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Southeast Asian Affairs
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Southeast Asian Affairs 2013
Background
The Philippines began claiming parts of the Spratly Islands — the Kal
Island Group or KIG — in the 1950s when Tomas Cloma discovered th
unoccupied. Since then, the Philippines has promulgated laws on archip
baselines and the geographic scope of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ
placed the KIG under the administrative jurisdiction of Palawan provin
2009, the Philippines submitted the geographical coordinates for its ar
lagic baselines to the United Nations. Using the "regime of islands" pri
under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the coordin
show Scarborough Shoal (Bajo de Masinloc) to be within the country's E
The government routinely protests the actions of other claimants, an
coast guard arrests fishermen and poachers in the KIG and in the EEZ
Philippines currently occupies eight islands in the KIG.
These actions are not unique to the Philippines. All South China Sea
claimants have followed a pattern of (re-)naming, claiming, mapping, occup
islets, protesting each other's statements or actions, and arresting fisherme
other would-be encroachers. The Philippines has held bilateral consult
with China on SCS-related issues since 1995 but progress has been slow
insignificant.
The Philippines, however, differs from other SCS claimants in two
It is the only claimant who has a formal alliance with a major power,
United States. Attacks on Philippine or American vessels could potentiall
Maria Ortuoste is Assistant Professor in Political Science at the California State Univ
East Bay, United States.
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The Philippines in the South China Sea: Out of Time, Out of Options? 241
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242 Maria Ortuoste
Another challe
depend on the
Development B
in 2012. Its eco
relies on expor
previous defen
the 1997-98 financial crisis led to a currency devaluation which added
US$2 billion to the estimated costs of the plan. To address this problem, the
2012 Modernization Act identifies other sources of revenue, such as proceeds
from the sale of military reservations, the lease or joint development of military
reservations, the sale of products of the government arsenal, donations from
local and foreign sources, and the Malampaya gas-to-power project in
Palawan.
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The Philippines in the South China Sea: Out of Time, Out of Options? 243
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244 Maria Ortuoste
located near th
and satellite communications facilities" on the western and northern coasts of
Australia, and hopes to gain access to Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay to safeguar
freedom of navigation and commerce in the SCS.6
For the Philippines and other Southeast Asian countries, U.S. presence i
reassuring. The Philippines possibly sees this presence as some sort of tripwire t
trigger U.S. action against an aggressor. Article V of the MDT states: an arme
attack will "include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of
the Parties, or the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific ocean,
its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific". However, Article I
implies that U.S. response will not be automatic and subject to Congressiona
approval. It states: "Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacifi
area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety
and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with
its constitutional processes."
The MDT does not delineate the Philippines' "metropolitan territory".
The Philippines considers its EEZ and the KIG as part of that metropolitan
territory, and argues that letters from previous American officials support this
interpretation. The 1979 Vance-Romulo letters, reaffirmed by Ambassador
Thomas C. Hubbard in 1999, states that an attack on Philippine or American
vessels "would not have to occur within the metropolitan territory of the
Philippines or island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific in order to
come within the definition of Pacific area in Article V". Moreover, Hubbard
noted that then Defence Secretary William Cohen stated that "the U.S. considers
the South China Sea to be part of the Pacific Area".7 Despite reaffirming
its treaty obligations, there are no other official statements confirming these
interpretations. If the United States wanted to signal a firmer commitment, it
could have negotiated defence guidelines as it did with Japan in 1997. Those
guidelines detail "actions in response to an armed attack against Japan" which
includes Japan's "surrounding waters and ... sea lines of communication".
But the Philippines will probably not be able to secure similar affirmations
for two reasons. Current U.S. policy not to take sides in territorial disputes
will be compromised if it protected Philippine ships in the KIG. The United
States' strategic ambiguity is also necessary in its relations with China. While
recalibrating bilateral ties in the Asia-Pacific, U.S. officials are quick to say that
they are not creating bases. Secretary Panetta visited Beijing in 2012 to deepen
bilateral military ties which were broken in 2010 over U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
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The Philippines in the South China Sea: Out of Time, Out of Options? 245
Panetta assured Beijing that the United States was not trying to contain Chi
but rather trying to initiate a "new model" relationship.8 China is still
important to the United States than the Philippines: not only does China
US$3.2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, but China's cooperation in the U
Security Council is necessary to respond to other issues such as Iran's nu
weapons programme.
