45. Guarin v. Limpin, A.C. No.

10576, January 14, 2015

Duty to respect the law and legal processes

F:
 This case started in 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief Operating
Officer and thereafter as President of OneCard Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy Group of
Companies. He resigned from his post effective August 11, 2008 and transferred to St. Luke’s
Medical Center as the Vice President for Finance.

 On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI), another
corporation under the Legacy Group, filed with the SEC a General Information Sheet (GIS) for LCI
for “updating purposes”. The GIS identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of Directors (BOD)
and President.

 On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the IBP CBD claiming that Atty. Limpin violated
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing him as a stockholder, Chairman of the
Board and President of LCI when she knew that he had already resigned and had never held any
share nor was he elected as chairperson of the BOD or been President of LCI. He also never
received any notice of meeting or agenda where his appointment as Chairman would be taken
up. He has never accepted any appointment as Chairman and President of LCI.

 Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a stockholder, the
Chairman of the BOD and President of LCI. She averred that the GIS was made and submitted in
good faith and that her certification served to attest to the information from the last BOD
meeting held on March 3, 2008. She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a stockholder. Atty.
Limpin said that on October 13, 2008, she sent Guarin a text message and asked him to meet
with her so he may sign a Deed of Assignment concerning shareholdings. Guarin responded in
the affirmative and said that he would meet with her. however, Guarin neglected to show up at
the arranged time and place for reasons unknown to Atty. Limpin. On the strength of Guarin’s
positive reply, Atty. Limpin filed the GIS on November 27, 2008.

I: Whether the disbarment case may prosper.

R: YES. Atty. Limpin is hereby suspended for 6 months. The SC ruled in favor of petitioner Guarin.
Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather
than seek exceptions as loopholes. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives
in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.

Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer may be found in Section 27 Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. Among these are (1) the use of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office and (2) any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to
practice.

There is no indication that Guarin held any share to the corporation and that he is therefore ineligible to
hold a seat in the BOD and be the president of the company. It is undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and
certified that Guarin was a stockholder of LCI in the GIS. While she posits that she had made the same in
good faith, her certification also contained a stipulation that she made a due verification of the
statements contained therein.
PENALTY: However, considering the seriousness of Atty. Limpin’s action in submitting a false document
we see it fit to increase the recommended penalty to six months suspension from the practice of law

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54. Almazan v. Suerte-Felipe, A.C. No. 7184, 17 September 2014

Notarial duties —!Note the various ways by which the Notarial Rules are violated.

F: A complaint for malpractice and gross negligence in the performance of his duty as a notary public
and/or lawyer, was filed by Felipe Almazan against Atty. Suerte-Felipe, alleging that the latter, despite
not having been registered as a notary public for the City of Marikina, notarized the acknowledgment of
the document entitled “Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Juliana P. Vda. De Nieva
dated “25th day of 1999”, stating that he is a “notary public for and in the City of Marikina.”

Ruling of the IBP: ...it was thus recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of two (2)
years from the practice of law. However, since it does not appear that he was still commissioned as a
notary public, the Investigating Commissioner did not recommend that he be disqualified as such

In a Resolution dated October 9, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification, decreasing the penalty of
suspension to one (1) year, with immediate revocation of notarial commission if presently commissioned,
and disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years.

On reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors, in a resolution modified the penalty stated in its
previous resolution, imposing, instead, the penalty of reprimand with warning, and disqualification from
being commissioned as a notary public for the decreased period of one (1) year.

I: Whether Atty. Suerte-Felipe is administratively liable

R: Yes. The Court concurs with the findings of the IBP except as to the penalty. The territorial limitation
of a notary public’s jurisdiction is crystal clear from Section 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice:

Sec. 11. Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in
any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years
commencing the first day of January of the year in which the commissioning court is made, unless either
revoked or the notary public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court.

Said principle is equally echoed in the Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V, Volume I of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917, as amended, of which Section 240, Article I states: Territorial jurisdiction. -
The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-extensive with theyrovince. The jurisdiction
of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess
authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction.
In a previous case, the court ruled that: While seemingly appearing to be a harmless incident,
respondent's act of notarizing documents in a place outside of or beyond the authority granted by his
notarial commission, partakes of malpractice of law and falsification.

PENALTY: …considering further the attendant circumstances of this case, take for instance, that he is a
first-time offender and that he had already acknowledged his wrongdoings, the Court finds that
suspension for a period of six (6) months from the practice of law would suffice as a penalty.

