Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Disaster Management
In Unit 7, you have studied about various accidents that can take place in a
power distribution utility, and measures for accident prevention and protection.
In this unit, we focus on the management of disasters due to natural calamities
and human actions, which tend to disrupt the power distribution network. You
know that our country is blessed by nature: The Indian peninsula has the
magnificent Himalayas guarding its frontiers in the North and a long coastal
line on the other three sides. The land has abundant rivers criss-crossing its
length and breadth. The Himalayan range is an immense source of flora and
fauna and provides perpetual water supply to major rivers in the North and
North-Eastern part of the country.
But many a times, the same bountiful nature turns its wrath on us and we face
natural calamities of untold agony and suffering. The Eastern coast often
brings high winds and tides and severe cyclones at times. The long coastal
line supporting the fortunes of sea is pounded by tides, cyclones and even
tsunamis, which take a heavy toll on human lives and infrastructure including
the power sector. Every year, we witness devastating floods due to incessant
rains in many parts of the country and severe droughts in others. The
mountainous regions are prone to landslides and many parts are earthquake-
prone. In addition, there are many human acts, e.g., terrorist attcks, strikes,
etc., that can have a disastrous impact on the power distribution system.
In this unit, we discuss various types of disasters, their impact on the power
sector, the measures that should be taken for disaster preparedness and the
features of a well-designed Disaster Management Plan. We also present
some case studies in Appendixes 1 to 3 of this unit to share the experiences
of various power distribution utilities in managing disasters.
Types of Disasters
Disasters in the power sector can occur due to natural calamities as well as
human acts. These include:
earthquakes;
floods;
storms;
cyclones;
droughts;
terrorist threats/attack and sabotage;
bomb threats and bomb explosions;
strikes;
major equipment failure.
Events like earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, cyclones etc. have been studied
statistically and scientifically and their occurrence and intensities can be
predicted with a certain degree of confidence. However, there is no certainty
that these events would not exceed the predicted values based on past history
and cause disaster. But, if various equipment and systems of power
generating plant and transmission system are designed after site-specific
studies, taking into account stipulations of the various codes / standards on
the subjects, damage to plants and equipment can be greatly minimized.
We now discuss each of these types of disaster and their impact on the power
system. In this section, we focus on natural calamities. We also highlight the
pre-disaster preparedness and post-disaster activities that should be
undertaken by power utilities for managing disasters.
8.2.1 Earthquakes
Earthquakes are one of the most dangerous and destructive forms of natural
hazards. THEY STRIKE SUDDENLY WITH LITTLE WARNING. They may Fig. 8.1: Impact of
Earthquakes
occur at any time of day or on any day of the year.
85
Electrical Safety and Impact of Earthquakes
Disaster Management
Earthquakes can devastate an entire city or a region of hundreds of square
kilometres. A large earthquake gives rise to a series of violent motions in the
ground, which set in motion the structures (e.g., buildings, roads, towers,
bridges, transmission lines, etc.) on the earth’s surface. Each type of structure
responds differently, depending on the type of materials it is made up of.
Buildings collapse like packs of cards. They get reduced to piles of rubble in
seconds, killing and injuring their inhabitants.
Since the power distribution network spreads over the entire area with
conductors running on metallic structures, it is most prone to the effects of the
earthquake. Moreover, sensitive equipment gets activated when shaken by an
earthquake and immediately interrupts power supply from the power grid. Fire
is another concern immediately following an earthquake because of severed
electrical lines.
Fig. 8.2: Cyclones are
devastating 8.2.2 Cyclones
Cyclones are among the most awesome events that nature can produce, and
pose a major threat to lives and property in many parts of the world. A
cyclone’s destructive work is done by the high wind, flood-producing rains, and
associated storm surges. The cyclonic storm dominates the ocean surface
and lower atmosphere over tens of thousands of square kilometres.
