196    PART V  •  READINGS
deliberators should go back-and-forth, as circum-
stances allow, between an “indirect” sympathy-
based deliberation and principle-based deliberation
(Railton 1984; Driver 2005 on connecting this to
care ethics). Care ethicists themselves have argued
that Kantian ethics is consistent with a sympathetic
approach to moral practice (Miller 2005; O’Dowd
2012). In sum, a combination of sympathy and prin-
ciples is recommended by a range of mainstream
ethical theories. Care ethicists can follow suit—and
some already have.
Second, principles are informative. Sometimes,
the results of sympathy are unclear or indeterminate:
sympathy pulls you towards this person, and towards
that person, with seemingly equal strength. Which
one should you help? In such situations, conscien-
tious carers need general principles to determine
whose interests come first. Often, these decisions
are made by likening the current situation to previ-
ous ones. This likening can occur only by referring to
general features that the situations share. Recogniz-
ing these general features, and reacting to them con-
sistently, brings order to our judgments: “[t]o argue
that no two cases are ever alike is to invite moral
chaos” (Held 1987, 119).
Third, principles sometimes rightly overrule sym-
pathy. Consider parents engaging in “tough love,”
policymakers who must prioritise after funding cuts,
or nurses deciding how to divide their time amongst
patients. Here, principles serve to constrain the ef-
fects of sympathy. Sympathy is intentionally put to
one side, in order to do what it best overall. This is in
part because engaging in sympathy—considering an-
other’s situation from her point of ­view—sometimes
blinds us to other morally relevant features of the
situation.
In sum, we should endorse sympathy in delibera-
tion, but not at the complete exclusion of principles.
That is the most that care ethicists can credibly
claim—but they are right to claim that much.
1.3 Justification
If we grant a role for principles in deliberation,
this might just be because they are useful “rules of
thumb.” If so, principles might have no role in justi-
fying moral decisions. Along these lines, Noddings
and Joan Tronto—two prominent care ethicists—
both suggest that any principle general enough to
be true will be too broad to be a full justification of
particular actions. Noddings considers the principle
“always act so as to establish, maintain or enhance
caring relations” (2002, 30). Tronto considers the
principle that “one should care” (1993, 153). They
use these principles to demonstrate the emptiness of
true, general, and universal principles for care ethical
justifications of actions. Crucially, though, these un-
conditional principles are viewed by their authors as
true. They are just not very rich justifications, since
they don’t say anything about why we should care.
This raises the question: are there rich principles
of justification that ring true to care ethics? Yes.
Here are three examples from the literature. First,
Eva Feder Kittay’s “principle of social responsibil-
ity for care”: “[t]o each according to his or her need
for care, from each according to his or her capac-
ity for care, and such support from social institutions
as to make available resources and opportunities to
those providing care, so that all will be adequately
attended in relations that are sustaining” (1999,
113, emphasis in original). Second, Daniel Eng-
ster’s “principle of subsidiarity”: “we should shift
the actual delivery of care whenever possible to the
most local and personal levels. We should care for
others whenever possible by enabling them to care
for themselves” (2007, 58). Third, my own “depen-
dency principle”: when an important interest is un-
fulfilled, and you’re capable of fulfilling that interest,
and fulfilling the interest will be not too costly, then
you have a responsibility to fulfil the interest (Col-
lins 2015, ch. 6). In short, some principles are empty
and uninformative, while others are not. Informative
principles might have a justificatory role within the
best version of care ethics—we should leave this as
an open possibility.
1.4 Conclusion: Claim 1
A key care ethical insight is that sympathy and direct
attention to concrete particulars are important in

deliberation. I have suggested that principles should
also have some role in deliberation, and that care
ethicists can preserve a place for principles in justifi-
cation (though I haven’t here argued that they should
do this). We thus arrive at:
First Claim of Care Ethics. Deliberation should include
sympathy and direct attendance to concrete particulars.
2.  PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS
2.1 Three Claims About Relationship
Importance
Care ethicists greatly value personal relationships,
that is (roughly), relationships that are not formally
contracted, that depend on a shared history (and/or
predicted future) between the participants, and that
are valued non-instrumentally by the participants.
In personal relationships, participants tend to take
one another’s interests as their own: it is good for
me when something good happens to my relative.
Examples of such relationships include parents and
children, siblings, friends, and spouses.
Care ethicists make three claims about personal
relationships. First, personal relationships are para-
digms for the rest of morality. We should take the same
kind of attitude—sympathetic, c­ompassionate—to
everyone that we naturally take to personal relatives
(even if not the same extent) (Noddings 2002, 2,
29; 2010, ch. 3). Second, some of the most morally
valuable actions and attitudes are those that value,
preserve, or promote personal relationships (Clem-
ent 1996, 15; Held 1987, 126; Noddings 1999, 3;
Tronto 1993, 78). Third, some of the responsibilities
that we have to all persons are weightier when had to
personal relatives (Kittay 1997, 234; Bubeck 1995,
229–236).
Common-sense accords with these claims. Imag-
ine a person who does not visit his lonely mother in
a rest home, despite living nearby. We think that (a)
this might indicate a general moral ineptitude; (b)
C ollins   •   Care Ethics: The Four Key Claims      197
he has more reason to value, preserve, or promote
his relationship with his mother than his relationship
with other lonely rest home residents; and (c) his re-
sponsibilities to visit his mother are weightier than
any such responsibility he might have to other lonely
residents.
But care ethicists do not think that the three
claims of relationship importance apply to all per-
sonal relationships. Many relationships are abusive
or disrespectful to participants, despite having the
general characteristics of personal relationships
mentioned above—simply consider abusive spousal
relationships. So we need to specify the relationships
to which the three claims apply.
2.2 Which Relationships?
One option is to say that the claims of relationship
importance apply to those personal relationships that
are valued by their participants. However, partici-
pants are not always good judges of whether personal
relationships are worthy of emulation, preservation,
and special attention. Taking this option would mask
the power dynamics that limit some people’s abilities
to properly assess their relationships’ value—most
notably children, and in many societies women. Re-
lationships so strongly inform our values, and do this
in such a slow and creeping way, that it seems im-
possible to trust our own judgments of their value.
Often, we’re too enmeshed in them to judge (Minow
and Shanley 1996).
A second option suggests that the social
community—and its norms, expectations, and so
­
on—could mark out the valuable relationships. But
this gives too much power to norms and tradition,
and not enough to marginalised voices, such as those
of women and subordinated cultural groups. And if
marginalised voices are given input, then we may be
left with disagreement within the social community
about which relationships are valuable. We would be
left in a stalemate.
