues to subsist.
If
it
this object pass from one place another, light would

to
or
pass thither also, not because turns back on itself
it
changes locality, but because the actualization

of
the
nothing
as
as
luminous object exists and present soon

is
opposes
to
the distance from the sun the earth

it.
If
really the light

is,
were much more considerable than

it
the Sun would nevertheless reach us, providing no

of
obstacle were interposed. On the one hand, there

is
the luminous body an actualization, Super

of
kind
in
abundant life, principle and source activity; on the

of
a
other hand, beyond the limits the luminous body,

of
the image
of
exists Second actualization which the

is
a
this body, and which

of
actualization characteristic
never separates itself from the body. Every being
image;
an
its
so
as
has actualization which that,

is
actualization exists also;
its
soon as the being exists,
long
its
actualization radi
so
or as
and the being subsists,
ates nearer further. Actualizations (differ indeed);
or
Some are feeble and obscure, others are secret
hidden, others are powerful and radiate afar. When
must be ad
at
an actualization radiates distance
it
it a
acts, where
to
mitted exist there where exercises
it
Consequently one can see
its
and manifests power.

light shine from the eyes animals whose eyes are
of
naturally brilliant"; likewise when the animals that
concentrated interior fire happen open their
to
exert
a
eyelids, they radiate rays light into the darkness;

of
while, when they close their eyes, no more light exists
outside them. The light therefore does not perish;
only, no longer produced exteriorly. does not
It
is
it
re-enter into the animal but merely ceases
to
exist
exteriorly, for the visual fire does not pass outside,
light itself then within
At
remaining inside. least
Is
2
.
this light remains within; but (when the eye closed) is
an
its
the eyelid forms diffusion.

to
obstacle
LIGHT AS ACTUALIZATION IS THE BEING OF THE

LUMINOUS BODY, AND IS INCORPOREAL.
Thus the light that emanates from bodies the actual

is
the luminous body which active exteriorly.

of
ization
is
The light the bodies whose original nature such,

in
is
the formal being the originally luminous body.

of
is
When such body has been mingled with matter,

it
a
produces color. The actualization alone does not

give color; produces only the hue, because
to
Suffice
it
the property subject, and de

of
the actualization
is
a
be
it,
so
pends on that nothing can withdrawn from the

Subject without simultaneously being withdrawn from
Light
it its
actualization. entirely incorporeal, though

of of is
body.
be
the actualization could not there

it It
a
fore properly light that

be
or
said withdraws
is
present. The true state of affairs is entirely different;
for the light, so far as it is the actualization of the
its
luminous body, is very being. The image produced
mirror therefore an actualization of the visible
in
is
a
object, which acts on anything that passive (that
is
can suffer, experience), without letting any
of
or its
substance escape by any wastage. the object be
If
the mirror;
as
present, the image appears
in
it
is
it
were the image the color that possesses, some par
of
ticular figure. When the object withdraws, the

no
diaphanous body longer possesses what possessed
it
while the visible object was acting on the mirror.
A
the soul; her actualization
of
similar condition that
is
long
so
dwells within the (world's) body
as
this soul
herself dwells within it.
LIFE AND LIGHT DO NOT PERISH, BUT ARE NO

MORE THERE.
(Curiosity might lead some one force
to
ask about)
a
the Soul, but which
of
that were not the actualization

only proceeded from this actualization, such the as
life which we say proper the body.
to
the case
Is
is
the light character

of
of
force similar
to
such that
a
We said that the light inheres

of
istic bodies?
in
so
colored bodies, far that which produces the colors

as
As the life proper

to
to
inheres the bodies. the

in
bodies, we think that the body possesses

so
far
as
it
is be
the soul present; for nothing can inanimate.

is
When the body perishes, and when no longer

it
it,
assisted by the soul which communicated life

to
nor by the actualization this soul, how should life

of
remain the body? What! Has this life perished?

in
No: this life itself has not perished, for only the
is
it
irradiation;
an
image say
of
would not be correct

to
it
more than that no more there.”

is
it
A WORLD OUTSIDE OF OUR WORLD WOULD NOT
BE VISIBLE.
8. If there were a body outside of our world, and
if an eye observed it from here without any obstacle,
it is doubtful that the eye could see that body, because
it;
the eye would have no affection common to for
community caused by the coherence
of
of
affection
is
the unity
is,
the single organism (that
of
the world).
Since this community of
affection (or, sympathy),
supposes that sense-objects and that the senses belong
to
the single organism, body located outside
of of
the
a
were part
be
world would not felt, unless the
it
world. this case,
In
would be felt. were
If
it
it
the world, but yet by
its
part
of
not color and

a
other qualities the organ that

to
was conformed
it
No,
it,
cognize be felt? would

to
was would
it
it
(of
is,
not be felt, that Such hypothesis

of if
a
a
body located outside the world) all
at
were
however, anyone should refuse
admissible. admit to
If
such hypothesis, he would pretend that ab is

it
a
surd that the eye should not see the color located
and that the other senses do not per
it,
of
front
in
ceive the qualities before them. That the reason

is
passive only
its
absurdity.
of
For we are active

or
because we are integral parts the single organism,

of
be
and are located within anything still left

to
it.
Is
considered what we have said suffices, our demon

If
2
finished; otherwise we shall have give

to
stration
is
still further proofs support our proposition.

to
SENSATION IS LIMITED TO COMMON INTEGRAL

PARTS OF THE UNIVERSE.
Every organism
is,
coherent (that sympathetic

is
is
single organism, our

of
with itself).
In
the case
a
demonstration suffices, and all things will experience

they constitute parts
to of
common affections far

so
as
the single organism. The plea that body exterior

a
its
the world could be felt because of resemblance (is
ill-founded because perception
of
characteristic an
is
organism and because the organism that pos
its is
it
sesses perception. For organ resembles (the
perceived object); thus Sensation would the per
be
ception presented the soul by means organs
of
to
similar the perceived objects. then the organism
to
If
feel not only
its
contents, but also objects resembling
them, will perceive these things by virtue
of
its
it
organic nature; and these things will be perceived not

because they are contents thereof, but by virtue
of
their
resemblance thereto. seems rather that perceived
It
their re
be
objects must perceived
of
the measure in
semblance, because the soul has familiarized herself
with them, and has assimilated them
to
herself.
to If
then the soul which has assimilated these objects
herself differ from them, the things which were sup
posed her will remain
to
to
have become assimilated
entirely foreign The absurditv this conse of
to
her.
quence shows flaw the hypothesis;
us
that there
in
is
a
for affirms simultaneously that the soul exists, and

it
does not exist, that the things are both conformable

and different, similar and dissimilar. Since then this hy
pothesis implies contradictories, not admissible;
in is
it
this world,
as
for supposes that the soul exists
it
a
the world, both being and not being universal,
of
result
both being and not being different, both being and not
being perfect. The above hypothesis must therefore
be
abandoned; and since implies contradiction, no

it
a
be
reasonable consequence could deduced therefrom.

Aristotle, de Ani-
11
iv. 4.23. Section 12 This Stoic

6.
1
ma, See section As theory set forth by Diogenes

ii.
5:
7.
is
8
thought Aristotle, de Anim.

18
Laertes vii. 157. As

in
in ii.
As Plato pointed out thought Aristotle, de Anima,

ii.
7.
his Meno, As Plato 14 As Aristotle again

6.
8.
80.
thought. As thought Aris
15
mistaken notion
A
7.
teaches.
of Plato's, then common; see totle, de Gener. Anim.
1.
v.
Matth. 6.23. Diog. Laert. vii. 16 See iv. 4,29.

8
8,
Section 10 Section
2.
157.
9
OF CONTEMPLATION
iii.
8] 531
THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK EIGHT.
Of Nature, Contemplation and Unity.”
(These three subjects are discussed paragraphs 1-4, 5-7, and

8-16. in
The plain, paragraph numbers are those of the Teubner
edition; those parenthesis are the Creuzer (Didot) edition.)
in
A. OF NATURE.
INTRODUCTION: AS JOKE, IT MAY BE SAID THAT
A
EVEN PLANTS ASPIRE TO CONTEMPLATION.

preliminary pleasantry, we said that all
as
If
1.
beings, not only reasonable ones, but even the irra

tional, plants
as
as
well the earth that begets them,

aspire contemplation, and are directed towards that
to
end; that, the difference existing between

of
as
result
a
them, some really achieve contemplation, while others

only accomplish
it,
or
image
of
reflection we would
a
be
no doubt told that this was an absurd paradox.

an as
But we are here engaged private study, we may,

in
a
as
indulgence, support this paradox. While thus

trifling, are we ourselves not actually engaging con
in
templation? Besides, not only we, but any

to be
would
it
who thus trifle, who aspire contemplation. We

might even say that joking child, med
as
well
as
a
itating man both aim reaching contemplation when

at
the former jokes, and the later meditates. Indeed,

there not single action that does not tend towards
is
contemplation; more less externalizing according

or
it
carried out strictly

its
as
freely. any case

In
or
is
it
ultimate aim is always contemplation; but of this
later.”
ENUMERATION OF THE LOWER FORMS OF

CONTEMPLATION.
ºf
(1). Let us begin by explaining what could be the
nature of contemplation (thought) that we attribute
to the earth, to the trees, and to the plants (as we
promised), and how the things and begotten
by these beings can be reduced to the actuality of con
templation; how nature, that is usually considered to
lack reason and imagination, nevertheless is quite
capable of some kind of contemplation, thereby pro
all
works, although speaking strictly,

its
ducing
is
it
incapable thereof.
NATURE ACTS ON MATTER NOT MECHANICALLY

BUT BY ITS POTENCY.
Evidently nature possesses neither hands, nor
2.
For pro
or
feet, nor any natural artificial instrument.

only need work,
its
duction matter on which to

is
a
and which forms. The works of nature exclude all

it
mechanical operation; not by any impelling

of
ideas
force, nor by using levers nor machines does produce
it
varied colors, nor draw the outlines objects.

of
Even
the workmen who form wax figures, whose work
to
the operations nature are often compared, cannot

of
endue objects with colors without borrowing them

from elsewhere. Besides, we must observe that these
workmen contain power which remains immutable,
a
and by the sole means which they produce their

of
works with their hands. Likewise, nature contains

a
whole;
as
power which remains immovable has

it
a
some parts that would remain immovable,

of
no need
and others that move. matter alone that under
is
It
goes movement, for the forming power no way

in
is
moved. Were the forming power moved, would no

it
8] OF CONTEMPLATION
iii.
533
longer the first motors; the first motor would no

longer be be totality,
its
nature, but whatever might,
in
be immovable.
-
NATURE IS IMMOVABLE AS FORM, BUT NOT AS
A
COMPOUND OF MATTER AND FORM.
be
may objected that the (“seminal) reason”

It
may remain immutable, but that nature distinct from
is
reason, and Considering the totality
of of
mutable.
is
nature, we include reason. Considering only one

immutable, this part still will be reason.
its
as
parts
form, and not composite
be
of
Nature must matter
a
a
and form. What need would have of matter that
it
a
might
to be
hot, since matter, when sub

or
either cold
form, either possesses these qualities, re
or
jected
or
ceives them, rather undergoes the action
of
reason
before having any qualities. Indeed, not by fire
is
it
that matter becomes fire, but by reason. Conse

quently, animals and plants, the “reasons” that
in
is
it
produce”; and nature reason that produces other

is
a
reasons, imparting some

of
to
herself the substance

subjected her influence, while remaining within her
to
self. The reason that consists visible shape oc

in
a
cupies the last rank; dead, and produces nothing.

is
it
The living “reason” (which administers the body

of
the living being), being sister the “reason” that pro

to
duced the visible form (in begetting the body

as of
the
living being), and possessing the same power this
reason, alone produces within the begotten being."
BOTH NATURE AND REASON ARE CONTEMPLATION:

WHILE UNIVERSAL REASON IS BOTH SOUL
AND NATURE.
(2). How does nature produce? And how,
in
3.
producing, does she arrive contemplation? Since she

at
produces while remaining immovable within herself,

and as she is a “reason,” she is a contemplation also.

Indeed, every action is produced according to a “rea
Son,” and consequently differs from
it.
Reason assists
an
and presides over action, and consequently not
is
action. Since reason not an action, contem
is
is
it
a
plation. universal Reason, the reason which holds
In
the last rank itself proceeds from contemplation, and
contemplation
of
this sense still deserves the name
in
because produced by the contemplation (of the

is
it
Soul). However universal Reason, which superior
is
as be
by to
the latter reason, may considered under two
us
as
points view, begin

of
soul and nature. (Let

nature.)
THE REASON OF NATURE THE RESULT OF AN

IS
IMMOVABLE CONTEMPLATION.
as
Does reason, considered nature, also derive from

contemplation? Yes, but on condition that has con
it
templated itself somewhat; for produced by
is
it
a
contemplation and principle which was contemplated.
a
How does contemplate itself? does not possess

It
of it
this mode contemplation which proceeds from (dis

cursive) reason; that say, which consists dis in
to
is
cursively considering what one has Being

in
himself.
living “reason” and productive power, how could it
a
fail discursively consider what

to
contains? Because
it
one considers discursively only what he does not yet

nature possesses, she produces by the
as
possess. Now
be
mere fact that she possesses. To what she and

is
produce what she produces are identical.

to
Because
she “reason,” she simultaneously contemplation
is
is
and contemplated object. As she all three: contem

is
plation, contemplated object, and “reason,” nature

produces by the mere fact that her essence
in
is
it
As we have shown, evidently

be
to
these things.
contemplation; for
of
action sort the result

is
is
it
a
of
the contemplation that remains immutable, which

iii.8] OF CONTEMPLATION 535
does nothing but contemplate, and which produces by

its
mere contemplation.
NATURE'S CONFESSION THAT HER MOTHER IS

UNIVERSAL REASON, AND HER FATHER THE
FORMAL REASONS.
(3). anybody were ask nature why she pro
to
4.
If
duces, Nature, all willing
to
at
listen and answer

if
would say, “You should not have questioned me; you
as
to
should have tried understand, keeping silence,
I
do; for speaking. What were
of
am not the habit
in
I
you
to
First, what produced

is.
understand? Here
is
it
my silent speculation, contemplation

of
the work
is
a
effected by my nature; for, myself being born con
of
templation, mine contemplative nature. Besides,
is
a
me contemplates, produces con
of
that which work
in
a
templation, like geometricians who, while contemplat
ing, describe figures. For not describing figures,
in
is
I it
but contemplating, that let drop from within me the

in
preserve
of
lines which outline the forms the bodies.

I
within me the disposition my mother (the universal

of
Soul), and that the principles that beget me (the

of
The latter, indeed, are born

of
formal ‘reasons').
contemplation: was begotten the same way. These
in
I
principles gave birth

or
me without any action,

to
the
mere fact that they are more powerful reasons, and
that they contemplate themselves.”
DESCRIPTION OF NATURE AS WEAKER
A
CONTEMPLATION.
These words signify that nature soul begotten by
is
a
superior Soul that possesses more potent life, and

a
a
contains her contemplation silently within herself,

without inclining towards that which
or
higher lower.
is
Abiding within her own essence (“being”) that

is,
within her own rest and self-consciousness, having

so
as
discovered, far was possible for her, what was

it
below her, without going out of her way to seek
it,
nature produced an agreeable and brilliant object.
If
cognition
of
sen
or
to
desired attribute some sort
is
it
sation nature, these will resemble true cognition and

to
sensation only awake re
of
man who
as
those
is
a
asleep."
of
semble those man who For nature
is
a
peaceably contemplates her object, which was born
in
nature’s abiding within and with her
of
of as
her effect
object
if an
self, herself being contemplation,
of
and
herself being silent, weak contemplation. There
a
is,
indeed, power
that contemplates
another more
strongly; the nature which the image another con
of
is
templation. Consequently, what she has produced
is
very weak, because weakened contemplation can
a
beget weak object only.

a
IT IS MEN WHO ARE TOO WEAK FOR CONTEMPLA

TION THAT SEEK REFUGE IN ACTION.
A
men too weak for speculation who,
in
Likewise
is
a it
action, seek speculation and reason.

of
shadow Not
of
being capable rising speculation, and because
of
to
their soul-weakness not being able grasp that which

to
intelligible, and fill themselves therewith,

to
itself
in
is
it,
though however desiring contemplate these men

to
seek, by action, achieve that which they could not

to
obtain by thought alone. Thus we find that action

is
or
contemplation, when we act,

to of
weakness result
a
to or
or
contemplate, grasp the

or
Ho
to
desire see,
try propose
it,
or
or
intelligible, get others grasp

to
our ability. weakness,

of
to
to
act the extent

It
is
a
for, after having acted, we possess nothing

of
what
we have done; and consequence, because we con
a
template something better than we ourselves have

made. What man indeed who could contemplate truth
the ex
its
would go and contemplate image? This

is
planation the taste for manual arts, and for physical

of
activity" (as thought Aristotle).

OF CONTEMPLATION
iii.
8] 537
B. CONTEMPLATION.
THE PROCESSION OF THE WORLD-SOUL.
(4). After having spoken nature, and having
of
5.
explained how generation contemplation,
of
sort
is
a
us
pass the Soul that occupies rank superior

to
to
let
a
nature. This say about her. By her
to
what we have
is
contemplative action, by her ardent desire
to
learn and
by
discover, her knowledge, and
of
to
the fruitfulness
her resulting need produce, the Soul, her totalit
.#
to
having become object

an
contemplation, gave
of
Some other object; just science, on fructifying,

as
to
by instruction begets
of
lesser science the soul
in
a
the young disciple who possesses the images
of
all
things, but only obscure theories,
of
of
the state
in
feeble speculations, which are incapable self-suf of of

ficiency. The higher and rational part the Soul
the higher region the intelligible
of
ever dwells
in
world, and by this intelligible world, ever illuminated

is,
and fructified”; while the lower (“natural and genera

tive power”) participates what the superior part has
in
received, by immediately participating the intelli-.

in
gible; for life ever proceeds from life, and

its
actualiza
tion extends everything, and present everywhere.
to
is
her procession, the universal Soul allows her Su

In
perior part the intelligible world; for,

to
remain
in
if
she detached herself from this superior part, she would

no
longer
be
present everywhere; she would subsist

only Besides, the part
of
her lower extremities.

in
the
of .
Soul that thus proceeds out the intelligible world

is
inferior what remains within Therefore,

to
it.
the
if
be
present and must assert her sphere

of
Soul must
activity everywhere, and that, which occupies the
if
in
superior rank differs from that which occupies the

if,
ferior; besides, her activity proceeds either from

contemplation action—though indeed originally
or
from contemplation—because contemplation precedes

the action which could not exist without contempla
tion; in this state of affairs, though one actualization
would be weaker than another, yet it would ever re
main a contemplation, so that the action derived from
contemplation seems to be no more than a weakened
contemplation; for that which is begotten must always
its
remain consubstantial with generating principle,
though weaker, since lower rank. All things there
of
fore silently proceed from the Soul, because they stand
either contemplation
of
or
no need exterior visible
in
action. Thus the Soul contemplates, and the con

templating part the Soul, being somehow located
of
the superior part, and being different there

of
outside
from, produces what below thus it;
that contem
is
is
it
plation begets contemplation.” No more than its ob
ject contemplation limited below; that why
is
is
it
everything. Where Every soul
to
extends not?
is
it
contains the same object contemplation. This ob

of
as
ject, without being circumscribed magnitude, does

a
not equally inhere all beings; consequently, not

in
is
it
all
present the same way parts the Soul. That

to
of
in
why Platolo says that the charioteer

of
the soul
is
The
to
communicates his horses what he has seen.

latter receive something from him only because they
possess what has seen; for they have not
he
to
desire
received the entire intelligible (world). Though they
desire, they act only
of
of
act because view what

in
a
of
is,
they desire; that contemplation,

of
view and
in
its object.
PRACTICE IS ONLY PREPARATION FOR
A.
CONTEMPLATION.
(5). The purpose contemplate,
of
to
6.
action
is
possess the contemplated object. The object

to
and
or
activity, therefore, contemplation.

to
seeks
It
is
achieve indirectly what accomplish

to
unable
is
it
directly. not otherwise when one has achieved

It
is
OF CONTEMPLATION
8]
iii.
539
the object
of
one's desires. One's real desire not
it, is
possess the desired object without knowing
of to to
but
know more thoroughly, present the sight
to
to
it
it
be
the soul, and
in to
contemplate
to
able therein.
it
Indeed, activity always has view some good; one
interiorly, appropriate
it,
posses
to
to
to
desires it and
as
possess the result one's action. of Now Good can
possessed only by
the Soul, activity once more
be
us
brings contemplation.
to
back Since the soul
is
be a
“reason,” what she capable possessing could
of
is
so
no more than silent “reason,” being much the
a
“reason,” for perfect “rea

as
more silent more

is
it
son” seeks nothing farther; rests the manifesta
in
it
filled; the completer the

of
tion that with which

is is
it
manifestation, the calmer the contemplation, and

the more does unite the soul. Speaking seriously,
it
there identity between knowing subject and known

is
object knowledge. they were

beof
the actualization
in
If
not identical, they would different, being alien
to
each other, without any real bond, just
as
reasons (are
foreign the soul) when they slumber within her,
to
without being perceived. The reason” must therefore

not remain alien the learning soul, but become
to
united thereto,
of
and become characteristic her.

