02 ISO 19443 Fundamentals Handout

Name of Training Course
Fundamentals
www.tuv-sud.com/nucleartraining
nucleartraining@tuvsud.com
TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022

Motivation
▪ “To protect individuals, society and the environment by establishing and maintaining in nuclear power plants an
effective defence against radiological hazard.” IAEA INSAG-12
▪ Due to the nature of nuclear energy, specific requirements are necessary to ensure a safe operation of nuclear installation
▪ Hence, the components and equipment (and the user) used in a nuclear power plant must fulfil above standard conditions
– Reliability
– Quality control
– Man-machine-interaction
–…
TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 2

Module Objectives and Learning Goal
▪ Participants will learn:
– How energy is converted within a nuclear power plant.

– How a nuclear power plant and its major component work
– How this specific form of nuclear energy conversions posts a safety related challenge
– How this challenge can be met by means of safety functions and safety principles
▪ Participants will be able:
– To explain the basic concept of energy conversion

– To explain the functioning of a nuclear power plant
– To explain the risk arising from nuclear power
– To explain the nuclear safety basics

Contents
1 Introduction
2 Nuclear Energy Conversion
3 Nuclear Risk and Nuclear Safety
4 Defence in Depth
5 Summary

Introduction
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/

Contents
1 Introduction
4 Defence in Depth
5 Summary

Nuclear Energy Conversion – Nuclear Fission Process 1/3
235
92U + 10n → 236
92U → 147
57La + 87
35 Br + 2 1
0n
Components of an atomic nucleus

neutron proton
Source: TÜV SÜD ET

▪ Not all materials are fissile
▪ Different fission reactions

possible ➔ Different fission
products (> 50 elements)
▪ 2 – 3 neutrons per fission

(depending on fission reaction)
▪ Not all neutrons are used for

fission (absorption, leakage, …)
Components of an atomic nucleus

neutron proton

▪ Fission takes place in a solid crystalline structure
Type of energy Energy [MeV]
▪ Fission products „move“ away from the point of Kinetic energy fission products 175
fission with a certain kinetic energy Kinetic energy neutrons 5
Gamma radiation due to fission 7
▪ Kinetic energy is converted into heat
Beta-dacay of fission products 7
▪ Total energy ~210 MeV, whereas ~190 MeV are Gamma radiation due to fission products 6
usable Energy of the neutrinos 10
▪ This energy is removed from the fuel and 1 eV = 1.6022·10-19 J

ultimately converted into electricity 190 MeV = 3.0441·10-11 J
▪ After conversion losses are applied ~ 35 % of the

thermal energy is converted

Nuclear Energy Conversion – Pressurized Water Reactor 1/3
▪ Currently, light water reactors are the dominant form of a nuclear power plant (365 of 442 – according to WNA 2019)
▪ Thereby, pressurized water reactors are the major type (300 of 442)
▪ In a pressurized water reactor, the water is pressurized to about 160 bar (+/-) with temperatures heating-up from 290 to
330°C (due to the fission reactions)➔ Primary circuit
▪ This water transfers the thermal energy to a steam generator
▪ The steam generator operates at around 60 bar (+/-) with temperatures heating-up from 210 to 280°C. Thereby, the water
is evaporated, and steam is produced. ➔ Secondary circuit.
▪ The steam is expanded in a turbine and is condensed in a condenser
▪ The condenser transfers the remaining thermal energy to a cooling tower or a fresh water source ➔ Tertiary circuit
▪ The thermal power in a pressurized water reactor can be up to 4500 MW (+/-), which can be converted to 1500 MW (+/-)

Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR)
1 – Reactor
280 °C / 63 bar 2 – Reactor Coolant Pump
Secondary Circuit
3 – Steam Generator
4 – High Pressure Turbine
Primary Circuit
326 °C 5 – Water Separator
4 7 6 – Re-heater
3 210 °C
1 7 – Low pressure Turbine
160 bar 8 – Condenser
12 5 9 – Condensate Pump
291 °C
6 Tertiary Circuit 10 – Pre-Heater
2
11 – Feed-Water Tank
8 12 – Feed Water Pump
11 9
10

▪ Reactor building of the new EPR (European
Pressurized Water Reactor)
▪ Combination and evolution of the state-of-the-art
French and German reactor types
▪ Components in yellow indicate the primary circuit
(detailed explanation to follow)
▪ Graphic shows the concept of defence in depth and
multi-barrier system ➔ Protective barrier after
barrier after barrier … ➔ To account for failures of a
single barrier (detailed explanation to follow)
▪ Expected time of operation: 60 years
https://www.edfenergy.com/energy/nuclear-new-build-
projects/hinkley-point-c/about/reactor.
PWR_animation Source: Tennessee Valley Authority