We can begin to resolve this by noting an assump-
tion here: the assumption that “relationships are
sources of moral importance.” This is suspect. More
plausibly, relationships—similarly to food, shelter,
198    PART V  •  READINGS
and security—are valuable in virtue of how they
affect persons (Pettit 1997, 155). The relationship is
not the thing for the sake of which we should take the
claims of relationship importance to be true. Rather,
we should take them to be true for the sake of the
people in relationships.
Following this, I suggest the claims of relation-
ship importance apply to all and only those personal
relationships that have “value to” their participants.
The idea of “value to” a person includes a subjective
aspect: part of what adds value to a relationship is
that participants take the relationship to be valuable
to them. One might object to this, since, it seems, an
abusive relationship’s value is not enhanced by the
fact that the abused participant takes the relationship
to be valuable. But we can acknowledge the minimal
value the subjective aspect adds in this case, while
emphasising that the subjective aspect does not ex-
haust a relationship’s value to its participants. An-
other part of what adds value to a relationship is that
the relationship is in fact life-enhancing for them,
whether they take it to be or not. This is the objective
aspect. In an abusive relationship, the objective dis-
value greatly outweighs the subjective value, so that
the relationship is disvaluable overall.
Why adopt this view of the relevant relation-
ships? A powerful reason relates to the scope of
care ethics. Contemporary care ethicists deny that
their theory applies only to personal relationships.
They instead emphasise that the responsibilities of
care ethics are global: we have them to those at a
great distance from us (Engster 2007; Held 2006;
Kittay 2005; Miller 2010; Robinson 2011; Ruddick
1989). This has resulted in a tension within care
ethics: on the one hand, personal relationships are
still seen as important in the three ways outlined
earlier. On the other hand, non-personal relation-
ships are recognised as sources of imperatives to
care. How can care ethicists account for the latter
imperatives?
They can do it by saying that the importance of any
relationship—personal or non-personal—is determined
by that relationship’s value to the individuals in that
relationship. When our relationships to distant others
have high value to us and to them, these non-personal
relationships are moral paradigms, are worthy of
preservation, and give rise to weighty obligations. The
first two claims of relationship i­mportance—that the
relationship is a paradigm and ought to be preserved—
are true to the extent that the relationship is of value to
participants.
For the last kind of relationship importance—
that the relationship is a source of morally weighty
duties—the story is more complicated. Here we want
to say that a relationship that has negative value to its
participants—such as an exploitative relationship—
might give rise to weighty duties. Care ethicists do
not disagree with this. But these are not duties of care
ethics. Recall that care ethics is not a theory of the
whole of morality. Morality includes duties that arise
out of harming others, out of receiving benefits, out
of making promises and contracts, and so on. It also
includes duties not to interfere with others. These are
all important duties—but they are not duties of care
ethics. Neither are the duties that arise out of non-
valuable relationships.
That said, the exaltation of “relationships that are
valuable to participants” gets us a wider range of
duties than might first meet the eye. This is because
the claims of relationship importance—in particu-
lar, the second one about relationships being valued,
protected, and promoted—properly apply not just to
relationships that already have value to participants,
but also to relationships that would have value to par-
ticipants, if the relationship were formed. If we could
create a relationship that would have value to partici-
pants, then care ethics says we have moral reasons
to form—i.e., promote—that kind of relationship.
Obviously, these reasons need to be balanced against
moral reasons of all other kinds, including reasons to
care for oneself. And—given what I said above about
globalising the theory—personal relationships aren’t
the only kind of relationships that are relevant here.
If we could form a “relationship” with an impover-
ished person that involved us contributing to institu-
tional arrangements that benefited that person, and if
that relationship would have value to them and/or us,
then we have moral reason to form that relationship.
This is part of promoting valuable relationships.
The suggestion, then, is that the importance of any
­relationship—actual or potential—is determined by
that relationship’s value to the participants. The special

role of personal relationships within care ethics—
as embodied in the three claims of relationship
­importance—is explained by personal relationships’
high value to participants. But these are not the only
relationships we should emulate, promote, and respond
to. This interpretation allows us to exclude abusive per-
sonal relationships from being valuable, and, perhaps
most importantly, to make sense of how we can glo-
balise and institutionalise the demands of care ethics:
we have moral reason to create all sorts of valuable re-
lationships, even over long distances or mediated by
institutions. In some cases, relationships can give rise
to duties in other ways—such as if the relationship is
exploitative—but this is not part of care ethics.
2.3 Conclusion: Claim 2
Care ethicists generally agree that personal relation-
ships are moral paradigms that ought to be preserved
and that generate weighty responsibilities. I sug-
gested that we identify the relevant relationships by
asking whether they have value to their participants.
So we get Claim 2 of care ethics:
Second Claim of Care Ethics. To the extent that they
have value to individuals in the relationship, relation-
ships ought to be (a) treated as moral paradigms, (b)
valued, preserved, or promoted/formed, and (c) ac-
knowledged as giving rise to weighty duties.
3.  CARING ATTITUDES
3.1 What Are Caring Attitudes?
Unsurprisingly, care ethics calls upon agents to
care. Care is multi-faceted. We can care about
­something—pay attention to it, emotionally invest in
it, worry about it. We can care for something—tend
to it, nurture it, help it thrive. We can take care around
something—make sure it isn’t disrupted, ensure it
is left to go on without our interference. We care
through directing our thoughts, through one-on-one
interactions, through coordinated action with others,
C ollins   •   Care Ethics: The Four Key Claims      199
by supporting other carers, and by contributing to
institutions that care. Care can last a minute or go
on for decades. It occurs on a multitude of levels,
from the individual to the global. I’ll divide care into
two basic kinds: caring attitudes and caring actions.
Some care ethicists run these together (Tronto 1993,
108; Held 2004, 60; Ruddick 1980, 348), but I will
demonstrate that they each have value of their own.
The present section focuses on attitudes, while Sec-
tion 4 focuses on actions.
What are caring attitudes? In brief, to “care about”
something is for it to matter to you—and for your
emotions, desires, decisions, and attention to be in-
fluenced by how you believe things are going with it.