A cyclone is a tropical
storm in which the Devastating floods from extremely heavy rainfall often accompany tropical
winds reach speeds of cyclones.
more than 120 km/h.
and blow in a large Impact of Cyclones
spiral around a
relatively calm centre Cyclones can lead to tremendous loss of life, property and infrastructure,
or “eye.” Simply stated,
cyclones are giant particularly, in the vulnerable human settlements. Their vulnerability is
whirlwinds in which the determined by the exposure to the storms, the degree to which the houses
air moves in a large, and other structures can be damaged, and the likelihood that secondary
tightening spiral
effects could occur. Safety is also compromised by the damage to or
around a centre of
extreme low pressure, destruction of public installations and facilities, such as water and electrical
reaching maximum plants, hospitals, and police stations. The impact of cyclones on the power
velocity in a circular utility is immediate interruption of supply from the power grid due to network
band extending
outward 30 to 50 km disruption by cyclonic winds. Fire is another concern immediately following a
from the edge of the cyclone because of severed electrical lines.
eye of the cyclone.
Near the centre, winds 8.2.3 Floods
may gust to more than
320 km/h. Floods caused by overflowing rivers result from heavy rains or from the
melting of winter snow, or from both. Floods in rivers differ from flash floods in
their extent and duration. Flash floods are of short duration in small streams,
while floods in rivers take place in river systems whose tributaries may drain
large geographic areas and encompass many independent river basins.
Floods on large river systems may continue for periods ranging from a few
hours to many days. Flood flows in large river systems are influenced primarily
86 by variations in the intensity, amount, and distribution of precipitation. The
condition of the ground − amount of soil moisture, seasonal variations in Disaster
vegetation, depth of snow cover, and imperviousness due to urbanization − Management
directly affects runoff. Silting, soil conditions, absorption capacity of the
watershed, and the capacity of streams to carry runoff have an effect on the
extent of the flooding.
Impact of Floods
Floods are natural hazards that are not, in and of themselves, disasters, but
they can transform a vulnerable situation into a disaster. The vulnerability of a
human settlement is determined by its exposure to flooding. The primary
effects are power failure, electrocution and short circuit due to water logging in
flooded areas as well as around the substation grids.
Table 8.1: Impact of Natural Calamities on Power Distribution Utilities and Their
Roles
A trigger mechanism must be established by the utility to initiate the action for
mitigation of disaster, as soon as information is received about any calamity
which is likely to occur or has occurred. An illustrative check list of who has to
do what should be prepared by each organisation for each of its sections, in
case of emergency. The rescue operation for any disaster has to start right
from the warning received from the Intelligence, meteorological organisations
or any other State / Central agency. The rescue operation should concentrate 87
Electrical Safety and on life safety as the prime objective followed by attending to the injured and
Disaster Management stopping the disaster from spreading further.
• training for first aid and trauma and maintaining stocks of medical supplies;
• formation of teams for search and rescue operations and teams for
disaster assessment; and
The role of the utilities also includes creating public awareness, preparedness
planning, economic mitigation, search and rescue activities, establishing the
distribution network of relief, disaster assessment, structural surveys and
bringing the power distribution to normal service level.
• Fixing permanent notice boards at all suitable places in the area displaying
information related to assisting agencies, important telephone numbers,
etc.
Earthquake-preparedness activities:
• Identification of safe sites where people living in areas threatened by
landslides in secondary tremors could be relocated.
• Dewatering pump and barrier walls in cable trenches to prevent the water
from entering the substation.
• dewatering;
• water purification; and
• epidemiological (which relates to the origin, nature, pathology and
prevention of epidemic diseases) surveillance.
In the next section, we discuss the disasters stemming from human actions.
But before studying further, you may like to consolidate the information
presented so far.
!" !#
List the activities that utilities must undertake in preparing to handle the
natural disasters most likely to occur in your area.
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Terrorist attacks, bomb threats and bomb explosions, and strikes are some of
the disasters that have their origin in human acts. We discuss the potential
threats and the measures needed to protect power utilities from such
disasters.
8.3.1 Terrorism
Of all the forms of disasters, terrorism happens to be the deadliest in terms of
loss of life and damage to the property. Acts of terrorism have grown over a
period of time. Power generation and transmission installations form the prime
target for such terrorist groups. The basic infrastructure in power sector such
as dams, generating stations, EHV substations, load dispatch centres,
distribution stations are vital national assets and these need to be protected
against acts of terrorism. The terrorism related security aspects should be
dealt with by using advanced technology in the areas of surveillance and
proper intelligence network.