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246 Maria Ortuoste
to elevate bilater
and increased tra
SCS, they agreed
on confidence-b
accordance with
"contribute posit
of conduct" in the SCS."
For the Philippines and its neighbours these were signs that China would
be a responsible international player. Tangible progress in bilateral relations was
made. China is now the Philippines' third largest trading partner with two-way
trade valued at US$12.1 billion in 2011.12 Philippines-China economic relations
have actually surpassed U.S.-Philippines trade: 28 per cent of all Philippine
exports in 2011 went to China and Hong Kong compared to only 13.8 per cent
to the United States which is the Philippines' traditional market. Philippine
investments in China totalled US$2.8 billion in 2011, while Chinese investments
in the Philippines stood at US$500 million. Chinese investors have expressed
interest in investing in infrastructure, agriculture, energy and tourism.13 Tourism
from China grew by 20.9 per cent from 2009 to 2010 and during the first
seven months of 2012, the Chinese were the fourth in tourist arrivals in the
Philippines. There are also plans to increase bilateral trade to US$60 billion
by 2016, and the Philippines is the first country to host a resident Chinese
investment advisor.14
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The Philippines in the South China Sea: Out of Time, Out of Options? 247
cent of the country's total receipts: this travel advisory led to the cancellati
of scheduled airline seats by approximately 15-20 per cent according t
Centre for Aviation. Many Filipinos were also concerned that China's go
ment would retaliate against the OFWs in the mainland and in Hong K
While not the top destination for OFWs, remittances from China have b
increasing since 2003: they now account for 15 per cent of remittances f
Asia according to the Philippine Central Bank.
Partly because of this pressure, the Philippines declared that it will brin
the SCS dispute to international courts. But this move is problematic f
both parties. First, since they are dismissing each other's claim outrig
they would probably never agree on a legal venue. Besides, China enter
declaration to the UNCLOS and, therefore, does not recognize the author
of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Second, bo
claimants need to refine their legal cases. China's nine-dash line is beyo
any of the boundaries set in UNCLOS, while the Philippines still ha
resolve important issues such as distinguishing which features are island
which are rocks, and dealing with the overlap of its EEZ with Palau, Tai
and Japan.17 Thus, it might be premature even for the Philippines to
advisory opinions from ITLOS. Finally, any compromises will be diffic
as both sides issued statements effectively putting their leaders on the
China by claiming indisputable sovereignty and the Philippines by stating th
"[i]t would be an impeachable offense if the President would cede any pa
our territory".18
Any settlement in the SCS will be political. The UNCLOS, according
Sam Bateman, "only comes into play when sovereignty over land feature
been agreed" and the convention is therefore not intended to address soverei
disputes.19 But the political atmosphere in 2012 has been toxic in both count
due to domestic power plays and nationalist rhetoric.
China's aggressiveness is either an attempt to divert attention from
domestic problems or to demonstrate the country's power to its citizens
2012, China's leadership transition was occurring amidst scandals, and gro
public dissatisfaction with corruption and socio-economic inequality. Th
International Crisis Group also raised the possibility that Chinese actions
the result of bureaucratic politics involving civilian agencies, military establi
ments, national and local governments, energy companies, and other governm
ministries without effective control by the central government.20 Regar
of the accuracy of these claims, the fact is that these machinations prev
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248 Maria Ortuoste
constructive p
decisions.
In the Philippines, the SCS issue and overall bilateral relations have been
politicized partly due to upcoming mid-term elections in 2013. Corruption
charges against the Arroyo administration include allegations of kickbacks to
allow a Chinese company to conduct oil exploration in the KIG. Any legislator
perceived to be close to China is quickly labelled as a traitor by political
opponents. This was the case when President Aquino's backroom negotiator
to China, Senator Antonio Trillanes IV, was accused by Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile of betraying the country's national interests during secret meetings. Not
coincidentally, Trillanes was reportedly behind a plot to oust Enrile as Senate
President. Trillanes similarly had a run-in with Secretary del Rosario labelling
the latter as "ineffective", revealing similar infighting in the Philippines as
in China.21
Nationalist rhetoric further muddies the waters. Several editorials from
Chinese media accused the Philippines of provoking China and escalating the
issue by sending a naval ship and for involving the United States in the dispute.