The possible objects of caring attitudes are numerous:
we can care about someone, something, some place,
or some time. We can care about types or tokens: we
might care about a type of thing (“interests”), or a type
of person (“individuals with interests”). We might
care about a type of event (“volcanic eruptions”), a
type of state of affairs (“poverty”), or a type of prop-
erty (“being ill”). Or we might just care about a par-
ticular token—a particular individual with interests, a
particular volcanic eruption, a particular illness of a
particular person, or similar. This type-token distinc-
tion matches onto a distinction made by Michael Slote
and Virginia Held (respectively) between “gener-
alised” (type-focused) and “specific” (token-focused)
caring attitudes (Slote 1999, 2–3; Held 1993). Caring
can be positively valenced (a pro-attitude, e.g., “I care
about scientific discovery, so I want it to continue”) or
negatively valenced (a con-attitude, e.g., “I care about
human rights abuses, so I want them to discontinue”).
For you to genuinely not-care about something, you
have to be entirely indifferent to it (“I don’t care about
what we have for dinner”). In short, caring attitudes
are everywhere, and are easy to hold.
But presumably care ethics calls upon agents to
have only those caring attitudes that are morally
valuable. Which caring attitudes are these?
3.2 Morally Valuable Caring Attitudes
Plausibly, caring attitudes are like relationships: valu-
able in proportion to their value to persons. That
200    PART V  •  READINGS
value might lie in the attitude’s being instrumental
to a person’s wellbeing, being partly constitutive of
their wellbeing, or simply being a valuable attitude to
them or for them, independently of their wellbeing.
Thus caring attitudes have only extrinsic value—they
are valuable in virtue of their relation to something
else—but this doesn’t mean that it only has instru-
mental value—that it is valued only as a means to
some further end. Rather, caring attitudes might
be non-instrumentally (but extrinsically) valued as
manifestations of love, kindness, forgiveness, or so
on—where these goods are intrinsically valuable to
persons.
Care ethicists, though, are particularly concerned
with caring attitudes that fulfil persons’ needs
(Bubeck 1995, 132; Engster 2007, 48; Held 2006,
10, 39; Kittay 1999, 133, 233; Miller 2010, 141,
150; Noddings 2010, ch. 7; Sevenhuijsen 1998, 60;
Tronto 1993, 137–141). Needs are the most basic or
vital constituents of, or means to, a minimally decent
life. Should we restrict morally valuable instances
of caring attitudes to those that fulfil needs? I sug-
gest not. There may be a stronger, or more urgent,
moral imperative to fulfil needs than other interests.
But this does not exclude imperatives to fulfil less
basic, urgent, or important interests. It is just that
these imperatives will be of a weaker strength.
One plausible view of caring attitudes’ moral
value, then, is this. Morally valuable caring at-
titudes have as their object something that has,
or that might affect something that has, interests,
where the caring about is a pro-attitude to the ful-
filment of those interests. This is consistent with
us caring about things without interests, though
such caring has no moral value. It is also consis-
tent with us caring about things without interests
(like medicine), where that caring has moral value,
if the caring is nonetheless a pro-attitude to the ful-
filment of interests (like the interests of people who
need medicine). So, this is not to say that morally
valuable caring attitudes are necessarily a positive
response to the object of the caring. For example, to
have a negative attitude to human rights abuses—
that is, to be invested in such abuses discontinu-
ing—is to respond positively to the interests of
beings (humans) that are affected by that object.
Caring about human rights abuses in a negatively
valenced way is morally valuable.
But can mere attitudes really be morally valuable?
To answer this, imagine an aged father, Frank, who
needs to have his house maintained. In one scenario,
Frank’s child, Sean, does this out of a personal, deep,
long-lasting attitude of care for his father. In another
scenario, a social worker, Wanda, does this because
she’s getting paid. Wanda cares about Frank to some
extent—she wouldn’t like to see Frank hurt. But
Wanda’s care doesn’t affect her emotions, decisions,
desires, attention, and so on nearly as much as, or
in the way that, Sean’s affects his. Wanda doesn’t
have the same kind of, or extent of, caring attitudes.
Plausibly, Sean’s assistance has value to Frank that
Wanda’s assistance does not.
How can we explain this? First, a caring attitude
can be instrumentally valuable, by enabling atten-
tion to detail that generates knowledge of this par-
ticular person’s interests and a motivation to fulfil
those interests. Second, the caring attitude might
have non-instrumental value, due to the attitude’s
relation to a fact whose truth they indicate—in this
case, the fact that Sean loves Frank. Sean’s attitude
could have this value despite the fact that Wanda is
equally disposed to recognise Frank’s needs when
they arise, equally recognising of the specificity of
his needs, just as motivated to fulfil them (though
motivated in a different way, i.e., money), and
equally aware of the desirability of fostering caring
attitudes within herself. This is not to say that Wan-
da’s attitude is not caring: Wanda does take a pro-
stance towards the fulfilment of Frank’s interests.
But our concern is the moral value of the two caring
attitudes. Sean’s attitude fares better in this regard.
We are now in a position to more carefully charac-
terise the kinds of attitudes that are called for by care
ethics. These are attitudes that (i) have as their object
something that has interests, or something that might
affect something that has interests; and that (ii) are a
positive response (e.g. promoting, respecting, rever-
ing) to those interests; and that (iii) lead the agent’s
affects, desires, decisions, attention, or so on to be in-
fluenced by how the agent believes things are going
with the interest-bearer. Clauses (i) and (ii) derive
from the moral value of caring attitudes. Clause (iii)

ensures that the attitude is one of caring, as charac-
terised in the previous sub-section.
3.3 Responsibilities for Attitudes?
An objection arises: attitudes—and particularly the de-
sires, emotions, and so on that might constitute, cause,
or result from those attitudes, and generate their moral
value—seem not to be under our voluntary control. It
seems we can only have responsibilities to do things
that are under our voluntary control. So, care ethics
cannot say that we “should” have caring attitudes.
In reply: we can, in many circumstances, bring our-
selves to have caring attitudes, including their motiva-
tional and emotional aspects. We do this by consciously
attending to the reasons we have to care about some-
thing, downplaying the reasons against caring about
the thing, or simply acting as if we care about the thing
(with the aim that such actions will produce the atti-
tude). And even if this is impossible, we can exercise
long-term cultivation of dispositions and capacities to
experience care emotions—so that the statement “you
ought to care about suffering” (say) would translate
into “you ought regularly to attend to others’ suffering,
do your best to ignore other demands on your atten-
tion, place yourself in environments where suffering
presents itself, remember or imagine yourself suffer-
ing . . .” and so on. This is perfectly intelligible.
3.4 Conclusion: Claim 3
The attitude of care comes in many forms. Care
ethics calls for those forms that have moral value,
which, I have suggested, are those that are positively
oriented towards interests. We now have:
Third Claim of Care Ethics. Agents should have caring
attitudes, that is, attitudes that: (i) have as their object
something that has interests, or something that might
affect something that has interests; and that (ii) are a
positive response (e.g. promoting, respecting, revering)
to those interests; and that (iii) lead the agent’s affects,
desires, decisions, attention, or so on to be influenced
by how the agent believes things are going with the
interest-bearer.