Bomb Threats
The basic steps to be carried out in the event of a bomb threat are as follows:
A thorough search by the security and police agencies that are well versed
in dealing with such situations.
Putting sand bags around the object, in case a bomb is found or Fig. 8.3: Bombs Need
suspected, to reduce the impact of damage in the event of an explosion. Special
Attention
Summoning the nearest police or army unit trained in bomb disposal.
• Fortifying the perimeter wall around the project area and making it as
straight as possible around the premises.
• Constructing a peripheral road both inside and outside the perimeter wall
(maintaining clear zones of 3 metres on both sides) to carry out mobile
patrolling.
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Electrical Safety and • Proper illumination of the perimeter wall and provision of portable flood
Disaster Management lighting and emergency lighting.
8.3.4 Strikes
Strike by any section of the employees, construction workers or contractors in
a generating station/sub-station/load dispatch centre could lead to an
emergency situation and bring the system to a grinding halt if adequate
alternate measures to run the generating station/sub-station/load dispatch
centres are not taken. Identification of alternate human
resource/outsourced workforce must be done in advance for managing
emergencies arising out of strikes.
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• Sufficient reserve stock of fuel oil and other consumable items needed for Disaster
keeping the system in operation should be maintained. Management
• Adequate provisions should be made (for food, cots, mattresses, etc.) for
executives and other running staff to stay inside the grid station/sub station
premises for prolonged period during the strike.
• The dangers and the threats during strike need to be assessed and
appropriate planning done to counteract such events.
• Arrangements should be made for additional workforce for running the grid
stations/substations. The organisation must also keep a list of the retired
persons from the grid station during the past 2-3 years so that their
services can be utilized under such eventualities. A list of resourceful
contractors should be kept ready who would be able to supply
skilled/unskilled workforce in the event of any emergency.
Disturbed Stage
• Activation of control room, which should form the nodal point for all
activities within and outside the organisation.
• Evaluation of the scope for further negotiations with the unions and
initiation of action on the same.
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Electrical Safety and • Receipt of reports from Intelligence Groups/loyal workers and taking
Disaster Management necessary action.
• Maintaining the morale of those employees who have not joined the
strike − a pre-requisite for smooth operation of power station/grid, sub-
station during the strike situation.
• Safe storage of vital records: Vital records should be duplicated and kept
in a safe place to protect them from accidental fire as well as sabotage.
• Each station should be able to arrange for vehicles with public address
system, which can be used to make necessary announcements. Similarly,
main gate/gates may also have public address facilities for dissemination
of announcement.
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8.3.5 Major Equipment Failure of Electricity Grid Disaster
Management
The integrated operation of vast and complex electricity grid like the one
existing in the country demands utmost vigil and care. Natural calamities as
well as human acts can have a devastating effect on the Electricity Grid.
Under extreme wind conditions, the conductors of transmission lines may get
snapped or transmission line towers may collapse. Floods, landslides and
earthquakes cause damage to or failure of foundations of towers. This may
sometimes lead to disruption of the transmission network due to uprooting of
foundations and consequent collapse of the tower. Floods also cause
disruption in power transmission in case substations are affected by the
floods.
In addition to this, terrorist attacks, fire accidents may also cause damage to
transmission lines, substations which, in certain cases, may lead to grid failure
and could black out the entire region for a considerable period of time. Various
faults, equipment failure/mal-operations are other common causes of grid
failure. Possible mishaps in transmission system in the event of disasters due
to various natural calamities and crises are:
• snapping of conductors;
• collapse of transmission towers;
• washing away of foundation for river crossing towers;
• landslides in hilly terrains affecting towers of the line;
• flooding of substations; and
• destruction / fire in substations.
( ! ) !" " *+
Outline the reasons for the failure of electricity grid when a disaster strikes.
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The first step in planning for disaster management involves assessing which
areas are prone to which kinds of natural or man-made disasters.
