PRESIDENT MARCOS AND LAND REFORM OF THE PHILIPPINES

Mendoza, M. P. (2021). Marcos' agrarian reform: Promises, Contradictions, Lessons. UNITAS,

94(1), 127-165. https://archium.ateneo.edu/history-faculty-pubs/56/
Fuwa, N. (2000). Politics and Economics of Land Reform in the Philippines: A Survey. A
background paper prepared for a World Bank Study, Dynamism of Rural Sector Growth: Policy
Lessons from East Asian Countries. https://www.h.chiba-u.jp/lab/mkt/LANDREF.pdf
Kerkvliet, B. J. (1974). Land Reform in the Philippines Since the Marcos Coup. Pacific Affairs,
47(3), 286–304. https://doi.org/10.2307/2755767

Author's View, Findings and Conclusion:

According to Meynardo P. Mendoza, the mechanics of the program focused greatly on
compensation to the landowner. As a result, the process of land acquisition became tedious and
burdensome for the targeted beneficiaries. The farmer had to undertake this double burden in so
short of time to qualify as a beneficiary.
According to Mendoza, covering only rice and corn made Marcos’ agrarian reform
vulnerable to criticisms that the real intent was to target oligarchs but at the same time protecting
cronies such as Benedicto, Cojuangco, Enrile, Lobregat etc.
Fuwa concluded that while the implementation of land reform under PD27 was limited to
specific geographical areas and thus the total mount of land redistributed ended up very modest,
many village-level studies found significant impact of the reform program in the areas where the
program was targeted.
AccordingAccording to Fuwa, despite the modest (though geographically limited)
success of PD 27 under the Marcos martial law regime, its implementation seems to have toned
down substantially after the initial few years; part of the reason was that President Marcos
increasingly came to appreciate his need for local leaders as intermediaries in the patrimonial
system through which he controlled local-level political processes including the implementation
of land reform.
According to Kerkvliet, agrarian reform is only a means of another end, one among
several means the government uses to foster stability and counter potential unrest.
Kerkvliet concluded that the Marcos land reform program succeeded in breaking down
many of the large haciendas in Central Luzon, a traditional center of agrarian unrest where
landed elite and Marcos allies were not as numerous as in other parts of the country. In the
country as a whole, however, the program was generally considered a failure. Why? Because it
did not destroy the landlord’s position in the society since no wealth have been taken away from
them and given to the other class.
Reflective Learning:
Agrarian reform is not a panacea for poverty reduction. Rather it is but one of the many
instruments to eliminate or alleviate poverty. Leaders' responsibility is not limited to specific
area so is his power so it is necessary for a leader to embrace his community. The
implementation of a land reform must benefit not only a specific area but the nation. Peasants
bore the brunt of predatory capitalism so malevolent during the martial law years. As a final
point, Presidential Decree 27 during the Marcos coup was a failure and ineffective because of the
modest political system of the Philippines.