KCA Digests 2009-2010
People vs. Maceren
G.R No. 32166, October 18, 1977
Aquino J.
Facts:
On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes,
Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary
investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint that
the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in
the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz using a device or equipment
to catch fish thru electric current which thereby destroy any aquatic animals
within its current reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace. The
municipal court quashed the complaint and the CFI affirmed such dismissal.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water
fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law
creating the Fisheries Commission is valid.
Held:
No. The court held that the that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in
issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those
orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No.
3512.
The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro
fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are
powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and
84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision
to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be
for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such
regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended to amend or expand
the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Bito-Onon vs. Fernandez
G.R. No. 139813       January 31, 2001
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Facts:
The petitioner, Joel Bito-Onon is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of
Barangay Tacras, Narra, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter
President for the Municipality of Narra, Palawan. The private respondent,
Elegio Quejano, Jr. on the other hand, is the duly elected Barangay
Chairman of Barangay Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga
Chapter President for the Municipality of Magsaysay, Palawan. Both Onon
and Quejano were candidates for the position of Executive Vice-President in
the August 23, 1997 election for the Liga ng Barangay Provincial Chapter of
the province of Palawan. Onon was proclaimed the winning candidate in the
said election prompting Quejano to file a post proclamation protest with the
Board of Election Supervisors (BES), which was decided against him on
August 25, 1997. Not satisfied with the decision of the BES, Quejano filed a
Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with the Regional Trial Court of
Palawan and Puerto Princesa City (RTC). On April 26, 1999, Onon filed a
motion to dismiss the Petition for Review raising the issue of jurisdiction.
Onon claimed that the RTC had no jurisdiction to review the decisions
rendered by the BES in any post proclamation electoral protest in connection
with the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election of officers and directors. In his
motion to dismiss, Onon claimed that the Supplemental Guidelines for the
1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election issued by the DILG on August 11, 1997

in its Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, providing for review of decisions or
resolutions of the BES by the regular courts of law is an ultra vires act and is
void for being issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, as its issuance is not
a mere act of supervision but rather an exercise of control over the Liga's
internal organization. On June 22, 1999, the RTC denied Onon's motion to
dismiss. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not QUESTIONED PROVISION IN MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR
97-193 WAS ISSUED BY THE DILG SECRETARY IN EXCESS OF HIS
AUTHORITY.
Held:
The court held that Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 of the DILG insofar as
it authorizes the filing a Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with
the regular courts in a post proclamation electoral protest is of doubtful
constitutionality. We agree with both the petitioner and the Solicitor General
that in authorizing the filing of the petition for review of the decision of the
BES with the regular courts, the DILG Secretary in effect amended and
modified the GUIDELINES promulgated by the National Liga Board and
adopted by the LIGA which provides that the decision of the BES shall be
subject to review by the National Liga Board. The amendment of the
GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of supervision but is an
exercise of the power of control, which the President does not have over the
LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations
and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely
"monitoring compliance" by local government units of such issuances. To
monitor means "to watch, observe or check" and is compatible with the
power of supervision of the DILG Secretary over local governments, which is
limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned or the
officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory enactments. Besides,
any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere with local affairs
should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government.
**take note of the meaning of power of supervision and power of control..
The President's power of general supervision over local government units is
conferred upon him by the Constitution. 14 The power of supervision is defined
KCA Digests 2009-2010
as "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their
functions in accordance with law." 15 This is distinguished from the power of
control or "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for the latter."
GMA Network Inc. vs. Movie and Television Review and classification
board
G.R. No. 148579             February 5, 2007
CORONA, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages the UHF television
station, EMC Channel 27. On January 7, 2000, respondent MTRCB issued
an order of suspension against petitioner for airing "Muro Ami: The Making"
without first securing a permit from it as provided in Section 7 of PD 1986. 3
The penalty of suspension was based on Memorandum Circular 98-17 dated
December 15, 19984 which provided for the penalties for exhibiting a
program without a valid permit from the MTRCB.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the suspension order and, at the
same time, informed MTRCB that Channel 27 had complied with the
suspension order by going off the air since midnight of January 11, 2000. It
also filed a letter-protest which was merely "noted" by the MTRCB thereby, in
effect, denying both the motion for reconsideration and letter-protest.
Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari which was dismissed
in the now assailed June 18, 2001 decision. The January 7, 2000 suspension
order issued by MTRCB was affirmed in toto.
Hence, this recourse.
Issue:

Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable and
binding on petitioner
Held:
The court held that while MTRCB had jurisdiction over the subject program,
Memorandum Circular 98-17, which was the basis of the suspension order,
was not binding on petitioner. The Administrative Code of 1987, particularly
Section 3 thereof, expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of
the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the
Philippines Law Center three certified copies of every rule adopted by it.
Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the ONAR are
ineffective and may not be enforced.9
Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, which provides for the penalties for the
first, second and third offenses for exhibiting programs without valid permit to
exhibit, has not been registered with the ONAR as of January 27, 2000. 10
Hence, the same is yet to be effective. 11 It is thus unenforceable since it has
not been filed in the ONAR.12 Consequently, petitioner was not bound by said
circular and should not have been meted the sanction provided thereunder.
Pesigan vs. Angeles
G.R. No. L-64279 April 30, 1984
AQUINO, J.
Facts:
Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in
an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six
carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia,
Batangas, as the destination.
They were provided with (1) a health certificate from the provincial
veterinarian of Camarines Sur, issued under the Revised Administrative
Code and Presidential Decree No. 533, the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974;
(2) a permit to transport large cattle issued under the authority of the
provincial commander; and (3) three certificates of inspection, one from the
KCA Digests 2009-2010
Constabulary command attesting that the carabaos were not included in the
list of lost, stolen and questionable animals; one from the LIvestock
inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and one
from the mayor of Sipocot.
In spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates, the carabaos,
while passing at Basud, Camarines Norte, were confiscated by Lieutenant
Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town's police station commander, and by Doctor
Bella S. Miranda, provincial veterinarian. The confiscation was basis on the
aforementioned Executive Order No. 626-A which provides "that henceforth,
no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no
carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabaos or
carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be
subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be distributed ... to
deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may
see fit, in the case of carabaos"
Issue:
Whether or not Presidential Executive Order No. 626-A dated October 25,
1980, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of
carabaos transported from one province to another is enforceable before
publication in the Official Gazette of June 14, 1982
Held:
The court held that the said executive order should not be enforced against
the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal
regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated
June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in
article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars
and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to
apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said
penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.
In the instant case, the livestock inspector and the provincial veterinarian of
Camarines Norte and the head of the Public Affairs Office of the Ministry of
Agriculture were unaware of Executive Order No. 626-A. The Pesigans could
not have been expected to be cognizant of such an executive order.

