You are on page 1of 6

PDO OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT FORM

pdc

Situation/Task CIVIL CABLE TRENCH &


FOUNDATION EXCAVATION, Likelihood Approver
(To assess the risk associated with....) WORKS FOR PDC PROJECTS
EXCAVATION FOR CIVIL
Severity A B C D E Low DTL or Delegate
Job Type / Equipment / System CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES
0 Medium Operations Manager
Process FAHUD ALL STATIONS
OPERATION- NORTH / FAHUD 1 High Oil, Gas or Engineering
Department / Area/Facility ALL STATIONS
2 Serious Director
IBRAHIM DNNF4 (SKILLED)
YASSER AL HARASI – DHN4, 3
Risk Assessment Team Members: (SKILLED)
VIJAY KUMAR -AIP
4 Highest
(Minimum 3 persons) S.C(SKILLED) Residual Risk 2 AP
5 Rating
SHARON-AIP HSE (SKILLED)
SAID KHALFAN AL JABRI-P/A
(KNOWLEDGE)
Risk Assessment Tracking No. AIP-FHD-RA-C004

Background/Supporting Information/Controls Assurance:


(Provide background information to support the ORA. Include information on controls assurance)
This risk assessment is reviewed as per PDO CSR instruction to avoid/protect the loose soil collapse into the trenches, risk assessment is reviewed and
highlighted point are added in the Risk assessment protective system should be applied of excavation areas, if excavation is more than 1.1M protective system
should be apply (benching or shoring or sloping)

Basic SOP
1) Ensure Team meets requirements of PR-2271 and brief team on procedure contents. Hierarchy of Controls
2) Fill in Title Block.
3) Fill in Background information. Include PEFS, method statements, how controls will be assured etc. Elim ina tio n Phy sic a lly re m o ve Ha za rd

4) Fill Situation/Task with scenarios of what could go wrong.


Elimination
a. Brainstorm many scenarios for assessment. Sub stitutio n Re p la c e the Ha za rd
b. Select with Scenarios will be assessed as credible
c. For less credible scenarios mark as “Scenario not credible”

In c re a sin ge ffe c tiv e n e ss


Eng ine e ring
5) Fill in Hazards, Effect of Hazards, Groups Effected, Initial Risk. Iso la te fro m the Ha za rd
Co ntro ls
a. For Initial Risk – select Severity then the likelihood of the chosen severity.
6) Enter NEW controls to control or mitigate the effect of the hazards. Avoid Administrative. Ad m inistra tive
a. Reducing Severity is “hard”, Reducing Likelihood is “easy”. Co ntro ls
Cha ng e ho w p e o p le wo rk
b. Number each control. Reference control number if used in multiple scenarios.
c. Assign an owner to each control.
7) Attach associated supporting documentation: PEFS, Photos, Method Statements etc Pro te c t wo rke r with PPE
PPE
8) Assess and document the residual risk.
9) Complete Cumulative Risk Assessment in full, with additional mitigation if required.
10) Complete checklist and approve in line with highest residual risk ranking.
Risk Assessment_Excavation_ AIP-4.docx-Excavation -4- Revision 6
June 2021
PDO OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT FORM

Situation / Task Hazard/Threat Effect of the Hazard Groups Affected/ Initial Control measures required to reduce Initial Risk and Residual /
(Situation faced or (What can (Why and how could it Consequence Risk recovery measures Tolerable
specific activity in the job) cause harm with cause harm?) (Who or what would (Highe Controls Measures: What can I do to reduce the pain or prevent Risk
Situation: What could no controls?) Effect: How do you get be affected and likely st the incident? (Severity /
S. happen? Hazard: What “hurt”? harm?) Rating) What kind of control from hierarchy? Likelihood/
N Task: What Steps Are could “hurt” you (E.g., Fire/explosion if Group Affected: (Severit Recovery Measures: What can I do if my controls fail? PEAR)
being Done? if it goes wrong? ignition source present) Who or What gets y/
(E.g., “hurt”? Likeliho
Hydrocarbon Consequence: How od/
release) bad are they “hurt”? PEAR)
 Excavated material 1.5 meter away from the edge of the
excavation the distance extended equal to the depth of the
excavation with minimum of 1 M. (PA/PH/CE/HSE)
 Excavation depth is exceeding 1.1m appropriate Shoring / 2A-P
LOSE SOIL SOIL COLLAPSE PH 01 Benching / Sloping to be provided as per soil condition.
SURFACE FALLING INTO Workers 03 2B(P) (PA/PH/CE/HSE)
AROUND TRENCH  Continues Supervision to be required while working
EXCAVATED PERSONAL INJURY inside the trenches (PH)
AREA,  Loose materials shall be properly trimmed off from
Excavation sides. (PA/PH/CE/HSE)
MANUAL  Deformation/cracks/moisture if absorbed at the excavated
EXCAVATION precautionary measure to be taken and stability of the
excavation sides to be ensured prior to man entry
(PA/PH/CE/HSE)
 Tools/equipment to be kept away from edge of excavation.
(PH)
 Comply with GU-501, SP 1143 & SP-1279 (PA/PH)
IMPROPER AND 2A-P
INADEQUATE People:
ACCESS TO SLIP, TRIP FALL PH 01 2B(P)
 Proper Access / Egress shall be provided (PA/PH/CE/HSE)
TRENCH Workers 03
 Ensure proper steps/slope to be provide (PA/PH/CE/HSE)
 Emergency no: 24385555,24675555 (PH)

