THE ACT OF BEING (ESSE AS ACTUS ESSENDI) IS NOT IDENTICAL WITH

EXISTENCE (EXISTENTIA)

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2015.

The metaphysical or ontological principle of intensive act of being (esse as actus essendi,
esse in the strong and proper sense, the actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections)
is not identical with, cannot be reduced to, existence (existentia). Existence (existentia) as result
or the fact of being1 is merely the external aspect of the act of being (esse), the result of a being
(ens) having the act of being (esse as actus essendi) by participation. Alvira, Clavell and
Melendo state: “Existence (existentia) designates no more than the external aspect of the act of
being (esse) – it is an effect, so to speak, of the act of being (esse). Since a being (ens) has the act
of being (esse), it is really there, brought out of nothingness, and it exists. To exist, therefore, is a
consequence of having the act of being (esse).”2 “Esse expresses an act, whereas ‘to exist’
simply indicates that a thing is factually there. When we assert that a thing exists, we want to say
that it is real, that it is not ‘nothing,’ that ‘it is there.’ Esse, however, signifies something more

1
Battista Mondin explains that St. Thomas Aquinas does indeed utilize the term existentia in his works (e.g., the
term is utilized often enough in the Commentary on the Sentences, Summa Contra Gentiles, De Veritate, and the
Commentary on the Metaphysics). However, Mondin notes that the Angelic Doctor does not assign to existentia the
strong, intensive meaning of actus essendi, but rather assigns to it the weak and common meaning of ‘fact of reality’
of some thing, of its pertaining to the real world and not to an imaginary world or to a world of ideas: “Dai testi
citati (Summa Contra Gentiles, IV, 29, no. 3655, 3651; Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 82; De Veritate, q. 1, a. 2 ad 3;
In VII Metaphy., lect. 17, no. 1658) risulta che S. Tommaso usa indubbiamente il termine ‘existentia,’ ma non gli
assegna il senso forte, intensivo di ‘actus essendi,’ bensì il senso debole e comune di ‘realtà di fatto’ di qualche cosa,
della sua appartenenza al mondo reale e non a quello immaginario o al mondo delle idee”(B. MONDIN, La
metafisica di S. Tommaso d’Aquino e i suoi interpreti, ESD, Bologna, 2002, pp. 218-219).
2
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, p. 25. The Spanish original:
“El existir designa sólo la cara o aspecto más exterior del ser, como una consequencia suya: porque el ente tiene ser,
está ahí realmente, fuera de la nada, y existe. Existir es como un resultado de tener el ser”(T. ALVIRA, L.
CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metafisica, EUNSA, Pamplona, 1982, p. 34). The Italian translation: “L’esistere mostra
soltanto il volto o l’aspetto più esterno dell’essere, il suo effetto: poiché l’ente ha l’essere, sta lì realmente fuori del
nulla, quindi esiste. L’esistere è la conseguenza del possedere l’essere”(T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO,
Metafisica, Le Monnier, Florence, 1987, p. 21). Being (ens) is “that which is” or “that which has esse,” and the
principal element of a being (ens) is its act of being (esse). If essence (essentia) is that which makes a thing to be
what it is (e.g., a dog, a horse, a tree, a fish), the act of being (esse) is that which makes a thing to be. Esse in the
proper sense is not esse in actu but esse as actus essendi. In its intensive meaning esse as actus essendi emerges over
all other acts, formalities and perfections, it being the actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections: De
Potentia Dei, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9: “Ad nonum dicendum, quod hoc quod dico esse est inter omnia perfectissimum: quod
ex hoc patet quia actus est semper perfectio potentia. Quaelibet autem forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi per
hoc quod esse ponitur. Nam humanitas vel igneitas potest considerari ut in potentia materiae existens, vel ut in
virtute agentis, aut etiam ut in intellectu: sed hoc quod habet esse, efficitur actu existens. Unde patet quod hoc quod
dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum.” Summa Theologiae, I,
q. 4, a. 1, ad 3: “Ad tertium dicendum quod ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium, comparatur enim ad omnia ut
actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est, unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam
ipsarum formarum. Unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum, sed magis sicut receptum ad
recipiens.”