It results that they have a cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos.
The summary confiscation was not in order. The recipients of the carabaos
should return them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the
carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said executive
order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda and Zenarosa
acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.
Araneta vs. Gatmaitan
GR Nos. L-8895, L-9191, April 30, 1957
Felix, J.
The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near the San Miguel Bay,
between the provinces of Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte, manifested
in a resolution that they condemn the operation of trawls in the said area and
resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San
Miguel Bay. In another resolution, the same League of Mayors prayed that
the President ban the operation of trawls in the San Miguel Bay area. In
response to the pleas, the President issued EO 22 prohibiting the use of
trawls in San Miguel Bay but the EO was amended by EO 66 apparently in
answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur
recommending the allowance of trawl-fishing during the typhoon season only.
Subsequently, EO 80 was issued reviving EO 22.
Thereafter, a group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction
praying that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director
of Fisheries be enjoined from enforcing said executive order and to declare
KCA Digests 2009-2010
the same null and void. The Court held that until the trawler is outlawed by
legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay by executive
proclamation and held that the EOs 22 and 66 are invalid.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the President has authority to issue EOs 22, 66 and 80
2. W/N the said EOs were valid as it was not in the exercise of
legislative powers unduly delegated to the President
HELD:
1. YES. Under sections 75 and 83 of the Fisheries law, the restriction
and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come within
the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
However, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
exercises its functions subject to the general supervision and control
of the President of the Philippines, the President can exercise the
same power and authority through executive orders, regulations,
decrees and proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary
concerned. Hence, EOs 22,66 and 80 restricting and banning of
trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay are valid and issued by authority of
law.
2. YES. For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small immature fishes,
Congress intended with the promulgation of the Fisheries Act, to
prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing devise like trawl nets that
could endanger and deplete our supply of seafood, and to that end
authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to
provide by regulations and such restrictions as he deemed
necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land.
When the President, in response to the clamor of the people and
authorities of Camarines Sur issued EO 80 absolutely prohibiting
fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San
Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the
welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of
issues of general concern which were in consonance and strict
conformity with the law.

Metropolitan Traffic Command West Traffic District vs. Gonong
GR No. 91023, July 13, 1990
Cruz, J.
Atty. Dante David claims that the rear license plate of his car was removed
by petitioner while his vehicle was parked in Escolta. He filed a complaint in
the RTC of Manila. He questioned the petitioner’s act on the ground that not
only was the car not illegally parked but that there was no law or ordinance
authorizing such removal. The lower court ruled that LOI 43, which the
defendant (petitioner) invoked, did not empower it to detach, remove and
confiscate vehicle plates or motor vehicles illegally parked and unattended. It
merely authorizes the removal of said vehicles when they are obstacles to
free passage or continued flow of traffic on streets and highways. Moreover,
the said LOI had been PD 1605.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner is authorized to penalize traffic violations as such
HELD: No. What the LOI punishes is not a traffic violation but a traffic
obstruction, which is an altogether different offense. LOI 43 deals with motor
vehicles that stall on streets and highways and not those that are
intentionally parked in a public place in violation of a traffic law or regulation.
In the case at bar, it is not alleged or shown that private respondents’ vehicle
stalled on a public thoroughfare and obstructed the flow of traffic. The charge
against him is that he purposely parked his vehicle in a no-parking area. The
act, if true is a violation that may not be punished under LOI 43. The
applicable law is PD 1605, which does not include removal and confiscation
of the license plate of the vehicle among the imposable penalties.
Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board
KCA Digests 2009-2010
GR Nos. 95203-05, December 18, 1990
Sarmiento, J.
The petitioners pray for injunctive relief to stop the ERB from implementing
its Order mandating a provisional increase in the prices of petroleum and
petroleum products. The Order, which was in pursuance to EO 172, was a
response to the separate applications of Caltex, Pilipinas Shell and Petron
Corporation for the Board to increase the wholesale posted prices of
petroleum products. Petitioners submit that the Order was issued with grave
abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction and without proper
notice and hearing.
ISSUE: W/N the ERB committed grave abuse of discretion
HELD: NO. While under EO 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not
preclude the Board from ordering, ex parte, a provisional increase, as it did,
subject to its final disposition of whether or not: 1) to make it permanent;2) to
reduce or increase it further; or 3) to deny the application. The Board has
jurisdiction to decree a price adjustment, subject to the requirements of
notice and hearing. Pending that, however, it may order, under Section 8 of
EO 172, an authority to increase provisionally, without need of a hearing,
subject to the final outcome of the proceeding.
Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. vs. Board of Transportation
GR No. L-59234, September 30, 1982
Melencio-Herrera, J.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators. They
filed the petition seeking to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular No.
77-42 of the Bureau of Land Transportation. The assailed memorandum
order provides for the phasing out and discontinuance in the operation of
dilapidated taxis or taxis of Model 1971 and earlier. Pursuant to the said
memorandum, the Bureau of Land Transportation issued Implementing