Risk Assessment_Excavation_ AIP-4.docx-Excavation -4- Revision 6


June 2021
PDO OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT FORM

 Valid License operator and banksman to be deployed for


the safe operation (PA/PH/CE/HSE)
 Ensure no one near line of fire (PA/PH/CE/HSE)
Uncontrol moment of the  Maintain 3 M safe distance from the equipment (PH/BM) 2A-P
MECHANICAL Equipment failed equipment People Assets: 2B(PA)  Ensure no live vehicles movements around the excavated
EXCAVATION Operator areas. (PA/PH)
Banksman  Proper Sign bords to be provide (PA/PH/CE/HSE)
 Allow only manual excavation 1M from live lines (PA/PH)
 Ensure ground stability for vehicle access (PH/PA)
Cumulative Risk Hazards  Ensure no excess / unwanted materials stacking near
Risk
Perf. Temp. vehicle moment. (PA/PH)
Mgmnt Permit to Temp. Passing Weeps & Locked Alarm Process no:Procedure
Emergency 24385555,24675555Org.(PH) Operating Outcome
Process Deviations Standard Portable
Work Repairs Valves Seeps Valves Overrides Overrides Variance Change Mode
Failures Equipment
Tool Register eMoC eMoC Standing Instns
ADVERSE Ensure MOPO procedure is followed (PH) Ops Waivers

WEATHER WEATHER PEOPLE /ASSEST 2B(PA)  CVs
No work shall be carried in the case of adverse + Cascade
clement. (PH)
2A-P
CONDITIONS CONDITIONS 7 Nos 
Effective communication between PH and Controllers
HSE teamin
FSR CIMS/ eMoC/ eMoC/ eMoC/
AI Portal eVision ODT Register (PH/HSE) eMoC Manual Mode
AI Portal AI Portal AI Portal AI Portal AI Portal
Process
Cumulative Risk
Abnormalities Outcome
Risk Assessment Checklist (RA Approver check to confirm completion) Alarms>6 per hr
MOPO compliance
General Information
EPAF PR-2379
Ref.
Is the situation/task clear and specific? SP-2329
PR-2410
CM CAM 2/3
PR-2124 Have the effects
PR-1960 of the hazards
PR-2049 PR-1961been detailed?
PR-1086 (Why PR-1001b Have recovery
PR-1001c PR-1001emeasures been included?
PR-2168
(These should
HSE Case
☒ ☒ ☐ ☒
☒ and☐
how the hazard

could cause

harm need

to be ☒
☒ detail

what to

do if something

goes wrong. ☒
RHS of bowtie) ☒
detailed
No relevant No relevant No relevant No relevant No relevanthere
Noasrelevant
both areNoneeded to generate
relevant No relevantcontrols)
No relevant No relevant No relevant No relevant No relevant Op.
Is the risk assessment teamPSmake
Deviations up, correct?
Failures PTWs Temporary Have
TPEsthe groups affected,
Passing andand
Weeps likely harm/damage
Locked Alarm Are controls
Process assigned
Procedure toChanges
Org. a specificMode
action party and
changes All items are ticked
(Minimum of 3 people – 1with skill, 1 with knowledge Repairs been detailed?Valves
(Without this information
Seeps it is
Valves Overrides could theVariances
Overrides controls overload one or more of the team? and in Blue Zone:
☒ ☒ ☒
in RA and 1 other with
☐ an in-depth ☐ knowledge ☒of the ☐ impossible
☒ to determine
☐ if the☐initial risk rating
☐ is ☐ (Check
☐ existing
☐ eMoC to prevent☐ overload,☐ especially in an
task. See PR-2271)
Deviations PS Failures PTWs are low Temporary correct)
TPEs are Passing Relevant Locked valve Relevant emergency)
Relevant Procedure Org. Changes Operating mode Proceed with
Has the required background/supporting
are low risk are present risk Has the
Repairs are present, initial
but riskare
valves rating beenand
Weeps detailed against each
changes Alarm Has RAVariances
Process closure plan been
are are lowdetailed including
risk changes are lowtimeline tocaution
information been supplied? but (Including
not PEFS, low risk hazard?
low risk (Thislow needs
risk to beSeeps
doneareas if required
no controls
are had complete?
Overrides are Overrides are low (Arisk
SAP work order and startrisk date may be
☒ ☒ ☒
Photos, Inspection Reports, Screenshots,
relevant Method been implemented) low risk low risk low risk lowapplicable)
risk
Statements etc.) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
There is a Assessment
Risk Risk to
There is a Details There is a There is a There isRisk one Assessment
There is a Controls
There are There is a There is a There is a The facility is There
Residual Riskare critical One or more items
Additional Risk

