SNEPCo Deepwater Projects Guidelines for The Operation of Subsea Production System

N
Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company Limited W E
SNEPCo Deepwater Projects

Guidelines for The Operation of Subsea Production System
Project Bonga North Tranche-1 Project
National Engineering and Technical Company

Originator
Limited
Document Number BNO-NETCO-500-PX-0580-00008
Document Revision 02R
Document Status IFR
Owner Steve Okwuosah
Issue Date 2022-02-22
Next Review Date N/A
ECCN N/A
Security Classification Restricted
Revision History shown on next

page
Document Guidelines for the Operation of the Subsea Production System Page 2 of 95
Title :
Revision History
REVISION STATUS SIGNATORIES
Rev Date Description Originator Reviewers Approver
Falla RUSTUM Oluwatoyin
01P 14-09-2021 Issued for IDC Paul OHIOR
Terry WOOD OGUNSANYA
Sayeh Falla RUSTUM
01R 08-10-2021 Issued for Review Kevin AGBASI
VAHEDI Terry WOOD
Sayeh Falla RUSTUM
02R 22-02-2022 Issued for Review Kevin AGBASI
VAHEDI Terry WOOD
 Revisions for review will be issued at start with 01R, with subsequent come as 02R etc.
 Revisions approved for Implementation/Design Issue/Eng. will be issued as 0xA, with incremental number
from last Review, while subsequent come as next incremental 0xA.
 Revisions approved for Tender will be issued as 0xT, with incremental number from last Review, while
subsequent come as next incremental 0xT.
 Revisions approved for Construction (AFC)/Purchase will be issued as 0xA, with incremental number from
last Review, while subsequent come as next incremental 0xA.
 Highlights of sections revised from previous approved issues or reasons for version change are to be listed in
the description box.
 All revisions to this document must be signed by the relevant Technical Authority (TA1, TA2 or TA3).
Signatures for this revision

Role Name Signature Date
Originator Sayeh VAHEDI 22-02-2022
Falla RUSTUM 22-02-2022
Terry WOOD
Reviewers
Approver Kevin AGBASI
Document No: BNO-NETCO-500-PX-0580-00008 Revision 02R
Bonga North Tranche-1 Project
Proprietary Information: This document contains proprietary information and may not be partly or wholly reproduced without prior written
permission from Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company Ltd.
Title :
TABLE OF CONTENTS
HOLDS............................................................................................................................................................ 5
ABBREVIATIONS..........................................................................................................................................6
1.0 INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................................9
1.1 Project Background.............................................................................................................................9
1.2 Project Description............................................................................................................................10
1.3 Purpose of Document........................................................................................................................11
1.4 Scope.................................................................................................................................................12
1.5 Definitions.........................................................................................................................................12
1.6 References.........................................................................................................................................13
2.0 GENERAL DATA............................................................................................................................14
2.1 Production Fluid Composition...........................................................................................................14
2.2 Well Development.............................................................................................................................15
2.3 Central Control Functionality............................................................................................................15
3.0 TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITION.............................................................................................17
3.1 Definition of Terms...........................................................................................................................17
4.0 DESCRIPTION OF OPERATION....................................................................................................19
4.1 Expectations......................................................................................................................................19
4.2 Operating Conditions and Constraints...............................................................................................20
4.3 Loss of Chemical Injections During Start-up or Steady State............................................................22
4.4 Valve Equalization Guidelines..........................................................................................................22
4.5 Methanol Injection Time Guidelines.................................................................................................24
4.6 Systems and Component Drawings...................................................................................................25
5.0 PRODUCTION SYSTEM OPERATING GUIDELINES.................................................................29
5.1 Start-up Notes....................................................................................................................................29
5.2 Shutdown Notes.................................................................................................................................29
5.3 Warm Well Start-up...........................................................................................................................29
5.4 Cold Well Start-up.............................................................................................................................30
5.5 Hot Oil Circulation............................................................................................................................32
5.6 Planned Single Well Shutdown.........................................................................................................34
5.7 Unplanned Single Well Shutdown.....................................................................................................35
5.8 Securing Flowline During Planned Well Shutdown..........................................................................37
5.9 Securing Flowline During Unplanned Well Shutdown......................................................................39
Title :
5.10 Planned Single Flowline Shutdown...................................................................................................41

5.11 Unplanned Single Flowline Shutdown..............................................................................................44
5.12 Planned System Shutdown with Blowdown and/or Dead Oil Displacement.....................................46
5.13 Planned System Shutdown with Methanol (MeOH)..........................................................................51
5.14 Unplanned System Shutdown............................................................................................................52
5.15 Annulus Management Procedure.......................................................................................................55
5.16 Blowdown Operations Procedure......................................................................................................56
5.17 Pigging Operations Procedure...........................................................................................................57
5.18 Aborted Well Start-up.......................................................................................................................59
5.19 Cold Flowline Start-up Using Cold Well Fluid.................................................................................60
5.20 Warm Well Switching into Cold Flowline.........................................................................................61
6.0 GAS Lift INJECTION SEQUENCES...............................................................................................62
6.1 Gas Lift Subsea Systems Schematics.................................................................................................62
6.2 Gas Lift Riser Start-up to a Single Flowline......................................................................................63
6.3 Gaslift Riser Startup to Two adjacent Flowlines PL-17&18..............................................................64
6.4 Planned Shutdown of Gas lift Supply to Single or Both Flowlines....................................................65
6.5 Securing Gas Lift Riser /Jumper(s) after an Unplanned Shutdown BGLU-01...................................66
7.0 WATER INJECTION SYSTEMS SEQUENCES.............................................................................67
7.1 Definitions.........................................................................................................................................67
7.2 Water Injection System Normal Start-up...........................................................................................69
7.3 Additional Water Injection Water Start-up........................................................................................70
7.4 Water Injection Flowline Planned Shutdown.....................................................................................70
7.5 Planned Individual Water Injection Well Shutdown..........................................................................72
8.0 AUTOMATIC SHUTDOWN SEQUENCING OVERVIEW............................................................73
8.1 Types of Shutdowns..........................................................................................................................73
8.2 Automated shutdown by Priority.......................................................................................................74
8.3 Automated Shutdown Sequencing.....................................................................................................75
8.4 SIMOPS SSESD................................................................................................................................79
8.5 All Other Automatic Shutdowns........................................................................................................79
9.0 INTERLOCKS..................................................................................................................................81
9.1 Bonga North Tranche-1 Interlocks Notes..........................................................................................81
9.2 System Security Levels......................................................................................................................82
Title :
HOLDS
Item No. Section Description
1. Table 8 -21 Gas Lift System Shutdown sequence
Title :
ABBREVIATIONS
API American Petroleum Institute
AMV Annulus Master Valve
AVV Annulus Vent Valve
BHP Bottom Hole Pressure
BLPD Barrels of Liquid Per Day
BV Boarding Valve
bbl Barrel
bbl/d Barrels per day
BGLU Bundled Gas Lift Umbilical
BM Bonga Main
bml Below Mudline
BN Bonga North
BOPD Barrels of oil per day
BPD Barrels per day
BWPD Barrels of water per day
CAPEX Capital Expenditure
CI Corrosion Inhibitor
CID Chemical Injection Downhole
CIV Chemical Injection Valve
CRA Corrosion Resistant Alloy
CWDT Critical Wax Deposition Temperature
DCS Distributed Control System
DEI Demulsifier Injection
DI Diluent Injection
ESR Emergency Shutdown Response
ESS Emergency Shutdown System
FEED Front End Engineering Design
FL Flowline
FPSO Floating Production Storage and Offloading
Title :
FWHT Flowing Wellhead Temperature

GCV Gas Choke Valve
GLIV Gas Lift Isolation Valve
GLR Gas Lift Riser
GLTA Gas Lift Termination Assembly
GLV Gas Lift Valve
GLM Gas Lift Module
GOR Gas Oil Ratio
GOM Gulf of Mexico
gpm Gallons per minute
HIV Header Isolation Valve
HMI Human Machine Interface
HDP Hydrate Dissociation Pressure
HDT Hydrate Dissociation Temperature
HFP Hydrate Formation Pressure
HOC Hot Oil Circulation
HP High Pressure
IWV Injection Wing Valve
LP Low Pressure
LTSD Low Temperature Shutdown
MAAP Maximum Allowable Annulus Pressure
MBPD Thousand barrels per day
MeOH Methanol
MCS Master Control Station
MPFM Multiphase Flow Meter
XOV Manifold Crossover Valve
OAL Operator Access Level
OWS Operator Work Station
PCV Production Control (choke) Valve
PILT Production In-Line Termination
PM Production Manifold
PMV Production Master Valve
PSD Process Shutdown
PSDV Production Shutdown Valve
PSH Process Safety High
PSL Process Safety Low
PWV Production Wing Valve
MMscf Million standard cubic feet
Title :
MW Molecular Weight
NETCO National Engineering and Technical Company
N/A Not available
OML Oil Mining Lease
OPL Oil Prospecting License
PDC Production Drill Centres
PF Production Flowline
ppm Parts per Million
PVT Pressure, Volume and Temperature
SC Safe Condition
SCSSV Surface Controlled Subsurface Safety Valve
SCM Subsea Control Module
SG Specific Gravity
SIMOPS Simultaneous Operations
SESD Subsea Emergency Shutdown
SSDS Safety Shutdown System
SSESD Ship/Shore Emergency Shutdown
UTP Umbilical Termination Panel
SNEPCo Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company
tvd True Vertical Depth
WC Watercut
WD Water Depth
WDC Water Injection Drill Centres
WI Water Injection
WRIPS Waterflood Reservoir Injection Protection System
WSV Well Selector Valve
XOV Cross Over Valve
Title :
Title :
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Project Background