Therefore when the soul has appropriated “reason,”
a
as
and has familiarized herself therewith, the soul

it
of
Thus
to
it.
were draws out her (breast) examine

it
she observes the thing that she (unconsciously) pos

sessed, and by examining
it,
distinguishes herself there

from, and by the conception she forms
it,
con
of
something foreign her; for though the

a to
as
siders
it
intelligence,
be
of
soul herself “reason” and kind

a
nevertheless when she considers something, she con

something distinct from herself, because
as
siders
it
she does not possess the true fulness, and defective

is
respect her principle (which intelligence).

to
in
is
Besides, with calmness that she observes what she

is
it
has drawn from within herself; for she does not draw
from within herself anything of which she did not
formerly have even a notion. But she only drew from
within herself that of which her view was incomplete,
and which she wished to know better. In her actual
izations (such as sensation), she adapts the “reasons”
she possesses to exterior objects.” On one hand, as
she possesses (the intelligible entities) better than
does nature, she is also calmer and more contem
plative; on the other hand, as she does not possess
(the intelligible entities) perfectly, more (than in
telligence) she desires to have direct experimental
knowledge and contemplation of the object she con
templates. After having (temporarily) withdrawn from
her own higher part, and having (by discursive reason)
run through the series of differences, she returns to
herself, and again gives herself up to contemplation by
her higher part (intelligence) from which she had
withdrawn (to observe the differences); for the higher
part does not deal with differences, as it abides within
herself. Consequently the wise mind is identical with
reason, and in itself possesses what it manifests to
others. It contemplates itself; it arrives at unity not
only in respect to exterior objects, but also in respect
to itself; it rests in this unity, and finds all things
within itself.
THIS CONTEMPLATION IS THE GOAL OF ALL KINDS

AND GRADES OF EXISTENCE.
7. (6). Thus everything (ultimately) derives from

contemplation; everything (really), is contemplation,
including the true beings, and the beings by the former
secondarily begotten by giving themselves up to con
templation, and which themselves are objects of con
templation either for sensation, or for knowledge or
opinion. Actions, and also desire, result in knowledge.
8] OF CONTEMPLATION
iii.
544
Generation originates speculation, and ends
in
the
in
is:
form, that
an
production object
of
of
contem
in
a
all
plation. general, beings that are images
ofof
In
generating principles produce forms and objects
contemplation. Begotten substances, being imitations
beings, show that the purpose generating prin
of
of
ciples neither generation nor action, but the pro
is
duction of works which themselves are to be contem

plated. Contemplation by both discursive
at
aimed is
it,
thought, and beneath by sensation, the end
of
both
knowledge. Further, beneath discursive
of
which
is
thought and sensation the nature which, bearing

is
is,
within herself an object contemplation,
of
that
a
(“seminal) reason,” produces another “reason.”
Such are the truths that are self-evident,
or
that can
be
demonstrated by reasoning. Besides clear that,

is
it
since the intelligible objects devote themselves con
to
templation, all other beings must aspire thereto; for
the origin beings
of
also their end.

is
EVEN LOWER FORMS OF BEGETTING ARE DUE TO

SEMINAL REASONS.
The begetting entirely due

of
to
animals the
is
activity within them

of
Seminal reasons. Generation

is
contemplation;
of
an actualization results from the

it
producing multiple forms, from objects

of
of of
need
contemplation, filling everything with reasons,
of
ceaseless contemplation; begetting no more than

is
producing form, and spread contemplation every

to
a
All the faults met with

or
where.** begotten manu

in
no
factured things are

of
more than faults contem

plation. The poor workman resembles the producer
be
bad form. Besides, lovers must counted among

of
those who study forms, and who consequently give

themselves up contemplation. But enough
of
to
this.
C. OF UNITY.
THE DIFFERENT GRADES OF THOUGHT AND LIFE.
8. (7). Since contemplation rises by degrees, from
nature to the Soul, from the Soul to Intelligence; and
as within it thought becomes more and more (intimate
º or) interior, more and more united to the thinker; and
as in the perfect Soul the things known are identical
with the knower; and because they aspire to Intelli
gence, the subject must then evidently within Intel
ligence be identical with the object; not through any
appropriation thereof, as the perfect Soul does indeed
but because their essence (“being”)
it,
appropriate
is
identical, because the identity between thinking and
of
being (“essence”). Within intelligence no longer do

we have on one side the object, and on the other the
subject; otherwise we would need another principle
where this difference would no longer exist. Within
it,
then, these two things, the subject and the object,

form but single (entity). That living contem
is
a
of a
contemplation
an
plation, and no longer object

which seems something else; for existence
to
inhere
it is in
within living being not identical with living by

a
Therefore be alive, the object of

to
oneself.
is
of if
be
contemplation and thought must life itself, and

or
plants, that sensation, psychic life.

of
not the life

of
Those are different thoughts, the one being the thought

plants, the thought sensation, and psychic
of
of
thought. They are thoughts because they are “rea

92
sons.
“ALL BEINGS ARE CONTEMPLATIONS.”
Every life thought which, like life itself, may be
is
a
also the first

or
more less true. The truest thought

is
life; and the first life identical with the first Intel
is
ligence. Consequently, the first degree

of
life also
is
8] OF CONTEMPLATION
iii.
543
the first degree thought; the second degree
of
of
life
also the Second degree thought; and the third
of
is
degree also the third degree thought.

of
of
life
is
Therefore every life thought. Never
of
this kind
is
a
humanly possible
to
theless define the differences
is
it
of
the various degrees life without being able
to
of
set forth clearly those thought; men will limit them
of
saying that some (of these degrees
to
of it, of
selves
,
thought) imply intelligence, while others exclude

because they do not seek penetrate the essence
to
life. We may observe that the remainder the dis
of
us
cussion brings this proposition, that “all

to
back
beings are contemplations.”
be
the truest life the
If
thought, thought
of
of
life the truest life and the life
if
be
be identical, then the truest thought must alive.
This contemplation life, the object this contempla
of
is
tion living being and life, and both form but one.
is
a
LIKE CIRCLE, INTELLIGENCE IS INSEPARABLY

A
SINGLE AND MANIFOLD.

Since both are identical, the unity that they form
became manifold because does not contemplate unity,
it
does not contemplate unity

or
so
as
far one;
it
is
it
After having
be
otherwise would not intelligence.

it
begun by being one, ceased being one; unconsciously

as it
the fruitful germs

of
became manifold result

it
it
a
developed become all things, though

to
contained.
It
would have been better for not

to
have desired
it
it
a as
this. Indeed, thus became the second principle,

it
circle which, by developing, becomes figure and

a
surface, whose circumference, centre, and rays are dis

tinct, occupying different points. The origin things
of
better than their goal. The origin not equivalent

to is
is
the origin and goal, and that which both origin

is
and goal
no
not identical with that which more

is
is
than origin. other words, intelligence itself

In
not
is
the intelligence single thing, but universal intel

of
a
ligence; being universal, it is the intelligence of all
things.” If then intelligence be universal Intelligence,
its
and the intelligence of all things, then each of parts
be
must also universal, also possess all things. Other
wise, intelligence would contain part that was not
bea
intelligence; intelligence would composed non
of
intelligences; and would resemble conglomeration
it
a
intelligence only by
is an
things which would form
of
their union. Thus intelligence infinite. When some

thing proceeds from thereit,no weakening; neither
is
it,
for the things that proceed from for this also all
is
things, nor for the intelligence from which the thing
parts.”
of
proceeds, because not summation
is
it
a
U
TO THE INTELLIGENCE THAT SIMULTANEOUSLY IS

THE INTELLIGIBLE THERE MUST BE SUPREME.
A
(8). Intelligence. There
of
9.
Such the nature

is
fore does not occupy the first rank. Above must

it
j
it
Principle, whose discovery the object this dis
be
of
is
a
Indeed, the manifold must be posterior
to
cussion.
unity. Now intelligence number; and the principle
is
a
unity, and the principle

of
of
number the number that

is
constitutes unity absolute Unity. Intelligence

is
is is
simultaneously intelligence and the intelligible;
it
be
therefore two things composed

at
once. then
If
it
two things, we must seek what prior

to
this duality.
of
is
Could this principle In

be
Intelligence alone? But

telligence always bound the intelligible.
to
the
If
is
Principle we seek cannot the intelligible,

be
to
bound
not Intel
be
be
neither will Intelligence. then

If
it
it
superior
be
ligence, and transcend duality, must

it
be
thereto, and thus above Intelligence. Could be

it
the Intelligence alone? But we have already seen that

the intelligible inseparable from Intelligence. this
If
is
Principle neither Intelligence, nor the intelligible,

it be
what can be? must be the Principle from which

It
implied intelligible.
its
derived both Intelligence and

are
|
iii.
8] OF CONTEMPLATION 545
THE BEGETTER OF INTELLIGENCE MUST BE SIMPLER

THAN IT. AND IS REACHED NOT BY INTELLIGENT
REASONING BUT SIMPLE INTUITION.
A
But what this Principle, and how are we con
to
is
not intel
or
ceive it? must be either intelligent
it It
be
ligent. intelligent, Intelligence.
be
will also
If
it
be not intelligent, itself,
of
will be unconscious
If
it
it
Though
bebe
and will not any way venerable. true,

in
or
would not perspicuous say that
to
clear the
it
it
is
an
Good itself, since we do not yet have object on
which we could fasten our thought when we speak
of
Besides, since the knowledge the other objects
of
in it.
all beings who can know something intelligent, oc

curs through Intelligence and lies Intelligence, by in
what rapid intellection (or intuition) could we grasp
this Principle that superior Intelligence? We may
to
of is
answer, by that part it;

or us
it;of
which resembles for there

us
something rather, all things that

in
in
is
is
it
participate Him. Everywhere you approach the

in
Good, that which you can participate receives some

in
thing desert,
of
of
Take the illustration

it.
voice
in
a
and the human ears that may be located there.

Wherever you listen this voice, you will grasp
to
it
entirely one sense, and not entirely another sense.

in
in
How then would we grasp something by approximating

up
our intelligence (to the Good)? To see there the

Principle
it so
seeks, Intelligence must, speak, return

to
it
backwards, and, forming duality, must somehow

it a
exceed itself; that means, cease being

to
would have
the Intelligence all intelligible things. Indeed, in
of
telligence primary life, and penetration all things,

of
is
not (as the soul does) by still actualizing move

a
ment, but by ever already ac

18
movement which
is
a
complished and past.” Therefore,

be
Intelligence
if
life, which the penetration all things, possess

of
if
it
is
all things distinctly, without confusion—for otherwise

it would possess them in an imperfect and incomplete

manner—it must necessarily proceed from a superior
Principle which, instead of being in motion, is the prin
ciple of motion (by which Intelligence runs through all
things), of life, of intelligence, and of all things. The
Principle of all things could not be all things, it is only
their origin. Itself is neither all things, nor any par
ticular thing, because it begets everything; neither is it
a multitude, for it is the principle of multitude. Indeed
that which begets is always simpler than that which
is begotten. Therefore if this principle beget Intel
ligence, it necessarily is simpler than Intelligence. On
the theory that it is both one and all, we have an
alternative, that it is all things because it is all things
at once, or that it is everything individually. On the
one hand, if it be all things at once, it will be posterior
to all things; if on the contrary it be prior to all things,
it will be different from all things. For if the One co
existed with all things, the One would not be a prin
ciple; but the One must be a principle, and must exist
all
anteriorly to things, all things are originate

to
if
from On the other hand, we say that the One

it.
if
be
each particular thing, will thereby identical

is
it
with every particular thing; later all things

be
will
it
once, without being able discern anything. Thus

at
to
these particular things, being prior

of
the One none

is
to
all things.
THE SUPREME IS THE POTENTIALITY OF ALL
THINGS, ABOVE ALL ACTUALIZATION.
the
10.
(9). This Principle then potentiality

of
f
is
all.” Without In
it,
nothing would exist, not even

telligence, which the primary and universal life.
is
Indeed what above life the cause of life. The

of is
is
actualization life, being all things, not the first

is
Principle; flows from this Principle

as
(water) from
it
Spring.
a
iii. OF CONTEMPLATION
8]
547
THE SUPREME AS SPRING OF WATER.
A
The first Principle may indeed
be
as
of
conceived
a
Spring (of water) which
its
own origin, and which
is
pours its water into many streams without itself be
coming exhausted by what yields, even without
it or
it
running low, because the streams that forms, before
flowing away each
its
own direction, and while
knowing which direction infollow, yet mingles
to
is
it
its
waters with the spring.
THE SUPREME AS THE TREE OF THE UNIVERSE.

Again, (the Supreme may be
compared to) the life
principle
its
that circulates great tree, without
in
a
its
issuing from the root, where seat, but which later
is
divides among the branches. Though spreading every

where manifold life, the Principle still dwells itself
in
a
exempt from all manifoldness, though being only
its
origin.”
IF UNITY PASSED INTO THE MANIFOLD, THE
UNIVERSE WOULD BE DESTROYED.
This contains nothing surprising. Why should we
be surprised manifoldness issuing from Him who
at
is
or
not manifold, the impossibility

of
at
the existence
the manifold without the prior existence
of
of
That
which not manifold? The Principle not distributed
is
is
the universe; far rather, were disturbed, the

in
if
it
universe would be annihilated; for cannot exist ex

it
Principle abides within itself, with

its
so
as
cept far
in
out becoming confused with the rest.

THIS IS THE BASIS OF THE RETURN TO UNITY.
Consequently, there everywhere unity
it to
return
is
—for for everything unity may

to
there which
is
Consequently, de
as be
be reduced. the universe must

it;
rived from the unity that superior

to
and this
is
548 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [3O
unity is not absolutely simple, it must itself be derived

from a still superior unity, and so on until we arrive
at the absolutely simple Unity, which cannot be reduced
to any other. Therefore, considering what is in a tree
permanent principle—or what unitary
its
—that
is,
is
an
the universe, you will
or
animal, Soul,
in
in
in
a
everywhere have that which most powerful and
is
If,
precious. last, you consider that unity
of
at
the
things that really exist, that
is,
their principle, their
source, their (productive) power, can you doubt its
reality, and believe that this principle amounts
to
nothing? Certainly this principle the things
of
none
is
the principle; such that nothing could
of
which
is
is
it
it
neither essence, nor being, nor life,
it,
be predicated
of
by
it,
superior all you grasp
to
it.
of
because
If
is
it
even being, you will
be
abstracting from ecstasy.
in
it
By directing your glance towards by reaching

it,
it,
and
it,
resting you will get unitary and simple intuition

in
thereof; you will conceive greatness by both

its
of
itself and its derivatives.
THE SUPREME IS NOT INTELLIGENCE. WHICH

ASPIRES TO THE FORM OF THE GOOD.
(10). further consideration. Since intelli
of A
1.
1
gence sort intuition, namely, Seeing (or actual

is
a
izing) intuition (or vision), really consists poten

of
it
tiality that has passed into actualization. will there

It
fore contain two elements, which will play the parts

(intelligible) matter,” and form, just like actual
of
of
ized vision,” for actualized vision also implies duality.

Therefore intuition, before being actualized, was unity.
Thus unity has become duality, and duality has be
come unity. (Sense-) vision receives from sense
its
its
so
objects fulness, and perfection, speak. As

to
intellectual vision, however, its fulness comes from

a to
principle that the Good. Now intelligence were

is
if
its
the Good itself, what would be the use

of
intuition
iii.8] OF CONTEMPLATION 549
its
or Other beings, indeed,” aspire
to
actualization?
the Good, the goal their activity; but the Good
as
of
nothing; and therefore possesses
of
itself has need
it,
nothing but itself.” After having named nothing
added thereto by thought; for,
be
add some
to
should
thing, suppose that He needs this attribute. Not
to
is
even intelligence should be attributed Him; that
to
introducing therein something alien, dis
be
would
tinguishing Him two things, Intelligence and the
in
Good. Intelligence needs the Good, but the Good

Intelligence. On achieving the Good,
of
has no need
form, for
its
its
Intelligence takes derives form from it
the Good; and becomes perfect, because assumes
it
it
the nature (of the Good). The model (or, archetype)
by
be
must judged the trace leaves Intelligence,

in
it
the im
its
conceiving true character according

of
to
pression leaves. Only by this impression does In
it
telligence behold and achieve the Good. That why
is
Intelligence aspires the Good; and Intelligence
to
as
ever aspires the Good, Intelligence ever achieves

to
The Good itself, however, never aspires any

to
it.
thing; for what could He desire? Nor does He achieve

anything, since He desires nothing.” Therefore (the
Supreme) not Intelligence, which ever desires, and
is
aspires
of
the form Good.

to
THE GOOD AS SUPREME NEITHER NEEDS NOR

POSSESSES INTELLECTION.
No doubt Intelligence beautiful; the most
it is
is
it
things, since illuminated by pure

it of
beautiful
is
light, since shines with pure splendor, and contains

of a
the intelligible beings which our world, spite

in
an
of
its
beauty, but adumbration and image. The

is
intelligible world located region resplendent

in
is
with clearness, where nothing either obscure in

or
is
definite, where, within itself, enjoys blissful life.

it
entrances the human gaze, especially when one

It
But just
as
knows how to commune with view
it.
a
heaven, and the splendor
to
of
of
the stars leads one
seek and conceive their author, likewise the contem
plation the intelligible world, and the fascination
of
it
its
The
to
exerts leads (the beholder) seek author.
question then arises, Who He who has given exist
is
the intelligible world? Where and how did
to
ence
so
He beget this pure Intellect, this
so
beautiful son
who derives all of his fulness from his father?” This
2.
supreme Principle itself neither Intelligence nor son,
superior Intelligence, which is
His son. In
to
but
is
is
telligence, His son, succeeds Him, because the son needs
to
receive from the father both intellection and fulness,

his food;
so
which (the son) holds the first rank

is
nothing, not even intellec

of
after Him who has need

tion. Nevertheless Intelligence possesses fulness and
true intellection, because immediately participates
in
it
the Good. Thus the Good, being above real fulness

and intellection, neither possesses them, nor needs
them; otherwise, He would not
be
the Good.
This book sounds more Nu the visible form; see iii. 8.1.
14 is
1
menian or Amelian, than the As thought Plato, Banquet,

former three, which seem to Cary, 31, and Aristotle Aris
in
have been written to answer totle, de Anima, 15 This

ii.
4.
questions Porphyry's. quota

of
as
See sounds were

if
it
2
section 1-7. As thought Aris tion from Numenius, though

it
8
totlein his Physics; viii. 4iv3.10. does not appear the latter's
i. in
iii. 6.6. Children, fragments. 16 See 8.2, 17 See

il.
See 3.13.
5
whose minds are still weak, 1.4. 18 See iii. 7.2. 19 See
v.
and cannot understand the iii. 7.10. 20 Notice the connec

theories of speculative sciences tion between this thought and
exhibited by Nic. Eth. the same period
5,
x.
written
in
ii.
7.
This upper part of the uni of his life; see vi. 8.18. 21 See
8
the principal
is,
22
That
vi.
versal Soul iii. 3.7 and 8.15.

is
power the soul; see the intelligible matter

of
of
in ii.
ii.
3.17. 4.3.
18. 10 In his Phae thought Aristotle,
it.
3.
See 28As Nic.

9
7;
drus, 272, Cary, 75. Anima,

is,
11
That Eth. 24 See

ii.
1.
de
i.
the essence of the known ob pun

25
vi. 8.16. vi. 8.15. 26

A
ject, “reason,” on “koros,” meaning both ful

as
pun on
in
a
6.2, 12 See iv. 6.3. 18 Which ness and son.

ii.
v.8] OF INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY 551
FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK EIGHT.

Concerning Intelligible Beauty.
ART MAKES A STATUE OUT OF ROUGH MARBLE.
1. Since he who rises to the contemplation of the

intelligible world, and who conceives the beauty of
true intelligence, can also, as we have pointed out,
by intuition grasp the superior Principle,” the Father of
Intelligence, let us, so far as our strength allows us,
try to understand and explain to ourselves how it is
possible to contemplate the beauty of Intelligence and
of the intelligible world. Let us imagine two pieces
of marble placed side by side, the one rough and in
artistic, the other one fashioned by the sculptor's chisel,
who made of it the statue of a goddess, a grace, or a
muse; or that of a man—but not that of any individual
whatever, but that of a (cultured gentle) man in
whom art would have gathered all the traits of beauty
offered by different individuals. After having thus
from art received the beauty of the form, the second
its
marble will appear beautiful, not by virtue of es

sence, which be stone—for otherwise the other
to
is
block would be as beautiful as this one—but because

of
the form received through art. The latter, how

ever, did not exist
it of
the matter the statue. was

in
It
the thought existed before pass

of
the artist that

in
ing into the marble; and existed therein, not because

it
had eyes and hands, but because participated art.

in
it
It It it
was therefore art that this superior beauty existed.

in
could not have become incorporated Stone.

in
Dwelling within itself, it begat an inferior form, which,
its
all
passing into matter, could neither preserve
purity, nor completely respond the artist,
of
the will
to
perfection other than that allowed by
no
possessing
produce beauty,
of
As the nature
to
matter. art
is
if
producing beauty which conforms its
to
art succeed in
essence, then, by the possession
of
constitutive the
it,
beauty essential art possesses beauty still greater
to
a
and truer than that which passes into exterior objects.
all
As form extends by passing into matter, (this ob

jectified form) weaker than that which remains one.
is
own (nature),
its
All that extends abandons
as
do
force, heat, and general any property; likewise with
in
beauty. Every creating principle always superior
is
the created thing.
of
not the lack
to
musical
It
is
ability, but the music itself that creates the musician;

while the intelligible music that creates the sense
It is
it
has been attempted degrade the arts by

to
music.
saying that create they imitate nature. This may
to
be
answered by pointing out that the natures beings

are themselves the images other beings (or es of
of
sences); besides, the arts do not limit themselves
to
objects which offer themselves
of
the imitation our to

as
view, but that they go far back the (ideal)

as
objects.
of
reasons from which are derived the nature

Further the arts independently create many things, and
the perfection the object they add what lack
of
to
is
ing, because they possess beauty themselves. Phidias

in
have represented Jupiter without copying any

to
seems
he
sense-objects, conceiving him such would appear

as
he
ever revealed himself our eyes.”

us
to
to
if
BEAUTY INHERES NOT IN THE ORGANISM'S PHYS

ICAL CHARACTERISTICS, BUT IN ITS COLOR
AND FORM.
turn away from the arts and con
us
Now let
2.
as
sider the objects they imitate, such natural beauties,

namely, rational and irrational creatures, especially the

more perfect, in which the creator was able to master
matter, and endue it with the desired form. What
then constitutes the beauty in these objects? Surely
not (the physical characteristics, such as) blood or
menstrual discharges, but the color and figure, which
differ essentially therefrom; otherwise that which con
stitutes beauty is something indifferent—either some
thing formless, or something that contains a simple
is,
nature (that the “seminal reason”), does matter,
as
for instance.
BEAUTY COMES FROM THE FORM IMPARTED BY
THE ORIGINATOR.
Whence came the beauty
of
that Helena about
many battles were fought?
so
whom Whence comes

so
the beauty many women comparable

of
to
Venus?
Whence came the beauty
of
Venus herself? Whence

or
comes the beauty perfect man,

of
of
of
that one
a
those divinities who reveal themselves our eyes,

to
who, without showing themselves, nevertheless

or
possess visible beauty Does not everywhere

it
a
originate from the creating principle that passes into

the creature, just as, the art considered above, the
in
beauty passes from the artist into the work? would

It
be unreasonable to assert that the creatures and the

(“seminal) reason” united matter are beautiful,
to
while denying beauty

to
the “reason” which not

is
matter while still residing

to
united the creator

in
in
primary and incorporeal condition; and

to
assert
a
that order to become beautiful this reason must be

in
to
For such, was

as
come united matter. mass,

if
beautiful, then the creative reason would

be
beautiful
only form, whether
so
as
far was mass.

in
in
it
If
large small object, equally touches and moves the

or
the beholder, evidently beauty does not depend

of
soul
the mass. Still another proof
of
of
on the size this

is
that so long as the form of the object remains exterior
it,
us
to the soul, and as we do not perceive leaves
it
as
as
insensible; but soon penetrates into the soul,
it
it
moves us. Now form alone can penetrate into the
soul by the eyes; for great objects could not enter by
the ob
so
space. this respect, the size
of
In
narrow
a
ject contrasts, because that which great not mass,
is
is
but form.8
RECOGNITION OF BEAUTY DEPENDS ON PRE

