Andrius Dirmeikis MD

VYTAUTAS MAGNUS UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND DIPLOMACY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
Andrius Dirmeikis
U.S. ROLE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE CASE OF SOUTH CHINA

SEA TERRITORIAL DISPUTES
Master Thesis
Diplomacy and International Relations, State Code 621L20004
Political Science Study Field
Supervisor Phd Cand. Mindaugas Norkevičius

(Research degree, name, surname)
Defended Prof. dr. Šarūnas Liekis
Kaunas, 2018
CONTENTS
SUMMARY….....……..……………………………………………………………………...…3
SANTRAUKA…...…………………………………………………………………………...…4
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................6
1. NEOREALIST APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS…................................9
1.1. Key Tenets of Neorealism................................................................................................9
1.2. Defensive and Offensive Realism..................................................................................14
1.3. Neorealism‟s Relevance in the 21st Century.................................................................18
2. SOUTH CHINA SEA TERRITORIAL DISPUTES.............................................................21
2.1. Historical Background…………………………………………...................................21
2.2. Importance of the Region………….………………………………………………….26
2.3. Legal Disputes.………………………………………………………………………..29
2.4. Claimants…………..………………………………………………………………….33
3. US APPROACH TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES……..……………………...37
3.1. Evolution of U.S. Participation in the Disputes…….………..…..................................37
3.2. U.S. Interests in the South China Sea………….………………………………………42
3.3. U.S. Strategies in Resolving the Disputes.….…………………………………………45
CONCLUSIONS……………………………..………………………………………………..52
LITERATURE AND SOURCE LIST…..…………………………………………………….54
ANNEXES…..………………………………………………………………………………...59
2
Dirmeikis, A. U.S. Role in Conflict Resolution: The Case of South China Sea Territorial Disputes: Master
Thesis in Political Science / Supervisor PhD Cand. Norkevičius, M.; Vytautas Magnus University, Faculty of Political
Science and Diplomacy, Department of Political Science. Kaunas, 2018. 60 p.
SUMMARY
The South China Sea maritime disputes are one of the largest, long-standing and most
complex territorial disputes in the world, which involves China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei
and the Philippines. The South China Sea is of utmost importance for the claimants, because it is an
area where the strategically crucial sea-lanes for commerce are located at, as well being an area that
is rich in natural gas and oil reserves. In this context, the United States plays a special role as a non-
claimant in the attempts to promote peaceful settlement of the disputes.
The object of this master thesis is U.S. participation as a non-claimant country in the South
China Sea territorial disputes. The goal of this thesis is to analyze the role of U.S. as a mediator in
the resolution of South China Sea territorial disputes. The hypothesis is made that U.S. policies in the
South China Sea territorial disputes do not lead to neither conflict resolution, nor to conflict
escalation. The tasks of this master thesis are:
1. To examine key aspects of neo-realism when it comes to explaining international relations;
2. To review and analyze the territorial disputes between China and ASEAN countries in the
South China Sea, in order to assess where U.S. fit in this context;
3. To analyze U.S. role in capacity as a mediator to foster peacemaking process between
conflicting parties.
For master thesis, the following research methods are used- descriptive-analytical method,
comparative method and document analysis method.
The conclusion of the thesis is that the U.S. plays a dual role of balancer and mediator in the
disputes. By enhancing its military cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam, the U.S. is
counterbalancing China‟s far-reaching ambitions in the South China Sea. Simultaneously, the U.S.
plays a role of a mediator and stimulates further developments in the process of peacefully settling
the disputes between all the claimants, by promoting international law, diplomacy and not taking
sides over the questions of sovereignty in the South China Sea. The hypothesis is partially verified,
as U.S. policies in the South China Sea contributes more towards the progress of solving the disputes
rather than keeping them unresolved for decades to come.
3
Dirmeikis, A. JAV Vaidmuo Konfliktų Sprendime: Pietų Kinijos Jūros Teritorinių Ginčų Atvejis: Politikos
mokslų magistro baigiamasis darbas / vadovas dokt. M. Norkevičius; Vytauto Didžiojo universitetas, Politikos mokslų ir
diplomatijos fakultetas, Politologijos katedra. Kaunas, 2018. 60 p.
SANTRAUKA
Teritoriniai ginčai Pietų Kinijos jūroje yra vieni iš ilgiausių, didžiausių ir labiausiai
komplikuotų ginčų XXI a. Teritorines pretenzijas reiškia 6 valstybės- Kinija, Taivanas, Vietnamas,
Filipinai, Malaizija ir Brunėjus. Šioms valstybėms Pietų Kinijos jūra yra labai svarbi dėl keleto
priežasčių. Visų pirma, Pietų Kinijos jūra yra labai svarbi vieta žvejybos pramonei, kadangi žuvis yra
pagrindinis maisto šaltinis aukščiau išvardytoms valstybėms. Antra, Pietų Kinijos jūra yra vieta kur
slypi galimi dideli naftos ir gamtinių dujų rezervai. Be to, Pietų Kinijos jūra yra labai svarbi
strategine prasme, kadangi ji randasi svarbių jūrų kelių sankirtoje, per kuriuos yra eksportuojamos
prekes ir importuojamos žaliavos į Rytų Azijos valstybes kaip Kinija, Pietų Korėja ir Japonija.
Valstybė, kuri kontroliuos šiuos jūrų kelius, įgis svarbų svertą kuris drastiškai pakeis tiek regioninį,
tiek tarptautinį, galios balansą. Dėl šių priežasčių, teritoriniai ginčai yra ,,užstrigę" ilgam laikui,
kadangi teritorijos, į kurias reiškia pretenzijas kiekviena iš aukščiau išvardytų valstybių, sutampa ir
persipina su teritorijomis į kurias reiškia pretenzijas kita valstybė. Iš visų valsybių, Kinijos
pretenzijos yra pačios didžiausios, kadangi ji priskiria beveik visą Pietų Kinijos jūrą į savo įtakos
sferą. Šiame kontekste, Jungtinės Amerikos Valstijos vaidinga ypatingą vaidmenį bandymuose
sureguliuoti šiuos ginčus. Apie tai ir yra šis magistro baigiamasis darbas.
Šio darbo objektas yra JAV dalyvavimas Pietų Kinijos jūros teritoriniuose ginčuose, kaip
valstybės kuri nėra tiesiogiai įsitraukusi į ginčus. Šio darbo tikslas yra išanalizuoti JAV, kaip
tarpininko, vaidmenį sprendžiant Pietų Kinijos jūros teritorinius ginčus. Darbe keliama hipotezė, kad
JAV vykdoma politika Pietų Kinijos jūros teritorinių ginčų atžvilgiu neskatina ginčų sprendimo, bet
ir nepriveda prie ginčų eskalacijos.. Magistro baigiamojo darbo užduotys yra šios:
1. Išnagrinėti pagrindinius neorealizmo teorijos aspektus;
2. Išanalizuoti teritorinius ginčus tarp Kinijos ir ASEAN šalių Pietų Kinijos jūroje;
3. Išanalizuoti JAV, kaip tarpininko, vaidmenį, bandymuose taikiai išspręsti konfliktą.
Magistro baigiamajame darbe yra naudojami šie tyrimo metodai: aprašomasis-analitinis,
lyginamasis ir dokumentų analizės metodas.
Darbe daroma išvada, kad Pietų Kinijos jūros teritoriniuose ginčuose JAV vaidina dvejopą
vaidmenį. Visų pirmą, didindama savo karinį bendradarbiavimą su Filipinais ir Vietnamu, JAV
atsveria ir balansuoja Kinijos ambicijas Pietų Kinijos jūroje. Tuo pačiu metu JAV vaidina tarpininko
vaidmenį ir skatina tolesnę taikių derybų raidą tarp visų konfliktuojančių pusių. Šiam tikslui, JAV
4
pasitelkia tarptautinę teisę, diplomatiją ir laikosi neutralumo Pietų Kinijos jūros teritorinių ginčų
atžviligiu. Hipotezė yra iš dalies patvirtinta, kadangi JAV vykdoma politika Pietų Kinijos jūroje
labiau skatina pažangą ginčų sprendimo procese negu atvirkščiai.
5
INTRODUCTION
Preface. Throughout the Cold War, the tensions between two superpowers of that period, the
U.S. and USSR, inevitably led to numerous indirect conflicts between both sides across various
regions of the world, such as the Korean War in East Asia, Arab-Israel Conflict in the Middle East
and the Congo Crisis in Africa. Both superpowers armed the opposing sides, which in turn escalated
conflicts instead of trying to find a peaceful solution to them.
With the end of the Cold War, with ideological hostilities being ended, it would have seemed
that the amounts of conflicts were bound to decrease. However, as the post-Cold War developments
in international politics and economy have shown, there continues to be many wide-ranging conflicts
some of which, such as war in Afghanistan, are continuation from the Cold War days, while other
conflicts, such as the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Yugoslav wars in the 1990‟s, resulted
largely from the breakup of communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Furthermore, in
the modern twenty first century a number of new, indirect conflicts and threats are on the rise such as
terrorism, cyber attacks, information security etc. With U.S. remaining the world‟s sole superpower,
its role in conflict prevention and resolution is of paramount importance. In this context, the ongoing
South China Sea territorial disputes are one of the most important issues in the modern international
relations, which involve many different actors and interests. This master thesis is about the U.S. role
in attempts to peacefully resolve the disputes among the conflicting parties in the South China Sea.
Relevance of the topic. The South China Sea is one of the world‟s most important
international sea-lanes. Activities there are numerous and primarily consist of maritime trade,
freedom of navigation, resource exploitation and exploration, such as natural gas, oil and fishery.
The South China Sea has one of the largest oil and natural gas reserves in the world.
The states with a particular interest in the aforementioned natural resources are some of the
most important regional and international actors in terms of economic capabilities as well growing
military capacity- it involves China, the states of ASEAN, specifically, Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei
and Malaysia, as well as Taiwan. Furthermore, international companies from Europe, North
America, Oceania, as well as India and Russia, are heavily involved in maritime trade at South China
Sea with trade worth being measured in trillions of dollars every year.
Any potential conflict in this area would hit various sectors of economy such as commodities,
logistics, and insurance. Major container shipping companies from Europe and North America send
their vessels through the South China Sea, making all of them vulnerable if China and the U.S.
collide with each other in this area. The most obvious and immediate impact may be on global crude
6
prices which would change drastically. Equally important is the fact that any potential conflict in the
area could disrupt the movement of vital energy resources from and to Southeast Asia, thus curbing
overall supply routes.
With tension rising in recent years over territorial claims in the South China Sea between
China and the countries of ASEAN, the disruption of the movement of vital energy resources, in case
of potential conflict, can have severe economic implications for regional and global trade as well as
peace and stability. Therefore, the settlement of territorial disputes in the region is of paramount
importance for the United States, which has vital economic interests there, as well as for its key allies
from ASEAN countries, such as Philippines, which also serve as a counterweight for China in the
South China Sea.
Research question. Inevitably, the growing maritime territorial ambitions of China in the
South China Sea becomes unsettling to the U.S. and its ASEAN allies, and these disputes can
undermine the regional stability of the entire East and Southeast Asia. The question of this thesis is
whether China and the U.S. can cooperate to peacefully manage and resolve territorial disputes in the
South China Sea.
Object of the master thesis. U.S. participation as a non-claimant country in the South China
Sea territorial disputes.
Goal of the thesis. To analyze the role of U.S. as a mediator in the resolution of South China
Sea territorial disputes. In order to reach this goal, the following tasks are set:
1. To examine key aspects of neo-realism when it comes to explaining international relations;
2. To review and analyze the territorial disputes between China and ASEAN countries in the
South China Sea, in order to assess where U.S. fit in this context;
3. To analyze U.S. role in capacity as a mediator to foster peacemaking process between
conflicting parties.
Hypothesis. U.S. policies in the South China Sea territorial disputes do not lead to neither
conflict resolution, nor to conflict escalation.
Methodology. Several methods are used in this master thesis. The descriptive-analytical
method allows to analyze China-ASEAN disputes in the South China Sea, outline key interests of
both sides as well as trends in mutual relations there. This method also helps to examine the
theoretical aspects of the paper. Most importantly, this method allows to analyze and dissect U.S.
approach towards the South China Sea territorial disputes, and its policies towards different
countries, that have territorial claims there. The comparative method compares various branches of
realism, their differences, similarities and how together they help to explain international relations.
This method also helps to reveal certain tendencies and future perspectives. The document analysis
method is also used in the work. Both, primary sources (international treaties, speeches) and
7
secondary sources (research reports, textbooks), are being used. This method is valuable since it
provides an opportunity to get acquainted with U.S. approach towards the claimants in the South
China Sea territorial disputes and how this approach affects the foreign policy strategies of those
countries.
Research source base. When analyzing the theoretical aspects of neorealism, the works and
ideas of the most influential neo-realists are being used. More specifically, Kenneth N. Waltz and his
book Theory of International Politics (1979), John J. Mearsheimer and his book The Tragedy of
Great Power Politics (2001), as well as others, are being used.
When analyzing South China Sea territorial disputes and U.S. approach towards it, various
articles and monographs from research centers, such as Brookings Institution, House of Commons
Library, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), as well as numerous public speeches
made by the U.S. Governmental officials, are being used.
Structure of the paper. The master thesis will be divided into 3 chapters. The first chapter
will be devoted to examining the theoretical framework of conflict between states, with focus being
put on neorealism and its key attributes. The second chapter will be dedicated to analyzing the
territorial disputes between China and ASEAN countries in South China Sea. The third chapter will
focus on analyzing U.S. role in the South China Sea territorial disputes and how it impacts the
attempts to solve the disputes in a peaceful manner.
8
1. NEOREALIST APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
Realism is one of the most well-established theories of international relations. Realism has a
long and rich tradition but at the same time, it is a complex theory that has several key branches
which differ from one another while also sharing some key similarities. When it comes to explaining
international system, relations among states, war and peace, and conflict management, realism has a
detailed theoretical base. Although Realist theories, namely neorealism and classical realism, share
certain core assumptions, such as the centrality of the state in international relations, there are key
divides inside realism. Basically, neorealism tries to explain such aspects of international relations as
the possibility of a major war and the chances for cooperation and alliance creation, while classical
realism is focused on trying to explain the foreign policy strategies of individual states.1
Furthermore, inside neorealism, there are disagreements about the implications of anarchic
international system, which is the very essence of the debate between the two subdivisions of
neorealism- offensive realism and defensive realism.2
Due to substantial variety of approaches in explaining the conflict side of contemporary
international relations, the neorealist approach is the focus of this chapter. The chapter will analyze
key aspects of neorealism, various approaches of it, and how it is relevant in the international
relations of 21 st century, which is full of great power competition among states.
1.1. Key Tenets of Neorealism