BN is in the Deepwater Nigeria block OML118 (originally OPL 212). Shell is the operator of
the block on behalf of the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC), who are the
contract/ concession holders and a contractor group which includes Shell (55%), ExxonMobil
(20%), Total (12.5 %) and AGIP (12.5%). The block has an area of approximately 1,200 km2
and located about 120km from the coast, in water depths ranging from 900m -1300m.
Figure 1-1: The Bonga North Field Location Map
Field Development and Project History
 A feasibility study was performed in early 2006 and concluded with the decision that BN
would be developed as a subsea tieback to BM with the objective of keeping BM
production facilities full.
 The Concept Select study in 2008 proposed Subsea tie back of BN to BM with a single
flow loop (4 Production Drill centre and 3 water Injection Drill centres) and First Oil Date
(“FOD”) by 2018. The concept took VAR 3 in 2008, followed by a brief period of
Project Improvement Phase, and entered the Define phase in 2009. During this period,
Subsurface studies indicated that there is significant increase in estimated recoverable
volumes in OML 118, resulting in Concept consideration for a separate new FPSO for BN
field development, which is additional to BM and proposed Bonga Southwest/Aparo
FPSO.
Title :
 However, the 2013 Field Development Plan was not supported by NAPIMS, as it was
considered proliferation of FPSO in OML 118. This in combination with feasibility of
BM life extension demonstrated in 2016, decision was made to recycle BN to Pre-DG-3
to evaluate the feasibility of a tieback concept especially with respect to weight and space
constraints.
 The concept Feasibility study was conducted in-house and a report was issued in 2017
confirming the feasibility of tie back to BM. The study together with the supporting cost
and production data, showed that the most attractive development concept offering the
best value for all stakeholders across the range of throughputs and cost scenarios
evaluated is summarized as to develop the BN in two tranches with BN Tranche-1 7
producers + 7 injectors) tie-back to existing BM with 10yrs life extension targeting
around 300 to 360MMbbl followed by Tranche-2 development.
 The VAR update of 2020 identified significant downside risks to the P50 volumes and
therefore recommended provision of 3 contingent wells (2 producers and 1 injector) to
mitigate the downside risks. The review also identified an opportunity to further fill the
ullage in the BM FPSO and recommended provision of 3 infill wells (2 producers and 1
injector) as an upside to the base case development. The facility scope (SURF and
Topsides) will be designed with flexibility to cater for the 3 contingent wells and the 3
infill wells.
 This concept (9 producers + 8 injectors + 3 contingent wells) therefore forms the basis for
technical definition required to close out the Select Phase
An overview of the PROJECT is summarized below:
Title :
Figure 1-2: Overview of the Bonga North Tranche-1 development
1.2 Project Description

BN field is in Deepwater Nigeria block OML118. BN comprises a cluster of geologically
separate hydrocarbon reservoirs north of Bonga Main and Bonga NW fields. The BN field
comprises five main reservoirs: 706, 708, 730, 738 and 742 with a combined STOIIP of
2.17bln barrels based on 2018 remodeling study.
BN field development is a subsea tie-back to the BM and will be developed in two tranches.
BN Tranche-1 development will comprise of 9 producer and 8 injector wells from 3 reservoirs
(708, 738 and 742), and associated subsea infrastructure for a tieback to the BM during the
initial 10- year life extension period. Development of Tranche-2 wells will follow later (4 to 5
years after BN Tr-1 FOD).
Wells are to be drilled from 4 Production Drill Centers (PDCs) and 3 Water-Injection Drill
Centers (WDCs) with new subsea infrastructure and wells completion. The production wells
will hook-up to subsea manifolds, in-line tees and in turn tie-back to BM via a 12” oil
production flow loop with corrosion inhibitor injection for corrosion management and
methanol injection for hydrate inhibition to address the flow assurance issues.
Water injection will be provided via a single 14” flowline consisting of two segments
connected in correspondence of drill center WDC-2. The first segment (WFL-05) will connect
Title :
the BM FPSO to WDC-2 while the second segment (WFL-06) will be entirely on the seabed
and connect WDC-1 to WDC-3 with an in-line tee in correspondence of WDC-2.
There will be significant topsides modifications required to accommodate the Bonga North
Oil production. However, the primary oil and gas processing facilities remain unchanged as
the premise for the subsea tie-back of BN field development to BM is to fill ullage. There are
no planned changes or additions to inlet separators, gas treating, or gas compression facilities.
Additional water injection upgrades and major control system upgrade will be required on the
BM topsides to deliver treated water to BN reservoirs. The additional equipment for Topsides
will be located within the available space on the BM and at close proximity to existing similar
facility where the space exists. The additional weight due to topsides upgrade circa 850 metric
tons (dry), will be further defined and validated as part of the Topside FEED scope.
1.3 Purpose of Document

The purpose of this document is to provide a set of operating guidelines which are essential
for the development of the operating procedures for the Bonga North Tranche-1 Project
subsea production system.
The document describes the process and system requirements for safe and effective operation
of the BN Tranche-1 subsea production system including start-up, shutdown, and other
auxiliary operations. Primarily, this report focuses on flow assurance challenges and system
operability while considering topsides and subsea constraints. Series of relatively detailed
logic chart sequence descriptions outline a logical means of overcoming the various Flow
Assurance issues during the different operational scenarios. These logic charts will be the
basis for developing operating procedures for BN Tranche-1 production, gas lift and water
injection systems.
1.4 Scope
The scope of this guidelines is to carry out detailed thermal-hydraulic, transient multiphase flow
simulations analysis of different operations that will require effective management of the flow
assurance issues identified for BN Tranche-1 subsea production system. The scope shall
include but not be limited to the following operational scenarios
These operational scenarios are as follows:
 Cold well Start-up

 Well safe Condition time
 Steady state flowing wellhead temperature
 Well Cooldown
Title :
 Steady-state arrival temperature

 Flowline Dead Oil Displacement
 Flowline Hot Oil Circulation
 Cold flowline start-up
 Flowline cooldown
 Flowline Blowdown
 Riser base gas-lift requirements
 Steady state water injection
Refer to the following documents for simulation details: Detailed Flow Assurance Design and
Operability Report (Ref. 4.), Gas Lift Steady State and Transient Analysis Report (Ref. 5.)
The results of these simulations were utilized in the development of this document.
Safety is given the greatest priority in the design, construction, and operation of Bonga North
Tranche-1 Project. The procedures and recommendations in this report have been compiled
and should be verified with respect to pursuing the objective all phases and operations of the
project.
1.5 Definitions
1.5.1 Definition of Terms and Phrases

The definitions of terms and phrases, as used within this document, are presented in Table 1
-1.
Table 1-1: Definitions of Terms and Phrases
Term/Phrase Definition/Meaning
COMPANY Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company Limited
1.6 References
For each BN Project Document, please refer to the latest revision unless otherwise indicated.
1. BNO-3-100-AA-7704-00003, Bonga North (BN) Project Basis for Design - PART1

2. BNO-3-100-AA-7704-00003, Bonga North (BN) Project Basis for Design - PART 2 & 3.
3. BNO-3-100-AA-3323-00003 - Note to File: Bonga North Well Count Change from 14
wells to 17 wells.
Title :
4. BNO-NETCO-500-PX-0580-00001, Detailed Flow Assurance Design and Operability

Report.
5. BNO-NETCO-500-PX-0580-00003, Gas Lift Steady State and Transient Analysis Report
6. BN2X_738[740B] _Oil, Bonga North_2X Oil PVT Study, Report No.: PVT-26/2006,
Well: BN _2X; 12529ft (Formation name: 738[740B]).
7. BN2X_742B [742] _Oil, Bonga North_2X Oil PVT Study, Report No.: PVT-09C/2006,
Well: BN_2X; 11630ft (Formation name: 742).
8. BN2X_708_Oil_PVT_Lab_Result, Bonga North Reservoir Fluid Analyses for SNEPCo
prepared by Reservoir Fluids Laboratory. NIG. LTD. Report # RFL-1193, SNEPCO ID
No.: NIG-O-289, No. 2X-ST1 Well; 10347ft (Formation name: 708)
9. BNO-NETCO-500-PX-0580-00002, Chemical Injection System Engineering Report.
10. BNO-NETCO-500-PX-0580-00005, Flow Assurance Design Premise.
11. BNO-NETCO-500-UA-2321-03001, Standard Production Well Schematic, Process
Engineering Flow Scheme
12. BNO-NETCO-500-PX-0580-00006, Flow Assurance Philosophy
13. Bonga FPSO Plant Operating Procedures Manual, Vol. 2, Flow Assurance guidelines
14. BNO-NETCO-500-UA-0780-00007, Subsea Master Shutdown Schedule
15. BNO-3-100-AA-7180-00008, Bonga North Tranche 1 - Development Pipelines Flow &
Flow Assurance Study Report, 27.03.2019.
16. BSWA-DAI-500-PX-7880-000003 Guidelines for the Operation of the Subsea
Production System
17. BNO-NETCO-500-UA-2321-03003-001_01A_STANDARD PRODUCTION WELL
TREE SCHEMATIC
18. BNO-NETCO-500-UA-2321-03004-001_01A_STANDARD WATER INJECTION
WELL TREE SCHEMATIC
19. BNO-NETCO-500-UA-2321-04010-001_GAS LIFT SYSTEM PROCESS
ENGINEERING
Title :
2.0 GENERAL DATA
2.1 Production Fluid Composition

Table 2 -2 provides a summary of the PVT and basic oil properties for the BN fluids per
reservoir, based on the location of the samples available, with bubble points around 222 to
299 barg, Gas oil ratios (GOR) of approximately 424 - 708 scf/STB and API gravity in the
range of 21 - 28. The reservoir fluid PVT properties and compositions are provided in Table
2 -2[Ref.6., 7., & 8.]
Table 2-2: PVT Data
Reservoir
Properties
BN708 BN738 BN742
Sampling depth (m) 3154 3819 3545
Res. Pressure (barg) 307.0 366.4 426.6
Res. Temperature (℃) 83.9 103.3 100
Bubble Pt. Pressure (barg) 256.8 298.8 222.2
Res. GOR (scf/bbl) 424 708 443
Formation Volume Factor (Boi) 1.219 1.279 1.198
API Gravity 21.6 25.2 28.1
Density @ reservoir conditions (g/cm³) 0.804 0.79 0.81
Viscosity @ reservoir conditions (cP) 2.25 0.832 1.47
N2 0.44 0.05 0.10
CO2 0.13 0.17 0.29
H2S 0.00 0.00 0.00
C1 45.17 56.10 44.20
C2 1.02 4.14 4.00
C3 0.37 1.74 0.94
i-C4 0.10 0.46 0.35
n-C4 0.23 0.70 0.26
i-C5 0.10 0.32 0.21
n-C5 0.20 0.30 0.22
C6 0.50 0.46 0.32
C7+ 51.74 35.56 49.11
MW [g/mol] 147.9 123.27 145.60
Title :
Reservoir
Properties
BN708 BN738 BN742
MW C7+ [g/mol] 269 318.76 282.92
S.G. C7+ 0.9242 0.9030 0.8916
2.2 Well Development

Development of the Bonga North (BN) field is split into two tranches to fit into the operating
plan in-country CAPEX ceiling as well as ullage on the Bonga main FPSO. BN Tranche-1
development comprises 9 producers and 8 injectors well pairs from 3 key reservoirs (708, 738
and 742) in the Bonga North field and associated subsea infrastructure for a tieback to keep
the BM FPSO full. This will be followed by a Tranche-2 development.
The well count summary is shown in Table 2 -3 [Ref. 2. & Ref. 3.]
Table 2-3: Well Count for Reservoirs (Tranche 1)
Reservoir 708 738 742 Totals

Producer Wells 1 2 6 9
Injector Well 1 2 5 8
Total Wells 2 4 11 17
The planned 17 Tranche-1 wells will be drilled from 3 PDCs and 2 WDCs with new subsea
infrastructure. Refer to BOD part 2, section 4.0 (Subsea Systems) for description of the subsea
infrastructure. Table 2 -4 lists the Tranche 1 well distribution.
The expected maximum individual well liquid flowrate is 30,000 BLPD [Ref.1.]. Production
wells will be shut-in at 90% WC or left to die out [Ref. 2.]
Table 2-4: Tranche 1 Well Distribution [Ref. 2.]
PRODUCERS INJECTORS
RESERVIOR
Wells Type Wells Type
708W
Conventional Conventional
708 708P1 2
738W
738P1 1
738
738W
738P4 3
742W
742P3 2
742 742W
742P6 7
742P7 Conventional 742W Conventional
Title :
8
742W
742P8 4
742P13 Conventional
742W
742BN3 2
TOTAL NUMBER
9 8
OF WELLS
2.3 Central Control Functionality