Nuclear Energy Conversion – Boiling Water Reactor 1/2
▪ Boiling water reactors (BWR) are the second major reactor type (65 of 442 – according to WNA 2019)
▪ In a Boiling water reactor, the water is evaporated inside the reactor pressure vessel.
▪ The pressure in the reactor vessel is around 70 bar (+/-) and water is heated from around 210°C to 280°C (+/-)
▪ The steam at the reactor vessel outlet/high pressure turbine inlet is saturated
▪ The steam is expanded in a turbine and is condensed in a condenser ➔ Primary circuit
▪ The condenser transfers the remaining thermal energy to a cooling tower or a fresh water source ➔ Secondary circuit
▪ The thermal power in a boiling water reactor is up to 3500 MW (+/-), which can be converted to 1200 MW (+/-)
▪ BWR operate at lower pressures and temperatures than PWR ➔ Lower thermo-mechanical loads
▪ BWR operates in two-phase flow ➔ More components in the reactor and more complex fuel optimization procedures
▪ BWR turbines, condenser, … are part of the primary circuit ➔ Radiation protection

Nuclear Energy Conversion – Boiling Water Reactor 2/2
4 5
Primary Circuit
1 – Reactor
2 – Recirculation Pump
285 °C 3 – High Pressure Turbine
1 4 – Water Separator
70 bar
5 – Re-heater
2 6 – Low pressure Turbine
210 °C 3 7 – Condenser
6
8 – Condensate Pump
11 9 – Pre-Heater
10 – Feed-Water Tank
Secondary Circuit 11 – Feed Water Pump
10 7
8

Nuclear Energy Conversion – Components
▪ Each pressurized light water reactor consist of two to four loops
connected to the reactor pressure vessel
▪ Each loop consist of:

– Main coolant pump
– Steam generator
– Hot leg piping system (red)
– Cold leg piping system (blue)
▪ Additionally, only one pressurizer is installed in one of the loops
▪ Valves, etc. are neglected for the sake of clarity

Nuclear Energy Conversion – Components: Reactor Pressure Vessel 1/2
▪ Low alloy carbon steel (ferritic – 250 mm+) with a stainless-
steel coating (austenitic – 5 mm+)
▪ Vessel is made from many forged parts welded together
▪ It must withstand the pressure difference (> 160 bar), the
temperature gradient (~ 300 K) and the neutron radiation (>
500 keV)

Nuclear Energy Conversion – Components: Reactor Pressure Vessel 2/2
▪ Framatome reactor vessel
fabrication at Le Creusot.
900 MW reactor vessel to
be placed in a furnace for
heat treatment.
▪ Shippingport reactor
pressure vessel during
construction of the power
plant

Nuclear Energy Conversion – Components: Pressurizer
▪ Due to incompressibility of water small
temperature changes result in large
pressure changes ➔ Steam reservoir
to absorb sudden pressure surges.
▪ Maintains the pressure during normal
operation, limits pressure variations
during operational transients and keeps
the pressure within safety limits during
off-normal transients.
▪ Water injection (high pressure), heater
elements (low pressure) or safety and
relief valves for pressure regulation.
▪ Pressurizers can be 16 m tall, 2 m in
diameter and weight around 100 t

Nuclear Energy Conversion – Components: Main Coolant Pump
▪ Single stage centrifugal pump
▪ Mechanical seal
▪ Weight: ~100 t
▪ Height: ~10 m
▪ Volume flow rate: ~30.000 m³/h
▪ Power demand: ~7 MW

Nuclear Energy Conversion – Components: Steam Generator
Parameter [unit] Value
▪ Shell-and-Tube Design with u-pipes. (approx.)
▪ Primary water in thousands of tubes. Height [m] 20
▪ Secondary water evaporates on the Shell diameter [m] 3 … 4.5
tubes.
▪ Due to vertical design large wet Operating pressure, tube [bar] 155
steam velocities. Operating pressure, shell [bar] 65
▪ Residues of evaporation can result Steam flow [kg/s] 480
in corrosion of the tubes at the
Maximum moisture [%] 0.25
bottom.
▪ Can be placed efficiently next to Coolant flow rate [kg/s] 4400
reactor pressure vessel. Coolant inlet temperature [°C] 330
Coolant outlet temperature [°C] 290
Heat transfer area [m²] >4000