Neo-realists, also known as structural realists, share similar views with classical realists
regarding the centrality of the state, pursuit of interests. However neo-realists put more attention on
the anarchic structure of international relations and the impact that the structure has on the way states
behave themselves. The key difference between these two approaches is reflected in the answer to
the following question: why do states seek power? For classical realists, like Morgenthau, the answer
is human nature, while for neo-realists, human nature has not much to do with why states want
power, rather, it is the structure of the international system that forces states to pursue power.3 In
addition, the classical realism focuses on states as actors and analyses international relations in terms
1
Taliaferro, W., J. Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited. International security 2000, p. 129
2
Ibid
3
Mearsheimer, J., J. Structural Realism. In Dunne, T., Kurki, M., Smith, S., eds. International Relations Theories:
Discipline and Diversity. Oxford University Press 2007, p. 72
9
of „units‟ called states.4 Contrary to classical realism, the neorealism puts more attention on the
importance of the anarchic international system, and is more versed in the approaches that explain
international relations.
In a system where great powers are principal actors and there is no firm assurance that one
side will not attack another, it is rational then that every state will try to maintain or increase its
military and (or) economic power, in order to protect itself from any potential attack. In the words of
John J. Mearsheimer, “great powers are trapped in an iron cage where they have little choice but to
compete with each other for power if they hope to survive.”5 Furthermore, neorealism disregards the
differences between the regimes of various states due to the fact that the international setting creates
the same motives for all states, especially great powers. For this reason, the neo-realists do not pay
much attention to whether a state is authoritarian or democratic, nor do they pay much attention to
who manages state‟s foreign policy, because it does not play a big role in how states act towards the
other states.6 In this regard, the neo-realists claim that all states act similarly, with the major
difference being that some states are inherently more powerful than the others.
The most influential authors in formulating neorealism, aka structural realism, are Kenneth
N. Waltz and his book Theory of International Politics (1979), and John J. Mearsheimer‟s book The
Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001). Waltz in his book characterizes power more as a means
rather than an end in anarchic international system.7 This is a noticeable contrast to classical realism
which states the opposite. Waltz claims that for states "the goal the system encourages them to seek
is security. Increased power may or may not serve that end" (Waltz, 1979, as cited in Hensel, 2015,
p. 4)8. Meanwhile, Mearsheimer characterizes international politics as "a ruthless and dangerous
business" where the great powers "fear each other and always compete with each other for power"
(Mearsheimer, 2001, as cited in Hensel, 2015, p. 4)9.
Neo-realist description as to why states compete with one another for power is based on 5
presumptions about international system. When these 5 presumptions are merged into one, they
portray international relations as an incessant competition for power.
4
Steans, J., Pettiford, L., Diez, Th., El-Anis, I. An Introduction to International Relations Theory: Perspectives and
Themes (Third edition). Routledge 2013, p. 57
5
6
Ibid
7
Hensel, R., P. Power Politics and Contentious Issues: Realism, Issue Salience, and Conflict Management. Florida State
University 2015, p. 4
8
University 2015, p. 4. Cited from Waltz, K. Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. 1979, p. 126.
9
University 2015, p. 4. Cited from Mearsheimer, J. Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W. W. Norton & Company 2001, p.
2
10
The first presumption, which is the main one, is that great powers are principal actors in
international system, which is anarchic.10 Although it may sound confusing at first, the anarchy is not
defined by chaos. Rather, anarchy means that there‟s no centralized and supreme authority that
stands above the states. While neo-realism certainly acknowledges the presence of other international
actors, such as international institutions and multinational corporations, they‟re not central actors in
international system, the states are.
The second presumption is that all states more or less possess some sort of offensive military
capability. 11 Basically, this means that every state has a capability to inflict at least some damage to
its neighbors. In this regard, power capabilities vary largely, depending on a specific case, and are
determined by several key aspects, such as size of the state‟s population, its military capabilities,
economic strength, geography etc. Here, it should be pointed out though, that things like population,
economy can change over time either in a bad way (decline in population growth, economic
recession) or in a good way (population growth, economic boom).
The third presumption is that states can never be certain about the intents of others.12 In this
regard, a crucial goal of the state is to know and be informed if other states are willing to use force
and coercion to change the existing balance of power.13 Those that do in fact want to change it, can
be perceived as a revisionist states, while those states that are satisfied with what they have and
therefore have no interest whatsoever in changing the existing situation, can be perceived as status
quo states. That being said, one key and rather obvious issue is that it is impossible to fully identify
what are the intentions of the other states. Contrary to the things like the size of the territory,
population, and military capabilities, the aims of the other states cannot be empirically verified. The
reason for this is the fact that the aims of the state are inside the minds of the decision-makers, which
makes it very complicated to recognize the plans of the state. In this regard, the aims of the state can
be partially verified and recognized through the official policy documents that are accessible to
everyone as well through public speeches. However an obvious issue here is the fact that policy-
makers never disclose their actual aims. Rather, they constantly lie and can say one thing in public
while hiding their true goals for present and the future.
The fourth presumption is inter-related with the third one. Since the state can never be certain
about the aims of the other, the crucial goal of the state is to ensure its survival. In this regard, the
state's goal is to preserve its territorial integrity and the autonomy of national political structures.14
Although states could seek various additional interests as well, such as increasing the well-being of
10
11
Ibid
12
Ibid
13
Ibid
14
Ibid, p. 74
11
its citizens by improving their salaries and seeking democratization of the political system, the goal
of survival is of utmost importance, therefore, other goals pale in comparison to this one and they
must be viewed as secondary.
The fifth presumption is inter-related with the fourth one. Since the priorities of the state are
focused around the survival, the states are therefore rational actors in the international arena. 15 This
means that they have the abilities to create some sort of pragmatic strategies which would increase
their chances of survival. However, this does not necessarily mean that states are immune from
making mistakes. This leads back to the third presumption which claims that states can never be
certain about the aims of the other state. Since the state is never certain about the policy of the other
state and therefore function with defective information, the state will have a tendency to make
mistakes from time. When all of these 5 presumptions are combined with one another, conditions are
created where state‟s goal will be to increase its power at the cost of another state, in order to ensure
its continuous survival.
In addition to these 5 presumptions, another key integral part of neorealism, when it comes to
explaining how states act in anarchic international system, is balance of power theory, enhanced by
the writings of Kenneth Waltz. The basis of Waltz‟s theory of international politics is found in the
penultimate chapter of his 1959 famous book Man, the State, and War, titled „Economics, Politics,
and History‟- influenced by the well-known „stag hunt‟ allegory used by Rousseau, Waltz
emphasizes that “to expect each country to formulate an economic policy that happens to work to the
advantage of all countries is utopian” (Waltz, 1959, as cited in Booth, 2011, pp. 207-208).16
Under anarchic international system, states have 3 options- either to risk perishing, seek
domination, or to seek the policy of the balance of power, which basically means not to allow others
to achieve dominance by strengthening themselves or by coalition. 17 Although the pursuit of
hegemony can still be an option, it would be rather irrational for a state to pursue this kind of policy
because it would risk perishing in the process of doing this, since other states would constantly try to
resist it, by creating powerful alliances that would balance or remove this kind of threat. In this
regard, Waltz points out that “for each state its power in relation to other states is ultimately the key
to its survival” (Waltz, 1959, as cited in Booth, 2011, p. 208).18 From the 3 assumptions, Waltz‟s
balance-of-power theory points to the second and third option. 19 Basically, he claims that states,
which are rational actors, will seek domination and (or) the policy of the balance of power. The
15
Ibid
16
Booth, K. Realism and World Politics. Routledge 2011, pp. 207-208. Cited from Waltz, K. Man, the State, and War.
Columbia University Press 1959, p. 196
17
Ibid, p. 208
18
Booth, K. Realism and World Politics. Routledge 2011, p. 208. Cited from Waltz, K. Man, the State, and War.
Columbia University Press 1959, p. 210.
19
Booth, K. Realism and World Politics. Routledge 2011, p. 208
12
anarchic international system forces state leaders to think and function in a way which would prevent
one great power from becoming extremely dominant. 20 Consequently, this has a tendency to create
balancing policies where large states try to balance one another, either individually or by changing
alliances. This is what leads to the balance of power between the big players.
In addition, neorealism takes largely materialistic view on virtually all human affairs, not to
mention international relations- for Waltz, the international relations and its structure is defined by
the distribution of power, particularly the number of major dominant players. 21 According to Waltz,
domination is based on such things as the "size of population and territory, resource endowment,
economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence" (Waltz, 1979, as cited in
Booth, 2011, p. 233).22 In terms of material capabilities, they are measured in relative terms to
explain the distribution of power in the international relations and to point out the centers of power,
therefore, the international relations are viewed in terms of material polarity in order to describe the
centers of domination and the number of dominating states.23
The main conclusion of neorealism is that in the international anarchic system, states
'balance' rather than 'bandwagon'. 24 The latter occurs in hierarchic political orders where actors have
a tendency to jump on the bandwagon of a leading political candidate or the one who recently won
an election. By siding with the stronger party, bandwagoners seek to increase their gains and reduce
or remove the potential risks and losses in case they oppose the stronger side. Unlike in the anarchic
international system, the political players here will not be under the risk of perishing. However, if
such an approach is chosen in an anarchic international system, bandwagoning means to meet one‟s
demise, because you enhance the capabilities of someone who later may turn on you. Since in
anarchic international system there‟s no government to turn for protection, there will always be a
large threat coming from the major states and powers. In this regard, weak states have no other
choice but to hope that timely alignment with the major power and potential victor will bring
favorable treatment. Contrary to the weak state, great powers cannot accept such a risk, as it would
be irrational. Rather, great powers will balance the opposing side, through military-political alliances
as well as by mobilizing all of its resources available to them.
Thus, while at first glance, it may seem that classical realism and neorealism appear to have
identical views on the centrality of the state in international relations, there is a noticeable difference
between these two branches of realism when it comes to explaining why states want power, with the
20
Ibid
21
Ibid, p. 233
22
Booth, K. Realism and World Politics. Routledge 2011, p. 233. Cited from Waltz, K. Theory of International Politics.
Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. 1979, p. 131.
23
Booth, K. Realism and World Politics. Routledge 2011, p. 233
24
Burchill, S., Linklater, A., Devetak, R., Donnelly, J., Paterson, M., Reus-Smit, Ch, True, J. Theories of International
Relations (Third edition). Palgrave Macmillan 2005, pp. 35-36
13
main question being centered on whether power serves as a means or an end in anarchic international
system. In this sense, it can be said that both approaches supplement one another and allows to have
a better, more versed and in-depth understanding of how states function in an anarchic international
stage.
1.2. Defensive and Offensive Realism

Within neorealism, there is a divide when it comes to several key questions. That difference
is reflected in two subdivisions inside neorealism- defensive realism and offensive realism. Both of
these approaches have differing opinions on the question of how much power the state should have
and on the implications of anarchy. More specifically, the key point of divide between these
approaches lay in the question of how states tend to behave in anarchic international system, that is,
whether they seek to maximize security or power, and whether power is a means or an end. 25 For
these reasons, both approaches can be regarded as theoretical competitors inside neorealism because
they generate different predictions.
This section will begin by examining key aspects of defensive realism. To begin with,
defensive realists agree that anarchic structure creates the motives to gain more power, however, they
claim that it is irrational to pursue hegemony. 26 This would lead to unreasonably large over-
extension which would be very challenging to preserve. In this regard, they point out that if one side
will become too powerful, balancing will inherently happen. Basically, this means that the opposing
sides will enhance their military capabilities and will create an alliance, which will lead the state that
is seeking domination to the path of destruction or at the very least make it feel far less safe. From
historical perspective, these claims are confirmed, because this is exactly what happened to
Napoleon's France and Hitler's Nazi Germany, both of which were destroyed by an alliances that
contained the major powers of that time. Within this context, the person that unified Germany, Otto
Von Bismarck, can be considered as one of the most rational rulers, because he knew that seeking
too much power for Germany would inherently lead to its neighbors, France and Great Britain from
the West and Russia from the East, creating powerful alliances against Germany. Afterwards, the
irrational pursuit of domination is what ultimately lead to an end of German empire after World War
1.
25
Feng, L., Ruizhuang, Z. The Typologies of Realism. Chinese Journal of International Politics 2006, p. 123
26
14
Defensive realists also assert that there is a constant balance of offence-defense, which shows
how much it is challenging to conquer certain territory and win against the defender in a combat. 27
Basically, this balance shows whether it is worth to attack a certain thing. Furthermore, they argue
that this balance in most cases is in defender's favor. As a result, any state that seeks to gain more
power is likely to find itself being involved in a number of costly and losing wars. In other words,
the costs will outweigh any potential benefits. Since the states are mostly rational actors, they will
identify these drawbacks and will focus instead on the attempts to preserve their status. If the state
will indeed choose to attack, it will do it on a limited scale where there is assurance that the benefits
outweigh the costs. Aside from this, in most other cases, the attack and potential conquest of other
territories are not rational. A potential nationalism of the occupied territories means that the local
population of those occupied territories will constantly rise against the state that occupied them. The
costly French occupation of Spain during Napoleon's rule in the early 19th century is a good example
of this. With these things taken into account, the main point of defensive realism here is that the
conquest does not pay and is not worth the costs it takes to conquer. This, relatively basic aspect of
anarchic structure is obvious to most (if not all) states that act as rational actors. In the opposite case,
the state is putting at risk its own existence. If most of the actors understand this principle, then the
power and security competition among the states should not be overly intense.
As a whole, there are 4 key assumptions that define defensive realism with the first two of
these 4 assumptions pointing out the motives for interstate conflict or cooperation, while the last two
assumptions indicate the connection between external forces and the actual foreign policy conduct of
separate states.28 The first assumption, which is a key part of defensive realism and was already
analyzed in the previous section as a crucial part of neorealism, is the intractability of the security
dilemma.29 This is hardly controllable aspect of the anarchic international system. Basically, this can
be described as a case in which the means by which one state attempts to increase its security, will
lead to a decrease in the security of others.30 Like it was mentioned previously, the anarchic structure
produces uncertainty and the states can‟t be sure regarding the aims of the others and their
capabilities, which changes from time to time. Therefore, anarchy creates the incentives for countries
to participate in self-help conduct.
The second assumption is structural modifiers. Along with the gross distribution of power in
the international relations, other material factors, "the structural modifiers," can increase or decrease
the chances of conflict.31 Structural modifiers include the things which were touched upon in the
27
Ibid, p. 76
28
Taliaferro, W., J. Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited. International security 2000, p. 136
29
Ibid
30
Ibid
31
Ibid, pp. 136-137
15
previous section. These are the offence-defense balance in military capabilities and technology,
geographic proximity, access to raw materials such as oil and gas, international economic pressure or
lack thereof, as well as the ease or difficulty with which the state can extract the resources from the
conquered territory.32 Within this context, the structural modifiers allude to the relative allocation of
power which allows the separate actors to conduct a certain political and military strategies.
Consequently, this influences the seriousness (or lack thereof) of the aforementioned security
dilemma between particular states. For this reason, the structural modifiers can be considered as the
ones that mediate the effects of systemic imperatives, such as economic constraints, on the behavior
of states.
The third assumption is the influence of material capabilities on the state's foreign policy.33
In this regard, it is presumed that in near future the relative allocation of material capabilities is not
entirely certain and state rulers frequently deal with contradicting information. As a result, a
particular role here is played by state leader's pre-existing belief system, perception of enemies, and
the inherent cognitive bias when it comes to the things like intelligence gathering, military
preparations and the decision making process in foreign policy. These things, and especially the state
leader's perceptions, play a pivotal role when it comes to shaping the state's foreign policy and how
the states react to potential conflict and the structural modifiers.
The fourth and final assumption is domestic politics.34 This means that a particular role is also
played by the state's domestic politics. Domestic politics influences how the state's foreign policy is
being formed. In this regard, the role of domestic politics in the state's foreign policy is important
when there is an imminent threat coming from another state. Here, the role of the state‟s decision
makers is crucial. However, in the long term and when there's no imminent threat coming from
another state, the decision makers of the state will face more difficulties in trying to mobilize the
resources of the state for the foreign policy. Therefore, domestic politics play a rather crucial role
only when there's an imminent threat coming from another state, in other cases its role can be
considered as secondary.
Meanwhile, offensive realists have different perspectives on these things. Although they
agree that states tend to balance against those that seek domination, their claim is that balancing is
frequently not effective, particularly when it comes to creating balancing alliances, and this lack of
effectiveness allows the cunning aggressor to use it for his advantage.35 In addition, the states that are
being threatened frequently conduct a practice of shifting the responsibility for balancing the
32
Ibid
33
Ibid, p. 141
34
Ibid, p. 142
35
16
dangerous foe to other states while unwilling to be directly involved in this process. In turn, this
creates the incentives for aggressive moves. In addition to these differences, the offensive realists
also disagree with the view of defensive realists that in most cases the defender will have the edge
over an attacker and therefore the costs of an attack outweighs the benefits. They support this
opposing argument by emphasizing the history, which reveals that those states, which initiated
conflict first, achieves victories more frequently instead of loses. The best example of this is the
United States, which throughout its history starting from the 19th century, has initiated and joined a
number of wars and achieved world hegemony in the process.
Despite these differences, both approaches agree that nuclear weapons have little usefulness
for offensive goals.36 The only case where these weapons would be usable, is when only one side has
them and the other don't. Aside from this, the nuclear weapons are barely fit for use. The reasoning
behind this is obvious- if both sides have an ability to retaliate another with nuclear weapons, which
is known as second strike capability, neither side gains a decisive advantage by striking first. An
example of this would be the Cold War period where both superpowers, the U.S. and Soviet Union,
had an enormous amount of nuclear weapons which deterred both sides from using it against one
another, even though there were tense moments, such as the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.
The offensive realists also emphasize that sometimes the benefits of the conquest outweigh
the costs that it takes to conquer another side.37 By conquering another side, the state can exploit the
conquered state's economy and resources for their own use. Although nationalism of the conquered
territory, as it was pointed out before, can make the occupation a nasty undertaking, the occupied
states, depending on the specific case, can sometimes be easy to govern. An example of this is the
Nazi German occupation of France during the World War 2. Without any significant resistance and
partisan movement, the Germans were able to exploit France's agricultural and industrial resources.
Here, the conquest certainly did pay.
Last but not least, offensive realism claims that the anarchic international system creates the
strong motives for expansion. While all states seek to maximize their power in relation to other
states, only great powers can ensure the survival of the small states.38 Great powers pursue
expansionist policies, but since they are rational actors, they pursue this kind of policy in the places
where, as it was emphasized before, the benefits of the conquest will certainly outweigh the costs of
conquering another side. In this regard, the expansion can be seen as an inherent feature of the
anarchic international system, because in the anarchy, the states are under constant threat of being
36
37
Ibid, pp. 76-77
38
Taliaferro, W., J. Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited. International security 2000, pp. 128-
129
17
attacked by another state. This forces the states to enhance their relative power capabilities through
things like military buildups, economic nationalism, and expansion. In turn, this would lead to states
seeking hegemony, which would ensure that the threat posed by other states is removed or at least
minimized.
The differing viewpoints of defensive and offensive realism supplement each other in a sense
that when one approach has limitations in explaining certain question, the other approach will
provide an extensive answer as to why states pursue one policy or another (such as balancing or
seeking expansion) in the anarchic international system and vice versa. As there is no single
approach that would provide all the answers, it is most useful to use both subdivisions of neorealism
in conjunction with one another, in order to explain various aspects of international relations.
1.3. Neorealism’s Relevance in the 21st Century