Bonga North (BN) Tranche-1 is being developed as a standalone field, with dedicated Central
Control System, having full suite of control modules required to achieve all required control
functionalities. Subsea operations shall be executed from the Central Control Room using the
Process Safety and Control System and its links to the Subsea Control System
These operations shall be governed by overall sequences expanded from the definitions and
procedures in this document and be designed to assure Flow Assurance objectives are
achieved.
Title :
3.0 TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITION

The Bonga North Tranche-1 development production system consists of four drill centres
connected to a dual 12” piggable pipeline flow loop tieback to Bonga Main FPSO. Refer to
Figure 1 -2 for a schematic representation of the production system
3.1 Definition of Terms

The following terminologies and definitions in
. are provided to ensure consistent meaning and interpretation:
Table 3-5: Definition of Terms
Cold Flowline A flowline in which sufficient heat does not exist to allow more than 12-hour
cooldown time throughout the flowline. Hot oiling must be performed before
production commences through a cold flowline. This is the base case strategy
for cold flowline start-ups.
Cold Well A well in which sufficient heat does not exist to allow more than 8- hour of
cooldown time at the tree.
A cold well must be started using chemical injection to manage flow assurance
issues.
Cooldown time The amount of time after shut-in until the temperature falls below Hydrate
Dissociation Temperature (HDT). Since HDT is a function of system pressure,
cooldown time is also a function of pressure. For the wellbore it is also a
function of flowrate. Cooldown time design targets are based on reaching
specific operating temperatures in each component before the
beginning of cooldown upon shutdown. Generally, cooldown has two distinct
periods: a no
touch time and a hydrate treatment time. The target design cooldown time for
Bonga
Bonga North (BN) Tranche-1 subsea components during field shutdown are
shown below:
Component Cooldown No-Touch
Tree/Jumper + 8hrs 3 hrs
Top 100 ft of wellbore
Wellbore 48 hrs 24 hrs
(from 100 ft to SCSSV)
Flowline 12 hrs 3 hrs
Title :
In the event of an aborted start-up, cooldown periods are reduced or eliminated
depending on the type of subsea component and/or its temperature at time of
shut-in.
Dead Leg Section of the flowline containing non – moving fluid between manifolds that is
not a part of a producing flowpath. A dead leg can be created when production
into a flowline ceases or is redirected to another flowline and the erstwhile
flowline lies dormant. Well and flowline jumpers are also possible locations for
the creation of dead legs. An untreated dead leg filled with live oil poses a
severe hydrate risk, and this situation must be avoided.
Safe Condition (SC) Characterized by having reached the Safe Condition Temperature. The safe
condition temperature is the temperature, which provides full cooldown time to
the HDT.
Earned Cooldown Time Safe Condition is characterized by having attained temperatures, which provide
full design cooldown times. Prior to reaching Safe Conditions, increasing heat
provides increasing margins of safety. Earned Cooldown Time is a means for
using sensed temperature/time to estimate reduced No-Touch times in the event
that shutdown occurs before reaching Safe Condition for the component.
Hydrate Dissociation Temperature at and below which live fluids at shut-in conditions are likely to
Temperature (HDT) form hydrates, unless fully inhibited with a suitable inhibitor such as methanol.
HDT is a function of system pressure
Methanol (MeOH) Methanol is a chemical hydrate inhibitor injected into Bonga North Tranche-1
production flowline, jumpers, trees and downhole above the SCSSV to protect
the produced well fluid from forming hydrate plugs during well start-up.
No touch time The period of time following a shut-in in which the equipment is allowed to cool
down without reaching HDT and without the need for operator intervention (i.e.,
operators can focus on other activities at the FPSO). No touch time for the
Bonga North Tranche-1 system is designated as a minimum of three (3) hours.
Note that within the no touch time the subsea system may be restarted as a warm
start-up.
Planned Shutdown A planned shutdown of a well/flowline/subsea system is initiated by the
operator, and not by a process upset or system trip.
Planned shutdown does not necessarily imply a designated amount of allocated
time before a shutdown commences; rather, the implication is that the shutdown
sequence is manually controlled.
Subsea component For hydrate prevention, three main components groups are defined: (1)
wellbore, (2) tree and well jumper, and (3) manifold, subsea flowline jumper,
flowline and riser.
Unplanned Shutdown Shutdown of a well/flowline/subsea system initiated by a system upset or
system trip. The shutdown sequence is not controlled manually by an operator,
but automatically commences. The philosophy of Bonga North Tranche-1
unplanned shutdowns is to stop production as soon as possible to prevent
flowlines packing. A list of shutdown types and their valve sequences and stages
Title :
can be referenced in Section 8.
Warm Flowline A flowline in Safe Condition, means sufficient heat exists to maintain at least 12
hours of cooldown time throughout the flowline. A flowline can be warm while
wells are producing to it or during hot oil circulation.
Warm Well A well in Safe Condition, that is, in which sufficient heat exists to start the well
without the aid of chemical injection. If a well is producing at steady state, the
well remains warm for three hours after shut-in.
Title :
4.0 DESCRIPTION OF OPERATION
4.1 Expectations
The general environment of the BN subsea system (4°C, ~1030 m water depth), the reservoir
properties, strongly suggests that there is the risk of experiencing flow assurance issues
(hydrate formation, wax deposition, corrosion, emulsion, slugging, and chilly choke) during
the start-up and shutdown processes. The severity of the risk will be dependent on the existing
system conditions.
The flow assurance risks must be effectively controlled through the application of appropriate
flow assurance management processes (e.g., MeOH dosage, hot/dead oil circulation, CI
injection and gas-lifting, etc.) incorporated into the start-up and shutdown sequences. Refer to
the Bonga North Tranche-1 Flow Assurance Philosophy [Ref. 12.] for discussion of
mitigating risk strategy in the different subsea components.
The expected salinity of produced fluids is that of the seawater (due to significant water
flooding), approximately 3 wt % salt. As a result of this low salinity, compared to the typical
15% salinity of subsea GoM fields, hydrate management for BN is an important risk
considered in the development of the flow assurance strategy.
Separate procedures are provided to manage start-up under warm and cold conditions. The
challenge during shutdown is to protect the subsea components against hydrates formation.
Operational actions are largely tailored by the Flow Assurance Management Strategy in
Subsea Components as discussed in Sections 4.1.1 & 4.1.2.
4.1.1 Wellbore, Tree and Jumpers

For short-term well shutdown, bull-heading with 5 bbl of methanol (MeOH) to treat the top
100 ft of the wellbore near the wellhead which cools fastest for its stabilization and
protection, as well as treating the tree and jumper with additional 15 bbl of MeOH shall be
adopted. For a long-term shutdown lasting longer than 48 hours, 75 barrels of MeOH will be
injected into the wellbore down to the SCSSV.
Cold start-up procedures will be applied for initial start-up, as well as when the well has been
shut down for longer than the no-touch time. Prior to a cold well start-up, the tree and jumper
will have been treated with MeOH, and MeOH will have been injected into the wellbore as
part of the shutdown procedures.
Title :
Warm start-up procedures will be employed only within the no-touch time of a shutdown.
Under these conditions, the tree, jumper and wellbore will not have been treated with MeOH
and the flowline will not have been blown down and /or displaced with dead oil.
If a well is shut-in after achieving safe condition (warm earth) i.e. the temperature which
provides full cooldown time to the HDT, a full 48-hour cooldown period is allowed for the
wellbore and an 8-hour cooldown period is allowed for the tree and jumper. Treatment of the
tree and jumper should commence 3 hours after the well has been shut-in, while the wellbore
should be treated after 24 hours. If shut-in occurs before achieving safe condition, then No
Touch Time is shortened or eliminated depending on earned cooldown. If the no touch or
hydrate treatment periods have elapsed or not available (typically upon a start-up), then the
tree and jumper are immediately treated with methanol upon well shut-in.
4.1.2 Flowline and Manifold

Thermal management is the primary strategy to mitigate against hydrates in a flowline. Unlike
the wellbore, tree, and jumper, which have to be cold started by use of hydrate inhibitors,
flowlines must always be warm before well production is started. Warm start-up procedures
will be used throughout the no-touch period of the flowline (including its manifolds) and
before any blowdown commences. If the flowline was shut-in after achieving safe condition, a
minimum of 12-hour cooldown period is allowed.
The primary strategy to protect BN Tranche-1 flowlines from hydrate formation is to

blowdown the system in early life. However, in mid to late life as the watercut increases, this
may not be achievable. Dead oil displacement then becomes the primary strategy to secure the
subsea flowlines during shutdown. If a dead leg along a flowline will be created by a planned
well shutdown, hydrate inhibitors shall be used (subject to flow assurance technical authority
approval) to secure dead legs when water production is low without shutting down the
flowline.
Upon initiation of either dead oiling or blowdown, the flowline must be hot oiled prior to any
well start-up. If a flowline segment (tree and /or jumper) can be restarted up with
backpressures >83 barg to avoid chilly choke effect, then it may be feasible to start-up a well
rapidly using MeOH injection and keep all fluids in the flow path protected with chemicals
until the fluids are hot.
4.2 Operating Conditions and Constraints

BN is prone to several key flow assurance and systems engineering challenges with
consequent constraints on system design and operation. These constraints are discussed in
detail in the BN Detailed Flow Assurance Design and Operability Report [Ref. 4.] and the
Gas Lift Steady State and Transient Analysis Report [Ref. 5. ] and have been summarised in
Table 4 -6 below.
Title :
Title :
Table 4-6 Operational limits/constraints
Parameter Criteria /Limits Note Reference

Minimum required arrival 36 C
o
minimum requirement to Ref. 2.
temperature enable comingling of the BN
fluids with other fluids
arriving at the topsides
without initiating any
adverse effects
HDT at WHSIP 23oC Based on maximum WHSIP Ref. 4.
of 282 barg
Inlet separator pressure 17 barg LP separator Ref. 15.
Minimum restart back 83 bara Hot oiling pressure for chilly Ref. 15.
pressure at manifold choke management
requirement
Depressurisation time 120 minutes Depressurisation prior to Ref. 15.
prior to DOD DOD reduces the pump
pressure requirement which
enable existing pump on the
FPSO to be utilised.
Target blow down <15 barg 15 barg is HDP Ref. 4.
pressure at ambient
temperature of
4.3oC
Dead oiling rate Without gas lift: 60,000 Primary hydrate mitigation Ref. 4.
bopd strategy for extended
Gas lift assisted: up to flowlines shutdown.
70,000 bopd
Hot oiling rate Without gas lift: 50,000 Primary hydrate mitigation Ref. 4.
bopd strategy at start-up for
Gas lift assisted: up to flowlines.
65,000 bopd
Title :
Parameter Criteria /Limits Note Reference

