20
2014
The Arab War(s) on Terror
by Florence Gaub and Patryk Pawlak
With jihadi groups in control of swathes of Iraq,
deadly attacks occurring on a weekly basis across
the region, and governments adopting harsher
measures to counter the spiral of violence, terror-
ism is back on the Arab agenda. Three years after
the killing of Osama bin Laden, terrorist groups
– some affiliated with al-Qaeda, some not – are
making inroads following a decade of relative con-
tainment. And while the region is no stranger to
terrorism, Arab states now seem more determined
than ever to stamp out the phenomenon.
The return of al-Qaeda…
Although it is true that al-Qaeda suffered serious
setbacks in the decade following 9/11 – in par-
ticular the killing of Osama bin Laden and sev-
eral other top leaders – it has managed to regroup
and establish strong regional franchises. Indeed,
the majority of terrorist attacks are now perpe-
trated by al-Qaeda’s regional outlets rather than
­al-Qaeda central.
Although al-Qaeda in Iraq was severely weakened
during the 2007 US military surge, it has regained
strength since the withdrawal of American forces.
Originally linked to Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda
affiliate participating in the fighting in Syria, the
group fell out with the central leadership over
questions of hierarchy. Now, having dissociated
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Hussein Malla/AP/SIPA
itself from al-Qaeda proper since February 2014
and calling itself the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL or ISIS), the group has embarked
on a full-scale guerrilla war against the govern-
ments of Iraq and Syria. Further south, Al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is mainly ac-
tive in Yemen, where it is currently engaged in a
bloody conflict with the Yemeni security forces.
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emerged
from the remnants of the Algerian Salafist Group
for Preaching and Combat in 2007 and has since
conducted numerous terrorist operations aimed
primarily at Algerian and European targets.
Al-Qaeda has thus become a more regional or-
ganisation than it was before, harnessing local
and national grievances to further its own agenda.
In Iraq, for instance, ISIS plays on Sunni dissatis-
faction following the establishment of a political
system from which they feel disenfranchised. In
Egypt, al-Qaeda called for war against the Egyptian
military after the ousting of President Morsi, while
Jabhat al-Nusra has managed to use the chaos of
the Syrian civil war to its own advantage.
…and friends
In addition to al-Qaeda, other terrorist groups
have also grown in strength, especially in areas
where weakened states are unable to control or
June 2014 1
 Terrorist attacks and casualties (regional) In addition, the limited capacity of most coun-
tries in the region to control their own borders
facilitates the movement of terrorist groups and
ATTACKS CASUALTIES supplies. Accordingly, local or national terrorist
190 50,000

42,549
networks operate regionally because they have the
180 freedom to do so. The border area between Syria
170 40,000 and Iraq has been practically unguarded since
160 the US-led invasion, resulting in a ‘jihadi high-
150 way’ running in both directions. Lebanon’s bor-
30,000 der with Syria is just as open, allowing Hizbullah
140 fighters and equipment to cross unimpeded. This

17,425
130 matters, as Syria’s civil war has taken on a regional
120 20,000
dimension precisely because its borders are open
9,284

110 to fighters from abroad.

7,383

100 10,000
6,833
6,329

6,106
5,714

The weapons surplus in Libya has turned the

1, 784

90
80 country into a lucrative market for all groups
5,000
1,440

across the region (Egyptian networks in the Sinai

70 recently shot down a military helicopter with sur-
3,720

1,000
448

60 face-to-air missiles most likely obtained in Libya).

