ROYONG VS.

OBLENA
AC No. 376 April 30, 1963
En Banc, Barrera

Facts
Respondent Ariston Oblena, a member of the bar and bench, is accused of rape by the
complainant, Josefina Royong. There was no rape, the investigation by the Solicitor General
revealed; rather, the complainant and respondent appeared to have had consensual sex.
According to his own research findings, the respondent was nonetheless guilty of additional
misbehavior even though he did not commit the alleged rape. The respondent is accused by the
Solicitor General of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles while also having illegal relations
with the 18-year-old Josefina Royong, and of making false and intentional claims in his
application for admission to the bar that he is a person of excellent moral character. Thus,
making him unfit to practice law, the petitioner requests that this Court issue a judgment ordering
the respondent's permanent removal as a lawyer and judge.

Issues

1. Whether or not the respondent's adulterous cohabitation with Briccia Angeles and their
unlawful relationship with Josefina Royong warrants disbarment.

Decision

Ariston Oblena was disbarred.

 Magdalena T. Arciga vs. Segundino D. Maniwang
AC No. 1608, 106 SCRA 651, August 14, 1981

Facts

Sometime in October 1970, Magdalena and Segundino met in Cebu City. Segundino was a law
student, and Magdalena studied medical technology. Magdalena and Segundino had a sexual
congress in March 1971. Following that, they frequently engaged in cohabitation. Segundino
began spreading the rumor that he and Magdalena were secretly married to his friends.
Segundino moved his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur, in 1972. In Davao City, he continued
his studies. Magdalena found out she was pregnant in January 1973. In order to inform
Magdalena's parents that they were married even though they weren't, the two traveled to her
birthplace of Ivisan, Capiz. The respondent persuaded Magdalena's father to postpone the church
ceremony until after he had successfully completed the bar exams, at which point he obtained his
birth certificate in preparation for submitting an application for a marriage license. Magdalena
was persuaded by Segundino that he will get married after passing the bar exams. On September
4, 1973, the latter gave birth to their child. The bar examinations, which were announced on
April 25, 1975, were passed by Segundo. Following the swearing-in, Segundino stopped
communicating with Magdalena. For a call to Segundino, Magdalena traveled to Davao. Due to a
lack of funds, Segundino informed her that they could not get married. Magdalena followed
Segundino to Bukidnon in December 1975, but she soon learned that their marriage could not
take place because he had already wed Erlinda Ang. Because Magdalena had an altercation with
his wife, Erlinda Ang, Segundino pursued her in Davao and hurt her physically. After he refused
to marry her, Magdalena Arciga initiated a disbarment action on the grounds of egregiously
immoral behavior.

Issues

Whether Segundino Maniwang should lose his license due to his egregious behavior

Decision
Segundino Maniwang shouldn't be barred, in other words. The Supreme Court determined that
the respondent's reluctance to wed the plaintiff wasn't sufficiently dishonest or unethical to merit
disbarment. The respondent's disbarment complaint is hereby withdrawn.
 CUI vs CUI

G.R. No. L-18727, August 31, 1964

Facts

The Hospicio is a charitable organization founded by the now-deceased spouses Don Pedro Cui
and Doa Benigna Cui "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and
incapacitated and helpless persons." It was given corporate existence by law (Act No. 3239 of
the Philippine Legislature passed 27 November 1926) and was endowed with substantial
properties by the said spouses through a number of donations, primarily the deed to the property
in question In accordance with Section 2 of Act No. 3239, the founders jointly were given initial
management, and in the event of their incapacity or demise, "such people as they may nominate
or designate, in the order pres'cribed to them."

Defendant Jesus Ma. Cui and Antonio Ma, the accused. Cui are brothers and the sons of Mariano
Cui, a nephew of Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui. On February 27, 1960, Dr. Teodoro Cui,
the previous administrator, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui on the terms of a "convenio"
they made and that was recorded in a notarial document. A day later, on February 28, Antonio
Ma. Cui took the oath required by law. Lord Ma. However, Cui was unaware of the "convenio"
or his brother's appointment before it happened.