Maximum production 120,000 stb/d - The maximum flowrate per Ref. 4.
capacity per flowline flowline is 120,000 stb/d
(early life at ~GLR825
scf/stb) based on a
Corrosion Stripping velocity
of 20m/s.
- The maximum flowrate is
a function of the range of
fluid properties (i.e., GLR,
watercut) and therefore
varies as these properties
change.
Minimum production -without gas lift: 35,000 Ref.4.
stable flowrate per line stb/d
-Gas lift assisted: 25,000
stb/d
Volume of MeOH for tree 5bbl/tree Tree treatment during start - Ref.15.
treatment up and shutdown
Volume of MeOH for all 15bbl/jumper Jumper treatment during Ref.15.
jumpers treatment start--up and shutdown
Volume of MeOH for 75 bbl Bull heading during Ref.16.
wellbore treatment prolonged shutdown
4.3 Loss of Chemical Injections During Start-up or Steady State

During a cold well start-up, if methanol injection is lost for any reason, start-up should be
continued. The operator should consider ramping up flowrate to outrun hydrate formation.
Periodic scale squeeze is to be carried out as required to protect the reservoir, wellbore and
subsea production system. Water injection wells do not require continuous scale inhibition;
however, during initial start-up of water wells, scale inhibitors shall be injected topsides into
the water injection system.
Upon loss of Corrosion Inhibitor (CI) (due to pump failure, motor failure, or other detectable
event), CIV valves located on the manifold headers should close automatically to provide a
safety barrier and prevent back flow. The time taken for the operator to change over injection
pumps will become more apparent during operations as the operator develops more
experience with the system.
Check valves shall be located downstream of each CI injection point to prevent fluid
(hydrocarbon) backflow.
Title :
4.4 Valve Equalization Guidelines

Pressure management guidelines should be followed while equalizing all valves. A pressure
differential of 20.6 bar (34.5 bar on manifold valves) across the valve before opening will
offer protection against reverse flow of hydrocarbons into the injection line.
The guidelines in Table 4 -7 are designed to minimize valve damage that may be incurred
from opening against a high pressure across valves. Refer to a standard BN Tranche-1 well
tree schematic in Section 4.6.
Title :
Table 4-7: Valve Equalization Guidelines
Valve Equalization Procedure

PWV 1. Compare PT210 to PT211.
2. Confirm PSDV, AWV are closed. XOV, Choke are open
3. Equalize and open MIV-01.
4. Pressure up on PWV with methanol through MIV-01 until PT211 equals
PT210.]
5. Close XOV
6. Open PWV.
PMV 1. Check last recorded SITP before PMV was closed.
2. Make sure PWV and PSDV are open
3. Equalize and open MIV-01
4. Pressure up on PMV
SCSSV 1. Ensure PMV is open.
2. Read PT210
3. Compare to last SITP when SCSSV was open.
4. Ensure PWV is closed and PSDV is closed.
5. Pressure up on SCSSV with methanol through MIV-01 until PT210 reads same
as last SITP (or is equalized).
6. Open SCSSV using control line
PSDV Due to system limitations, pressures around the PSDV cannot be equalized in
the same approach as all other subsea valves. PSDV will have to be opened
occasionally with a high-pressure difference across the valve.
1. Ensure at least one WSV at the manifold is open.
2. Open PSDV.
AWV 1. Confirm XOV is closed. Choke is open
3. Pressure up with methanol on AWV through MIV-02 until surface pressure plus
the hydrostatic head of methanol (approx. 0.35 psi/ft) equals PT213.
4. Open AWV.
AMV If opening the AMV after bleeding off annulus pressure:
1. Confirm that the AWV are closed.
2. Check that PT213 is equalized to previous annulus pressure (read at PT212).
3. Open AMV.
XOV 1. Ensure PWV, AWV and PSDV are closed.
3. Pressure up on XOV with methanol through MIV-2 until (read at PT210)
surface pressure plus the hydrostatic head of methanol (approx. 0.35 psi/ft)
equals PT213.
4. Open XOV.
MIV-1 (MeOH) 1. Compare PT210 and surface pressure plus the hydrostatic head of methanol
(approx. 0.35 psi/ft).
Title :
Valve Equalization Procedure

2. Equalize pressure by pressuring on methanol line.
3. Open MIV-1
MIV-2 (MeOH) 1. Compare PT210 and surface pressure plus the hydrostatic head of methanol
(approx. 0.35 psi/ft).
2. Equalize pressure by pressuring methanol line.
3. Open MIV-02.
Future Chemical 1. Compare PT210 and surface pressure plus hydrostatic head of Chemical.
2. Equalize pressure by pressuring up chemical inhibitor line
3. Open CIV.
CIV (CI) at Manifold/In- 1. Pressure up or bleed off on corrosion inhibitor line.
Line tees 2. Equalize appropriate manifold pressure and surface pressure on Corrosion
Inhibitor line plus hydrostatic head of Corrosion Inhibitor.
3. Open CIV.
WSV at If PT210 is within34 bar of manifold pressure, WSV can be opened.

manifold/In-Line tees If PT210 is much less than manifold pressure:
Ensure PWV and PCV are open.
Make sure that PSDV is open.
Pressure up on jumper using MIV-01 (MeOH).
Open WSV
If PT210 is much greater than manifold pressure:
1. Ensure PCV is closed.
2. Open WSV.
3. Re-open the well. This minimizes cut across the valve.
HIV at Manifold/In-Line If pressures across HIV are within 34.5 bar, it is okay to open HIV
tees
4.5 Methanol Injection Time Guidelines

Two (2) dynamic umbilicals serve the production drill centres and water injection drill
centres. Gas lift manifold is served by one dynamic gas Lift umbilical
 Umbilical 8 (UMB-08) provide services to PDC1 and continue to infield Umbilical 8A

(UMB-08A), 8B(UMB-08B) and 8C(UMB-08C) providing services to PDC2, WDC1 and
WDC2
 Umbilical 9 (UMB-09) lands at PDC-2 for cross connection operational flexibility to
PDC-2. provide services to PDC-2 and continues to infield Umbilical 9A(UMB-09A),
9B(UMB-09B) & 9C(UMB-09C) to provide services to PDC-3, PDC-4 and WDC-3
Title :
 Bundled Gas Lift Umbilicals (BGLU-XX) provides services to the production riser bases
(PFL-17 & PFL-18)
 The methanol supply consideration is via UMB-08 and UMB-09 to the production drill
centres
 No provision has been made for methanol supply from either the FPSO or PDCs to the
WDCs.
 The methanol injection requirements for the subsea production trees and jumpers are
provided in Table 4 -8 [Ref.9.].
Table 4-8: Methanol Inhibitor Requirements for Tree and Jumper.
Methanol Injection U/S Choke D/S Choke
Injection Point Top of the tubing Tree/Jumper

Required Injection Rate (Well)
216 648
[bpd]
Maximum Back Pressure [barg] 282 138
4.6 Systems and Component Drawings

4.6.1 Subsea Production and Subsea Water Injection Schematics
The subsea production system and water injection system schematic is shown in Figure 4 -3.
Title :
PDC-4
742BN3
WDC-3
742p PDC-3
WDC-2 708p
738p
PDC-2
738w3
WDC-1
738w1 PDC-1
BM FPSO
Figure 4-3: BN Tranche-1 Subsea Production and Water Injection System Overall Field
Schematic
4.6.2 Subsea Production Tree Schematic
The subsea production tree schematic for standard well is shown in Figure 4 -4.
Title :
Figure 4-4: Standard Production Well Tree Schematic (Ref.17.)
4.6.3 Subsea Water Injection Tree Schematic

The subsea water inject. ion tree schematic for standard wells is shown in Figure 4 -5.
Title :
Figure 4-5: Standard Water Injection Well Tree Schematic (Ref.18.)
Title :
5.0 PRODUCTION SYSTEM OPERATING GUIDELINES

This section is about sequences for start-up, shutdown, and auxiliary procedures of the
production system and are given in the form of logic charts. The logic charts encompass
manual operations of subsea system components.
These logic charts hold on the assumption that the principles as it pertains to all equipment in
the Basis for Design of the Bonga North project are implemented in the construction of the
subsea infrastructure. The flow assurance strategy, including cooldown times and operating
guidelines, has been based on the inclusion of standard trees, dual pressure and temperature
gauges, sand detectors, and insulation of flowlines. Provision has also been made for
multiphase flow meters.
In the event that any components in this basis are to change, the flow assurance strategy, and
hence, these included logic charts, may also vary accordingly.
5.1 Start-up Notes

In order to mitigate Joule-Thompson cooling (chilly choke), a cold well must not be started up
if pressure downstream of the PCV is less than 83 barg, doing so could result in temperatures
below material limits. The Valve Equalization guidelines should be followed when equalizing
all valves.
5.2 Shutdown Notes

Production trees and jumpers must be treated with MeOH on shutdown within an 8-hour
cooldown time. In addition, production flowlines, risers, and manifolds must be secured
within 12-hour cooldown time. Learnings from Bonga Main as it affects cooldown time of
trees and jumpers should also be incorporated into this guideline by COMPANY.
The Valve Equalization guidelines should be followed when equalizing all valves.
5.3 Warm Well Start-up

Warm well - A well in Safe Condition, means sufficient heat exists to start the well without
the aid of chemical injection. If a well is producing at steady state, the well remains warm for
three (3) hours after shut-in.
A well is at steady state when its annulus temperature has stabilized and FWHT>50 oC. This
procedure is for starting a warm well into a warm flowline. This situation usually occurs when
a producing well has been shut-in for a period of less than three (3) hours. MeOH is required
only for valve equalization during warm well start-up, not for flow assurance issues.
Title :
Depending on the nature and extent of the preceding shutdown, the PCV may be open or
closed prior to a warm well start-up. The Valve Equalization guidelines should be followed
when equalizing all valves. At the conclusion of this procedure, the well will be producing.
Figure 5-6: Warm Conventional Well Procedure Logic Chart
Title :
5.4 Cold Well Start-up

Cold well - A well which has not attained adequate thermal inertia to assure its cooldown time
can be achieved, i.e. it was shut down before steady state was achieved or it has been shut-in
longer than the no touch period (typically more than 3 hours).
This procedure is for starting a cold well into a warm or cold flowline, that is either shut-in or
flowing. Hydrate inhibition is required to treat the production fluid at the tree and subsea
equipment.
Chilly choke requirements must also be met prior to starting up the well. For cold production
well start-ups, flowline should be hot oiled as the base case start-up strategy. A contingency
for starting up a cold well into cold flowline is to warm up the flowline via well start-up with
methanol until the arrival temperature is 36oC. For cold start – up into a flowline that has been
hot oiled, methanol injection is stopped when the Flowing Well Head Temperature a (FWHT)
reaches above 23oC. This procedure is without prejudice to the base case strategy of HOC and
should only be used when the HOC is not feasible or may lead to significant deferment of
production.
The Valve Equalization guidelines should be followed when equalizing all valves. At the
conclusion of this procedure, the well will be producing.
Title :
Figure 5-7: Cold Conventional Well Start-up Procedure Logic Chart
5.5 Hot Oil Circulation