409

978

50 North African states therefore view the disintegra-

386

40 500 tion of Libya’s security apparatus with great con-

30 cern. Egypt, for example, has repeatedly called
20 100 for an international conference regarding Libya’s
119

10 borders to be held later this year. Generally speak-

ing, Arab states are seeking more international
0 0 cooperation in the War on Terror, and it is in this
0
2
4
6
8
2010
2012
2014
200
200
200
200
200

spirit that Iraq organised the first international

Conference on Combating Terrorism in March
Sources for data: Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (1999 - 2010), this year.
media sources (2011 - 2014).

contain them. A case in point is Egypt’s Sinai,
where various home-grown Egyptian groups –
such as Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, Jama’at al-Tawhid,
and armed Bedouins disgruntled with the govern-
ment – have joined forces. Although this develop-
ment preceded the events of 2011 (tourists were
already targeted several times between 2004 and
2006), attacks have since intensified. Similarly,
groups like Ansar al-Sharia are taking advantage of
the implosion of Libya’s security structure to con-
duct operations, particularly in the eastern parts
of the country. Adding to regional worries, the
branches of Ansar al-Sharia in Libya and Tunisia
also recently announced their unification.
For two reasons, terrorism in the Arab world is,
by default, a regional and not a national problem.
Borders in the region are notoriously porous due
to geographical constraints: the desert landscape
of the Sahel zone and the Arab peninsula is dif-
ficult to effectively patrol. Saudi Arabia resorted
to building a concrete barrier along its border
with Yemen in 2003, and the oil-rich kingdom
recently announced its intention to build a simi-
lar structure (costing €2.5 billion) on its border
with Iraq.
Re-defining terrorism: legal measures
Arab states are being called upon to address the
current threats; as US President Obama declared
this week, it is their job to stop the slide into in-
security. In any case, terrorism is not a new phe-
nomenon in the Arab world, and the region has
already seen off waves of sustained attacks in the
1940s, 1950s, and 1990s.
In 1998, the Arab League adopted the Arab
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism,
which defined terrorism as ‘any act or threat of
violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that
occurs in the advancement of an individual or col-
lective criminal agenda and seeking to sow panic
among people, causing fear by harming them, or
placing their lives, liberty or security in danger,
or seeking to cause damage to the environment or
to public or private installations or property or to
occupying or seizing them, or seeking to jeopard-
ise a national resource.’ Following 9/11, however,
Arab regimes stalled attempts to establish an in-
ternational definition of terrorism at a UN level,
worrying that it might be conflated with the le-
gitimate right to resist occupation.

European Union Institute for Security Studies June 2014 2

 Terrorist attacks Terrorist attacks and casualties (national)
Tunisia Lebanon Syria Iraq

28,969
ATTACKS CASUALTIES ATTACKS CASUALTIES ATTACKS CASUALTIES 50,000 ATTACKS CASUALTIES 50,000

13,414
12,216
20 100 60 622 1,000 110

7,820
50 10,000 100 10,000
10 5 3 81 14 558

5,905

5,785
4

6,418

5,311
0 0 40 412 500 90

3,390
0
2
4
6
8
2010
2012
2014
30 5,000 80 5,000
200
200
200
200
200

321 100
20 56 70

4,502
Algeria 16 1,000 1,000

2,685
10 60

988
ATTACKS CASUALTIES 0 0 50
30

826
0
2
4
6
8
2010
2012
2014
93 500 40 500

200
200
200
200
200
20 26 30 55 69 100 276

200 Lack of data

37 33 41 32 23 30
10 7 5 15 8 Kuwait 20 100 20 100
0 0 ATTACKS CASUALTIES 33 39 39
10 50 10 6 5 10
0
2
4
6
8
2010
2012
2014

3 4 17 7 4
200
200
200
200
200

2 0 0 0 0
0 0

0
2
4
6
8
2010
2012
2014

0
2
4
6
8
2010
2012
2014
Morocco

200

200
200

200
200
200

200
200

200
0
2
4
6
8
2010
2012
2014
200
200
200
200
200
ATTACKS 145 CASUALTIES
20 100
Lebanon Syria
Bahrain
10 34 36 ATTACKS CASUALTIES
Tunisia Iraq 10 50
0 0 3 4
0 0
0
2
4
6
8
2010
2012
2014
200
200