LIMINARY INTERIOR BEAUTY.
either ugly,
be
Further, the cause beauty must
of
were ugly, could not

or
beautiful indifferent.
If
it
it
produce its opposite. were indifferent, would
If
it
it
produce that which beautiful,
to
have no more reason
is
than that which ugly. Therefore nature which pro
is
so
many beautiful objects must herself possess

in
duces
very superior beauty.
as
But we do not have the

a
seeing the interior things, which remains

of
of
habit
unknown, we attach ourselves only their exterior,
to
forgetting that which moves hides itself within them;

us
ours) we resemble (Narcissus"),

of
and (in this habit

who, on seeing his image, and not knowing whence
it
came, would try
of
to
it.
catch not the mass an

is
It
its
object that constitutes attractiveness for us, for

it
not mass that beauty inheres." This revealed
in
is
is
by the beauty found the sciences, the virtues,

in
in
and general the souls, where shines more truly

in
on in
it
and brilliantly
its
contemplation and admiration

of
inherent wisdom. Then we do not regard the counten

ugly; we leave aside the form
be
ance, which may

of
the body, attach ourselves exclusively

to
interior
to
by
If,
beauty. carried away the emotion that such

its a
spectacle should cause, you should not proclaim

directing your gaze within yourself,
on
if,
beauty; and
all
you should not experience beauty,”

byof
the charm
then you search for intelligible beauty, such
a
method, would be vain; for you would seek it only

with what is impure and ugly." That is why these
all
discussions are not intended for men. But you
if
have recognized beauty within yourself they you may
the reminiscence (of intelligible beauty).
to
rise
BEAUTY IS THE CREATING PRINCIPLE OF THE

PRIMARY REASON.
the beauty
of
The reason nature the arche
in
3.
is
type the beauty the (bodily) organism.
of
of
Nature
herself, however (is the image
of
the) more beautiful
archetypal “reason” which resides the (universal)
in
Soul, from which derived.* This latter shines
is
it
more brilliantly the virtuous soul, whenever de

It in
to it
velops therein. adorns the soul, and imparts her
is,
light itself derived from still higher Light, that
a
primary Beauty. The universal Soul's beauty thus in

hering the individual soul, explains the reason
of
in
it,
the Beauty superior not adven

to
reason which
is
a
titious, and which not posited any thing other than

in
is
itself, but which dwells within itself. Consequently

of it
not “reason,” but really the creating principle
is
the primary Reason, that

is,
the beauty the Soul,

of
respect the soul plays the part

of
which
to
matter.”
in
is,
the last analysis, Intelligence, which eternal

in
It
is
and immutable because not adventitious.

is
it
OUR IMAGE OF INTELLIGENCE IS ONLY SAMPLE

A
THAT MUST BE PURIFIED.

image does Intelligence then af
an
of
What sort
ford? This material question because we know
is
a
by
that any image Intelligence supplied anything

of
else would be imperfect. Therefore this image

of
itself given by Intelligence also could not

be
genuine
a
image; it can be no more than what is any stray piece
of gold in respect to gold in general, namely, a Sample.
But if the gold which falls under our perception be not
pure, we have to purify it either by our labor or by our
thought, observing that it can never be gold in general
that we can examine, but gold in particular, considered
in an individual mass.” Likewise (in the subject we
are studying) our starting-point must be our purified
intelligence, or, if you prefer, the divinities themselves,
considering the kind of intelligence indwelling in them;
for they are all venerable and unimaginably beautiful.
To what do they owe their perfection? To Intelli
gence, which acts in them with sufficient force to man
ifest them. They do not indeed owe it to the beauty
of their body; for their divinity does not consist in the
possession of a body”; the divinities therefore owe
their character to their intelligence. Now all divinities
are beautiful, because they are not wise at certain
times, and at other times unwise. They possess wis
dom by an impassible intelligence, that is immutable
and pure. They know everything; not indeed human
things, but those which are proper to them, the things
which are divine, and all those that intelligence con
templates.”
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CELESTIAL AND

INFERIOR DIVINITIES.
Amidst the divinities, those who reside in the visible

heaven, having much leisure, ever contemplate the
things existing in the superior Heaven, but as it were
from a distance, and “by raising their head.” On
the contrary, those in the superior Heaven, and who
dwell there, dwell there with their whole personality,
because they reside everywhere. Everything on high,
namely, earth, Sea, plants, or animals, forms part of
the heaven; now all that forms part of the heaven
is celestial. The divinities that dwell there do not

scorn men, nor any of the other essences up there,
because all are divine, and they traverse the whole
celestial region without leaving their rest.**
DESCRIPTION OF THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.
4. That is why the divinities in heaven lead an

easy life, truth being mother, nurse, element and food.
So they see everything; not the things which are sub
ject to generation, but those which have the perman
ence of being, so that they see themselves in every
thing else. In this intelligible world everything is
transparent. No shadow limits vision. All the es
sences see each other and interpenetrate each other in
the most intimate depth of their nature. Light every
where meets light. Every being contains within itself
the entire intelligible world, and also beholds it entire
in any particular being. All things there are located
everywhere. Every thing there is all, and all is each
thing; infinite splendor radiates around. Everything
is great, for there even the small is great. This world
its
its
has sun and stars; each star Sun, and all Suns
is
a
its
them, while shining with

of
are stars. Each own

due splendor, reflects the light
of
the others. There

abides pure movement; for He who produces move
ment, not being foreign
its
it,
to
does not disturb

in
it
production. Rest perfect, because not mingled

is
is
it
with any principle

of
disturbance. The beautiful

is
completely beautiful there, because does not dwell

it
is,
that which not beautiful (that matter).

in
in
is
the celestial things, instead resting on

of
of
Each one
an alien foundation, has
its its
its
own especial seat,

its
origin, and principle, own being, and does not

in
differ from the region within which dwells, because

it
in
its
Intelligence that substrate, and itself

is
it
is
is
telligible.
THE INTELLIGIBLE COMPARED TO LYNCEUS WHOSE
SIGHT PENETRATED ALL.
In order to conceive this better, we should imagine
that this visible sky is a pure light which begets all
the stars. Here below, doubtless, no one part could
its
be begotten by any other, for each part has own
individual existence. On the contrary, the intel
in
ligible world every part born from the whole, and
is
simultaneously the whole and part; wherever
is
is
a
a
part, the whole reveals itself. The fabled Lynceus,
whose glance penetrated the very bowels the earth,
of
only the symbol the celestial life. There the eye
of
is
contemplates without fatigue, and the desire con
of
templating insatiable, because does not imply
is
it
a
void that needs filling,
In or
need whose satisfaction

a
might bring on disgust. the intelligible world, the
so
to as
beings do not, among each other, differ that what
proper the one would not be proper
to
the other.
is
Besides, they are all indestructible. Their insatiability

be
(in contemplation)
to
understood the sense

in
is
that satiety does not make them scorn what satiates

them. The more that each sees, the better he sees;
its
as
each one follows nature seeing infinite both

in
its
itself and the objects that present themselves
to
view. On high, life, being pure, not laborious. How

is
indeed could the best life imply fatigue? This life

no is
wisdom which, being perfectly complete, demands

research. primary wisdom, which not derived
It
is
is
an
from any other, which being, and which not

is
is
adventitious quality intelligence; consequently there

of
none superior the intelligible world absolute

In
to
it.
is
knowledge accompanies intelligence, because the

former accompanies the latter, Justice
as
enthroned
is
by the side Jupiter.” All the essences (or, beings)

of
so
the intelligible Being resemble many statues which

in
are visible by themselves, and the vision which im

of
an
parts unspeakable happiness the spectators. The

to
greatness and power of wisdom is revealed in con
its
its
taining all beings, and having produced them.
in
their origin; identical with them; fuses with
It
is
is
it
do it
them; for wisdom very being. This we not easily
is
understand because by sciences” we mean groups
of
demonstrations and propositions, which not true
is
this point con
be
of
even our sciences. However,
if
drop this comparison with our sciences,
to us
tested, let
knowledge itself, which Plato” says
of
and return
that “it does not show itself different different ob
in
jects.” How can that be? Plato left that be ex
to
plained by us, that we might show
be
to
we deserve
if
called his interpreters.18 We shall undertake this inter
pretation by the following observation.
DEMONSTRATION THAT WISDOM IS WERITABLE

BEING, AND THE CONVERSE.
All
or
the productions
of
5.
nature art are the

certain wisdom which ever presides over
of
works
a
their creation. Art made possible only by the exist

is
ence of this wisdom. The talent of the artist de

is
nature which presides over

of
rived from the wisdom

the production every work. This wisdom
of
not
is
a a
sequence demonstrations,
of
of
the whole forms

as
it
unity; plurality reduced unity, but unity

to
not
is
is it
which resolved into plurality. we admit that this

If
a
primary Wisdom, there nothing

of be
to
wisdom
is
is is
it,
sought beyond independent

in
since this case

it
If,
every principle, and located within itself. on the

is
contrary, we say that nature possesses the (“seminal)

reason,” and
its
principle, we shall have

to
ask
is
whence nature derives it.” be called superior

If
it
principle, we still have

of
to
ask the derivation this

principle; derived from nothing, we need not go
be
it
if
beyond
to
(but return the above demonstration).

it
If,
on the contrary,
be
derived from Intelligence, we

it
shall have examine whether Intelligence produced

to
wisdom. The first objection here will be, how could
it,
it have done so? For if Intelligence itself produced
Intelligence could not have produced without itself
it
being Wisdom. True Wisdom therefore “being”
is
and, on the other hand, “being” wisdom, and derives
is
dignity from Wisdom; that why “being” verit
its
is
is
able “Being.” Consequently, the being (essences)
which do not possess wisdom are such beings only be
cause they were created by certain wisdom; but they
a
are not true beings (essences), because they do not
in
themselves possess Wisdom. would, therefore, be
It
state that the divinities, the blessed dwell
or
to
absurd
ers the intelligible world, that world are engaged
in
in
studying demonstrations. The entities that exist
in
there are beautiful forms,” such

as
as
of
are conceived
existing within the soul the wise man;
of
do not
I
mean painted forms, but existing (substantial) forms.
That why the ancients” said that ideas are essences
is
and beings.
BY PUN, EGYPTIAN WISDOM IS ADDUCED AS
A
A
SYMBOL,
The sages Egypt seem
of
us or to
to
6.
me have
shown either consummate insight marvellous
a
instinct when, their wisdom,

to
to
order reveal
in
they did not, express words and propositions, make

to
letters representing sounds and expressions, but

of
use
symbolized objects by hieroglyphics,” and their
in
mysteries symbolically designated each them by

of
particular emblem. Thus each hieroglyphic sign con

wisdom; and without dis
or
of
stituted kind science

a
places the thing under

or
cursive conception analysis

the eyes synthetic manner. Later, this synthetic
in
a
notion was reproduced by other signs which developed

it” expressing discursively, declaring the causes
of
it
things, wherever
of
the constitution their beautiful

disposition excited admiration.
of
The wisdom the

Egyptians is best seen in this, that though they did

not possess the causes of (essential) beings, (their
writing) was able to express everything so as to har
monize with the causes of essential “Being.”
RESEMBLANCE OF EARTHLY THINGS TO THE INTEL

LIGIBLE IS THE BASIS OF THE RESEMBLANCE
OF THE INTELLIGIBLE TO THE EARTHLY.
all
If
therefore (celestial) entities resemble earthly
objects—a truth** which perhaps impossible
to
is
or so
demonstrate, much the more must we, before any
all
examination discussion, premiss that (earthly)
objects resemble those which exist the intelligible
world. This truth, which applies everything, may in
to
important example.
an
perhaps best understood by

be
CONTROVERSY AGAINST THE GNOSTIC DIVINE

PLANNING OF THE WORLD.
then by all
us
agreed that the universe

of
7.
It
is
proceeds from superior Principle which possesses

a
a
certain perfection. The (Gnostic) question then arises
whether this Principle, before creating, reflected that
was necessary first form the globe, and suspend
to
to
it it
the world; then, produce the

of
to
to
the middle
water, and spread the earth;
of
over the surface

to
it
later creating successively the other things contained

the space between the earth and heaven. Further,
in
did He give birth all the animals only after having

to
to
Himself represented all their forms, and exterior

parts? Did the Creator undertake the work only after
having conceived the plan totality
its
of
the world
in
Certainly not; He cannot have

its
and details?
in
all such considerations.” How could He,

to
submitted
never having seen anything such, have been inclined
to them? Neither could He have borrowed the idea
of the things He was to produce, and then carried them
out as some workman, by the use of his hands and feet;
for hands and feet are created entities. The only
hypothesis left is that all things were within some one
is,
other thing (that matter, which their substrate).
is
(“Being”) was next this other thing (matter), and
to
no
as
interval separated them, He suddenly begot an

Himself, either by Himself,
or
image representation
of
toof
or
or
by the intermediation the universal Soul,
of
some particular soul—which detail does not matter
our discussion here.
HOW CREATION OF THE WORLD TOOK PLACE.

Therefore, everything
here below derives from
above there, and more beautiful the superior
in
is
world; for forms here below are mingled with matter;

on high, they are pure. Thus this universe proceeds
from the intelligible world, and contained by the
is
forms from beginning First matter receives

to
end.
the elements, later receiving gradual ac
of
the forms
that ultimately matter be
so
other forms,
of
cessions
comes So buried under forms that becomes difficult
it
to
recognize. receives forms easily, because

It
it
(already) possesses form which holds the lowest
a
rank. Likewise, the producing Principle uses form

a
as
model, and easily produces forms because consists

it
“being” and form;

its
entirely result,
of
work has
as
a
been easy and universal, because itself was universal.

Therefore met no obstacle, and still exercises an
it
absolute sovereignty. the things that act

of
as
Even
each other, none, even until the present
to
obstacles
the demiurgic (Creator),
an
time, form
to
obstacle
because He preserves. His universality. That why
is
am convinced that even we were simultaneously

if
I
the models, forms and essence things, and

of
the
if
form which produces here below were our essence,

being), we would accomplish our work with
is,
(that
out trouble, though man, his present state here below,
in
form dif
is)
produces (his individual body which
a
ferent from himself; indeed, indi
on
an
becoming
vidual, man ceased being universal. But on ceasing
to
be an individual, man, Plato,” “soars
of
the words
in
the ethereal region, and governs the whole world.”
in
For, becoming universal,

he
administers the universe.
THE SUPREME PRINCIPLE ADMITS OF NO REASON

ING, DEMONSTRATION, FAITH OR CAUSE.
Returning our subject, you can perhaps explain

to
why the earth the world,

of
located the middle
in
is
and why spherical”; you may clear up why

its
form
is
the equator inclined towards the ecliptic; but you

is
wrong thinking that the divine Intelligence

be
would
in
proposed achieve these objects because judged

to
it
only
be
reasonable; things good be

to
them these are

cause Intelligence
is.
what Its work resembles the

is
it
syllogism, whose premises had been

of
conclusion
a
withdrawn, and that was based on the intuition

of
its
divine Intelligence nothing consequence,
In
causes.
is
a
plan
its
nothing depends on means;

of
combination
a
independently
of
conceived such considerations.

is
Reasoning, demonstration, faith—all these are pos
j
terior things. The mere existence the principle de
of
termines here below the existence and nature of the

entities depending from one more right
it.
Never
is
asserting that the causes principle should not be

of
in
sought, than when referring Principle which

to
is is
a
perfect, and both principle and end. That which

is
simultaneously principle and end all things

be at
the
is
time, and consequently leaves nothing de

to
S11COl.
IF THIS PRINCIPLE IS NOT BEAUTIFUL, NOTHING

ELSE COULD BE THAT.
8. This Principle is sovereignly beautiful; it is

beautiful entirely and throughout, so that not a single
its
one of parts lacks beauty. Who could deny that

this Principle Only such do not en
as
beautiful?
is
tirely possess beauty, possessing only partially,
or
it
this Principle were not sovereignly
at
even not all.

If
beautiful, Surely none other could claim that distinc

As the superior Principle (the one, superior
to
tion.
Intelligence) above beauty, that which first presents
is
our view, because form, and the object

to
itself is
it
the contemplation intelligence, a

of
of
that whose
is
aspect amiable.”
is
PLATO SYMBOLIZES THIS BY MAKING THE CREATOR

ADMIRE HIS HANDIWORK.
express this idea strikingly that Plato.”
to
was
It
represents the demiurgic creator admiring his handi

to as
work, which would lead

us
also admire the beauty

the idea. After all, admira
of
of
both the model and

tion of work made to resemble model amounts to
a
a
admiration of the model itself. However there no

is
reason for astonishment persons whom this idea

at
to
seems novel, for lovers, and general all those who

in
admire visible beauty do not realize that they admire

only because (it the image) the intelligible
of
is
it
beauty.90 That Plato referred the model the ad

to
miration felt by the demiurgic (creator) for his work

proved by his adding the words “he admired his
to
is
he
work” the expression “and conceived the purpose

its
rendering
to
of
still more similar model.” He

it
betrays the beauty the model by saying that the

of
beautiful, and that the image the model;

of
work
is
is
it
for if this model were not sovereignly beautiful, and

did not possess an unspeakable beauty, how could there
be anything more beautiful than this visible world?
It is therefore wrong to criticize this world; all that can
its
it,
be said of inferior model.”
to
that
is
is
it
THE POWER OF THE INFERIOR DIVINITIES DEPENDS
IN
ON THEIR INHERING THE SUPREME.
(To our view we shall propose an ex
explain
9.
periment”). imagine that

Let
us
the sense-world
in
is,
as
every being should remain confusing itself with

it
the unity the whole,

of
of
to
the others the extent
so in
ability;
its
that all that we see lost this unity.
in
is
Imagine transparent sphere exterior the spectator,

to
a
by looking through which one might See all that con
it
tains, first the sun and the other stars together, then
the sea, the earth, and all living beings. At the moment
picturing yourself thought transparent sphere
of
to
in
that would contain all moving, resting and changeable

things, preserving the form this sphere, and without
of
it,
diminishing the size Suppress mass, extent, and

of
material conception. Then invoke the divinity that

which you have made yourself
it. of
created this world

an image His coming down into may
to
invest
it
resulting from two causes.

of
Either
is as
be conceived
the Divinity that simultaneously single and manifold
will come the company
of
adorn this world

to
the
in
other inferior divinities which exist within Him. Each

of these would contain all the others that are manifold
their powers; and nevertheless they would
of
because
form single divinity because their multiple powers are
a
contained unity. Or the Divinity will do this be

in
cause the only divinity contains all the inferior divini

ties, within His breast. (Which the more likely hy
is
pothesis?)
ALL THE INFERIOR DIVINITIES ARE CONTAINED

WITHIN THE SUPREME.
Indeed, this only Divinity loses none of His power
by the birth of all the divinities contained within Him.
All co-exist, and their individual distinctions obtain
without their occupying separate localities or affecting
a sense-form. Otherwise the one would be here, and
the other there; each one would be individual, without
simultaneously being universal in itself. Neither have
they any parts that differ in each of them, or from
each other; neither is the whole formed by each of
them a power divided in a multiplicity of parts, a power
whose magnitude would be measured by the number
universality the intelligible
its
its
of parts. Taken
in
world possesses universal Power, which penetrates

a
its
everything infinite development without exhaust

in
its
so
ing infinite force. He great that even His

is
parts are infinite. There no locality that He does

is
not interpenetrate. Even our world great; like

is
it
wise contains all the powers; but
be
would much
be it
its
better, and magnitude would inconceivable
if
did not also contain physical powers, which are es
it
sentially small (because limited). Fire and the other

called great powers because they con
be
bodies cannot
sist only the infinity
an
image the genuine

of
of
of
Power by burning, crushing, destroying, and con

tributing the generation They destroy
of
to
animals.
only because they themselves are destroyed; they con
generation only because they themselves are
to
tribute
generated. -
BEING IS DESIRABLE BECAUSE BEAUTIFUL.
The Power which resides the intelligible world

in
pure “being,” but perfectly beautiful “being.” With

is
out beauty, what would become of “being”? With

out “being,” what would become of beauty” “Being”
itself would be annihilated by the beauty of “being.”
“Being” is therefore desirable, it is identical with
beauty, and beauty is amiable because it is “being.”
Seeing that both are of the same nature, it would be
useless to inquire which is the principle of the other.
The deceptive “being” (of bodies) needs to receive
the image borrowed from beauty to appear beautiful;
and in general, to exist; it exists only in so far as it
participates in the beauty found in “being”; the greater
ap
it,
its participation, the more perfect is because
it
propriates this beautiful being all the more.
88
VISION OF THE SUPERCELESTIAL.

why Jupiter, the most ancient
in of
10. That the
is
is,
other divinities, whose chief he leads them this

divine spectacle the contemplation the intelligible
of
of
world.** He followed by these divinities, the

is
guardians, and the Souls who can Support (the glory

invisible place,” this divine
an
of) this vision. From

world sheds light on all. On rising above
its
sublime
horizon,
its
scatters rays everywhere, inundating

it
everything with clearness. dazzles all those who

It
the peak where shines; and,

of
the foot
at
are located
it
like the sun, often obliges them turn away their

to
it
glory. Some however

its
sight, which cannot sustain

raise their eyes, imparting
to
to
are forced them

strength for this contemplation; others, who are
at
a
in it it,
distance, are troubled. On perceiving those who

can contemplate Him fix their gaze on and all its
contents. Not every one, however, sees the same
it
thing. One discerns therein the source and being

of of
by
justice; another overwhelmed the revelation

is
wisdom, which men here below scarcely possess an

of
only
an
enfeebled image. Indeed, our vision imita

is
tion of intelligible wisdom. The latter, spreading over

all beings, and as it were embracing immensity, is the
last to be perceived by those who have already long
contemplated these brilliant lights.
PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF THIS VISION.
Such is the vision seen by the divinities, all together,

and each one separately. It is also beheld by the souls
the things contained within the intelligible
all
that see
world. By this sight, souls themselves become capable
containing, from beginning end, all the entities
of
to
within their intelligible world; they dwell within by
it
that part capable doing so. Often,
of
of
theirs which
is
it,
even, the whole
of
at
them dwells within least So
long they do not withdraw therefrom.
as
THIS VISION, WHEN TRANSFERRED WITHIN,

BECOMES SWEET AS NECTAR.
beheld by Jupiter and by all those
of
This what
is
is
who share His love for this revelation. The last thing
us
which then appears the beauty that shines en its

in
is
is,
beings),
in
tirety as
the essences (that well
as
in
those who participate therein. the intelligible world

In
everything glows, and beautifies itself by shedding

splendor on those who gaze Thus men who have
at
it.
high mountain on arriving the summit

at
climbed
a
by
suddenly shine with the golden color reflected the

ground whereon they stand. Now the color that
bathes the intelligible world the beauty that blooms
is
flower; color,
its
or
within rather there everything

is
its
everything beauty, most intimate depths; for

in
is
beauty, the intelligible world, not flower that

in
is
blooms only on the surface. Those who do not ap

prehend the totality the view appreciate the beauty
of
only that which meets their gaze; but those who,

of
like men intoxicated with this sweet nectar,” are, to

the very soul, penetrated by the beauty of the intel
ligible world, are no longer mere spectators. No
longer are the contemplated objects and the contem
plated soul two things exterior to each other. If the
soul's gaze is piercing enough, she finds the object
she contemplates within herself. Often she possesses
it without knowing Then indeed does she contem
it.
she would contemplate Some exterior ob
as
plate
it
ject, because she seeks to the same manner.
in
see
it
Every time that one looks something
at spectacle,
as
a
Now this spectacle
of
of
seen outside oneself.
is
it
the intelligible world must be transferred within one

be
as
self, and contemplated something with which one

has fused, the point identity. man, pos
of
Thus
to
a
divinity, whether by Phoebus
or
sessed by by some
a
Muse, would contemplate this divinity within himself,

divinity.
he
all able contemplate

at
to
were
if
MECHANISM OF THE ECSTASY.