C ollins   •   Care Ethics: The Four Key Claims      201
4.  CARING ACTIONS
4.1 What Are Caring Actions?
In addition to having attitudes, we care by perform-
ing, practicing, or giving care. I will use the phrases
“caring for” (as opposed to “about”), “giving care,”
and “taking care of” synonymously, to refer to ac-
tions of care. This includes actions that intend to
leave alone, or not disturb, the thing we care for.
Caring actions differ from caring attitudes in
a number of ways. First, the range of possible ob-
jects is smaller. One does not care for a type of
event (“volcanic eruptions,” “human rights abuses,”
“scientific discoveries”), or a type of state of affairs
(“poverty”), or a property (“having AIDS”). We
might care for (as well care about) those who are af-
fected by volcanic eruptions (human rights abuses,
scientific discoveries, having AIDS), but then we are
not caring for these things themselves. Also, care as
an action is not open to a “pro” and “con” reading:
to care for something is always to respond positively,
rather than negatively, to that thing. And minimally
caring actions are more costly to realise than mini-
mally caring attitudes. While we care about anything
we are not indifferent to, caring for something re-
quires intentional actions or omissions.
Specifically, caring actions are intended in the
manner “trying to do what I believe is good for this
thing.” Why just “trying” and “what I believe”? Con-
sider a child who keeps a rock wrapped up in a blan-
ket, carries the rock around with him, asks people to
be quiet when he believes the rock is sleeping, and so
on. He is asked whether he is caring for the rock, and
he answers affirmatively. Does he actually care for
the rock? He at least intends to. He intends to look
after the rock, tend to it, enable it to live well, and so
on. In short, he does what he believes is in the rock’s
interests.
I suggest that the boy does, in fact, care for the
rock. He just does not do it very well. It is often dif-
ficult to distinguish doing something badly from not
doing it at all. If I get out paints and use them to rep-
resent the bird outside my window, then I am paint-
ing the bird even if the painting is unrecognisable
202    PART V  •  READINGS
as a bird. In such cases, my intentions (along with,
perhaps, social conventions) are key to determining
whether I am painting the bird. For caring, I suggest,
it is all in the intentions. To care for someone is to
do what you believe is in the interests of that thing—
even if that thing, in fact, lacks interests, or even if
you are incorrect about their interests. (Importantly,
this is what it takes for an action to be care as op-
posed to non-care, not what it takes for an action to
be good care as opposed to bad care.)
The intention is not a very strict condition. The
carer need not consciously entertain their intention as
“doing what I believe is in the recipient’s interests”
and they need not have a full-blown concept of inter-
ests. They just need an implicit belief that the action
is good for the recipient in some way. Children, for
example, can perfectly well care for their parents,
without a hint of reflection on the fact. Moreover,
fulfilling the person’s interests need not be the final
intention of the carer—the care can be intended to be
instrumental to some other aim. Consider our social
worker Wanda, who intends to fulfil Frank’s interests
only as a means to a paycheck. She cares for Frank,
despite not caring much about Frank.
As a result, I will use the following definition of
caring action (to be distinguished, in the next sub-
section, from morally valuable caring action):
an action is caring if and only if it is performed under
the (perhaps tacit) intention of fulfilling (or going some
way to fulfilling) interest(s) that the agent perceives
some perceived moral person (the recipient) to have.
4.2 Morally Valuable Caring Actions
The above definition is broad, and allows more spe-
cific definitions to be used for specific purposes. In
particular, we should whittle this definition down
so that it specifies only those caring actions that are
called for by care ethics, that is, the morally valuable
caring actions.
In defining caring action, I talked only about the
intentions and beliefs of the caregiver. These things
enhance moral value. But the effects matter greatly.
Take the boy and his rock. The boy’s actions do not
fulfil any interests of the rock. The rock does not
have any interests. The boy’s actions are caring. But
they have less moral value than if the rock had inter-
ests that were being fulfilled. Effects matter.
One might object as follows. Imagine you and I
each stumble upon injured dogs. We each attempt
to drive our dog to the nearest vet. While your dog
reaches the vet in time and is healed, I get caught
in traffic and arrive five minutes too late. It seems
odd, one might think, to say that your action is more
valuable than mine. Your action had better effects,
but this seems irrelevant for the moral assessment of
the action.
However, we should distinguish: (i) the sources
of an action’s moral value, (ii) the conditions under
which an agent morally ought to perform the action,
(iii) the conditions under which the agent should be
praised or blamed for performing the action. You
and I deserve equal praise for our dog-saving efforts.
And assuming that I couldn’t reasonably have known
about the traffic, we each had an equally weighty
reason to do what we could for our respective dogs.
But it is nonetheless true that your action was more
valuable—was better care—than my action, through
no fault of my own. That is to say, when we are ret-
rospectively assessing the value of an action (as op-
posed to prospectively assessing whether the action
should be performed, or retrospectively assessing the
praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of the agent),
its actual effects matter, alongside intentions and
beliefs.
Additionally, some effects matter more than
others. This point is frequently made by care ethi-
cists, who, as we have seen, focus on persons’
needs. While care might be directed at fulfilling any
­interest—however trivial—care will have value if it
fulfils a more vital, important, or compelling interest
(a need). By a­ llowing that care is more valuable if it
fulfils ­interests—and even more valuable if it fulfils
the most important interests—we are able to avoid the
“paternalism objection” to care ethics. This is the ob-
jection that care ethicists endorse actions that patro-
nise, belittle, or otherwise undermine the autonomy
of the care recipient—by fulfilling interests that are
trivial, or not the ones the care recipient wants ful-
filled. For morally valuable caring actions, it is not

enough that the action is intended to fulfil important
interests: to be valuable, the care must actually fulfil
important interests. In many cases, these will be the
interests the recipient themselves endorses, including
empowerment, autonomy, independence (insofar as
this is ever possible), and so on.
I suggest the following, then, about morally valu-
able caring actions. The moral value of caring action
is a function of (1) how well that action fulfils the
recipients’ interests (where needs are more impor-
tant than other interests), and (2) the strength of the
agent’s intentions to fulfil the recipient’s interests.
(2) is separable from (1). An action can be caring
despite having little moral value, just as long as it
has the right intentions (i.e. fulfilling perceived inter-
ests). Above this threshold, a caring action can have
more or less moral value, as a function of (1) and (2).