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interior, not the mere fact of being there in reality, but rather the innermost perfection of a thing,
and the source of all its other perfections.”3

Concerning the difference between act of being (actus essendi)/esse ut actus and esse in
actu/existence (existentia) Christian Ferraro writes: “Se badiamo alla terminologia, san
Tommaso si mostra molto libero e l’esse è da lui indicato in diversi modi. Si può trovare, per
esempio, ipsum esse, la formula più frequente – ch’è accompagnata da «subsistens» quando
indica Dio. Seppur meno volte, si può trovare anche actus essendi, cioè «atto di essere»; di
valore simile è l’espressione esse ut actus, che vuol dire «l’essere come atto», cioè l’essere inteso
come un atto. Bisogna distinguere quest’ultima espressione da esse (in) actu: questa significa
piuttosto l’attualità che ottiene l’essenza per via dell’esse (ut actus) partecipato, e si dice sia della
sfera sostanziale che di quella accidentale, come vedremo più avanti; l’esse in actu, talvolta, nel
senso più debole possibile, può anche significare il semplice «stare in atto», ch’è una espressione

3
Ibid. The Spanish original: “…ser expresa un acto, mientras existir indica sólo que una cosa se da «de hecho». Al
afirmar que una cosa «existe», queremos decir que es real, que no es la nada, que «está ahí»; ser, en cambio,
significa algo más interior, no el mero hecho de estar en la realidad, sino la perfección más íntima de una cosa y la
raíz de sus restantes perfecciones.” The Italian translation: “…l’essere esprime un atto, mentre l’esistere indica
soltanto che qualcosa si dà «di fatto». Quando affermiamo che una cosa «esiste», vogliamo dire che è reale, che non
è il nulla, che «sta lì»; l’essere, invece, significa qualcosa di più interiore: non il semplice fatto del darsi in realtà, ma
la perfezione più intima di una cosa, radice delle restanti sue perfezioni.”
Explaining certain features of the act of being (esse) as act, Alvira, Clavell and Melendo state: “a) Above all, esse
is an act, that is, a perfection of all reality. The term ‘act’ is used in metaphysics to designate any perfection or
property of a thing; therefore, it is not to be used exclusively to refer to actions or operations (the act of seeing or
walking, for instance). In this sense, a white rose is a flower that has whiteness as an act which gives the rose a
specific perfection. Similarly, that ‘is’ which is applied to things indicates a perfection as real as the perfection of
‘life’ in living things. In the case of esse, however, we are obviously dealing with a special perfection.
“b) Esse is a ‘universal’ act, that is, it belongs to all things. Esse is not exclusive to some particular kind of
reality, since without esse, there would be nothing at all. Whenever we talk about anything, we have to
acknowledge, first of all, that it is: the bird ‘is,’ gold ‘is,’ the clouds ‘are.’
“c) Esse is also a ‘total’ act: it encompasses all that a thing is. While other acts only refer to some part or aspects
of being, esse is a perfection which includes everything that a thing has, without any exception. Thus, the ‘act of
reading’ does not express the entirety of the perfection of the person reading, but esse is the act of each and of all the
parts of a thing. If a tree ‘is,’ then the whole tree ‘is,’ with all its aspects and parts – its color, shape, life and growth
– in short, everything in it shares in its esse. Thus, esse encompasses the totality of a thing.
“Esse is a ‘constituent’ act, and the most radical or basic of all perfections because it is that by which things
‘are.’ As essence is that which makes a thing to be this or that (chair, lion, man), esse is that which makes things to
be. This can be seen from various angles:
“(i) Esse is the most common of all acts. What makes all things to be cannot reside in their principles of diversity
(their essence), but precisely in that act whereby they are all alike, namely, the act of being.
“(ii) Esse is by nature prior to any other act. Any action or property presupposes a subsisting subject in which it
inheres, but esse is presupposed by all actions and all subjects, for without it, nothing would be. Hence esse is not an
act derived from what things are; rather it is precisely what makes them to be.
“(iii) We have to conclude, by exclusion, that esse is the constituent act. No physical or biological property of
beings – their energy, molecular or atomic structure – can make things be, since all of these characteristics, in order
to produce their effects, must, first of all, be.
“In short, esse is the first and innermost act of a being which confers on the subject, from within, all of its
perfections. By analogy, just as the soul is the ‘form’ of the body by giving life to it, esse intrinsically actualizes
every single thing. The soul is the principle of life, but esse is the principle of entity or reality of all things”(T.
ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 20-22).