In the modern 21st century of international relations, neorealism continues to be highly
relevant. The reason for this is the fact that states with powerful military capabilities continue to be
the main actors, while the inter-state competition continues to prevail. The endless amount of wars,
the constant craving for more power and influence are some of the most important things that
continue to define the 21st century international relations.
While non-state actors, such as the international institutions and corporations, also exist, their
role is secondary to that of the state. A good example of this is the United Nations (UN) and the
World Trade Organization (WTO) institutions. In both of these institutions, the states continue to be
primary actors. In the UN for example, it is the states that make all the key decisions on important
UN resolutions, and not some separate entities or independent institution. The similar case can be
observed in WTO, where all the decisions are made by member state governments. Although these
kind of organizations have departments, such as the secretariat and various councils, they have no
real influence in the decision making process. Furthermore, the resolutions made by the UN are non-
binding, therefore, they have little to no capacity in forcing the states to act based on the decisions
that UN has made. Here, a good example is the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. The U.S. invasion had no
UN mandate, but the UN couldn't do anything stop the invasion. This shows that the states continue
to be primary actors in the international system which continues to be anarchic as there is no greater
authority than the states, especially the great powers such as the United States.
With states continuing to be the primary actors, the international stage remains to be a self-
help arena. The limitations of international institutions are further highlighted by the 1970 Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Nuclear weapons drastically change the balance of power. The NPT
forbids its 190 signatories from developing nuclear weapons, but that's not the case with North Korea
18
(DPRK).39 The treaty didn't stop the DPRK from testing several nuclear weapons, which clearly goes
against the principles of the NPT. Basically, this means that the treaty is only effective to the extent
that the great powers, such as the U.S. and Russia, are willing to support it. Therefore, the limitations
are not only applicable to international organizations, but also for this kind of treaties as well. Hence,
the great powers are continuing to be the central decision-makers.
Since the international system continues to be anarchic and dominated by great powers, the
inter-state power competition remains one of the key aspects of anarchy. In this regard, Southeast
Asia is a good example of inter-state power competition. Here, China is consistently becoming more
and more forceful. Notably, China has made highly controversial maritime claims in the South China
Sea, created numerous artificial islands there while also enhancing its military capabilities. From the
theoretical standpoint, China‟s rise can be best explained by both offensive and defensive realism.
According to offensive realism, China will follow the U.S. path and will seek the status of hegemon
in Asia. 40 Due to China's economic size and its overwhelming superiority in the size of population, a
key goal of China will be to maximize the huge gaps in power between itself and its neighbors in the
east and southeast, such as Russia, Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. By seeking domination,
China would ensure that there is no state in Asia that can pose a threat to it. From Chinese
perspective, these aims would be sensible since China would certainly like to see its two large
neighbors, Russia and Japan, to be militarily weak, similarly as the U.S. prefers a militarily weak
Canada and Mexico on its northern and southern borders respectively. 41 The unpleasant past
experiences during World War 2, when China was weak while Japan was powerful and more
advanced in military and economic areas, which led to the invasion of China's mainland, adds further
incentives for China to seek expansion.
Meanwhile, the defensive realism sees China's rise and the security competition revolving
around it, not as intense as the offensive realism would. From the standpoint of defensive realism,
China should be able to coexist peacefully with its neighbors.42 There are several reasons for that. To
begin with, it is irrational for great power such as China to seek hegemony, because this will lead to
its rivals creating a balancing alliance that will frustrate China's plans for domination. Therefore, it is
far more rational for China to act like Germany under the rule of Otto Von Bismarck- gradually seek
more and more power but not to such an extent that it would lead China's neighbors to create an
alliance against it. In this regard, defensive realism does not deny that China will seek more power in
39
Pearson, M., A. Realism and Politics Among States in the 21st Century. Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism
Studies 2015, p. 6
40
41
Ibid
42
Ibid, p. 84
19
Asia, but the structure of the anarchic system means that it will have a more calculated and limited
aims. 43
This approach is further strengthened by the fact that in the era of nuclear weapons, it is very
challenging for any of the large states to expand their power when being confronted by other powers
that have nuclear weapons. Countries such as Russia and the U.S. have a large amount of nuclear
weapons. Furthermore, the U.S. has a significant amount of troops stationed in Japan, which means
that in case China will aggressively seek domination in East Asia, U.S. can swiftly reinforce its
troops in Japan with nuclear weapons. Due to these reasons, it‟s likely that China will seek to
increase its power with caution and with certain level of restraint. Last but not least, it‟s hardly
rational for China to conquer its Southeast Asian neighbors given the fact that the countries located
there are some of China's largest trading partners and which play an important role in China
economic growth. Furthermore, if China would conquer those countries, there's a high possibility
that China will encounter a strong resistance from the local population which would mean that
occupation certainly does not pay.
Altogether, there is no firm agreement between offensive and defensive realism about
whether China will continue to rise peacefully or not. However, one key point on which both
approaches agree with one another is the fact that the anarchic international system leads to the
competition between large states for more power. Having taken these things into account, it becomes
obvious that anarchy continues to prevail, states with strong military capabilities are still the main
actors in the international system, and they continue to compete with each other for more power.
This basic trend, which is time-tested, most likely will continue to prevail in the near future as well.
43
Ibid
20
2. SOUTH CHINA SEA TERRITORIAL DISPUTES
The territorial disputes in the South China Sea are complex and long-standing. They involve 6
countries- Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Between these countries,
hundreds of small land features, as well as international law, which is disputed, are being contested.
This chapter will analyze key aspects of these disputes, such as historical background, why South
China Sea is so important, legal issues and the position of each claimant.
2.1. Historical Background

Maritime territorial disputes among the aforementioned 6 countries in the South China Sea,
has its roots in the mid-twentieth century but have become more serious in the last several decades.
There‟s various explanation, depending on which side is chosen, as to why this is so. To understand
the present situation, it is important to analyze historical background of these disputes which began
in the middle of the twentieth century and is continuing to the present day.
Basically, the South China Sea territorial disputes started after the end of World War 2 in
Asia, with China being the first state to make claims. In accordance with the 1943 Cairo and 1945
Potsdam Declarations, all the Chinese territory stolen by Japan was to be returned to China.44 In
1946, the Chinese government, led by Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek, dispatched four
warships, named Taiping, Yongxing, Zhongjian and Zhongyeto, to the islands to recover the lost
territories. 45 In the process, China created sovereignty markers and established a permanent military
presence on Taiping Island and on several other objects in the South China Sea. The present and
long-standing China‟s nine-dash line has its roots here. In 1947, China for the first time published a
map with a dotted U-shaped line which originally consisted of eleven dashes. The eleven dashes
transferred virtually the entire South China Sea to China. The eleven dashes were maintained until
1953 when after the change in the Chinese regime, the new Communist China removed two dashes
and transferred them to fellow communist country North Vietnam. Consequently, the original
eleven-dash line became a nine-dash line. Since then, this nine-dash line has remained as China‟s
claim over the existing land features of South China Sea. Although two dashes were removed as a
concession to North Vietnam, the nine-dash line still assigns the majority (around 80%) of the South
China Sea areas to China.
From late 1940‟s and onwards to the present day, many other key events happened in the
South China Sea, which have made the maritime disputes there more complex. After the creation of
44
Shi, X. UNCLOS and China’s Claim in the South China Sea. Australian Defence College 2015, p. 1
45
Ibid
21
North Vietnam and its widespread recognition in the 1950‟s, two countries with different regime
emerged- communist North Vietnam and capitalist South Vietnam, although the latter practically
remained French colony even though it was declared as a sovereign country. From these two
countries, it was the South Vietnam that made formal demands in the South China Sea.
With regards to China, when the Communist China was created in 1949, the new regime
reasserted the claims made by the previous Kuomintang government, while Taiwan, were
Kuomintang and its leader Chiang Kai-shek were located at, in 1956 claimed Taiping Island in the
Spratly Islands and stationed permanent troops there.46
The next important event to motivate new claims started in 1967, when a global initiative
began to discuss how countries should handle the continental shelves beyond their national
jurisdictions. 47 This negotiation process ended in 1982 and brought promising results- it ended with
the signature of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereafter UNCLOS). This
agreement was important for the evolution of the South China Sea maritime disputes. The reason for
this is the fact that in UNCLOS, suggestions such as the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the
possibilities of enlarging the continental shelves to the same extend as the EEZs gained a lot of
support from the countries located in the South China Sea. The latter aspect, in combination with the
discovery of large oil and natural gas deposits in the South China Sea, further accelerated the
disputes in the South China Sea over its land features. In this regard, the first of many claims was
made in 1970, when the Philippines claimed the western part of the Spratly Islands by occupying 5
land features there.48 Consequently, the claims of the Philippines were extended to include many
more land features. The Philippines were followed up by South Vietnam which occupied 6 land
features and claimed the Spratly Islands as part of Vietnam in 1974, while China took control of the
Crescent Group of the Paracel Islands from Vietnam. 49 In 1983, Malaysia also joined the disputes by
occupying 3 features in the Spratly Islands and 2 more in 1986.50 Brunei followed up- it claims
Louisa Reef for itself. In these regards, it should be emphasized that from China's standpoint, no
dispute existed over Chinese sovereignty and maritime rights in the South China Sea until the 1970's,
when Southeast Asian countries became eventually aware of potentially vast reserves of natural gas
and oil in this area. 51 Until 1970's no country formally protested China's nine-dash line.
46
Rustandi, A., C. The South China Sea Dispute: Opportunities for ASEAN to Enhance its Policies in Order to Achieve
Resolution. Australian Defence College 2016, p. 3
47
Poonsiri, P. The Territorial Dispute Over the South China Sea. University of Erfurt 2017, pp. 8-9
48
49
Ibid
50
Ibid
51
Zhang, F. Chinese Thinking on the South China Sea and the Future of Regional Security. Political Science Quarterly
2017, p. 437
22
From late 1980‟s to the present day, China, of all claimants, has been the most active in
asserting its claims with force. In 1988, China launched an assault against Vietnamese troops on
Johnson South Reef, while in the 1990‟s, China had also involved itself in a maritime dispute with
the Philippines when China‟s troops occupied the Philippines-claimed Mischief Reef and built
military installations on it in 1994. 52. This was further exacerbated when both sides became engaged
in the contest for control of Scarborough Shoal in 1997- the ultimate outcome of this competition
ended in 2012, when China effectively occupied Scarborough Shoal by deploying maritime law
enforcement vessels there on a permanent basis. 53
In addition to these things, China is the only claimant that has undertaken land reclamation
activities not only on the existing islands, but also on reefs. 54 In this way, China is creating artificial
islands, the constructions of which are not legal according to UNCLOS and this understandably
creates legal issues. Given the fact that these disputes have become stuck for several decades now,
the current Chinese policy of creating artificial islands further aggravated the attempts to legally
settle the disputes.
The incidents in the South China Sea, such as the aforementioned China‟s assault on Johnson
South Reef in 1988, and China‟s occupation and militarization of Mischief Reef in 1994, caused the
loss of life. 55 In the wake of the Mischief Reef skirmishes, mistrust had risen in the countries of
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) over Chinese behavior and intentions. China‟s
diplomacy, led by its Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, sought to reduce the tensions. The eventual
result was that China and the ASEAN member states managed to sign a regional nonbinding
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in November 2002- this declaration
called all the claimants for voluntary restraint on activities that would cause tensions and for
consultation and negotiation, instead of using force to resolve disputes.56 This agreement is a key
stepping stone towards future attempts to solve the disputes among the claimants peacefully.
However, it should be pointed out that the Philippines and Vietnam were not entirely pleased with
the outcome as both sides had pushed for a binding document.57 In this regard, Vietnamese side
requested that the declaration would include a commitment not to build new structures, which was
understandably rejected by China.
In the midst of the clashes in the South China Sea, ASEAN made an effort to create a
favorable environment for peaceful resolution of the disputes by adopting the 1992 ASEAN
52
53
Ibid
54
Ibid
55
Bader, J., Lieberthal, K., McDevitt, M. Keeping the South China Sea in Perspective. Brookings 2014, p. 4
56
Ibid
57
Emmers, R. Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea: Strategic and Diplomatic Status Quo. Institute of Defence and
Strategic Studies (IDSS) 2005, p. 12
23
Declaration on the South China Sea which encouraged all parties to exercise self-restraint.58 Here, a
key role was played by Indonesia which maintains neutrality in the disputes. In 1990, Indonesia
promoted a dispute resolution process between all the claimants by launching an informal diplomacy
initiative through a series of workshops which involved the academics and government officials of
all the claimant countries. 59 From 1990 to 2009, Indonesia had organized 19 workshops which
involved the representatives of both, ASEAN claimants and China.
While the 1992 declaration and numerous workshops were certainly important in making
progress towards settling the disputes peacefully, they have one key drawback. That drawback lies in
the fact that these things merely serve as a tool for informal exchange rather than serving as a formal
mechanism on dispute settlement that legally binds all the claimants and which also involves step by
step approach on how to solve the issues. For this reason, the only present confidence-building
mechanism for the dispute is the aforementioned Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea, signed by the ASEAN claimants and China in 2002.60
Although the 2002 declaration was being negotiated from the late 1990‟s and signed in 2002,
this period once again saw a rise in tension. These tensions were highlighted by numerous detentions
of fishing vessel crews by all of the claimants, by protests of attempts to drill for oil and gas, and
increased number of patrols by China‟s Navy and its coast guard.61 Although the promises set out in
the declaration of conduct for peaceful negotiations to settle the disputes failed to materialize, the
direct military confrontation was avoided. 62 Nonetheless, this period was also highlighted by serious
confrontations between the U.S. and China over U.S. Navy reconnaissance activities well outside of
China‟s territorial waters but within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). 63 These things will be
examined in the third chapter.
The constantly renewing skirmishes make it obvious that legally binding agreement on the
code of conduct and dispute settlement is a must if the claimants are interested in making any
progress towards the peaceful resolution of the disputes. The fact that the 1992 and 2002 declarations
are non-binding, serves as a major reason that thwarts any real attempt to settle the disputes with
legal methods. The only accomplishment, if any at all, that these declarations have made is that a
large-scale military confrontation between the claimants has been avoided with only minor local
skirmishes happening from time to time.
58
59
Ibid
60
Ibid, p. 4
61
62
Ibid
63
Ibid
24
Looking from the historical background, it is obvious that territorial disputes between the
claimants have become “stuck” with no significant progress being made towards legally binding
agreement on this issue. Therefore, the tension and security risks in the South China Sea continues to
be present. Table 1 below shows the timeline of key events in the South China Sea territorial
disputes.
Table 1- timeline of key recent events in the South China Sea.
YEAR (MONTH) COUNTRIES INVOLVED EVENT