Nuclear Energy Conversion – Operating Conditions 1/2
▪ Normal Operation: Defined as plant operation within specified operational limits and conditions
− Start-up or shut-down
− Normal power operation
− Maintenance
− Testing
− Refueling
▪ Abnormal Operation: Defined as off-normal operational state, which most likely would not cause any significant
damage to important safety items or lead to accidental conditions
− Loss of normal electric power
− Turbine trips
− Malfunction of individual components

Nuclear Energy Conversion – Operating Conditions 2/2
▪ Accidents: Accident conditions are defined as deviations from normal operation more severe than
anticipated operational occurrences, including design bases accidents, beyond design bases
accidents and severe accidents
− Loss of coolant accident (LOCA)
− Loss of heat sink
− Anticipated transients without scram (ATWS – abnormal operation without reactor shut-
down)

Contents
1 Introduction
4 Defence in Depth
5 Summary

Nuclear Risk and Nuclear Safety – The Risks
▪ The nuclear risk in a nuclear power plant (NPP) is presented by:
– Radioactivity and -toxicity of the NPP inventory (Core, fuel element storage, …) ➔ Waste storage concepts needed!
– Radiation in form of different sources of ionization (α, β, γ, n) ➔ Shielding and protection needed!
– Heat production during normal operation and shut down ➔ Long term heat removal systems needed!
➔ Nuclear risk exist during operation, shut-down procedures and shut-down state!
▪ Several pathways of release of radioactivity and radioactive materials
– Radiation coming from the NPP during normal operation and/or maintenance
– Radiation coming from regular discharge of radioactive material (liquid and gaseous) into the environment
– Radiation coming from accidents

Nuclear Risk and Nuclear Safety – General Safety Objectives 1/4
▪ Based on this statement the following safety objectives can be formulated
– Retention of radioactivity (superior goal) by means of:
– Control of reactivity
– Cooling of fuel elements (core, spent fuel storage)
– Confinement of radioactive materials
▪ Fulfillment of the general safety goal and the safety objectives ➔ Defence in Depth concept

▪ Control of Reactivity
▪ Reactivity can be controlled when during the reactor operation or under postulated situations the following can be
assured:
– Safe shutdown of the reactor ➔ Two independent shutdown systems are available
– Proper handling of fresh and spent fuel elements, so that fuel assembly configurations are always sub-critical
– Limit reactivity changes and local power density changes below admissible values due to inherent safety features of the
core in connection with reactor limiting, control and protection systems

▪ Cooling of the Fuel Elements
▪ It can be guaranteed when under all operational and off-normal conditions the fission and decay power can
always be removed
▪ Therefore, it is necessary that:
– Sufficient coolant and heat sinks are available

– The heat transport from the fuel elements to the heat sink is assured
– Sufficient heat removal from the spent fuel storage pool is assured

▪ Confinement of Radioactive Materials
▪ Confinement function under postulated accidental conditions are given if:
– The fuel remains sufficiently confined

– Leaks and cracks of the primary system are under control
– The integrity of the containment remains intact

Contents
1 Introduction
4 Defence in Depth
5 Summary

Defence in Depth – Concept
▪ Structure
– Hierarchical deployment of different levels of equipment and procedures

– Maintaining the effectiveness of physical barriers between radioactive materials and the environment
▪ Elements
– Multi-barriers concept ➔ Six layers of physical barriers as protection

– Successive levels of protection ➔ Five levels of protective functions
▪ Implementation
– Graded protection through design and operation ➔ Safety principles

– Consideration of human errors, component failures internal and external initiating events (flood, fire, earthquake, …)

Defence in Depth – Multi-Barriers (Physical Barriers) Concept
▪ 1st barrier: Crystal structure of the fuel pin
▪ 2nd barrier: Fuel rod cladding
▪ 3rd barrier: Primary circuit
▪ 4th barrier: Concrete shielding
▪ 5th barrier: Containment – Steel liner
▪ 6th barrier: Containment – Concrete shell

Defence in Depth – Levels of Protection
▪ 1st level: Normal operation and prevention of abnormal
operation
▪ 2nd level: Control of abnormal operation and detections of

failures
▪ 3rd level: Control of design bases accidents
▪ 4th level: Accident management and confinement

protection
▪ 5th level: Off-site emergency response and mitigation of

radiological consequences

Defence in Depth – Loss of Coolant Accident 1/4
▪ Graph shows only 1 loop
▪ However, a NPP consist of

several loops (e.g., steam
generator) and several
emergency core cooling
system
▪ Even if one system fails
and one system is in
maintenance additional
systems are available