This procedure is for the circulation of hot oil in the flowlines prior to starting up a cold
well(s) in order to protect the fluids from flow assurance issues. Bonga North Tranche-1
subsea flowlines will be hot oiled prior to initial start-up and any subsequent start-up into a
cold flowline. Flowlines may also utilize hot oiling to meet chilly choke requirements for
starting up a well.
Title :
The rate of hot oil pumped through the flowlines will depend on the circumstances requiring
hot oil circulation. This procedure is a guideline for aligning the system properly before hot
oil circulation may commence.
Note: Prior to hot oiling a flow loop containing a live leg (ongoing production via one leg)
and a dead leg filled with cold fluid, refer to the guidelines for this procedure as given in hot
oiling with a dead leg in place.
Title :
Figure 5-8: Hot Oil Circulation Logic Chart
Title :
5.6 Planned Single Well Shutdown

This procedure describes the process for shutting-in a presently producing well in a planned
manner. During a planned shutdown, it is imperative to secure the flowlines first prior to
shutting in the well in order to protect the system from dead legs. For this reason, the steps
listed in this procedure follow an output from ‘Securing Flowline during Planned Well
Shutdown’ and assumes that the flowline system has been secured. Methanol is used to
displace fluids and protect the wellbore, tree, and jumper from flow assurance risks during the
shutdown.
The Valve Equalization guidelines should be followed when equalizing all valves. As this
procedure is a standard case, these steps may be optimized to minimize stroking of the valves
at the discretion of the operator. At the conclusion of this procedure, the well is secure for
indefinite shut-in.
Title :
Figure 5-9: Planned Single Conventional Well Shutdown Logic Chart
Title :
A timeline matrix summarizing the timing of the actions of this shutdown logic is shown in
Table 5 -9.
Table 5-9: Planned Single Well Shutdown Timeline Matrix
Action Time(hr)
1 2 3 4 5…6 7…20 21 22 23 24
No Touch Time (flowline already
secured).
Treat PCV, MPFM, Tree, Jumper with 15
bbl MeOH
Inject 5 bbl MeOH into wellbore.
Inject 75 bbl MeOH into SCSSV.

=Well Restarted with Warm Well Start-up
=Well Restarted using Cold Well Start-up
Tree/jumper cooldown time = 8 hours

30 m into wellbore cool-down time = 24 hours
60 m into the wellbore cooldown time = 48 hours
5.7 Unplanned Single Well Shutdown

This procedure describes a shutdown process for a currently producing well due to
undesirable event or upset. Single well shutdown trips include BHP Low, Reverse Choke,
Well PSL/PSH, LTSD Choke, Casing Integrity and Rate of Change. In the case of an
unplanned well shutdown, the well will be secured prior to securing the flowline.
After three hours of no touch time following shutdown, the well should be secured. The
flowline should be secured within 12hours of the shutdown if there are no other production
wells lined up to it. After the well is secured, the last portion of this procedure follows an
output from ‘Securing Flowline during Unplanned Well Shutdown’ after the flowline system
has been secured.
Note that there may be instances where it is clear that the well may not be started up for
several hours (>3hours). In this case, operations may begin to secure wells without waiting
for the 3 hr no touch time.
Methanol is used to treat fluids and protect the wellbore, tree, and jumper from hydrate
formation during the shutdown.
The Valve Equalization guidelines should be followed when equalizing all valves. As this
procedure is a standard case, these steps may be optimized to minimize stroking of the
Title :
valves at the discretion of the operator. At the conclusion of this procedure, the well is
secure for indefinite shut-in.
See Figure 5 -10 for system conditions and unplanned single well shutdown procedures.
Figure 5-10: Unplanned Single Conventional Well Shutdown Logic Chart
A timeline matrix summarizing the timing of the actions of the unplanned single well
shutdown logic is shown in Table 5 -10.
Title :
Table 5-10: Unplanned Single Well Shutdown Timeline Matrix
Time (hour)
Action
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10...12 13...48 49 50 51 52
No Touch Time (Shutdown
already initiated)
Determine if flowline needs to
be secured
Treat PCV, MPFM, Tree,
Jumper with 15bbl MeOH
Take steps to secure flowline
(Section 5.7)
Inject 5 bbl MeOH into

wellbore.
Inject 75 bbl MeOH into
SCSSV.
Notes
1. Timeline assumes only one well is flowline in the flowline, when an unplanned flowline shut in is initiated.
2. Available Tree and Jumper cooldown time is 8 hours. Cooldown time for flowline is 12 hours
3. Available cooldown at a depth of 30m into the wellbore is 24 hours.
4. Available cooldown at a depth of beyond 30m into the wellbore is 48 hours
=Well is restarted with Warm Well Startup (Figure 5 -6)
=Well Restarted using Cold Well Start-up
5.8 Securing Flowline During Planned Well Shutdown

This procedure serves as a guide to choose whether further action is needed to secure the
flowline in the event of a planned single well shutdown. In the event of any well shutdown,
securing the flowline is a requirement. Shutting-in a well may necessitate further action (such
as switching other wells to the flowline, shutting-in the flowline, or making use of slugging
control techniques) so that the flowrate in a producing flowline can be maintained above an
acceptable minimum flow depending on water cut.
The strategy in this case is to minimize loss in production while securing the flowlines. The
output of this procedure may lead to either Planned Single Well Shutdown or Planned Single
Flowline Shutdown. Figure 5 -11 provides system conditions and securing flowline during
planned well shutdown procedures. The procedure described in Figure 5 -11 is a contingent
procedure that requires production to be maintained due to urgencies. It is not a normal
operation for production with methanol, this procedure can only be maintained for a very
short time period, due to availability of methanol.
Title :
Figure 5-11: Securing Flowline during Planned Well Shutdown Logic Chart
Title :
5.9 Securing Flowline During Unplanned Well Shutdown

This procedure serves as a guide to decide whether further action is needed to secure the
flowline in the event of an unplanned single well shutdown. During any well shutdown,
securing the flowline is a requirement
The well shutdown may necessitate further action (such as switching other wells to the
flowline, shutting- in the flowline, or making use of slugging control techniques) so that
the flowrate in a producing flowline can be maintained above an acceptable minimum ≥
25,000bbld for the early life (GLR 825 scf/stb, WC 0%) and with gas lift. For minimum
stable flow corresponding to other WC and GLR, see [Ref. 5.]
The strategy in this case is to maximize production while securing the flowlines. The
output of this procedure may lead to either an Unplanned Single Well Shutdown or
Unplanned Single Flowline Shutdown.
Title :
Title :
Figure 5-12: Securing Flowline during Unplanned Well Shutdown Logic Chart
5.10 Planned Single Flowline Shutdown

This procedure outlines the securing of a single flowline as necessitated by either a well
shutdown or a planned flowline shutdown. The strategy for this procedure is to shut-in one
flowline while continuing production from the other. A flowline can be protected from
hydrate formation either by treating it with MeOH or by dead oil displacement.
This procedure is split into a different series of steps for each option. Management of the
wells that are currently producing to this flowline is discussed within these procedures. Dead
oil displacement may be commenced any time after no-touch time, provided that the flowline
will be treated within the 12-hour cooldown time. The final outcome is to secure a flowline
for indefinite shutdown.
See Figure 5 -13 and Figure 5 -14 for system conditions and planned single flowline
shutdown procedures.
Title :
Figure 5-13: Planned Single Flowline Shutdown with Dead Oil Displacement Logic
Charts
Title :
Figure 5-14: Planned Single Flowline Shutdown with Chemical Logic Charts
Title :
A timeline matrix summarizing the timing of the shutdown logic is shown in Table 5 -11.
Table 5-11: Timeline Matrix for Planned Single Flowline Shutdown
Time (hour)
Action
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
No Touch Time (Shutdown already
initiated)
Treat all trees and jumpers with MeOH.

Dead oil displacement
Notes
1. Total flowrate in flowline should be such that inhibited liquid arrives at the FPSO within the 12 hour
of shutdown window.
2. For single well shutdown dead oil displacement is expected to be completed within a 3-hour window.
= Well is restarted with Warm Well Startup (Figure 5 -6)
= Well is restarted using Cold Well Startup (Figure 5 -7)
5.11 Unplanned Single Flowline Shutdown

This procedure describes the proper method for securing a single flowline in the event of an
unplanned single flowline shutdown, that is, when shutdown of a single flowline is initiated
by a system trip such as a Process Shutdown. Flowline PSLL/PSHH or when an unplanned
single well shutdown necessitates a flowline shutdown.
In this case, treatment of the flowline with chemicals to prevent hydrate formation is not an
option because no wells are producing to this flowline. The primary strategy to prevent
hydrate formation in the flowline consists of dead oil displacement or blowdown, with or
without gas lift
The outcome of this procedure will result in the flowline being secured as well as possible,
but the level to which it is protected will depend on the severity of the shutdown and what
treatment techniques are available.
Title :
Figure 5-15: System Conditions and Unplanned single flowline Shutdown Procedures.
Title :
A timeline matrix summarizing the timing of the actions of the unplanned single flowline
shutdown logic is shown in Table 5 -12.
Table 5-12: Timeline Matrix for Unplanned Single Flowline Shutdown
Time (hour)
Action
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
No Touch Time.
Treat all trees and jumpers with
MeOH.
Depressurise
Notes
1.Depressurization of flowlines to flare is the primary hydrate mitigation strategy for unplanned
shutdown.
= Well on flowline are restarted using warm Well Start-up
= Well on flowline are restarted using Cold Well Start-up
5.12 Planned System Shutdown with Blowdown and/or Dead Oil Displacement
This procedure outlines the securing of the entire subsea system, including flowlines, in a
planned manner. For the BN Tranche-1 flowlines, blowdown with or without gas lift aid is
the main primary strategy for fluids with low water cut, while dead oil displacement is the
secondary strategy for shutting in the flowline/ riser components of the subsea system.
Similarly, for flowlines with higher water cut fluid, blowdown with gas lift aid is sufficient to
reduce pressures to the required 15barg pressure.
As part of the entire system shutdown process, all producing wells are arranged for shutdown,
and the final outcome is a secure subsea system. Note: A system containing live and dead
fluids (dead legs) will require a different approach due to hydrate risk associated with pushing
live fluids into long cold sections of flowlines. As such, a separate procedure for DOD with
dead legs in place is also shown in Figure 5-12.
A maximum of two flowlines are to be lined up to the flare system hourly until blowdown is
completed. Similarly, two flow loop can be dead oiled either to the low pressure separator or
to the flare system when the L.P. system is unavailable.
Title :
Figure 5-16: Planned System Shutdown with Blowdown Logic Chart
Title :
Figure 5-17 : Planned System Shutdown with Dead Oil Displacement Logic Chart
Title :
Figure 5-18: Planned System Shutdown with Dead Oil Displacement for System with
Dead Leg in Place Logic Chart.
Title :
A timeline matrix summarizing the timing of the actions of the planned system
shutdown logic with blowdown and DOD is shown in Table 5 -13 and Table 5 -14.
Table 5-13: Timeline Matrix for Planned System Shutdown with Blowdown
Time (hour)
Action
1 2 3 4 5 96 7 8
10 11 12
No Touch Time.
Start well shutdown, treat all wells with
MeOH.
Depressurise flowlines to flare system
Notes
1. No 'no-touch' time since this is a planned shutdown, well treatment can commence as soon as shutdown is
completed.
2. Depressurization of flowlines is the primary hydrate mitigation strategy for planned and unplanned shutdown
3. Current design requires just one 708 well to be produced in Tranch-1, such that high viscosity issues will not
be prevalent in the flowline.
4. Dead oil displacement is the primary strategy for flowlines containing fluids with high water cut.
5. All operation to secure the subsea system must be completed within the available cooldown time of the
various components following a shutdown.
= Wells on flowline can be restarted with Warm Well Startup
= Wells on flowline are restarted using Cold Well Start-up
Table 5-14: Timeline Matrix for Planned System Shutdown with DOD
Time (hour)
Action 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
No Touch Time.
Treat all trees and jumpers
with MeOH.
Depressurize flowlines to
LP separator
Dead oil displace all subsea
flowlines
Notes
1. No 'no-touch' time since this is a planned shutdown, well treatment can commence as soon as
shutdown is completed.
2. Depressurization of flowlines is the primary hydrate mitigation strategy for planned and unplanned
shutdown.
3. Dead oil displacement is only to be used when blowdown is not effective / feasible or long shut-in of
flowlines.
4. All operation to secure the subsea system must be completed within the available cooldown time of the
various components following a shutdown.
= Wells on flowline can be restarted with Warm Well Startup
Title :
5.13 Planned System Shutdown with Methanol (MeOH)