1974 China, South Vietnam Battle of Paracel Islands:
China ousts South Vietnam
from the Crescent Group; 18
soldiers die on each side.
1988 China, Vietnam Johnson South Reef
Skirmish: China defeats
Vietnam‟s navy, 74
Vietnamese sailors die.
1994 China, Philippines China occupies Mischief
Reef and erects buildings on
it, despite the protests by the
Philippines.
1999 Philippines, China The Philippines runs the BRP
Sierra Madre aground on the
Second Thomas Shoal,
protests from China.
2001 China, United States Hainan Island incident: mid-
air collision between a U.S.
intelligence aircraft and a
Chinese fighter jet; one
Chinese pilot dies.
2002 ASEAN, China Agreement on the Code of
Conduct (COC) within the
Declaration on the Conduct
of Parties in the South China
Sea.
2010 United States At the ASEAN Regional
Forum, U.S. Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton declares
that the U.S. has a national
interest in the South China
Sea.
2011 (February) China, Philippines Chinese frigate fires warning
shots at a Philippine fishing
boat near Jackson Atoll.
2011 (May) China, Vietnam Clash between Vietnamese
gas survey ship and 3
Chinese patrol vessels.
Large-scale anti-China
protests in Vietnam.
25
2012 China, Philippines Scarborough Shoal standoff:
Philippine warship vs. 2
Chinese surveillance vessels.
2013 Philippines, China The Philippines submits its
case versus China over
competing South China Sea
claims to the International
Tribunal on the Law of the
Sea (ITLOS).
2015 China, United States U.S. destroyer USS Lassen
sails close to Chinese-held
Subi Reef.
Source: Van Ham, P., Montesano, S., F., Van der Putten, P., F. A South China Sea Conflict: Implications for European
Security: A Scenario Study. Clingendael Institute 2016, p. 7.
2.2. Importance of the Region
The South China Sea region is a semi-enclosed sea which encompasses an area of
approximately three and a half million square kilometers.64 The area is economically and
strategically crucial for all the countries involved in the disputes. Due to the number of claimants, the
scope and complexity of the claims, and the wide range of interests involved, the South China Sea
can be considered as a centerpiece of both land and maritime territorial disputes in the 21 st century.
This section examines why the region of South China Sea is so important for the claimants.
For the nations that have an access to it, the South China Sea is the number one food source,
totaling around 10% of the world's total commercial fishing output.65 The South China Sea is
responsible for feeding several of the most populated nations today, starting from over 190 million
people in Pakistan and ending with over 1.3 billion citizens of China.66 Furthermore, the South China
Sea is home to the single largest marine biodiversity, 40% of the world's tuna, and accounts for 22%
of the average Asian diet.
In terms of resources, South China Sea is one of the most crucial areas in the world. As it was
mentioned, the South China Sea amounts for around 10% of the world's annual total commercial
fishing output, making it very important to the fishing industries of the surrounding countries. In this
regard, the area is one of the world‟s five leading fishing zones- the fishery alone employs over 3
million people, contributes heavily to the global fish trade, as well as being a key source of protein to
64
Criekemans, D. Towards a solution for the increasing tensions in the South China Sea? University of Antwerp 2017, p.
3
65
Khoury, E. Recent Trends In The South China Sea Disputes. The French Institute for International and Strategic
Affairs (IRIS) 2017, p. 2
66
Ibid, p. 2
26
millions of people living in the littoral countries that rely on it.67 Although the area is crucial to the
East and Southeast Asian people, it is also negatively affected by overfishing, resource exploitation
and land reclamation, which are the product of the activities that littoral states have undertaken there.
For these reasons, 40% of the South China Sea's fish stocks have disappeared, while 70% of the coral
reefs are classified as being in “fair to poor” conditions, primarily due to the reclamation works and
dredging activities carried out by China and ASEAN claimants.68
Aside from fishery, the region as a whole is also rich in both oil and gas. According to the
United States Air Force officer Captain Adam Greer, the stakes in the South China Sea can be
grouped into three “P”s- “politics, petroleum, and proteins (fish).”69 Furthermore, Greer argues that
fishery “may be most consequential in driving competition” in the South China Sea.70 Meanwhile,
the (potential) oil discoveries in the region are vast. Estimates of oil reserves vary from as high as
213 billion barrels (bbl) to as low as 28 billion bbl. 71 However, oil comprises only 30-40% of the
total hydrocarbon estimates of the South China Sea. The natural gas reserves comprise the majority
of the total hydrocarbon estimates of the South China Sea. Most of the natural gas and oil are located
in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. Due to overlapping claims and legal disputes in these areas, the
possibilities of conducting an in-depth exploration and analysis to make accurate estimates regarding
the natural gas and oil reserves remain limited. Whatever the precise numbers are, the oil and natural
gas reserves in the South China Sea has attracted many international companies to this area- at
present, over 200 companies are actively engaged in oil and gas exploitation in the South China
Sea.72 For example, Indian and Spanish companies have worked with Vietnam since 2016 for gas
and oil exploration in the South China Sea, meanwhile the Philippines, being a U.S. ally, was
working in 2012 with U.S.-based oilfield products company "Forum Energy Technologies" (FET) to
explore the same things, while British-Dutch oil and gas company "Royal Dutch Shell" has been
working extensively with Malaysia.73
As a result, there is no accurate estimate about the potential reserves of natural gas in the
South China Sea. China estimates that the Spratly Islands alone contain 900 trillion cubic feet (Tcf)
67
9
68
Khoury, E. Recent Trends In The South China Sea Disputes. The French Institute for International and Strategic
Affairs (IRIS) 2017, p. 2
69
Adam Greer, “The South China Sea Is Really a Fishery Dispute,” The Diplomat, July 20, 2016.
70
Ibid
71
10
72
Morton, K. China’s ambition in the South China Sea: is a legitimate maritime order possible? International Affairs
2016, p. 915
73
"Foreign Countries Chase Oil in South China Sea Without Incident," Voice of America, February 26, 2018.
27
of natural gas.74 If the estimate is accurate, this would mean that the natural gas reserves in the
Spratly Islands would be equivalent to China‟s current reserves, which currently rank 11th in volume
and nearly three times that of the U.S. In addition, the shipments of natural gas through the sea-lanes
of the South China Sea constitute two-thirds of the world‟s overall natural gas trade, with more and
more countries in the region transitioning to natural gas since it entails less CO2 emissions. 75 In
addition to this, gas hydrates, also known as flammable ice, are considered as a key source of future
energy, and China has initiated offshore survey for this resource.76 Inside these gas hydrates there are
molecules of methane which is the most crucial element of natural gas- if brought to the surface, one
cubic meter of gas hydrate releases an astounding 164 cubic meters of natural gas, which potentially
makes gas hydrates as an invaluable part of future energy resources. 77 So far, China is the most
active in exploring and drilling the areas that are potentially rich in gas hydrates.
In addition to being rich in natural gas and oil, the South China Sea is also the world‟s busiest
international sea-lane, with over 50% of the world‟s merchant fleet (by tonnage) sailing through the
South China Sea annually. 78 Furthermore, over half of the world‟s oil tanker traffic passes through
the sea-lanes of the South China Sea, and over half of the top 10 container shipping ports in the
world are located inside or around the South China Sea. 79 For the energy-importing countries of East
Asia, such as Japan and the Republic of Korea, the South China Sea is the shortest, cheapest, and
therefore main maritime route for vital energy imports and commodity exports.80 The importance of
the South China Sea is further highlighted by China‟s example. Almost 80% of China‟s crude oil
imports arrive through the South China Sea. 81 In a way, this figure alone can explain why China‟s
claims in the South China Sea are so ambitious- it seeks to protect its imports of oil and natural gas
from any potential adversary.
Any potential major disruption of these commercial lanes would have an extensive regional
and global effect. Regionally, citizens and businesses of the affected littoral states could face
dramatic increase in energy prices, driving up costs for practically all sectors of their economy. 82
Globally, this could lead to an extremely costly supply line restructuring for the aforementioned
consumers in East Asia. Such restructuring, coupled with the huge rise in transaction costs attached
74
10
75
Ibid, pp. 10-11
76
"China Searches for More Gas Hydrates in South China Sea," The Maritime Executive, February 21, 2018.
77
Ibid
78
Rosenberg, D. Governing the South China Sea: From Freedom of the Seas to Ocean Enclosure Movements.
Middlebury College 2011, p. 7
79
Ibid
80
Ibid
81
15
82
Ibid
28
to energy commerce, would drive world prices rapidly upwards. Therefore, the control of the sea-
lanes is of crucial importance for all the claimants. Furthermore, by controlling those sea-lanes, one
of the claimants, such as China, can exert a tremendous influence on the regional states and major
international companies.
The fact that South China Sea is the world‟s busiest international sea-lane, also means that
pirate attacks on merchant shipping are frequent. More than a half of the world‟s reports of piracy in
the last two decades have taken place in or around the South China Sea.83 Due to frequent pirate
attacks and September 11 terrorist attacks, there‟s been an increased international security of ports
and shipping containers. In addition, the countries of the South China Sea have other security issues
as well, such as the constant skirmishes between fishing vessels that compete for fish stocks, drug
trafficking, refugees etc.84
Due to numerous security issues in the South China Sea, the countries located there are
constantly enhancing their military capabilities, modernizing naval and coast guard forces. What is
more, the long-standing and overlapping maritime claims in the South China Sea further exacerbates
the situation and relations between the countries- China‟s military capabilities are constantly growing
and in response to this, the Southeast Asian claimants are seeking U.S. military support to oppose the
potential threat of China. With stakes being high in the South China Sea and claimants enhancing
their military capabilities, the chances of reducing the tensions are limited. Therefore, the tense
environment in the South China Sea will continue to prevail.
2.3. Legal Disputes
When it comes to the South China Sea territorial disputes, one of the key aspects and biggest
issues is the legal status of the maritime features in the South China Sea and the international legal
issues raised by the dispute. That is, which country claims which islands and based on what
principles or legal rationale? This section will outline and examine key legal issues in the South
China Sea territorial disputes.
International law is always cited in connection with claims in the South China Sea. However,
it raises many key issues which makes the territorial disputes in the South China Sea even more
problematic. The main international legal issues raised by the dispute are the following: 85
1. Sovereignty;
2. Maritime zones;
83
Rosenberg, D. Governing the South China Sea: From Freedom of the Seas to Ocean Enclosure Movements.
Middlebury College 2011, p. 7
84
Ibid
85
Lunn, J., Lang, A. The South China Sea dispute: July 2016 update. House of Commons Library 2016, p. 19
29
3. Definition of territories;
4. Historical sovereignty claims;
5. Freedom of navigation;
6. Extended continental shelf claims.
One of the most important issues in the South China Sea is sovereignty- which country owns
which islands? A major reason why this issue is so important is the fact that islands generate
sovereignty over the surrounding sea, which is, as it was already mentioned, a crucial fishing zone.
In addition, the islands generate sovereignty over the seabed rights and rights to other, more distant,
areas as well. Sovereignty is determined by a variety of means under customary international law.
For instance, discovery on its own is not enough- there must also be effective occupation (though
what counts as „effective‟ will vary according to the circumstances). In this regard, China‟s claims in
the South China Sea and the area inside the „nine-dash line‟ is highly controversial since it largely
relies on historical claims, but with little evidence of exactly what those claims cover.
Another key legal issue is maritime zones. Basically, this means that, depending on how an
area of sea is classified under international law, different rights arise for coastal states and foreign
vessels respectively. 86 As it was outlined in the previous section, fishing and seabed oil and gas
rights are the most important of these rights in the South China Sea. The international law of the sea
is now largely embodied in the previously mentioned 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS). The UNCLOS includes all the claimants in the South China Sea with the
exception of Taiwan. UNCLOS covers a number of issues with regards to the world‟s seas, including
the rights over the sea-bed, fishery, freedom of navigation and shipping. 87 Even though UNCLOS
covers these issues, the multilateral nature of overlapping claims in the South China Sea adds to the
complexity- due to the fact that it is a semi-enclosed sea, the maritime zones of the neighboring
countries inevitably have areas that overlap each other.88 What further exacerbates the situation is
that all the claimants in this South China Sea claim 200 nautical mile EEZ‟s and up to 350 nautical
mile continental shelves.89 In this regard, China is not willing to resolve such disputes with the
principles outlined in the UNCLOS. Therefore, the maritime zones will continue to remain a
contentious issue in the South China Sea disputes.
The third major issue in the South China Sea disputes is how to define territories located
there. This means whether each land feature, located there, should be considered as an island or a
rock. UNCLOS article 121 defines island as a “naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water,
86
Ibid, p. 20
87
Ibid
88
Recent Trends In the South China Sea Disputes. Boston Global Forum 2015, p. 3
89
Ibid
30
which is above water at high tide.”90 The article also points out that only this kind of island can
generate EEZ, the contiguous zone, the continental shelf and territorial sea. The same article also
states that if land features that “cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall
have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf” and be considered as “rocks”. 91 In this regard,
China has the most “rocks” in the South China Sea because it‟s artificially build islands are not
naturally formed. Therefore, under UNCLOS, China cannot have EEZ or continental shelf there.
Since China is yet to specify the principles based on which it has “historic rights” in the South China
Sea, the issue of defining the territories in the South China Sea further exacerbates the disputes.
The fourth issue is historical sovereignty claims. These kinds of claims in the UNCLOS are
generally not accepted. However, UNCLOS article 15 makes one noticeable exception. The article
states that “Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two
States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond
the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured. The above provision
does not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special
circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance
therewith.”92 Aside from this statement, there‟s no more mentioning in the UNCLOS of using
historic rights as a basis for maritime claims. Seeing as China is the only country which bases its
claims primarily on historic rights, means that either serious amendments in the UNCLOS will have
to be done or China will have to change its “historic rights” approach if the claimants will want to
settle the disputes legally and peacefully. In China‟s case, it‟s highly unlikely that historic rights
approach will change.
Freedom of navigation is the fifth issue. According to UNCLOS article 87, the freedom of
navigation shall be exercised by all states which include both coastal and land-locked states.93
However, in order to assert their sovereignty over the disputed areas, claimants in the South China
Sea have been carrying out a number of activities that violate the navigational rights of others. 94 In
this regard, the claimants have occupied maritime features, built fortifications and other structures on
them. For instance, Malaysia built military structures on Investigator Shoal and on Erica Reef in the
Spratly archipelagos, while Vietnam further upgraded its structures on Cornwallis South Reef and
90
United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea, Article 121.
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part8.htm
91
Ibid
92
93
94
Recent Trends In the South China Sea Disputes. Boston Global Forum 2015, pp. 6-7
31
Alison Reef in the middle of the Spratly area. 95 Meanwhile China was creating artificial islands from
the reefs in the neighboring disputed areas by dredging up millions of tons of rock and sand on the
sea floor while also building a sea wall. 96 Furthermore, China unilaterally launched a prohibition on
fishing in the disputed area challenging the jurisdiction of other neighboring countries.
Within this context, the Philippines brought the dispute concerning freedom of navigation
between it and China to an annex VII arbitral tribunal. 97 In 2013 the Philippines brought 15 claims
against China at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. 98 Understandably, China
immediately announced its strong opposition to the Philippines action and denounced the ruling of
Arbitral Tribunal that it had jurisdiction to consider the claim of the Philippines in its maritime
dispute with China. Although the arbitration tribunal ruled in favor of the Philippines, pointing out
that China has no historical rights in the South China Sea, the tribunal still has no real influence in
solving the disputes in the South China Sea. In this regard, China was factually right that the tribunal
has no real jurisdiction to make decisions on the issues of maritime claims in the South China Sea.
Similarly as the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, the rulings of the
Arbitral Tribunal have no binding force. Therefore, the dispute resolution process in the South China
Sea continues to be very problematic. However, it should be pointed out that the Tribunal's ruling
was the first time when either International Court or Tribunal has extensively and straightforwardly
addressed the status of South China Sea islands under the UNCLOS. 99 The Tribunal's attempt to
clarify the status of maritime features in the South China Sea is an important step towards further
development in the field of the law of the sea.
Last but not least, the extended continental shelf claims is another contentious legal issue
when it comes to the South China Sea. According to UNCLOS article 76, coastal states can claim an
extended continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from its baselines. 100 In 2012, the United
Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) verified the outer limits of these
claims which were set out in UNCLOS article 76, and also provided technical advice to states if
requested.101 However, the CLCS has a major drawback- it does not solve the territorial disputes
between the countries, because in case of a dispute, the CLCS will not consider a submission unless
an earlier approval is given by all states concerned.102 A good example of this was in 2009, when
Malaysia and Vietnam filed submissions with the CLCS for areas of extended continental shelf
95
Ibid, p. 7
96
Ibid
97
Ibid, pp. 7-8
98
Gewirtz, P. Limits of Law in the South China Sea. Center for East Asia Policy Studies- Brookings Institution 2016, p. 2
99
Schofield, C. Legal and Geographical Implications of the South China Sea Arbitration. National Library of Australia
2016, p. 12
100
101
Lunn, J., Lang, A. The South China Sea dispute: July 2016 update. House of Commons Library 2016, p. 23
102
Ibid
32
beyond 200 nautical miles in the South China Sea. 103 Since these submissions included the maritime
areas claimed by China, the Chinese side submitted Notes Verbale to the UN Secretary-General
objecting to the submissions.104 Similarly as the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea and the aforementioned rulings of the Arbitral Tribunal, the CLCS cannot resolve
sovereignty disputes, therefore these submissions does not hold much practical weight.
As of now, there‟s little prospect for meaningful negotiations and legally-binding resolution
to the dispute. As the experience of the last several decades have shown, a legally binding Code of
Conduct is impossible to establish, at least in the near future.
2.4. Claimants
The South China Sea territorial disputes involve 6 claimants- Brunei, China, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam- that compete for hundreds of small land features. To clarify the
context and ambiguity of claims, this section will address each claimant and what are their main
claims on the South China Sea territorial disputes.
All the claimants in the South China Sea have rather ambitious claims, but the most
ambitious and ambiguous position comes from China. 105 Without China and its defined position, the
possibility of peacefully resolving the claims is not possible. China‟s claim to unspecified historical
rights within the nine-dash line (NDL), which assigns the majority of the South China Sea to China,
is making the territorial disputes very complicated in the South China Sea. China is yet to clarify its
rights that it claims within NDL. Furthermore, China‟s activities insinuates that it enjoys the rights to
resources anywhere within the NDL- For example, the Hainan Provincial Government‟s
“Implementation Methods” for the China‟s Fisheries Law followed the NDL. 106 Chinese side says
that China enjoys “historic rights” to resources within the NDL, while privately, they also say that
the NDL only outlines the territories within which China claims all of the maritime land features,
with associated maritime rights to be determined by applying UNCLOS rules to those land
features.107 With one exception outlined in the previous section, the UNCLOS doesn‟t allow claims
to maritime territories of the kind that China‟s ambitious NDL suggest.108 In 2014, China also
released a new map that included an additional 10th dash to the east of Taiwan. 109 Because it
103
Ibid, p. 24
104
Ibid
105
Poling, B., G. The South China Sea in Focus: Clarifying the Limits of Maritime Dispute. Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) 2013, p. 2
106
107
Ibid
108
Ibid
109
Criekemans, D. Towards a solution for the increasing tensions in the South China Sea? University of Antwerp 2017,
p. 16
33
predates UNCLOS by several decades, the Nine-Dash Line is unrelated to an EEZ claim. China's
NDL encompasses approximately 2,000,000 square kilometers of maritime space, an area equal to
about 22 percent of China‟s land area.110 The NDL includes three groups of land features within the
South China Sea which are the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, and the Scarborough Reef. 111
Notably, a serious clash occurred between China and the Philippines at the Scarborough Shoal in
2012, when Philippine Navy tried to arrest Chinese fishing boats that were caught doing illegal
fishing activities there, with the area being located inside the EEZ of the Philippines. 112 China's coast
guards intervened to stop the arrests, and this resulted in a lengthy standoff, with the Philippines
eventually leaving the Shoal while China occupied the area and strengthened its military installations
there.113 With regards to the South China Sea, Taiwan shares the same claims as China. The U-
shaped line, which encloses the majority of the South China Sea, appears on Taiwanese maps as
well.
Meanwhile, the Philippines maintained the lines established by the 1898 Treaty of Paris and
initially regarded them as if they were a claim to territorial waters.114 But since this kind of claim
was possible only within 12 nautical miles of a country‟s shores, the position was changed later on-
in 2009, the Philippines passed a landmark baselines law in 2009, which was an important step
towards clarifying Philippine claims. 115 The law declared that the Philippines claims a 12-nautical-
mile territorial sea and an EEZ of up to 200 nautical miles from straight territorial baselines between
coordinates enumerated in the law. 116 Here, it should be pointed out that the Philippines‟ baselines
law has not generated accusations of illegality like Vietnamese and Chinese side has. This law made
the maritime claims of the Philippines more clear. With China however, the tensions have risen in
the recent years over the control of potentially large oil and natural gas reserves. Here, a key area of
disputes is the Reed Bank area, a rocky shoal about 93 miles east of the Spratly Islands and 155
miles west of the Philippine island of Palawan. 117 The Philippines claim that Reed Bank is within its
200-nautical-mile EEZ, whereas the Chinese side views it as a part of the Spratly Islands group. 118
110
Limits in the Seas, No. 143 China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea. United States Department of State,
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs 2014, p. 4
111
Ibid
112
Forsby, B., A. The South China Sea - a Breeding Ground for Geopolitical Rivalry? Danish Institute for International
Studies (DIIS) 2016, p. 37
113
Ibid
114
115
Ibid
116
Ibid
117
Muscolino, S., M. Past and Present Resource Disputes in the South China Sea: The Case of Reed Bank.
CrossCurrents 2013, p. 82
118
Ibid
34
With no real progress being made here to settle the disputes, the tensions between both countries will
continue to be present.
Aside from China, Vietnam‟s claims are the most ambitious of the Southeast Asian
claimants, with claims going almost as far as the shores of the Philippines. From the late 1980's to
1990's, Vietnam has increased its possessions in the Spratly Islands from 10 to 21 land features by
setting up permanent military bases, equipment and facilities. 119 However, Vietnam has taken
numerous steps over the last 15 years to clarify its claims in accordance with UNCLOS. It started in
2003, when Vietnam signed an agreement with Indonesia delimiting the continental shelf and EEZ
boundaries between the southern portion of Vietnam and the Tudjuh Archipelago.120 Afterwards,
Vietnam signed the treaty with China which delimited their boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin.
Another key event in clarifying the claims, which was already mentioned in the previous section,
was Vietnam‟s submission of claims for continental shelf made to the CLCS in 2009. 121 In doing so,
Vietnam has specified its claims and no longer makes the vast claims as it previously did. This was
also reaffirmed by Vietnam‟s 2012 Law of the Sea, which stated that Vietnam claims an EEZ of 200
nautical miles and a continental shelf of up to 350 nautical miles from its baselines. 122
Malaysia is another important claimant in the South China Sea. A crucial goal of Malaysia is
to preserve its claims there. Malaysia claims 11 maritime features in the Spratly Islands and occupies
8 of them, with the other 3 being occupied by Vietnam and the Philippines.123 Unlike other ASEAN
claimants, Malaysia has been much less affected by China‟s assertiveness, largely due to the fact that
its claims lie in the southernmost part of China‟s NDL.124 As a result, it is easier to clarify Malaysia‟s
claims. Malaysia has delimited the majority of its maritime boundary with Indonesia‟s Tudjuh
Archipelago as well as with the Philippines. 125 However, there hasn‟t been much progress in
delimiting the boundary between Vietnam‟s continental shelf and that of mainland Malaysia to the
west of its boundaries with the Tudjuh Archipelago- the claim that Malaysia has made on that section
of continental shelf in 1979 still stands, but given the fact that this claim is halfway between
Vietnam‟s baselines and the Malaysian coast, it should not be difficult for both sides to reach a
resolution on this question..126 However, the only features that actually generate maritime zones, are
119
Vuving, L. A. Vietnam, the United States, and Japan in the South China Sea. Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
2014, pp. 3-4
120
121
Ibid
122
Ibid
123
Parameswaran, P. Playing It Safe: Malaysia’s Approach to the South China Sea and Implications for the United
States. Center for a New American Security (CNAS) 2015, p. 4
124
Ibid, p. 5
125
126
Ibid
35
the following islands, atolls and reefs- Swallow Reef, Amboyna Cay, Barque Canada Reef, and
Commodore Reef. 127 These areas are entitled to have a territorial sea, EEZ, and continental shelf,
while other areas, claimed by Malaysia, cannot generate maritime zones.
Brunei‟s claim is the only one with a claim to legality in the South China Sea. It is based on
128
three things. First of all, it is based on Brunei‟s maritime boundaries with Malaysia, as defined in
two British Orders in Council in 1958, secondly, the extension of that boundary as an EEZ out to 200
nautical miles, as declared in 1982 and accepted by Malaysia in 2009.129 Thirdly, the extension of
those boundaries for an extended continental shelf, approximately 60 nautical miles farther, is based
on the official 1988 map.130 That being said, the status of the boundaries between Malaysia‟s and
Brunei‟s continental shelf claims is ambiguous.131 In this regard, both sides have agreed that Brunei
is entitled to a 200-nautical-mile EEZ, but Malaysia has never actually recognized Brunei‟s claims
that Brunei is also entitled to an extension of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles-
Malaysia‟s submission of claims for continental shelf made to the CLCS in 2009 shows an unbroken
line, implicitly denying Brunei‟s right to extend its shelf to the same distance.132 Although this aspect
of maritime claims continues to be an issue between the two countries, this problem is still not that
serious that it would lead to conflict escalation, as was the case with China and the Philippines.
Although in recent years most claimants were able to make their claims in the South China
Sea more clarified in accordance with UNCLOS, the ambiguities and overlapping claims to the
waters, small land features and economic areas continues to be present. This is further exacerbated
by the legal issues of these disputes, which were examined in the previous section. Nonetheless,
recent positive developments in clarifying the claims (except China) show that the claimants are
going on the right path, towards reaching moral and legal high ground.
127
Roach, A., J. Malaysia and Brunei: An Analysis of their Claims in the South China Sea. Center for Naval Analyses
2014, p. 15
128
International Studies (CSIS) 2013, pp. 7-8
129
Ibid
130
Ibid, p. 8
131
Ibid
132
Ibid, pp. 8-9
36
3. U.S. APPROACH TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES
The United States has a long history of engagement with East and Southeast Asia, where
South China Sea is located at. It can be traced back to 1898 Spanish-American war, during which the
United States acquired the rights to the ownership of the Philippines from Spain. The subsequent 20th
century events, such as World War 2, the Korean and Vietnam wars, are one of many examples
which shaped U.S. engagement with this region. The South China Sea, with its crucial sea lanes for
U.S. Navy, its Asia-Pacific allies, for maritime trade etc., plays a crucial role in U.S. strategic
considerations. Therefore, the U.S. is highly interested in solving the South China Sea territorial
disputes. This chapter will analyze U.S. participation as a non-claimant in attempts to manage and
solve these disputes.
3.1. Evolution of U.S. Participation in the Disputes
Ever since the beginning of the Cold War and especially during the Vietnam war, the U.S.
involvement in the military, political and economic matters of the South China Sea gradually
increased. However, the U.S. made a more institutionalized approach towards these matters after the
end of Cold War and especially in the 21 st century, coinciding not by accident with the rising
tensions in the region. This section will outline and analyze key aspects in the evolution of U.S.
approach towards the South China Sea territorial disputes from the end of the Cold War to the
present day.
By analyzing the U.S. approach towards the East and Southeast Asian matters in the 1990‟s
and 2000‟s, inconsistency and lack of institutionalized approach stands out. The period of U.S.
presidential administration of Bill Clinton in the 1990‟s was highlighted by the fact that
administration favored bilateral treaties and alliances as the basis for maintaining the U.S. influence
in the Southeast Asia while containing any potential adversaries. This kind of approach in U.S.
foreign policy is no surprising as U.S. gets far more leverage and benefit in bilateral negotiations
rather than multilateral. Bilateral defense treaties, such as the ones with the Philippines and Thailand,
remained the basis of U.S. engagement in the matters of Southeast Asia. A coherent set of principles,
based on which the U.S. would approach the South China Sea maritime disputes and the region as a
whole, were absent.
Once George W. Bush became the new U.S. president, the United States participation in the
Southeast Asian matters increased. However, by analyzing the context, it became understandable that
37
greater U.S. involvement was primarily based on the anti-terrorism campaign which dominated U.S.
agenda due to 9/11 terrorist attacks. Nonetheless, the traditional U.S. alliances with countries such as
the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore where strengthened while closer military cooperation were
promoted with Indonesia and former Cold War nemesis Vietnam. As a result, the U.S. helped the
aforementioned maritime nations to increase the security of maritime trade routes, which does not go
well with China and its “nine-dash line” approach towards the maritime disputes in the South China
Sea.
While U.S. approach towards the East and Southeast Asia in the first two decades after the
Cold War is highlighted by inconsistency and lack of coherent principles, the U.S. approach towards
South China Sea maritime disputes is far more consistent and clear. The first time that the United
States has taken an official stance on the South China Sea maritime disputes was in 1995 when
China occupied Mischief Reef and erected building on it, despite the protests from the Philippines. In
reaction to China‟s activities there, the U.S. Department of State issued its first comprehensive
policy statement through its spokesman on May 10, 1995. From that statement, key aspects of U.S.
stance on the South China Sea disputes can be outlined.
First of all, the U.S. is seeking a peaceful resolution of maritime disputes. In that briefing, the
spokesman of U.S. Department of State said that “the United States is concerned that a pattern of
unilateral actions and reactions in the South China Sea has increased tensions in that region. The
United States strongly opposes the use or threat of force to resolve competing claims and urges all
claimants to exercise restraint and to avoid destabilizing actions.”133
Secondly, the U.S. seeks peace and stability in the South China Sea. “The United States has
an abiding interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea. The United
States calls upon claimants to intensify diplomatic efforts which address issues related to the
competing claims, taking into account the interests of all parties, and which contribute to peace and
prosperity in the region. The United States is willing assist in any way that the claimants deem
helpful. The United States reaffirms its welcome of the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South
China Sea.”134
Third key aspect of U.S. position on the South China Sea is maintaining the freedom of
navigation. “Maintaining freedom of navigation is a fundamental interest of the United States.
Unhindered navigation by all ships and aircraft in the South China Sea is essential for the peace and
prosperity of the entire Asia-Pacific region, including the United States.”135
133
U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, May 10, 1995.
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1995/9505/950510db.html
134
Ibid
135
Ibid
38
The fourth and final U.S. statement regarding this issue is not taking sides with any of the
claimant while respecting international law. “The United States takes no position on the legal merits
of the competing claims to sovereignty over the various island, reefs, atolls, and cays in the South
China Sea. The United States would, however, view with serious concern any maritime claim or
restriction on maritime activity in the South China Sea that was not consistent with international law,
including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.”136
Afterwards, when China and the ASEAN member states began negotiating and then finally
signed the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct in the South China Sea, the U.S. official position on the
South China Sea remained the same as the one outlined in the 1995 statement. The U.S. position on
these matters was further enhanced once Barack Obama became the new U.S. President in 2009. As
part of his “pivot” to Asia policy, the South China Sea also gathered more attention. In addition to
Obama declaring U.S. pivot to Asia, there were several other reasons why the U.S. began paying
more attention to this area. First of all, China‟s threats to the United States oil companies that
operated off the coast of Vietnam in 2008, highlighted the first time ever that China had openly and
directly challenged U.S. commercial and shipping interests in the South China Sea. 137 Secondly,
China has notoriously harassed United States Naval Ship Impeccable and other U.S. naval survey
vessels which renewed concerns regarding China‟s approach to freedom of navigation in the South
China Sea. 138
A key stepping stone in enhancing U.S. position in the South China Sea was made at the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on July 23, 2010. In that forum, the U.S. side was represented by
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Clinton made a speech in which not only she reasserted the key
aspects of U.S. approach on the South China Sea disputes, as outlined in the 1995 statement, but also
introduced several new elements. First of all, a new position was outlined, that “Consistent with
customary international law, legitimate claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be
derived solely from legitimate claims to land features.”139 Secondly, Clinton pointed out that “the
United States supports a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the various
territorial disputes without coercion.” 140 Finally, Clinton highlighted that “the U.S. supports the 2002
ASEAN-China declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea. We encourage the
parties to reach agreement on a full code of conduct. The U.S. is prepared to facilitate initiatives and
confidence building measures consistent with the declaration. Because it is in the interest of all
136
Ibid
137
Fravel, T., M. U.S. Policy Towards the Disputes in the South China Sea Since 1995. S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies 2014, p. 5
138
Ibid
139
Remarks At Press Availability, Secretary Clinton July 23, 2010. https://china.usc.edu/remarks-press-availability-
secretary-clinton-july-23-2010
140
Ibid
39
claimants and the broader international community for unimpeded commerce to proceed under
lawful conditions.”141
Although China was never directly mentioned in Clinton‟s speech, the first new element of
U.S. approach in the South China Sea, mentioned above, is clearly directed towards China, because
the claims in the South China Sea should be based solely on “legitimate claims to land features”. In