Circular No. 52 instructing Regional Directors, the MV Registrars and other
personnel of the BLT, all within the National Capital Region, to implement
said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be
allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances.
ISSUES: W/N the assailed memorandum orders were invalid exercise
of police power
HELD: NO. Section 2 of Presidential Decree 101 grants the Board of
Transportation the power to fix just and reasonable standards, classification,
regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed,
observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. As
enunciated in the BOT circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and
comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated
taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations
to promote the health…,safety and general welfare of the people.
Balbuna,et. al. vs. Hon. Secretary of Education, et. al.
GR No. L-14280, November 29, 1960
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
The action was brought to enjoin the enforcement of Department Order No.
8, s. 1955, issued by the Secretary of Education, promulgating rules and
regulations for the conduct of compulsory flag ceremony in all schools, as
provided in Republic Act No. 1265. Petitioners, who are members of the
Jehova’s Witnesses, contend that the said Department Order denied them
freedom of worship and of speech, among others. They also contend that the
Order is not valid for it was not published in the Official Gazette as required
by law.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the Department Order is invalid
2. W/N RA 1265 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power
KCA Digests 2009-2010
HELD:
1. NO. The contention that assailed Department Order has no binding
effect, not having been published in the Official Gazette is without
merit. The assailed order being addressed only to the Directors of
Public and Private Schools and educational institutions under their
supervision, cannot be said to be of general application, requiring
previous publication in the Official Gazette before it could have
binding force and effect.
2. No. The requirements of the law constitute an adequate standard.
SAÑADO vs. CA
The Philippine Fisheries Commission issued petitioner a fishpond permit.
Thereafter, petitioner and private respondent Nepomuceno executed a
contract which stipulated that Nepomuceno would undertake to develop an
area or 30 hectares out of the 50 hectares covered by the permit issued to
petitioner.
In 1979, the Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources recommended
to the Ministry of Natural Resources to convert the fishpond permit issued to
petitioner into a 25-year agreement which covered a reduced area. The
lease agreement was then issued to petitioner.
In 1980, private respondent waived his rights, interests and participation over
the fishpond area in favor of Edgar Chu. Private respondent then informed
BFAR of his development contract with petitioner and that the fishpond was
almost fully developed at his expense.
In 1981, petitioner filed a complaint against private respondent and Chu with
the RTC for recovery of possession and damages. During the pendency of
the case, the Minister of Agriculture and Food cancelled petitioner’s fishpond
lease agreement. The matter was elevated to the Office of the President but
was dismissed.
Meanwhile, the court rendered a decision in the civil case ordering the
defendants to restore possession and control of the fishpond area, among
others.
 KCA Digests 2009-2010

ISSUE: W/N the decision of the Office of the President in cancelling
petitioner’s lease agreement should be given weight
HELD: YES. The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying,
or in suspending or revoking a license, permit, franchise, or certificate of
public convenience and necessity is administrative or quasi-judicial. A
decision of the Office of the President is explicitly an official act of and an
exercise of quasi-judicial power by the Executive Department headed by the
highest officer of the land, and it thus squarely falls under matters relative to
the executive department which courts are mandatorily tasked to take judicial
notice.
has the power to issue certificates of public convenience. But this power to
issue certificates of public convenience does not carry with it the power or
supervision and control over matters not related to the issuance of the
certificate of public convenience or in the performance therewith in a manner
suitable to promote public interest. The Board of Communications has power
to impose fine only where public service violates or fails to comply with terms
and conditions of the certificate of public convenience or the orders,
decisions or regulations of the board. Moreover, the proper forum for
complaints of injury caused by breach of obligation should be in the courts.

Globe Wireless Ltd. vs. Public Service Commission

RCPI vs. Board of Communications
Private respondent Antonio Arnaiz sent a message to Maria Diaz in Spain
In GR No. L-43653, Diego Morales’ daughter sent him a telegram while he
through the telegraph office of the Bureau of Telecommunications in
was in Manila, informing him that his wife has died. The telegram was sent
Dumagete and was transmitted to Manila. The message, however, was not
through petitioner RCPI. The telegram, however, never reached Morales.
delivered to the addressee. After being informed of said fact, Arnaiz sent a
Because of the failure of the RCPI to transmit said telegram to him,
complaint to the Public Service Commissioner a letter-complaint. In its
respondent allegedly suffered inconvenience and additional expenses and
answer, petitioner denied liability but questioned PSC’s jurisdiction over the
prays for damages.
subject matter. After hearing, the PSC found petitioner responsible for the
unsatisfactory service complained of and ordered it to pay a fine.
Meanwhile, in GR No. L-45378, complainant Pacifico Inncocencio claims that
his sister, Lourdes, sent him a telegram on July 13 through petitioner for the
ISSUE: W/N PSC has jurisdiction to discipline and impose fine upon
purpose of informing him of the death of their father. However, the telegram
petitioner
was never received by Pacifico but the sneder, Lourdes, was never notified
of such failure. Because of this failure, Pacifico claims to have suffered
HELD: NO. The Public Service Act vested in the PSC jurisdiction,
mental anguish and personal inconveniences and thus prays for damages.
supervision and control over all public services and their franchises,
equipment and other properties. However, Section 5 of RA 4630, the
After hearing, respondent board in both cases imposed upon petitioner in
legislative franchise under which petitioner was operating, limited respondent
each case a disciplinary fine.
Commission’s jurisdiction over petitioner only to the rate which petitioner may
charge the public. The negligence imputed to public respondent had nothing
ISSUE: W/N the Board of Communications has jurisdiction to take
whatsoever to do with the subject matter of very limited jurisdiction of the
cognizance of complaints for injury caused by breach of obligation arising
Commission over petitioner.
from negligence

HELD: NO. As provided under Section 129 of the Public Service Act
governing the organization of the Specialized Regulatory Board, the BOC