4.3 Conclusion: Claim 4
Caring actions are actions performed with intentions
to fulfil interests. These actions are morally valuable
in proportion to the strength of the intention and the
goodness of the effects. That is:
Fourth Claim of Care Ethics. (i) Agents should perform
actions that are performed under the (perhaps tacit) in-
tention of fulfilling (or going some way to fulfilling)
interest(s) that the agent perceives some moral person
(the recipient) to have; (ii) the strength of this “should”
is determined by the moral value of action, which is a
function of the strength of the intention, the likelihood
that the action will fulfil the interest, and the extent to
which the interest is appropriately described as a “need.”
CONCLUSION
These four claims are merely the normative claims
of care ethics. Many care ethicists make descrip-
tive claims that support their overall outlooks. For
example, many care ethicists endorse a relational
view of autonomy, according to which autonomous
C ollins   •   Care Ethics: The Four Key Claims      203
plans, projects, and purposes are inseparable from,
and hugely influenced by, those around us. Many
care ethicists emphasise that the world of ethics is
constituted by complex webs of relationships be-
tween fragile, embodied human beings. With the
four key normative claims now on the table, it is
easy to see how they might arise out of a deep ap-
preciation of these descriptive claims. But the four
key claims are what make care ethics a normative
ethical theory.
Although moral theorists who do not call them-
selves care ethicists may endorse the four claims,
the claims are unlikely to be the central or most im-
portant parts of non-care ethical theories. Non-care
ethicists are unlikely to be interested in intricately
analysing actions of care in particular, or in vindi-
cating sympathetic modes of deliberation in particu-
lar, as a central part of their theoretical edifice. It is
the combination of these claims, and their status as
the most important normative aspects of the theory,
which makes care ethics distinctive.
REFERENCES
Bubeck, Diemut. 1995. Care, Gender and Justice.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Clement, Grace. 1996. Care, Autonomy, and Justice:
Feminism and the Ethic of Care. Boulder: Westview Press.
Collins, Stephanie. 2015. The Core of Care Ethics.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Driver, Julia. 2005. “Consequentialism and Feminist
Ethics.” Hypatia 20(4), 183–199.
Engster, Daniel. 2007. The Heart of Justice: A Political
Theory of Caring. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gilligan, Carol. 1982. In a Different Voice. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Held, Virginia. 1987. “Feminism and Moral Theory.”
Pp. 111–128 in E. F. Kittay and D. Meyers (eds), Women
and Moral Theory. Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield.
Held, Virginia. 1993. Feminist Morality. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Held, Virginia. 2004. “Taking Care: Care as Practice
and Value.” Pp. 59–71 in C. Calhoun (ed.), Setting the
Moral Compass: Essays by Women Philosophers. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Held, Virginia. 2006. The Ethics of Care: Personal,
Political, and Global. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
204    PART V  •  READINGS

Held, Virginia. 2014. “The Ethics of Care as Normative
Guidance: Comment on Gilligan.” Journal of Social
Philosophy 45(1), 107–115.
Hursthouse, Rosalind. 1999. On Virtue Ethics. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Kittay, Eva Feder. 1997. “Human Dependency and
Rawlsian Equality.” Pp. 219–266 in D. T. Meyers (ed.),
Feminist Rethink the Self. Colorado: Westview Press.
Kittay, Eva Feder. 1999. Love’s Labor: Essays on
Women, Equality and Dependence. New York: Routledge.
Kittay, Eva Feder. 2005. “Dependency, Difference and
the Global Ethic of Longterm Care.” Journal of Political
Philosophy 13(4), 443–469.
Kohlberg, Lawrence. 1973. “The Claim to Moral
Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral Judgment.” Journal
of Philosophy 70(18).
Miller, Sarah Clark. 2005. “Need, Care and Obligation.”
Royal Institute of Philosophy 80, supp. 57 (supplement on
“The Philosophy of Need”), 137–160.
Miller, Sarah Clark. 2010. “Cosmopolitan Care.” Ethics
and Social Welfare special issue on “Care Ethics: New
Theories and Applications” 4(2), 145–157.
Minow, Martha and Mary Lyndon Shanley. 1996.
“Relational Rights and Responsibilities: Revisioning the
Family in Liberal Political Theory and Law.” Hypatia
11(1), 4–29.
Noddings, Nel. 1984. Caring: A Feminine Approach
to Ethics and Moral Education. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Noddings, Nel. 1999. “Two Concepts of Caring.”
Philosophy of Education 1999, 36–39.
Noddings, Nel. 2002. Starting at Home: Caring and
Social Policy. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Noddings, Nel. 2010. The Maternal Factor: Two
Paths to Morality. Los Angeles: University of California
Press.
O’Dowd, Ornaith. 2012. “Care and Abstract Principles.”
Hypatia 27(2), 407–422.
Pettit, Philip. 1997. “Love and its Place in Moral
Discourse.” Pp. 153–163 in R. Lamb (ed.), Love Analyzed.
Boulder: Westview Press.
Railton, Peter. 1984. “Alienation, Consequentialism,
and the Demands of Morality.”  Philosophy & Public
Affairs 13(2), 134–171.
Robinson, Fiona. 2011. The Ethics of Care: A Feminist
Approach to Human Security. Philadelphia: Temple
University Press.
Ruddick, Sara. 1980. “Maternal Thinking.” Feminist
Studies 6(2), 342–367.
Ruddick, Sara. 1989. Maternal Thinking: Toward a
Politics of Peace. Boston: Beacon Press.
Sevenhuijsen, Selma. 1998. Citizenship and the Ethics
of Care: Feminist Considerations on Justice, Morality, and
Politics. New York: Routledge.
Slote, Michael. 1999. “Caring Versus the
Philosophers.” Philosophy of Education 1999, 25–35.
Slote, Michael. 2007. The Ethics of Care and Empathy.
London: Routledge.
Tronto, Joan C. 1993. Moral Boundaries: A Political
Argument for an Ethic of Care. London: Routledge.
NOTE
1. For present purposes, “sympathy” and “empathy”
can be treated synonymously, though there are subtle dis-
tinctions that are relevant for other purposes.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1.  What are care ethicists’ arguments against using principles in ethical deliberation? Do you find
those arguments compelling? Why or why not?
2.  What does Claim 2 (about the importance of relationships) mean for how we should live our lives?
Would taking Claim 2 seriously dramatically affect how you live your life? Why or why not?
3.  In what sense does Collins say the effects of one’s caring actions matter morally? Do you agree with
her claim about this? Why or why not?