this regard, the U.S. clearly opposes any of the Chinese claims based on nine-dash line, while
reaffirming its support for UNCLOS. With regards to the second new element, the “collaborative
diplomatic process”, the U.S. clearly refers to promoting multilateral negotiations among all the
claimants which does not go well with China since it prefers to deal bilaterally with ASEAN
claimants on these issues without outside intervention. Finally, by supporting the 2002 ASEAN-
China declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea and willing to create conditions
and “facilitate the initiatives”, based on which the peaceful negotiations on dispute settlement among
all the claimants would begin, the United States have increased its involvement in the South China
Sea while maintaining neutrality and promoting international law in the disputes.
Ever since Clinton‟s speech at the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum, the U.S. has taken steps to
enhance its military ties with the countries in the region. Noticeably, in that same year, the U.S. had
finally terminated the ban on ties with the Indonesian Special Forces group called Kopassus.142 The
ban was introduced by the U.S. in 1997 which prohibited the United States to from having any
relations with foreign military groups that had a history of violating human rights. 143 In reaction to
this, the Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natelagawa rejected China‟s position that the U.S.
should not become involved in the maritime disputes of South China Sea- such a move from
Indonesian side was risky given the fact that it has close economic ties with China. 144 In addition to
these steps, the U.S. also continues to strengthen its military cooperation with its long-standing ally
in the Southeast Asia, the Philippines, and the emerging partner in the South China Sea disputes,
Vietnam. These aspects will be examined in another section.
During the second term of Obama Presidency, the U.S. position on the South China Sea
remained the same. The new U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry reiterated the long-standing U.S.
position on the South China Sea disputes. At the 2013 U.S.-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Kerry said
that “As a Pacific nation, and the resident power, the United States has a national interest in the
maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, unimpeded lawful commerce, and
freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. As we have said many times before, while we do not
141
Ibid
142
Buszynski, L. The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry. Center for Strategic and
143
Ibid
144
Ibid
40
take a position on a competing territorial claim over land features, we have a strong interest in the
manner in which the disputes of the South China Sea are addressed and in the conduct of the parties.
We very much hope to see progress soon on a substantive code of conduct in order to help ensure
stability in this vital region.”145
Once Donald Trump became the new and acting U.S. President, it would have seemed
initially that the U.S. position in the Southeast Asia and South China Sea, which was enhanced
during both presidential terms of Barack Obama, may decline. The reason for that was the fact that in
his presidential campaign, Donald Trump emphasized that once he would become the new U.S.
President, the U.S. would withdraw from one of the key agreements that tied the U.S. with East and
Southeast Asia- the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. Instead, Trump favored bilateral
approach when it came to Asia-Pacific, which is a contrast to what previous two presidential
administrations of the U.S. President Barack Obama were doing. Although Trump, as promised,
withdrew the U.S. from TPP, the U.S. stance on the South China Sea maritime disputes remained the
same. The newly elected Trump administration have made clear that when it comes to the South
China Sea, it intends to continue pursuing the policy that was advocated by 2 previous
administrations. Regarding the South China Sea maritime disputes, the newly elected (now former)
U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said that “The United States will uphold freedom of navigation
and overflight by continuing to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows.” 146 With
regards to the China building artificial islands, Tillerson said that “China cannot be allowed to use its
artificial islands to coerce its neighbors or limit freedom of navigation or overflight in the South
China Sea.”147 This kind of statement is similar to many other statements, which were made during
the term of 2 previous U.S. presidential administrations. Furthermore, the Trump administration
continued to uphold the U.S. position of asserting the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.
In February 2017, when Trump just began his presidential term, the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson
was deployed to the maritime areas of the South China Sea as part of “routine operations.” 148 A week
earlier, the USS Coronado, a littoral combat vessel temporarily based for a time in Singapore,
conducted training operations in these areas as well. 149 On May 24, 2017, the U.S. conducted most
recent freedom of navigation operation by deploying navy destroyer USS Dewey, and challenging the
existence of an illegal territorial sea, with obvious hint being at China. 150
145
John Kerry. Remarks at the U.S.-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Brunei, July 1, 2013. https://2009-
2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/07/211377.htm
146
Johnson, Jesse. “Behind the scenes, Tillerson tones down rhetoric on South China Sea”, Japan Times, 7 February
2017.
147
Ibid
148
McCormick, M., J. American Domestic Politics, Public Opinion, and the South China Sea Disputes. Iowa State
University 2017, pp. 3-4
149
Ibid
150
Freund, E. Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea: A Practical Guide. Harvard Kennedy School 2017, p. 26
41
Therefore, despite the statements made by Trump during the presidential election, in which
he emphasized that U.S. will be dealing bilaterally in the matters of Asia-Pacific, the U.S. approach
towards the South China Sea territorial disputes has remained consistent, in line with the policy
pursued by previous U.S. Presidents. This means that all key aspects of U.S. position on these
matters, as outlined in 1995 and 2010 statements will continue to be upheld.
3.2. U.S. Interests in the South China Sea
For economic, military, diplomatic and historic reasons, the United States has many key
interests in the South China Sea. Some of these interests are already outlined in the 1995 and 2010
U.S. statements regarding its position on the South China Sea disputes, while other interests lie in the
obvious geographical and economic reasons. All things taken into account, the U.S. interests in the
South China Sea can be grouped into the following areas: (1) economic interests; (2) maintaining the
freedom of navigation and unimpeded commerce; (3) promoting international law and rules-based
approach; and (4) strengthening military cooperation with U.S. allies in the South China Sea. Below
each of these interests will be analyzed.
The first significant interest that the United States has in the South China Sea is economic.
Annually, over 5.3 trillion dollars‟ worth of trade passes through the South China Sea, with U.S.
trade accounting for 1.2 trillion dollars of this total. 151 In case of a crisis, the damage to U.S.
economy would be measured in trillions of dollars, not to mention the costs of redirecting the cargo
ships to other sea routes that are longer and far more costly. Here it is important to point out that that
the United States has the rights for commercial shipping and to exploit the natural resources of the
high seas, the boundaries of which are outlined in UNCLOS. 152 According to the reports of U.S.
Energy Information Administration (EIA), one-third of global crude oil and over half of global LNG
trade pass through the South China Sea, making it one of the most important economic areas and
maritime trade routes in the world. 153 In addition, like it was mentioned before, the South China Sea
has vast (potential) resources of natural gas and oil. Although the estimates of it vary, it is clear that
the energy resources located there increases the significance of the South China Sea in economic and
energetic calculations of the U.S. However, one possible drawback here is the fact that the U.S. is yet
to ratify UNCLOS. The main reason why the U.S. is yet to ratify UNCLOS, lies in the “Part XI” of
this convention, covering exploitation of the deep seabed. The U.S. objects those provisions because
151
Glaser, S., B. Armed Clash in the South China Sea. Council on Foreign Relations 2012, p. 4
152
Bouchat, J., C. The Paracel Islands and U.S. Interests and Approaches in the South China Sea. Strategic Studies
Institute 2014, p. 93
153
“The South China Sea is an important world energy trade route,” U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA),
April 4, 2013.
42
it considers them to be statist and not oriented towards free-market approach.154 Furthermore, even if
the U.S. would ratify UNCLOS, the maritime disputes would continue to persist. This is further
highlighted by the fact that ever since UNCLOS was signed in 1982, no country or major shipping
company was successful in commercially mining for high seas mineral resources in the South China
Sea without some sort of disruption or limitations. 155 For this reason, it‟s not a major issue for the
U.S. if it has ratified UNCLOS or not. However, by ratifying UNCLOS, the U.S. would certainly
make an important formal step towards increasing the possibilities of exploiting the resources in the
South China Sea.
The second key interest of the United States in the South China Sea is maintaining the
freedom of navigation and unimpeded commerce. These interests were highlighted in both 1995 and
2010 U.S. statements regarding the South China Sea maritime disputes. The South China Sea is a
place where two of the world's most heavily traveled sea-lanes are located at. The east-west route
connects the Indian and Pacific Oceans, while the north-south route connects Oceania to East
Asia.156 Therefore, these sea-lanes are of crucial importance when it comes to transferring U.S.
troops from the Western Pacific to the Persian Gulf, from which the U.S troops stationed in the
Middle East can be reinforced. 157 By maintaining the freedom of navigation here, the U.S. Navy can
swiftly move its troops and equipment from one region to another if a potential crisis may occur.
With regards to unimpeded commerce, the issue for the U.S. is that China objects to U.S.
surveillance activities in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).158 The views of both sides differ when
it comes to the question what military activities are allowed in the EEZ of China. The U.S. side
argues that UNCLOS allows the countries to exercise “high seas freedoms” in the EEZs of coastal
states, which then means the right to conduct peaceful military activities that also include
surveillance and military surveys. 159 Here, China disagrees, claiming that these U.S. activities are
hostile. The disagreements have led to 2 serious incidents: the 2001 mid-air collision between a U.S.
Navy surveillance aircraft and an intercepting Chinese navy fighter, and the already mentioned 2009
episode in which China‟s paramilitary ships and fishermen have harassed United States Naval Ship
Impeccable, which was conducting undersea surveillance. 160 With no real progress being made in
this regard between China and the U.S., the issue of preserving unimpeded commerce in the South
154
Bouchat, J., C. The Paracel Islands and U.S. Interests and Approaches in the South China Sea. Strategic Studies
Institute 2014, p. 96
155
Ibid
156
Sokolsky, R., Rabasa, A., Neu, R., C. The Role of Southeast Asia in U.S. Strategy Toward China. RAND Corporation
2000, p. 10
157
Ibid, p. 11
158
McDevitt, M. The South China Sea: Assessing U.S. Policy and Options for the Future. Center for Naval Analyses
2014, p. 19
159
Ibid
160
Ibid
43
China Sea will remain to be one of the key U.S. interests there, in conjunction with maintaining the
freedom of navigation.
The third key U.S. interest in the South China Sea maritime disputes is promoting
international law and rules-based approach. This U.S. interest was legitimized by in the previously
mentioned statement of Hillary Clinton at the ASEAN Regional Forum, in which she said that
“Consistent with customary international law, legitimate claims to maritime space in the South China
Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features.”161 This policy was further
enhanced during the second term of Barack Obama‟s presidency. The U.S. Secretary of State during
Obama‟s second term, John Kerry, emphasized the rules-based U.S. approach. In his 2014 speech at
Honolulu, Hawaii, Kerry said that “Important opportunities can and should be realized through a
rules-based regional order, a stable regional order on common rules and norms of behavior that are
reinforced by institutions. And that‟s what holds the greatest potential for all of us for making
progress. We support this approach, frankly, because it encourages cooperative behavior. It fosters
regional integration. It ensures that all countries, big and small – and the small part is really
important – that they have a say in how we work together on shared challenges. I want you to know
that the United States is deeply committed to realizing this vision.”162 In this regard, the stance of the
current U.S. presidential administration of Donald Trump remains unchanged.
Last but certainly not least, the U.S. seeks to strengthen military cooperation with its allies in
the South China Sea, namely, the Philippines. The ambitious Chinese territorial claims in the South
China Sea, outlined by nine-dash line, have led the U.S. to seeking ways how to balance China. One
of the most effective ways to do it is by supporting other claimants in the disputes. In this regard, the
U.S. has a long time historic military ally in the South China Sea- the Philippines. In addition, the
military ties with the other ASEAN claimants, namely, Vietnam and Malaysia, are being enhanced.
In the wider scope of Asia-Pacific, the U.S. has expanded and signed multiple defense treaties with
the countries that are located in the neighborhood of South China Sea, such as Japan, South Korea,
Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, Brunei, Australia and New Zealand, with Singapore being the
latest country with which the United States have entered an agreement that allows the U.S. to base its
warships in Singapore.163
Both sides, the U.S. and ASEAN claimants, need one another- by enhancing military
cooperation with the Philippines and the newly emerging partners in the South China Sea, the United
States creates a counterbalance for China‟s ambitions there, while the ASEAN states, whose military
161
Remarks At Press Availability, Secretary Clinton July 23, 2010. https://china.usc.edu/remarks-press-availability-
secretary-clinton-july-23-2010
162
John Kerry. U.S. Vision for Asia-Pacific Engagement. Hawaii, August 13, 2014.
https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/08/230597.htm
163
Ring, H., A. A U.S. South China Sea Perspective: Just Over the Horizon. Harvard University 2012, p. 37
44
strength pale in comparison to China, need the U.S. to ensure the stability in the South China Sea and
oppose the one-sided Chinese domination there. In this regard, it is a win-win situation for both
sides. Furthermore, the U.S. military presence in the South China Sea can be considered as a must if
a peaceful and legally binding dispute settlement mechanism, which is free from coercion and
intimidation, will be created by all the claimants.
The South China Sea, with its crucial sea-lanes and trade routes, vast energetic resources and
key allies there, is of utmost importance for the U.S. and its national interests. Naturally, these
interests also entail a number of important legal, military and diplomatic issues which are not likely
to be solved in the near future. These issues require a sensible and active diplomatic strategy. With
stakes being high, the South China Sea will continue to play a crucial role in strategic considerations
of the U.S.
3.3. U.S. Strategies in Resolving the Disputes
While analyzing the U.S. approach towards the South China Sea territorial disputes and the
various aspects of it, a crucial aspect must be underlined. Namely, the U.S. strategy toward these
disputes is rational and well-balanced. The reason for this is the fact that by using diplomacy and
encouraging all the claimants to use the rules of the international law to solve the conflicting claims,
the U.S. does not take side in the disputes and therefore serves as balancer in this conflict. This kind
of strategy means that the U.S. does not use force or coercion to persuade the claimants to take
certain steps which they may not like, such as China. At the same time, the U.S. uses military muscle
to a modest extent in order to ensure that its presence in the South China Sea territorial disputes is
felt, and especially if there‟s a need to temporarily balance the territorial ambitions of China.
Thus, the continuous and present U.S. approach in resolving the disputes is a mixture of using
diplomacy (primarily) and military power to moderate extent, such as enhancing the cooperation
with long-term U.S. ally in the South China Sea, the Philippines, as well as developing military ties
with Vietnam, which in turn allows the U.S. Navy to access the South China Sea. These approaches
mean that U.S. presence in this region stabilizes the situation- from one side, China‟s ambitions in
the South China Sea are deterred and checked by U.S. military presence there, while from the other,
the U.S. calls for all the parties in the dispute to adhere to the international rules which means that
U.S. approach is not based on choosing sides, but rather, it is based on principles.
At the same time, by applying primarily diplomatic tools to solve the disputes, the U.S.
makes sure that these disputes do not undermine its relations with China as a whole. Given the fact
45
that China already is the largest U.S. trade partner 164, the United States have little interest in wanting
to see its largest trade partner engage in direct military conflict with its Southeast Asian ally, the
Philippines, and the emerging partner in Vietnam and Malaysia. Similarly, if U.S. would not fulfill
its commitment to defend these allies and partners, the U.S. credibility as a reliable security partner
would be greatly undermined. In this regard, the U.S. is aware that although members of ASEAN
expect the U.S. to play key a role in strengthening security in the South China Sea, ASEAN
claimants are also not willing to see an increased tensions in the U.S. and China's relations.165 For
this reason, the role of U.S. military is rather moderate, because increased U.S. military involvement
in the South China Sea disputes is more or less a no-win situation for all sides. Also, in this area, a
key objective of U.S. strategy is to improve the cooperation with China on risk reduction, which
would lower the number of naval and aerial collisions between both sides. 166 This would serve as an
expansion of the previous agreements, signed in 2014 and 2015, that have focused on rules of
behavior for the military forces of both sides. 167
As a result, the U.S. policy in the South China Sea faces certain dilemmas. That is, how to
maintain and find the equilibrium between the role of a balancer, which deters any potential
aggressive move from one of the claimant, and peacemaker, which means preserving good political
and economic relations with all of the claimants while also fostering peaceful resolution of the
disputes based on international rules. In this regard, U.S. role in these disputes can be considered as
delicate and unique because of these peculiarities.
With regards to these dilemmas, the U.S. is making a successful effort of maintaining both
roles simultaneously. While encouraging all sides to use international law to solve the disputes, the
U.S. Government also criticizes China‟s policy in the South China Sea to a moderate extent from
time to time. In this regard, the term moderate means that while U.S. criticizes China‟s policy there,
it does not go overboard with the criticism to an extent that it would affect overall U.S.-China
economic and diplomatic relations. Such carefulness is understandable because good relations
between these great powers are vital to regional and global peace. In addition, the continuous U.S.
cooperation with its allies and partners in Southeast Asia serve as checks and balances so to speak,
against any potential aggressive moves from China in the South China Sea.
All in all, the U.S. is following a versatile strategy which seeks for peaceful conflict
resolution while also balancing China‟s aggressive stance in the South China Sea and urging it to be
164
Ken Roberts. “Top 10 U.S. Trade Partners In 2017 Can Be Broken Into 3 Tiers”. Forbes, February 18, 2018.
165
Hideshi, U. The Problems in the South China Sea. Review of Island Studies 2013, p. 7
166
Wuthnow, J. Beyond Imposing Costs: Recalibrating U.S. Strategy in the South China Sea. Asia Policy 2017, p. 130
167
Ibid
46
less confrontational. These strategies involves the following aspects: 168 (1) criticizing China for its
coercive approach; (2) endorsing legal dispute settlement mechanisms; (3) increasing U.S. military
presence in the region; (4) strengthening the capabilities of U.S. allies in the region; and (5)
supporting multilateral frameworks for dispute resolution while urging Southeast Asian claimants to
work jointly in solving the disputes. Below each of these aspects will be analyzed separately.
During the two presidential terms of U.S. President Barack Obama, the U.S. administration
has consistently issued a tougher position on China, due to its policy in the South China Sea.
Criticizing China‟s policy there has become one of the bases of U.S. approach in these disputes. In
reaction to China creating a new air defense identification zone in the South China Sea, then U.S.
State Secretary John Kerry, in a meeting with Philippines official, said the following: “Today, I
raised our deep concerns about China‟s announcement of an East China Sea Air Defense
Identification Zone. I told the foreign secretary that the United States does not recognize that zone
and does not accept it. The zone should not be implemented, and China should refrain from taking
similar unilateral actions elsewhere in the region, and particularly over the South China Sea.”169
With regards to China‟s policy in the South China Sea, observers characterized it as a
“salami-slicing” strategy that utilizes a series of incremental actions, none of which serves by itself
as a reason for provoking war.170 Rather, this kind of approach changes the whole situation
gradually, step by step, in China‟s favor. From China‟s side, another term is used, the “cabbage
strategy” which means gradually increasing the control over the islands in the South China Sea by
enclosing them militarily, like the leaves of cabbage, which are used in consecutive manner until
China has full control of all the islands. 171 In response to these ongoing salami-slicing or cabbage
strategies, the new U.S. President Donald Trump had reiterated the position of his predecessor while
also presenting some new approaches- to counter China‟s policies of taking over the entire South
China Sea, Trump emphasized a usage of behind the scenes talks. During his November 2017 visit to
Vietnam, China‟s coercive approach in the South China Sea, was on Trump‟s agenda for discussion
in a meeting with Vietnamese colleagues.172 In those meetings, Trump voiced U.S. concern about the
“militarization of features in the South China Sea.”173 In addition, Trump called on regional states to
avoid “escalatory actions, the militarization of disputed features, and unlawful restrictions on
168
Hiebert, M., Nguyen, P. Poling, B., G. Perspectives on the South China Sea: Diplomatic, Legal and Security
Dimensions of the Dispute. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 2014, p. 54
169
John Kerry. Remarks With Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario. Philippines, December 17, 2013.
170
O'Rourke, R. Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for
Congress. Congressional Research Service (CRS) 2017, p. 31
171
Ibid
172
Bill Gertz, “Trump Courts Vietnam to Ward Off Beijing in South China Sea,” Asia Times, November 14, 2017.
173
Ibid
47
freedom of the seas.”174 Although no particular country was specified in this speech, the
aforementioned description makes it obvious that this speech is directed clearly towards China‟s
activities in the South China Sea. This example shows that consistent U.S. approach of criticizing
China‟s activities in the South China Sea will not change under the new U.S. President Donald
Trump, and will continue to remain an effective diplomatic tool.
The second aspect of U.S. strategy in the South China Sea is promoting legal dispute
settlement mechanisms. This aspect, which was outlined in the previous section, is arguably the
primary U.S. tool when it comes to approaching South China Sea disputes. The basis in U.S.
approach for using international law, such as principle of freedom of seas and usage of exclusive
economic zone in accordance with customary international law of the sea, to solve the disputes, was
created during the presidency of Barack Obama during both of his presidential terms. In the midst of
China versus Philippines arbitration case, the U.S. supported the Philippines by promoting and
reaffirming their position that all claimants should follow the principles that were set out in the
UNCLOS. On March 30 2014, after the Philippines submitted a memorial to the tribunal, in the
arbitration case against China, the U.S. Department of State press statement outlined that “the United
States reaffirms its support for the exercise of peaceful means to resolve maritime disputes without
fear of any form of retaliation, including intimidation or coercion. All countries should respect the
right of any States Party, including the Republic of the Philippines, to avail themselves of the dispute
resolution mechanisms provided for under the Law of the Sea Convention. We hope that this case
serves to provide greater legal certainty and compliance with the international law of the sea.” 175
With regards to this second U.S. approach however, there is a possible pitfall. The potential
limitation lies in the fact that the U.S. is yet to ratify the UNCLOS, even though it respects and
complies with the principles set out there. Provided that United States will ratify the UNCLOS, its
positions regarding the territorial disputes in the South China Sea will be far stronger, as it will have
even more legal basis on which to operate and purse its strategy in the South China Sea.
The third U.S. strategy in these disputes is increasing its military presence in the South China
Sea and Southeast Asia. Ever since the China-Philippines arbitration case, the U.S. has consistently
strengthened its military presence in the region. The basis for that is outlined in the 2015 Asia-Pacific
Maritime Security Strategy prepared by the U.S. Department of Defense. To begin with, the reasons
for enhancing U.S. military presence in the region are essentially the same ones with the basic
principles on which U.S. approach in the disputes are based on- that is, preserving the freedom of
navigation, deterring any potential conflict and the use of force, and promoting international law
174
Ibid
175
U.S. Department of State, “Philippines: South China Sea Arbitration Case Filing,” press statement. March 30, 2014.
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/03/224150.htm
48
based approach in the South China Sea. As far as enhancing military capabilities, the U.S.
Department of Defense is strengthening U.S. capabilities across 3 key areas- in the air, sea and under
the water. For this, the U.S. is deploying one of the most advanced surface ships, the USS Ronald
Reagan, and sending newest air operations-oriented amphibious assault ship, the USS America, to
Southeast Asia by 2020. 176 As of 2015, the U.S. has 368,000 personnel in the Asia-Pacific region.177
While the number of personnel will continue to gradually increase, the more important aspect that
highlights the U.S. intention to bolster its military presence in the South China Sea, lies in the fact
that by 2020, the U.S. Navy will increase the number of ships allocated to Pacific Fleet outside of
U.S. territory by 30 percent, which is a significant percentage given the fact that the number of U.S.
personnel present in the Asia-Pacific is already large.178 Furthermore, by 2020, 60% of U.S. naval
and overseas air assets will be home-ported in the Pacific region. 179 Among the multi-faceted U.S.
strategies in the South China Sea, this strategy- enhancing U.S. military presence in the region- is
certainly among the strongest and the most feasible, which also balances China‟s military power in
the region.
The fourth U.S. strategy in these disputes is inter-related with the third one. While enhancing
U.S. military presence in the region, the U.S. at the same time also strengthens the military
capabilities of its allies and partners in the South China Sea. This is also being emphasized in U.S.
Department of Defense statements- the statement says that “we are working together with our allies
and partners from Northeast Asia to the Indian Ocean to build their maritime capacity. We are
building greater interoperability, updating our combined exercises, developing more integrated
operations, and cooperatively developing partner maritime domain awareness and maritime security
capabilities, which will ensure a strong collective capacity to employ our maritime capabilities most
effectively.”180 At the 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), then U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck
Hagel said that "the United States also remains committed to building the capacity of allies and
partners in the region through as many as 130 exercises and engagements, and approximately 700
port visits annually. And across the Asia-Pacific region, as part of the rebalance, the United States is
planning to increase Foreign Military Financing by 35%, and military education and training by 40%
by 2016."181 With regards to the allies, the U.S. mutual defense treaty with the Philippines continues
to be a primary guarantee of security assurance. Philippines, being the most important U.S. ally in
the South China Sea, is being significantly enhanced in military capabilities by U.S. support. In late
176
Department of Defense, Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, August 2015, p. 20
177
Ibid
178
Ibid, p. 22
179
Ibid
180
Ibid, p. 20
181
Chuck Hagel, remarks at Shangri-La Dialogue, May 31, 2014.
http://archive.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5442
49
2013, then U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry had announced a 40 million dollar military aid to the
Philippines.182 In addition to this, another 32 million dollars were provided to the Southeast Asian
nations to help them protect their territorial waters. Of these 32 million dollars, 18 million dollars
were allocated to one of the South China Sea claimants- Vietnam. 183
While U.S. military ties with claimant countries, such as Vietnam and Malaysia, are
expanding, the strongest U.S. military link in the South China Sea continues to be the Philippines. In
2015 alone, the U.S. conducted over 400 military exercises with the Philippines, including the joint
exercise “Balikatan” which was the largest joint military exercise ever between both countries. 184 In
addition to this, the U.S. Department of Defense provides the Philippines with state of the art coastal
radar systems, assists in strengthening naval maintenance capacity while also providing modern
interdiction vessels, naval fleet upgrades and communications equipment. 185 The aforementioned
financial U.S. assistance to Vietnam, also creates incentives to further develop U.S. military ties with
this emerging and strategically important partner, when it comes countering China‟s influence in the
South China Sea.
Last but not least, the U.S. approach on the South China Sea maritime disputes is also based
on calling the Southeast Asian claimants to work jointly in resolving the disputes through
multilateral frameworks and regional organizations. In recent years, the U.S. has increased its
participation in various regional organizations of Southeast Asia while at the same time supporting
them as one of the primary mechanisms through which the disputes can be solved peacefully. In this
regard, key stepping stone was in 2009 when the U.S. finally signed the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation, which serves a prerequisite if an outside nation wants to actively participate in the
regional matters of Southeast Asia. In the process, the U.S. also became a full-time member of East
Asia Summit (EAS) forum which brings together all the nations in Asia-Pacific while maintaining an
important role in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Through these kinds of
multilateral forums and institutions, the U.S. approach of peacefully resolving the South China Sea
maritime disputes, based on international rules, can be further enhanced.
The importance of regional organizations and multilateral approach is also emphasized in
U.S. Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy. In it, the U.S. Department of Defense outlines that
“Finally, we are working to strengthen regional security institutions and encourage the development
of an open and effective regional security architecture. Many of the most prevalent maritime
challenges we face require a coordinated multilateral response. As such, the Department is enhancing
our engagement in ASEAN-based institutions such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus
182
“US Pledges $40 Million in Military Aid to Philippines,” Voice of America, December 13, 2013.
183
Ibid
184
Department of Defense, Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, August 2015, p. 24
185
Ibid, p. 26
50
(ADMM-Plus), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum
(EAMF), as well as through wider forums like the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) and
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), which provide platforms for candid and transparent
discussion of maritime concerns.”186 For this reason, the promotion of multilateral framework for
solving the maritime disputes in the South China Sea has become one of the key U.S. strategies as
well.
In addition, the U.S. is putting its efforts in trying to create more momentum for progress on
establishing a legally binding code of conduct on these disputes. 187 This is an issue that has thwarted
any realistic possibilities for solving the disputes. While Southeast Asian claimants and China have
resumed the talks on this issue, no real and tangible progress has been made. In this question, the
U.S. expects that a potential code of conduct will not only be legally binding, but will also have
dispute settlement mechanisms. 188 To solve these issues, the various aforementioned multilateral
institutions and forums, which U.S. firmly supports, would be the most sensible place where those
issues can be addressed and solved. That being said, the U.S. role in establishing the code of conduct
on the South China Sea would be rather limited because the U.S. is not a claimant country that is
directly participating in the negotiations, even though it plays a major role as a non-claimant country.
The South China Sea maritime disputes with its various aspects present key challenges for the
United States. Namely, the U.S. ability to balance China‟s ambitions in the South China Sea while
seeking and promoting peaceful conflict resolution among the claimants is a challenging task. Given
the current developments, the U.S. manages to maintain equilibrium in both of these challenges. The
reason for this is the fact that U.S. approach is cautious and calculated, meaning that the U.S. is not
willing to get itself heavily involved into large-scale confrontations that will threaten vital U.S.
economic relations with China. At the same time, the U.S. seeks to counter China‟s salami-slicing
strategy by maintaining and strengthening the U.S. military and security relations with its allies and
partners in the South China Sea, while constantly emphasizing diplomacy and international law as
the tools that will help to solve the disputes.
186
Ibid, p. 20
187
Hiebert, M., Nguyen, P. Poling, B., G. Perspectives on the South China Sea: Diplomatic, Legal and Security
Dimensions of the Dispute. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 2014, p. 59
188
Ibid
51
CONCLUSIONS
1. Neorealism, with its two subdivisions, the defensive and offensive realism, continues to be
a relevant theory when it comes to explaining the contemporary international relations, especially
between the great powers. The neo-realist factors of the state‟s strategic and vital interest, which is
security, and relative power capabilities, perform especially well with regards to foreseeing the
competition between great powers for more influence. The competition between great powers
inherently leads to them creating balancing alliances against one another, in order prevent the
domination of one side. Thus, anarchy continues to prevail with states, especially great powers,
continuing to be primary actors on international stage, while international institutions, such as the
UN, has little power in decision-making process because their resolutions are non-binding. This is
the case in the South China Sea where China‟s ambitions to dominate the entire maritime area is
balanced by the U.S., which creates military alliances with China‟s neighbors in order to deter China
from any further aggressive movements while the resolutions of the UN has no real effect on China‟s
activities there;
2. The South China Sea maritime disputes are complex, long-standing and hardly solvable
given the present realities there. The South China Sea with its vast resources of natural gas and oil,
strategically crucial sea-lanes for trade and economically important fishing industry, is of utmost
importance for the claimants there. All the claimants want to increase the strength and the legality of
their claims, which overlap with one another, by occupying islands, reefs, atolls and building military
fortifications inside the South China Sea. The disputes are further exacerbated by a number of legal
issues which revolve around the legal status of maritime features there and the principles based on
which the claims are made there. China‟s maritime claims are, bar none, the most ambitions of all the
claimants, as it assigns virtually the entire South China Sea to China. As a result, other claimants
seek military cooperation with the U.S. as a counterweight to China‟s military power and its
ambitions in the South China Sea;
3. U.S. policy regarding the South China Sea maritime disputes has been consistent and long-
standing. The U.S. urges all the claimants to follow international law, namely the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which is the key to peacefully settling the disputes. In
this regard, the U.S. plays a delicate role of a balancer and conciliator. By criticizing China from
time to time and enhancing its military cooperation with the claimants in the South China Sea, such
as the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia, the U.S. balances and deters any potential aggressive
moves from China in the disputed areas. Although increased U.S. military involvement in this area
periodically provokes a negative reaction from China, the U.S. involvement is not to such an extent
52
that it would make the U.S. directly involved in the disputes and further escalate the tensions. At the
same time, by promoting international law, diplomacy and maintaining strict neutrality over the
questions of sovereignty in the South China Sea, the U.S. plays a role of conciliator. As a result, the
U.S. also facilitates further developments in the process of peacefully settling the disputes between
all the claimants. Therefore, the hypothesis is partially verified, as U.S. policies in the South China
Sea contributes more towards the progress of solving the disputes rather than keeping them
unresolved for decades to come.
53
LITERATURE AND SOURCE LIST
1. Literature List
Monographs:
1. Booth, K. Realism and World Politics. Routledge 2011;