as
11. (The ecstasy operates follows.) When a

man entranced by the divinity, he loses consciousness
is
of
himself. Then when he contemplates the (divine)

he
spectacle which possesses within himself, he con

templates himself and sees his image embellished.
However beautiful be, he must leave aside, and
it
it
concentrate upon the unity, without dividing any

of
it.
Then he becomes simultaneously one and all with this

divinity which grants him. His presence silently. Then
the divinity
of
to
to
the man united the extent his

is
If,
desire and ability. while remaining pure, he return

he
the divin
as
duality, possible
to
to
as
remains close
enjoys the divine presence
he
he
as
as
ity, and soon

turns towards the divinity.
BENEFITS OF THIS CONVERSION TOWARDS THE

DIVINITY.
The advantages derived from this conversion towards
the divinity are first Self-consciousness, so long as he
remains distinct from the divinity. If he penetrate
into his interior Sanctuary, he possesses all things, and
renouncing self-consciousness in favor of indistinction
from the divinity, he fuses with de
he
As soon
as
it.
himself,
so
see Something, speak, outside
of
he to
to
sires
considers, even exteriorly. The
he
himself that
is
it
soul that studies the divinity must form an idea
of
him
while seeking know him. Later, knowing how great
to
that divinity which she desires unite herself,

to
to
is
and being persuaded that she will find beatitude
in
this union, she plunges herself into the depths
of
the
divinity until, instead contenting herself with con
of
templating the intelligible world, she herself becomes

an
object contemplation, and shines with the clear

of
the conceptions whose source on high.

of
ness
is
HOW THE SOUL MAY BE UNITED TO THE DIVINITY

WITHOUT SEEING HIM.
be
But how can one beauty, without seeing

to
united
be
as
it? seen some thing distinct from oneself, he

If
it
not yet fused with vision imply

of
it.
the act
If
is
exterior object, we have no vision;

an
relation with
or, least, this vision consists the identity
of of
at
Seer
of in
and seen. This vision kind conscience, self

is
a
be
consciousness; and this feeling too acute, there

if
even danger breaking up this unity. Besides, one

of
is
must not forget that the sensations

of
evils make
stronger impressions, and yield feebler knowledge, be
cause the latter are frittered away by the force im
of
pressions. Thus sickness strikes sharply (but arouses

v.8] OF INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY 57.1
only an obscure notion); health, on the contrary,
it,
us
thanks to the calm that characterizes yields
a
itself, for remains quietly within us,
of
clearer notion
it
proper us, and fuses with us. On the
to
because
is
it
contrary, sickness not proper us, but foreign.
to
is
Consequently manifests itself vividly, because
is
it
it
opposed our nature; while we, on the contrary,
a to
enjoy but feeble feeling
of
of
ourselves and what
belongs us. The state which we grasp ourselves
to
in
best the one which our consciousness of ourselves
in
is
fuses with us. Consequently on high, the very
at
by
its
moment when our knowledge intelligence
at
is
best, we believe that we are ignorant
it,
of
because we
consult sensation, which assures that has seen us
it
nothing. Indeed has not seen anything, and never
it
it
could see anything such (as the intelligible beings).

therefore the sensation that doubts; but he who
It
is
has the ability

to
see differs therefrom. Before the

he
seer could doubt, cease believing
in
to
would have
speak, ex
he
so
his very existence; for could not,

to
consider himself with the eyes

of
ternalize himself
to
the body.
NATURE OF THE OBJECT OF SPIRITUAL VISION.
12. We have just said that man can see, either

a
differing from what

he
identifying him
or
sees,
in
in
self with the object seen. Now, when has seen,

he
heas
being different, being identical, what

or
us as
either
report?
he
does He
that tells
has seen the
Divinity beget an offspring an incomparable beauty,
of
producing everything Himself, and without pain

in
In
preserving within Himself what He has begotten.

fact, charmed with the things He has begotten, and full
love for his works, the Divinity retained them within
of
Himself, congratulating Himself upon their splendor,

as
upon his own.

of
In
as
much the midst these

beauties, nevertheless inferior to those which have

remained within the nature of the Divinity, alone of
all these beings, his Son (Jupiter, the son of Saturn,
here representing the universal Soul born of divine
Intelligence) has manifested himself externally. By
him, as by an image, you may judge of the greatness
of his Father, and that of his brothers still unissued
from within their Father's nature. Besides, it is not
in vain that Jupiter tells us that he proceeds from his
Father; for he constitutes another world that has be
come beautiful, because he is the image of beauty, and
because it is impossible that the image of beauty and
being should not itself be beautiful. Jupiter, there
fore, everywhere imitates his archetype. That is why,
because he is an image, he possesses life and consti
tutes being; and that is why, because he proceeds from
his Father, he also possesses beauty. He likewise
enjoys the privilege of being the image of his eternity.
Otherwise he would at one time reveal the image of
his Father, and at other times he would not; which is
impossible, because he is not an artificial image. Every
natural image remains what it was, so long as archeits
type subsists.”
an
believe that,
to
therefore error
is
It
while the intelligible world subsists, the visible world

could perish, and that was begotten
in
such manner
it
with de
it,
as
so
he
that who had created had done

liberation. Whatever indeed might have been the
operation, these men” do not wish con
of
to
manner
so
ceive and believe that, long the intelligible world

as
shines, other things that proceed therefrom could not

perish; and that they exist ever since (their model)
existed. But the (intelligible world) has ever existed,
and will ever exist; for (in spite their impropriety),
of
we are obliged express

of
to
to
make use such terms

our thought.
SATURN IS SON OF COELUS, AND FATHER OF

JUPITER.
13. (Saturn) is always represented as chained,
because He remains immovable in his identity. It is
said he gave up to his son, Jupiter, the government of
the universe, because such (an occupation) did not
suit Him, who possesses the fulness” of good things, 40
to distract himself from the government of the intel
ligible world to undertake that of an empire younger
and less exalted than himself. Besides, on one hand,
(Saturn) fixed within himself, and raised himself up to
his father (Coelus, or Uranus). On the other hand,
he likewise fixed the inferior things which were be
gotten by his son (Jupiter). Between both he (Saturn)
therefore occupies a rank intermediary between his
Father, who is more perfect and his son, who is less so.
On one hand he mutilates his Father, by splitting
primitive unity into two different elements. On the
other, he raises himself above the being which is in
ferior to him, disengaging himself from the chains that
might tend to lower him. As (Coelus), the father of
(Saturn), is too great to admit of having beauty at
tributed to him, (Saturn) occupies the first rank of
beauty.
IF THE WORLD-SOUL AND VENUS BE BEAUTIFUL,

HOW MUCH MORE THEIR SOURCEP
The universal Soul is beautiful also; but she is less

beautiful than (Saturn), because she is his image, and
because, however beautiful she may by nature be, she
is still more beautiful when contemplating her principle.
Therefore if the universal Soul—to use clearer terms—
and if even Venus (as subordinate to him, Jupiter),
possess beauty, what must be that of Intelligence?
If by their nature the universal Soul and Venus receive
their beauty from some other principle, from whom

would they derive the beauty they intrinsically possess,
and that which they acquire? As to us, we are
beautiful when we belong to ourselves; and we are
ugly when we lower ourselves to an inferior nature.
Again, we are beautiful when we know ourselves, and
ugly when we ignore ourselves. It is therefore in the
intelligible world that beauty shines and radiates. Are
these considerations sufficient for a clear knowledge
of the intelligible world, or must we engage in a further
effort to accomplish this?
1. Another proof of the which differed from both the

chronological order; see 3.8.9. hieroglyphic and demotic.
24
See
2 Cicero, Orator 2; Seneca, Con iii. and 25 See 9.12;
ii.
3.
2
troversiae v. 36. 8 his Phaedrus,
In
ii.
8.1. See iii. 2.1. 26

i. 4
246; Cary, 55. As was taught
27
6.8. 6.2. 6.9. 6.8.
8 i.
7
9 i.
i.
6.2. 6.6. 10 6.5. 11 iii. by Cleomedes, Meteora viii,

i.
i.
i.
As thought Plato, Ptolemy, Almagest

in
5.6. 12 and
i. i,
7;
Phaedrus, Cary, 58. 18 Phae Geogr.
28
vii. See
5.
i.
drus, Cary, 59, 62; Numenius, his Timaeus, 37;

29
In
6.9.
32. 14 Seeii. 2.1. 15In Sophocles Cary, 14. 30 See 3.2; 6.8.
c.
i.
i.
Oedipus Coloneus, 1375; pun Referring the Gnostics;
81
to
Aa
on “diſ” and “dikén.” 15 pun 9.17; this another

ii.
see
is
between “science” and “knowl proof the chronological or

of
edge.” 17 In his Phaedrus; der. 82 As proposed

ii.
in
9.17.
Cary, 58. 84 As thought
18
See 1.8. 19See iv.

v.
88 See 8.15.
in i.
4.11, 12. pun on the word Plato his Phaedrus; Cary,

A
20
meaning “forms” and “statues,” 56. 85 The “infra-celestial
mentioned above. 21 Such as vault,” of Theodor of Asine.
Numenius fr. 20. 22 Pun on 86 As said Plato, his Phae
37 in
“agalmata,” which has already drus; Cary, 59. See 1.6.

v.
done duty for “statues” and 88 Gnostics. 89 Pun on “koros,”

“forms.” 23 Here Plotinos re fulness, or son. 40 Or, being
the hieratic writing, satiated with good things.
to
fers
v.5] INTELLIGIBLES WITHIN INTELLIGENCE 575
FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE.

That Intelligible Entities Are Not External to the
Intelligence of the Good.
(The subject of the quarrel between Amelius and Porphyry.1)
KNOWLEDGE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES

IMPLIES THEIR PRESENCE.
1. Surely, nobody could believe that the veritable
and real Intelligence could be deceived, and admit the
existence of things that do not exist? Its very name
intelligent nature. therefore pos
its
guarantees
It
sesses knowledge without being subject forgetful to

knowledge neither conjectural, doubtful,
its
ness, and
is
nor borrowed, nor acquired by demonstration. Even
if
its
knowledge was derived

of
we did admit that some

from demonstration, no one will deny that possesses
it
certain knowledge from within itself. would be

It
be
wiser, however, entirely reasonable and say that

to
derives everything from within itself.” Without this,

it it
would be difficult distinguish what knowledge

to
it
derived from itself, and what was derived from outside.

Even the certainty the knowledge derived from
of
itself would vanish, and would lose the right be

to
it
lieve that things really are such

as
imagines. Indeed,
it
though the things whose knowledge we derive from the

us
senses seem capable producing the highest

of
in
evidential value, may still

be
asked whether their

it
apparent nature do not derive more from modifications

than from the objects themselves. Even so,
us
in
the intelligence,
of
belief
or
them demands” assent

in
at
the discursive reason, for though we admit

of
least
-
that things perceived by the senses exist in sensible

objects, it is none the less recognized that what is per
ceived by sensation is only a representation of the
exterior object, and that sensation does not reach to
this object itself, since it remains exterior to sensation.*
But when intelligence cognizes, and is cognizing intel
ligibles, intelligence could never even meet them if
they are cognized as lying outside of Intelligence. One
explanation would be that intelligence does not at all
meet them, nor cognize them. If it be by chance that
intelligence meets them, the cognition of them will
also be accidental and transient. The explanation that
cognition operates by union of the intelligence with the
intelligible depends on explanation of the bond that
unites them. Under this hypothesis, the cognitions of
the intelligible gathered by intelligence will consist of
impressions (or, types") of reality, and will conse
quently be only accidental impressions. Such, how
ever, could not exist in Intelligence; for what would
be their form 2 As they would remain exterior to In
telligence, their knowledge would resemble sensation.
The only distinction of this knowledge from sensation
would be that intelligence cognizes more tenuous
entities. Intelligence would never know that it really
perceives them. It would never really know for cer
tain that a thing was good, just or beautiful. In this
case the good, just and beautiful would be exterior and
it;
foreign to Intelligence, itself, will not possess

in
its
its
any forms regulate judgments, and deserve

to
as
as
confidence; they, just much truth, would remain

outside of
it.
INTELLIGENCE IS ANNIHILATED BY THE THEORY

THAT TRUTH IS EXTERNAL TO IT.
On the other hand, the intelligible entities are either
deprived feeling, life and intelligence, they are
of
or
intelligent. If they be intelligent, they, like truth,

fuse with intelligence into the primary Intelligence.
In this case we shall have to inquire into the mutual
relations of intelligence, intelligible entity, and truth.
Do these constitute but one single entity, or two
What in the world could intelligible entities be, if they
be without life or intelligence? They are surely
neither propositions, axioms, nor words, because in
this case they would be enunciating things different
from themselves, and would not be things themselves;
thus, when you say that the good is beautiful, it would
be understood that these two notions are foreign to
each other. Nor can we think that the intelligibles—
for instance, beauty and justice—are entities that are
simple, but completely separate from each other; be
cause the intelligible entity would have lost
its
unity,
and would no longer dwell within unitary subject.
a
particular en
be
dispersed into
of
would crowd
It
tities, and we would be forced consider into what

of to
localities these divers elements the intelligible were

scattered. Besides, how could intelligence embrace
these elements and follow them their vicissitudes?
in
How could intelligence remain permanent? How

could fix itself on identical objects? What will be
it
Will they be
or
figures the intelligibles?

or of
the forms
gold, like images and effigies made
of
like statues
this case, the intelligence
of
In
some other material?

that would contemplate them would not differ from
be
sensation. What would the differentiating cause

one justice, and
of
of
that would make the other some

an
thing else? Last, and most important, assertion

that the intelligible entities are external Intelligence
to
would imply that thus contemplating objects ex

in
to
terior itself Intelligence will not gain genuine

a
knowledge them, having only

of
of
false intuition
a
them. Since, under this hypothesis, true realities will

Intelligence, the latter, while con
to
remain exterior
templating them, will not possess them; and in know
ing them will grasp only their images. Thus reduced
to perceiving only images of truth, instead of possess
ing truth itself, it will grasp only deceptions, and will
not reach realities. In this case (intelligence will be
in the dilemma) of either acknowledging that it grasps
only deceptions, and thus does not possess truth; or
intelligence will be ignorant of this, being persuaded
it possesses truth, when it really lacks By thus
it.
doubly deceiving itself, intelligence will by that very
my
be
is,
fact still further from the truth. That
in
opinion, the reason why sensation cannot attain the
opinion" because
to
truth. Sensation reduced
is
is
it
receptive" power—as indeed expressed by the
is
a
word “opinion”;-and because sensation receives

something foreign, since the object, from which sen
possesses remains external
to
sation receives what
it
Therefore, intel
of
to
Sensation. seek truth outside

verity
of
ligence deprive intelligence
to of
or
to
truth
is
intelligence. would amount annihilating Intel

It
it)
ligence, and the truth (which was dwell within
to
will no longer subsist anywhere.
THE NOTION OF INTELLIGENCE IMPLIES ITS

POSSESSION OF ALL INTELLIGIBLES.
Therefore intelligible entities must not re

be
2.
is of in as
garded Intelligence, nor impressions

to
as
exterior
Nor must we deny the intimate pos
it.
formed
it
Otherwise, any cognition intel

of of
session truth.
ligibles made impossible, and the reality both
them and Intelligence itself destroyed. Intimate
is is
the only possible con

its
possession
of
all essences
dition that will allow knowledge and truth
to
remain
within Intelligence, that will save the reality
of
the
intelligibles, that will make possible the knowledge
of
every thing, instead limiting

to
of
of
us
the essence the

its
us
mere notion of qualities, notion which gives
to of a
only the image and vestige the object, which does
not permit
it,
it,
possess
us
to
unite ourselves with
On this condition only, can
to
it.
become one with
Intelligence know, and know truly without being ex
groping uncertainty; can
be
posed forgetfulness
or
to
it
the location where truth will abide and essences will
Subsist; can
of
live and think—all which should
it
belong this blessed nature, and without which no

to
found anything that deserved our

be
where could
esteem and respect. On this condition only will Intel
in be
or
ligence dispense with credulity demon
to
able
stration believing realities; for Intelligence itself con
sists these very realities, and possesses clear self
in
a
consciousness. Intelligence sees that which its own
is
it,
principle, sees what what gives

to
below and
is
it
Intelligence knows that know its
in
to
birth. order
own nature, must not place credence any testi is in
it
mony except own; that intelligible

its
essentially
it
reality. therefore truth itself, whose very being

It
no is
conform foreign form, but itself ex

to
to
to
is
it
clusively. Within Intelligence fuses both being, and

existence; thus reality justifies
its
that which affirms

By whom could Intelligence
be
of
itself. convinced
any
of
error? What demonstration thereof would be

value? Since there nothing truer than truth, any
is
proof the contrary would depend on some preceding

to
proof, and while seeming declare something dif

to
be
ferent, would reality begging the question.

in
SUPREME INTELLIGENCE IS DIVINITY AND

SUPREME ROYALTY.
Thus Intelligence, with the essences and truth,
3.
form but one and single nature for us. forms Some
It
reat divinity; rather, not some certain divinity,

or
is
it
but total (divinity); for Intelligence judges worthy

it
all
of itself to constitute these entities. Though this
nature be divine, nevertheless but the second
is
it
divinity”; which manifests itself
us
to
before we see
the (Supreme divinity, Unity). Intelligence forms the
magnificent throne which (the Supreme) formed for
Himself, and whereon He seated immovably. For
is
was not adequate that something inanimate should
it
either develop within the breast the divinity, nor
of
Support the Supreme Divinity when advancing towards
US.
ALLEGORY OF THE ROYAL PROCESSION.

King deserved
In as
So great have dazzling beauty
to
a
his (royal) procession.

of
the (ostentatious) van

rising towards Him are first met the
of
the course
things which by their inferior dignity are classed
among the first ranks the procession; later those
of
that are greater and more beautiful; around the king

stand those that are truly royal, while even those that
Then, after all these things,
of
follow Him are value.

suddenly breaks upon our view the King himself;
in
and we who have remained behind after the departure

the pre
of
of
those who were satisfied with view

a
liminaries, fall down and worship. profound dif

A
ference distinguishes the great King from all that pre

cedes Him. But must not be supposed that He
it
governs one man governs He

as
them another.
possesses the most just and natural sovereignty. He
possesses real royalty because He the King
of
truth.
is
all these beings that He has

of
He the natural master

is
begotten, and which compose His divine body-guard.

the king the king and the kings,”, and
of
of
He
is
is
justly called Father Jupiter himself

of
the divinities.
(who the universal Soul), imitates Him this
in
is
the contemplation
he
of
at
respect that does not stop

Intelligence), and
he
his father, (who

to
rises the
is
actualization of his grandfather,” and he penetrates

into the hypostatic substance of His being.”
THE COURSE UPWARDS IS ONE OF UNIFICATION.

4. It has already been said that we must rise to
the Principle which is really one, and not one in the
same way as are other things, which, being in them
selves multiple, are one only by participation. On
the contrary, that Principle is not one by participation,
all
as are those things which (being neutral) would

just lief be multiple one. We have also said that
as
as
Intelligence and the intelligible world, are more unitary

than the remainder, that they approach Unity more
than all other things, but that they are not purely one.
To the extent our ability we are now going ex
of
to
amine what the Principle which purely one con
in
is
sists, purely and essentially, and not (accidentally)

from without.
THE THEORY OF THE UNIQUE; THE PAIR;

AND THE GROUP.
Rising the One, we must add nothing
to
therefore
Him; we must rest Him, and take care not
to
to
in
withdraw from Him, and fall into the manifold. With

be
out this precaution there will

of
an occurrence
duality,” which cannot offer unity, because duality
us
Unity. The One cannot

be
posterior
to
enumerated
is
along with anything, not even with uniqueness (the

monad), nor with anything else. He cannot be
enumerated any way; for He measure, without
in
is
Himself being measured; He not the same rank

in
is
with other things, and cannot other things

be
to
added
(being incommensurable). Otherwise, He would have
something common with the beings along with which
be in
be
He would enumerated; consequently, He would

inferior to this common element, while on the contrary
He must have nothing above Him (if He is to be the
one first Being). Neither essential (that intelligible)
is,
Number, nor the lower number which refers quan
to
tity, can be predicated the unique; repeat, neither
of
I
the essential intelligible Number, whose essence
is
identical with thought, nor the quantative number,
which, because all number quantity, constitutes
is
quantity concurrently with, independently
of
other
or
genera.” Besides, quantative number, by imitating
the former (essential intelligible) Numbers their
in
relation the Unique, which their principle, finds its
to
is
real Unity, which
its
to
existence relation neither

in
it
shares nor divides. Even when the dyad (or “pair”)
does not alter) the priority
(it
born,
of
the Monad
is
(or Uniqueness). Nor this Uniqueness either
of
the
is
unities that constitute the pair, nor either
of
them
alone; for why should
be
of
one them rather than

it
or
the other? then the Monad Uniqueness be

If
the two unities which constitute the pair,

be of
neither
superior them, and though abiding within
to
must
it
itself, does not do so.