4.  In what ways are the key claims of care ethics at odds with deontology, consequentialism, and virtue
ethics? In what ways do they overlap with those theories?
 M encius   •  Essential Mengzi: Selected Passages with Traditional Commentary      205

MENCIUS (CA. 372–289 BCE)

TRANSLATED BY BRYAN VAN NORDEN

Essential Mengzi: Selected Passages with

Traditional Commentary

Mencius is known as Mengzi in Chinese; the book that records his discussions with various
rulers and disciples in ancient China is also called Mengzi. Reading the Mengzi is a bit differ-
ent than reading most Western philosophers because the text conveys Mencius’s teachings by
relating Mencius’s aphorisms and stories about Mencius talking to other people. You some-
times need to know something about ancient Chinese history or culture to understand the
point that Mencius is making in each passage. To help with that, even Chinese scholars have
typically read the Mengzi along with traditional commentaries, such as those by the great
twelfth-century philosopher Zhu Xi. In the excerpts below, the translator has included some
of this commentary, along with his own, to help you understand the meaning of the various
passages. You’ll find these commentaries set off in the text next to the Chinese character 注
(zhù), which means “to annotate” or “to comment.”

GUIDING QUESTIONS
1.  What does Mencius mean by “profit”? What is his main criticism of focusing on profit?
2.  In 1A3 (i.e., chapter 3 of Book 1A), Mencius compares King Hui to soldiers who flee from battle
but turn around after fifty paces. What point is Mencius making with that analogy?
3.  What skill is Mencius trying to encourage King Xuan to practice in 1A7?
4.  What point is Mencius trying to make about human nature with the story about the child near the
well in 2A6?
5.  What is Mencius trying to say about virtue in 2A9? In what other passages does he make a similar
point?
6.  In what ways do the stories about Shun in 5A1, 5A2, and 5A3 seem inconsistent? What point is
Mencius making by telling all three stories?
7.  Does Mencius think that human nature is good or not good? What arguments does he give for his
view in Book 6A?
8.  What kinds of moral arguments do you see Mencius making in the text? For instance, is he ap-
pealing to obligations, consequences, or virtues? Is he making arguments by analogy or offering
examples to support or undermine intermediate moral principles? (If you’re not used to reading
Chinese philosophy, Mencius might present some of these arguments in a slightly different way
than you’re used to seeing, but they’re there!)

Reprinted with permission of Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. All rights reserved.
206    PART V  •  READINGS
BOOK 1A
1. Mengzi had an audience with King Hui of Liang.
The king said, “Venerable sir, you have not regarded
hundreds of leagues too far to come, so you must
have a way of profiting my state.”
Mengzi replied, “Why must Your Majesty
speak of ‘profit’? Let there simply be benevolence
[rén] and righteousness [yì]. If Your Majesty says,
‘How can I profit my state?’ the Chief Counsel-
ors will say, ‘How can I profit my clan?’ and the
nobles and commoners will say, ‘How can I profit
my self?’ Superiors and subordinates will seize
profit from each other, and the state will be endan-
gered. When the ruler in a state that can field ten
thousand chariots is assassinated, it will invari-
ably be by a clan that can field a thousand chari-
ots. When the ruler in a state that can field a thou-
sand chariots is assassinated, it will invariably
be by a clan that can field a hundred chariots. To
have a thousand out of ten thousand or a hundred
out of a thousand is plenty. But when people put
profit before righteousness, they cannot be satis-
fied without grasping for more.1
“Never have the benevolent left their parents
behind. Never have the righteous put their ruler last.
Let Your Majesty speak only of benevolence and
righteousness. Why must one speak of ‘profit’?”
注 Zhu Xi comments, “If one accords with the Heav-
enly Pattern, one will not seek profit, but one will
naturally never fail to profit. If one submits to human
desires, then one will never obtain profit though one
seeks it, and harm will follow upon it. . . . This is the
profound meaning with which the Mengzi begins.
This is something learners should carefully examine
and clearly understand.”
Cheng Yi said, “A gentleman never fails to desire
profit, but if one is single-mindedly focused on profit,
then it leads to harm. If there is only benevolence
and righteousness, then one will not seek profit, but
one will never fail to profit.”
[This passage] can be read as a criticism of
Mohism, a consequentialist philosophy [in ancient
China] that encouraged people to judge actions
in terms of the benefits (or “profit”) they bring to
people in general and not just to oneself or one’s
group.  .  .  . But Mengzi argues that this practice
is self-undermining: aiming directly at profit is,
paradoxically, unprofitable.
3. King Hui of Liang said, “We use our heart to the
utmost for our state. When the region within the river
has a famine, we move some of the people to the
region to the east of river and move grain to the region
within the river. When there is a famine in the region
to the east of river, we do likewise. When we examine
the governments of neighboring states, there are none
that use their hearts to the utmost like we do. Why is
it that the people of neighboring states do not grow
fewer and our people do not grow more numerous?”
注 Zhu Xi explains, “He moves the people in order to
get them to the food. He moves the grain to give it to
those too old or young to move.”
Mengzi replied, “Your Majesty is fond of war, so
allow me to use war as an illustration. Thunderingly,
the drums spur the soldiers on. Blades clash together.
Casting aside their armor and weapons, they run.
Some stop after running a hundred paces; some stop
after running only fifty paces. How would it be if
those who ran fifty paces were to laugh at those who
ran a hundred paces?”
The king said, “That is not acceptable. They
simply did not run a hundred paces. But this too is
running.”
Mengzi replied, “If Your Majesty understands
this, then you will not expect your people to be more
numerous than those of neighboring states. . . . ”
注 Notice the subtle irony in Mengzi’s comment, “Your
Majesty is fond of war, so allow me to use war as
an illustration.” Mengzi’s general point is that King
Hui only understands a small part of good govern-
ment. He goes on to explain other policies that the
king needs to enact. . . .
7. King Xuan of Qi . . . said, “What must one’s Virtue
be like so that one can become King?”2
 M encius   •  Essential Mengzi: Selected Passages with Traditional Commentary      207
Mengzi said, “One cares for the people and be-
comes King. This is something no one can stop.”
The king said, “Can one such as ourselves care
for the people?
Mengzi said, “You can.”
The king said, “How do you know that we
can?”
Mengzi said, “I heard your attendant Hu He say,
While the king was sitting up in his hall, an ox was led
past below. The king saw it and said, “Where is the ox
going?” Hu He replied, “We are about to ritually anoint
a bell with its blood.” The king said, “Spare it. I cannot
bear its frightened appearance, like an innocent going
to the execution ground.” Hu He replied, “So should
we dispense with the anointing of the bell?” The king
said, “How can that be dispensed with? Exchange it
for a sheep.”
