12  The Grenfell Tower fire

b There were many instances of the cavity barriers being poorly

fitted, so instead of the barriers being tightly abutted, there were
gaps between them.

Evidence presented to the inquiry advised that the primary cause of the
rapid spread of the fire was due to the presence of polyethylene.

The ACM (aluminium composite material) product on Grenfell

Tower incorporates a highly combustible polyethylene polymer
filler which melts, drips and flows at elevated temperatures.
… the fundamental assertion I am making here is that if a fire is
ignited in a cladding system such as this is made from these materi-
als under any circumstances, we have to expect it to spread quickly
and catastrophically because of the nature of the materials used.9

The inquiry report concluded that though many different factors were
involved, the main reason for the rapid spread of the flames up the
building was the melting of ACM panels with polyethylene cores which
provided the source of fuel for the fire. The presence of PIR and phenolic
foam insulation boards located behind the ACM panels also contributed
to the rate and extent of the vertical flame spread. Interestingly, whilst it
was accepted that there were fundamental problems with the horizontal
cavity barriers, the inquiry found that these defects were not significant
with respect to the rate of vertical flame spread.10

Window units
As part of the major renovation works, new window units were installed
on every floor of the tower whilst leaving the original t imber window
units in situ. The new window sills, jambs and head were made of
unplasticised polyvinyl chloride (uPVC) and were glued into position
as opposed to using mechanical fixings. Extruded polystyrene, which
melts rapidly forming burning droplets, was covered in aluminium foil
and was used to fill the gaps around the extractor fans and within the
infill panels around the windows. Figure 3 shows a close-up of the
completed window installation works to the higher floors of the tower.
The new units were smaller in size than the original windows, and
instead of sitting flush with the original concrete, they were moved
forward to finish flush with the new over-cladding system. This created
gaps behind the new window units, some of which were filled with
expanding polyurethane foam which is inflammable. The reduction
in the size of the windows also created gaps between the sides of the
 The Grenfell Tower fire  13

Figure 3 Completed Cladding Works.

(Credit: Dr Lane supplemental report [BLAS0000004] p. 35 Fig. 4.22.)

windows and the columns which was covered using a black EPDM
(Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer) membrane. EPDM is a com-
bustible material and burns quite rapidly. The building regulations re-
quired cavity barriers to be located around the window to stop the
spread of fire, but none were shown on the design drawings. Conse-
quently, none were provided between the interior of the building and
the cavity within the over-cladding facade, which effectively under-
mined the compartmentation of the building. Figure 4 illustrates the
new window location in relation to the original window frame and the
positioning of the EPDM weatherproof membrane.
In her evidence given to the inquiry, Dr Lane stated that

In my opinion, once any localised fire occurred near a flat window –

regardless of how that fire started – the majority of the construc-
tion materials around the window had no potential fire resisting