% , +
Explain the need for zoning for natural disasters. What zoning schemes are
in practice for earthquakes and floods?
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The Disaster Management Plan should spell out the roles and responsibilities
of departments, teams units and personnel during emergency situations. It
should address several specific types of emergencies on an individual basis,
providing guidelines for the stabilization and recovery from the incident.
These include emergency instructions and references in a concise format for
the individuals designated to manage the resources.
The basic emergency procedures are designed to protect lives and property
through effective use of the available resources both of the utility and the
community. Since an emergency may be sudden and without warning, these
procedures should be designed to be flexible in order to accommodate
98 contingencies of various types and magnitudes.
The plan should be made for three levels and types of emergencies: Disaster
Management
• LEVEL 1 − MINOR INCIDENT: A minor incident is defined as a local
event with limited impact, which does not affect the overall functional
MINOR INCIDENT
capability of the organisation. Planning response is carried out at a limited
local level (e.g. in a building/zone/grid). The Disaster Management Plan
Local Event with
would not be activated at this level. Limited Impact
• LEVEL 2 − EMERGENCY: An emergency is defined as a serious event
that significantly disrupts one or more operations of the utility. In this
multiple locations/area are involved: the Disaster Management Plan would
EMERGENCY
be activated to the extent necessary.
• Management response − to allocate resources and make critical Fig. 8.7: Three Levels
decisions needed to resolve the situation. of Emergencies
The plan should facilitate the setting up of an appropriate system for disaster
management in the utility.
- ( &
.
Though the prime focus of activities would be at the actual installations that
are affected due to impending or actual event, a comprehensive disaster
management system should be in place with initiatives/support at regional and
central level especially in case of major disasters affecting the plant,
installation or site. It is necessary to have an integrated approach at the
national level to monitor and meet the various situations arising out of the
crisis in the power sector.
A 4-tier structure should be in place for the purpose (Fig. 8.8) with intervention
and response depending on the severity of the disaster/calamity. Natural
calamities may be broadly grouped into major and minor types depending
upon their potential to cause damage to human life and property. While the
central and regional level interventions are necessitated for major calamities,
the state and local agencies should respond to minor incidents. Disaster
management groups should be set up at all levels.
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Electrical Safety and 8.5.1 Constitution of Disaster Management Groups
Disaster Management
The responsibilities of Disaster Management Groups up to the State level are
described below:
Responsibilities
These Control Rooms should work in a well coordinated manner. The main
objectives of these control rooms should be to pool up all the possible
100
resources to ensure continuity of power supply in the country. The control Disaster
rooms should have: Management
Since the plant level emergency management group shoulders the major
responsibility in disaster management, we would like to deal with its role and
responsibilities in some detail. But before that, we would like you to attempt an
SAQ to test your understanding!
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• To direct actions within the affected area taking into consideration the
priorities for safety of plant / installation, personnel, minimize damage
to plant and equipment, property and the environment.
• To ensure that all non-essential workers / staff in the affected area are
evacuated to safer places.
B. Damage Assessment
C. Alert Notification
Depending upon the nature of emergency, the EMG should be put on high
alert. The following actions should be taken in this respect:
For effective preparedness to face the disasters and to avoid last minute
arrangements in panic conditions, the following aspects should be covered
as an organisational practice:
• Emergency call out list of persons drafted for emergency control, key
personnel, fire safety, first aid, Medical, Security, Police and District
Administration Authorities.
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& & • Survival / Auxiliary / Start-up power should be provided to the collapsed
system till requirement on priority basis and power should be utilized for
other purposes only after meeting these power requirements.
• A list of telephone numbers of all the substations with STD codes should
be available as communication is the essential requirement and time is the
essence during the restoration process.
• Loading of generator supplying the start-up power should not exceed 80%
of its capacity. Efforts should be made to keep the generator operating on
lagging side; if not possible, at least to near unity power factor.
Transmission lines are the arteries of the Electricity Grid and these are
most prone to damage due to earthquake, cyclone, terrorist attack, flood,
etc. The following points should be considered for handling disasters:
• The substation and other control centres should have details of the key
front line personnel/task force members who are identified for handling
the restoration process in the event of disaster so that deployment of
these personnel to the affected areas can be made without any delay.