Securing the flowlines with MeOH is only a tertiary, contingency strategy and should only be
used if the blowdown and dead oiling systems are not available, feasible or effective.
This procedure outlines the securing of the entire subsea system, including both flowlines,
in a planned manner at low water cuts.
MeOH is effective to prevent hydrate blockage up to a certain produced water limit. In order
to chemically treat the flowline with MeOH, the amount of produced water entering the
flowline must be within acceptable limits. During this process, all producing wells are
arranged for shutdown, and the final outcome is a secure subsea system.
Figure 5-19: Planned System Shutdown with MeOH Treatment Logic Chart
Title :
A timeline matrix summarizing the timing of the actions of the planned system
shutdown with MeOH logic is shown in Table 5 -15.
Table 5-15: Timeline Matrix -Planned System Shutdown with MeOH Treatment
Time (hour)
Action
1 2 3 4 5
8 6
9 7
10 11 12
No Touch Time (flowline already secured).
Start well shutdown, treat all wells with
MeOH.
Notes
1. No 'no-touch' time since this is a planned shutdown, well treatment can commence as soon as flowline is secured
with MeOH.
= Wells on flowline can be restarted with Warm Well Startup.
5.14 Unplanned System Shutdown

This procedure describes the proper method for securing the subsea system in the event of
an unplanned system shutdown, that is, when shutdown of the system is initiated by a
system trip such as an ESR-1, ESR-2, ESR-3 or SIMOPS trip.
In this case, treatment of the flowlines with chemicals to prevent hydrate formation is
not an option because the trees producing to the flowlines have already shutdown. The
primary strategy to prevent hydrate formation in the flowlines consists of blowdown with
or without gas lift assist and dead oil displacement if blowdown is not achievable. Thus,
for unplanned system shutdown a combination of flowline blowdown and dead oil
displacement may be the optimum hydrate mitigation strategy to secure the flowlines.
The outcome of any of the options discussed above will result in the flowline system being
secured as well as possible, but the level to which it is protected will depend on the
severity of the system trip and what treatment techniques are available.
See Figure 5 -20 for system conditions and unplanned system shutdown procedures.
Title :
Figure 5-20: Unplanned System Shutdown Logic Chart
Title :
A timeline matrix summarizing the timing of the actions to secure the system following
an unplanned system shutdown is shown in Table 5 -16 and Table 5 -17 . The logic
shows a combination of blowdown and dead oil displacement as well as for dead oiling
option only.
Table 5-16: Timeline Matrix for Blowdown to Flare System (Unplanned System
Shutdown)
Time (hours) Remarks

Action
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
No Touch
Time
Tree &
Jumper 2 x 1”
Methanol cores
Treatment
Blowdown
See Note 1
to Flare
Note:
1. For normal operating production rates, blowdown maybe constrained by orifice size and low temperature
excursions downstream of the orifice.
Table 5-17: Timeline Matrix for Dead Oiling Option Only (Unplanned System Shutdown)
Time (hours) Remarks

Action
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
No Touch Time
Tree & Jumper

2 x 1” cores
Methanol Treatment
Depressurise to Inlet
Separator
DOD DOD rate of
60,000 bopd
without gas lift
or up to 70,000
bopd with gas
lift
Title :
5.15 Annulus Management Procedure

This procedure describes the proper method for relieving pressure increases in the annulus
caused by thermal expansion of the completion fluid during initial start-up of the well as flow
temperature increases to steady state conditions. Build-up of gas or hydrocarbon liquids due
to completion component failure or gas permeability within elastomeric seals can also cause
annulus pressure to increase.
Well annulus management shall be pressure relief, within annulus via the crossover valve on
each through into the production system. Hydrate inhibition should be made available during
this operation to possible chilly choke effect downstream of the crossover valve.
The Valve Equalization guidelines should be followed when equalizing all valves. At the
conclusion of this procedure, normal operation of the well may resume.
Title :
Figure 5-21: Annulus Management Procedure Logic Chart Subsea
5.16 Blowdown Operations Procedure

This procedure is for blowdown of a single Bonga North Tranche-1flowline in order to
prevent hydrate formation. Blowdown is the primary strategy while the secondary strategy
available is dead oil displacement. Gas lift can also aid in blowdown.
For the entire system to be safe from hydrates, all subsea pressures at the manifolds must be
less than 15barg. If pressures in the system are not blown down to below 15barg dead oil
displacement must be implemented to fully secure the system. If the dead oil system is not
available, no further securing of the system is possible.
Title :
It is important to suitably position the subsea valves at the manifolds to allow for blowdown
of the desired portion of the flowlines. Certain HIV’s may be closed in order to isolate a
treated dead leg away from the FPSO.
Figure 5-22: Blowdown Logic Chart
5.17 Pigging Operations Procedure

This procedure is an outline of safe pigging operation for the subsea system for dewatering
or to remove wax and other solids from the flowlines. Bonga North Tranche-1 flowlines
will be pigged during commissioning and as often as deemed necessary to avoid any
plugging issues and for regulatory requirements. It is important to ensure that there is a
Title :
safely prepared path for the pig to travel through by suitably positioning the appropriate
subsea valves.
Before pigging, the topsides procedure should be referenced to confirm that equipment is
correctly positioned, aligned, and fit for service. The topsides procedure also details the
process of loading and launching the pig.
Title :
Figure 5-23: Pigging Procedure Logic Chart
Title :
5.18 Aborted Well Start-up

This procedure describes the appropriate method for securing a single well in the event of
an aborted well start-up. That is, in the event that a well has a trip during the well ramp-
up period before it attains a steady state safe condition temperature of 50°C [Ref.13.] at
the tree. In the event this occurs, then the well must be secured immediately as the 3 hour
no touch period, cannot be applied to the well.
Figure 5-24: Securing Well after an Aborted Start-Up Logic Chart
Title :
5.19 Cold Flowline Start-up Using Cold Well Fluid
Figure 5-25: Cold Well into Cold Flowline Start-Up – Contingency Logic Chart
Title :
5.20 Warm Well Switching into Cold Flowline
Figure 5-26: Warm Well Switching into Cold Flowline Logic Chart
Title :
Title :
6.0 GAS LIFT INJECTION SEQUENCES
6.1 Gas Lift Subsea Systems Schematics

The Bonga Bundled Gas Lift Umbilical (BGLU) system as shown in F i g u r e 6 - 2 7 . It
consists of an integrated umbilical supplying required lift gas to two adjacent flowlines.
The umbilical terminates subsea at a GLTA and connects to the flowlines via two
dedicated gas lift jumpers connected to the GLILT.
The following procedures as contained in the charts Figure 6 -28 to Figure 6 -30
describes the various methods of operating the gas lift system to be deployed on Bonga
North. They range from methods for starting up the system to securing the system in the
event of a planned or an unplanned shut down.
Figure 6-27: Gas Lift System Schematic (Ref.19.)
Title :
6.2 Gas Lift Riser Start-up to a Single Flowline
Figure 6-28: Gas Lift Riser Start-up to a Single Flowline
Title :
6.3 Gaslift Riser Startup to Two adjacent Flowlines PL-17&18
Figure 6-29: Gas Lift Riser Start-up to Two Adjacent Flowlines PFL – 17 and 18
Title :
6.4 Planned Shutdown of Gas lift Supply to Single or Both Flowlines
Figure 6-30: Planned Shutdown of Gas Lift to Single or Both Flowlines
Title :
6.5 Securing Gas Lift Riser /Jumper(s) after an Unplanned Shutdown BGLU-01
Figure 6-31: Securing Gas Lift Riser / Jumper(s) after an Unplanned Shutdown BGLU
Title :
7.0 WATER INJECTION SYSTEMS SEQUENCES
7.1 Definitions
In this section, logic sequences for water injection well start-up and shutdown are provided.
The steps are limited to subsea valve opening/closing and adjusting topsides pressure control
set points. Discussion in this section pertains only to the water injection system and not to the
production system.
Refer to Section 4.6.3 for the water injection tree schematic.
7.1.1 Turbine Start-up Pressure

This is the set point pressure for the Injection Pressure Controller used during turbine start-up.
It is selected to establish and maintain enough backpressure on the injection pump and is
much less than normal operating pressure.
7.1.2 Normal Operating Pressure

The maximum set point for the Injection Pressure Controller used for normal operation is
325.5 barg but this does not take into account topside pressure losses. The exact set point will
be resolved once optimal choke positions are determined.
Note: When the Bonga topsides system is well defined, the contents of this section shall be
revised.
7.1.3 Minimum Back Pressure Set-point

This is the setpoint of the minimum backpressure controller. This controller maintains a
minimum backpressure on the pump during turbine start-up. The minimum backpressure
setpoint is much lower than normal operating pressure so that the backpressure control valve
will be wide open during normal operations.
7.1.4 Initial Start-up Pressure