BOISER vs. CA
Petitioner has been operating a telephone system in Tagbiliran City and
other municipalities in the province of Bohol under the name of Premiere
Automatic Telephone Network. Petitioner and private respondent PLDT
entered into a contract whereby PLDT bound itself to provide Premiere with
long distance and overseas facilities.
Without any prior notice to the petitioner, respondent PLDT issued a “circuit
authorization order” to its co-respondents to terminate the connection of
PLDT’s relay station with the facilities of the petitioner’s telephone system.
Petitioner then instituted with the CFI a petition for injunction and damages.
The court issued a temporary restraining order. Five months after the
issuance of the TRO, the private respondents filed a motion to dissolve or lift
the restraining order. Three years after the filing of their motion to dissolve
the TRO, the private respondents elevated the case to the CA on the ground
that the CFI judge had no authority to issue the restraining order.
ISSUE: W/N the CFI has jurisdiction to hear and decide controversies arising
from the operation of telephone systems or the interconnection of
communications facilities
HELD: NO. PLDT has cited in full the authority and powers given by PD No.
1 to the Board of Communications, now NTC. There is nothing in the
Commission’s powers which authorizes it to adjudicate breach of contract
cases, much less to award moral and exemplary damages.
Philippine Lawyer’s Association vs. Agrava
Respondent Director of the Philippine Patent Office issued a circular
announcing an examination schedule for the purpose of determining who are
qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippine Patent Office,
the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of
practice before said office. According to said circular, members of the
Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and
technical training are qualified. Petitioners contend that one who has passed
the bar exams and licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the
Philippines is duly qualified to practice before the said office.
KCA Digests 2009-2010
On the other hand, respondent Director maintains that the prosecution of
patent cases does not involve entirely the practice of law but includes the
application of scientific and technical knowledge and training.
ISSUE: W/N the appearance before the Philippine Patent Office is included
in the practice of law
HELD: YES. The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent
Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and
the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto or
the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. The practice before the
Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and
legal principles.
Furthermore, the Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-
judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because
of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the
said office, without further examination or other qualification.
CARMELO vs. RAMOS
The Mayor of Manila created a committee to investigate the anomalies
involving the license inspectors and other personnel of the License
Inspection Division of the Office of the City Treasurer and of the License and
Permits Division of the said office. He named Jesus Carmelo as chairman.
The committee issued subpoenas to Armando Ramos requiring him to
appear before it in connection with an administrative case but Ramos refused
to appear. Claiming that Ramos’ refusal tended to impede or obstruct the
administrative proceedings, petitioner filed with the CFI a petition to declare
Ramos in contempt. The trial court dismissed the petition. It held that there is
no law empowering committees created by municipal mayors to issue
subpoenas and demand witnesses testify under oath and that to compel
Ramos to testify would be to violate his right against self-incrimination.

ISSUE: W/N the said committee is empowered to subpoena witnesses and
ask for their punishment in case of refusal
HELD: NO. The rule is that Rule 64 (Contempt) of the Rules of Court applies
only to inferior and superior courts and does not comprehend contempt
committed against administrative officials or bodies like the one in this case,
unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as
contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
GUEVARA vs. COMELEC
Petitioner was ordered by the COMELEC to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt for having published in the Sunday Times an
article which tended to interfere with and influence the COMELEC and its
members in the adjudication of a controversy then pending. The article
pertained to the contracts entered into by COMELEC regarding the
requisitioning and preparation of ballot boxes to be used in the elections.
Petitioner appeared and filed a motion to quash upon the ground, among
others, that the Commission has no jurisdiction to punish as contempt the
publication of the alleged contemptuous article. The COMELEC denied the
motion to quash but granted petitioner a period of 15 days within which to
elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC has the power to jurisdiction to conduct
contempt proceedings
HELD: NO. Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has
resulted in controversy between several dealers, that however merely refers
to a ministerial duty which the Commission has performed in its
administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of elections ordained by our
Constitution. In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial
duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could
not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for
such power is inherently judicial in nature.
KCA Digests 2009-2010
PEFIANCO vs. MORAL
Former DECS Secretary Ricardo Gloria filed a complaint which charged
respondent Maria Luisa Moral with the pilferage of some historical
documents from the vault of the Filipiniana and Asian Division of the National
Library which were under her control and supervision as Division Chief. The
DECS Secretary found respondent guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. She was ordered
dismissed from the government service.
Respondent did not appeal the judgment but she filed a petition for
production of the DECS investigation committee report, which was, however,
denied. She reiterated her request but likewise denied. She then filed an
action for mandamus and injunction before the regular courts against Sec.
Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS investigation
committee. Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case for lack
of cause of action, but the trial court denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the
case to the CA imputing grave abuse of discretion, which was dismissed as
well for lack of merit. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari
HELD: YES. The challenged order of the trial court falls short of the
requirements prescribed in Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure. The
Order merely discussed the general concept of mandamus and the trial
court’s jurisdiction over the rulings and actions of administrative agencies
without stating the basis by petitioner’s motion to dismiss was being denied.
NOTE: There is no law which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish
respondent with a copy of the investigation report. A respondent in an
administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and
recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into
charges filed against him.
Batongbacal vs. Associated Bank
Petitioner Bienvenido Batongbacal started his banking career as a manager
of the Second Rizal Development Bank. He then transferred to Citizens Bank