2. Bouchat, J., C. The Paracel Islands and U.S. Interests and Approaches in the South China Sea.
Strategic Studies Institute 2014;
3. Burchill, S., Linklater, A., Devetak, R., Donnelly, J., Paterson, M., Reus-Smit, Ch, True, J.
Theories of International Relations (Third edition). Palgrave Macmillan 2005;
4. Dunne, T., Kurki, M., Smith, S., eds. International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity.
Oxford University Press 2007;
5. Steans, J., Pettiford, L., Diez, Th., El-Anis, I. An Introduction to International Relations Theory:
Perspectives and Themes (Third edition). Routledge 2013;
Books and Article Collections:
6. Hiebert, M., Nguyen, P. Poling, B., G. Perspectives on the South China Sea: Diplomatic, Legal
and Security Dimensions of the Dispute. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 2014;
7. McDevitt, M. The South China Sea: Assessing U.S. Policy and Options for the Future. Center for
Naval Analyses 2014;
8. O'Rourke, R. Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China:
Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service (CRS) 2017;
9. Roach, A., J. Malaysia and Brunei: An Analysis of their Claims in the South China Sea. Center for
Naval Analyses 2014;
10. Sokolsky, R., Rabasa, A., Neu, R., C. The Role of Southeast Asia in U.S. Strategy Toward China.
RAND Corporation 2000;
Articles in Periodic Scientific Journals:
11. Buszynski, L. The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry.
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 2012;
12. Feng, L., Ruizhuang, Z. The Typologies of Realism. Chinese Journal of International Politics
2006;
54
13. Fravel, T., M. U.S. Policy Towards the Disputes in the South China Sea Since 1995. S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies 2014;
14. Glaser, S., B. Armed Clash in the South China Sea. Council on Foreign Relations 2012;
15. Hideshi, U. The Problems in the South China Sea. Review of Island Studies 2013;
16. Morton, K. China’s ambition in the South China Sea: is a legitimate maritime order possible?
International Affairs 2016;
17. Muscolino, S., M. Past and Present Resource Disputes in the South China Sea: The Case of Reed
Bank. CrossCurrents 2013;
18. Parameswaran, P. Playing It Safe: Malaysia’s Approach to the South China Sea and Implications
for the United States. Center for a New American Security (CNAS) 2015;
19. Rosenberg, D. Governing the South China Sea: From Freedom of the Seas to Ocean Enclosure
Movements. Middlebury College 2011;
20. Taliaferro, W., J. Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited. International
security 2000;
21. Wuthnow, J. Beyond Imposing Costs: Recalibrating U.S. Strategy in the South China Sea. Asia
Policy 2017;
22. Zhang, F. Chinese Thinking on the South China Sea and the Future of Regional Security.
Political Science Quarterly 2017;
Articles in Other Scientific Publications:
23. Bader, J., Lieberthal, K., McDevitt, M. Keeping the South China Sea in Perspective. Brookings
2014;
24. Emmers, R. Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea: Strategic and Diplomatic Status Quo.
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) 2005;
25. Forsby, B., A. The South China Sea - a Breeding Ground for Geopolitical Rivalry? Danish
Institute for International Studies (DIIS) 2016;
26. Freund, E. Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea: A Practical Guide. Harvard Kennedy
School 2017;
27. Gewirtz, P. Limits of Law in the South China Sea. Center for East Asia Policy Studies- Brookings
Institution 2016;
28. Hensel, R., P. Power Politics and Contentious Issues: Realism, Issue Salience, and Conflict
Management. Florida State University 2015;
29. Khoury, E. Recent Trends In The South China Sea Disputes. The French Institute for
International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS) 2017;
55
30. Lunn, J., Lang, A. The South China Sea dispute: July 2016 update. House of Commons Library
2016;
31. McCormick, M., J. American Domestic Politics, Public Opinion, and the South China Sea
Disputes. Iowa State University 2017;
32. Pearson, M., A. Realism and Politics Among States in the 21st Century. Centre for Geopolitics &
Security in Realism Studies 2015;
33. Poonsiri, P. The Territorial Dispute Over the South China Sea. University of Erfurt 2017;
34. Poling, B., G. The South China Sea in Focus: Clarifying the Limits of Maritime Dispute. Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 2013;
35. Ring, H., A. A U.S. South China Sea Perspective: Just Over the Horizon. Harvard University
2012;
36. Rustandi, A., C. The South China Sea Dispute: Opportunities for ASEAN to Enhance its Policies
in Order to Achieve Resolution. Australian Defence College 2016;
37. Schofield, C. Legal and Geographical Implications of the South China Sea Arbitration. National
Library of Australia 2016;
38. Shi, X. UNCLOS and China’s Claim in the South China Sea. Australian Defence College 2015;
39. Van Ham, P., Montesano, S., F., Van der Putten, P., F. A South China Sea Conflict: Implications
for European Security: A Scenario Study. Clingendael Institute 2016;
40. Vuving, L. A. Vietnam, the United States, and Japan in the South China Sea. Asia-Pacific Center
for Security Studies 2014;
41. Limits in the Seas, No. 143 China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea. United States
Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs 2014;
Articles in Conference Material Compendiums:
42. Recent Trends In the South China Sea Disputes. Boston Global Forum 2015;
Other Literature:
43. Criekemans, D. Towards a solution for the increasing tensions in the South China Sea?
University of Antwerp 2017;
56
2. Sources
Legal Acts:
44. Department of Defense, Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, August 2015.

