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Intelligence Memorandum, Washington, September l6, 1969

The CIA produced a paper on the implications of the Libyan coup, suggesting that the

moderation of the new regime was likely to be temporary.

[CIA]

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1239, Saunders

Files, Libya, 1969. Secret. Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, Central

Intelligence Agency. It was discussed with representatives of the Office of Current

Intelligence and the Office of Economic Research, who were in general agreement With

its judgments. In research memorandum RAF I8, September 10, Denney furnished
Rogers with information on the leaders of the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council.

(Ibid., RG 59, Central Files, I967-69, POL 15 Libya.) (eleelass) Another Central

Intelligence Agency Memorandum released in September, ER IM 69-125, assessed the

importance of Libyan oil to the United States and its allies. (Central Intelligence Agency,

OER Files, IM 69~l25.)

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MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Implications of the Libyan Coup:

Some Initial Thoughts

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/secfi 16 September 1969

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

16 September 1969

{:1

MEMORANDUM -

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SUBJECT: Implications of the Libyan Coup: Some Initial b

Thoughts* é

The Nature of the New Regime

4

l. The identity of the rulers of the new Libyan govern-

ment remains unclear and no authoritative statements of their

objectives and priorities have been made. Nonetheless, they

§

appear in control, and continue to show a posture of moderation

1

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--M").

and caution. Though avowing "socialism", no Libyan leader has

mouthed the extremist slogans typical of Arab radicals. To the

contrary, such themes as the protection of foreign lives and

property, the fulfillment of international obligations, and

the elimination of corruption and favoritism at home have been

stressed. "Social reform" has been emphasized far more than

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* This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National

Estimates. It was discussed with representatives of
,

the Office of Current Intelligence and the Office of

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Economic Research, who are in general agreement with its

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judgments.
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-
.

Excluded from automatic

S- —R-E-T downgrading and
_declassification

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socialism in Libyan broadcasts. In private conversations with

Revolutionary Command
US officials, members of the ruling
have given the
Council (RCO) have gone even further, and
with the United
impression of seeking very close relations

States.

dissimulation,
Such statements may be deliberate
p
2.
counterrevolutionary
designed to reduce any threat of foreign
2

intervention; in
intervention. The RCC probably feared US/UK
made good sense.
such circumstances, conciliatory reassurances
u

mutual defense
The UK did put Idris in power and signed a
were some
agreement with him. At the time of the coup, there
an RAF base close
l,100 British troops near Tobruq, along with
American
by. In addition there was Wheelus, with some 5,000 g
3’

personnel, and the Sixth Fleet was not far away.

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pt

3. Whatever the case, the moderate posture of the Libyan

are no very good
regime is probably temporary, though there
will change.
grounds for predicting just when or how this stance
tendency of
We base the judgment that it will on the general

Arab politics over the past two decades: other military-

dominated revolutionary regimes have tended, almost

without

passage
exception, to become more leftist and extreme with the

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about under one leader.

of time. In Egypt's case this has come
of successive military
In Syria and Iraq, it was the result
regimes to power.
coups which brought ever more radical

both. It has already

Libya could follow either path, or
h.
and will quickly
declared itself in the Arab revolutionary camp, ~:'.’~

While the RCC members --

be receiving advice from its new brethren.
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-- remain shadowy figures, we know

the ultimate power in Libya
'§

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~§

their new government

that at least some civilian officials of
of influence. So, in all
will be highly susceptible to this type

probability, will be the RCC itself, not

wanting its image tar-
sincere or ardent.
nished by accusations that it is less than
x

Ihe Future of Libyan

Politics
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35

one in
Beyond this, the coup ~- as did the July 1958
5.
_

Iraq -- has probably created a precedent

which will not be for-
had long
gotten. Most observers inside and outside of Libya
in Idris' lifetime.
believed that a military takeover was unlikely
officers) was greatly
The little army of 8,000 (with only 200—3OO
lacked that essential
outnumbered by the royalist police forces; it
still powerful
instrument of Arab revolution, the tank. The

tribes in Cyrenaica were loyal to the King,

who in fact was
of secretly
generally respected by most Libyans. The task
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takeover of the
planning and carrying out a coordinated
hundreds of miles
principal population centers separated by

of desert seemed insuperable.

proved it could
But the RCC, with some armored cars,
6.
to be lost on other
be done, and this lesson is not likely
Libyans in the future. We do not know
how many officers --
-— are in the RCC,
apparently mostly captains and lieutenants
maintain secrecy and
but suspect the group is small enough to
direction and
security and large enough to assure adequate
Nor do we know how
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command a coup -- perhaps 50 to 60 people.

its members might be
cohesive this group is, or how susceptible
intrigue. In
to possible Algerian or Egyptian influence and
certainly be
the years ahead, the Libyan arm will almost §

on a program which
expanded (the old regime had already embarked
its size}. In the
would upgrade its equipment and nearly double
small clandestine
new and more heated political climate of Libya,
and the like will
officer groups of Baathist, Arab Nationalists

appear; over time, some may succeed in

seizing power.