Morocco
200
200
200

Kuwait

0
2
4
6
8
2010
2012
2014
Jordan

200
Algeria

200
200
200
200
Mauritania Libya
ATTACKS CASUALTIES Bahrain United Arab United Arab Emirates
43 Egypt Qatar
10 12 6 50 Emirates ATTACKS CASUALTIES
10 50
0
Saudi Arabia 0 0
0
2
4
6
8
2010
2012
2014
200
200
200
200
200

0
2
4
6
8
2010
2012
2014
Mauritania Oman

200
200
200
200
200
Jordan Sudan
ATTACKS 55 CASUALTIES
Yemen Qatar
10 1 2 3 50 ATTACKS CASUALTIES
7 2 10 50
0 0 14
Yemen 0
1
0
0
2
4
6
8
2010
2012
2014
200
200
200
200
200

0
2
4
6
8
2010
2012
2014
120 ATTACKS CASUALTIES

200
200
200
200
200
Libya 110
ATTACKS CASUALTIES 100 Saudi Arabia
500
10 17 28 50 Sudan 90
30
ATTACKS
182 122
CASUALTIES
0 0 ATTACKS CASUALTIES 5,000 80 5,000
20 100
0
2
4
6
8
2010
2012
2014

70 1,241 70 1,089
200
200
200
200
200

866 1,000 949 1,000 10 12 9 1 1 12 4 18

60 60
0 0
Egypt 50 617 50 598 618

0
2
4
6
8
2010
2012
2014
470 50 502

200
200
200
200
200
ATTACKS CASUALTIES 500 40 318 500 40 500
209 201 30 207 216 30 114 163
30 123 165
80 93 Oman
20
111 94
100 20 48
32 41 158 100 20 56 106 100 ATTACKS CASUALTIES
10 10 15 10 5 10 25 19 23 10 50
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
2
4
6
8
2010
2012
2014

0
2
4
6
8
2010
2012
2014

0
2
4
6
8
2010
2012
2014

0
2
4
6
8
2010
2012
2014
200

200

200

200
200

200

200

200
200

200

200

200
200

200

200

200
200

200

200

200
Sources for data: Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (1999 - 2010), media sources (2011 - 2014).
Source: Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (1999 - 2010), media sources (2011 - 2014).

Now, however, several Arab states have (re)de- into doing or refraining from doing something.’
fined terrorism in even more sweeping ways. In In a similar vein, Algeria toughened its terrorism
April, Jordan issued a new law introducing harsh- law last year. Against the current trend, Tunisia is
er sentences for terrorism – broadly defined as currently reviewing its 2003 law (which defined
‘any act meant to create sedition, harm property terrorism as acts which could ‘disturb the public
or jeopardise international relations, or to use order’ and ‘bring harm to persons or property’) in
the internet or media outlets to promote terror- order to bring it into line with international hu-
ist thinking’ – which include ten year’s incarcera- man rights standards.
tion or the death penalty. Egypt’s newly elected
President al-Sisi has made the fight against ter-
rorism his number one priority, and a draft law Creating more enemies?
is currently being reviewed which defines terror-
ism as actions which may: ‘obstruct’ the work of Where terrorism is defined in too broad a man-
public officials, universities, mosques, embassies, ner, it is often hard to distinguish between legiti-
or international institutions, qualify as ‘intimida- mate political opposition and terrorism.
tion’, ‘harm national unity’, prevent the applica-
tion of the country’s constitution and laws, or The Syrian regime frames its crackdown on a pop-
‘damage the economy’. In June, the Egyptian gov- ular uprising as a fight against Islamist terrorism,
ernment also announced a new system of mass while in Egypt, several journalists working for Al
surveillance of social media to combat terrorism. Jazeera have been sentenced to lengthy prison
terms for having assisted the Muslim Brotherhood.
In Iraq, the relevant law states that anyone ‘who The official branding of the Brotherhood as a ter-
instigated, planned or financed, or enabled ter- rorist organisation by Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia
rorists groups […] shall be punishable by death.’ and the United Arab Emirates – 86 years after its
Saudi Arabia’s 2013 terrorism law vaguely defines founding – seems questionable given the group’s
it as ‘any act harming the reputation or standing renunciation of violence in the 1970s. And al-
of the state, or attempting to coerce authorities though the Brotherhood stands accused of being