▪ Break of a main coolant
line
1. High pressure injection

at 110 bar
2. Accumulators at 25 bar
3. Low pressure injection
at 10 bar
4. Sump circulation below
10 bar

▪ Temperature profile at the fuel
element surface
▪ Sharp temperature increase
T [°C] (t < 5 s)
▪ Sharp temperature drop
(t = 5 …15 s)
▪ Temperature increase
(t = 15 …40 s)
▪ Constant temperature
(t = 40 … 75 s)
▪ Sharp temperature drop
(t ~ 75 s)
▪ Constant temperature
(t > 90 s)
t [s]

▪ A loss of coolant example poses a threat to the general safety objectives
– If we loss the coolant we cannot cool the fuel
– If we cannot cool the fuel it may fail
– If the fuel loses its mechanical integrity radioactive materials may be released
➔ Multiple barriers and levels of protection ➔ Progressive activation of redundant safety systems
▪ A consequence of loss of coolant accident is the (rapid) change of variables ➔ Pressure and temperature
▪ Hence, materials, components, equipment must not only withstand high pressure (160 bar) and high temperature (330°C)
during normal operation (for 60 years!) but also higher temperatures and sharp pressure and temperature gradients

Defence in Depth – Safety Principles
▪ Redundancy
▪ Diversity
▪ Independence
▪ Physical separation
▪ Fail Safe
▪ Automation
▪ Priority
▪ Self sufficiency
▪ Plant protection
▪ Consequential damage protection
▪ Conservative design
▪ Functional testing

▪ Redundancy ▪ Design against single failure
▪ Diversity ▪ Multiple installations/systems/components/… available to perform the
▪ Independence same task
▪ Fail Safe No failure Single failure Single failure + maintenance
▪ Automation 1x100 % 2x100 % 3x100 % 4x50 %
▪ Priority
▪ Functional testing 100 % F 100 % F M 100 % F M 50% 50%
To close a valve To open a valve

▪ Redundancy ▪ Design against common cause failure
▪ Diversity ▪ Different principles of operation or different manufactures of components
▪ Independence and systems that fulfill the same function
▪ Fail Safe
▪ Automation
▪ Priority

▪ Redundancy ▪ Design against overlapping or common failures (e.g., fire)
▪ Diversity ▪ Independence between redundant systems and components
▪ Independence ▪ Functional isolation to avoid inadvertent interaction
▪ Physical separation ▪ No common auxiliary systems ➔ Separated power supply, cooling
▪ Fail Safe circuits, …
▪ Automation
▪ Priority

▪ Redundancy ▪ Design against overlapping or common failures (e.g., fire)
▪ Diversity ▪ Redundant systems located at different places in and around the NPP
▪ Independence
▪ Fail Safe
▪ Automation
▪ Priority

▪ Redundancy ▪ Design against loss of power supply
▪ Diversity ▪ If the power supply is lost, a function fails and the conected system goes
▪ Independence into a safe state
▪ Physical separation ▪ Example: Electromagnetic control rod
▪ Fail Safe
▪ Automation
▪ Priority

▪ Redundancy ▪ Design against human error
▪ Diversity ▪ Detection of accidents/accidents and activating of counter measures to
▪ Independence deal with accidents is independent of human actions
▪ Physical separation ▪ Likelihood of wrong/inadequate decisions especially right after the
▪ Fail Safe accident are too high
▪ Automation ▪ In the first 30 min. no actions of the personal necessary (possible)
▪ Priority ▪ Safety functions must run in an automatized way to avoid false response
▪ Self sufficiency in situations of high stress
▪ Plant protection ▪ 10-hour self-reliance after blackout/failure of the control room due to
▪ Consequential damage protection external events

▪ Redundancy ▪ Design against human error
▪ Diversity ▪ Safety systems, which ensure that the safety objectives are met, have
▪ Independence precedence over auxiliary systems
▪ Physical separation ▪ Important safety function are running automatic and have priority to
▪ Fail Safe manual actions
▪ Automation
▪ Priority

▪ Redundancy ▪ Active components shall be independent from external power sources
▪ Diversity ▪ Grid failure ➔ Emergency diesel generators
▪ Independence
▪ Fail Safe
▪ Automation
▪ Priority