On September 5, 1960, the plaintiff sent a letter to the defendant requesting that the office be
given to him. On September 13, 1960, after receiving no response to his letter, the plaintiff filed
the complaint in this matter. Later, Romulo Cui intervened and asserted his claim to the position
as Vicente Cui's grandson, another of the nephews named by the Hospicio's founders in their
deed of donation.

Regarding Jesus and Antonio, the fundamental argument revolves around each person's
eligibility for the administrator job. According to section 2 of the deed of donation, Jesus would
be chosen if all things were equal because he is the oldest of the two. The deed, however, gives
preference to the one among the legal descendants of the nephews named therein "who posesa
titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, or a falta de estos titulos, el que
pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion," before the test of age may be applied.

Issue

Whether Jesus Ma. Cui is entitled to the position of administrator.

Decision

No, the phrase "titulo de abogado" refers to membership in the Bar upon proper admission,
which qualifies one to practice law, not only holding a Bachelor of Laws degree.

In this country, the Supreme Court has the power to regulate both bar admission and legal
practice. In accordance with Rule 138, admittance to the profession entails passing the Bar
Exams, swearing to uphold the law, and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, which
serves as his license to practice. Except as proof of compliance with the requirement that an
applicant to the examinations has "Successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law
school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education," a Bachelor of Laws
degree has little to do with admission to the Bar in and of itself.

However, having a degree is not required for this purpose; proof of passing the required courses
can be provided in other ways. There have been occasions where people without any formal legal
training in college have been permitted to sit for the Bar exams and become licensed attorneys,
notably while the previous Code of Civil Procedure was in effect. Dismissal of the complaint and
the complaint in the intervention; judgment reversed and put aside.
JOSE I. MEDINA, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF THE LATE
ABUNDIO CASTANARES, Represented byANDRES CASTANARES, Respondents.

G.R. No. 137582 : August 29, 2012

FACTS

Wenceslao Mahilum, Jr., age 4, was run over and injured, and Arles Castares (Arles), now
deceased and represented by his heirs, was ordered to pay damages. The victim in the
aforementioned lawsuit was represented by the petitioner Jose Medina (Medina). Arles was
forced to forfeit two land lots covered by Tax Declaration Numbers 1107 and 1106 in order to
pay the judgment, according to the sheriff.

The lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 1107 was put up for sale when the heirs of Arles failed
to pay their debt, with Medina placing the highest bid. Medina submitted an application for the
abovementioned lot's registration. The heirs of the late Abundio Castares (Abundio), represented
by Arles' brother Andres (Andres), filed an opposition, nevertheless. Andres asserted that Tax
Declaration No. 1107 was revoked upon the passing of his father Abundio, and as a result, a new
tax declaration was made in his favor. He steadfastly maintained his ownership of the
aforementioned piece of property.

The RTC decided in Medina's favor. On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC and added that it
was premature for Arles to designate a specific area of the property as his share of the estate
because the estate of Abundio has not yet been settled.

ISSUE
Whether or not Abundio's heirs have a legitimate claim to the disputed lot?

DECISION

The petition is denied.

A tax declaration is insufficient proof of ownership in civil law, according to the heirs'
ownership rights over the decedent's assets.

There was no settlement of Abundio's inheritance, as the appeal court correctly noted. There is
also no evidence that Lot 224 has already been divided notwithstanding Abundio's passing.
According to established law, an heir's claim to the decedent's property is only incipient as long
as the estate hasn't been fully settled and divided. This means that no specific property in the
decedent's estate that could be explicitly levied upon and sold at public auction is currently under
the absolute authority of the upcoming heir.
Therefore, any attachment over the heirs' rights in the estate remains only a possibility and
cannot be completely satisfied without the ultimate division of the estate's assets. The concerned
property is still covered by the Estate of Abundio, which has not yet been divided, hence the
public auction sale of the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 1107 is invalid. According to
Tax Declaration No. 110 7, Arles' ownership of the lot could not be established. It might not be
incorrect to say that a tax declaration alone is insufficient to establish ownership.

Petition is DENIED. The CA is AFFIRMED.