and Trust Company and was appointed as assistant vice-president and
concurrently, as acting manager of the personnel department. Subsequently,
Citizens Bank merged with Association Banking Corporation and later
became known as Associated Bank. In the new bank, petitioner resumed his
position as assistant vice president.
Years later, he found out that his salary was very much below the standard
remuneration of the bank’s other assistant vice presidents. He asked for the
board to give him the accrued salary withheld from him but to no avail.
Thereafter, as part of its streamlining measures, the management required
all bank officers to submit their courtesy resignations. Petitioner did not
submit his courtesy resignation. As a result, he received a letter from the
Bank informing him that his resignation was accepted. Petitioner made
repeated demands for the reconsideration of the bank’s decision to
terminated his employment. He then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
damages in the arbitration branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission. The NLRC ordered petitioner’s reinstatement with full
backwages. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, the bank
appealed to the NLRC which ruled in favor of the legality of petitioner’s
dismissal.
ISSUE: W/N respondent bank legally dismissed petitioner for refusing to
tender his courtesy resignation
HELD: NO. Petitioner’s dismissal was effected through a letter “accepting”
his resignation, even if petitioner did not actually submit such letter. It is
clear from private respondent’s pleadings that it terminated petitioner for
insubordination in view of his failure to comply with the order to submit his
letter of courtesy resignation. However, the Court held that insubordination
may not be imputed to one who refused to allow an unlawful order.
Moreover, the Court held that the record fails to show any valid reasons for
terminating the employment of petitioner.
NOTE: The SC remanded the case to the NLRC for determination of factual
issues. It noted the “impracticality of the position paper method of disposing
labor cases. As exemplified by this case, there are instanced wherein claims
of parties are not properly ventilated because they agree to dispense with the
KCA Digests 2009-2010
hearing not knowing that more often than not both of them suffer adverse
consequences. “
Civil Aeronautics Board vs. PAL
PAL is granted a legislative franchise to provide domestic and international
flights. In 1970, it required Flight 213 (Tug-Mla) to pass Baguio to pick up 20
passengers. No airline was affected by the flagstop.
Thereafter, the CAB Chairman filed a complaint against PAL contending that
the latter should have first obtained permission from CAB. The Board then
resolved to impose a fine against PAL. PAL filed a motion for reconsideration
claiming that the power and authority to impose fines is a judicial function
and does not belong to the CAB. Subsequently, the Board resolved to reduce
the fine imposed upon PAL.
ISSUE: W/N CAB possesses the necessary legal authority to impose a fine
HELD: YES. RA 776 provides that the CAB has the power to review, revise,
reverse, modify or affirm on appeal any administrative decision or order of
the Civil Aeronautics Administrator on matters pertaining to imposition of civil
penalty or fine in connection with the violation of any provision of the said Act
or rules and regulations issued thereunder. In the case at bar, the fine
imposed on PAL is that fine or civil penalty contemplated in the relevant
provision of RA 776 and not a fine in the nature of criminal penalty as
contemplated in the RPC. It is an administrative penalty which administrative
officers are empowered to impose without criminal prosecution.
Bautista vs. Board of Energy
MERALCO filed with the BOE an application for an upward revision of its
rates. In the same petition, MERALCO prayed for an ex parte provisional
approval of the proposed rates. Subsequently, petitioners filed an opposition
to the application and prayed that no provisional approval be granted by the
BOE. They claim that the increases in rates is exorbitant and unreasonable.
In an order, the BOE provisionally approved MERALCO’s revised rate
schedules without hearing. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration stating

that they were no afforded the opportunity to be heard. Without setting for
hearing, the BOE denied the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: W/N the BOE committed grave abuse of discretion in approving the
provisional increase of MERALCO rates
HELD: No. When BOE provisionally authorized private respondent’s
application without hearing, it merely exercised a prerogative granted to it by
law. Under similar circumstances, the Court has upheld the authority of
regulatory boards like the Energy Regulatory Board , to grant provisional
relief upon the filing of an application, petition or complaint or at any stage
thereafter, and without need of prior hearing, but it shall call a hearing
thereon within thirty days thereafter for the determination of its final decision.
The order granting such provisional relief, however, must be based upon
substantial evidence – supporting papers duly verified or authenticated, and
is without prejudice to rendition of a final decision after hearing.
DELFIN vs. INCIONG
The 136 petitioners herein are former employees of private respondent
Atlantic Container Corporation, organized themselves into Atlantic Container
Employees Organization (ACCO) and affiliated with the Federation of
Democratic Labor Unions (FEDLU).
Claiming that Atlantic and its General Manager, private respondent Roberto
Jacinto, refused to implement the Collective Bargaining Agreement,
petitioners and FEDLU held a strike. Thereafter, ACCO and FEDLU filed a
case in the Court of Industrial Relations. The CIR found Atlantic Container
Corporation and Jacinto guilty of unfair labor practice and ordering them to
cease and desist from further committing the same and to reinstate
complainants striking members. They filed motions to reconsider the said
decision, presumably for the reinstatement of all the petitioners, but the CIR
denied the motions.
The petitioners again filed a charge with the CIR alleging that the named
respondents established a corporation which was an alter ego of Atlantic and
which was allegedly organized to engage in the identical business as Atlantic
Container, absorbing all the assets including the facilities and machineries.
When the CIR was abolished, the case was transferred to NLRC which
ordered the reinstatement of complainants. Only 86 out of the 136 petitioners
were ordered reinstated. The appeal was dismissed, based on the ground of
KCA Digests 2009-2010
res judicata. Petitioners appealed to the Minister of Labor through
respondent Deputy Minister Inciong who affirmed the NLRC decision.
ISSUE: W/N the cause of action was barred by the principle res judicata
HELD: YES. While it is true that the complainant in the first charge was the
union, in reality it had no material interest in the outcome of the case. The
real party who stands to be benefited or defeated by the case brought in the
name of the union are the union members themselves. Since the judgment
therein had become final and executor, the subsequent filing of another
charge against Atlantic for the same violations committed during its
existence, is barred by res judicata. The bringing of the same action in the
name of the individual members of the union will not take out the case from
the ambit of the principle of res judicata.
Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc. vs. NLRC
Private respondent Juanito Collado was employed by petitioner as security
guard. In the course of his employment, 4 crates of lawanit boards were
stolen. He was implicated in the theft and thereafter placed under preventive
suspension. NALCO then filed an application with the Regional Office of the
Department of Labor for clearance to dismiss Collado. The application was
approved was approved by Officer-in-Charge Rey Seneres. The said officer
certified the case to the labor arbiter who, after a perusal of records (position
papers submitted by the parties), returned the case to the Regional Director,
who recommended that the case be elevated to the Secretary of Labor. The
acting Secretary of Labor affirmed the decision of Seneres granting
petitioner’s application for clearance to dismiss Collado.
Collado then filed a complaint before the District Labor Office for unjust
dismissal and reinstatement with backwages and benefits.NALCO filed a
motion to dismiss upon the ground that the order of the Acting Secretary had
become final and executory, making the issue of illegal dismissal res
judicata. The Labor Arbiter ordered NALCO to reinstate Collado without
backwages. Both Parties appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC modified the
Labor Arbiter’s decision adding backwages.
ISSUE: W/N the principle of res judicata applies
HELD: NO. The principle of res judicata may not be invoked in labor relations
proceedings considering that Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V of the Rules and