European Union Institute for Security Studies June 2014 3

involved in the recent terrorist attacks which have soared across the region. Most of these additional
struck Egypt (a charge it denies), the Egyptian resources will fund new positions (8,700 new
government has, so far, failed to produce any evi- posts were created in Tunisia), or salary increases
dence in support of its claims. and other perks for existing staff.

Several countries have also taken decisive steps to
deal with returning fighters from Syria. According
to the International Centre for the Study of
Radicalisation, up to 11,000 individuals from 74
nations have taken up arms as opposition fight-
ers in Syria. Some countries simply question, and
then either release or monitor, the suspected indi-
viduals. Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Jordan, how-
ever, threaten returning fighters with jail terms.
It remains to be seen to what extent these new
laws will curtail freedom of expression or be used
to clamp down on citizens expressing discontent
through either public protest or social media. But
governments should be wary of the limits of re-
pressive techniques: the abuse of new laws to fight
political opponents rather than genuine terrorists,
combined with pervasive corruption and contin-
ued human rights violations, may have negative
consequences for domestic and regional stability.
The barring of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front
from politics in 1992, for example, undoubtedly
contributed to the group’s radicalisation.
Across the board, Arab citizens support meas-
ures against terrorism: according to a Pew sur-
vey, public support for al-Qaeda has decreased to
17%, while 66% of those questioned expressed
concern over Islamic extremism. However, sup-
port for Hamas (which Egypt declared a terrorist
organisation in 2014) and Hizbullah (declared a
terrorist organisation by the Gulf states in 2013)
remains steady at 46% and 33%, respectively.
Nevertheless, the situation of Arab security
personnel remains dire. Underpaid and over-
stretched, domestic security forces are also often
under-equipped or employed to monitor political
opponents rather than terrorist networks. Security
forces in Tunis recently went on strike in pro-
test against their lack of equipment, and in Iraq,
the intelligence services – crippled after Prime
Minister Maliki dismissed personnel trained by
US instructors – were almost blind to the devel-
opments leading up to the current crisis.
Tough choices?
The knock-on effects of terrorism in the Arab
world are being felt across the Mediterranean: EU
and Arab League officials agreed at the third min-
isterial meeting in June 2014 ‘to share, as appro-
priate, assessments and best practices, as well as
to cooperate in identifying practical steps to help
address the threats’.
While recognising the ‘shared interest in ensuring
that terrorism and violent radicalisation be elimi-
nated from the region’, the EU has consistently
stressed that the fight against terrorism must not
come at the expense of civil liberties and human
rights.
Florence Gaub and Patryk Pawlak are Senior
Analysts at the EUISS.

Upping the ante: logistical measures

Arab states have also taken practical steps to curb
terrorist activity. Egypt has deployed several bat-
talions in the Sinai, and Tunisia (increasing its
troop deployment rates eight-fold) has ordered
the aerial bombardment of terrorist training
camps on its soil. Algeria, struck by a major attack
on an oil installation in early 2013, has reshuffled
its internal security directorate, dismissed high-
ranking officers in charge of the dossier, and sent
some 5,000 troops to patrol its border with Libya.
Algeria also joined forces back in 2010 with Mali,
Mauritania and Niger to create a joint military
committee to combat AQIM.

Despite difficult financial conditions, the budgets

of both internal and external security forces have

European Union Institute for Security Studies June 2014 4

© EU Institute for Security Studies, 2014. | QN-AK-14-020-2A-N | ISSN 2315-1110