• Each “Key Front Line Personnel Team” should be provided with mobile
satellite telephone for ensuring instantaneous response/mobilization to
the front on the occurrence of a disaster.
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Electrical Safety and • Strategic locations should be decided for spares on centralized/
Disaster Management regional/zone wise.
B. Restoration of Substations
Substations are the nerve centres of the Electricity Grid. In case of any
disaster the preparedness of the substations for restoration is a must.
• Every utility owning and operating the substations should carry out an
in-depth analysis of all the possible contingencies and should prepare
plans for such contingencies.
• The power backup facilities like D.G. Set and inverter should be
maintained properly and checked periodically for readiness of
operation in case of any emergency.
• The fire fighting equipment and the bore wells should be maintained
and checked periodically. Mock fire fighting exercises should be done
on regular basis.
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B. Communication Facilities: Communication and information management Disaster
is the key to any crisis response and recovery plan. Use of modern day Management
information technology has to play a greater role. Software system
incorporating risk assessment, creating procedures, establishing command
and control structure, monitoring crisis response activities and integration
with various agencies/groups would need to be incorporated as a part of
emergency management.
E. Black Start Facilities: Arrangements for start up power source for each
major installation must be identified. Regional Load Dispatch Centres have
to make necessary plans.
• Safety audit must be carried out once every year at each generating
station and substation.
• State level support groups should identify category-wise all the generating,
substation grid centres and Load Dispatch Centres based on their strategic
importance. The highest vulnerable centres should be provided the highest
type of security.
• Each Regional Electricity Board and Regional Load Dispatch Centre must
identify all the generating stations/grid substations and load dispatch
centres according to their critical importance with respect to safe operation
of the electricity grid. The highest critical station must be provided the
highest security arrangement and it may go on reducing to the least risk
element, without jeopardizing the safety of electricity grid.
• State level Support Group should meet at least once in six months. Power
Management Group (PMG) at National level has to meet once in 12
months for exchange of views and also for updating the Disaster
Management Plans.
• All State and Central Power Utilities should constantly review the
equipment / system design standards and practices based on the new
developments and the state of the art technologies and design practices
available at that time. The equipment, which frequently creates problems
need to be replaced.
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• Each power station/Power utility should create a fund for meeting the Disaster
requirement of disaster management plan. The disaster management fund Management
should be 1% of the annual revenue of the station/Utility. These funds
should be non-lapsable and should be allowed to accumulate. The disaster
management funds should be at the full discretion of the Emergency
Management Group once emergency has been declared.
This was an overview of a typical Disaster Management Plan and the system
for managing disasters for a power utility. We have presented some case
studies in the Appendixes 1 to 3 as illustrations of the Disaster Management
System and handling of disasters.
0 .
• Disasters in the power sector can occur due to natural calamities such as
earthquakes, floods, storms, cyclones, droughts as well as human acts like
terrorist threats/attack and sabotage, bomb threats and bomb explosions,
strikes, major equipment failure, etc.
• Each utility must have in place a Disaster Management Plan with well-
defined objectives. It should set up a Disaster Management System that
have clearly spelt out disaster preparedness activities and post-disaster
measures for each type of disaster.
• A 4-tier structure at the national, regional, state and local levels should be
in place for management of disasters with intervention and response
depending on the severity of the disaster/calamity. While the central and
regional level interventions are necessitated for major calamities, the state
and local agencies should respond to minor incidents. 109
Electrical Safety and • Disaster Management Groups should be constituted at all levels with
Disaster Management clearly spelt out responsibilities.
3. Explain the need for a Disaster Management Plan for your power utility.
Outline its objectives and the scope of activities.
5. Compare the Disaster Management Plan of your utility with the Plan of
NDPL given in Appendix 1. Point out the differences and the need for
improvement, if any, based on your own experiences.