Regulations Implementing the Labor Code provides that such proceedings
are non-litigious and summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities
obtaining in courts of law. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial
or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to exercise of administrative powers.
G.R. No. L-34674             October 26, 1931
MAURICIO CRUZ vs. STANTON YOUNGBERG
Ostrand, J
Topic: Contingent regulation (page 50)
FACTS:
This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of
Manila for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the
respondent, Stanton Youngberg, as Director of the Bureau of Animal
Industry, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle
imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. The petitioner
attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the
importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.
The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was based on
two reasons, namely, (1) that if Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional
and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded because
Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the
respondent from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was
constitutional and, therefore, valid.
The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by
reason of the failure of the petitioner to file another complaint. From that
order of dismissal, the petitioner appealed to this court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent as cause of action
HELD:
Yes. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting
the public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are
objects within the scope of the police power.
KCA Digests 2009-2010
The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the
time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity
therefor and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its power in
passing the Act. That being so, it is not for this court to avoid or vacate the
Act upon constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the
measures are wise or the best that might have been adopted.
Garments and Textile Export Board vs. CA
Glorious Sun was a recipient of a substantial number of EQ allocations from
the GTEB. Glorious Sun was charged before the GTEB and was found guilty
of, misdeclaration of values of its imported raw materials resulting in dollar
salting, and other related frauds, in connection with its importations in 1983.
Its export quotas were thereafter given to two newly-formed corporations —
the De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation (De Soleil) and the herein
petitioner American Inter-Fashion Corporation (AIFC). The cancelled EQs of
Glorious Sun which were given to AIFC are the subject of dispute between
GTEB and petitioner. Glorious Sun continues to claim its right over the
aforementioned EQ. AIFC was able to maintain its EQ from 1984 up to the
time of the filing of this petition.
With the establishment of a new government in 1986, Glorious Sun filed an
appeal with the Office of the President, which, in turn, set aside the GTEB
decision adverse to Glorious Sun and remanded the case for genuine
hearings where due process would be accorded both parties. This decision
was upheld by the Supreme Court.
After further proceedings were conducted concerning Glorious Sun's alleged
violations and frauds, the GTEB adopted a resolution providing that the
disqualification of Glorious Sun and its principal stockholders and officers
from engaging in the garments export business is lifted.
AIFC, on the other hand, prior to the Supreme Court denial of its petition for
review of the cancellation of its registration, requested the GTEB to release
its EQ allocation for 1993. This request was, however, refused by the GTEB.
The RTC denied AIFC’s petition for injunction. AIFC's subsequent motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: Whether or not GTEB have the power and authority to grant or
cancel export quotas or authorizations

HELD: YES. The Court held that that the power and jurisdiction to adjudicate
on the question of AIFC's entitlement to the export allocations subject of the
above-entitled petitions (be they export quotas or export authorizations),
which includes the discretion to grant and disapprove said export allocations,
belongs solely to the GTEB, and not to the regular courts. On the basis of EO
537 and EO 952, which amended the former, the power to adjudicate on the
question of an entity's entitlement to export allocations was expressly
granted to the GTEB, or at the very least, was necessarily implied from the
power to cancel or suspend quota allocations, is beyond cavil.
GSIS vs. CSC
According to Asuncion Salazar’s service record filed with the CSCS, she was
employed by the GSIS as a casual laborer. She became permanent with a
designation of stenographer. Thereafter, she was promoted to Confidential
Technical Assistant Aide.
Salazar's GSIS Service Record however, revealed that she was appointed to
the position of Confidential Executive Assistant in the office of then GSIS
President and General Manager Roman A. Cruz, Jr. on a permanent status.
She was then promoted to Technical Assistant III, the position she held when
her services were terminated by the newly appointed President and General
Manager of the GSIS for the reason that her position was co-terminous with
the term of the appointing authority.
Salazar filed a petition for reconsideration with the GSIS Board of Trustees,
but reconsideration was denied. Thereafter, she filed a petition for
reconsideration of the denial with the Review Committee, which referred the
same to the Merit Systems Promotion Board and the CSC.
In a resolution, the CSC directed the immediate reinstatement of Salazar with
back salaries. The Board however affirmed her termination. Salazar filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Board's order and manifested that the
Commission already resolved her petition on July 22, 1987. On June 30,
1988. the Board set aside its previous Order affirming Salazar's dismissal in
view of the Commission's prior resolution of the case. The GSIS filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied by the board and stated that the
CSC is a higher administrative appellate body on matters concerning the
removal of officers and employees from the service. Hence, the Board
cannot in any manner modify or alter the determinations and actions of the
KCA Digests 2009-2010
Civil Service Commission. The GSIS appealed but the CSC denied the
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC has jurisdiction over the case
HELD: No. Presidential Decree No. 1409, creating the Merit Systems Board
provides that the Merit Systems Board has the function to “Hear and decide
cases brought before it by officers and employees who feel aggrieved by the
determination of appointing authorities involving appointment, promotion,
transfer, detail, reassignment and other personnel actions, as well as
complaints against any officers in the government arising from abuses
arising from personnel actions of the these officers or from violations of the
merit system.”
When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such
jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise
vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent
jurisdiction over the matter. Presidential Decree No. 1409 clearly provides
that the Merit Systems Board shall take cognizance of appeals from parties
aggrieved by decisions of appointing officers involving personnel action. The
Commission therefore cannot take original cognizance of the cases specified
under Section 5 of P.D. 1409, except in the case specified under Section 9 (j)
of the Civil Service Decree which directly gives it such power, to wit:
SECTION 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission
shall administer the Civil Service Commission and shall have the following
powers and functions:
j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it
in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal;
In the case at bar, the appeal of Salazar was endorsed by the Review
Committee to both the Merit Systems Board and the Civil Service
Commission. In the absence of a decision from the Merit Systems Board, the
Commission cannot legally assume jurisdiction over the appeal. Hence, its
decision in favor of Salazar and all subsequent resolutions of the
Commission in this case are void. Likewise, the Order of the Board setting
aside its previous order upholding the termination of Salazar in deference to
the Commission's final appellate jurisdiction over the matter, is null and void.
Jurisdiction is vested by law and is not lost nor be legally transferred by
 KCA Digests 2009-2010