In
what then do these

unities differ from the Uniqueness (or Monad) What
2
the unity the “pair”? the unity formed by

of
Is
is
the “pair” the same that which

as
contained each
in
is
the two unities constituting the “pair”?

of
The unities
(which constitute the “pair”) participate the primary
it in
Unity, but differ from So far one, the

in as
it.
is
“pair” also participates unity, but different ways;

in
similarity between the unity

no
of
for there house

is
and the unity

an
its
army. continuity,
of
In
to
relation
therefore, the “pair”
so
as
not the same far

is is
is
it
so
in as
one, and far single quantity. Are the

a it
group
of
five
in to
unities contained relation

in
a
unity different from that

of
the unities contained

group (To answer this we must distinguish
of
ten?
a
unity). The unity which obtains be

of
two kinds
tween a Small and a great ship, and between one town

and another, and between one army and another, ob
tains also between these two groups of five and of ten.
A unity which would be denied as between these various
objects would also have to be denied as obtaining
between these two groups. (Enough of this here);
further considerations will be studied later.
PUNS ABOUT VESTA, TAKEN FROM THE

CRATYLUS OF PLATO.
5. Returning to our former assertion that the First

ever remains identical, even though giving birth to
other beings, the generation of numbers may be ex
plained by the immanence of Unity, and by the action
of another principle which forms them, as images of
unity. So much the more must the Principle superior
to beings be immanent Unity; but here it is the First
himself who begets the beings, and not another prin
ciple who produces beings in the image of the First
while this First would abide within Himself. Likewise
the form of unity, which is the principle of numbers,
exists within all in different degrees, because the num
bers posterior to unity participate therein unequally.
Likewise, the beings inferior to the First contain some
thing of His nature, which something constitutes their
form. Numbers derive their quantity from their par
ticipation in unity. Likewise here beings owe their
being to their containing the trace of the One, so that
their being is the trace of the One.” Not far from the
truth would we be in holding that essence, which is
the (more common or) plainer nomenclature of
being, 17 is derived from he word “hen,” which means
one. Indeed essence proceeded immediately from the
One,81 and has differentiated from Him but very little.
Turning towards
its
own basis, has settled, and both

it
the “being” man pro

of
became and all. When

is
a
nounces essence (“on”), and emphasizes he un
it,
consciously approximates the Sound meaning one
(“hen”), demonstrating that essence proceeds from
possible, by the
as
as
unity, indicated,
So
indeed far
is
word “on,” which means essence. That why
is
so
“being” (“ousia”) and essence (“einai.”8) imitate
they can the principle
as
of
far the Power from which
they have emanated. The human mind, observing
these similarities, and guided by their contemplation,”
imitated what grasped by uttering the words “on,”
it
“einai,” “ousia,” and “hestia.”28 Indeed, these

sounds try express the nature
of
what has been
to
begotten by unity, by means the very effort made

of
so
as
as
by the speaker well possible the
to
as
imitate
generation being.
of
THE SUPREME NAMED APOLLO.24

a be
as
these etymologies,
to it of
Whatever
6.
the value be
begotten being form—for would impossible
is
give any other designation

to
that which has been

begotten by the One—as particular form,
is,
not
it
but all form, without exception, evidently results

it
that the One formless. As possesses no form, it

is
it
“being,” for this must something indi

or be
be
cannot
vidual, determinate. Now the One could not be
something determined; for then He
of
as
conceived
principle; He would only
be
be
no
would longer the

a
be
determined thing attributed Him. all things

to
If
that which has been begotten, none

of
them could
be in
be
be
unity. them, He cannot

of
the One none

If
above them; consequently,

as
what these things are

is
“essences and essence,” the One must be above eS

sence. Indeed, the mere statement that the One
is
above essence, does not imply any determinateneSS on

His part, affirms nothing concerning Him and does
not even undertake give Him merely
to
name.
It
a
states that He is not this or that. It does not pretend

to embrace Him, for it would be absurd to attempt to
embrace an infinite nature. Mere attempt to do so
would amount to withdrawing from Him, and losing
the slight trace of Him thereby implied. To see in
telligible Being, and to contemplate that which is above
the images of the sense-objects, none of these must
remain present to the mind. Likewise, to contemplate
Him who is above the intelligible, even all intelligible
entities must be left aside to contemplate the One.
In this manner we may attain knowledge of His exist
ence, without attempting to determine what He
is.
Besides, when we speak the One, not possible
of
is
it
opposite.”
its
It to
indicate His nature without expressing

would indeed be impossible declare what
to
is
a
principle impossible say that
of
which
to
this
is
is
it
of to it
All that we human beings can do
or
that. have
is
doubts poignant enough resemble pangs child
to
birth. We do not know how name this Principle.

to
We merely speak the unspeakable, and the name

of
we give Him merely (for the convenience of) re

is
ferring best we can. The name “One” ex

as
Him
to
presses no more than negation

of
the manifold. That

why the Pythagoreans” were accustomed, among
is
each other, this principle symbolic

to
to
refer
in
a
manner, calling him Apollo,” which name means

An attempt carry out the
of of
to
denial manifoldness.
name “One” positive manner would only result
in
a
greater obscuration the name and object, than

of
of as if in
a
we abstained from considering the name

of
“One”
the proper name the first Principle. The object
of of
the employment
to
this name induce the mind

is
that seeks the first Principle first give heed

to
to
that
which expresses the greatest simplicity, and conse
quently reject this name which has been proposed
to
only the best possible.

as
Indeed, this name not

is
adequate
to
designate this nature, which can neither

be grasped by hearing, nor be understood by any who
hears it named. If it could be grasped by any Sense,
it would be by sight; though even so there must be no
expectation of seeing any form; for thus one would
not attain the first Principle.
TWO METHODS OF SIGHT; THE FORM, AND

THE LIGHT.
7. When intelligence is in actualization it can see

in two ways, as does the eye.** First, the eye may see
the form of the visible object; second, it may see
the light by which this object is seen. This light itself
is visible, but it is different from the form of the ob
ject; it reveals the form and is itself seen with this
form, to which it is united. Consequently it itself is
not seen distinctly, because the eye is entirely devoted
to the illuminated object. When there is nothing but
light, it is seen in an intuitive manner, though it be
still united to some other object. For if it were isolated
from every other thing, it could not be perceived.
Thus the light of the sun would escape our eye if
seat were not solid mass. My meaning will best its
a
appear by considering the whole sun

as
light. Then
light will not reside any other visible
of
the form
in
object, and will possess no property except that

of
it
being visible; for other visible objects are not pure

light. intellectual intuition (sight
of
Likewise the
in
mind) intelligence sees intelligible objects by means

the light shed on them by the First; and the Intel
of
ligence, while seeing these objects, really sees intel

its
as
ligible light. But, Intelligence directs attention

the enlightened object, does not clearly see the
to
it
If,
Principle that enlightens them. on the contrary,

forget the objects the process
of
sees, contem
in
it
it
plating only the radiance that renders them visible,

it
sees both the light itself, and Principle. But
its
is
it
itself that that Intelligence contemplates
of
not outside
intelligible light. then resembles the eye which,
It
exterior and foreign light, be
it, it, an
without considering
fore even perceiving suddenly struck by radiance
or is
a
proper by ray which radiates
to
of
which
is
a
itself, and which appears ob
of
to
the midst
in
it
scurity. The case still similar when the eye,
so in
is
to
order see no other objects, closes the eye-lids,

light from itself; when, pressed by
its
or
as
to
draw
the hand, perceives the light which possesses within
it
it
itself. Then, without seeing anything exterior the eye
sees, even more than any other moment, for
at
sees
it
the light. The other objects which the eye heretofore
saw, though they were luminous, were not light itself.
Likewise, when Intelligence,
its
so
speak, closes eye

to
to
the other objects, concentrating itself, and seeing

in
nothing, sees not foreign light that shines foreign

in
it
forms, but own light which suddenly radiates in

a its
teriorly, with clear radiance.
INTELLIGIBLE LIGHT, NOT BEING SPATIAL, HAS

NOTHING TO DO WITH PLACE.
When intelligence thus perceives this divine
8.
light, discern whence this light

impossible
to
it
is
comes, from within from without; for when

or
has
it
ceased shining the subject first thinks that came

it
from within, and later that came from without. But

it
this light, for no ques

to
of
useless seek the source

is
it
tion of location can be mooted connection with

it.
in
Indeed, could neither withdraw from us, nor ap

it
proach us; merely appears,

or
remains hidden.
it
Therefore cannot be sought; we must restfully wait

it
till appears, while preparing ourselves contem

of to
it
just
it,
as
plate the eye awaits the rising the sun

as
which appears above the horizon, or, the poets say,

which springs up from the ocean.
GOD ARISES ABOVE THE HORIZON OF

INTELLIGENCE.
Whence rises He whose image is our Sun? Above

what horizon must He rise, or appear, to enlighten us?
He must appear above the contemplating Intelligence.
Thus, Intelligence must remain immovable in contem
plation, concentrated and absorbed in the spectacle of
pure beauty which elevates and invigorates Then
it.
Intelligence feels that more beautiful and more
it is
it
brilliant, merely because has approached the First.
might be thought; He
in as
The latter does not come,
comes without really coming, the proper sense
of
the
word; He appears without coming from any place,
it all
because He already present above things before
is
Intelligence approaches Him. fact, Intelligence

In
is
which approaches and withdraws from the First;
it
withdraws when does not know where should be,
it
it
nowhere; and
or
where the First. The First
to if
is
is
be
Intelligence could also nowhere—I do not wish

say “in no place,” for itself all place, that
of
outside
is
is,
absolutely nowhere—it would always perceive the

First; would not perceive Him,
or
rather, would
it
it
within the First, and fusing with Him. By the mere

be
fact that Intelligence intelligence, perceives the

of is
it
First only by that part itself which not intelligence

is
is,
(that which above Intelligence). doubtless

It
is
be
us
seems surprising that the One could present

to
without approaching us; and everywhere, though

is be
being nowhere. This surprise based on the weak

our nature; but the man who knows the First
of
ness
would much more likely be surprised were the state
of affairs different. cannot indeed be otherwise.
It
it,
Wonder you please; but what has been said

at
if
nevertheless represents the real state

of
the case.
OMNIPRESENCE IS EXPLAINED BY POSSESSION OF

ALL THINGS WITHOUT BEING POSSESSED
BY THEM.
9. All that is begotten by anything else resides
either in the begetting principle, or in some other being,
in the case of the existence of any being after or below
the generating principle; for that which was begotten
by something else, and which, to exist, needs some
thing else, needs something else everywhere, and must
consequently be contained within something else. It
is therefore natural that the things which contain the
last rank should be contained in the things which pre
cede them immediately, and that the superior things
should be contained in those which occupy a still more
elevated rank, and so on till the first Principle. As
there is nothing above Him, He could not be contained
within anything. Since He is not contained in any
thing, and as each other thing is contained in the one
the first Principle contains
it,
immediately preceding
all the other beings; He embraces them without sharing
Himself with them, and possesses them without being
shared by them. Since He possesses them without
being possessed by them, He everywhere; for, unless
is
be
He present, He does not possess; on the other hand,

be
He not possessed, He not present. Conse

is
if
is,
quently He both and not present this sense that,

in
is
not being possessed, He not present; and that, find

is
ing Himself independent everything,

of
He not
is
hindered from being nowhere. indeed He were

If
hindered from being somewhere, He would be limited

by some other principle, and the things beneath Him
Him; consequently the
no
could longer participate

in
divinity would limited, He would no longer exist

be
within Himself, and would depend from inferior beings.

All things contained within anything else are the
in
principle from which they depend. the contrary

It
is
with those which are nowhere; there is no place where
they are not. If indeed there be a place lacking the
divinity, evidently this place must be embraced by
some other divinity, and the divinity is in some other;
whence, according to this hypothesis, it is false that the
divinity is nowhere. But as, on the contrary, it is true
that the divinity is nowhere, and false that He is any
where, because He could not be contained in any other
divinity, the result is that the divinity is not distant
from anything. If then He, being nowhere, be not
distant from anything, then He will in himself be
everywhere. One of his parts will not be here, while
another is there; the whole of Him will not be only
in one or another place. The whole of Him will there
fore be everywhere; for there is no one thing which
exclusively possesses Him, or does not possess Him;
everything is therefore possessed by Him. Look at
the world: as there is no other world but Him, He is
not contained in a world, nor in any place. No place,
indeed, could exist anteriorly to the world. As to its
it,
parts, they depend from and are contained within

The Soul not contained the world; on the
it.
in
is
contrary, the Soul that contains the world; for the

is
it
not the body, but Intelligence.

of
locus the Soul

is
The body the Soul, the

of
the world therefore

in
is
Soul Intelligence, and Intelligence itself some

in
in
other Principle. But this Principle Himself could not

be (contained) any other principle, from which He
in
would depend; He therefore not within anything,

is
.
and consequently He nowhere. Where then are the

is
other things? They are the first Principle. He

in
is
therefore not separated from other things, nor He

is
them; there nothing that possesses Him, on the

in
is
contrary, He who possesses all. That why He

is
is
it
all
all
the good things, because things exist by

of
is
Him, and are related Him each different manner.

to
in
a
That why there are things which are better, one

is
than the other; for some exist more intensely than

others (in relation with the Good).
THE MANNER OF PERCEIVING THE SUPREME.

10. Do not seek to see this Principle by the aid of
other things; otherwise, instead of seeing Him himself,
you will see no more than His image. Try rather to
conceive the nature of the Principle that must be
grasped in Himself, that pure and without any ad
is,
mixture, because all beings participate Him, without
in
any them possessing Him. No other thing indeed
of
He; but nevertheless such

as
could be such Being
a
must exist. Who indeed could all at once embrace the
totality the power this Principle? being did
of
of
If
a
so, how could this being differ from Him? Would the
being limit itself embracing only part
of
Him?
to
You might grasp this Principle by an intuitive, simple

intellection, but you will not
be
represent Him
to
able
His totality. Otherwise you who
to
yourself
in
is
it
the thinking intelligence, indeed you have

be
would
if
reached that principle; but He more likely

to
flee
is
you, more likely still, you will flee from Him.

or
When you consider the divinity, consider Him His

in
totality. When you think Him, know that what you

the Good; for He
of
of
remember Him the cause

is
is
the wise intellectual life, because He the power from

is
which life and intelligence proceed. He the cause

is
“being” and essence, because He

of
one; He
is
is
.
simple and first, because He principle. from

It
is
is
Him that everything proceeds. from Him that

It
is
the first movement proceeds, without being Him;

in
from Him also that proceeds the first rest, because

it
is
it;
of
He himself has no need

in
He himself neither
in is
movement nor rest; for He has nothing which He

could rest By His relation what, towards
or
to
move.
what, what could He move
or
or
rest? Neither
in
is
He limited, for by what could He be limited? Neither

is He infinite in the manner suggested by an enormous
mass; for whither would He have any need of extend
ing Himself? Would He do so to get something 2
But He has need of nothing! It is His power that
He could neither change nor lack anything;
§
is infinite.
the beings which lack nothing owe this to Him
only.
PROGRESS TOWARDS HIM IS WAKENING TO

TRUE REALITY.
11. The first Principle is infinite because He is one,

and nothing in Him could be limited by anything what
ever. Being one, He is not subject to measure or
number. He is limited neither by others nor by Him
Self, since He would thus be double. Since He has
neither parts nor form, He has no figure. Not by
mortal eyes therefore must you seek to grasp this prin
ciple such as reason conceives of Him. Do not imagine
that He could be seen in the way that would be
imagined by a man who believes that everything is
perceived by the senses, and thus annihilate the prin
ciple which is the supreme reality. The things to
which the common people attribute reality do not
it;
possess for that which has extension has less reality

(than that which has no extension); now the First
of to is
the principle existence, and even superior

of
is
“being.” You must therefore admit the contrary

that which asserted by those commonplace persons;
is
otherwise, you will the divinity. You

be
deprived
of
would resemble Such men as the Sacred festivals

in
gorge themselves with the foods from which one should

the divinities, and who, re
on
abstain approaching
more certain than the con
as
garding this enjoyment

templation the divinity whose festival being cele
of
is
brated, depart without having participated the

in
mysteries. Indeed as the divinity does not reveal Him

self in these mysteries, these gross men doubt His
existence, because they consider real only what is
visible by the physical eyes. Thus people who would
spend their whole life in slumber would consider as
certain and real the things they would see in their
dreams; if they were to be waked and forced to open
their eyes, they would place no credence in the testi
mony of their eyes, and would plunge themselves again
into their somnolence.
THE GOOD IS SUPERIOR TO THE BEAUTIFUL, AND

IS COGNIZED BY THE MIND AS ITS SENSE.
12. We should not seek to perceive an object
otherwise than by the faculty that is suitable to cognize
Thus colors are perceived by the eyes, sounds by
it.
the ears, and other qualities by other senses. Analogy

proper function,
its
so
would assign intelligence
to
that
thinking should not
be
identified with seeing and hear

ing. To act otherwise would
be
to
resemble man
a
who would try perceive Colors by the ears, and who

to
would deny the existence

of
sounds because he could

not see them. We must never forget that men have
forgotten the Principle which from the beginning until
this day has excited their desires and wishes. Indeed
all things aspire the first Principle, tend thither by
to
natural necessity, and seem

to
divine that they could.

a
not exist without Him. The notion of the beautiful

is
given only souls that are awake, and that already

to
possess some knowledge; sight Him they are

of
at
simultaneously dazed with His sublimity, and spurred

on by love.” From His very origin, on the contrary,
the Good excites an innate desire; He present
us
in
is
with sleep; His view never dazes with

us
us
even
in
stupor, because He always with us. Enjoyment

of
is
His presence demands neither reminiscence nor atten

tion, because one is not deprived thereof even in sleep.
When the love of the beautiful overwhelms us, it causes
us anxieties, because the sight of the beautiful makes us
As the love excited by the beautiful only
it.
desire
is
exists only
as
as
Secondary, and such persons
in
it
possess already some knowledge, the beautiful evi
dently occupies only the second rank. On the con
trary, the desire more original, and
of
the Good
is
demands no preliminary knowledge. That surely
demonstrates that the Good anterior and superior
is
as
Besides, all men are satisfied soon
as to
the beautiful.
they possess the Good; they consider that they have
reached their goal. But not all think that the beautiful
suffices them; they think that the beautiful beautiful
is
for itself, rather than for them; the beauty in
of
an as
advantage only for himself.
an
dividual Last, the

is
greater number people are satisfied with seeming

of
reality; but they

to so
beautiful, even they are not

in
if
are not satisfied with seeming possess the Good,

which they desire possess reality. Indeed, all
to
in
have that which occupies the front rank; but

to
desire
they struggle, they engage rivalry about the beauti
in
ful the opinion that born just they are (from

as
in
is
it
development They resemble

of
circumstances).
person who would claim equality with another person a
who holds the first rank after the king, because both
depend from the king; such person does not realize
a
that though both are subject

to
the king, yet there

is
great difference hierarchical rank between them”;

in
a
that both participate

of
the cause this error

in
is
of a
same principle, that the One superior

to
both
is
them, and that lastly the Good has no need

of
the
beautiful, while the beautiful
of
need the Good.30

in
is
sweet, calm, and full delights; we en

of
The Good
is
joy will. On the contrary, the beautiful strikes the

at
it
it,
soul with amazement, agitates and mingles pains

with pleasures. spite ourselves we are thereby
of
In
often separated from the Good, like a beloved object

separates a son from the father. The Good is more
ancient than the beautiful, not in time, but in reality;
besides, it exerts superior power, because it is unlimited.
possesses only an inferior
it,
That which is inferior to
and dependent power, instead having
of
limitless
a
power (as belongs Intelligence, which
to inferior
to
is
The Divinity therefore
of
the Good). master the
is
power which inferior His own; He has no need
to
is
things that are begotten; for

of
from Him that all
is
it
their contents are derived. Besides, He had no need
He was before; nothing
of
as
begetting; He still such
is
would have been changed for Him He had not be

gotten; had been possible for other things if re
to
it
if
ceive existence (independently

of
Himself) He would
not have opposed through jealousy. now no
is
It
it
longer possible for anything begotten, for the

be
to
divinity has begotten all that He could beget. Nor
is
He the universality things, for thus He would stand
of
Raised above all things, He has been

of
in
need them.
beget them, and permit them exist for
to
to
to
able
themselves by dominating all.
THE SUPREMACY OF THE GOOD IMPLIES HE IS

SUPERIOR TO ALL POSSESSIONS.
13. Being the Good Himself, and not simply some
thing good, the Divinity cannot possess anything, not
even the quality being good. He possessed any
of
If
good, not good;

be
or
thing, this thing would either

the principle which good Himself and
in
now
in
in
is
be
the highest degree, there cannot anything which

not good. On the other hand, the statement that
is
the Good possesses the quality being good im

of
is
possible. Since therefore (the Good) can possess

or
neither the quality being good, not being good,

of
of
the result that He cannot possess anything; that He

is
As
all
unique, and isolated from everything else.

is
other things either are good without being the Good,
or are not good, and as the Good has neither the qual
ity of being good, or of not being good, He has nothing,
and this is the very thing that constitutes His good
ness. To attribute to Him anything, such as being,
intelligence, or beauty, would be to deprive Him of
the privilege of being the Good. Therefore when we
deprive Him of all attributes, when we affirm nothing
about Him, when one does not commit the error of
supposing anything within Him, He is left as simple
essence, without attribution of things He does not pos
sess. Let us not imitate those ignorant panegyrists
who lower the glory of those they praise by attributing
to them qualities inferior to their dignity, because they
do not know how to speak properly of the persons
they are trying to praise. Likewise, we should not
attribute to the Divinity any of the things beneath and
after Him; we should recognize Him as their eminent
cause, but without being any of them. The nature of
the Good consists not in being all things in general,
nor in being any of them in particular. In this case,
indeed, the Good would form no more than one with
all beings; consequently, He would differ from them
only by His own character; that
is,
by some difference,
by the addition
or
some quality. being

of
of
Instead
one, He would be two things, which the one—
of
namely, what Him was common with the other

in
beings—would not the Good, while the other would

be
be
the Good (and would leave all beings evil). Under

be
this hypothesis, He would good and

of
mixture
a
not good;
he
would no longer the pure and

be
of
primary Good. The primary Good would

be
that
which the other thing would particularly par
in
ticipate, participation by virtue

of
which would
it
a
the good only

be
become the good. This thing would

by participation, whilst that which would par
in
it
particular; which would

be
ticipate would nothing

in
demonstrate that the good was nothing in particular.
be
if,
But the principle under discussion, the good

in
is,
difference whose presence
be
such—that there
if
a
gives the character goodness the composite—this
of
to
good must derive from some other principle which
be
must the Good uniquely and simply. Such com
a
on
posite, therefore, depends the pure and simple
Good. Thus the First, the absolute Good, dominates
all beings, uniquely the Good, possesses nothing
is
within Himself, mingled with nothing, superior
to
is
is
all things, and all things. The beautiful

of
the cause
is
and that which “being” could not derive from evil,

is
from indifferent principles; for the cause being more

or
its
perfect, always better than effects.

is
See Life of Plotinos, covered by Plotinos the re
in
18.
1
Notice how well the chrono the “bastard reasoning”

of
sult
logical order works out. The process, which Hegel called
former book (31) and the next “dialectic.” See iii. 6.1. The
4
8
the Gnostics, Kantian “thing-in-itself.”

of
(33) treat See

Porphyry, Principles Intel
of
of
while this book treats the

philosophical principle ligibles, 33. See ifi. 6.1.
of
their
5
practical aspect. Besides, Here pun based on

is
it
a
6
explains the Amelio-Porphy “doxa.” “Paradechomeně.”