Writers called on Beijing to stop loans to, and to punish, the Philippines.
Filipinos likewise took up the nationalist cause by staging protests calling fo
a boycott of Chinese imports. Most of this vitriol is not surprising considering
that Filipinos have always had a low net trust in China according to a Social
Weather Stations report in May 2012. Such is the strength of territorial
nationalism that even Philippine leftists objected to China's actions in the
SCS. But unlike the general public and legislators, the Philippine Left object
to prolonged U.S. presence on constitutional grounds. The nature of Chinese
aggressiveness, its economic pressure, and the nationalist rhetoric have
engendered widespread support for the United States which has effectively
drowned out dissenting voices.
If the Philippines and China are serious about keeping the peace, they need
to establish a direct line of communication (or hotline) in order to defuse tensions
quickly. They also need to moderate public discourse. There are some signs that
the Chinese government had been able to calm nationalist sentiments,22 but similar
measures will probably not be forthcoming in democratic Philippines.
In the end, the legal avenue could be premature: the Philippines is
gambling that China's nine-dash claim makes such a mockery of UNCLOS that
China will have no credible legal grounds to claim the KIG, and thus give the
Philippines an edge in future negotiations. But the decision could also go the
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The Philippines in the South China Sea: Out of Time, Out of Options? 249
other way. There is no substitute for peaceful political relations even if onl
a safeguard against possible abandonment by the United States.
After seven years, ASEAN and China signed the Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002 where they identified
four CBMs and five voluntary cooperative activities. It took another two years
before they agreed to the Terms of Reference for an ASEAN-China Joint
Working Group to implement the DOC, and another three years to draft those
guidelines. It was only after six years and when ASEAN agreed to drop its prior
insistence to consult among themselves that China agreed to the guidelines.23
Despite these delays, there was optimism that these hurdles could be overcome
because China and ASEAN were developing close political and economic ties.
They established the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area and, together with Japan
and South Korea, formed the East Asia Summit. China also became a staunch
supporter of ASEAN: it provided some assistance during the 1997-98 financial
crisis when the United States was unsympathetic, and was a staunch supporter
of ASEAN's centrality in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) when other
members were questioning ASEAN's leadership and consultative processes.
China was also open to signing the protocols to the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone treaty ahead
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250 Maria Ortuoste
of the United
Southeast Asia involving Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar such as in the
Mekong River.
China had generated such goodwill that sometimes Vietnam and the
Philippines are asked by other members to temper their statements against
China. Nevertheless, frustration was developing as COC negotiations dragged
on, and China remained unflinching. It continued to reject multilateral venues to
discuss the topic, griped about ASEAN's ganging up on China, insisted that
China will agree to a COC when the time is "ripe", and asked for a seat in
ASEAN discussions when the Philippines circulated an informal working draft
on the COC.24
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The Philippines in the South China Sea: Out of Time, Out of Options? 251
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252 Maria Ortuoste
or any agreem
discuss the CO
claimants wou
accession to an
China's own actions in the SCS and its efforts to divide ASEAN that led to
this proposed four-nation meeting which is, perhaps, the last best hope for
Philippines.
Notes
1. Benigno Aquino III, "Third State of the Nation Address", 23 July 2012 <http://www
gov.ph/2012/07/23/english-translation-benigno-s-aquino-iii-third-state-of-the-nation
address-july-23-2012/>.
2. SIPRI, "Background paper on SIPRI Military Expenditure, 2011" <http://www.sip
org/research/armaments/milex/sipri-factsheet-on-military-expenditure-2011 .pdf>.
3. "Manila Declaration on US-Philippine Alliance", 16 November 2011 <http://ww
state.gov.r.pa.prs.ps.2011.11.177226.htm>.