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Disaster
'' 3 & Management
' ( '
Without
Disaster Planning
Damage to
Financial Results, Reputation
and Key Relationships
EMERGENCY With
READINESSSM Crisis
Readiness
Some of the kinds of incidents and events that would be managed are:
The following assumptions are made and used as general guidelines in any of
these events:
The plan is operational for all three types of emergencies / levels of response:
Minor incidents, emergencies and disasters (Table 1).
Organisational Components
The Emergency Operations Team (EOT) is activated, based on the type and
nature of the incident, to manage the operational aspects of the organisational
response to an emergency event. It is comprised of the Head Operation and
all HODs.
• IT Department
• Projects
• Human Resources
Special Unit Plans: Several units have been determined to have critical
responsibilities on an internal unit basis during emergency situations. Each
Special Unit is required to develop a Unit Plan. As necessary, Special Unit
Plans will be augmented by Response Annexes to address specific situations.
Special Unit Plans are required from the Units listed in Table 3.
• Central Store
• Administration
• Finance
• Medical
• Power Management
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Building/Area Emergency Plans are developed to reduce the risk of life or Disaster
property loss through preparation for foreseeable events. Management
Response Annexes
• Procedures for specific response activities.
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Electrical Safety and The primary responsibility for monitoring emergency threats and events
Disaster Management resides with Power System Control (PSC) and Disaster Mitigation (DM)
team. PSC operates on a continuous 24x7x365 basis and is always available
to receive emergency communications from variety of official and public
sources. Full plan activation begins at the discretion of EMT Members and
Managing Director and upon the receipt of information of an emergency event
or threat of an emergency. In case of any type of declared local, state or
regional emergency, a decision will be made by the Head Operations on a
plan of action and whether to activate the Emergency Management plan in
consultation with the Managing Director.
The primary Emergency Control Centre like District office building (in
respective District/ system offers/circle head office) will be continuously
maintained in a state of readiness for conversion and activation. The
Command Centre serves as the centralized, well-supported centre located at
PSC in which the Emergency Operation Team (EOT) leaders and the
Executive Management Team (EMT) may assemble and assume their role.
Response activities and work assignments will be planned, coordinated and
delegated from the Command Centre. The Command Centre is located at the
office of PSC. Depending upon the type of incident, the members of EMT
may, at their discretion, designate Board Room corporate office as the Primary
Command Centre (Applicable only for cases of Level 1). If all of these
command centres are unsuitable or unusable, the backup command centre
will be located at the command centre IT conference Room, CENCARE.
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Table 3: Areas of Critical Responsibility / Emergency Operation Team Members Disaster
Management
Department Primary Contact Alternate Contact
After a disaster where NDPL’s operations have been shut down the entire
environment may be dangerous. The first recovery step is to secure the
network and then the buildings/ facilities. After ensuring that the working
environment is safe, restoration efforts begin followed by an orderly reopening
of normal operating procedure.
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Electrical Safety and
Disaster Management Emergency Response
Team Inspects
Building / Network
YES
D. ESF 4 – Medical: The medical team provides the means for health
response, treatment, sending medical team along with mobile dispensary
on the site and transportation of victims out of impact area(s); immediate
support to hospitals and other health care facilities; provision of emergency
external medical help form outside or nearby medical hospitals. The Chief
Medical Officer will lead the team of the doctors and in his/her absence his
official second in charge will take the responsibilities.
E. ESF 5 - Supply and Store Team: The team has to ensure supply and
storage of the list of the emergency equipments required at the time of
recovery from Disaster / Emergency.
119
Electrical Safety and 1. It is necessary to have an inventory of recovery equipment and spares
Disaster Management available with various power utilities and their location so that these
could be used into service within the shortest possible time.
6. HOG (Store) has to ensure that material issued form store has been
delivered at site in shortest possible time.
7. HOG (Store) has to ensure the suitable stock position of the material in
his store and timely submitting the stock position of same to
Emergency Management Team for any addition emergency
procurement.
F. ESF 6 – Power Management Team: The team has to arrange for the
alternate source of the supply from nearby Power Supply Utilities in case;
failure of supply from Delhi Transco Ltd. (DTL) in proper coordination with
Corporate Operation Services and Operation department of NDPL.