Western Military Facilities

sticky
T. The US and the UK will likely be in for some

times in the years ahead. An overriding theme of the new

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an aggressive
government, and of any conceivable successor, is
support of
and militant anti-Israeli posture, and American
the new
Israel will cause serious problems. For the moment,

government has said nothing about Wheelus and the British

military facilities in Libya, or made an move against them.

As it consolidates its hold on power and seeks to get more

and L
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more into the mainstream of Arab nationalism, it will probably ,a$‘»*»?T€"'\."“»'f€$"'FC<;"-

It might permit them to remain until the respective

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do so. it
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for example, it could, under the terms of

2‘.

treaties expire:

the Base Rights Agreement, formally give notice to the US in

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December 1970 that it must be out of Wheelus within a year.

,

But pressures, both internal and external, for earlier removal

will be strong, and we would give Wheelus only a 50-50 chance of m

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survival until late 1971 -- and virtually no chance at all of V

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remaining after that. The British, already disliked as the

patrons of the old regime, are unlikely to remain all the way

to 1973, when their mutual defense pact expires.

Petroleum Policy

8. Relations with the oil companies will be a more

complicated matter; in this field, such radical tendencies

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as the new regime may have are

likely to be tempered by practical

considerations. Idris' government

had already initiated nego-
Libya's share of oil
tiations aimed at substantially raising
continue, and Libyan demands
revenues. These will of course
follow the course of either of the
may increase. ,The new regime may
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Iraq or Algeria. The former

other two Arab radical oil producers,
much alone, though it has
has left current operations pretty
Petroleum Company from
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prevented the US~UK-French owned Iraq 7

The Algerians have been

expanding into new concession areas.
the June 1967 Arab~Israeli
much tougher. Indeed at the time of
of putting all American companies
war, they took the extreme step
of total output) under
(which controlled only about l0 percent
repatriation of any earnings,
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Algerian management and forbade the

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the French companies, which

an arrangement still in effect. With
the government has been
produce the bulk of Algeria's petroleum,
engage in harassment in
less harsh, but it has not hesitated to
output. The new Libyan
the quest for more revenue and more
demands on the US and UK
government is likely to make similar 1

companies which produce nearly all the

Libyan oil. We doubt,

as rigorously as American
however, that they will be treated
such treatment cannot be
producers have been in Algeria, though
of another major Arab-Israeli
ruled out, especially in the event _,,,._

war ¢

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9.- There are some rather persuasive reasons why Libyan

oil policy appears more likely to resemble that of Algeria.

Like the latter, Libya holds some high cards; its oil comes

from west of the Suez Canal and is of a very low sulphur

content. Hence, shipping costs to Europe are lower, and so are

those of refining; the process of removing sulphur to prevent

Further, the sheer
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air pollution is a fairly expensive one.

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magnitude of Libyan output, now over three million barrels per

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day and rapidly climbing, will give the regime strength in dealing

with the oil companies. Even the implied threat of a sudden cut—

off of these supplies which meet about a quarter of Europe's

demand would have disruptive effect -- even though alternative

but more expensive —- sources of supply would be available. Thus ,1“

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the Libyan government is in a position to get progressively more §

demanding with the oil companies. How far and how fast it

might go will, of course, depend on how far and how fast the

present regime -- or a successor -- moves in a generally radical

direction, though in the last analysis the Libyans will not

wish to risk losing their oil revenues, on which they are almost

completely dependent.

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Consequences in the Arab World

the main-
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IO. The institution of the Khartoum subsidies,
ending of
tenance of a united front against Israel, and the
the
Nasser's subversive efforts and hostile propaganda lulled
-- including Libya --
conservative or moderate Arab governments

into a false sense of security. We believe that the governments .

-- to
of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (and Morocco and Tunisia) may
than they
varying degrees-- be more susceptible to overthrow
substantial
were before the Libyan coup. There is evidence of

popular discontent in each country. Their regimes é- like

too
that of Idris -— are viewed by many of their citizens as
with
friendly to the US, soft on Israel, corrupt, and unconcerned
a handful
the welfare of the ordinary citizen. The lesson that
i
of obscure junior army officers can successfully pull off
a
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circumstances
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coup against a conservative regime in very difficult

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will not be lost in these countries.

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ll. If in the next year or two, one or more of these
that some
moderate regimes were overthrown, this would not mean
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under
new and more effective stage of Arab political unity,
a
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Nasser or anybody else, would be in the offing. For the most

ff.

a fairly
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part, Arab unity has been a myth, but there has been
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states on the
consistent unity amongst revolutionary Arab
in the
subject of Israel. It should be remembered that,
—- Iraq and
aftermath of the June war, the Arab radicals
as a means
Algeria included -- strongly urged using Arab oil
policies. The
of pressuring the US to change its pro-Israeli [1

refusal of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Libya to join

in killed
Were
m.,a*:<""=\~,-.

that project. Libya might not be so reluctant again.

I
Saudi
new revolutionary governments to appear in Kuwait and
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Arabia, this could mean very difficult times for

American oil

companies throughout the Arab world. In any event, the Libyan

in
coup represents one more step in a process of polarization
on one
the Middle East, which could see the Arabs all aligned -e

other.
side, confronting the US as well as Israel on the
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