4. "Hillary Clinton's remarks with Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Philippine
Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario, and Philippines Defense Secretary Voltai
Gazmin after their [2+2] Meeting", Washington, D.C., 30 April 2012 <http://www.
state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/04/188982. htm>.
5. SIPRI Arms Trade Database <http://armstrade.sipri.org>.
6. John O'Callaghan and Manuel Mogato, "The U.S. Military Pivot to Asia: When
Bases are not Bases", Reuters, 14 November 2012 <http://www.abs-cbnnews.com
depth/11/14/12/us-military-pivot-asia-when-bases-are-not-bases>.
7. "Statement of Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert F. del Rosario regarding the Philippin
US Mutual Defense Treaty", Public Information Services Unit, 9 May 2012.
8. Thom Shanker and Ian Johnson, "In China, Panetta says American focus on Asia is
no threat", New York Times, 18 September 2012 <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/2
world/asia/panetta-meets-with-xi-easing-doubts-on-chinese-leader.html?_r=0>.
9. Renato Cruz de Castro, "Future Challenges in the US-Philippines Alliance", Asi
Pacific Bulletin, no. 168, 26 June 2012 <http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default
files/private/apbl68.pdf>.
10. "Joint Statement, Republic of the Philippines-People's Republic of China Consultation
on the South China Sea and on Other Areas of Cooperation", 10 August 1995
<http://www.scribd.com/doc/61125477/Joint-Statement-PRC-and-RP>.
11. "Joint Statement between China and the Philippines on the Framework of Bilateral
Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century", Beijing, 16 May 2000 <http://www.fmprc
gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/tl5785.htm#>.
12. Thomas Lum, "The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests", CRS Report f
Congress, 5 April 2012, p. 10 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33233.pdf>.
This content downloaded from 128.122.230.148 on Sat, 25 Feb 2017 02:26:01 UTC
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The Philippines in the South China Sea: Out of Time, Out of Options? 253
13. "PNoy brings home $11-billion investment deals from China", GMA New
4 September 2011 <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/231398/news/nat
brings-home-11 -billion-investment-deals-from-china>.
14. Roy C. Mabasa, "Philippines welcomes China investment advisor", Manila
27 March 2012 <http://mb.com.ph/node/355580/philippine>.
15. Carlyle A. Thayer, "ASEAN's Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: A
test for community building", Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, vol. 10, iss
no. 4 (20 August 2012).
16. Joseph Santolan, "Philippine protests further escalate tensions with China",
2012 <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2012/may2012/phch-ml 1 .shtml>.
17. Rodolfo C. Severino, "The Philippines' National Territory", in Southea
Affairs 2012, edited by Daljit Singh and Pushpa Thambipillai (Singapore:
of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), pp. 257-62.
18. Matikas Santos, "Lacierda: Aquino won't give up Scarborough Shoal", I
Global Nation, 23 July 2012 <http://globalnation.inquirer.net/45205/lacierda
wont-give-up-scarborough-shoal>.
19. Sam Bateman, "Managing the South China Sea: Sovereignty is not the is
Commentaries no. 136/2011, 29 September 2011 <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publ
Perspective/RSIS 1362011 .pdf>.
20. ICG, "Stirring up the South China Sea (I)", 23 April 2012 <http://www.crisis
org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/223-stirring-up-the-south-china-sea-i>.
21. Gil C. Cabacungan, "Aquino's back channel to China is Trillanes", Philipp
Inquirer, 19 September 2012 <http://globalnation.inquirer.net/50558/aquinos
channel-to-china-is-trillanes>.
25. Jason Szep and James Pomfret, "Tensions flare over South China Sea
summit", Reuters, 19 November 2012 <http://www.reuters.com/article/201
us-asia-summit-idUSBRE8 AI0BC201221119>.
26. Kyodo News Agency, "PH scraps meet of 4 ASEAN claimants in S. Chin
disputes", ABS-CBN News.com, 7 December 2012 <http://www.abs-cbnnew
nation/12/07/12/ph-scraps-meet-4-asean-claimants-s-china-sea-disputes>.
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