https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy-
08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF
45. United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS. United Nations Official Website.
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm
Electronic Media:
46. Adam Greer, “The South China Sea Is Really a Fishery Dispute,” The Diplomat, July 20, 2016.
https://thediplomat.com/2016/07/the-south-china-sea-is-really-a-fishery-dispute/
47. Bill Gertz, “Trump Courts Vietnam to Ward Off Beijing in South China Sea,” Asia Times,
November 14, 2017. http://www.atimes.com/trump-courts-vietnam-ward-off-beijing-south-china-
sea/
48. Johnson, Jesse. “Behind the scenes, Tillerson tones down rhetoric on South China Sea”, Japan
Times, 7 February 2017. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/02/07/asia-pacific/behind-scenes-
tillerson-tones-rhetoric-south-china-sea/
49. “Challenging Beijing in the South China Sea,” Voice of America, July 31, 2012.
https://blogs.voanews.com/state-department-news/2012/07/31/challenging-beijing-in-the-south-
china-sea/
50. "China Searches for More Gas Hydrates in South China Sea," The Maritime Executive, February
21, 2018. https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/china-searches-for-more-gas-hydrates-in-
south-china-sea#gs.twp8ay4
51. "Foreign Countries Chase Oil in South China Sea Without Incident," Voice of America, February
26, 2018. https://www.voanews.com/a/foreign-countries-chase-south-china-sea-oil-without-
incident/4270580.html
52. “The Philippine military buildup amid China tensions,” Navarra Center for International
Development (NCID), February 8, 2016. http://ncid.unav.edu/en/news/philippine-military-buildup-
amid-china-tensions
53. “The South China Sea is an important world energy trade route,” U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA), April 4, 2013. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=10671
57
54. “US Pledges $40 Million in Military Aid to Philippines,” Voice of America, December 13, 2013.
https://www.voanews.com/a/us-pledges-40-million-in-military-aid-to-philippines/1811876.html
Reports:
55. U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, May 10, 1995.
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1995/9505/950510db.html
56. U.S. Department of State, “Philippines: South China Sea Arbitration Case Filing,” press
statement. March 30, 2014. https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/03/224150.htm
Other Sources:
57. Chuck Hagel. Remarks at Shangri-La Dialogue. Singapore, May 31, 2014.
http://archive.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5442
58. John Kerry. Remarks at the U.S.-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Brunei, July 1, 2013.
59. John Kerry. U.S. Vision for Asia-Pacific Engagement. Hawaii, August 13, 2014.
60. John Kerry. Remarks With Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario. Philippines,
December 17, 2013. https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/12/218835.htm
61. Remarks At Press Availability, Secretary Clinton. Vietnam, July 23, 2010.
https://china.usc.edu/remarks-press-availability-secretary-clinton-july-23-2010
58
ANNEXES
Annex No. 1: Territorial Claims in the South China Sea
Source: “Challenging Beijing in the South China Sea,” Voice of America, July 31, 2012.
https://blogs.voanews.com/state-department-news/2012/07/31/challenging-beijing-in-the-south-china-sea/
59
Annex No. 2: Military strength of the claimants in the South China Sea
Source: “The Philippine military buildup amid China tensions,” Navarra Center for International Development
(NCID), February 8, 2016. http://ncid.unav.edu/en/news/philippine-military-buildup-amid-china-tensions
60