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64. Castaneda vs. Ago, 65 SCRA 505 (1975)

To settle controversies outside of court whenever possible

F: Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit against Ago in the CFI of Manila to recover certain
machineries.

 Judgment in favor of Castaneda and Henson

 SC affirmed the judgment; trial court issued writ of execution; Ago’s motion denied, levy was
made on Ago’s house and lots; sherif advertised the sale, Ago moved to stop the auction; CA
dismissed the petition; SC ffirmed dismissal
 Ago thrice attempted to obtain writ of preliminary injunction to restrain sherif from enforcing
the writ of execution; his motions were denied
 Sherif sold the house and lots to Castaneda and Henson; Ago failed to redeem
 Sherif executed final deed of sale; CFI issued writ of possession to the properties
 Ago filed a complaint upon the judgment rendered against him in the replevin suit saying it was
his personal obligation and that his wife 1⁄2 share in their conjugal house could not legally be
reached by the levy made; CFI of QC issued writ of preliminary injunction restraining Castaneda
the Registed of Deeds and the sherif from registering the final deed of sale; the battle on the
matter of lifting and restoring the restraining order continued
 Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin sherif from enforcing writ of
possession; SC dismissed it; Agos filed a similar petition with the CA which also dismissed the
petition; Agos appealed to SC which dismissed the petition
 Agos filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA which gave due course to
the petition and granted preliminary injunction.

I: Whether the Agos’ lawyer, encourage his clients to avoid controversy

R: No. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sherif’s sale,
justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now
enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos abetted by their lawyer Atty. Luison, have misused legal remedies
and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended
prejudice of the petitioners.
 Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of
the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a
predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a
virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of
truth and moral justice.
  A counsel’s assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his client’s cause must be
encouraged and is to be commended; what the SC does not and cannot countenance is a
lawyer’s insistence despite the patent futility of his client’s position.
 It is the duty of the counsel to advise his client on the merit or lack of his case. If he finds his
client’s cause as defenseless, then it is his duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit
rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his
client, and temper his client’s propensity to litigate.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside. Civil case Q -7986 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the re -filing of the petitioners'
counterclaim in a new and independent action. Treble costs are assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago
and Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison

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74. Ramos vs. Imbang, 530 SCRA 759 (2007)

Duty not to use public position for private interest

F: This is a disbarment or suspension case against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for multiple violations of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
● Ramos sought the assistance of Atty. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions.
● Ramos tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses.
● Imbang never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside.
● He would then come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled
and rescheduled.
● This happened six times and for each “appearance” in court, respondent charged her P350.
● Ramos was shocked to learn that Imbang never filed any case against the Jovel lanoses and
that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO)

I: Whether Atty. Imbang should be disbarred

R: YES, Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity. More specifically,
lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are
subject to public scrutiny.
● Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. This undertaking includes the observance of the
above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by Imbang when he accepted the
complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services.
● Consequently, Imbang's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the private practice of profession
disqualified him from acting as Ramos' counsel.

PENALTY: Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty and is hereby disbarred from the practice of law and his
name is ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to complainant the
amount of P5,000 with interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995, within 10 days from receipt of this
resolution.
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84. Letter of Atty. Cecilio Arevalo, 458 SCRA 209 (2005)

IBP Dues

F: Petitioner files a motion for exemption for paying his IBP dues from 1977-2005 in the amount of
P12,035.00.
● He contends that after admission to the Bar he worked at the Phil. Civil Service then migrated
to the US until his retirement.
● His contention to be exempt is that his employment with the CSC prohibits him to practice his
law profession and he did not practice the same while in the US.
● The compulsion that he pays his IBP annual membership is oppressive since he has an inactive
status as a lawyer.
● His removal from the profession because of non-payment of the same constitutes the
deprivation of his property rights bereft of due process of the law.

I: Whether inactive practice of the law profession is an exemption to payment for IBP annual
membership.

R: NO. The court held that the imposition of the membership fee is a matter of regulatory measure by
the State, which is a necessary consequence for being a member of the Philippine Bar. The
compulsory requirement to pay the fees subsists for as long as one remains to be a member
regardless whether one is a practicing lawyer or not. Thus, his petition for exemption from paying his
IBP membership fee dues is denied.
● Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the
holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is]
clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the
Court to perpetuate its
existence, the respondent's right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and
is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry.
● And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognized[d], then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not
void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
● But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
● As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions, one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of
them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.

PENALTY: WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is
ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as

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