G. ESF 7 – Finance Team: The team has to arrange for any of financial
requirement during emergency / Disaster.
1. The team has to distribute certain amount of the cash to other ESF
teams directly related to recovery and restoration. The account will be
settled soon after emergency.
2. If any team requires extra cash the same will be approved by Chief
Incident Controller and sanctioned to Team leader.
3. The team to explore the possibilities of arranging the funds/ cash for
any emergency procurement/ salary of the employees.
I. ESF 9 – Legal and Insurance Team: The team has to inform the
insurance and other allied legal agencies during/ post disaster.
1. The team has to contact the insurance agency and plan for the site
visit.
2. The team has to take all legal clearance from the Govt. agencies if any
required during the restoration/ recovery process.
3. The team has to gather all relevant data of injury/ fatal accident/
property damage from the ground staff/ Chief Incident Controller so
that claim (if any) to settle them on priority basis. As well as to present
the authentic report of the accident if required in the court.
1. The team has to take all required clearance/ approvals from the Govt.
agencies.
2. The team has to work closely with the Chief Incident Controller/ Site
Incident Controller.
5. The team has to tie up for any emergency requirement of Workforce for
the nearby Power distribution agencies, Vendors, Military, retired
employees of the organisation.
6. Taking the support of security staff from other security agencies also.
7. Also working closely with the Power System Control and the Chief
Incident Controller for sharing of any vital information, and
8. Working round the clock and sharing the information with the Area
Security Managers, Security Officer, Disaster Mitigation, etc.
2. Contact list of all Unit Head and Team members e.g. Details like all
contact nos. of District Manager along with the same of Zonal
Managers.
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Disaster
C. Identify all life safety threats. Management
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Electrical Safety and
Disaster Management '' 3 &
. (
Table 1: Extent of
Damage '
220 kV 2 The cyclonic storm on 16th October, 2001 disrupted power supply in six
Substations districts of Andhra Pradesh: Nellore, Prakasam, Cuddapah Chittoor, Kurnool
and Ananthapur. There was extensive damage to lines and substations and
220 kV tower 1
power supply in all six districts was affected. Many 220KV, 132KV, 33KV and
collapse
11 KV lines and substations were affected and huge number of distribution
132 kV 3 transformer structures collapsed (Table 1).
Substations
All villages and tanks were flooded and approach roads were cut off. The lines
33 kV 54 and DTR structures were inaccessible due to water logging. As a response to
Substations the disaster, AP Transco deputed those senior most officials who had earlier
worked in these districts and had good knowledge of the electrical layouts in
33 kV lines 63 the districts as well as the resources in the region. Material requirements,
availability in local stores, balance to be arranged from out-stations were
11 kV feeders 321
assessed. Men and materials with break down vehicles, tools, etc. were
Distribution 759 rushed from other districts where the supply network was safe. All contractors
transformers who executed works were asked to depute their men with vehicles, T & P, etc.
to help quick restoration of supply.
Towns 133
affected Temporary advances were opened and disbursed to DEs, ADEs, and AEs in
smaller denominations in the field. Control rooms were set up at division,
Villages 1295 district and state Head Quarters levels and manned round the clock with One
affected Divisional Engineer, SE and Chief Engineer heading each shift team. Top
priority was given to establish wireless communication from work spots up to
Head Quarters. Walky talkie sets for men, mobile wireless sets for break down
vehicles and cars of officers and stationery sets at control centres were
established within 12 hours. The AP TRANSCO carried out weekly monitoring.
Near normalcy was restored within 10 days and total normalcy within 20 days
of the disaster.
The State has faced a sudden shortage in generation during September 2002
when 1470 MW Neyveli Power House was totally shutdown due to a fire
accident and also the 340 MW Kalpakkam Atomic Power Station was
shutdown for statutory checks. There was simultaneous fall in hydel
generation on account of no inflows into the hydel reservoirs, which have
touched MDDL. Also one 500 MW unit at NTPC, Ramagundam was under
overhaul and the Simhadri units (2 x 500 MW) were getting shutdown on and
off due to teething troubles. The power supply situation got further aggravated
due to continuous dry spell and the daily energy demand touched 150 MU
against normal 120 MU during same period in previous years.
