Brief description of the issue on WEST PHILIPPINES SEA CONFLICT

The South China Sea (“West Philippine Sea”) has been for several years a space of potential conflict
between several countries due to overlapping of their EEZs and China’s claim of a large part of this oceanic
space, well beyond its UN-endorsed EEZ. The Spratly islets and Scarborough shoal are mere coral reefs,
uninhabited for the most part, but they lie in the middle of rich fishing grounds and atop large reserves of
petroleum and natural gas. Furthermore, the area is one of the world’s busiest sea lanes for commercial
navigation. This chapter presents the general rules of UNCLOS (international laws pertaining to oceanic
space), and then examines the competing claims, focusing on the China-Philippines dispute. Despite a
resounding legal victory of the Philippines at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, Chinese
encroachment and buildup has continued. A major uncertainty lies in the level of support of the United States
towards the Philippines, which appears as a small local player within a powerful rivalry between two
superpowers, but tries to gather support from other Asian nations such as Vietnam and Japan.

Probable solution on the issue

The first solution is the solution that has been always on the negotiation table between the Philippines and
China: that is, joint exploration of the Scarborough Shoal while shelving the dispute on sovereignty. But even
here, the two countries can go further than a minimalist solution. They can agree to develop the disputed
waters into a jointly administered ecological and biological exploration station that allows scientists from both
countries and beyond to explore life beneath the South China Sea, and an eco-friendly tourism site that allows
people from all over the world to experience the beauty of the South China Sea.

The second solution is more radical and thus more path-breaking. This solution is for the Philippines
and China to mutually recognize each other’s sovereignty claims over the Scarborough Shoal, in addition to
the bargain proposed in solution one.

Evidences that it will help the Asian countries

Contrary to the thinking in certain quarters, the Philippines does not lay claim to the entire South China
Sea (SCS), but rather to that smaller area of the SCS off the country’s western seaboard that is well within its
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf and is known as the West Philippine Sea (WPS). The
WPS would include the Kalayaan Island Group (part of the larger Spratlys group of features in the SCS), and
Bajo de Masinloc, also locally called the Panatag Shoal and internationally known as Scarborough Shoal. But
the Kalayaan Island Group and Bajo de Masinloc are actually distinct and quite distant from one other.
Moreover, while the Kalayaan Island Group hosts features that are above water, with some large enough to be
considered islands, Bajo de Masinloc is an entirely submerged feature. As such, their maritime entitlements
differ, as does the basis for Manila’s claims.

The WPS is critical for the Philippines for strategic, security and economic reasons, not to mention
national patrimony and territorial integrity. The WPS is the source of most of the country’s indigenous oil and
gas, with the potential to meet the country’s fuel demand in the next 20 years, while also hosting a wide array
of seabed minerals. While other SCS claimants like China, for instance, can boast onshore and offshore
producing basins outside the SCS, the Philippines’ present oil and gas production are clustered around
offshore northwest Palawan and the Recto (Reed) Bank in the WPS. Seismic studies suggest that these two
areas possess the greatest potential for a country long dependent on oil imports. As the Philippines continues
to develop its offshore hydrocarbons exploration and development capabilities, while attracting local and
foreign investors in harnessing these resources, the WPS promises to figure in the country’s quest for future
energy security and self-sufficiency.

This may help to explain why the trilateral Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (2005-2008) was publicly
criticized after news emerged that the coverage area includes 75-80 percent of the Philippines’ western EEZ,
including the gas-rich Recto Bank. The notion of sharing scarce finite resources with other states led many to
reject the proposed continuation of the deal. It was also said that JMSU gave China a window to
claim previously undisputed maritime areas, such as Recto Bank and other waters very close to Palawan.

The WPS is also home to 20% of the country’s fisheries catch. Its rich coral formations serve as
spawning grounds that replenish depleted stocks in waters adjacent to the Philippines. It is also a transit area
for migratory species. The development of the local commercial fishing industry will, therefore, hinge on a
sustainably managed use of these living marine resources in the WPS, which is under threat from poaching
and use of illegal and destructive fishing practices. Local fishermen visiting certain parts of the WPS have also
been harassed and chased away by armed troops and paramilitary ships of other occupants. The need to
develop the country’s naval and maritime law enforcement assets is thus essential, both to protect local
fishermen and to conserve the fisheries resources of the WPS for future Filipino generations.

The WPS is also important from a national security standpoint. In fact, during World War II, Japanese
invaders used an island in the Spratlys to stage attacks against Philippine positions. The fear of the Kalayaan
Island Group falling into the hands of another state thus has echoes of the past. Indeed, as early as 1933, long
before the country attained self-rule from the U.S., Filipino leaders had already expressed the importance of
incorporating the features of the WPS as an integral and indispensable part of their nation.

The WPS also lies along major Philippine trading channels, and control of these waters by an unfriendly
state could cripple the country’s improving economy. To this concern add the close proximity of many foreign-
occupied features. Hence, China’s 1995 occupation of Panganiban (Mischief) Reef, its alleged effective
occupation of Bajo de Masinloc since last year and recent moves in Ayungin (Second Thomas) Shoal have all
been met with concern and even outrage in the Philippines. These developments lend credence to the idea of
a creeping westward push by China towards poorly defended Philippine posts. This, in turn, prompts calls for
the modernization of the Philippine Navy and the Philippine Air Force to deter further intrusions and occupation
of new features and to guard against unfriendly moves by other claimants. The increasing assertiveness of
other claimants also pushes the Philippines closer to its mutual defense treaty ally, the U.S., whose forces
have been allowed a rotational presence in the country since 1999, eight years after the termination of the U.S.
bases agreement.

All of this demonstrates the significance of the WPS for the Philippines. Allegations that Manila is
making a mountain out of a molehill should be reconsidered in light of these legitimate interests. Emphasis on
adherence to diplomacy and international law and a commitment to maintaining good relations with neighbors
have long prevented the Philippines from fortifying and enhancing military facilities in its administered features,
but further erosion of its defensive position may encourage a rethink. Moreover, because of the proximity
access and potential transformative impact on Philippine economic development of WPS resources, any
cooperative undertaking (namely, joint development) with other claimants may need to entail significant
concessions to assuage Philippine fears that it is being disadvantaged.

The Philippines had been seeking to align its position in the WPS with international law. In 2009, the
country passed its baselines law, wherein the Kalayaan Island Group and Bajo de Masinloc were placed under
a “regime of islands” consistent with UNCLOS, signaling that Manila has no interest in drawing EEZs and
ECSs for its WPS features, which would excessively expand the country’s maritime entitlements and cause it
to overlap with the maritime claims of other SCS disputants. The Philippines is also advocating a rules-based
approach that calls for the delineation of areas under dispute from those that are undisputed, to facilitate talks
on functional cooperation or joint development in disputed areas. This position had been communicated at
regional meetings and summits on the SCS issue. The recent filing of a legal challenge against China’s claims
in the WPS can also be understood as resorting to international law to encourage a rival claimant to clarify the
extent, nature and bases of its claims.