4 Introduction

and independent assessment against these competence standards. The

implications of the final report produced by the CSG’s Working Group
8, entitled Safer People, Safer Homes: Building Safety Management, are also
set out in Chapter 4.

Chapter 5: The golden thread and traceability

The Hackitt Review recommends a very clear model of risk ownership,
with transparency of information and an audit trail available all the way
through the life cycle of a building, to provide reassurance and evidence
that a building was built safely and continues to be safe in occupation.
An important component of this audit trail will be the creation of a
digital record to create “a golden thread of information” specific to
each higher-risk building. The Hackitt Review also highlights confu-
sion over product labelling as a contributory factor to fire safety systems
being compromised and recommends that the digital record should also
be used to provide product traceability. Chapter 5 explores the different
types of digital technology that can be used to support both the “golden
thread of information” and the traceability of building products.

Chapter 6: Four years on

The final chapter tracks the practical progress that has been made
towards ensuring residents of HRRBs feel safe and are safe in their
homes. The chapter opens with a review of the independent expert
advisory panel set up to provide advice and make recommendations
to the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Gov-
ernment on urgent building safety measures that should be carried out
to HRRBs with Aluminium Composite Material external wall clad-
ding. The chapter covers the unintended consequences of the panel’s
much-criticised “Advice Note 14” for the valuation of flats in high-risk
residential buildings, as many valuation surveyors take the position that
if compliance with the advice document cannot be demonstrated, then
all flats within that building will have a valuation of £nil. The indus-
try’s response was to produce the EWS1 form which was intended to
unblock the market. However, this aim has not been achieved, and the
final chapter details why the EWS1 form is failing and sets out alterna-
tive ways of restoring confidence within the market.
1 The Grenfell Tower fire

Background
Grenfell Tower is approximately 67 m in height and has 25 storeys in-
cluding a basement. The building comprises an in situ concrete struc-
tural frame with a central reinforced concrete core, reinforced concrete
floors and perimeter reinforced concrete columns. Originally, pre-cast
concrete spandrel panels formed the cladding to the upper 20 storeys
of the building, with sliding windows units of mill-finished, single
glazed aluminium and non-structural white window infill panels. At
the top of the building was a pre-cast architectural crown with ta-
pered pilasters at the tops of the columns and a ring of freestanding
concrete beams. In the central core of the building was a single stair-
case and two lifts serving each floor of the tower. The residential
flats occupied floors 4–23 with 6 flats on each floor. The flats were
separated with reinforced concrete cross walls. The lower levels of
the building were designed for use by the local community.1 Figure 1
shows the external view of Grenfell Tower prior to the refurbishment
works being carried out.

The refurbishment
Grenfell Tower is owned by the Royal Borough of Kensington and
Chelsea (RBKC), but from 2009, the management of the building
became the responsibility of an independent company, The Kensington
and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO). Between
2012 and 2016, an extensive regeneration project altered the building
both internally and externally. These works included the refurbish-
ment of the lower part of the building and the creation of nine new
flats. Building services work was undertaken throughout the building
including the installation of a new heating system and the modification

DOI: 10.1201/9781003092803-1