voluntary surrender in favor of a body not vested by law with such Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict
jurisdiction. and regulate recruitment and placement activities.
Art. 36. Regulatory Power. — The Secretary of Labor shall have the
power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement
activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation
of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to
G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992
issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,
objectives and implement the provisions of this title. (Emphasis
vs.
ours.)
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor &
Employment, and JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the
The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION,
bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It is noteworthy
respondents. 
that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas
employment.
FACTS:
as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino
The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as
housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres
delegated to the executive branch of Government.
issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the
recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers
Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of
going to Hong Kong". The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the
power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative
business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers. Pursuant to the
Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code
DOLE circular, POEA issued a Memorandum providing guidelines in the
and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of
Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong
1987.
Kong and accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire
Filipino domestic helpers. POEA administrator also issued a Memorandum
circular on processing employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong
Kong.
G.R. No. 78385 August 31, 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC. vs. SECRETARY OF
Petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for prohibition to annul the
EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS
aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their
Gancayco, J.
implementation for the following reasons:
1. That the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in
Petitioner: Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit
excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;
corporate entity duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines
2. That the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the
Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and
Respondent: Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports is a ranking cabinet
3. That the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the
member who heads the Department of Education, Culture and Sports of the
National Administrative Register were not complied with.
Office of the President of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitions are with merit
FACTS:
On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education created
HELD:
by DECS submitted a report entitled "Report and Recommendations on a
There is no merit in the first and second grounds of the petition.

Policy for Tuition and Other School Fees." The report favorably
recommended to the DECS the following courses of action with respect to
the Government's policy on increases in school fees for the SY 1987 to 1988.
DECS took note of the report and issued an Order authorizing the 15% to
20% increase in school fees as recommended by the Task Force. Petitioner
sought for reconsideration on the ground that increases were too high.
Thereafter, the Order was modified reducing the increases to a lower ceiling
of 10% to 15%. Petitioner still opposed the increases.
Petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the public interest, went to this Court and
filed the instant Petition for prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendered
declaring the questioned Department Order unconstitutional. The thrust of
the Petition is that the said Department Order was issued without any legal
basis. The petitioner also maintains that the questioned Department Order
was issued in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution in
asmuch as the petitioner was not given due notice and hearing before the
said Department Order was issued.
In support of the first argument, the petitioner argues that while the DECS is
authorized by law to regulate school fees in educational institutions, the
power to regulate does not always include the power to increase school fees.
Regarding the second argument, the petitioner maintains that students and
parents are interested parties that should be afforded an opportunity for a
hearing before school fees are increased. In sum, the petitioner stresses that
the questioned Order constitutes a denial of substantive and procedural due
process of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DECS has the power to prescribe school fees
HELD:
Yes. In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the
power to prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been
vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should be
considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge
its functions and duties under the law.
The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a
legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the
grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement
of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in
the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are
essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down
by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given
KCA Digests 2009-2010
kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character.
Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party,
based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character.
Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its
legislative function? We believe so. The assailed Department Order
prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all private
schools in the country for schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior
notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of its issuance.
Arrow Transportation Corp. vs. Board of Transportation
GR No. L-39655, March 21, 1975
Fernando, J.
FACTS:
Both petitioner and private respondent Sultan Rent-a-Car are domestic
corporations. The former has in his favor a certificate of public convenience
to operate a public utility auto-truck service from Cebu city to Mactan
Interantional Airport and vice versa. Private respondent filed a petition with
the respondent Board for the issuance of a certificate of private respondent
filed a petition with the respondent Board for the issuance of a certificate of
public convenience to operate a similar service on the same line. Without the
required publication, the Board issued on order granting it provisional permit
to operte on the line applied for. A motion for reconsideration was filed and
for the cancellation of such provisional permit but without awaiting final
action, this petition was filed on the ground that the issuance of provisional
permit was patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the controversy is ripe for judicial determination
HELD: YES. It is undeniable that at the time the petition was filed, there was
pending with respondent Board a motion for reconsideration. Ordinarily, its
resolution should be awaited. The Court was impelled to go into the merits of
the controversy at this stage, not only because of the importance of the issue