Mengzi continued, “I do not know if this happened.”
The king said, “It happened.”
Mengzi said, “This heart is sufficient to become
King. The commoners all thought Your Majesty was
being stingy. But I knew that Your Majesty simply
could not bear the suffering of the ox.”
The king said, “That is so. There were indeed
commoners who said that. But although Qi is a small
state, how could I be stingy about one ox? It was just
that I could not bear its frightened appearance, like
an innocent going to execution ground. Hence, I ex-
changed it for a sheep.”
Mengzi said, “Let Your Majesty not be surprised
at the commoners taking you to be stingy. You took
a [big] thing and exchanged it for a [small] thing.
How could they understand it? If Your Majesty were
pained at its being innocent and going to the execu-
tion ground, then what is there to choose between an
ox and a sheep?”
The king laughed, saying, “What was this feeling,
actually? It’s not the case that I grudged its value and
exchanged it for a sheep. But it makes sense that the
commoners would say I was stingy.”
注 Zhu Xi says, “This means that the ox and sheep are
both going to die although innocent. In what ways
does one distinguish between them and exchange
the sheep for the ox? Mengzi intentionally sets up
this difficulty, desiring the king to examine himself
and seek his fundamental heart. The king seems
unable to do so. . . .
Mengzi said, “There is no harm. What you did
was just a technique for (cultivating your) benev-
olence. You saw the ox but had not seen the sheep.
Gentlemen cannot bear to see animals die if they
have seen them living. If they hear their cries
of suffering, they cannot bear to eat their flesh.
Hence gentlemen keep their distance from the
kitchen.”
注 Zhu Xi comments, “On the one hand, killing the
ox was something that the king could not bear
to do. On the other hand, anointing the bell was
something that could not be dispensed with.  .  .  .
When he saw the ox, this heart had already been
expressed and could not be repressed. But he had
not yet seen the sheep, so . . . there were no feel-
ings to hinder. Hence, exchanging the sheep for
the ox allowed for the two (i.e., the heart and the
ritual) to be complete without harm. This is how it
is a technique of benevolence.  .  .  . Now, humans
are the same as animals in being alive but are dif-
ferent categories of things. Hence, we use animals
for rituals, and our heart that does not bear their
suffering applies only as far as they are seen and
heard. Keeping one’s distance from the kitchen is a
technique used to cultivate this heart and broaden
one’s benevolence.”
The king was pleased and said, “The Odes say,
Another person had the heart,
I measured it.
This describes you, Master. I was the one who did it.
I examined myself and sought to find my heart but
failed to understand it. But when you discussed it,
my heart was moved. So in what way does this heart
accord with becoming King?”
注 Zhu Xi comments, “Because of Mengzi’s words, the
king’s heart from the previous day sprouts again.
208    PART V  •  READINGS
Consequently, he understands that this heart does
not come from outside, but he still does not under-
stand how to examine its root and extend it.
Mengzi said, “Suppose there were someone who
reported to Your Majesty, ‘My strength is sufficient
to lift five hundred pounds, but not sufficient to lift
one feather. My eyesight is sufficient to examine the
tip of an autumn hair, but I cannot see a wagon of
firewood.’ Would your Majesty accept that?”
The king said, “No.”
Mengzi said, “In the present case your kindness
is sufficient to reach animals, but the effects do not
reach the commoners. How is this different from
the examples I just gave? Hence, one fails to lift a
feather only because one does not use one’s strength.
One fails to see a wagon of firewood only because
one does not use one’s eyesight. The commoners fail
to receive care only because one does not use one’s
kindness. Hence, Your Majesty fails to become King
because you do not act, not because you are unable
to act. . . .”
注 Zhu Xi comments, “People have the most valu-
able natures of anything in Heaven and Earth.
Hence, people are in the same category as other
people and are affectionate to each other. Con-
sequently, the expression of compassion to the
people is very immediate, but to animals it is
slow.  .  .  . In the present case, the king is al-
ready able to extend this heart [of benevolence]
to animals. So his failure to care for the people
and become King is not because he is unable
to act. It only comes from his not being willing
to act.”
“Treat your elders as elders, and extend it to
the elders of others; treat your young ones as
young ones, and extend it to the young ones of
others, and you can turn the world in the palm of
your hand. . . . Hence, if one extends one’s kind-
ness, it will be sufficient to care for all within the
Four Seas. . . .”
注 Zhu Xi explains, “ ‘To treat as elders’ is to serve the
elderly. ‘Your elders’ means your father and elder
brothers. ‘The elders of others’ means the fathers
and elder brothers of others. ‘To treat as young ones’
is to nurture young ones. ‘Your young ones’ means
your children and younger brothers. ‘The young
ones of others’ means the sons and younger brothers
of others. . . .”
BOOK 1B
5. King Xuan of Qi asked, “People all tell me to
destroy the Bright Tower. Should I destroy it or
leave it?”
Mengzi replied, “The Bright Tower is the tower
of a King. If your Majesty desires to put into effect
Kingly government, do not destroy it.”
The king said, “May I hear more about Kingly
government?”
Mengzi replied, “In former times, King Wen ruled
his state like this. For farmers, there was the nine-
one system [of field management]. For those in posi-
tions of responsibility, there were stipends for their
descendants. The customs officers of the roads and
markets made inspections but levied no duties. The
people were not prohibited from fishing in the ponds
and weirs. Guilt for crime did not extent to the crimi-
nals’ wives. The old without wives were called ‘wid-
owers,’ the old without husbands were ‘widows,’ the
old without children were ‘bereft,’ the young without
fathers were ‘orphans.’ These four were the poorest
among the people and had none to bring their cares
to. King Wen, in applying benevolent government,
put these four first. The Odes say,
Fitting it is for those with funds
To be sad for these wretched, lonely ones.
The king exclaimed, “What excellent teachings!”
Mengzi responded, “If Your Majesty regards
them as excellent, then why do you not put them into
effect?”
The king said, “We have a weakness. We are fond
of wealth.”
Mengzi responded, “In former times, Duke Liu of
Zhou was fond of wealth. The Odes say,
 M encius   •  Essential Mengzi: Selected Passages with Traditional Commentary      209
They stacked, they stored,
Bundled up dried goods,
In bags, in sacks,
Thinking to gather together and bring glory.
His bows and arrows were displayed,
With shields, spears, and battle-axes,
He commenced the march against Bin.