The setpoint for the Injection Pressure Controller established prior to the initial opening
of the chokes when optimum choke settings have not been determined.
Initial Start-up Pressure is established such that the subsea flowline pressures upstream of the
WICVs are much higher than the shut-in tubing pressure of the highest pressure well but less
than frac pressure. This will be sufficient to establish flow into all wells at a minimum rate
with no danger of fracturing a well.
Title :
7.1.5 Start-up Pressure

The setpoint for the Injection Pressure Controller established prior to setting the chokes when
optimum choke settings have been previously determined.
7.1.6 Subsea Flowline Pressure

The injection flowline pressure measured just upstream of the chokes. The subsea injection
pressure will be equal to the topsides injection pressure plus the hydrostatic pressure minus
the pressure loss due to flow in the flowline. As flowrates change, the subsea injection
pressure will change even if the topsides injection pressure remains constant.
Title :
7.2 Water Injection System Normal Start-up

This procedure describes the start-up of the Bonga North Tranche-1 water injection flowline.
Figure 7-32: Water Injection System Normal Start-up Logic Chart
Title :
Title :
7.3 Additional Water Injection Water Start-up
Figure 7-33: Additional Water Injection Well Start-up Logic Chart
7.4 Water Injection Flowline Planned Shutdown

This procedure illustrates the sequence required to manually shut in the entire water injection
system. This procedure may be required to repair surface valves associated with the flowline.
Title :
Figure 7-34: Planned Water Injection Flowline Shutdown Logic Chart
Title :
7.5 Planned Individual Water Injection Well Shutdown

This procedure describes the shutdown of an individual water injection well.
Title :
Figure 7-35: Planned individual Water Injection Well Shutdown Logic Chart
Title :
8.0 AUTOMATIC SHUTDOWN SEQUENCING OVERVIEW
8.1 Types of Shutdowns

Bonga North Tranche-1 automatic shutdowns could affect the whole subsea system, all the
wells on a single flowline or individual wells. SIMOPS and ESR shutdowns are all existing
Bonga Main (BM) shutdown sequences, and they must be utilized in a manner to aligned with
the existing control system for the BM FPSO. Some shutdowns come as a result of lesson
learnt from BM, these shall be implemented in Bonga North Tranche-1 Project.
 ESR-3
o ESR-3 is a manual topsides-initiated abandon platform shutdown. The same functions as

an ESR-2 shutdown are performed, plus the HP hydraulics are bled and generators on the
FPSO go down. All wells and GLR are shut in.
 ESR-1& 2
o An ESR-1&2 is identical to a Process Shutdown, but LP hydraulics are bled in addition.

All wells and GLR are securely shut in.
 SIMOPS Emergency Shutdown (SESD)

 Process Shutdown
o A Process Shutdown functions in the same manner as a Flowline PSLH/PSHH, but all
wells on both flowlines are shut-in, as well as the GLR. This shutdown is usually
initiated as a result of the process system being outside the set operating range.
 Flowline PSLL/PSHH
o Flowline pressure sensors near the BV can trip the Flowline PSLL/PSHH shutdown
sequence when flowline pressure is not maintained within a safe operating envelope. All
wells associated with this flowline are shutdown.
 BHP Low
o This tree-initiated shutdown is caused by low downhole pressure; hence a time delay
must be installed to ensure this shutdown does not occur on instantaneous bad readings.
 Reverse Choke
o Pressure transmitters determine the pressure differential across the PCV; trips in the
case of high reverse dP.
Title :
 Well PSLL/PSHH
o This shutdown will be initiated if the pressure reaches shutdown set point.
 LTSD Choke
o Pressure transmitter will signal a trip if temperature downstream of choke is beyond

material limits.
 Casing Integrity
o If annulus pressure, exceeds MAAP, this shutdown is initiated.
 Rate of Change
o High rate of pressure change at the tree indicating high drawdown differential will
signal this shutdown.
 Loss of Communications
If subsea communications are lost, all valves remain ‘as is’ until (if required), hydraulics are
vented to allow all valves to engage in their respective fail-safe positions. In general, if a
SCM stops communicating during a normal flowing condition, an alarm should be raised but
it is undesirable to perform any automatic actions immediately. The Loss of communications
condition is detected by the MCS and a flag is set indicating which umbilical provides
hydraulic supply to the affected well. If, however, there is a shutdown initiated from topsides
and the SCM is not communicating then the hydraulic supply must be vented.
8.2 Automated shutdown by Priority

Shutdown sequences have been assigned a priority level. For each individual well, if a
shutdown is in progress, and a shutdown of a higher priority is initiated, the control system
will stop responding to the initial shutdown and respond to the highest-level shutdown. Table
8 -18 describes the priority levels of all shutdowns
Table 8-18: Priority Levels of all Shutdowns
1.Highest Priority SIMOPS Emergency Shutdown Producers

(SESD)
2 Emergency Shutdown ESR 3 Producers Wells on associated
and Injectors flowline only
3 Emergency Shutdown ESR2 Producers

and Injectors
Title :
4 Emergency Shutdown ESR1 Producers and

Injectors
5 Process Shutdown Producers Wells on
and Injectors associated flowline
Flowline
PSHH/PSL L only
6 BHP Low Producers

and Injectors
7 Subsea Choke Reverse Producers
Differential Shutdown and Injectors
8 Well head PSLL/PSHH Producers
and Injectors Single Well
9 LTSD Choke Producers
10 Casing Integrity (Annulus) Producers
and Injectors
11 Lowest Priority Rate of Change Producers
and Injectors
12 Manual Additional Loss of Communications
Shutdown
8.3 Automated Shutdown Sequencing

The Bonga North Tranche 1 shutdown valve sequencing strategy to shut-in wells quickly is
shaped by two drivers, namely:
 Avoid packing of the flowlines.

 Prepare the system for blowdown.
These strategies have been formulated to assist flow assurance mitigation and to assist
subsequent start-up of the subsea system.
Table 8 -19 (Ref. 14.) through Table 8 -21 list the valve shutdown sequences for
production and water injection wells, as well as the gas lift riser manifolds. It should be noted
that the gas lift table is on hold and will be updated once the information becomes available.
LTSD is not applicable to the water injection system, as Joule-Thompson cooling does not
occur in this system. Note that the WRIPS does not shut in the wells, it is however, expected
to initiate a shutdown of the topsides turbine and HP pump.
Title :
Table 8-19: Production Well Automatic Valve Shutdown Sequence

A Sequence Initiating Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Topsides Topsides
Name Condition
Signal from Stop PCV if moving. Close Close all close all SCSSVP Close BV Vent LP &
Shutdown (SESD)
Safeguarding PSDV, XOV, WSVs. PWV, AWV, and GL HP

Emergency
All Wells
SIMOPS
System Initiate Choke Hydraulics

Closure, CIVs,
MIVs, PMV,
AMV
Signal from Start T1, T2. Stop PCV if After T1, After T2, Close Close BV Vent LP &
ESR3
Safeguarding moving. Close s Close PWV, PMV, AMV, WSVs, and GL HP

System PSDV, AWV, XOV, MIVs Initiate Choke SCSSV.P Hydraulics
Shutdowns
Full Field
& CIVs Closure

Signal from Start T1, T2. Stop PCV if After T1, After T2, Close
ESR2 &
ESR1
Safeguarding moving. Close M. Close PWV, PMV, AMV, WSVs.

System PSDV, AWV, XOV, MIVs, Initiate Choke
CIVs Closure
Signal from Start T1. After T1, After T2, Close
Shutdown
Flow line
/Process
Safeguarding Stop PCV if moving, close Close PWV, PMV, AMV, WSVs.
(PSHL)
System PSDV, AWV, XOV, MIV’s Initiate Choke

& CIV’s on Flowline A or Closure
Flowline B
MCS Stop PCV if moving. After T1,
Subsea Choke
Differential
calculation Close MIVs, PSDV, AWV Close PWV,

Shutdown
pressure
Reverse
and XOV Initiate

Choke Closure
Signal from Stop PCV if moving. After T1,

(PSL/PSH)
Safeguarding Close MIVs, PSDV, AWV Close PWV,

Well
System and XOV Initiate

Choke Closure
MCS Stop PCV if moving. VV. After T1,

Affected Flowline
Shutdown
Wells Aligned to
pressure
Bottom
(BHP)
Calculation Close MIVs, PSDV, AWV Close PWV,

Hole
PVs >LL limit and XOV Initiate Choke

Closure
Stop PCV if moving. After T1,
Shutdown
Temperat
TT3<or =LL .Close MIVs, PSDV, AWV Close PWV,

(LTSD)
Low
ure
Limit and XOV Initiate

Choke Closure
If PT4 PSIG Stop PCV if moving. After T1,

Casing Integrity
or = HH Limit Close MIVs, PSDV, AWV Close PWV,

Shutdown
(CISD)
and XOV Initiate

Choke Closure
MCS Stop PCV if moving. Close After T1,

Rate of Change
Calculation MIVs, PSDV, AWV and Close PWV,

XOV Initiate Choke
Closure
Title :
A Sequence Initiating Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Topsides Topsides

Name Condition
Loss of If a loss of communications Close BVs Vent LP
Hydraulic Supply with
Loss of Comms (LoC)
communication from MCS to subsea system Manually & HP

Affected Wells
Wells Sharing
s occurs, then an alarm is Hydraulic

raised. If a hardwired s
shutdown is then signaled to
the MCS, then the LP
hydraulics will be vented.
After specified time delay,
the HP hydraulics
Title :
Table 8-20 Water Injection Well Automatic Valve Shutdown Sequence

Sequence Initiating Stage 3
B Name Stage 1 Stage 2 Topsides Topsides
Condition
All Wells are affected
Shutdown (SESD)
Emergency
SIMOPS
Signal from Initiate Close IMV, AMV.

Stop PCV, Close all IWV, XOV,
Safeguarding Choke Close all SCSSV Vent LP &
AWV
System closure HP
Hydraulics
After T1, Vent LP

Signal from Start T1, T2. Stop PCV if After T2, Close
Full Field Shutdowns
ESR3
Cl Initiate Hydraulics
Safeguarding moving. IMV, AMV,
Choke Close BV Vent HP
System Close IWV, XOV, AWV.
Closure Hydraulics
ESR1&ESR2
Start T1, T2. Stop PCV if After T1,

Signal from After T2, Close
moving. Initiate Vent LP
Safeguarding IMV, AMV.
Choke Close BV Hydraulics
System
Close IWV, XOV, AWV closure
Reverse Differential
Pressure Shutdown
Subsea Choke
After T1, V
Start T1. Stop PCV if moving.
PT1-PT3> or = Initiate
CV.
+setpoint PSI Choke
Close IWV, XOV, AWV
Closure

(PSL/PSH)
After T1,
Signal from
Start T1. Stop PCV if moving. Cl Initiate
Well
Safeguarding
Close IWVs, XOV, AWV. Choke
System
Closure
Individual wells
After T1,
Shutdown
Pressure
Signal from Stop PCV if moving.

