22  The Grenfell Tower fire

After the downgrade, Arconic stopped selling Reynobond PE in France

but continued to sell the product for architectural use in the UK and
only halted supply to the UK 12 days after the Grenfell Tower fire.
Arconic’s view put forward at the Inquiry was that the firm did not
believe that Reynobond PE was inherently dangerous, but that it had
certain characteristics that, if it was used “incorrectly”, would increase
the risk of fire spread because the polyethylene core would burn if it
was exposed to a heat source. Arconic’s position regarding the fire at
Grenfell was that the product had been used incorrectly in conjunction
with other materials and products and that the insulation made by others
caught alight first.29
Similarly, the two insulation suppliers, Celotex and K ingspan, have
been accused of ignoring the results of testing regimes undertaken to
check fire safety, and of circumventing regulations by using misleading
marketing strategies relating to the performance of their products. Ce-
lotex FR5000 PIR insulation was originally specified for use in the
Grenfell Tower refurbishment in 2012, but it failed a Building Research
Establishment fire test in April 2014. The product was rebranded as
RS5000 and passed the BS8414 fire test. But the test was manipulated as
the insulation system presented for the fire test included non-combustible
magnesium oxide board which improved the fire performance rating
ensuring that the test was passed.
The “new” RS5000 was specified and used as the main insulation in
the refurbishment works at Grenfell. RS5000 had been granted a Local
Authority Building Control Certificate (LABCC), declaring it to be
safe to be used on buildings above 18 m in height, as it had achieved a
Class 0 rating. The certificate may, however, have been issued in error,
due to a misconception that a Class 0 rating meant that a product was
of limited combustibility when, in fact, the rating only refers to the fact
that a product adequately resisted the surface spread of fire. Similarly,
Kingspan, who made the rest of the insulation, carried out tests that
allegedly involved concealing components to assist in achieving the de-
sired rating and/or using materials that were not as explicitly described
in the test reports. Both Celotex and Kingspan dispute the allegations
that have been made against them. Celotex has stated that Arconic
misled the industry regarding the safety of the Reynobond cladding
panels and that the construction professionals involved in the refurbish-
ment works at Grenfell Tower failed to follow the building regulations.
Kingspan has cited Arconic’s panels as the major issue and argues that
even if non-combustible insulation had been used, the outcome of the
fire would have been no different. These will be crucial issues that the
Inquiry will determine upon.30
 The Grenfell Tower fire 23
Summary
The narrative of Chapter 1 exemplifies the nature of the overall systemic
failure that led to the tragic fire at Grenfell Tower. The failure to learn
from the lethal and no less tragic fire at Lakanal House in 2009, and the
manipulation of fire safety test results by materials manufacturers are
prime examples of why Dame Judith Hackitt put forward such a pessi-
mistic view of the UK construction industry. She condemned the in-
dustry for displaying characteristics of ignorance and indifference with
a primary motivation to do things as quickly and cheaply as possible
as opposed to delivering quality homes. Hackitt concluded that safety
is not always prioritised and the vagueness and lack of understanding
around regulations a llowed some actors in the industry to game the
system.
Perhaps the most crucial lesson to come from the Grenfell tragedy
was the role of residents and the need to listen to them. Not only are
they entitled to have a voice in how their homes are managed, but they
are often more aware of what happens in their buildings than the prop-
erty management team. Rather than viewing tenants as problems to
be managed, they should be empowered by legislation to become part
of the risk-mitigation strategies to establish safety priorities for their
buildings and their homes.

Notes
1 The description of Grenfell Tower and the refurbishment works has been
taken from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 1 report Vol 1 Chapter 3.
Moore-Bick, M (2019) Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase1 Report Overview.
Open Government Licence.
2 Department for Communities and Local Governments (2006) A Decent
Home: Definition and Guidance for Implementation. HMSO, Holborn,
London, UK.
3 Lane, B (2018) Grenfell Tower Fire Safety Investigation. Phase 1 Report –
Section 9. Routes for fire spread out through the window openings pp
9–46 Dr Barbara Lane report – section 9 (Phase 1 – supplemental).pdf
(grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk) (Accessed 31/12/2020).
4 Gorse, C & Sturges, J (2017) Not What Anyone Wanted: Observations on
Regulations, Standards, Quality and Experience in the Wake of Grenfell.
Construction Research and Innovation Vol 8(3) pp 72–75. https://doi.org/10.
1080/20450249.2017.1368260
5 UK Fire Statistics (2017) and Preceding Editions, Home Office, London,
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/fire-statistics (Accessed
01/06/2020).
6 Mckenna, ST, Jones, N, Peck, G, Dickens, K, Pawelec, W, Oradei, S,
Harris, S, Stec, AA, & Hull, R (2019) Fire Behaviour of Modern Façade