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VYTAUTAS MAGNUS UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND DIPLOMACY

U.S. ROLE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE CASE OF SOUTH CHINA

Diplomacy and International Relations, State Code 621L20004

Political Science Study Field

Supervisor Phd Cand. Mindaugas Norkevičius

Defended Prof. dr. Šarūnas Liekis

1. NEOREALIST APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS…................................9

1.1. Key Tenets of Neorealism................................................................................................9

1.2. Defensive and Offensive Realism..................................................................................14

1.3. Neorealism‟s Relevance in the 21st Century.................................................................18

2. SOUTH CHINA SEA TERRITORIAL DISPUTES.............................................................21

2.1. Historical Background…………………………………………...................................21

2.2. Importance of the Region………….………………………………………………….26

2.3. Legal Disputes.………………………………………………………………………..29

3. US APPROACH TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES……..……………………...37

3.1. Evolution of U.S. Participation in the Disputes…….………..…..................................37

3.2. U.S. Interests in the South China Sea………….………………………………………42

3.3. U.S. Strategies in Resolving the Disputes.….…………………………………………45

LITERATURE AND SOURCE LIST…..…………………………………………………….54

1.1. Key Tenets of Neorealism

1.2. Defensive and Offensive Realism

1.3. Neorealism’s Relevance in the 21st Century

2.1. Historical Background

Table 1- timeline of key recent events in the South China Sea.

YEAR (MONTH) COUNTRIES INVOLVED EVENT

2.2. Importance of the Region

2.3. Legal Disputes

3.1. Evolution of U.S. Participation in the Disputes

3.2. U.S. Interests in the South China Sea

3.3. U.S. Strategies in Resolving the Disputes

1. Booth, K. Realism and World Politics. Routledge 2011;

Books and Article Collections:

Articles in Periodic Scientific Journals:

Articles in Other Scientific Publications:

Articles in Conference Material Compendiums:

44. Department of Defense, Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, August 2015.

Annex No. 1: Territorial Claims in the South China Sea

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