raised but also because of the strong public interest in having the matter
settled.
Tiangco vs. Lauchang
GR No. L-17598, September 30, 1963
Padilla, J.
FACTS:
These are petitions for a writ of certiorari to review an amended judgment
rendered by the Court Appeals holding Faustina Lauchang is entitled to
acquire by purchase whole of Lot No. 10, Block 2, of the Tambobong Estate.
It appears that Lot No. 10, Block No. 2 of the Tambobong Estate in the
municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal, Philippine Islands, was formerly
leased by the Archbishop of Manila to one Matea Suarez. Matea Suarez sold
her leasehold interest in the land to Anacleto Lauchang, father of the plaintiff-
appellee and appellant Faustina Lauchang. When Anacleto died in 1923, his
daughter, the plaintiff, took over and since then has been occupying said
property paying rents therefor to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila
up to August 31, 1927 when further payments of rents was suspended
because the Archbishop of Manila sold the Tambobong Estate to the
Government of the Commonwealth of Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI of Rizal should have dismissed the case for
lack of cause of action, in view of respondent’s failure to exhaust all
administrative remedies
HELD: NO. The contention of the petitioners that the action brought in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal should have been dismissed for lack of cause
of action, in view of respondent's failure to exhaust all administrative
remedies is untenable. It is well to recall that the lot, subject of the litigation,
is not a part of the public domain, but of private ownership acquired by the
Government for resale to private persons, and for that reason any aggrieved
party may bring an action in court without the need of exhausting all
administrative remedies.
KCA Digests 2009-2010
Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr.
GR No. L-17860, March 30, 1962
De Leon, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner was holding the position of Special Assistant to the Governor of the
Central Bank. He was charged in an administrative case resulting in his
suspension by the Monetary Board and the creation of a three-man
committee to investigate him. After conducting hearings, the committee
recommended petitioner’s reinstatement. The Monetary Board, however,
adopted a resolution stating that petitioner is deemed resigned as of the date
of his suspension. Subsequently, respondent Mariano Marcos was appointed
to replace petitioner. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus
and quo warranto. After several hearings, the court dismissed the petition on
the ground that petitioner did not exhaust all administrative remedies.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should have exhausted all administrative
remedies
HELD: NO. The doctrine of administrative remedies does not apply where, by
the terms or implications of the statute authorizing an administrative remedy,
such remedy is permissive only, warranting the conclusion that the legislative
intended to allow the judicial remedy even though the administrative remedy
has not been exhausted.
Tan vs. Director of Forestry
GR No. L-24548, October 27, 1983
 KCA Digests 2009-2010

Makasiar, J. Davide, Jr., J.

FACTS: FACTS: The Municipal Government of Muntinlupa, thru its Mayor Santiago
Carlos, entered into a contract with petitioner for the latter’s management
and operation of its New Muntinlupa public Market. The contract provides for
The Bureau of Forestry issued an advertisement for public bidding for a a 25 year term renewable for a like period unless sooner terminated and/or
certain tract of forest land in Olongapo, Zambales. The public forest land rescinded by mutual agreement of the parties. Subsequently, Mayor Ignacio
consists of 6,240 hectares and located within the former US Naval Bunye, Mayor Carlos’ successor, claiming to be particularly scandalized by
Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland. Petitioner submitted the 50-year term of the agreement, contrary to the provision of Section 143,
his application in due form along with nine other applicants. Thereafter, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, and the patently inequitable rental,
President Carlos P. Garcia issued a directive to the Director of the Bureau of directed the review of the contract. Consequently, the Municipal Council
Forestry to draft a proclamation establishing the said area as a watershed approved a Resolution abrogating the contract.
forest reserve for Olongapo and that the bids received for the issuance of
timber license be rejected. The Secretary of Agriculture and National
Petitioner filed with the RTC of Makati a complaint for breach of contract,
Resources sustained the recommendations of the Director of Forestry who
specific performance with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against
concluded that it would be beneficial to the public interest if the area is made
the Municipality and its officers. The writ applied for was denied, the
available for exploitation under certain conditions. Finally, the area was
KBMBPM officers resisted the attempts of Bunye and company to complete
awarded to petitioner. Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick
the take-over. The matter was elevated to the Supreme Court but it was
filed motions for reconsideration which were denied by the Director of
remanded to the Court of Appeals.
Forestry. Ravago appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, which later on, declared the license issued to petitioner by
Thereafter, Amado Perez, Gerneral Manager of KBMBPM, filed with the
Director of Forestry as null and void. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
Ombudsman a complaint charging Bunye and his co-petitioners of
was denied.
harassment, oppression, abuse of authority and violation of the Anti Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act for taking over the management of the public
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has not exhausted all administrative
market.
remedies
On October 1998, respondent Madriaga and Coronado, accompanied by the
HELD: YES. Considering that the President has the power to review on
Bunye and the latters’ heavily armed men forcibly broke open the doors of
appeal the orders or acts of the respondents-appellees, the failure of the
the offices of petitioners purportedly to serve upon petitioners the Order of
petitioner to take that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust his
respondent Secretary of Agriculture and to implement the same by taking
administrative remedies. From the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture
over and disbanding the incumbent Board of Directors of KBMBPM.
and Natural Resources complained of, petitioner had a plain, speedy and
Petitioners claim that the Order served on them was not written on the
adequate remedy by appealing to the Chief Executive. Certiorari is not a
stationary of the Department, does not bear its seal and is a mere Xerox
substitute for appeal as held time and again, it being a time honored and well
copy. Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition praying that respondents refrain,
known principle that before seeking judicial redress, a party must exhaust the
cease and desist from enforcing the questioned Order and that the order be
administrative remedies available.
declared null and void.
KBMBPM vs. Dominguez
ISSUES:
GR No. 91927, January 13,1992
1. Whether or not the issued Order was valid
 KCA Digests 2009-2010

2. Whether or not the petitioners needed to exhaust administrative

remedies available

HELD:

1. NO. There is an established procedure for the removal of directors

and officers of cooperatives. It is likewise manifest that the right to
due process is respected by the express provision on the opportunity
to be heard. But even without said provision , petitioners cannot be
deprived of that right. The procedure was not followed in this case.
Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated himself the power of
the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove
the petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under
PD 175 which grants him the authority to supervise and regulate all
cooperatives. An administrative officer has only such powers as are
expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the
exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by
implication beyond what may be necessary for their just and
reasonable execution.
2. NO. The rule is well-settled that this requirement does not apply
where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an
alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the latter,
unless actually disapproved by him. This doctrine of qualified political
agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed.
There was no need to appeal the decision to the Office of the
President; recourse to the courts could be had immediately.
Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also
yields to other exceptions, such as when the question involved is
purely legal, as in the instant case, or where the questioned act is
patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the claim of
petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.