7
rian quarrel. Like all other “Doxa,” which derived

is
8
difficulties of the time, was from “dechesthai,”

to
receive.
it
about Gnosticism, and Ame We would, other words,

in
9
pessimists. 10 This
p. is
lius's dismissal meant that become

Plotinos rejected Egyptian Philo's secondary divinity,
Gnosticism, and Numenius's 27, Guthrie’s “Message of
is,
11
true position Philo Judaeus.” That of

as
dualist stands
a
revealed; but after Porphyry's the Intelligence and the in

of
departure, Plotinos harked telligible entities. 12 Who

is
We see here an the Unity; Numenian con

to
it.
back
a
2
of the standpoint ception, fr. 36. term

A
assertion 13
later asserted by Berkeley, reminiscent of the famous
Kant and Hegel that the mind Christian Nicene formulation.
cannot go outside itself, and 14 That we will form
is
that consequently the “pair.” Numenius, 14, also

is
it
all things. Kant's taught the Pythagorean “pair

of
measure
“thing-in-itself,” deduction or doubleness.” 15 See vi. 6.16.
a
from this, was already dis 16 Pun between essences,

“einai,” and one, or “henos.” lus, Cary, 40. 24 See Numenius,
17 “Ousia.” 18 Notice the 67, 42. 25 See 9.1; iii. 99.
ii.
two words for “essence.” Plato 26 Such as Numenius, 42, and
Cratylos, 424; Cary, 87. 19 As Plutarch, de Isis Osiris, Fr.
et
Plato in his Cratylus suggests. Tr. 381. 27 From “a-polus.”
Or, Or, essence, 28See 64; iii. 5.1 29see 5.1.
v.
20 essence. 21
i. i.
to be. 22 Being. 28 The god
81
6,
30 See end. Pun between
dess Hestia in Greek, or Vesta “on” and “hen.” 82 See Plato,
in Latin; but “hestia” also Rep. vi., Cary, 13.
meant a “stand.” P. 401, Craty
ii.9) AGAINST THE GNOSTICS 599
SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK NINE.
Against the Gnostics; or, That the Creator and the

World are Not Evil.1
THE SUPREME PRINCIPLES MUST BE SIMPLE AND

NOT COMPOUND.
1. We have already seen” that the nature of the

Good is simple and primary, for nothing that is not
primary could be simple. We have also demonstrated
that the nature of the Good contains nothing in itself,
but is something unitary, the very nature of the One;
for in itself the One is not some thing to which unity
could be added, any more than the Good in itself is
Some thing to which goodness could be added. Con
sequently, as both the One and the Good are sim
plicity itself, when we speak of the One and the Good,
these two words express but one and the same nature;
they affirm nothing, and only represent it to us so far
as possible. This nature is called the First, because it
is very simple, and not composite; it is the absolute
as self-sufficient, because it is not composite; other
wise it would depend on the things of which it was
composed. Neither is it predicable of anything (as
an attribute in a subject) for all that is in another
thing comes from something else. If then this nature
be not in anything else, nor is derived from anything
else, if it contain nothing composite, it must not have
anything above
it.
THE ONLY SUPREME PRINCIPLES MUST THEN BE

UNITY, INTELLIGENCE AND SOUL.
Consequently there are no principles other (than
the three divine hypostatic substances); and the first
rank will have to be assigned to Unity, the second to
Intelligence, as the first thinking principle,8 and the
third to the Soul. Such indeed is the natural order,
which admits of no further principles, in the intelligible
world. If less be claimed, it is because of a confusion
between the Soul and Intelligence, or Intelligence with
the First; but we have often pointed out their mutual
differences.4 The only thing left is to examine if there
might not be more than these three hypostatic sub
stances; and in this case, what their nature might be.
THE ARISTOTELIAN DISTINCTION OF POTENTIALITY

AND ACTUALITY IS NOT APPLICABLE TO DIVINITY.
The Principle of all things, such as we have de

it,
scribed the most simple and elevated possible.

is
The (Gnostics) are wrong distinguishing within

in
that (supreme Principle") potentiality from actualiza

tion"; for apply
be
would
to
to
to
ridiculous seek
it
principles that are immaterial and are actualizations,

that (Aristotelian) distinction, and thus
to
increase the
number (of the divine hypostatic substances.")
THE DISTINCTION OF REST AND MOVEMENT ALSO

INAPPLICABLE.
Neither could we, below the Supreme, distinguish

two intelligences, one rest, and the other motion.*
at
in
define the resting the First,

of
We should have
to
and the movement or utterance? Of the Second. The

inaction of the one and the action of the other would
By being (or, nature),
its
equally mysterious.
be
Intelligence is eternally and identically a permanent

actualization. To rise to Intelligence and to move
around it is the proper function of the soul.
AN INTERMEDIARY LOGOS (OR AEON JESUS), ALSO

DNACCOUNTABLE.
Reason (logos) which descends from Intelligence
into the Soul, and intellectualizes her, does not con
stitute a nature distinct from the Soul and Intelligence,
and intermediary between them.
CONSCIOUSNESS Is UNITARY THOUGH CONTAINING

THINKER, OBJECT AND THOUGHT.
Nor should we admit the existence of Several intel
ligences, merely because we distinguish a thinker from
a consciousness of the thinker. Though there be a
difference between thinking, and thinking that one
thinks, these two nevertheless constitute a single in
tuitive consciousness of its actualizations. It would be
ridiculous to deny such a consciousness to veritable
Intelligence. It is therefore the same Intelligence that
thinks, and that thinks that it thinks. Otherwise there
would be two principles, of which the one would have
thought, and the other consciousness of thought. The
second would doubtless differ from the first, but would
not be the real thinking principle. A mere logical
distinction between thought and consciousness of
thought would not establish the (actual) differences
between two (hypostatic substances). Further, we
shall have to consider whether it be possible to con
ceive of an Intelligence which would exclusively think,
without any accompanying
its
consciousness of
thought.” we ourselves who are entirely devoted
If
practical activity and discursive reason were

to
such
in
condition,” we would, even otherwise considered

if
a
be
Sensible, But true Intelligence

as
insane. thinks
ºr
its
the intelligible, far from
as
itself in thoughts, and
being outside Intelligence, Intelligence itself, In
of
is
telligence, by thinking, possesses itself, and necessarily
sees itself.” When Intelligence sees itself, does not
it
as
as
see itself unintelligent, but intelligent. Therefore
thought, Intelligence has
of
the first actualization
in
the thought and consciousness thought, two things
of
that form but single one; not even logically this
it is
is a
a
is,
duality. Intelligence always think what
If
there any reason separate, even by simple logical

to
of
distinction, thought from the consciousness
thought? The absurdity the doctrine we are con
troverting will of
be
still more evident we suppose that
if
third intelligence conscious that the second intel
is
a
ligence the thought the first; we

of
of
conscious
is
on
might thus go infinity.18

to
DIFFERENTIATED REASON WOULD DEPRIVE THE

A
SOUL OF CONSCIOUSNESS.
Last, we suppose that Reason derived from In
in is
if
telligence, and then from reason the soul derive

another reason which would be derived from Reason
principle intermediary
so
as
itself,
to
constitute
in
de
be
between Intelligence and Soul, the Soul would
prived the power thought. For thus the Soul,
of of
of
instead receiving reason from Intelligence, would

In
an
receive reason from intermediary principle.

possessing Reason itself, the Soul would pos
of
stead
sess only
an
Reason; the Soul would

of
adumbration
ºw
be
Intelligence, and would not

to
able
#.
think.
-
NO MORE THAN THREE PRINCIPLES ADMITTED

BECAUSE OF THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS.
the intelligible world, therefore, we shall not
In
2.
recognize more than three principles (Unity, Intel

ligence, and Soul), without those superfluous and in
congruous fictions. We shall insist that there is a

single Intelligence that is identical, and immutable,
which imitates its Father so far as it can. Then there
is our soul, of which one part ever remains among the
intelligibles, while one part descends to sense-objects,
and another abides in an intermediary region.” As
our Soul is one nature in Several powers, she may at
times entirely rise to the intelligible world, with the
best part of herself and of essence; at other times the
soul's lower part allows itself to be dragged down to
the earth, carrying with it the intermediate portion;
for the soul cannot be entirely dragged down." This
being dragged down occurs only because the soul does
not abide in the better region.” While dwelling in
it)
it,
the Soul, which part (of
of
not and which
is
part,” has given the body the uni
of
we art not
to
a
verse all the perfections which she was capable.

of
The Soul governs by remaining quiet, without reason

it
ing, without having correct anything. With wonder

to
ful power she beautifies the universe by the contem

plation the intelligible world.
of
The more the Soul

contemplation, the more powerful
to
attaches herself
and beautiful she is; what she receives from above,
the Sense-world, and illuminates
to
she communicates
because she herself always illuminated (by Intel
is
ligence).
-
THE WORLD AS ETERNALLY BEGOTTEN-GOD'S

NEED TO GIVE.
Thus the Soul, ever being illuminated, turn

in
3.
herself illuminates lower things that subsist only

through her, like plants that feed on dew, and which
life, each according
its
participate capacity.
to
in
it,
Likewise fire heats the objects that surround each

a
proportion
its
Now
in
to
nature. such the effect

is
if
of fire whose power is limited, while intelligible beings

exert unlimited powers, how would it be possible for
these beings to exist without causing anything to par
ticipate in their nature? Each of them must therefore
its
communicate some degree of perfection other
to
beings. The Good would no longer the good, Intel
be
ligence would no longer
be
intelligence, the Soul would
if,
be
no longer soul, beneath that which possesses the

first degree life, there was not some other thing
of
which possessed the second degree life, and
of
which subsisted only long so
as
subsists He who
occupies the first rank. therefore unavoid
It
is
able that all things (inferior the First) must
to
always exist mutual dependence, and that they be
in
begotten, because they derive their existence from

They were not begotten
at
some other source.
a
definite moment. When we affirm that they are be
gotten, we should Say, they were begotten, or, they
be
begotten. Nor will they destroyed, unless

be
shall
they are composed which they could
of
in
elements
be dissolved. Those that are indissoluble will not
re
be
perish. may objected that they could be

It
solved into matter. But why should matter also not

be
be
to
liable destroyed? were granted that

If
it
destruction, there was no necessity

to
matter was liable

be
its
for existence.” may further objected that

It
matter necessarily results from the

of
the existence
other principles.
of
is In
existence this case, this neces

be
as
sity still subsists.

to
matter considered
If
isolated (from the intelligible world), then the divine

principles also, instead being present everywhere,”
of
will, limited place.” But

be
as
were, walled up
in
it
illu
be
the latter be impossible, then must matter

if
minated (by the intelligible world).

BY A PUN ON INCLINATION, PLOTINOS SHOWS THAT

THE WORLD-SOUL COULD NOT HAVE GONE
THROUGH THE DRAMA OF CREATION AT
TRIBUTED TO SOPHIA AND ACHAMOTH.
4. But in that case, the Soul created only because”
she had lost her wings. The universal Soul, however,
could not have been subject to such an accident.
Those (Gnostics) who claim that she committed a
fault should explain the nature of that fault.** Why
did this fall occur? If she fell from all eternity, she
must similarly remain in her fault; if only at a de
terminate time, why not earlier? We however be
lieve that the Soul created the world not by inclining
(towards matter), but rather because she did not in
Thus to incline towards matter the
it.
cline towards
Soul would have forgotten the intelligible entities;
but she had forgotten them, she could not have
if
created the world (using them

as
modeſs). From
what (models) would the soul have created the world?
according the intelligible
to
She must have formed

it
models she had contemplated above. she remem

If
bered them while creating, she had not inclined (away

from them towards matter). Neither did the Soul
the intelligibles; otherwise
an
of
have obscure notion

She would have inclined herself towards them,
to
get she kept some

of
clear intuition them. For

if
a
memory the intelligible world, why would she not

of
have wished to reascend therein

2
MOST GENERALLY ASSIGNED MOTIVES OF CREATION

ARE RIDICULOUS, OR WORSE.
Besides, what advantage could the (world-Soul)
by
have imagined she was gaining creating the world?

be honored”* seems un
so
to
That she did order

in
worthy, for it would be attributing to her the desires
of a sculptor. Another theory is that the (world-Soul)
created the world by virtue of a rational conception,
and she thus exercised her power, though creating did
not inhere in her nature. If so, how did she make the
world? When will she destroy it? If she repented,
what is she waiting for (before she destroys her handi
If,
work) 2 however, she has not yet repented, she
.
could not repent after time will have accustomed her
her work, and will have made her more kindly dis
to
be
posed thereto. however she awaiting individual
If
souls, the latter should not have returned into genera

tion, since, the former generation, they have already
in
experienced evils here below, and consequently, they

long since have ceased descend upon this
earth. to
THE WORLD SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED EVIL

BECAUSE OF OUR SUFFERINGS; NOTHING MORE
BEAUTIFUL COULD BE IMAGINED.
Nor should the world be considered badly made,
so
merely because we suffer much therein. This idea

results from entertaining unjustifiable expectations of
its
perfections, and from confusing with the intel

it
ligible world
an
image.
of
which Could more

is
it
a
be
beautiful image, indeed, imagined? After the

celestial fire could we imagine better fire than our
a
own After the intelligible earth, could we imagine

2
better earth than ours? After the actualization by

a
which the intelligible world embraces itself, could we

or
imagine sphere more perfect, more wonderful,

a
better ordered its movements?” After the intel

in
2.
ligible sun, how could we imagine any sun different

from the one that we See?
ii.9) AGAINST THE GNOSTICS 6O7
IT IS CONTRADICTORY TO CONSIDER ONESELF

CAPABLE OF PERFECTION, BUT TO DENY IM
PASSIBILITY TO THE BEAUTIFUL WORKS OF
NATURE.
5. Is it not absurd to see those (Gnostics) who, like
everybody else, possess a body, passions, fears, and
excitements, holding an idea of their own powers
high enough to make them believe themselves capable
of attaining the intelligible,” while to the sun, though
it be immutable and perfect,” and though it be im
passible power, refusing a wisdom Superior to ours,
we who were born only yesterday, and who find so
many obstacles in our search after truth? We cer
tainly are surprised to see these (Gnostics) consider
ing the souls of both themselves and of the vilest
men immortal and divine, while refusing immortality
to the entire heaven, to all the stars it contains, though
they be composed of elements more beautiful and
purer” (than we), though they manifest a marvellous
beauty and order, while (these Gnostics) themselves
acknowledge that disorder is observed here below 2
According to their theories, however, the immortal
Soul would have picked out the worst part of the
world, while giving up the best to mortal souls.”
AN INTERMEDIARY ELEMENTAL SOUL -
IS ALSO
INADMISSIBLE.
It is also absurd to see them introduce into the
world, after the universal Soul, another soul said to
be composed of elements. How could a composition
of elements possess life? A mixture of elements does
not produce heat or cold, humidity or dryness, or any
combination thereof. Besides, how could this soul
(that is inferior to the universal Soul), hold in union
together the four elements, if she herself were com
posed of them, and therefore were posterior to them?
We may also rightfully demand of the (Gnostics) an

explanation of their predicating perception, reflection,
and other faculties to this (mythical) soul.
THE GNOSTICS NEW EARTH, THAT IS MODEL OF
THE OLD IS UNREASONABLE.
Besides, as the (Gnostics) have no appreciation of
the work of the demiurgic creator, nor for this earth,
they insist that the divinity has created for them a new
earth, which is destined to receive them when they
shall have left here below, and which is the reason
of the world. But what need do they have of inhabiting
the model of this world that they pretend to hate 2
In any case, from where does this model come?
According to them, the model was created only when
its
author inclined towards things here below. But

the model,
of
what was the use its creator busied

if
himself considerably with the world world

to
make
a
the intelligible world which he possessed
to
inferior
?
(the model were created) before the world, what
If
could have been its use Was for the Saved Souls49?
it
2
Why therefore were those souls not saved (by re

maining within the model) Under this hypothesis
2
(the model,
of
the creation the model was useless.

If
however, was created) after this world,

its
author
derived from this world, stealing the form away
it
from matter; the experience that the souls had ac

quired
to
to
their earlier trials sufficed teach them

in
seek their salvation.91 Last, the (Gnostics) pre

if
have, their souls, received the form

of
to
tend the
in
world,8° we have new incomprehensible language.**

a
EXILES, REPENTANCES, ANTITYPES, AND OTHER

GNOSTIC INVENTIONS.
hardly say
of
We know what the other new

to
6.
conceptions they have injected into the universe, such

antitypes,” and repentances.”. by
as
exiles,
**
If
“repentances” and “exiles” they mean certain states

of the Soul (in the normal meaning of the word,
where a soul) yields to repentance; and if by “anti
types” they mean the images of the intelligible beings
that the Soul contemplates before contemplating the
intelligible beings themselves, they are using meaning
less words, invented merely as catchwords and terms
for their individual sect; for they imagine such fictions
merely because they have failed clearly to understand
the ancient wisdom of the Greeks. Before them the
Greeks, clearly and simply, had spoken of “ascen
sions” of souls that issued from the “cavern,” and
which insensibly rise to a truer contemplation. The
doctrines of these (Gnostics) are partly stolen from
Plato, while the remainder, which were invented
merely to form their own individual system, are in
novations contrary to truth. It is from Plato that
they borrowed their judgments, the rivers of Hades.**
They do speak of several intelligible principles, such
as essence, intelligence, the second demiurgic creator
or universal Soul; but all that comes from Plato's
Timaeus, 88 which says, “Likewise as the ideas con
tained in the existing Organism were seen by Intel
ligence, so he [the creator of this universe”] thought
that the latter should contain similar and equally
numerous (natures).” But, not clearly understanding
Plato, the Gnostics here imagined (three principles),
an intelligence at rest, which contains all (beings),
a second intelligence that contemplates them (as they
occur) in the first intelligence, and a third intelligence
that thinks them discursively. They often consider
this discursive intelligence as the creative soul, and
they consider this to be the demiurgic creator men
tioned by Plato, because they were entirely ignorant
of the true nature of this demiurgic creator. In general,
they alter entirely the idea of creation, as well as many
other doctrines of Plato, and they give out an entirely
erroneous interpretation thereof. They imagine that

they alone have rightly conceived of intelligible nature,
while Plato and many other divine intellects never
attained thereto. By speaking of a multitude of in
telligible principles, they think that they seem to pos
sess an exact knowledge thereof, while really they
degrade them, assimilating them to lower, and sensual
beings, by increasing their number.” . The principles
that exist on high must be reduced to the smallest
; º number feasible; we must recognize that the principle
below the First contains all (the essences), and so
deny the existence of any intelligible (entities) out
contains all beings, by virtue
it,
as
side of inasmuch
it
being primary “Being,” primary Intelligence,

its
of
of
and of all that beautiful beneath the First Himself.
is
be
The Soul must assigned The

to
the third rank.

differences obtaining between souls must further be
explain: by the difference
or
of
their conditions
nature.
THE GNOSTICS MAY WELL BORROW FROM THE

GREEKS, BUT SHOULD NOT DEPRECIATE THEM.
besmirching the reputation
of
of
Instead divine
men,42 the (Gnostics) should interpret the doctrines
the ancient sages friendly way, borrowing from
of
in
a
they are right professing, as, for in

in
as
them such
stance, the immortality the soul, the existence
of
is of
the intelligible world, and the first Divinity (who

of
the Good), the necessity for the soul flee from

to
intercourse with the body, and the belief that separa

the soul from body equivalent
of
tion
to
return
is
“being.” They
do
from generation
to
well indeed
they borrow these ideas from Plato, for the purpose
of if
developing them. They are even liberty

to
at
express any opinion they please diverging from his

in
views; but their own doctrine should not be established

their followers by insults and sarcasms
of
in
the minds
ii.9) AGAINST THE GNOSTICS 61 1
against Greek sages. They could only do so by

demonstrating the propriety of their distinctive tenets,
whenever they differ from those of the ancient philos
ophers, and by expounding their own tenets with a
really philosophic reserve and equanimity. Even
when they controvert a system they are still bound
to consider nothing but the truth, without any attempt
at self-glorification, either by attacking men whose
teachings have long since been approved by worthy
philosophers, or by claims of superiority to the latter.
For that which the ancients taught on the subject of
the intelligible world will always be considered as the
best and wisest by all who do not permit themselves
to be misled by - the errors that to-day mislead so
many.**
GNOSTIC ADDITIONS TO PLATONISM ARE THEIR

POOREST DOCTRINES.
If from the doctrines of the (Gnostics) we remove
what they have borrowed from the teachings of the
ancients, their remaining additions will be discovered as
very unfortunate. Their polemic against (Greek
philosophy) consists of an introduction of a great
number of genealogies,” and destructions, blaming the
intercourse of the soul with the body,” complaining
its
of the universe, criticising administration, identi

fying the demiurgic creator (that Intelligence) with
is,
the universal Souls.”
THE UNIVERSAL SOUL MAY NOT BE JUDGED BY

THE HUMAN STANDARD.
7.
Elsewhere we have demonstrated48 that this

world never began, and will never end; and that
it
long the intelligible entities.

as
We have
as
must last
also shown,” and that earlier than these (Gnostics),
that the soul's intercourse with the body not ad
is
vantageous to her. But to judge the universal Soul
according to ours is to resemble a man who would
blame the totality of a well governed city by an ex
amination limited to the workers in earth or metal.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNIVERSAL SOUL

AND THE HUMAN SOUL.
The differences between the universal Soul and our
(human) souls are very important. To begin with,
the universal Soul does not govern the world in the
same manner (as our Soul governs the body); for she
governs the world without being bound thereto. Be
sides many other differences elsewhere noted,50 we
were bound to the body after the formation of a
primary bond.” In the universal Soul the nature that
is bound to the body (of the world) binds all that it
embraces; but the universal Soul herself is not bound
by the things she binds. As she dominates them, she
is impassible in respect to them, while we ourselves
do not dominate exterior objects. Besides, that part
of the universal Soul which rises to the intelligible
world remains pure and independent; even that”
which communicates life to the body (of the world)
receives nothing therefrom. In general what is in
another being necessarily participates in the state of
that being; but a principle which has
its
own individual
life would not receive anything from any other
source.* That why, when one thing located
is
is
within another, feels the experiences the latter,

of
it
its
but does not any the less retain individual life

in
For instance,
of
be of
the event the destruction the latter.

the fire within yourself extinguished, that would
if
not extinguish the universal fire; even the latter were

if
it,
extinguished, the universal Soul would not feel and

only the constitution the body (of the world) would
If of
affected thereby. world exclusively composed

be
a
of the remaining three elements were a possibility,

that would be of no importance to the universal Soul,
because the world does not have a constitution similar
that of each of the contained organisms. On high, the
universal Soul soars above the world, and thereby
imposes on it a sort of permanence; here below, the
parts, which as it were flow off, are maintained in
their place by a second bond.64 As celestial entities
have no place (outside of the world), into which they
might ooze out,” there is no need of containing them
from the interior, nor of compressing them from with
out to force them back within; they subsist in the
location where the universal Soul placed them from
the beginning. Those which naturally move modify
the beings which possess no natural motion.” They
carry out well arranged revolutions because they are
parts of the universe. Here below there are beings
which perish because they cannot conform to the uni
versal order. For instance, if a tortoise happened to
be caught in the midst of a choric ballet that was
dancing in perfect order, it would be trodden under
foot because it could not withdraw from the effects
of the order that regulated the feet of the dancers;
on the contrary, if it conformed to that order, it would
Suffer no harm.
GNOSTIC DEMANDS FOR REASON OF WORLD'S

CREATION ARE IDLE, AND INVOLVE STILL
LARGER QUESTIONS.
8. To ask (as do the Gnostics) why the world was

created, amounts to asking the reason of the existence
of the universal Soul, and of the creation of the demi
urgic creator himself. To ask such a question well
characterizes men who first wish to find a principle of
that which (in the world) is eternal, but who later
opine that the demiurgic creator became the creating
cause only as a result of an inclination or alteration.*