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più affine al termine «existentia».4 L’esse però è atto in senso forte e non va confuso con il mero
fatto di esistere…L’esse non è il mero fatto di «trovarsi nella realtà», dell’«essere ‘situato’ fuori
del nulla». Il fatto di esistere è oggetto di constatazione, di esperienza, anche se eventualmente
l’esistenza di una determinata realtà può essere oggetto di dimostrazione. La existentia è un fatto
e, come tale, non ha «gradi», non è una perfezione intensiva, come invece è l’esse. La existentia
non è un principio ontologico, ma un semplice fatto, in ogni caso una risultante, e non certo un
costitutivo, ed essendo una risultante è constatabile. L’esse invece non è assolutamente oggetto
diretto di constatazione empirica, poiché è principio costitutivo dell’ens, l’atto profondo, l’atto
attuante ogni atto, l’atto primo-primissimo e intimissimo.”5

Fabro on the Formalistic Reduction of Esse as Actus Essendi to Existence

(Existentia)

Cornelio Fabro describes the erroneous formalistic reduction of esse (as actus essendi) to
existence (existentia), in many of his works, but especially in his Partecipazione e causalità
(1960) and in his article, Il posto di Giovanni si S. Tommaso nella Scuola Tomistica (1989). The
formalistic turn from acceptance of esse as actus essendi towards its replacement by existence
(existentia) started when followers of St. Thomas Aquinas adopted the metaphysical terminology
of the Angelic Doctor’s adversaries, in particular, that of Henry of Ghent. St. Thomas used
essentia and esse (actus essendi) when describing the real composition of finite beings, but
already, some of the Aquinas’s contemporaries, such as Peter of Tarantasia, were using the terms
existentia, esse actuale or actus existendi instead of esse as actus essendi. Peter of Tarantasia, for
example, writes concerning the real composition in finite beings: “In omni creato differunt
quidditas et actus existendi.”6 Fabro writes in Partecipazione e causalità: “1. Essentia-esse: è la
terminologia autentica di San Tommaso presso il quale non conosco alcun testo che porti
existentia al posto e nel significato di esse (come atto intensivo) e mai l’Angelico usa la
terminologia di «distinctio (o compositio) inter (ex) essentiam (a) et existentiam (a)». Al suo
tempo il confratello e suo contemporaneo Pietro di Tarantasia…usa il termine già ambiguo di
«actus existendi»7, mentre San Tommaso ha sempre actus essendi. Nella esposizione di Pietro di
Tarantasia i termini esse, esse actuale e actus existendi sono usati promiscuamente. L’incertezza
speculativa di questa posizione si vede anche dal fatto che Pietro di Tarantasia, a differenza si
San Tommaso, combina insieme questa dottrina della distinzione reale di essenza e di esse nelle
creature con quella della composizione ilemorfica delle sostanze spirituali (propria della vecchia
scuola agostiniana) contro quale l’Angelico l’aveva precisamente escogitata.8”9

4
Certi autori son caduti in gravi errori per aver sostituito alla terminologia di san Tommaso, che parla di
composizione fra essentia et esse o, più precisamente, di id quod est et suum esse, un’altra, secondo cui ci sarebbe
composizione fra essentia et existentia e, peggio ancora, fra esse essentiae et esse existentiae…
5
C. FERRARO, Appunti di metafisica, Lateran University Press, Vatican City, 2013, pp. 184-185.
6
P. DE TARANTASIA, ss., t. I, 78, Tolosae 1649.
7
Cfr. P. DE TARANTASIA, In I Sent., d. 8, a. 6, a. 1; Tolosae 1649 ss., t. I, 78: «In omni creato differunt quidditas
et actus existendi». Anche: In II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 1; t. II, 88 b; ibid., d. 17, q. 1, a. 2; t. II, 142 a.
8
Cfr. H.-D. SIMONIN, Les écrits de Pierre de Tarentaise, Roma, 1943, Estr. p. 18 s. La terminologia genuina di
San Tommaso appare in forma isolata nei secoli seguenti: V. il tomista indipendente JO. VERSOR, Comm. in ll. XII
Metaph., q. XII, Concl. III: «In substantiis intellectualibus est compositio ex natura et esse ita quod non sunt suum
esse»(Coloniae, Quentell, 1493, fol. 106 ͮ b).
9
C. FABRO, Partecipazione e causalità, SEI, Turin, 1960, p. 605.