Have all crediblehigh-risk


hazards been ongoing(Awork high risk or
identified?
relevant critical
Are theorcontrols
or more
relevanthigh-risk
to the hazard? multiple critical Alam critical
(Ask the Hasorthe residual
critical riskatbeen
or below Operating
assessed takingMode
into account
ticked in Orange
Deviation
hazard is something with the
RAM Severitytolocation
potential cause harm or leaking high-risk
question TPE critical
‘If implemented Weeps andhave
will this Locked Valve ofOverride in Red Process
the effect the controlsProcedure Minimum variations
to be implemented? (Remember in place
that in the zone:
present
– Sources of energy, substances, activity
unsafe conditions,
3-5 PS Failure Temporary
☒ in place the impact
reducing Passingof the hazard?
Seeps If the changes
answer is noplace ☒ Override in Variation
majority of cases thein severity
Manning remains the same unless the ☒
Repair valves required place place
unsafe actions) then delete it as it will remove focus from the controls hazard has been removed) 1) Minimum TA02
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
that☐have an There ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ signature required
There is an There is a PS There is a There is a There is an
impact) are There is an There are There is one There is an There is an There are There are expired
Has each hazard been
FSR Red identified on itshigh
Failure past ownriskline
PTW in relevant overdue
Can you TPEaddoverdue
controls to overdue
reduce the risk to ALARP?
overdue or more Is it safe for
expired the work to
expired proceed ororshould
expired we stop?
long-term
the risk assessment?
present(This ensures
LAFD thatactivity
the controls
in the overdue (Look to the hierarchy ofWeeps controls,
andcan we reasonably (Can anything else be Temporary
done to remove the need for the2)Risk
No Delegation
☒ in the facility Passing Locked expired ☒ process Procedure Operating Mode
allowed☒
associated with the hazard can be easily identified)
area Temp. Repair increase the effectiveness
valves by moving
Seeps item towards Valves overrides Assessment?
override Delay work
Variation until next shutdown?)
Appoints variations
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ elimination?)
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 3) Include additional
There is a Completion
There is a Thereofare a risk assessment
a There is a does
Therenot
is a mean thatis the
There a workThereshould go ahead. If There
is a Safeguarding it is not
is asafeThere
to proceed
is a then
Theretheis a work
Thereshall stop!There is a high
is more mitigations
Risk Assessment_Excavation_
high number high numberAIP-4.docx-Excavation
high number high number high number - 4 - system high number high number high number than one number of overall
high number high number Revision 6
of Deviations of relevant of PTWs of relevant of TPE of relevant of weeps and Locked of alarm of Process of Procedure relevant Operating Mode June 2021
4) If risk is not
present PS Failures concurrently Temp. present in passing seeps valves overrides overrides Variations Temp. Appts variations present ALARP, then do not
present Repairs the facility valves changes are proceed
required
PDO OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT FORM

Cumulative Risk Assessment:

Cumulative Risk Outcome:


Cumulative Risk Assessment Verification (to be completed by Lead Risk Assessor):
In addition to the required tool checks, the assessment has checked the AI Portal for station status and any red items have been
AI Portal Check: considered in this overall Risk Assessment. ☒
The Cumulative Risk Check Matrix has been assessed and completed as part of this ORA and any required mitigations or
Cumulative Risk Assessment Completion: actions identified. ☒
Cumulative Risk
Cumulative Risk Comments Additional Mitigations
Outcome
Blue Zone: ☒ Proceed with caution N/A
Orange Zone: ☐

Cumulative Risk Technical Authority 2 Review and Acknowledgement:


Name: Ref ID: Sign: Date:

Position:

Residual and Cumulative Risk Reviewed and Accepted (PRODUCTION COORDINATOR):


Sign: Date:
Name: SAID AL KHARUSI Ref ID: ONO1F

Residual and Cumulative Risk Approved by; (See Approver Table Front Page of risk assessment form)
Approval based on residual and Cumulative risk. Organizational Change eMoC must be in place if signing as delegate. Delegation not allowed for Cumulative Risk approval.
DTL Approval (Low, Medium, High and Serious Risk) Ref ID: Sign: Date:
Name:

Risk Assessment_Excavation_ AIP-4.docx-Excavation -4- Revision 6


June 2021
PDO OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT FORM

Operations Manager Approval (Medium, High and Serious Risk) Ref ID: Sign: Date:
Name:

Director Approval (High and Serious Risk) Ref ID: Sign: Date:
Name:

Consequences Likelihood
A B C D E
Has happened Has happened
in the at the Location Has happened
Severity People Assets Environment Reputation Never heard of
Heard of in the Company or or more than more than once
before in the
industry more than once once per year per year at the
industry
per year in the in the Location
industry Company
No injury or health effect No damage No effect No impact

Slight injury or health effect – Not affecting work Slight damage– Slight effect - Slight environmental damage – contained within the Slight impact
performance and not affecting daily life activities. Costs less than premises. Example:  Local public awareness but no discernible concern
Examples: 10,000 US$.  Small spill in process area or tank farm area that readily evaporates  No media coverage
 First aid cases and medical treatment cases Example:
 Exposure to health hazards that give rise to noticeable  No disruption
1 discomfort, minor irritation or transient effects to operation
reversible after exposure stops

Minor injury or health effect – Affecting work Minor damage– Minor effect - Minor environmental damage, but no lasting effect. Minor impact
performance, such as restriction to activities or need to Costs between Examples:  Local public concern
take up to 5 days to fully recover. Or affecting daily life 10,000 and 100,000  Small spill off-site that seeps into the ground  Local media coverage
activities for up to 5 days. Or reversible health effects. US$. Example:  On-site groundwater contamination
Examples:  Brief  Complaints from neighbours, Contamination. Damage s
2  Restricted work day cases or lost work day cases disruption to  Single exceedance of statutory or another prescribed limit
resulting in up to 5 calendar days away from work operation
 Illnesses such as skin irritation or food poisoning.

Major injury or health effect – Affecting work Moderate damage– Moderate effect - Limited environmental damage that will persist Moderate impact - Significant impact in region or country
performance in the longer term, such as absence from Costs between or require cleaning up. Examples:  Regional public concern
work for more than 5 days. Or affecting daily life 100,000 and 1  Spill from a pipeline into soil/sand that requires removal and  Local stakeholders, e.g., community, NGO, industry and
activities for more than 5 days. Or irreversible damage to million US$. disposal of a large quantity of soil/sand government, are aware
health. Examples: Example:  Observed off-site effects or damage, e.g., fish kill or damaged  Extensive attention in local media. Some regional or national media
3  Lost Work Day cases resulting in 6 or more calendar  Partial vegetation coverage.
days away from work shutdown  Off-site groundwater contamination
 Long term disabilities (previously called Permanent  Complaints from community organisations (or more than 10
Partial Disabilities) complaints from individuals)
 Illnesses such as sensitisation, noise induced hearing  Contamination. Damage Frequent exceedance of statutory or other
loss, chronic back injury, repetitive strain injury or prescribed limit, with potential long term effect

Risk Assessment_Excavation_ AIP-4.docx-Excavation -4- Revision 6


June 2021
PDO OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT FORM

Permanent total disability or up to three fatalities – Major damage– Major effect - Severe environmental damage that will require Major impact – Likely to escalate and affect Group reputation
resulting from injury or occupational illness. Examples: Costs between 1 and extensive measures to restore beneficial uses of the environment.  National public concern
 Illnesses such as corrosive burns, asbestosis, silicosis, 10 million US$. Examples:  Impact on local and national stakeholder relations. National
cancer and serious work-related depression. Example:  Oil spill at a jetty during tanker (off) loading that ends up on local government and NGO involvement with potential for international
 Car accident resulting in 1, 2 or 3 fatalities  Up to two beaches, requiring clean-up operations NGO action.
4 weeks  Off-site groundwater contamination over an extensive area  Extensive attention in national media. Some international coverage.
shutdown  Many complaints from community organisations or local  Potential for regulatory action leading to restricted operations or
authorities. impact on operating licences.
 Extended exceedance of statutory or other prescribed limits, with
potential long term effects
More than three fatalities – resulting from injury or Massive damage – Massive effect - Persistent severe environmental damage that will Massive impact – Severe impact on Group reputation
occupational illness. Examples: Costs in excess of 10 lead to loss of commercial, recreational use or loss of natural  International public concern.
 Multiple asbestosis cases traced to a single exposure million US$. resources over a wide area. Example:  High level of concern amongst governments and action by
situation Example:  Crude oil spillage resulting in pollution of a large part of a river international NGOs.
5  Cancer to a large exposed population  Substantial or estuary and extensive clean-up and remediation measures  International media attention.
 Major fire or explosion resulting in more than 3 total loss of  Significant potential for effect on national/international policies
fatalities operation with impact on access to new areas, grants of licences and/or tax
legislation.

Risk Assessment_Excavation_ AIP-4.docx-Excavation -4- Revision 6


June 2021

You might also like