Hence those who stayed at home had loaded gra-
naries, and those who marched had full provisions.
Only then could they ‘commence the march.’ If Your
Majesty is fond of wealth but treats the common-
ers the same, what difficulty is there in becoming [a
great] King?”3
注 Zhu Xi comments, “Mengzi means that Duke Liu’s
people were satisfied with their wealth because, al-
though he was fond of wealth, he was able to extend
his own heart so that it reached to the people. . . .”
The king said, “We have a weakness. We are fond
of sex.”
Mengzi responded, “In former times, King Tai
of Zhou was fond of sex, and loved his wife. The
Odes say,
The Ancient Duke Danfu
Came riding his horse in the morning,
Along the banks of the Western waters.
He came to the foot of Mount Qi,
With his Lady Jiang.
They came and both settled there.
At that time, there were no bitter women in private,
or any unmarried men in public. If Your Majesty is
fond of sex but treats the commoners the same, what
difficulty is there in becoming [a great] King?”
注 Zhu Xi comments, “In my humble opinion, from the
opening chapter of [Book 1B] down to this one, the
general idea is the same. Whether it is the delights
of making music (1B1), parks (1B2), touring (1B4),
of the heart that is fond of courage (1B3), wealth,
or sex (1B5), these are all part of the Heavenly Pat-
tern that human feelings cannot lack. . . . To accord
with the Pattern and be impartial to the world is the
manner in which sages fully use their natures. To
give free reign to one’s desires and be selfishly inter-
ested in oneself alone is the way in which the masses
extinguish the Heavenly in themselves. . . .”
BOOK 2A
6. Mengzi said, “All humans have hearts that are not
unfeeling toward others. . . .
“The reason why I say that all humans have hearts
that are not unfeeling toward others is this. Suppose
someone suddenly saw a child about to fall into a
well: anyone in such a situation would have a feeling
of alarm and compassion—not because one sought
to get in good with the child’s parents, not because
one wanted fame among one’s neighbors and friends,
and not because one would dislike the sound of the
child’s cries.
注 Note that Mengzi does not say that every human
would necessarily act to save the child. All he claims
is that any human would have at least a momentary
feeling . . . of genuine compassion, and that the re-
action would occur “suddenly” (which shows that
it is not the result of calculations of self-interest).
This passage is, in part, a response to the “ethical
egoist” Yang Zhu, who seems to have claimed that
only self-interested motivations are part of human
nature. . . .
“From this we can see that if one is without the
feeling of compassion, one is not human. If one is
without the feeling of disdain, one is not human.
If one is without the feeling of deference, one is
not human. If one is without the feeling of approval
and disapproval, one is not human. The feeling of
compassion is the sprout of benevolence. The feel-
ing of disdain is the sprout of righteousness. The
feeling of deference is the sprout of propriety. The
feeling of approval and disapproval is the sprout of
wisdom.
“People’s having these four sprouts is like their
having four limbs. To have these four sprouts, yet
210    PART V  •  READINGS
to claim that one is incapable (of Virtue), is to steal
from oneself. To say that one’s ruler is incapable is to
steal from one’s ruler. In general, having these four
sprouts within oneself, if one knows to fill them all
out, it will be like a fire starting up, a spring breaking
through! If one can merely fill them out, they will be
sufficient to care for all within the Four Seas. If one
merely fails to fill them out, they will be insufficient
to serve one’s parents.”
注 A “normal,” healthy human has four limbs. Simi-
larly, a normal human has the four “sprouts.” But,
as the comparison to limbs suggests, it is possible to
lose the sprouts.
Mengzi thinks the capacity for virtue is innate
in humans, but it must be cultivated (“filled out”) in
order for us to become fully virtuous. . . .
7. Mengzi said, “Is the arrow-maker less benevolent
than the armor-maker? Yet the arrow-maker only fears
that he may not harm people; the armor-marker only
fears that he may harm people. The s­haman-healer
and the coffin-maker are the same way, respectively.
Hence, one may not fail to be careful about one’s
choice of craft.
注 The arrow-maker and the coffin-maker are born
with the same heart of benevolence as the armor-
maker and the shaman-healer. But their choices of
career and way of life determine whether they want
humans to live or die.
“Kongzi said, ‘To dwell in benevolence is beau-
tiful; if one chooses to not dwell in benevolence,
how can one be wise?’ .  .  .  If one is not benevo-
lent though nothing prevents it, this is to fail to be
wise. If one fails to be benevolent and fails to be
wise, then one lacks propriety and righteousness.
This is to be the lackey of other people. To be the
lackey of other people yet to be ashamed of being a
lackey is like being a bow-maker yet to be ashamed
of making bows, or to be an arrow-maker yet to be
ashamed of making arrows.
注Z
 hu Xi explains this paragraph in the terms of the
unity of the virtues: “Benevolence is the heart of
Heaven and Earth in giving birth to things. One
gets it first of all, and it links all four virtues
together. . . . Because one is not benevolent, one
is not wise. Because one is not wise, one does
not understand wherein propriety and righteous-
ness lie.”
“If you are ashamed of it, there is nothing as
good as becoming benevolent. Benevolence is like
archery. An archer corrects himself and only then
shoots. If he shoots but does not hit the mark, he does
not resent the one who defeats him but simply turns
and seeks for it in himself.”
注 Zhu Xi comments, “He does not discuss wisdom,
propriety, and righteousness, because benevo-
lence encompasses the entire substance. If one can
become benevolent, then the other three are in its
midst. . . .”
8. Mengzi said, “Kongzi’s disciple Zilu was
pleased if someone informed him of his faults.
When King Yu heard good teachings he bowed
down in thanks. The Great Shun was even greater
than they. He was good at unifying himself with
others. He put himself aside and joined with
others. He delighted in copying from others in
order to do good. From plowing, planting, making
pottery, and fishing on up to being Emperor—he
never failed to copy from others. To copy others
when they do good is to do good with others.
Hence, for a gentleman, nothing is greater than to
do good with others.”
注 Zhu Xi explains how the people mentioned form a
hierarchy. “Zilu was pleased that he heard about his
faults so he could reform them. Such was his cour-
age in self-cultivation.” Zhou Dunyi commented,
“Nowadays, when people have a fault, they are
not pleased to be corrected by others. This is like
concealing an illness and shunning medicine.” Zhu
Xi continues, “In contrast, King Yu did not wait to
have a fault, but was capable of humbling himself
to accept what was good in the world.” Finally,
Shun was greater than Zilu or King Yu, because he
did not await being told criticisms or hearing good
advice. . . .