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 After the Peter di Tarantasia “actus existendi” stage, Fabro describes the second stage of
the formalistic turn as the explicit utilization of the terminology of St. Thomas’s adversary Henry
of Ghent, who used the terms esse essentiae and esse (actualis) existentiae, where we find esse
being reduced to a vague meaning of “reality.” Esse essentiae would now refer to the essence in
itself, no longer viewed in the Thomistic sense as a quid creatum ut potentia which is actuated by
a quid creatum ut actus (the participated esse as actus essendi). Also suffering eclipse in the
metaphysical thought of those espousing the terminology of Henry of Ghent is St. Thomas’s
terminological couplet esse per essentiam (referring to God) and ens per participationem
(referring to creatures), to be replaced with the terminological couplet ens necessarium and ens
(per aliud) possibile, a terminology which would invade and dominate the Thomistic school until
the end of the sixteenth century. Fabro writes: “2. Esse essentiae, esse (actualis) existentiae: è la
terminologia…nella quale esse sta per «realtà» nel senso più vago (esse essentiae, esse
existentiae, esse speciei…) ove già si delinea l’equivoco di prendere l’esse essentiae come la
«essenza in se stessa» (o come possibile o in quanto prescinde sia dalla possibilità come dalla
sua attuazione) così che l’essenza non si vede come il «quid creatum ut potentia» attuato dal
«quid creatum ut actus» ch’è l’esse – actus essendi – partecipato. In altre parole la tensione
metafisica si sposta dalla coppia tomistica originaria di «esse per essentiam» ed «ens per
participationem» alla coppia di «ens necessarium» per sè reale (Dio) ed «ens (per aliud)
possibile» ch’è la creatura: la divergenza allora fra i difensori e i negatori della distinzione reale
si attenua nel momento cruciale e più non sorprende il fatto che per alcuni insigni rappresentanti
della scuola tomista tale distinzione scompaia o almeno notevolmente si attenui (Erveo Natale, P.
Niger, Bannez, D. Soto…). Questa terminologia invade presto la scuola tomista e vi domina fino
al secolo XVI.”10

With the seventeenth century onwards, Fabro explains that one finds the utilization of
terminological simplification where esse, which had already been reduced by Henry of Ghent to
‘entitas’ or ‘reality in general,’ was now set aside for the terminological couplet essentia-
existentia, where esse as actus essendi was expelled, a logical consequence being the negation of
the real distinction of essence and esse in favor of a modal (possible-real) distinction or
distinction of reason. Fabro writes: “3. Essentia, existentia: è la semplificazione semantica e
logica della formula precedente con la quale spesso coesiste11, ma specialmente a partire dal
secolo XVII e quasi di riflesso essa diventa la formula del razionalismo illuministico che a suo
modo si appropriava del formalismo della cosidetta seconda Scolastica e lo trasmetteva alla
neoscolastica. In questa formula, per logico sviluppo di problemi, è stato eliminato l’esse che la
formula precedente aveva volatilizzato nel vago significato di entitas o realtà in generale. La
logica conseguenza di tale espulsione dell’esse quale «actus essendi» intensivo doveva essere la
negazione della distinzione reale di essenza e di esse o di ridurla al più come distinzione modale
(possibilità-realtà): Suarez ha fatto la più grande pressione, e con ragione, in questa direzione e la
sua opera non è stata del tutto senza effetto su alcuni tomisti. Quei tomisti che invece intendono
mantenere la distinzione reale, dentro questa terminologia, prendono senz’altro «existentia» per
«esse» generando con ciò un’ambiguità di termini e problemi che si prolunga fino ai nostri

10
Ibid.
11
La formula si trova p. es. già alla fine del secolo XIII nel tomista R. DE PRIMADIZZI († 1303): «Quamvis nulla
essentia creata habeat rationem subsistentis…, nec per se ipsam possit coniungi actui existendi, et sint duo quaedam
in supposito essentia et existentia»(Apologeticum veritatis contra corruptorium, ed. J. P. Muller, Città del Vaticano,
1953, p. 155).