If indeed they be at all willing to listen to us fairly, we
shall have to teach them the nature of these intelligible
principles, to end their habit of scorning (those) vener
able (intelligible) beings, and (to induce them to) pay
these a deserved respect. No one, indeed, has the
right to find fault with the constitution of the world,
which reveals the greatness of intelligible nature. We
are forced” to recognize that the world is a beautiful
and brilliant statue of the divinities, from the fact that
the world achieved existence without beginning with
an obscure life, such as that of the little organisms it
contains, and which the productiveness of universal life
never ceases to bring forth, by day or night; on the
continuous, clear, manifold, ex
its
contrary, life
is
tended everywhere, and illustrating marvellous wisdom.

would be no more than natural that the world should
It
not equal the model imitates; otherwise, would

it
it
no longer be an imitation. would be an error, how
It
model badly;
its
ever, think that the world imitates

to
contained by
be
the things that could

of
lacks none
it
a
beautiful and natural image; for was necessary for
it
exist, without implying reasoning

or
to
i
image
Skill.59
INTELLIGENCE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN THE LAST

DEGREE OF EXISTENCE,
be
Intelligence, indeed, could not (the last degree

was necessarily actualization
of
of
existence).
It
double nature, both within itself, and for other beings.”

followed by other
be
was inevitable that should

It
it
beings, for only the most impotent being would fail

produce something that should proceed from it,”
to
granted that) the intelligible possesses

(it
while
is
wonderful power”; wherefore, could not help

it
creating.
THIS IS THE BEST OF ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS

BECAUSE WE CAN ACHIEVE VIRTUE.
What would be the nature of a world better than the
present one, if it were possible? The present one
must be a faithful image of the intelligible world, if
the existence of the world be necessary, and if there be
no better possible world. The whole earth is peopled
with animate and even immortal beings; from here
below up to the heaven (the world) is full of them.**
Why should the stars in the highest sphere (the fixed
stars), and those in the lower spheres (the planets),
not be divinities, in view of their regular motion, and
their carrying out a magnificent revolution around the
world"? Why should they not possess virtue? What
obstacle could hinder them from acquiring it? Not on
high are found the things which here below make men
evil; namely, that evil nature which both is troubled,
and troubles. With their perpetual leisure why should
not the stars possess intelligence, and be acquainted
with the divinity and all the other intelligible deities***
How should we possess a wisdom greater than theirs?
Only a foolish man would entertain such thoughts.
How could our souls be superior to the stars when at
the hands of the universal Soul they undergo the con
straint of descending here below”? For the best part
If,
of souls is that which commands.” on the contrary,

the souls descend here below voluntarily, why should
the (Gnostics) find fault with this sphere whither they
came voluntarily, and from which they can depart
whenever suits them.*** That everything here be
it
low depends on the intelligible principles proved by

is is
organization such that,

to of
the fact that the the world

during this life, we are able acquire wisdom, and
live out life similar to that of the divinities.**
a
THE INEQUALITY OF RICHES IS OF NO MOMENT
TO AN ETERNAL BEING.
9. No one would complain of poverty and the
unequal distribution of wealth if one realized that the
sage does not seek equality in Such things, because he
does not consider that the rich man has any advantage
over the poor man, the prince over the subject.”
The sage leaves such opinions to commonplace people,
for he knows that there are two kinds of life; that of
the virtuous who achieve the Supreme degree (of
perfection) and the intelligible world, and that of
common earthly men. Even the latter life is double;
for though at times they do think of virtue, and par
ticipate somewhat in the good, at other times they form
only a vile crowd, and are only machines, destined to
satisfy the primary needs of virtuous people.” There
is no reason to be surprised at a man committing a
murder, or, through weakness, yielding to his passions,
when souls, that behave like young, inexperienced
persons, not indeed like intelligences, daily behave
thus. It has been said” that this life is a struggle in
which one is either victor or vanquished. But is not
this very condition a proof of good arrangement?
What does it matter if you are wronged, so long as
you are immortal? If you be killed, you achieve the
fate that you desired. If you have reason to complain
of how you are treated in some particular city, you
can leave it.78 Besides, even here below, there evi
dently are rewards and punishments. Why then com
plain of a society within which distributive justice is
exercised, where virtue is honored, and where vice
deserved punishment”?
its
meets
MOREOVER THIS WORLD CONTAINS TRADITIONS
OF DIVINITY.
only are
of
Not there here below statues the

divinities, look
to
but even the divinities condescend

on us, leading everything in an orderly manner from

beginning to end, and they apportion to each the fate
that suits him, and which harmonizes with his ante
cedents in his successive existences.” This is unknown
only to persons who are most vulgarly ignorant of
divine things. Try therefore to become as good as
you can, but do not on that account imagine that you
alone are capable of becoming good”; for then you
would no longer be good. Other men (than you) are
good; there are most excellent (ministering spirits
called) guardians; further, there are deities who, while
inhabiting this world, contemplate the intelligible
world,” and are still better than the guardians.
Further still is the blissful (universal) Soul that man
ages the universe. Honor therefore the intelligible
divinities, and above all the great King of the intel
ligible world,” whose greatness is especially mani
fested in the multitude of the divinities.
TRUE KNOWLEDGE SHOWN NOT BY UNIFICATION,

BUT REVELATION OF DIVINE POWER.
It is not by reducing all things to unity, but by

setting forth the greatness developed by the divinity
itself, that one manifests his knowledge of divine
power. The Divinity (manifests His power) when,
is,
though remaining what He He produces many

divinities which depend on Him, which proceed from
Him, and exist by Him. this way this world holds
In
existence from Him, and contemplates Him along with

all the divinities which announce to men the divine
decrees, and who reveal them whatever pleases
to
be
them.” These stars must not blamed for not being

what the divinity for they only represent their
is,
nature.
MODESTY Is A PART OF GOODNESS; PRIDE Is Folly.

If,
however, you pretend
to
scorn these (stars that
are considered) divinities, and you hold yourself
if
high esteem, on the plea that you are not far in
in
ferior them, learn first that the best man he who

to
is
most modest his relations with divinities and men.
in
In is
the second place, learn that one should think
of
the
divinity only within limits, without insolence, and not
to Seek to rise to condition that above human
is
a
possibilities.
to
unreasonable believe that there
It
is
is
no place by the side the divinity for all other men,
of
while impudently proposing alone
to
aspire
to
that
dignity. This by itself would deprive the Soul
of
the
possibility the Divinity
of
the limit
to
to
assimilation
her receptivity.”
of
This the Soul cannot attain unless

guided by Intelligence. To pretend In
to
rise above
telligence,” There are people
of
fall short
to to
it.
is
insane enough believe, without reflection, claims

the following (“By initiation into secret knowl
as
such
gnosis), you will better, not only than all
or
edge,
be
men, but even than all the deities.” These people are
swollen with pride”; and men who before were
modest, simple and humble, become arrogant on hear
ing themselves say, “You are the divinity;
of
child
a
the other men that you used honor are not his
to
children, any more than the stars who were wor

shipped by the ancients. You yourself, without work
ing, are better than heaven itself.” Then companions
crowd around him, and applaud his utterance. He
man who, though not knowing how
to
resembles
a
count, should, men, equally

of
of
the midst crowd

in
ignorant with him, hear

he
said by somebody that

it
was thousand feet high while others were only five

a
feet high. He would not realize what was meant by

a
would consider this measure very

he
thousand feet, but

great.
OTHER GNOSTIC INCONSISTENCIES.
(Gnostics) admit that the Divinity interests Him

self in men. How then could He (as they insist),
neglect the world that contains them? Could this be
the case because He lacked the leisure to look after it?
In this case He would lack the leisure to look after
anything beneath Him (including men also). On the
other hand, if He do care for men, that care would
include the world that surrounds and contains them.
If He ignored what surrounded men, in order to ignore
the world, He would thereby also ignore the men
themselves. The objection that men do need that
the Divinity should care for the world (is not true),
for the world does need the care of the Divinity. The
Divinity knows the arrangement of the world, the
men it contains, and their condition therein.88 The
friends of the Divinity support meekly all that results
necessarily therefrom. (They are right), for that
which happens should be considered not only from
one's own standpoint, but also from that of the totality
of circumstances. Each (person or thing) should be
considered from his place (in the scale of existence);
one should ever aspire to Him to whom aspire all
beings capable of (the Good); one should be per
suaded that many beings, or rather that all beings,
aspire thereto; that those who attain to Him are happy,
while the others achieve a fate Suitable to their nature;
finally, one should not imagine oneself alone capable
of attaining happiness.” Mere assertion of possession
does not suffice for real possession thereof. There
are many men who, though perfectly conscious that
they do not possess some good, nevertheless boast of
who really believe they do possess
it,its
or
possession,
affairs;
or
when the opposite

of
the true state

is
that they exclusively possess when they are the only

it
ones who do not possess

it.
PLOTINOS ADDRESSES HIMSELF TO THOSE OF HIS

FRIENDS WHO WERE FORMERLY GNOSTIC, NOT
TO THE LATTER WHO ARE HOPELESS.
10. On examining many other assertions (of the
Gnostics), or rather, all of their assertions,
we find
more than enough to come to some conclusion con
cerning the details of their doctrines. We cannot,
indeed, help blushing when we see some of our friends,
who had imbued themselves with (Gnostic) doctrines
before becoming friends of ours, somehow or another
persevere therein, working zealously to try to prove
that they deserved full confidence, or speaking as if
they were still convinced that they were based on good
grounds.” We are here addressing our friends, not
the partisans (of the Gnostics). Vainly indeed would
. we try to persuade the latter not to let themselves be
deceived by men who furnish no proofs—what proofs
indeed could they furnish 2—but who only impose on
others by their boastfulness.8°
PLOTINOS HAS NO INTENTION OF WRITING A

FULL CONFUTATION.
Following another kind of discussion, we might
write a refutation of these men who are impudent
enough to ridicule the teachings of those divine men
who taught in ancient times, and who conformed en
tirely to truth. We shall not however embark on this,
for whoever understands what we have already said
will from that (sample) be able to judge of the re
mainder.
GNOSTIC THEORY OF CREATION BY MERE

ILLUMINATION.112
Neither will we controvert an assertion which over
tops all their others in absurdity—we use this term for
is:
lack of a stronger. Here it “The Soul and another

Wisdom inclined downwards towards things here be

low, either because the Soul first inclined downwards
spontaneously, or because she was misled by Wisdom;
or because (in Gnostic view), Soul and Wisdom were
identical. The other Souls descended here below
together (with the Soul), as well as the “members of
Wisdom,” and entered into bodies, probably human.
Nevertheless the Soul, on account of which the other
soul descended here below, did not herself descend.
She did not incline, so to speak, but only illuminated
the darkness. From this illumination was born in
matter an image (Wisdom, the image of the Soul).
Later was formed (the demiurgic creator, called) an
image of the image, by means of matter or materiality,
or of a principle by (Gnostics) designated by another
name (the “Fruit of the fall”)—for they make use
of many other names, for the purpose of increasing
obscurity. This is how they derive their demiurgic
creator. They also suppose that this demiurgic creator
separated himself from his mother, Wisdom, and from
him they deduce the whole world even to the extremity
of the images.” The perpetration of such assertions
amounts to a bitter sarcasm of the power that created
the world.
THE NUMBERLESS INTELLECTUAL DIFFICULTIES

OF SUCH A THEORY.
11. To begin with, if the Soul did not descend,
if she limited herself to illuminating the darkness
(which is synonymous with matter), by what right
could it be asserted that the Soul inclined (down
wards) If indeed a kind of light issued from the
Soul, this does not justify an inclination of the Soul,
unless we admit the existence of something (darkness)
beneath her, that the Soul approached the darkness by
and that, on arriving near
it,
a local movement, the

On the contrary,
il
Soul illuminated the Soul

it.
if
luminated it while remaining self-contained, without
doing anything to promote that illumination,” why
did the Soul alone illuminate the darkness? (Accord
ing to the Gnostics) this occurred only after the Soul
had conceived the Reason of the universe. Then only
could the Soul illuminate the darkness, by virtue of
this rational conception. But then, why did the Soul
not create the world at the same time she illuminated
the darkness, instead of waiting for the generation of
(“psychic), images”? Further, why did this Reason
of the world, which (the Gnostics) call the “foreign
land,” and which was produced by the superior powers,
its
as they say, not move that inclination?
to
authors
Last, why does this illuminated matter produce psychic
(Wisdom, or) the image
of
images, and not bodies?
the Soul does not seem to stand need of darkness
in
the Soul create, then her image (Wis
or
matter.
If
a to
dom) should accompany her, and remain attached
Besides, what
of
her. this creature hers?
Is
is
it
it,
as
being, the (Gnostics) say, conception

a or
is
?
be
being, what difference there between and

its If
is
it
it
principle?
be
soul,
of
some other kind

If
it
of it
growth and since its

be
must “soul generation.

a
principle reasonable soul.” however (this

If
be is
a a
growth and generation,” how

be
of
Wisdom) “soul of
have created for the purpose
to
could said
it
being honored 882 short, how could

In
have been
it
created by pride, audacity, and imagination? Still

less would we have the right say that
to
had been
it
created by virtue rational conception. Besides,

of
a
what necessity was there for the mother the demi

of
urgic creator
of
of
have formed him an

to
matter and
be
image? Speaking conception, necesssary

of
would
it
to
explain the origin this term; then, unless

of
it a
be
predicated this conception,

of
creative force
be
would necessary show how conception can

to
constitute real being. But what creative force can

a
be inherent in this imaginary being? The (Gnostics)

say that this image (the demiurgic creator) was pro
duced first, and that only afterwards other images were
created; but they permit themselves to assert that
without any proof. For instance, how could it be said
i. §s
alter) f
was produced first (and other things only
HOW THE GNOSTIC DEMIURGE CREATED.
12. How could this newly formed image (the

demiurgic creator) have undertaken to create by
memory of the things he knew As he did not exist
before, he could not have known anything, any more
than the mother (Wisdom) which is attributed to him.
Besides, it is quite surprising that, though the (Gnos
tics) did not descend upon this world as images of
souls, but as veritable, genuine souls, nevertheless
hardly one or two of them succeeds in detaching them
selves from the (sense) world and by gathering to
gether their memories, to remember some of the things
they previously knew, while this image (the demi
urgical creator), as well as his mother (Wisdom),
which is a material image, was capable of conceiving
intelligible entities in a feeble manner, indeed, as say
the Gnostics, but after all from her very birth. Not
only did she conceive intelligible things, and formed an
idea of the sense-world from the intelligible world, but
She also discovered with what elements she was to
produce the sense-world. Why did she first create the
fire? Doubtless because she judged she would begin
thereby; for why did she not begin with some other
element? If she could produce fire because she had
the conception thereof, why, as she had the conception
of the world—as she must have begun by a conception
of the totality—did she not create the whole at one
single stroke”? Indeed, this conception of the world
its
embraced all parts. would also have been more
It
natural, for the demiurgical creator should not have
workman,
to
acted like all the arts are posterior
as
a
the world. Even to-day,
of
to
nature and the creation
we do not see the natures” when they beget indi
viduals, first produce the fire, then the other elements
successively, and finally mingle them. On the con
trary, the outline and organization the entire organ
of
the germ born the monthly
at
at
ism are formed once
of in
periods the womb Why then,
at in
the mother.
in
creation, should matter not have been organized

by
the type the world, type that must

one stroke
of
a
have contained fire, earth, and all the rest
of
them
of 2
Perhaps the (Gnostics) would have thus conceived
the world, image) they
an
of
of
the creation (instead
if
had had their system genuine Soul. But their

in
demiurgic creator could not have proceeded thus. To

the greatness, and especially the dimen
of
of
conceive
the heavens, the obliquity the zodiac,
of
of
of
to of
sion
the stars, the form the earth, and
of
of
the course
these things, would
of
of
understand the reason each

an image, but rather
of
of
not have been the work
as a
power that proceeded from the better principles,
spite themselves acknowledge.
of
the (Gnostics)
in
THE NECESSITY OF THE ILLUMINATION OF THE

DARKNESS MUST HAVE BEEN ETERNAL.
Indeed, we examine attentively that
in
which this
if
the darkness consists, the (Gnostics)

to of
illumination
the true principles
be
may recognition
of
of
led
a
the world. Why was the production this illumina

of
its
the darkness necessary,

of
tion existence was not

if
absolutely unavoidable? This necessity (of an

il
conformity
of
lumination the darkness) was either

it in
with, opposition
or
to
nature. conformed
in
If
from all time;

so
thereto, must have been were

it
if
it
contrary thereto, something contrary to nature would

have happened to the divine powers, and evil would
be prior to the world. Then it would no longer be
the world that was the cause of evil (as the Gnostics
claim), but the divine powers. The world is not the
principle of evil for the soul, but it is the soul that is
the principle of evil for the world. Ascending from
cause to cause, reason will relate this world to the
primary principles.
EVEN THE EXISTENCE OF THE DARKNESS MUST

BE RELATED TO THE SOUL.
If matter is also said to be the cause of evil, where
does it originate? For the darkness existed already,
as Say (the Gnostics), when the soul has seen and
illuminated them. From whence (comes darkness) 2
If (the Gnostics) answer that it is the soul herself
that created (darkness) by inclining (downwards to
matter), then evidently (the darkness) did not exist
before the inclination of the Soul. Darkness therefore
is not the cause of this inclination; the cause is in the
nature of the soul. This cause may thus be related to
preceding necessities, and as a result to first prin
ciples.**
INSTEAD OF COMPLAINING OF THE WORLD, UNDER

STAND IT AND FIT YOURSELF TO IT.
13. Those who complain of the nature of the
world do not know what they are doing, nor the extent
of their audacity. Many men are ignorant of the close
concatenation which unites the entities of the first,
second, and third ranks,” and which descends even
to those of the lowest degree. Instead of blaming
what is subordinate to first principles, we should gently
submit to the laws of the universe, rise to first prin
ciples, not undergo those tragic terrors, 98 inspired in
certain people by the spheres of the world which exert

on us nothing but a beneficent influence.94 What is
so terrible in them? Why should they be feared by
these men foreign to philosophy and all sound learn
ing? Though celestial spheres do have fiery bodies,
they should not inspire us with any fear, because they
are perfectly harmonious with the universe and with
the earth. We must besides consider the Souls of the
stars to which those (Gnostics) consider themselves
so superior, while their bodies, which surpass ours so
much in size and beauty, efficaciously concur in the
production of things that are conformed to the order
of nature”; for such things could not be born if first
principles alone existed. Finally the stars complete
the universe, and are important members thereof. If
even man holds a great superiority over animals, there
must be a far greater superiority in those stars which
exist as ornaments to the universe, and to establish
order therein, and not to exert thereover a tyrannical
influence.9° The events that are said to flow from
the stars are rather signs thereof than causes.” Be
sides, the events that really do flow from the stars
differ among each other by circumstances. It is not
therefore possible that the same things should happen
to all men, separated as they are by their times of
birth, the places of their residence, and the dispositions
of their souls. It is just as unreasonable to expect
the impossi
of all
be
good, nor, because

of
that would
bility this, go and complain on the grounds that
to
all
intelligible ob
is be
sense-objects should similar

to
jects. Moreover,” evil nothing but what less

is
complete respect
to
wisdom, and less good,

in
in
is,a
decreasing gradation. For instance, nature (that

the power growth and generation) should not be
of
called evil because she not sensation; nor sensation

it is
Otherwise,
be
called evil, because not reason.

is
in
be
we might think that there was evil

to
led the
in
telligible world. Indeed, the Soul is inferior to Intel

ligence, and Intelligence is inferior to the One.
GNOSTICS WRONGLY IMAGINE INTELLIGIBLE

ENTITIES CAN BE BEWITCHED.118
14. Another error of the (Gnostics) is their teach
ing that intelligible beings are not beyond the reach
of being affected by human beings. When the
(Gnostics) utter magic incantations, addressing them
to (intelligible beings), not only to the Soul, but to
the Principles superior thereto, what are they really
trying to do? To bewitch them? To charm them?
Or, to influence them??? They therefore believe that
divine beings listen to us, and that they obey him who
skilfully pronounces these songs, cries, aspirations and
whistlings, to all of which they ascribe magic power.”
If they do not really mean this, if they by sounds only
claim to express things which do not fall under the
senses, then, through their effort to make their art
more worthy of respect, they unconsciously rob it of
all claim to respect, in our estimation.
THEIR EXPLANATION OF DISEASE AS DEMONIACAL

POSSESSION IS WRONG.
They also pride themselves on expelling diseases.
If this were done through temperance, by a well regu
lated life, as do the philosophers, this claim might be
respected. But they insist that diseases are demons,
which they can expel by their words, and they boast
of this in order to achieve reputation among the com
mon people, that is always inclined to stand in awe of
magic. They could not persuade rational individuals
that diseases do not have natural causes, such as
fatigue, Satiety, lack of food, corruption, or some
change depending on an interior or exterior principle.
This is proved by the nature of diseases. Sometimes
a disease is expelled by moving the bowels, or by the

administration of some potion; diet and bleeding are
also often resorted to. Is this because the demon is
hungry, or the potion destroys him? When a person
is healed on the spot, the demon either remains or
departs. If he remain, how does his presence not
hinder recovery? If he depart, why? What has
happened to him? Was he fed by the disease? In
this case, the disease was something different from the
demon. If he enter without any cause for the dis
ease, why is the individual into whose body he enters
not always sick? If he enter into a body that con
tains already a natural cause of disease, how far does
he contribute to the disease ? The natural cause is
sufficient to produce the disease. It would be ridicu
lous to suppose that the disease would have a cause,
but that, as soon as this cause is active there would
be a demon ready to come and assist it.
THE GENUINE VALUE OF GNOSTICISM SEEN IN ITS

LOW MORAL ASPECTS.
The reader must now clearly see the kind as

of
sertions given out by the (Gnostics), and what their
purpose must be. What they say about demons (or
guardians) has here been mentioned only com
as
a
on
of of
mentary their vain pretenses. Other opinions

judged by
be
the (Gnostics) may best perusal

a
their books, by each individual for himself. Remember

always that our system philosophy contains, beside
of
the other good (reasons), the simplicity

of
moral
habits, the purity
of
intelligence, and that instead

of
vain boasting personal

of
recommends the care

it
dignity, rational self-confidence, prudence, reserve,

and circumspection. The remainder (of Gnostic
philosophy) may well
be
contrasted with ours. As

all that taught by the Gnostics very different
is
is
(from our teachings), we would have no advantage in

a further detailed contrast; and it would be unworthy
of us to pursue the matter (?).
THE GNOSTIC DESTINY OF MAN IS DEMORALIZING.
15. We should however observe the moral effect
produced in the soul of those who listen to the speeches
of these men who teach Scorn of the world and its
contents. About the destiny of man there are two
principal doctrines. The one assigns as our end the
pleasures of the body, the other suggests honesty and
virtue, the love of which comes from the divinity, and
leads back to the Divinity, as we have shown else
where.191 Epicurus, who denies divine Providence,
advises us to seek the only thing that remains, the
enjoyments of pleasure. Well, the (Gnostics) hold a
still more pernicious doctrine; they blame the manner
in which divine Providence operates, and they accuse
Providence itself; they refuse respect to laws estab
lished here below, and the virtue which has been
honored by all centuries. To destroy the last vestiges
it;
of honor, they destroy temperance by joking at they

attack justice, whether natural, acquired by reason
or
one word, they annihilate everything

or
exercise;
in
that could lead Nothing remains but

to to
to
virtue. seek
out pleasure, profess selfishness, renounce all
to
social relations with men, think only one's per

of
to
sonal interest, unless indeed one's own innate dis

position be good enough resist their pernicious doc
to
Nothing that we regard good by them

as
trines.
is
esteemed, for they seek entirely different objects.
THE GNOSTICS IGNORE VIRTUE WITHOUT WHICH

GOD IS MERE WORD.
A
Nevertheless, those who know the Divinity should

by
Him even here below, and de

to
attach themselves
voting themselves to His first principles, correct earthly
things by applying their divine nature thereto. Only
a nature that disdains physical pleasure can understand
that of which honor consists; those who have no virtue
could never rise to intelligible entities. Our criticism
of the (Gnostics) is justified by this that they never
no
it,
it,
speak of virtue, never study give
of
definition
do not make out its kinds, and never repeat anything
us
to
by the
of
the beautiful discussions thereof left

ancient sages. The (Gnostics) never tell how one
or
could acquire preserve moral qualities, how one

purify the soul.192 Their precept,
or
should cultivate
“Contemplate the divinity,”98 useless one does
if
is
not also teach how this contemplation take place.
to
is
One might ask the (Gnostics) such contemplation
if
the divinity would hindered by any lust anger?
be
or
of
of
What would hinder one from repeating the name
the divinity, while yielding
of
the
to to
the domination
passions, and doing nothing repress them? Virtue,
when perfected, and by wisdom solidly established
in
the divinity. Without real
us
the soul, what shows

is
virtue, God no more than name.

is
SCORN OF THIS WORLD IS NO GUARANTEE OF

GOODNESS.
16. One does not become good man merely by
a
scorning the divinities, the world, and the beauties

contains. Scorn of the divinities the chief char
it
is
Perversity never complete

of
acteristic the evil.

is
reached; and
of
until scorn the divinities man

if
is
were not otherwise perverse, this vice would be suffic

The respect which the
to
ient make him such.