Bottom
Initiate
Hole
Safeguarding Close IWV, XOV,

Choke
System AWV.
Closure

Casing Integrity
After T1,
Shutdown
If PT4 PSIG > or

(CISD)
Start T1. Stop PCV if moving. Initiate

= HH Limit
Close IWV, XOV, AWV. Choke
Closure
After T1, V
Change
Rate of
MCS Start T1. Stop PCV if moving. Initiate

Calculation Close IWV, XOV, AWV. Choke
Closure

If a loss of communications from
Hydraulic Supply
with affected well
MCS to subsea system occurs,

Loss of Comms
Wells Sharing
then an alarm is raised. If a

Close BVs Vent LP &
(LoC)
Loss of hardwired shutdown is then

Manually HP
communications signaled to the MCS, then the LP
Hydraulics
hydraulics will be vented. After a
time delay the HP hydraulics will
vent too.
Title :
Title :
Table 8-21: Gas Lift System Automatic Valve Shutdown Sequence (HOLD 1.)
Sequence Initiating
Scope Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Step 4 Topsides Topsides
Name Condition
Hyd Supply with
Communication
Affected Wells
Wells Sharing
Shutdown (SESD) (Comm Loss)

See Text for Close BVs
Loss of detailed Manually Vent
Loss
Communications Explanation LP & HP

Hydraulics
Affected Flowline
Wells Aligned to
Emergency
SIMOPS
Signal from Close GL CI, GL

Safeguarding IV-B, Close BV.
System GL IV-A, GL CV.
Process shut "Abandone
depressurization depressurization Platform "

ESR3

d

Full Field Shutdowns
down with

ESR2

Process shut
down with

ESR1
Safeguarding IV-B, Close BV

Aligned to
Flowline
Affected

flowline
PSHL
Wells
PSD/
Safeguarding IV-B, Close BV

Shut Down
(Low Gas
Affected
Gas Temp Close GL CI, GL

LGTSD
Temp
Riser
leaving topsides IV-B, Close BV

choke GL IV-A, GL CV.
Shutdown
Not applicable for

Pressure
(B H P)
Bottom
MCS
Hole
GL
Calculation
System
No Topsides Action
Individual Well
Differential
Shutdown
Not applicable for

Pressure
Reverse
Subsea
Choke
If PT1 < (PT3 -750

GL
PSI)
System
Signal from Not applicable for

Safeguarding GL
(PSL/PSH)
System System
Well
Title :
Sequence Initiating
Scope Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Step 4 Topsides Topsides
Name Condition
Temperature
Shutdown
Not Applicable for
(LTSD )
PT3 >xx
Low
GL
Degrees
System
Shutdown
Not Applicable for

Integrity
(CISD )
Casing
If PT4 PSIG >

GL
XXXX,
System
Rate of change
Not Applicable for

MCS
GL
Calculation
System
8.4 SIMOPS SSESD

SIMOPS shutdown will be initiated by activating the SESD switch on the rig (Microwave
Link from the rig to the FPSO) that will automatically trip the SSDS system, or via a phone
call or radio call from the rig Vto the FPSO control room. This is followed by operator
activation of a switch in the control room to start the automated shutdown sequence.
A SIMOPS situation could involve serious subsea containment issues such as a broken
jumper or split riser. Therefore, stopping production immediately is of utmost importance,
and the strategy is to shut all valves as soon as possible.
The BV to both flowlines is shut upon initiation, as well as all valves for the GLR. The
PSDV of affected wells are shut at once to contain the well. Closing the PMV, then AMV,
MIV’s and XOV minimizes backflow into the annulus or umbilicals. The remainder of the
valves at the tree closes, including the SCSSV, to completely shut in the well.
8.5 All Other Automatic Shutdowns

The remaining shutdowns contain largely similar subsea valve sequencing. ESR, Flowline
PSL/PSH, BHP Low, Reverse Choke, Well PSL/PSH, LTSD Choke, Casing Integrity, and
Rate of Change shutdowns occur in three stages. Stage 1 begins immediately upon initiation.
Stage 2 begins after a five-minute time out, and Stage 3 begins after 55 minutes of shutdown.
The PSDV is considered the sacrificial valve and closes off production from the trees affected
by shutdown in Stage 1 upon shutdown initiation. Prior to PSDV closure, chemical injection
valves are closed to prevent backflow into umbilical lines, and the XOV is closed to ensure
segregation of the annulus. Stage One also includes closing of the BV and GLR valves to
isolate the subsea system (if the shutdown affects an entire flowline) and securing of the
Title :
affected well annuli by closing the, AVV, and AWV. The PCV (choke), if it was in the
process of opening, is stopped, and is closed after all major valves have closed.
The PWV is closed during Stage Two, allowing five minutes to build up pressure in the tree,
so this doesn’t have to be done during subsequent start-up. The choke is closed, as it must be
closed prior to restart. The PMV does not close to allow for MeOH injection to treat the
wellbore.
ESR shutdowns contain Stage Three after 55 minutes of initiation to further secure the tree for
longer- term shutdown (closing of the PMV, AMV, and WSV at the manifold), and the
SCSSV is closed during an ESR-3 shutdown.
As a general note, if a shutdown affects multiple wells, all identical valves are operated before
the command to move on to the next step in valve sequencing. For shutdowns applicable to
both kinds of wells, producer wells are secured before water injection wells.
Title :
9.0 INTERLOCKS
Protecting the subsea equipment and ensuring safe and optimized production, an interlock
system will be included in the Bonga North Tranche-1 development. Bonga North Tranche-1
Subsea Master Interlock Schedule lists all of the interlocks pertaining to all valves at the
producer and water injection wells, production manifolds, and the gas lift sleds controlled in
the Bonga North Tranche-1 MCS.
9.1 Bonga North Tranche-1 Interlocks Notes

The interlocks included in these guidelines are subject to the following:
Each transmitter shall have four alarm points (AL, ALL, AH, AHH). Alarm set/trip points can
only be changed with technician or administrator security level authority.
Production flowlines shall be labelled in accordance to the Bonga North Tranche-1tagging

philosophy document The manifolds should be labelled in accordance to the Bonga North T-
1tagging philosophy document.
The WSVs at the manifolds shall be labelled in accordance to the Bonga North Tranche-
1tagging philosophy document The Water Injection flowline shall be labelled in accordance
to the Bonga North Tranche-1 tagging philosophy document HIVs and XOVs shall be
labelled in accordance to the Bonga North Tranche-1tagging philosophy document
All HIVs shall fail in the open position, and all XOVs shall fail closed.
The MCS shall monitor uptime and downtime on each well, based on valve positions. The
timers shall display time in hours and minutes. The hour display shall have four digits.
In a shutdown condition, if the shutdown signal returns to normal (i.e. the initiating condition
has cleared) and the operator resets the shutdown condition on the HMI, then the shutdown
sequence is halted at the current step (after completion of that step).
The MCS shall calculate the differential pressure across the choke and display this value on
the HMI screen. This value shall have four alarm points as in Note 1.
The WSV shall be operated from both the manifold and tree display.
The ESS/MCS watchdog circuit shall issue an alarm signal to the platform HMI upon a
failure of the MCS.
Title :
9.2 System Security Levels

Alarm set points will go through a formal change and recording procedure requiring approval
from the OIM. Depending on the alarm, it may require approval/support from the onshore
support team and approvals from Operations Manager level.
All interlocks require a certain Operator Access Level to be overridden. Interlock overrides do
not remain engaged, that is, if an interlock is overridden to commit an action, it must be
overridden again to perform the same action a second time. bypass levels for all interlocks
must be assigned in future stages of development for all interlocks.
9.2.1 Admin
 Has all the access of Level 3.
 Ability to enable ESD 3 &2 bypassing
9.2.2 Operator Access Level 3 (OAL3)

 Has all the access of Level 2.
 Ability to change tuning parameters, alarms/trip/limit set points
 Ability to put SESD and ESD 3 & 2 points into Test” mode
9.2.3 Operator Access Level 2 (OAL2)

 Access to view all displays and initiate printout of reports
Table 9-22: Operator Access Level
Initial / None OAL 1 OAL 2 OAL 3 Admin
View All Screens X X X X X

View Alarms X X X X X
Access Reports - X X X X
Operate Valves/Chokes - - X X X
Modify/Disable Alarms - - - X X
Modify Valve / Choke - - - - X
Configuration
Configure Users - - - - X
Restore Defaults - - - - X

SNEPCo Deepwater Projects Guidelines for The Operation of Subsea Production System

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SNEPCo Deepwater Projects Guidelines for The Operation of Subsea Production System

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N

Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company Limited W E

SNEPCo Deepwater Projects

Project Bonga North Tranche-1 Project

National Engineering and Technical Company

Document Number BNO-NETCO-500-PX-0580-00008

Document Revision 02R

Document Status IFR

Owner Steve Okwuosah

Issue Date 2022-02-22

Next Review Date N/A

Security Classification Restricted

Revision History shown on next

Signatures for this revision

Approver Kevin AGBASI

Document No: BNO-NETCO-500-PX-0580-00008 Revision 02R

Bonga North Tranche-1 Project

Document No: BNO-NETCO-500-PX-0580-00008 Revision 02R

Bonga North Tranche-1 Project

5.10 Planned Single Flowline Shutdown...................................................................................................41

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Bonga North Tranche-1 Project

Item No. Section Description

1. Table 8 -21 Gas Lift System Shutdown sequence

Document No: BNO-NETCO-500-PX-0580-00008 Revision 02R

Bonga North Tranche-1 Project

Document No: BNO-NETCO-500-PX-0580-00008 Revision 02R

Bonga North Tranche-1 Project

FWHT Flowing Wellhead Temperature

Document No: BNO-NETCO-500-PX-0580-00008 Revision 02R

Bonga North Tranche-1 Project

Document No: BNO-NETCO-500-PX-0580-00008 Revision 02R

Bonga North Tranche-1 Project

Document No: BNO-NETCO-500-PX-0580-00008 Revision 02R

Bonga North Tranche-1 Project

1.1 Project Background

Figure 1-1: The Bonga North Field Location Map

Field Development and Project History

Document No: BNO-NETCO-500-PX-0580-00008 Revision 02R

Bonga North Tranche-1 Project

An overview of the PROJECT is summarized below:

Document No: BNO-NETCO-500-PX-0580-00008 Revision 02R

Bonga North Tranche-1 Project

Figure 1-2: Overview of the Bonga North Tranche-1 development

1.2 Project Description

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Bonga North Tranche-1 Project

1.3 Purpose of Document

These operational scenarios are as follows:

 Cold well Start-up

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Bonga North Tranche-1 Project

 Steady-state arrival temperature

1.5.1 Definition of Terms and Phrases

Table 1-1: Definitions of Terms and Phrases

1. BNO-3-100-AA-7704-00003, Bonga North (BN) Project Basis for Design - PART1

Document No: BNO-NETCO-500-PX-0580-00008 Revision 02R

Bonga North Tranche-1 Project

4. BNO-NETCO-500-PX-0580-00001, Detailed Flow Assurance Design and Operability

Document No: BNO-NETCO-500-PX-0580-00008 Revision 02R

Bonga North Tranche-1 Project

2.0 GENERAL DATA