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The staff at SLDC, grid substations and in Discoms faced tough challenges in Disaster
view of the big gap between demand and availability to ensure nine hours Management
supply to the agricultural sector in two spells (four hours during daytime and
five hours during night time). The Discom staff extensively toured and
identified problem areas and took remedial actions whereby the standing
Kharif crops in the entire State could be saved and while doing so they gained
first hand knowledge and experience of certain bottle necks in the System to
be removed before commencement of Rabi 2002-03.
I. Group Line of EHT Feeders: The 132 kV feeders are segregated into three
groups: I, II & III. The hours during which the load on these feeders is to be
brought down to nearly zero by cutting off loads other than those declared
essential (like Railways, Water works, defence, major hospitals, etc.)
should be fixed. If this is not implemented by Discoms, the entire 132 kV
feeders should be cut off and recharged only after the expected load relief
is given by 33 kV substations fed by these feeders.
One Load Monitoring Cell has to be opened at each Discom and District Head
Quarters are to be manned round-the-clock.
One ADE from Discom has to be on shift at each 220 kV SS in the jurisdiction
of Discom for coordination. One AE from Discom has to be on shift at each
132 kV SS in the jurisdiction of Discom for coordination.
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Electrical Safety and
Disaster Management '' 3 &
. (
On 26.12.2004, Sunday, the day after Christmas, at about 9.15 hours, the
people near the sea shore encountered the tsunami. After it struck, the need
of the hour for the personnel in the power sector was to avert any electrical
accidents due to snapping of conductors, uprooting of poles on the roads, etc.
The next foremost duty was to resume power supply to all emergency services
such as Hospitals, Telephone Exchanges, Collectorate, City areas, Street
lights, etc. in order to speed up the rescue operations of other Departments.
Rescue operations included clearing of dead bodies, rescuing
trapped/affected persons from damaged buildings, huts, etc., providing
temporary shelters to the affected persons and providing food and medical
facility to the rescued persons.
The feeders were then energized one-by one. The damages due to the above
devastation were tentatively assessed and furnished to the Head Quarters.
• Every Discom was to provide hourly load requirements for the next day
before 4 P.M. to SLDC.
• SLDC was to inform by 6 P.M. every day the hourly allotment of loads that
could be drawn based on availability.
• Every Discom was to ensure that their withdrawals were not in excess of
allocations given by SLDC. In the event of the necessity to ensure grid
safety, SLDC was to Suo Moto instruct immediate "trip off' of certain
loads / feeders and such instructions were to be complied by the EHT Staff
without any reservations. Normalcy could be restored only after taking the
concurrence of SLDC.
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• Directors (Operations) of DISCOMs would daily monitor implementation of Disaster
the measures required to safeguard the Grid as per the directions of Management
SLDC.
• All the staff manning EHT substations was to send the programme of load
shedding to EHT substations immediately, with a copy to Chief Engineer
(Grid Operation).
DEs and ADEs (Operation) chalked out a daily programme so that they could
go in different directions to visit substations and villages en route, and meet
the farmers to elicit their problems. The reasons for the system emergency,
actions taken to mitigate the emergency, the scheduled hours in which they
were to get supply (3 phase and single phase) would be explained. Actions
being taken to redress their grievances would be detailed including the time
frame. An impression was to be given that all possible efforts a\were being
taken to ensure reasonably fair power supply to them despite the system
emergency.
They were to be in close touch with the district administration (Revenue and
Police), and elected representatives and explain the steps being taken to
mitigate the situation. Schedule of timings of supply was displayed in bold
letters at the entrance of the substations, village panchayat offices, market
yards, etc. Printed pamphlets in local language were distributed in all villages
explaining the hours of power supply being maintained. The substation staff
was made fully conversant with the schedules drawn up, their responsibilities
and need to give daily feed back. A brief daily report on areas visited,
complaints received, actions taken or proposed to be taken was given to
District, Discom and Transco Head Quarters.
127