(Gnostic) pretend have for the intelligible divinities
to
illogical accident.
hean
(the aeons) For when one

is
all
loves being, loves that attaches thereto; he

a
the children the affection for the parent.

to
extends
Now every soul daughter the heavenly Father.
of
is
a
The Souls that preside over the stars are intellectual,

good, and closer to the divinity than ours. How could
this sense-world, with the divinities it contains, be
separated from the intelligible world? We have
already shown above the impossibility of such a separa
tion. Here we insist that when one scorns beings so
near to those that hold the front rank, it can only be
that one knows them by name only.
TO EXCEPT CERTAIN CLASSES OF BEING FROM

DIVINE CARE IS TO SHOW CALLOUSNESS
OF DISPOSITION.
How could it ever be considered pious to claim that

divine Providence does not extend to sense-objects,
or at least interests itself only in some of them (the
spiritual men, not the psychical) Such an assertion
must surely be illogical. The (Gnostics) claim that
divine Providence interests itself only in them. Was
this the case while they were living on high, or only
since they live here below In the first case, why did
they descend onto this earth? In the second, why
do they remain here below 2 Besides, why should the
Divinity not be present here below also Otherwise
how could He know that the (Gnostics), who are here
below, have not forgotten Him, and have not become
perverse? If He know those that have not become
perverse, He must also know those who have become
perverse, to distinguish the former from the latter.
He must therefore be present to all men, and to the
entire world, in some manner or other. Thus the
world will participate in the Divinity. If the Divinity
deprived the world of His presence, He would deprive
you also thereof, and you could not say anything of
Him or of the beings below Him. The world certainly
existence from Him whether the divinity
its
derives
by
protect you His help, and what

or
His providence
ever be the name by which you refer to Him. The

world never was deprived of the Divinity, and never
will be. The world has a better right than any in
dividuals to the attentions of Providence, and to par
ticipation in divine perfections. This is particularly
true in respect to the universal Soul, as is proved by
the existence and wise arrangement of the world.
Which of these so proud individuals is as well arranged,
and as wise as the universe, and could even enter into
such a comparison without ridicule or absurdity? In
deed, unless made merely in the course of a discussion,
such a comparison is really an impiety. To doubt such
truths is really the characteristic of a blind and sense
less man, without experience or reason, and who is so
far removed from knowledge of the intelligible world
that he does not even know the Sense-world? Could
any musician who had once grasped the intelligible
harmonies hear that of sense-sounds without profound
emotion? What skilful geometrician or arithmetician
will fail to enjoy symmetry, order and proportion, in
the objects that meet his view 2 Though their eyes
behold the same objects as common people, experts
see in them different things; when, for instance, with
practiced glance, they examine some picture. When
recognizing in sense-objects an image of intelligible
(essence), they are disturbed and reminded of genuine
beauty: that is the origin of love. 194 One rises to the
intelligible by seeing a shining image of beauty glow
ing in a human face. Heavy and senseless must be
that mind which could contemplate all the visible
beauties, this harmony, and this imposing arrangement,
this grand panoramic view furnished by the stars in
spite of their distance, without being stirred to en
thusiasm, and admiration of their splendor and mag
nificence. He who can fail to experience such feel
ings must have failed to observe sense-objects, or
know even less the intelligible world.
GNOSTICS JUSTIFY THEIR HATE OF THE BODY BY

PLATO; IN THIS CASE THEY SHOULD FOLLOW
HIM ALSO IN ADMIRATION OF THE WORLD.
47. Some object that they hate the

(Gnostics)
body because Plato”
it,
complains much of
as
an
the soul, and something far inferior
to
of to
as
obstacle
this case, they should, making abstraction
In
her.
the body the world by thought, consider the rest;
of
is,
that the intelligible sphere which contains within
it
the world, and then the incorporeal souls
of
the form
which, perfect order, communicate greatness
to
byin
an
modeling space according intel
to
matter
in
it
ligible model,
its so
so
that what begotten might, far
is
possible, by
of as
greatness, equal the indivisible nature

model; for the greatness
of
its
sense-mass here
corresponds the greatness intelligible of
to
below
power. Let the (Gnostics) therefore consider the
celestial sphere, whether they conceive as
of
in
set
its it
motion by the divine power that contains principle,

im
or
of as
middle and end, whether they imagine
it
its
movable, and not yet exerting action on any the

governs by both ways they
its
In
things revolution.
it
proper idea the Soul that presides over

of
will attain
a
this universe. Let them then conceive of this soul as

body, though remaining impassible, and
to
united
a
this body
so
as
still communicating far

to
the latter
is
per
its
capable participating therein, 19% some

of
of
fections, for the divinity incapable jealousy.”

of
is
Then they will form proper idea the world. They

of
a
will understand how great the power the Soul,

of
is
since she makes the body participate her beauty

to
in
her receptivity. This body has no beauty by

of
the limit
by
nature, but when (it beautified the Soul) en

is
it
trances divine souls,

GNOSTICS BOAST OF LACK OF APPRECIATION OF
BEAUTY ALREADY RECOGNIZED. .
The (Gnostics) pretend that they have no ap
preciation for the beauty of the world, and that they
make no distinction between beautiful and ugly bodies.
In this case they should not distinguish good from bad
taste, nor recognize beauty in the sciences, in contem
plation, nor in the divinity itself; for sense-beings
possess beauty only by participation in first principles.
If they be not beautiful, neither could those first prin
ciples be such. Consequently sense-beings are beauti
ful, though less beautiful than intelligible beings. The
scorn professed by (Gnostics) for sense-beauty is
praiseworthy enough if it refer only to the beauty of
only purpose be
its
women and of young boys, and if
But you may be sure that they
to
chastity.
to
lead
scorning what ugly, they only boast
of
do not boast
is
scorning what they had first recognized and loved

as of
at
being beautiful.
EVEN EXTERIOR OR PARTIAL BEAUTY NEED NOT

CONFLICT WITH THE BEAUTY OF THE UNI
VERSE; AND IN ANY CASE THERE WOULD BE
NO EVIL IN IT.
We must further observe that not the same
in is
it
beauty that the parts and the whole,

in
in
seen
is
individuals and the universe; that there are beauties

in
great enough sense-objects and individuals, for

in
us in
instance, the guardians, admire their

to
to
lead
in
us
creator, and prove that they indeed are works

to
to
this way we may attain conception

of
do of
In
his. the
a
unspeakable beauty the universal Soul,

of
we not
if
if,
sense-objects, and without scorn

to
attach ourselves
ing them, we know how intelligible entities.
to
to
rise
be
sense-being beautiful,
it of
the interior we
If
is a
its
shall judge that harmony with exterior

in
beauty. ugly we will consider that

be
If
is
it
it
ii.9] AGAINST THE GNOSTICS 635
its
inferior to principle. But impossible for
its is
is in it
really
be
being exterior while
to
beautiful
a
ugly within; for the exterior beautiful only
in
dominated by the interior.”
so
as
far is Those
it
who are called beautiful, but who are ugly within, are
externally beautiful only deceptively.
In
contradiction
to
those who claim that there are men who possess

beautiful body and an ugly soul, insist that such
a
I
never existed, and that
to
was mistake
it consider
a
them beautiful. such men were ever seen, their
If
interior ugliness was accidental, and also their soul

was, by nature, beautiful; for we often meet here below
us
obstacles which hinder from reaching our goal. But

the universe cannot by any obstacle be hindered from
possessing interior beauty the same way that pos
in
it
sesses exterior beauty. The beings
to
whom nature
has not, from the beginning, given perfection, may
indeed not attain their goal, and consequently may
become perverted; but the universe never was child,
a
nor imperfect; did not develop, and received no
it
physical increase. Such physical increase would have

a
as
been impossible inasmuch already possessed

it
its
everything. Nor could we admit that Soul had ever,

time, gained any increase.
of
the course But even

in
this were granted the (Gnostics), this could not

to
if
constitute any evil.
RECOGNITION OF THE BEAUTY OF THE BODY NEED

NOT IMPLY ATTACHMENT THERETO; IT IS
COMPATIBLE WITH RESIGNATION.
18. (Gnostics) however might object that their
doctrine inspired revulsion from, and hate for the body,
Plotinos) really attached the soul
of
while (that
to
the body (by recognition beauty). Hardly. We

its
of
may illustrate by two guests who dwelt together

in
a
beautiful house. The first guest blamed the disposition

of
it,
the plan, and the architect who constructed but

nevertheless remained within The other guest, in
it.
blaming the architect, praised his skill, and
of
stead
he
awaited the time when might leave this house, when
he
no
longer need The first guest would
it.
should
think himself wiser and better prepared leave be
to
repeat that walls are com
to
cause he had learned
posed lifeless stones and beams, and that this house
of
was far from truly representing the intelligible house.

He would however not know that the only difference
obtaining between him and his companion, that he
is
did not know how support necessary things, while
to
his companion (who did not blame the house) will

be
he
without regret because loved
to
able leave
it
stone-buildings only very moderately. So long
as
we
body we have these houses con
to
have abide in
a
structed by the (world) Soul, who our beneficent

sister, and who had the power is
such great things
do
to
without any efort.109.

ACKNOWLEDGE KINSHIP WITH DE
GNOSTICS
PRAVEDMEN, BUT REFUSE IT TO THE
BEAUTIFUL UNIVERSE, OF WHICH
WE SHOULD BE FAR PROUDER.
The Gnostics do not hesitate call the most
to
abandoned men their “brothers,” but refuse this name

to
the sun, and the other deities heaven, and

of
to
the
very Soul the world, fools that they are! Doubtless,
of
of
to
the stars by the bonds

to
unite ourselves thus

kindred, we must no longer be perverse, we must have
be
become good, and instead being bodies, we must

of
in so
as
souls these bodies; and, far possible, we

in
must dwell within our bodies the same manner as

the universal Soul dwells within the body the uni
of
verse. To do this, one has be firm, not allow one

to
charmed by the pleasures

be
sight hearing,
of
or
to to
self
and remain untroubled by any reverse. The Soul
not troubled by anything, because she
of
the world
is
is outside of the reach of all. We, however, who here

below are exposed to the blows of fortune, must repel
them by our virtue, weakening some, and foiling others
by our constancy and greatness of soul.110 When we
shall thus have approached this power which is out of
the reach (of all exigencies), having approached the
Soul of the universe and of the stars, we shall try to
become her image, and even to increase this resem
blance to the assimilation of fusion. Then, having
been well disposed by nature and exercised, we also
will contemplate what these souls have been con
templating since the beginning. We must also re
member that the boast of some men that they alone
have the privilege of contemplating the intelligible
world does not mean that they really contemplate this
world any more than any other men.
GNOSTICS WHO BOAST SUPERIORITY TO THE DIVIN
ITIES WHO CANNOT LEAVE THEIR BODIES ARE
IN REALITY IGNORANT OF THE TRUE STATE
OF AFFAIRS.
Vainly also do some (Gnostics), boast of having to
leave their bodies when they will have ceased to live,
while this is impossible to the divinities because they
always fill the same function in heaven. They speak
thus only because of their ignorance of what it is to
be outside of the body, and of how the universal Soul
in her entirety wisely governs what is inanimate.
THE JEALOUS DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SPIRIT
UAL, PSYCHIC AND MATERIAL IS DUE CHIEFLY
TO IGNORANCE OF •OTHER PEOPLE'S AT
TAINMENTS.
We ourselves may very well not love the body, we
may become pure, scorn death, and both recognize and
follow spiritual things that are superior to earthly
things. But on this account we should not be jealous
of other men, who are not only capable of following
the same goal, but who do constantly pursue Let
it.
doing so. I.Ct
us us
not insist that they are incapable
of
as
not fall into the same error those who deny the
the stars, because their senses show them
of
movement
to remain immovable. Let us not act as do the
(Gnostics), who believe that the nature
of
the stars
does not see what external, because they themselves
do not see that their own Souls are outside. is
Biography said Phaedrus, 246; Cary, 55.
of
Mentioned
in
1
Plotinos, 16. See vi. An The Gnostic theory crea
of
9.
23
2
other proof of the chrono tion by the fall Sophia and
of
logical arrangement. Achamoth. 24 See
it.
9.11.
9. 6.
See
v.
8
6;
Valentinus however said only

1,
6 2,
3,
7,
See vi.
v.
5 4
Of Bythos. Ennoia and The that Achamoth had created all

lesis. By distinguishing with things honor of the aeons;
in
7
each of them potentiality only the later theologians held

in
and actualization, Numenius, this view mentioned by Plo

25, multiplied them. Nous, and 21,
2,
tinos. 25 See 26 See
i.
8
Logos Achamoth; Tim. vi. 20, 21; and

or
99.
ii. ii.
ii.
see
I.
The prophoric logos, see 27 See 28 See

ii.
9.6, 3.9. 1.4.

9
2.3; and Philo, de Mosis Vita This, however, mis

29
is
3. i.
a
Plotinos's,
as
of
10 See 3.4. 11 See 1.7. take the

a v.
i.
This mingling of Pla Gnostics held not this, but that

is
12
tonic and Aristotelic thought, the pneumatic or spiritual hu
see Ravaisson, Essay on the mans dwell on earth, and the
Metaphysic Aristotle, psychic
as
heaven,
of
Bouillet
in
ii.
407.
18 Which would be nonsense; remarks. 80 So that they
the Gnostics (Valentinus) had should remain in the model in
gone descending here be
33
14
81 of
as
as
far aeons. See stead

15 Between the sense low By remaining the
in
ii.
9.11.
P
world, and the intelligible world, model, instead descending

of
see iv. 3.5-8; Plotinos here below. 32 That is, the

v.
2.3.
followed by Jamblichus and spiritual germs emanating
is
Damascius, but Proclus and from the “pleröma.” 88 Plo

synony
as
Hermias denied that the soul tinos here treats

did not entirely enter into the mous “new earth,” “reason of
body, Stobaeus, Ecl. 52. the world,” “model of the
16
See
i.
iv. 3.18; iv. 4.3. 17 The intel world,” and “form

of
the
ligible world. 3.1-8; world;” but Bouillet shows
iv.
18. See
op
to
19 Thus Plotinos that there reason believe

is
iv.
9.
he was error the matter.

in
in
poses the Gnostic belief that

From the pleröma, whose
84
the world was created, and will

perish. “seeds of election” they were,
20
16. 21. The

9,
9,
Seeii.
to
Gnostic Horos. 22. As Plato and which now become them

ii.9] AGAINST THE GNOSTICS 639
a foreign country. 85 Of the 78 That is, Intelligence, see
i.
aeons, from whom souls, as 8.2. 79 The stars prognosticate
intelligible beings, had eman events, see 80 See
ii.
2.
3.9.
i.
By
. 86 As in the To the perfect Father,
81
ated. famous
drama of Sophia and Acha thos, Irenaeus, 82 See
ii.
18.
place; Irenaeus, iii. 15.
ii.
moth. 37 The unseen 88 See
the transmigrations of Basil
84
9.16. See Irenaeus. 21.
i.
ides, Valentinus, Carpocrates, 85 See Irenaeus, iii. 15. 86 See
and the others. 88 P. 39. Cary, Thus identifying the
87
1.12.
i.
15. 39 Added to Plato by “reasonable soul” with Sophia,
Plotinos. 40Plotinos had done and “the soul of growth and
so himself (Intelligence, and generation” with Achamoth.
the intelligible world); Nu 9.4, 90 Or
il.
ii.
88 See 89 3.16.
menius (25) also did so. 41 See “seminal reasons,”
ii.
3.13.
iv. 3.8, 15. 42 Such as Pytha 91 See iii. 4.1. 92 As wrote
goras and Plato, Life of Plot. Plato his second Letter,
x. 2,
in
43 See 44 The 312, Cary, 482.
ii.
23. 9.17. 98 Jeremiah

the Gnostics. 45 Or, 94 Pindar, Olymp.
of
doctrine
2.
43
ii. i.
generations, the “syzygies” of 95 See 3.9, 96 See
ii. ii.
3.7.
the aeons, see Titus iii. 98 As thought
ii.
9.
46 97 See 3.7.
47 As the drama of Plato, Laws,
x,
in
9.17. 897, p.
viii.
C
the fall of Sophia and Acha 265; Cary, C8, that evil only
is
moth. 1.1; iii. 2.1; negative. Irenaeus,
i. ii.
48 See 99 See
i. i.
iv. 3.9. 49 See 50 iv. 100 See Origen,
2.
3.
25. Cels.
c.
51. For the descending souls 101 See 102 This is,
2.
24.
i.
enter bodies already organized however, extreme,

as
Clement
by the universal Soul, see iv. of Alexandria hands down
3.6; 1.5; 3.9; helpful extracts from Valen
ii.
ii.
ii.
9.18.
52 Lower part, see 1.5; tinus, Strom. iv.; etc. 103 See
1, ii.
5. ii.
5.8
In
3,
4,
ii.
3.5, 18, See 9.9 104 See 6.7. 105

ii.
i.
54 The first “bond” nature, his Phaedo, pp. 66, 67; Cary,
is
is,
the second the human soul. 106 That according

is
29–32.
receptivity. 107 As
ii. is,
56 That
to
the its
ii.
55 See 1.3.
57
stars, thought Plato the Timaeus,

ii.
in
3.7-13. See 9.5.

Timaeus, 29, xi. 110, Cary, 10. 108 By
58
With Plato's 29;

p.
Cary, the soul that gives form,

In
ii. 9,
59. the universal

it
Soul, 3.16, 17. 60 By exist see 6.2. 109 See iii. 4.6;
v.
i.
ing and creating, see 1.2–6. 110 Seei. 4.8–14. 111 This
ii.
5.2.
was evidently Ame
61
8.7, for matter. 62 See.

to
See rebuke
i.
See Philo, de Gigant. lius, for his faithfulness Nu

68
to
i. ii.
9.3.
menius; and
ii.
ii.
64 See 2.1. 65 See 3.9–13. this time

at
is
it
left Plotinos.
8,
66 See iv. that Amelius

il.
67 See 3.9.
112 This may refer Nu
to
4.8. 69 See
2.
68. See 70 See

T i.
i.
72 See menius's views, see fr. 27

ii.
4.7. See 3.13.

b.
10.
ii. i. i.
4.8. 73 See 4.14–16. 74 See 118 Compare Numenius, fr. 61,

i.
3.8, 16. 75 See See

ii.
62
a.
3.9.
ii. 6
T
below. 77 The stars, see 3.9.

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PLOTINOS

BIOGRAPHY by Porphy Ry, EUNAPius, & SUIDAs,

KennETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE,

COMPARATIVE LI'I’ERATURE PRESS

ALPIN N.J., U.S.A.

Copyright, 1918, by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie.

SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR.

WHY THE WORLD-SOUL IS EVERYWHERE ENTIRE

everywhere in existence before thus, whatever

place may be, found the Soul present before

itself was part the universe, and the total body of it

the universe was located the Soul that existed

HOW COULD THE SOUL HAVE No MAGNITUDE, IF

body approached her, she already filled space,

how can she have no magnitude? Besides, how could

did not yet exist? Last, being considered indivisible

and non-extended, she everywhere present without

having any magnitude that she ex

tended herself throughout the body the universe

resolved by thus accidentally attributing magnitude to

another part; but

the whiteness not identical

the soul which the foot identical

be seen the percepts thereof. Last, what identical

the soul said

THE SOUL WAS CAPABLE OF EXTENSION BEFORE

how the soul, being incorporeal and extended, could,

nevertheless, have assumed such extension, either

the bodies. indeed one see

that she was capable assuming extension before the

bodies existed, will easily understood that she

could have done so within the bodies.

DESCRIPTION OF THE UNIVERSAL BEING.

The world that we see more than image. This

veritably universal (Being) is in nothing; for nothing

far contains, space which before had, and

aside local nomenclature. Indeed, when one speaks

but the universal (being), being the First, and possess

and where the universal because this itself.

What has been built on the universal, being other

than participates and approaches receives

“strength from not but because finds

itself, because approaches since the universal

(“being”) itself; for impossible

for the essence non-essence; on the contrary,

non-essence that must subsist essence, and conse

quently unite entirely with the whole essence. We

this sense that essence, that itself.

not surprising that what everywhere essence

itself; for that which everywhere

unity. We, however, positing that the (Being)

question sense-(existence), believe that every

where here below; and,

the sense- (existence)

great, we wonder how nature (that

that which has great

essence) can extend

nitude. In reality, the (Being) which is called great

place, and with having place where might pre

Therefore, approaching the uni

verse finds the universal “Being”; having no need

cause the thing around which turns the veritably

parts enjoys the