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giorni.”12 Fabro also writes: “The Scholasticists of a formalistic and nominalistic character, when
they distinguished essentia and existentia in the sense of two states and not of two ‘real,
constitutive principles’ of ens, reduce essentia and existentia to two ‘aspects’ of the same reality:
they speak of a ‘distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re,’ insofar as they admit the dependence
of the creature on the Creator as the sole, founding constitutive of ens. This dependence results,
for this reason, introduced extrinsically and does not touch the very structure of ens which, both
as possible and as real, results from the same principles with the only respective difference of the
absence or presence of divine causality.”13

In the reductionism effected by essentialistic formalism, existence (existentia) would

come to mean that of something outside its extrinsic causes and outside nothingness (nihil). We
see this thinking in John of St. Thomas, who prefers existentia instead of esse as actus essendi or
esse ut actus and takes existentia to mean “that by which something is placed outside its causes
and outside nothing.”14 For John of St. Thomas, existence (existentia) as positio extra causas
would refer to the entity by which a particular thing, which is ‘already’ constituted by its essence
(essentia) in a certain grade of perfection, is formally ‘effected’ and thus placed outside of
nothingness (nihil) and its extrinsic causes. Fabro critiques John of St. Thomas’s essentialistic
and formalistic reduction of esse ut actus or esse as actus essendi into existence (existentia) and
John’s defining it as positio extra causas, explaining that such a position tends towards an
implicit negation of causality itself: “The fundamental observation about the conception that
John and traditional Thomism has of the couplet esse essentiae and esse existentiae regards the
concept of esse existentiae which accents the ex in the extrinsic sense of ‘positio extra nihil’ and
‘extra causas’ or as ‘positio in facto esse,’ which forgets – even further, turns upside down – the
metaphysical concept of both act and cause. According to St. Thomas, the act that enters into
composition with potency becomes the intrinsic principle to the potency itself that passes into act
and thus becomes real, that is, in act. Thus, the cause that places the potency in act becomes
‘present’ to the actuated essence and therefore immanent in (to) it: for this reason, saying that
‘existence places essence extra causes’ implies the negation of causality itself.”15

Millan Puelles on Fabro Concerning the Difference Between Existentia and Esse as
Actus Essendi

Concerning the difference between existence (existentia) and esse as actus essendi in the
metaphysical thought of Fabro, Antonio Millan Puelles writes that Fabro maintained that
“existence forms part of the act of being, and that the act of being cannot be reduced to
existence…He [Fabro] paid more – in fact, incomparably greater – attention to the distinction
between existence and the act of being. Now, this is not without foundation.

“In the very philosophical tradition that developed on the basis of the teachings of Saint
Thomas, esse had come to be reduced to existence, the latter term having been taken precisely

12
C. FABRO, op. cit., p. 606.
13
C. FABRO, op. cit., p. 31.
14
JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, Cursus Theologicus, In I P., q. 3, a. 3, 106 b: “Nominae existentiae intelligitur
communiter apud omnes illud quo aliquid denominatur positum extra causas et extra nihil in facto esse.”
15
C. FABRO, Il posto di Giovanni si S. Tommaso nella Scuola Tomistica, “Angelicum,” 66 (1989), p. 77.

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with the connotation of something that is ‘inessential’ to an entity by virtue of the fact that the
latter is identified with essence, in the sense of a possible quiddity.

“Esse, understood as the actus essendi – which Saint Thomas has regarded as the
primordial and innermost core of every entity – was, in the final analysis, reduced to the status of
something incidental in the eyes of a significant and numerous group of people participating in
that tradition.

“One must agree with Fabro in rejecting the reductionistic interpretation of esse as
existence, which is already operative at the level of the thesis of the real distinction between
essentia and esse, and one must do so because of the overwhelming documentary evidence
produced by Fabro himself in his taking recourse to Saint Thomas’s own texts, and not on the
basis of mere lucubrations more or less conjectural in character.

“Suffice it to say that it is impossible to translate esse as ‘existence’ when one is

considering the gradations of being, a realization that does not however imply that it would be
valid to take them as if they were gradations of essence, since that which can be participated in
secundum magis et minus (in terms of the more or less) is not essence, but being.

“Existence is part of the act of being but the act of being cannot be reduced to existence.

“Thanks to Fabro (and in opposition to a long line of eminent interpreters of Saint

Thomas’s thought) we have come clearly to see that the reduction of esse to existence is
inadmissible always, not just so far as the real distinction between essence and esse is
concerned.”16

16
A. MILLAN PUELLES, The Theory of the Pure Object, Heidelberg, 1996, pp. 319-325.