▪ Redundancy ▪ Design against internal and external events
▪ Diversity ▪ Protection against events induced by nature and humans
▪ Independence – Earthquake
▪ Physical separation – Flood/Tsunami
▪ Fail Safe – Fire
▪ Automation – Hurricanes/Tornados/Typhoons/…
▪ Priority
▪ Self sufficiency – Plane crash
▪ Plant protection – Explosion
▪ Consequential damage protection – Fire

▪ Redundancy ▪ The failure of one component or system shall not cause any interference
▪ Diversity with other systems
▪ Independence
▪ Fail Safe
▪ Automation
▪ Priority
sd-shutterstock-220004227 Source: TÜV SÜD ET

▪ Redundancy ▪ Implementation of safety margins
▪ Diversity ▪ Compensation of uncertainties
▪ Independence
▪ Fail Safe
▪ Automation actual load limiting capacity
▪ Priority value value
▪ Self sufficiency safety margin
load

▪ Redundancy ▪ Periodic inspection of components and systems
▪ Diversity ▪ Reduction of the failure probability
▪ Independence ▪ Addressing the issue of aging
▪ Fail Safe
▪ Automation
▪ Priority

Contents
1 Introduction
4 Defence in Depth
5 Summary

Summary
▪ The learning objective of this module was the basics approach to nuclear energy conversion and nuclear safety.
▪ We have derived the safety objectives, according to the specific risk potentials of a nuclear power plant, which are:
– Retention of radioactivity (superior goal) by means of:
– Control of reactivity
– Cooling of fuel elements (core, spent fuel storage)
– Confinement of radioactive materials
▪ We have discussed what kind of barriers separate the radiation source from the environment and the levels of protection
that together constitute the principle of defense in depth.
▪ We learned about the function of a nuclear power plant at its major components
▪ In addition, we investigated an accident and discussed the consequences for the components

Copyright
‘‘ The contents of the training materials are protected by copyright.

TÜV SÜD Energietechnik GmbH Baden-Württemberg reserves all rights resulting
thereof, especially with regard to reprinting, publication by photomechanical
reproduction or other means, and storage in data processing systems (in whole
or in part).
This document and any information it contains shall not be used for any other
purpose than the one for which they were provided.
’’
Stock photos and ClipArt's: Licensed by TÜV SÜD.com Image Database.

02 ISO 19443 Fundamentals Handout

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

02 ISO 19443 Fundamentals Handout

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Name of Training Course

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 2

– How energy is converted within a nuclear power plant.

▪ Participants will be able:

– To explain the basic concept of energy conversion

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 3

2 Nuclear Energy Conversion

3 Nuclear Risk and Nuclear Safety

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 4

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 5

2 Nuclear Energy Conversion

3 Nuclear Risk and Nuclear Safety

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 6

Components of an atomic nucleus

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 7

▪ Different fission reactions

▪ 2 – 3 neutrons per fission

▪ Not all neutrons are used for

Components of an atomic nucleus

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 8

▪ This energy is removed from the fuel and 1 eV = 1.6022·10-19 J

▪ After conversion losses are applied ~ 35 % of the

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 9

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 10

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 11

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 12

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 13

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 14

▪ Each loop consist of:

▪ Additionally, only one pressurizer is installed in one of the loops

▪ Valves, etc. are neglected for the sake of clarity

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 15

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 16

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 17

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 18

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 19

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 20

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 21

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 22

2 Nuclear Energy Conversion

3 Nuclear Risk and Nuclear Safety

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 23

▪ Several pathways of release of radioactivity and radioactive materials

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 24

▪ Based on this statement the following safety objectives can be formulated

– Retention of radioactivity (superior goal) by means of:

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 25

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 26

▪ Therefore, it is necessary that:

– Sufficient coolant and heat sinks are available

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 27

▪ Confinement function under postulated accidental conditions are given if:

– The fuel remains sufficiently confined

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 28

2 Nuclear Energy Conversion

3 Nuclear Risk and Nuclear Safety

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 29

– Hierarchical deployment of different levels of equipment and procedures

– Multi-barriers concept ➔ Six layers of physical barriers as protection

– Graded protection through design and operation ➔ Safety principles

TÜV SÜD Academy UK | ISO 19443 Training 21-23/06/2022 30

▪ 2nd barrier: Fuel rod cladding

▪ 3rd barrier: Primary circuit